"Where are the Carriers?"Whenever the expected unexpected happens on the globe, that is the question that is often asked first. As our nation also faces one of its greatest budget crisis - it is also one that the budget cutters are asking as well.
What is the status of our carrier force as we approach 2012 and what possible directions are we heading? Is the carrier more important in supporting our national strategy than it used to be, or less? Are we buying the right kind of systems to go on and in our carriers? Are we buying enough? How are we assessing our technology risk as we bring in new tools?
Our guest for the full hour on Sunday, December 4th from 5-6pm EST will be J. Talbot Manvel, CAPT, USN (Ret.), presently teaching at the U.S. Naval Academy and is a frequent writer on issues of carrier issues and larger Navy policy issues. In the course of his career he served on three carriers and led development of the maintenance plan for the Nimitz class and design of the Ford class carriers.
Join us live if you can and pile in with the usual suspects in the chat room where you can contribute your thoughts and observation - and suggest to us questions for our guests.
If you miss the show you can always listen to the archive at blogtalkradio - but the best way to get the show and download the archive to your audio player is to get a free account and subscribe to the podcast on iTunes.
19 comments:
Our country will soon become like Russia: unable to construct our own large, complicated warships. Perhaps we can get France to build all our LHD/LHA ships after we forget how to do so ourselves ?. (like FRANCE is doing for Russia now). You watch, all too soon, neither Newport News nor INGALLS will still possess even the basic industrial shipbuilding skills to put together 45,000 ton LHD/LHA or a 97,000 ton CVN. Absolutely must increase the new construction rate, not so much to put modern up-to-date capital ships into out fleet, so much as to just retain up-to-date work force(s) that can recall how to do so, at least without too many mistakes, major structural misalignments, out of sequence significant rework, and hundreds of various QA issues that can be safety issues and not just never ending repairs and warranty work for 6 years after commissioning. Practice makes perfect and building overlapping hulls is essential, not just cost effective.
aCtually Japan, South Korea, Spain, Italy (along) with France, can all build some excellent large deck warships. So, COngress can just build 2 or 3 LHD/LHA type ships every decade. JuSt dont expect any of that on time, on budget, with decent quality nonsense in the future.
"Where are the SSBNs (and the SSGNs)? Is a better question...
I've often wondered if, in the future, we might (or could...or even should...) avoid present national-restrictions (legislative, and perhaps based more on funding constituencies than real national security issues) that may not make sense anymore - and build forieign designed ships, or purchase warships built overseas...
Sunday, December 6? You already have guests scheduled as far as next December? I am impressed!
Many have already wondered if we shouldn't build absolons instead of LCS. Except for speed it has everything and is cheaper and more powerfull. Speed is simply not nessesary,
There's a simple answer to the carrier issue: The CVA. New construction Essex size attack carriers, and leave the ASW mission to the skimmers. A LAMPS equipped DD/CG/FFG can handle what little ASW threat there is handily. Which is better: one 100,000 ton CVN that takes a Homeric iliad to fund and that can't pull in many places, or 3 30,000 ton attack carriers that can do everything a CV needs to? Cheaper to buy, cheaper to maintain and more flexible. What's not to like? As the Nimitzes wear out, replace each of them with 3 CVAs with heritage names: USS Saratoga, USS Enterprise, and USS Ranger would be three great places to start.
We've been advocating that for what - 4-5 years methinks.
Only problem is that Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter administrations both tried to get the CVV concept through the budgeting processes. With some support of CNO's Zumwalt, Halloway and Hayward to potentially get CVV's into the fleet and have them equipped with the XFV-12 and SH-3 platforms while being forward deployed to bases in Crete, Diego Garcia and Yokouska. The GAO looked at the plan in 1976 and said it was a no go because when compared and contrasted the 27C Essex ships were inferior to the Forrestall, Kitty Hawk and the proposed Nimitz class ships for time on station, ability to rapidly respond to a threat and overall risk of the ship in a combat situation where the threat of a catastrophic engineer hit would effectively render the ship useless and it would have to depend on its escorts to tow it out of the theater until the engineering damage could be repaired. This book has a full chapter dedicated to the CVV concept and why it ultimately failed, which beyond the ship not being capable when the numbers were crunched but also the planned VSTOL strike fighter just couldn't get there with the technology at the time. Which is sounding very similar to the problems with the VSTOL variant of the F-35. As to the ASW threat nothing being an issue, ask the guys still on the USS Wasp, HMS Courageous, HMS Ark Royal and HMS Ark Royal about no submarine threat.
D'oh for the last one meant HMS Royal Oak.
Bite me.
Note I said "CVA" not "CVV". intentional. This is a Strike Carrier. 2 VFAs 1 with Legacies 1 with Supers. A VAQ det with 3 EA-18Gs. VAW det with 3 E-2C ICAPs. Helo capability comes from the skimmers with an HSL/HSM det on an FFG and a DDG/CG. 4 helos is plenty, especially if one of the dets has the SH-60B Armed Helo. Gas turbine propulsion, no needless ASW or Theater Defense; leave that to the skimmers. @30K tons, crew of 1400 or so+ air dets. 3x the forward presence for the same $$$ a Nimitz costs, not to mention there are still a lot of ports a nuke can't hit. As to catastrophic engineering hits, USS Franklin (CV-13) should be enough answer to that concern. They made it back without a modern Strike Battle Group screening. Further, regarding time on station, gas turbines are much more efficient and given recent developments in alternative fuels, may well equal nukes in the years to come. I have said for years there is no such thing as an engineering impossibility, only challenges we have yet to find solutions for.
I did note you said CVA. I will again note that CVV was initally thought of to have no ASW except for short range, no fleet interceptor mission, nothing more then the ability to have a carrier on hand ready to put some basic fighters over the beach for the Marines or hunt down surface raiders; all while waiting for the big boys to arrive on station from the US. If I remember right, NAVSEA and NAVAIR had wanted a pair of Gas Turbines driving only two props and a ship that wasn't much bigger then a Midway class CV. Again questions of how the ship could survive if it took a torpedeo into one of the shafts. Down to one shaft it would have survived but taken a long time to leave the threat zone.As the folks from NAVSEA and GAO looked at what was being dreamed up, they realized it wasn't going to be feasible nor survivable in a serious wartime situation when going up against the Soviet Naval Forces.
What you are talking about is a ship the size of the Midway class carriers, with a smaller air wing then either CVW-13 or CVW-5 was (around 40 aircraft). The question is honestly could that same air wing preform just as well as the air wing of a super carrier in being able to maintain the same sortie rates to an air wing with 75-80 aircraft. The answer is nope, as the GAO noted in 1998 when talking about CV vs CVN debate. They noted that although the Midway had a sortie completion rate of 1.45 compared to the USS Roosevlet's 1.36, realistically the stats can't be compared between pre-Forrestall class carriers and the Forrestall or later class of ships.
There are a few other things missing from your battle group build up. You actually still need a full size Cruiser/Destroyer Squadron to help escort the Underway Replenishment Group around as well. Otherwise this thing is permantely tied to the coastline. Are you willing to defend the URG with some DDG's a few LCS's and some helos or drones?
The last thing I would suggest you take a look at the Charles De Gualle and then look at her capabilities, along with her availablity time. She is about the same size but with a bigger air wing then what your asking for. She has been slower than the larger carriers and has cost about the same as a Nimitz.
BADGER CHOMP!
Again questions of how the ship could survive if it took a torpedeo into one of the shafts. Down to one shaft it would have survived but taken a long time to leave the threat zone.As the folks from NAVSEA and GAO looked at what was being dreamed up, they realized it wasn't going to be feasible nor survivable in a serious wartime situation when going up against the Soviet Naval Forces.
There haven't been Soviet Naval Forces since 1991; the next generation CVA doesn't need to be much more than a lilypad to launch strike ops against terrorists. And if somehow the ChiComs actually deploy a real blue-water Navy, our superior DC training and the proven Essex design would make the Strike Carrier VERY survivable.
The question is honestly could that same air wing preform just as well as the air wing of a super carrier in being able to maintain the same sortie rates to an air wing with 75-80 aircraft.
PMC and FMC levels would be improved through commonality of parts between the Super Hornet VFA and the Growler VAQ. The IM Department would only be handling 3 basic platforms: Legacy Hornets, Super Hornets and E-2 Hawkeyes. Less platforms to maintain=more up aircraft= better sortie rates. As to once the Strike CVW goes feet dry, with PGMs like the JDAM, a 40 aircraft CVW can be more effective than a full Nimitz complement.
Well, the troublke is when USN will have to go into area where Chinese "extended coastal defence" with subs, minefields, bombers, TACAIR, surface forces with ASCMs, and ASBMs to top it off. And re: subs being non issue... 2 words: Phillipine Sea. In fact quiet SSKs are proliferating like there is WW3 coming in Asia...
Twas a foolish thing to say to a badger 8-)
At least...
NH,
You keep telling yourself that commonality will improve PMC and FMC rates. I will tell you from doing tours at both I and O level maintenance where FMC and PMC rates even in a squadron I was assigned to but we had different lots of EA-6B's and couldn't share parts between the four of them at least in the electrical and avionics side. Ditto for when I was in the I level doing maintennace on fire control suites. One suqadron in an air wing we supported on the ship had an older version of the APG-65 which could only use Lot A parts, while another one had the most modern APG-65 which could use either lot C or lot B parts but not lot A, and finally we had a squadron that had the latest and greatest radar APG-73 and couldn't use any of the APG-65 parts. As for the F-18E/F sharing parts with the EA-18G, it isn't happeneing. In the wonderful wisdom that is the PMA's and Aviation Supply Offiers; they had decided to designate certain parts in the avionics and electrical side (again) as only being capable of going into either the E/F or into the G; they can't be shared between the three in according with the MIMs. If they can't be shared between in accordance with the MIMs, then the NAMP says that is unauthorized maintenance. As to only having limited numbers don't forget your going to have that one airplane with the gremlin that won't die and constantly keep it in PMC status, that one airpalne which has gone down for Phase maintenance and all of a sudden a needed part is only located in St. Louis and your blue-water in the IO, or that one airplane which becomes the hangar queen because the pilot doesn't know how to fly his plane. If you do that to your smaller VAQ or VAW outfits then they will be trying to make a 10 egg omlette with only one egg. Eventually the whole squadron is going to be worn out and for some of those aircraft your going to hit a point that it won't be FMC due to maintenance just so they can get caught up on all the little up gripes, along with letting the aircrew get caught up on thier skill sets (or restart thier skill sets because if they don't fly so many hours than they become dequalifed to be NFOs or Naval Aviators), heck working your maintenance personnel 18-20 hours to all of a sudden maintain two aircraft becaue 1 is hard down will cause moral issues and safety issues.
As to the superior DC training, ask Captain Dykhoff about his DC training program.
"Ford class CVN"... that just sounds so, so wrong.
Whatever happened to PROUD names for a CV...?
I believe it is.
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