A Frigate for your CSG

What a great opportunity for both our good friends in the Danish and the US Navy. As reported by Janes last NOV;

The Royal Danish Navy's (RDN's) new Iver Huitfeldt-class frigate HDMS Peter Willemoes (F 362) is to join a US carrier strike group for operations next year, and Danish officials expect to gain significant experience from the deployment.

Peter Willemoes is to begin integration exercises with the George H W Bush Carrier Strike Group (CSG-2) during the week commencing 28 November, Commander Senior Grade Kristian Haumann, Peter Willemoes ' commanding officer, told IHS Jane's during an 18 November port visit in Baltimore, Maryland.

The frigate is to then return briefly to Denmark and depart from Copenhagen in January to join CSG-2 for operations around the Mediterranean Sea from February through May, Cdr Haumann said.

It would be nice if we could have at least one EUROFRIGATE per CSG. Perhaps a Norwegian NANSEN next? Give our leaders an opportunity to see what these ships can do, as our practical institutional knowledge about what a sub-DDG-51 ship can bring to the toolbox is limited.

Some interesting notes about the IVER HUITFELDT Class. From a displacement point of view, they are right between LCS and DDG-51 and only 37' longer than the INDEPENDENCE Class LCS. The program has some smart details.

First of all, they are exceptionally affordable. A very modern design, Hull-1 was commissioned only in 2011 with a "list price" of $325 million per hull. Much of the savings were brought about through leveraging the successful ABSALON Class hull design and a creative construction plan that included building sections in cost-effective but high quality Estonian and Lithuanian yards.

Though defined as an AAW frigate, she is a true multimission platform with a modular capability along the lines of her ABSALON family members. Baseline capability covers AAW, ASUW and ASW capabilities. I also like the interesting dual 76-mm mounts forward.

Their MK-56 VLS can, I believe, be configured to carry a mix of RIM-162 ESSM and/or Harpoon as a natural byproduct of the plug-n-play STANFLEX system.

Armament:
- 4 × Mk 41 VLS with up to 32 SM-2 IIIA surface-to-air missiles (Prepared for, but not purchased.)[7]
- 2 × Mk 56 VLS with up to 24 RIM-162 ESSM
- 8–16 × Harpoon Block II SSM
- 1 × Oerlikon Millennium 35 mm Naval Revolver Gun System CIWS
- 2 × OTO Melara 76 mm
- 2 × dual MU90 Impact ASW torpedo launchers
Aircraft carried:
- 1 × Westland Lynx Mk90B or MH-60R

This is the kind of ship we should have, and something approaching this platform, but no larger, should be the basis for the follow-on to LCS that hopefully we will be laying down in the next five to eight years.

A little side note about what can happen when, like the Danes, you only have 1.17% of GDP invested in your military capability, and compromises have to be made. In this case, the compromises manifest as empty MK-41 VLS cells. With the right funding, this ship could carry SM-2, TLAM, etc, but can't.

Deconstructing Mabus

When it comes to the outgoing SECNAV, Gary Anderson over at SWJ ain't messing around;

Global warming and political incorrectness are the greatest threats to the United States, and it is the job of America’s Navy to protect us from those threats. For the past eight years, that has been the strategic legacy of Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, and the primary goal of his successor should be to ensure that Mabus has no legacy. The traditional mission of the US Navy has been to deter potentially hostile navies, or failing to do that, defeat them. Getting the US naval services back to that philosophy is going to be a big job for the new administration.

The Mabus priorities have been making the naval services more caring, inclusive, and environmentally protective. Discipline, combat effectiveness, and readiness have been secondary goals at best. Under Mabus, the Navy has sunk to readiness levels approaching those of the post-Vietnam Carter era.

If he had his druthers, he would do three things;

The next Navy Secretary should have three immediate priorities:

First, should be a firm statement that a return combat readiness and iron discipline will the primary emphasis of the Navy and Marine Corps. Leaders should not be afraid to discipline malcontents because they might be accused of being racist or sexist; that is not the case today. Sailors and Marines should be trained to be warriors and not lab rats in bizarre social experiments.
...
A second priority should be to conduct a thorough investigation into the Mabus’ era project on biofuels. In a recent Washington Post interview, Mabus touted supplying biofuels that cost only $1.99 a gallon as part of his legacy. The shady accounting that led to that ridiculous claim should be investigated and Mabus should be prohibited from being employed by any of the renewable energy firms with Navy contracts that profited from that scam in the future if it is shown to be bogus.
...
Third, the embarrassingly bad performance of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) is an example of shoddy management and poor judgment involved in that program should result in a total review of Mabus era naval procurement. In the 21st Century, taxpayers should be able to demand that a multimillion dollar Navy ship have the same type of quality expected of a Toyota Prius.

Remind me not to piss off the good Colonel.

Fullbore Friday

Your commander matters. The best commanders know when to take the advice of their staff and when to brush it off. 

The worst commanders are those who lack the knowledge or personality to know when to do one of the other.

As told by Douglas Sterling;

“Great Army of the Sea”

On May 16, the English royal council met and pushed back the deadline for gathering the ships until June 12, which would mean a sailing date around the 20th. When Edward met with his council again on June 4, it was clear that earlier delays had not been resolved. The only way to even attempt to keep up with the timetable previously set, which was being relied upon by the allies, was to send at least a small force across the Channel to give support. Little did the English council know that the French had amassed a fleet, principally from the Norman ports, and had sailed from Harfleur on May 26. It was a large force, consisting of 202 vessels—seven royal sailing ships, six galleys, 22 oared barges, and 167 merchantmen— requisitioned by Philip’s agents. By the time the smaller English force sailed, the French had passed Calais.

The French fleet, called the “Great Army of the Sea,” appeared off Sluys on June 8. According to Jonathan Sumption, author of a multivolume history of the Hundred Years’ War, the French soon “swiftly and brutally occupied the island of Cadzand and anchored in the mouth of the River Zwin opposite the harbor of Sluys. The news passed rapidly through the Low Countries, spreading panic in coastal towns and drawing a great crowd of gapers to the foreshore to watch the denouement.”

Reaching the English government two days later, the news of the French attacks at Sluys caused a near panic, many of the king’s advisers claiming the odds were too great to force a confrontation with such an armada. Edward’s Chancellor, Archbishop Stratford, in particular argued strenuously that the risk was too great. He had never supported the King’s enterprise and now considered it folly to risk the government’s finances, its fleet, the security of the English coast, and, indeed, the King’s person on an unworkable scheme. Edward would have none of it, and accused his advisers of trying to frighten him. For him, there could be no question of abandoning the coalition he had helped create, nor could there be any question of running from a fight. “I shall cross the sea and those who are afraid may stay at home,” he announced.

Archbishop Stratford resigned and was succeeded by his brother Robert, Bishop of Chichester. Edward was, however, persuaded to delay his departure for a few days to requisition more ships and to convert a transport armada into a battle fleet. Horses were removed to make room for infantry, and strong messages were sent to every reachable port to provide all ships over 40 tons. No excuses were accepted; Edward himself confronted the mariners of Great Yarmouth who were yet delinquent.

By June 20, nearby harbors were empty and the ships previously assembled were brought into the Pool of Orwell to join the large ships of the western Admiralty. The exact size of the armada is unclear, but is thought to have been around 140 to 150 ships when added to the Northern Fleet under Lord Robert Morley. Edward himself went aboard the cog Thomas, and the fleet set sail just after midnight on June 22, 1340.

Kind Edward Longed for Revenge

Catching a strong northwesterly breeze, the English fleet passed the point of Harwich at dawn and late on the following afternoon stood off the Flemish coast west of the Zwin estuary. Inside, the French fleet lay in wait, commanded by Admirals Hugh Quieret and Nicholas Behuchet. According to Jean Froissart, the famous chronicler of the early part of the war, “King Edward saw such a number of masts in front of him that it looked like a wood. When he asked his ship’s captain what it could be, he replied that it must be the Norman fleet that King Philip kept constantly at sea, which had done such great damage at Southampton, capturing the Christopher and killing her crew. King Edward declared that he had long wanted to fight them, and now, please God and Saint George, he would be able to, for they had done him such harm that he longed for revenge.”

The French saw the English fleet, too, and held a council of war. Barbavera, as the most experienced sailor among the commanders, counseled caution. He was concerned that the anchorage in which the French fleet lay was too confined for maneuvers if attacked and that the wind, blowing into the mouth of the river, would further hamper maneuverability. He suggested that Quieret and Behuchet take their fleets into the open ocean where they would have a better chance to maneuver and meet the English fleet on more favorable terms, but his colleagues balked. In their minds, the mass of their force was more than a match for the English. It certainly looked it, with the closeness of their ships and their great bulk, with bows, poops, and masts fortified with timber. Reinforcements from Flemish and Spanish allies brought their force to 213 vessels. Quieret and Behuchet were afraid that any move to the open ocean would provide an opening for the English force to sail in behind them and land in Flanders.

Instead of following Barbavera’s advice, the French admirals drew their ships into three lines across the mouth of the estuary, like an army on land setting up a strong defense. In the first line were 19 of their largest vessels, including the captured cog Christopher, which stood out larger than the others. Each line was chained together to form an impregnable barrier.

Who said SEALS are a recent invention?

The English sent a knight, Reginald Cobham, ashore with two others to gather intelligence on the French anchorage and their dispositions for the battle. Their report pointed out the major weakness of the French order of battle that Barbavera had warned of: the anchored, chained, and massed lines. According to N.A.M. Rodger, “This was a traditional galley or longship tactic, serving to make the naval battlefield as much like a battlefield ashore as possible, but of course it removed any possibility of manoeuvre and resigned the initiative to the enemy.” 

An English council of war decided to grasp the initiative and attack the next day when they would have the advantage of wind and tide behind them. 

Preparing for Battle

At the end of the 15th century, the Zwin estuary silted up, so that the site of the Battle of Sluys is now farm land and dunes. In 1340, according to Sumption, it was “a stretch of shallow water about 3 miles wide at the entrance and penetrating some 10 miles inland towards the city of Bruges. It was enclosed on the northeastern side by the low-lying island of Cadzand and on the west by a long dyke on which a huge crowd of armed Flemings stood watching. Along the west side lay the out-harbours of Bruges, Sluys, Termuiden and Damme.” 

In preparation for battle, the English also drew up their fleet in three battle lines. In the early afternoon of June 24, they began to press down from the north on the entrance to the Zwin. Although Froissart’s account of the battle is truncated in time— making it seem like the dispositions of the two fleets and the attack of the English followed quickly upon the two forces sighting one another—he nevertheless gives a stirring battle narrative. According to him, Edward deployed his fleet, maneuvering it “so that the wind was on their starboard quarter, in order to have the advantage of the sun, which had previously shown full in their faces. The Normans, unable to understand these maneuvers, thought that the English were trying to avoid giving battle; but they were delighted to see that King Edward’s standard was flown, for they were eager to fight him.” It was then that the English fleet “advanced to the sound of trumpets and other warlike instruments.” 

The English had the wind and the tide. Importantly, they sailed with the sun behind them, shining into the faces of the French. 

Within the French force, confusion was beginning to overshadow confidence. As Sumption relates, the French fleet “had been too long at their battle stations and the chained lines of vessels, which originally extended across the breadth of the bay, had drifted eastward piling the ships up against each other on the Cadzand shore and reducing their sea room still further. The chains were useless in these conditions.” The French admirals ordered the chains to be thrown off, and the fleet then attempted to recover the open flank to the west. 

Unfortunately, the Riche de Leure, a front line vessel of the French force, detached from their line and became entangled with a ship of the English van. While those ships grappled and struggled together, the English front line rammed into the French. 

The front lines of the two forces included their largest ships. Edward’s flagship, the cog Thomas, was among the large ships from the Cinque Ports and faced the Christopher, captured from the English in earlier action, and the St. Denis, a large vessel with 200 seamen aboard. 

Sea battle tactics in this period consisted of grappling with an enemy vessel to assault the enemy decks with showers of arrows in preparation for boarding, which was seen as a kind of infantry attack, like an assault on a fortress. The idea was to hold the enemy close to weaken them for a victorious assault. This is indeed how Froissart described the beginning of the battle, with “each side opening fire with crossbows and longbows, and hand-to-hand fighting began. The soldiers used grappling irons on chains in order to come to grips with the enemy boats.” Both sides had artillery of a sort, stone throwers and giant crossbows called “springalds,” but, according to Sumption, they were “more dramatic than useful.” 

Arrows Fell on French Crews “Like Hail in Winter” 

Because the French force was hemmed in by the weight of the English fleet and was soon snared with hooks and grappling irons, they were forced to fight with a serious disadvantage in firepower. For, as in the English land battles that were to come in the following years, the English crews were equipped with the longbow, which was greatly superior to the crossbow used by the French and their Italian allies. As Sumption says, the longbow “was more accurate. It had a longer range. Above all it could be fired at a very rapid rate.” He quotes a London observer as describing arrows falling on the French crews “like hail in winter,” while “crossbows had to be lowered and steadied at the stirrup while the wire was strenuously levered back between every firing.” 

By all accounts, the battle was ferocious and the slaughter terrible. According to Froissart, “The battle … was cruel and horrible. Sea-battles are always more terrible than those on land, for those engaged can neither retreat nor run away; they could only stand and fight to the bitter end, and show their courage and endurance.” Although the French had the advantage in numbers, the disposition of their forces and the weight at the point of attack favored the English. 

Still, the French and their allies fought hard. The English forces “were hard-pressed, for they were outnumbered four to one, and their enemies were all experienced sailors. But King Edward, who was in the flower of his youth, proved himself a gallant knight, and he was supported by … many … gallant knights [who] fought so valiantly, with the help of those from the neighborhood of Bruges, that they won the day.” 

The fighting proved to be fierce and lasted well into the afternoon when it became clear to the French in the rear lines that their comrades in the front were suffering grievously. Yet they were unable to join the fray because they were hemmed in between their own front line and the shore, and did not have room to maneuver round to the west. By evening, however, the English front line had broken through to the French ships in the rear and fell upon them. Now the English had a tremendous advantage in weight of ship as their cogs towered over the smaller French ships in their second line and they were able to rake the decks of the French from their greater height. 

With the English clearly winning, Flemings began to pour from Sluys and other harbors in the estuary to join the fight and share in the victory. They fell upon the French from the rear as the English continued to press from the front. As night fell, the third French line of Norman merchantmen and Philip’s barges attempted to escape the estuary. The English tried to block their path and the battle devolved into a series of skirmishes as more and more French ships made toward the open sea. By 10 pm the fighting was nearly over, except for two ships so entangled that they fought fiercely throughout the night. By the time the English were able to board the French ship at dawn the next day, they discovered 400 enemy dead aboard. 

Unlike war ashore, at sea here is not much room to retreat once fully engaged. Losses are rarely done in retail, deaths are wholesale. In modern times as it was for thousands of years.

Almost 18,000 Frenchmen Were Killed

In fact, only the dawn of the following day would reveal the extent of the French defeat and the tremendous loss of life and shipping. According to Sumption, the French “suffered a naval catastrophe on a scale unequalled until modern times.” The English had captured 190 of the 213 French ships that had been engaged, including their old cogs, Christopher and Edward . Although a certain number had escaped, including Barbavera’s six galleys, four of the six-oared galleys based at Dieppe, and 13 others, the death toll was almost indescribable. Again, as Sumption puts it, “The crews and troops on board the ships which did not escape were killed almost to a man. No quarter was given once a ship was boarded, and those who threw themselves into the sea, as many did, were picked up by the Flemings on the foreshore and clubbed to death.” Perhaps between 16,000 and 18,000 Frenchmen were killed. Edward himself would write to his son that each tide brought in more and more corpses.

As for the French admirals, Quieret was killed when his ship was boarded by the English. Behuchet, who was recognized by his captors, was held for ransom. Then, Edward III, in a pique of anger, waived the normal conventions of aristocratic warfare and had Behuchet hanged from the mast of his flagship.\

And now, befitting our era; the Battle of Sluys in Lego. Seriously; it's fairly good to excellent.

Diversity Thursday

Now and then on DivThu, instead of raging against the dying of the light, we try to put a little light on one of the cold hard facts that are one of the real reasons that on the edge of 2017, we still do not have a Navy officer corps that "looks like America."

As we have covered through the years, there are significant problems up-stream that prevent black and "hispanic" groups from being represented in the same percentage as they are in the general population.

For officer selection, one of the primary objective criteria that will cull any pool of applicants is education. Just jumping through one gate or another isn't enough, you have to be one of the better jumpers.

If you desire an officer corps to reflect the racial and government approved ethnic group make-up of the general population, nearing the end of the second decade of the 21st Century, you need to stop putting your Diversity Stormtroopers against the armed services, but instead invest in the education of our children most in need.

Take some time to review the following from the Brown Center on Education Policy at Brookings on improving high school and college graduation rates.

There is a reason obscene, discriminatory, racist, and soul crushing compromises are made to "make the numbers work" on the margins - it is because you don't have the same entering objective criteria.

The reasons are complicated, but are not the fault of the US Navy - much less those who self-identify as Asian, mixed race, and non-"hispanic" European who just want to serve.

Here are the pull quotes;

...according to the Digest of Educational Statistics, Asians (57 percent) and whites (40 percent) are roughly twice as likely to hold a bachelor’s degree as African Americans (27 percent) and Hispanics (20 percent). Despite recent improvements in college-going rates, the overall degree completion rates, combined with disparities in educational attainment for low-income and underrepresented populations, will impede our nation’s efforts to develop a flourishing, inclusive economy.
...
The opportunity gap remains one ongoing challenge. The overall increase in high school graduation rates notwithstanding, substantial racial and economic variation persist. For example, while 88 percent of white students graduate, only 73 percent of African American and 75 percent of Hispanic Americans leave school with a diploma. That means one-quarter of African and Hispanic American students have little chance of obtaining a reasonably well paying job and are effectively shut out of college.
...
According to Columbia University’s Community College Research Center (CCRC), 92 percent of two-year colleges and many four-year colleges use reading, writing, and math placement assessments. The State Higher Education Executive Officers Association (SHEEO) and Complete College America report that for two-year colleges, “more than 70 percent of black students and 60 percent of Hispanic students fail the assessments and enroll in at least one remedial course compared to just over 50 percent of white and Asian students.” Another CCRC report finds that 68 percent of community college students and 40 percent of open-access four-year college students are placed into remedial courses.

There are some things the Navy can do that I think everyone can support. Our enlisted ranks have greater "diversity" than the officer ranks. As we all know, we have a lot of great Sailors who just happened to grow up in poor public education systems that did not prepare them for college level work. What if we move NAPS to what it should be, a place to get sharp but mal-educated enlisted ready for USNA, instead of mostly a place to red-shirt athletes?

That sure would establish the right priority signal, wouldn't it?

Just an idea.

Fighting a War With Your Face

What does a well shaved Eastern European know about your line of work that you don't?

I'm discussing over at USNIBlog. Come visit and ponder along.

The Hard Math of Hypersonic

As much as I like to emphasize the important but much maligned liberal arts side of this line of work, I have to give a nod to our engineering minded; the math matters. As such, and be kind, but let's exercise that side of the brain today.

Be warned; there will be math.

As the designers of the Long Lance torpedo and its victims will tell you - the engineering matters. Speed. Distance. Rigorous, operationally realistic testing. It all matters. When war comes, they speak.

The numbers - both quantity and quality - are what often at sea define the odds when the shooting starts. It predestines nothing; in Tamarian I believe it goes, "The Spanish Armada in the Channel" or somesuch - but it must be the entering argument. Once you establish that baseline, then you can talk about tactics, leadership and all that liberal arts stuff.

Remember; the Comanche had the best light cavalry in the world; the Germans had the best tanks; the Japanese had the best torpedoes; the French had the best DFAC ... so ... having the best isn't everything, but it is preferred.

In that light, let's look at the most deadly offensive weapon in Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW). Just in time for Christmas, this little present was slipped under the tree;

Two aging Russian Navy battlecruisers will be outfitted with the anti-ship version of the world's first hypersonic missile, the 3K-22, which carries Zircon (or Tsirkon) 3M22 hypersonic warheads. This hypersonic missile will also arm Russian ballistic missile submarines.

With a claimed speed of Mach 5 or 6,200 km/h, the 3K-22 has a range of 450 kilometers. The weight of the 3M22 Zircon warhead remains unknown but will likely be heavier than the 200 kg warhead on India's BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. 

It's widely believed BrahMos II is the export version of the 3M22 Zircon. BrahMos II, which will have a speed of Mach 7 (8,600 km/h), will be the world's fastest cruise missile when it enters service with the Indian Armed Forces some eight years from now.
Production of the 3M22 Zircon is expected to begin in 2017. Tests of this warhead began last March.

Yes my friends, over the last couple of decades as our best and brightest spent a lot of real capital - not to mention mountains of political and reputational capital - on one ship to counter Boston Whalers and another designed with around guns that can't afford the rounds it shoots - other navies were focused on weapons designed primarily to keep the premier global power from operating in THEIR seas, i.e. sinking the US Navy.

We made the decision that we could push to the right and accept the risk of not being able to do the same. In the post-Cold War era, we got a bit spoiled and rested on our temporary supremacy at sea. As a result, most of our primary surface warships built since the fall of the Soviet Union - the DDG-51 Class - don't - and more importantly can't - even carry Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM), let's check in on what we have in the near term inside our lifelines, and what may be peaking it's nose over the horizon. 

As a companion piece to what I ran last month at USNIBlog, let's look at a couple of things;

- What we have.
- What they have.

When you can you see it?

How long until a weapon is ready to engage?

At what distance will your weapon intercept it?

SHOOT SHOOT LOOK SHOOT?

...or perhaps this?



With those ASCM in the green, like we have seen off Yemen this year, we can handle that. Those in the Yellow? We've been thinking about that challenge since the end of the Cold War.  

Those in the Red?

Well, do the math and it doesn't take long to realize that the only effective kinetic counter to hypersonic once it makes it to a few minutes from impact needs to be, yes, the speed of light; lasers. Lasers are limited to line of sight, so that gives us the visual horizon of a warship.

I warned you there would be math. Let's use round numbers for a point to argue from; if both the incoming weapon and sensor are 30' above the water, that gives you a visual horizon to detect of 12.9-nm. For a missile going Mach 3, that gives you about 21 seconds to impact. 

Again, follow the questions between the spreadsheet and the video above.

That is for a Mach-3 ASCM. Now do the math for a Mach-5. A Mach-7.

It does focus the mind a bit, yes?

For some, this brings up the old saw, "Shoot the archer, not the arrow." OK; shoot it with what?

I actually like the archer analogy for a couple of reasons. Here's one way that goes a little deeper. 

Let's go back to the "archer." In the late Middle-Ages, the English/Welsh Longbowmen were the terror of Europe. They were fast, agile, and could eliminate the flower of European nobility hundreds of yards before that nobility, with their shining, exquisite armor and expensive lances, maces, swords, and battle-axes could be brought to bear.

Longbowmen were also very vulnerable, as they were lightly armed. The only way to eliminate them from the field was through a surprise cavalry attack from the flank or by your own archers who had the range, will, and numbers to move them off the field.

We have yet to see a Battle of Crécy at sea to really show the power of the ASCM. From the coast of Sinai, to the Falkland Islands, to the Persian Gulf, we have seen little demonstrations over the last couple of decades, that is about it. 

We have been warned.

Note I didn't include the recent US Navy swatting down the relatively primitive ASCM used off Yemen. That generation of ASCM really is no match for our DDG as long as everything works. That exchange ended as it should - but we should not think we have the modern problem solved.

In time, it was only the invention of the firearm that ended the Longbowman's tenure. That took awhile, as will our response to modern ASCM.

There is a larger question here, and it has to do with a dominate power's complacency. We mostly talk about defense - but what are we doing about offence? Why is it the world's premier naval power has some of the slowest and shortest range ASCM?

Does that fact give you pause? It should. Look at what we are, replacing Harpoon with, perhaps, LRASM and NSM. Are they even supersonic? No. Do they challenge modern defenses? On paper, not really if you discount any electronic fairy dust.

In some ways, we are just building the best, most high-tech pre-Dreadnoughts in an era when Dreadnoughts are growing in number.

NB: all speeds used here are from open source material. You, or I, may have different speeds in mind - but keep all that to yourself. This is just to demonstrate a point, not be military pedantic or to forget that we are blogg'n in the Red, not Green. An errata as well; "NATO Strike Missile" should be "Naval Strike Missile." My bust, I had NATO on the brain.

Fullbore Friday

It is always good to remember your friends at Christmas time.


When we speak of the "Frozen Chosin" or the "Chosin Few" we think of US Marines. Well - take some time to read this.

For those who have served with Royal Marines, the story of the 41 Independent Commando Royal Marines will ring a bell.

At Chosin, with 50 percent casualties from a unit strength of 250, they shaved every day in combat, looked after weapons and gear even when wounded, and refused helmets in combat.
...
41 Commando spent Christmas with the First Marine Division at Masan. ...Their ranks were badly depleted, particularly in specialists and NCOs, and it was eventually decided that they should withdraw to Japan to await reinforcements. It was with mixed feelings that the Commando left their USMC comrades. In his report, Lt.Col. Drysdale stated:

This is the first time that Marines of the two nations had fought side by side since the defense of the Peking Legation in 1900. Let it be said that the admiration of all ranks of 41 Commando for their Brothers in Arms was and is unbounded. They fought like tigers and their morale and esprit de corps is second to none.

Read it all.

When we fail to recognize what a great friend the British have been to this nation for so long, we not only do them a disservice - we dishonor ourselves.

Hat tip Derb. First posted DEC11.