Monday, December 12, 2011

A: Strategic; B: Operational; C: Tactical


Are you making your points and observations at the correct level? Can you be correct, but also wrong?

What happens when Dr. Norman Friedman reads Red Star Over the Pacific?

Well, I'm pondering it over at USNIBlog. Come pay a visit.

6 comments:

Adversus Omnes Dissident said...

I'm confused........why is tactical next to strategic?

cdrsalamander said...

+1 to AOD. You found my easter egg. It leads in to the major point of the USNIBlog article .... but it would be cheating to put that out here.

Adversus Omnes Dissident said...

my JMO professor would fail me if I got that one wrong ;)

Scott Brim, USAF Partisan said...

One can debate endlessly over what interpretation should be applied to the current Chinese naval build-up, but their current intentions matter less than their future ability to quickly shift gears as their perceived security needs evolve in response to internal and external politcal and economic developments. 

America is turning inward, placing in serious doubt America's long-term commitment to maintaining its current role as the world's primary guarantor of freedom of navigation in the maritime commons.

China benefits greatly from America's role as the world's guarantor of freedom of navigation, and its security interests would be threatened if America retreated from our current military commitments. 

In terms of developing and sustaining the kind of economic and industrial power needed to support naval forces worldwide, who better than the Chinese themselves could be able to fill the vacuum once America can no longer support its current naval commitments in maintaining freedom of navigation worldwide?  

As opposed to any overarching Chinese military ambitions which might currently be extent, it is America's retreat from its current military commitments -- and the resulting adverse impacts to the security of China's economic interests worldwide -- that would most likely be the impetus for bringing the Chinese into the realm of blue water operations far from their own shores, and eventually into power projection operations as well.  

And so what is most important to be following here is the ability of China's industrial base to quickly shift gears in the service of an evolving Chinese strategic viewpoint concerning their own security requirements, not necessarily what their current strategic and tactical thinking actually represents in terms of achieving short-term military capabilities and ambitions.

Retired JAG said...

The problem of tactization of strategy is analogous to policy by anecdote.  Anecdotes and tactics can be tantalizing and intriguing as well as beguiling.  We like anecdotes and tactical situations in discussions of situations because they are easy to understand and empathize with but they must be analyzed in volume before they become the worthy stuff of good policy or strategy.  Sensational new tactics and compelling anecdotes are the bread and  butter of what I call the "Great Ideas Department."  I spent a large part of my career working the clutch and brakes on the Great Ideas Department.  Sometimes it turns out nice products but often times what is produced is jerry-rigged and does not respect precedent or acknowledge second or third degree effects in the future.    

Retired JAG said...

The problem of tactization of strategy is analogous to policy by anecdote.  Anecdotes and tactics can be tantalizing and intriguing as well as beguiling.  We like anecdotes and tactical situations in discussions of situations because they are easy to understand and empathize with but they must be analyzed in volume before they become the worthy stuff of good policy or strategy.  Sensational new tactics and compelling anecdotes are the bread and  butter of what I call the "Great Ideas Department."  I spent a large part of my career working the clutch and brakes on the Great Ideas Department.  Sometimes it turns out nice products but often times what is produced is jerry-rigged and does not respect precedent or acknowledge second or third degree effects in the future.