What Does Sending a Firm Signal to China Look Like?

A lesson as old as the human condition was again proved in February of this year; weakness invites aggression.

From demographers to strategists, a variety of disciplines see the second half of this decade through the first half of the next as a window of exceptional vulnerability for a war with China in the Western Pacific.

We have discussed this emerging threat there for almost two decades and the time is here. Are we ready?

No.

If you agree with this window, then you also must agree with the following: no magic system or capability is going to fight and win this war for us and our allies. There is nothing that isn’t at least IOC today that will be available to the fleet in numbers the first few years of the war (Yes, I said years. This will not be a 3-day or 3-month war when it comes).

We will either lose quickly or claw our way to victory with those weapon systems under production right now. If the war starts later in the window and goes more than three years, then we may see some of those systems still prior to IOC, but not in numbers needed in the early fight.

What can we do?

If we prepare well and ensure the porcupine enough and long quills, the dragon may never bite. If we appear strong and full of resolve, the dragon may never leave its lair. However, if the porcupine’s quills are few and blunt and we are seen as lacking resolve behind a carboard shield – it will be worth the risk for the dragon to head east.

We need something that is actionable. Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-WI) gave a speech yesterday at Heritage that fives us that; three steps in the right direction, told with the correct tone and clarity of speech; an adult talking to adults about adult things.

Refreshing.

We must put American hard power in Xi’s path before it’s too late. While long-term investments to rebuild American military superiority in general—and maritime superiority in particular—are critical, the reality is that we will not be able to build the Navy the nation needs within the next five years. What we can do within the Davidson Window, however, is build an anti-navy. By anti-navy I mean asymmetric forces and weapons designed to target the Chinese Navy, deny control of the seas surrounding Taiwan, and prevent PLA amphibious forces from gaining a lodgment on the island. 

Step 1:

The first step in building this anti-navy does not require us to defy any laws of physics, though technically it is rocket science. Now that we are no longer bound by the INF Treaty, we can surge long range conventional precision fires in three concentric rings across the Pacific: (1) the First Island Chain; (2) the Second Island Chain plus the Central Pacific islands, and (3) the outer edges of the theater including Alaska, Hawaii, and Australia. In the first ring we need shorter range anti-ship and air defense missiles such as the Naval Strike Missile, Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, and SM-6. 

All three of these lines should be running on three shifts today.

Step 2:

The second step in building an anti-navy is to stockpile munitions before the shooting starts. At current production rates, for example, it will take at least two years to boost Javelin production from 2,100 to 4,000 missiles annually. In many cases Chinese companies are the sole source or a primary supplier for the energetic materials used in our missiles. To fix this the Pentagon should stop buying minimum sustaining rates of critical munitions and start maxing out the capacity of active production lines through multi-year procurement contracts. 

I will add this: no active production line for weapons systems shall be allowed to go cold until their replacement is under construction. For example: yes, we must keep the P-8A line open, even under reduced production. Of course, we could convert that to license build ShinMaywa US-2 ... but let's get back to the Gentleman from Wisconsin. 

Step 3:

The third step is to turn the talk about arming Taiwan to the teeth into reality. This starts with moving Taiwan to the front of the Foreign Military Sales line and clearing the backlog of $14 billion dollars worth of FMS items that have been approved but not delivered. 

The hardest questions sometimes have the most simple answers. Is this perfect? No, but is it good and actionable in an acceptable timeframe? 

Yes.

I would like to leave everyone with this one reminder: when Ukraine found itself in a spot of bother with their larger neighbor to the east, they were able to look to the USA and her allies to help supply her with the weapons she needs to keep fighting. 

Should we find ourselves in a fight with our neighbors across the Pacific, we will not have that luxury. There is no other nation that can give us weapons at scale to keep us in the fight. We will be it.

No one is there to rescue us should we fail to properly prepare in time.

Ponder that.

Keeping an Eye on the Long Game: Part XXX

Who is keeping an eye on the long game? James Kraska is.

Over at Orbis, he has an article that is worth reading, How the United States Lost the Naval War on 2015. Sure, the article has been out a few months --- but it lingers; it has a flavor.

Let's look at it.

First thing; I won't pick too much on his 2015 date. Who knows - I wouldn't call that time ripe (if I were Chinese I would push that to the right a decade and a half) - but hey - this is a just a vignette to spark a discussion, and no one called 1939 or 1914 either.

That isn't what is important. The vignette is just the wrapper - the concepts he brings out via the vignette is its meat.

He hits center mass however or some critical "shaping" issues. Starting in the first paragraph - you get a good idea where he is coming from and going to.

With a maritime strategy focused on lower order partnerships, and a national oceans policy that devalued strategic interests in freedom of navigation, the stage was set for defeat at sea.

Yes, a few Salamanderesque things to talk about.

He outlines well the second and third order effects of military exchanges and technology transfer. Short term thinking with long term consequences.

Globalization, developments in the international law of the sea, and the revolution in military affairs aided the emergence of China and other new naval powers. Globalization was a democratizing force among navies. The wealth effect of expanding trade and rising economies combined with the spread of doctrine, training and operational art, serving as a force multiplier. The result of globalization was a vastly improved Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) Navy in terms of its force structure and warfighting skills. The proliferation of advanced weapons technology helped nations that historically had never exercised naval power to make generational leaps in precision-guided munitions.

Just for starters, review Loral from the '90s. You know the background.

In addition to being very good at reverse engineering (though more work needed on the quality side) - the Chinese are also a good are understanding history, especially their history.

There are a few things that I would pop Kraska on the back of the head for though, as some good stuff got lost in poorly chosen buzz-words we could have done without. Here is one pop on 'da head.

A collection of unfriendly coastal states had invested heavily in asymmetric anti-access technologies and strategies to counter the power of U.S. naval forces. In 1991, Iraq used a mixture of crude pre-World War I contact navalmines and sophisticated magnetic and acoustic influence mines launched from small rubber boats. The country deployed over 1,100 mines in the first Gulf War, but most of them were either inoperable or improperly positioned. Yet Baghdad still reaped success in using mines to secure its seaside flank off Kuwait City. The USS Tripoli struck a moored contact mine, which ripped a 16 20 foot cavern below the waterline; hours later, and despite proceeding with deliberate caution to avoidmines, the USS Princeton struck a mine that cracked her superstructure and caused severe deck buckling.
...
Fueled by a dynamic economy and impressive ingenuity, Beijing developed and fielded a bevy of asymmetric weapons. One game-changing weapon, an anti-ship ballistic missile, could hit an underway aircraft carrier.

The good stuff is the note on "Sea Denial" weapons - or as I call it, the "Porcupine Strategy." You don't have to be the biggest, strongest, or most intelligent - you simply have to make it too painful and dangerous for anyone to get close to you.

The bad part - "asymmetric."

No, no, no. Sigh, sorry - I have to do this.

Adj. 1. asymmetric - characterized by asymmetry in the spatial arrangement or placement of parts or components

asymmetrical
irregular - contrary to rule or accepted order or general practice; "irregular hiring practices"

There is nothing asymmetrical about mine warfare - good googly moogly, there is a Union Ship a mortar shot away from me sunk by a "mine" in the Civil War. There is nothing "contrary" about it - it is about as much of the environment as typhoons - and like typhoons, they are only asymmetrical if you ignore them and/or don't prepare for them.

Same thing as ASBMs. Was the Dive Bomber asymmetrical? Was the Motor Torpedo Boat? Was the Submarine?

No. They were evolutionary developments in warfare - the eternal Darwinian battlefield. One technology begets a defensive response to them, that begets the need for another weapon, etc. Once again, they are only asymmetrical if you are so hide-bound and myopic as an institution that you refuse to improvise, adapt and overcome. Ahem.

I do not like the use of the "A-word" because it gives some mystic glint to what is a straight-forward professional challenge. A nit-pic? Sure. Detracts from the good stuff in his article? Not at all.

The core of his vignette,

Without warning, a Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile – a variant of the 1,500 km-plus range DF-21/CSS-5 solid propellant medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) specifically designed to decapitate U.S. carrier strike groups operating in East Asia – struck the USS George Washington causing the ship to erupt in a cataclysm.

There is some nice "PSYOPS-INFO OPS" vignette play that I will skip through because this part is what interests me - but if that is your thing, make sure and read it all. Back to my stuff though.

Nations that had little respect for offshore or littoral freedom of navigation were courted, and regional commanders favored the benefits of partnership over the value of preserving navigational rights. Winning ‘‘hearts and minds’’ trumped age-old principles. The U.S. Navy struggled with how to conduct combined, lower-order maritime security operations. China was concentrating on how to win a naval war.
...
Furthermore, most of the other nations with large navies were allies. While technically true when measured in fleet tonnage and missile tubes, his testimony obscured the fact that while the U.S. Navy perhaps could outmatch any other navy in a fair fight, her rivals were not looking for a fair fight. Allies would prove unreliable partners, more intent on avoiding war than deterring it. U.S. adversaries were thinking asymmetrically.

Those are two paragraphs that are very difficult to talk about in "polite company" but represent two significant strategic risks that we have adopted. Oh, and I will ignore the A-word. Read Sun Tzu (the Chinese do) - its all there.

He reminds us of another challenge of the American Fleet - we have more than one ocean to worry about,

The fourteen-to-one advantage in naval power also assumed that the United States had time to collect and concentrate its far-flung ships against a single foe. The ephemeral 313-ship force structure was never achieved, but it called for eleven carriers, eighty-eight cruisers and destroyers, forty-eight submarines, fifty-five littoral combat ships and thirty-one amphibious warfare ships. But these forces were spread thinly throughout the world maintaining a bewildering and multi-tasked agenda. Given that a 1.0 force presence—maintaining one ship on station—typically requires three ships—one in work-ups and evaluation, getting ready to deploy, one on deployment, and one in the yard being refurbished after deployment—the 313 ships never really promised more than about 100 ships at sea at any given time, and these would be spread over the entire globe.
...
No sooner had warships from the U.S. Second Fleet in Norfolk gotten underway, however, than did Cosco, the Chinese company operating the Panama Canal, declare the passageway closed for four weeks for urgent repairs to the Atlantic and Pacific locks. Closure of the 40-mile long canal added 3,000 miles to transits from the East coast of the United States to the Far East.6 The alternative was to take the laborious route through the Strait of Magellan in southern Chile. Considerably safer than Drake Passage, Magellan was still difficult to navigate. The narrow passage was dogged by fierce winds and the inhospitable climate. Half the U.S. fleet anchored in Norfolk was temporarily cut off from the Pacific. At the same time, street protests to stop the impending transit of U.S. warships through the Suez Canal stung the government in Cairo. The Suez Canal shaves 40 percent of the distance off a trip from the Sixth Fleet operating area in the Mediterranean Sea to the Far East.

Actually, the Straight of Magellan is a challenge, but isn't that difficult, but inside the vignette, both canal challenges are well described.

... and here is the Porcupine in action,

In 2015, China’s navy was somewhat smaller, numbering only a handful of aircraft carriers, sixty submarines and seventy major surface combatants. Beijing also operated hundreds of fast offshore patrol vessels, many that packed a punch with anti-ship cruise missiles. Whereas an adversary like China could marshal its entire national fleet for a crisis immediately off its shore, as well as land-based missiles and aircraft, to face down the United States, the U.S. Navy would have to fight with the forces that happened to be in the region.

Back to the critique - there is another problem from a historical perspective, though I don't blame the author. It came from the 2009 DOD Capstone Concept for Joint Operations,

Foreign sensitivities to U.S. military presence have steadily been increasing. . . .

Balderdash. I remember the Sane-Freeze gaggle anti-GLCM/Pershing II et al from the Cold War. This is nothing new - we have it easy.

Speaking of balderdash,

The Army could fail, as it did in Vietnam;

No, no, and no. The military part of the Vietnam War was won. The defeat of the '72 invasion proved that. Vietnam was lost in '75 when Congress cut off all support for South Vietnam, inviting the North to invade. Political, not military defeat. Rinse, repeat.

He makes up for these historical oversights with a more critical historical reference that is a foundation stone to understanding th Chinese mind.

When China was weak, it suffered the indignity of routine U.S. and foreign naval operations off its shores. But as the U.S. Navy declined and the Chinese Navy became more powerful, China became less willing to tolerate the ‘‘foreign invasions.’’

All you need to do is pull the string from The Sand Pebbles and you will know what he is talking about. Still a huge issue for the Chinese. Their cultural historical memory is a order of magnitude greater than ours - and they hold grudges.

Towards the end, Kraska plays gadfly rather well.

When China acted, it was the culmination of a patient and focused national plan to couple naval technology and resources to a corresponding political, legal and diplomatic strategy in the oceans. The U.S. Naval force plans had been in disarray for decades. The nation was implementing a ‘‘cooperative’’ naval strategy designed for peace—preventing brushfire wars rather than deterring great power conflict. Meanwhile, the White House, through both Republican and Democratic administrations, placed environmentalists in charge of strategic U.S. oceans policy. These environmentalists championed coastal state control over the offshore areas – both in the United States and in multilateral diplomacy – and this focus played into China’s hands by de-legitimizing freedom of the seas in the littorals.

From the Battle of Lepanto to the Battle of Okinawa, major fleet action was the decisive event in many modern wars. Over the past five hundred years all of the world’s foremost powers achieved their position of leadership through reliance on unsurpassed naval capabilities.16 Even a traditional continental power such as Russia reached the apex of its standing on the global stage through naval power.17 The West had forgotten that the history of international security and freedom of the seas was a story intimately woven into the material of world politics, forming the basis for an Anglo-American world order.

True, we lost focus on Neo-Mahanian ideal - but a good Navy can do both. "Distributed and Networked" warfare with many small units has a long history in the USN. From the Union blockade of the South to the Battle of the Atlantic and the unrestricted submarine warfare against Imperial Japan - we did that while being able to pivot to major fleet actions as well.

Yes, we do need to focus on what I call the Long Game - but we can and must do both. I am not too pessimistic on the technology side. Sure, they (might) have a MRBM - but we will have SM-3. They may sink one carrier - but with the political will, we can handle that. History also proves that fixed shore sites are no match for mobile strike from the sea.

What we do need to do is to shorten our lab-to-Fleet technology cycle. Get technology demonstrators to sea. We don't do that like we used to.

Why did I call Kraska a gadfly? Well - he got a reaction - reaction in the right places.

Let's start with the Financial Times. In their article you find a common problem - the "official" thinkers in both locations seem to have the same mission; tell everyone to ignore the poor innocent military expansion by the world's most populous nation - who BTW is run by an authoritarian government.

Some analysts express caution against overstating China’s naval prowess. Even sending a small group of ships to take part in anti-piracy operations off the east coast of Africa this year proved to be a large logistical challenge for the Chinese navy.

“China lacks many of the capabilities to project power abroad,” says David Shambaugh, a China specialist at George Washington University in the US.
...
“The focus of our foreign policy will be in assisting development, not in signing up to expensive new commitments,” says Shi Yinhong, an international relations professor at People’s University in Beijing.

Or as another Chinese academic, who asked not to be named, says of protecting seaborne trade: “Why should we spend billions of dollars paying for something that is already being paid for?” Largely paid for, he did not need to mention, by the US.

Can anyone say, "Don't plan based upon stated intentions, but by capability." Wait, I did.

Thomas E. Ricks isn't all that happy, here is the part he didn't like.

The U.S. Navy also suffered problems in readiness and proficiency. Diversion of thousands of officers and enlisted sailors to fill Army shortfalls in Iraq and Afghanistan deprived the service of years of training and operational experience at sea. Promotions were tied to disassociated augmentation tours for stability operations and reconstruction rather than excellence afloat. An entire generation of mid-career commissioned and noncommissioned officers tried to learn counterinsurgency land warfare in the desert and mountains of of central Asia while their counterparts in China conducted fleet exercises to learn how to destroy them."

Ricks snarkily replies,

Really? Has the Navy sent "an entire generation" to Iraq and Afghanistan?

Well, yes; or at least a large part of it. I spent the last part of my career largely doing nothing but that - Navy CDR doing a LTC's job. I didn't mind though - I picked that set of orders around what "my community" wanted me to do. The taxpayer got much more out of me than the "busy make-work" the folks in Millington would have had me do. So yes, Ricks has a point - but so does Kraska.

Ricks then shifts fire here.

Also, does national security rest ultimately only on the Navy, as this hydrocentric article tendentiously asserts?:

Only more slowly did people begin to realize that the maintenance of the world order had rested on U.S. military power, and that the foundation of that power was U.S. command of the global commons. The Army could fail, as it did in Vietnam; the Air Force was ancillary to the Army. To secure the U.S. position and the nation's security-and indeed for world order-the Navy could never fail."

Well, when you are fighting China - the Navy and the USAF better be at the front. Land war in Asia? No thank you.

In his final broadside, I think Ricks tells us more about himself than Kraska,

But what stuck in my craw most of all was Kraska's casual poke at "the apologizing Obama administration," which he asserts that, combined with the "unpopularity" of the predecessor administration, is undermining national security. I think it is acceptable for active duty officers to critique strategy, but I think here Kraska is sailing a little too close to politically attacking his commander in chief, especially since he offers no evidence, and footnotes this sentence to an article by Henry Kissinger that appeared months before Obama became president.

That is a funny snit. James - you made Tom look cross-eyed! Bravo Zulu!!! Oh, and for the record; Ricks is totally off base on this argument - Kraska is well clear. No one is perfect though, we'll give Ricks a pass.

Intellectual churn - it keeps you healthy. There has been a push, General Mattis and Admiral Stavridis have pushed the most I think, for officers to read, think, and write. James Kraska has answered that call.

One note of warning though - Mattis and Stavridis are rare. Many of their peers - and many more between O6-O9, do not share their enthusiasm for discussion. Cultivate those who support your efforts - but watch your back. Sad, but even this month I have received emails from people on active duty who have had the person who ownes paper on them threaten them professionally for "reading, thinking, writing." But hey - Sims, Mitchell, Connolly - you're in good company.

State Dept. Makes Us All Look Stooopid

Who does this insult more, the Chinese, the American military, or any thinking person reading it?

As China's first aircraft carrier takes to the open seas today for its inaugural sea trials, the U.S. government directed a pointed question at the Chinese military: Why would you need a warship like that?

"We would welcome any kind of explanation that China would like to give for needing this kind of equipment," U.S. State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland told reporters today. "We have had concerns for some time and we've been quite open with them with regard to the lack of transparency from China regarding its power projection and its lack of access and denial of capabilities."

This is not helpful.

The PRC is a sovereign nation with legitimate maritime security requirements that are easily understood by anyone with an even rudimentary understanding of where maritime strategy and commerce come together.

The fact that the DOS would ask this in public does too things; it insults the Chinese through its patronizing tone and it makes our nation look like it is led by arrogant imperialists at best, simpletons at worst.

STRATCOM fail.

If I were the Chinese I would respond thusly;

"Here are our plans for our follow-on carrier development. Also, the Chinese people would like to know what plans the United States government has to bring its credit rating to back AAA. Our people worry about their investments. Until the Americans do that and assure worries in the investments by the Chinese people in the sovereign debt of the American government, we do not see the reason for their continued spending on such an unnecessarily large and offensively-minded military.

We have had concerns about the American ability to service their debt for some time and we've been quite open with them with regard to the lack of transparency from the Americans regarding their capabilities to ensure their own economic stability."

As a final note - I find all the wide-eyed panting over the Chinese carrier immature and silly.

It is a limited carrier with a limited airwing. The French CVN Charles de Gualle is a much more capable platform and we have seen what it can do off Libya. Nice, but no biggie.

I am more interested in how we would kill the Chinese carrier if we ever needed to. That is no problem at all.

As a matter of fact - in the case of general war, I would give the job to the Japanese. Their SS could take care of that quite well and no one would know whose submarine took it out until the conflict was over. I've tangled with the Japanese submarine community in RIMPAC. They would do just fine with the mission. Just fine.

Anyway, it would be fun to watch the US 1120s whine that they didn't get the mission.

If you want to nibble your nails over the Chinese, then nibble over the multi-axis "Porcupine Strategy" they have for the Taiwan Strait that wants to make the prospect so painful to contemplate that we simply won't go there. They don't need a carrier for that. SS, Houbei Class, ASCM, ASBM, H-6M and other land based long range strike aircraft; that is what you should focus on; that is the challenge. Simple, but in numbers and worth a sober ponder.

Against our carriers coming across the Pacific, they only need to get lucky once; we have to get lucky every time.

Like Lucius says;

"Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity."

Keeping and eye on the long game: Part XXII

"The oceans are our lifelines. If commerce were cut off, the economy would plummet,"

Who said that? Mahan, Churchill? Nope.

...says Ni Lexiong, a fellow at the Shanghai National Defense Institute and an outspoken proponent of Chinese sea power. "We need a strong navy."

Growth is the key.

China says it will spend nearly $45 billion on its military this year, an increase of about 18% from 2006.

18% a year means you double about every 4 years.

China has 76 main surface combatants and no carriers, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Chinese fleet is also untested in modern naval warfare.

Be careful. Be very careful. Outside of benign Carrier and SSN ops, so are we.

This whole WSJ article gives a solid executive summary of why a navy is critical to China in the 21st Century. It is also a reminder that as we try to get our Fleet plan on a steady footing after a lost decade - other nations get a vote on what we think the future will look like.

In 1996, during a standoff between leaders in Beijing and Taipei over Taiwanese moves to assert independence, China test-fired missiles near the island. The U.S. responded by ordering carrier battle groups to the area.

China's inability to prevent this U.S. show of military strength and support for Taiwan rankled political and military leaders in Beijing. They started to develop what is viewed by the Pentagon as an "anti-access strategy." The Pentagon says it is designed to limit the U.S. military's freedom of movement in Asia and, specifically, its ability to intervene in any conflict between China and Taiwan.

I use a less fancy name - The Porcupine Strategy.

"If we develop a strong navy with more advanced weapon systems, we have more choices. It's possible that China will join in a cooperative system headed by the U.S.," says Mr. Ni of the Shanghai National Defense Institute. "But we would also be ready to fight if we have to."

Fair, clear headed thinking by China.

At a time when the CNO states that the debunked theory of Diversity is a top priority, SES and NAVSEA junior Flag Officers send out Bu11sh1t Bingo laden Six-Sigma love letters of Homeric length, and SECNAV seems almost alone fighting against the fraud, waste, and abuse of LCS, DDG-1000, and LPD-17 - the PLAN is focused on what a once young and ambitious navy did in its rise to Maritime Dominance.

Keeping an Eye on the Long Game: Part LXXIV

In so many ways, things have gone sideways since I left Active Duty in 2009...

I started the "Long Game" series in 2004. Half a decade later when I left AD, this was what the PLAN's major surface combatant fleet looked like;

This is where the Chinese will have grown their navy 10-yrs later. You know ... next year.

There are a lot of bad arguments and concepts out there on why we need to get to a 350+ fleet. There are a few good ones. Sadly, from those who actually have the power to make it happen, we are not hearing an effective case for it.

All they really need to do it look what the Chinese have done in the 10 years from 2009 to 2019. 

Wait until you see what they have by 2029.

Why this graphic is not showing up on C-SPAN every time our Navy is discussed in the House and Senate, I don't know ... but no one is asking for my advice.

The PLAN will be more than just a porcupine at the other end of the Pacific.

We are in denial. The Chinese are not.

Hat tip SakaMobi.

May Day Midrats Melee!

OK, it is the day after May Day ... but that's close enough for government work.

As the entire maritime world this week decided to pick up on some Midrats favorites - poaching the Army's budget and making the Taiwanese porcupine a bit more imposing - could there be a better time for another Sal & Eagle One green range?

Open topic, open chat room, open phones. 

We'll cover the waterfront and invite you to come on board for a broad ranging discussion of national and maritime security issues.

Join us live if you can and roll in with your preferred topic in the chat room or call the switchboard number right here on the showpage.

This Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern come join us for a Midrats free for all.

If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here.

Did you hug your SM-3 today?

Defending against the dive bomber of the 21st Century, perchance.

The greatest threat to U.S. missile defenses are short- and medium-range weapons, the director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency said today.

“Ninety-nine percent of the threat today” is from these types of missiles, Army Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly told Bloomberg Television in an interview. Defending against these missiles “is where the administration is focusing the majority of our funding.”

The administration’s proposed 13 percent cut in the agency’s budget wouldn’t affect current missile defenses because most of the funding lost would be for systems still being developed, O’Reilly said.

“We are not reducing the missile defense capability we have today and that we’ve built in the last couple of decades,” he said.

The approaches to the Taiwan Straits - if we still consider that inside our concerns - are looking tougher and tougher with each passing year.

Like I said before - the strategy of the porcupine is a good one. Make it not worth the trouble and you are fine.

Keeping and eye on the long game: Part XXV

Why is China growing its military so fast? Why all the new Navy construction and conventional SRMB? Ummmm - simple answer, I'll tell you - real short and sweet like - kind of like this.

China continues its huge military buildup opposite Taiwan, further pushing the balance of power between the two rivals toward the mainland's favor, the U.S. Defense Department says in its annual report on China's military.

Although the Taiwan Strait remains stable, China is adding more than 100 missiles a year to the estimated 1,000 it has targeting the democratic, self-governing island that Beijing claims as its own, the report found. Hundreds of thousands of troops are based opposite Taiwan, it said, and hundreds of planes are ready to make good on China's threat to attack should Taiwan formalize its de-facto independence.

''A potential military confrontation with Taiwan, and the prospect of U.S. military intervention, remain the PLA's most immediate military concerns,'' the report said, referring to the People's Liberation Army, China's military.

They don't have to defeat the US military pound for pound. Just be able to take Taiwan and using the porcupine strategy - make us taking it back too painful to do. .... if they want to. Anyway, they know we have no desire or ability to fight a major land war in Asia.

Either that, or just read their own documents.

“Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”

– Deng Xiaoping

As we have tracked here, they have also moved away from the traditional Chinese dislike for naval warfare.

China’s emerging local sea denial capabilities – mines, submarines, maritime strike aircraft, and modern surface combatants equipped with advanced ASCMs – provide a supporting layer of defense for its long-range anti-access systems. Acquisition and development of the KILO, SONG, SHANG, and YUAN-class submarines illustrates the importance the PLA places on undersea warfare for sea denial. In the past ten years, China has deployed ten new classes of ships. The purchase of SOVREMENNYY II-class DDGs and indigenous production of the LUYANG I/ LUYANG II DDGs equipped with long-range ASCM and SAM systems, for example, demonstrate a continuing emphasis on improving anti-surface warfare, combined with mobile, wide area air control.

You can read the full report here.

Fullbore Friday

A good life, well lived. Erik Hazelhoff Roelfzema. Outlaw Mike probably knows him - but for the rest of you think; in your early 20s, would you have met the standard?

Erik Hazelhoff Roelfzema, who won the Netherlands' highest military honor in World War II after leading 15 small-boat spying missions to the shores of his Nazi-occupied homeland in 1942, then flew 72 sorties in small plywood planes over Germany to point British bombers toward their targets, died Sept. 26 at his home in Ahualoa, Hawaii. He was 90.

The cause was heart failure, said his wife, Karin.

Acclaimed in the Netherlands as one of the nation's greatest World War II heroes, Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema gained international recognition after he wrote an autobiography, "Soldier of Orange" (Forum Boekerij, 1971; Hodder & Stoughton, 1972). The book offers gripping accounts of coastal landings on moonless nights near Nazi headquarters in the Netherlands, and then of dodging splays of tracers and anti-aircraft fire over Berlin. "Soldier of Orange," titled in deference to the Dutch royal dynasty, the House of Orange, has sold more than a million copies. In 1977, it was made into a movie by the director Paul Verhoeven, with Rutger Hauer portraying Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema as a 23-year-old.

"Tracers crisscrossed over our heads like monstrous party streamers," Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema wrote of the last of his 15 spy missions, on May 11, 1942, aboard a motorized dinghy that had been slipped over the side of a British gunboat, No. 320, near Noordwijk. "Machine guns and cannon chattered and barked."

The dinghy came under withering fire after delivering radio transmitters to Dutch resistance fighters who would use the devices to relay information about German installations and troop movements. Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema wrote of the gunboat: "Crewmen crouched on the foredeck and along the sides. Finally, they pulled us aboard without stopping, abandoning the dinghy. Then, rearing up under full power, the 320 roared out to sea."

Born April 3, 1917, in Indonesia, when it was under colonial rule as the Dutch East Indies, Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema was the son of a coffee plantation manager. The family later returned to the Netherlands.
Days after the Nazis invaded, Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema boarded a Swiss freighter bound for New York. When a British cruiser stopped the freighter, he persuaded the captain to take him to Britain. Once in London, Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema volunteered for the Dutch section of MI6, the British intelligence service, and was soon assigned to the dinghy missions to his homeland.

"He used to joke, 'Wait a minute, I just left,' " his wife said. Besides carrying transmitters to the resistance, Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema and his crew ferried spies to and from the Netherlands.

Despite the success of those missions, Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema ran afoul of Col. Mattheus de Bruyne, the newly appointed leader of the Dutch intelligence section, after he refused to provide information to another branch of the Dutch government in exile for fear it had been infiltrated by Nazi sympathizers. Court-martial proceedings were dismissed after the exiled Queen Wilhelmina recommended him for the Militaire Willemsorde.

The Militaire Willemsorde (the Military Order of William) was bestowed on Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema in the summer of 1942 by Queen Wilhelmina, who had fled to London and established the government in exile after the Germans occupied the Netherlands in May 1940.

Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema joined Britain's Royal Air Force. He learned to fly a De Havilland Mosquito, the twin-engine, spruce and balsa plane of the elite Pathfinder Force. The light, agile Mosquito was used for, among other things, firing flares at potential bombing targets. Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema's 72 flights into German airspace included 25 over Berlin.

Describing a night flight over Berlin, Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema wrote, "Hundreds of searchlights pierce the cloudless sky, rigid, motionless, like quills of the giant porcupine - Berlin." The RAF awarded him its Distinguished Flying Cross.

In April 1945, Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema was appointed aide-de-camp to Queen Wilhelmina and accompanied her as she returned from exile to the liberated Netherlands.

He moved to the United States in the early 1950s and became a citizen. He was a writer at NBC and for Radio Free Europe. Then, in 1971, he retired to Hawaii, where he was named to the board of Barnwell Industries, an oil and gas exploration company.

Besides his wife, Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema is survived by a son, Erik Jr., of Amsterdam; a daughter, Karna Hazelhoff-Castellon of San Francisco; a granddaughter; and a great-granddaughter.

Last July, in an interview with De Telegraaf, the Netherlands' largest daily newspaper, Mr. Hazelhoff Roelfzema said he had received too much recognition for his wartime exploits. "I became a war hero because I stuck out, because I wrote about my experiences," he said. "But behind every soldier decorated with military honors there are a hundred anonymous heroes, some of them greater."

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This was first posted nine years ago. At the time, the movie had not made it to youtube yet. Most of it is there. Not a bad life if you can get Rutger Hauer to play you. Click here for most of the movie.

Reforming the Confederate Navy

What characterized the Confederate Navy? Though many things - she was scrappy, inventive, and had some outstanding leaders - in line with many things in the Confederacy though, she suffered a fatal flaw that doomed her. In her case, the Confederate Navy placed her bet on a few grand ships to make the "transformational" break.

When we think of the Confederate Navy, we think of the CSS VIRGINIA, CSS HUNLEY, and at least I think of the CSS SHENANDOAH. Wonderful platforms, but in the end did little but absorb people and resources.

The Confederate Navy adapted where she could, but when faced with having to build a fleet from scratch - she threw her lot in with transformationalism. VIRGINIA and HUNLEY were wonderful ground breaking designs and concepts - built against tremendous odds - but in the end they were like the nation they served - beautiful losers destroyed by their own fatal conceits.

What was their conceit? They thought that a few high technological breakthroughs thrown into a few hulls and applied with a bit of tactical verve could triumph over the many primarily pushing sound fundamentals.

I think alternative history is a goofy subject when real history is so much more interesting, but if Sherman never made it through the Atlanta defensive lines and the Democrats won the '64 election - someone would have had the opportunity to look at the wartime record of the Confederate Navy and set about building a better, more balanced fleet based upon what worked.

Funny the things that will tangentially come into one's mind. When I got through looking over the PPT and PDF from the exceptionally poorly titled The New Navy Fighting Machine, what came to mind was the conceptual challenge of a post-war Confederate Navy.

Goofy, no? Well, work with me a bit; tell me if you see it.

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NPS Professor and retired CAPT Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. and his crew deserve congrats for a very good and thought provoking work - one that if not related, then at least that folds in well with the conversation CDR Henry J. Hendrix, Jr. brought forward in Buy Ford not Ferrari.

You could spend a few thousand words discussing in detail their work - which we don't have time for right now - but let me take some time to point out the good, bad and others.

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The good;
First of all, the PDF shows a great focus on China, and the China challenge influences a lot of their ideas. That intellectual honesty and clear headed view of the future makes the discussion in and from the document of much greater use than the 2/3 of our latest Maritime Strategy that I find so useless. As that touchstone, the China challenge is an important reference when looking at what they offer.

... we anticipate formidable Chinese sea-denial capabilities that will threaten to reduce American influence in East Asia.

Already taking place. I have called it the Porcupine Strategy. They don't have to be the biggest or most dangerous - they just need to make it look too painful to mess with.

Submarines in greater numbers are central to the maritime strategy, but within a constrained budget the larger force cannot be exclusively nuclear powered. We find that diesel submarines with air-independent propulsion not only allow twice as many submarines, but they also nicely complement the SSNs in the critical scenario.

That is for the USA - and I don't think you can buy and maintain twice as many SS as SSN - but perhaps close to 3 to 2. Still a sound concept. If an early 20th Century designed Type VII, then a 21st Century SS can handle a little transit time.

Perhaps most important of all, we emphasize maritime power as the foundation of present American influence and international prosperity. Sea power’s value is well appreciated by our friends around the world, but is taken too much for granted by the American public. The United States is a maritime nation and the United States Navy is its great manifestation.

That last sentence should be put on a bumper sticker and some JOPA DC DET types should put it on cars in all the nice parking spots at the Pentagon.

Concurrent with broad agreement on the new fighting machine’s characteristics, it is necessary to calculate whether its personnel costs will be more or less than the cost of manning, training, and supporting the 313-ship Navy. Our impression is that:
- In numbers, manning 650 mostly smaller ships will be about the same.
- In terms of individual, shipboard team and fleet tactical training, the cost will be somewhat less.
- The cost to support recruiting, assignment, and education will be determined by the outcome of the manning and training calculations.
Here and there we highlight the easier training to competencies for the smaller and more focused warships of the new fighting machine. But, in a different way, the training must be just as sophisticated. Examples are (1) the need to prepare junior commanding officers of patrol craft in the art of theater security and nation building; and (2) the return to professionalism in warships devoted to mine warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and countering swarms of small missile boats—as compared to the well-developed capability to deliver accurate strikes ashore. There is time to change the training as the new fleet is produced, but only if both the different tactics and new training are developed simultaneously with the new operational emphasis.

Manpower. That is the key - sell with sound work manpower considerations.

American nation needs a fleet that is more distributed for flexible presence, adjustable intensities, short and long durations, survival against surprise attack, and which is capable of fighting in tight corners and taking affordable losses. The new fighting machine incorporates many simpler and more single-purposed vessels so that the Fleet can respond more quickly in an unforeseeable direction to a particularly severe threat or rewarding opportunity—what has been called “a Black Swan.” We are arguing against a Navy with warships so hard-wired that an unforeseen surprise will be fatal, because our present fleet is an organization of long lived big warships, some programmed to last 40 years in order to amortize their construction costs.

We are not as hard-wired as we used to be. I think we are already moving in this direction - though we can do better.

Preserving the industrial base for an abrupt expansion is a DoD (Department of Defense) obligation. The industrial base does not appear explicitly in designing the new fighting machine, but an awareness of the need for competition and greater cost controls is implicit everywhere.

Of course, anyone who uses my favorite example of doing it right will always get a gold-star-happy-face. Seriously - this is a story that every officer should know by heart.

Here is an illustration of design experimentation with a happy ending. It is the story of the Treaty Cruisers built under terms of the 1921 Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty. During the 1920s and 1930s, heavy cruiser standard displacement of 10,000 tons was the limiting design factor instead of construction costs. Four classes were designed and built under the treaty, in 1925, 1927, 1929, and 1931-34, each successive class being obviously superior to the previous one. How much superior was a hotly debated question answered in World War II. The first two, supposedly much inferior, ships of the Pensacola class saw as much action as any cruisers, were repaired after battle damage, and survived the war. Looking at the 15 supposedly much improved later cruisers built under treaty limitations, seven—almost half—were sunk. Our impression is that the effectiveness of USS Pensacola and Salt Lake City was about 90% that of the culminating seven-ship USS Astoria class, three of which were destroyed in the Battle of Savo Island in about 15 minutes. Equally important, when the treaty terms were lifted in 1936, we were ready with the design for 17 more heavy cruisers of the magnificent USS Baltimore and Oregon City classes. All were ordered by July 1940 and commissioned before the end of the war. None were sunk.

The following suggestion/compromise about LCS needs to be acted on before we have a few dozen "test beds." As a face-saving move, it iss a good compromise as a chance to move forward with alternatives .... but there isn't much time left to act.

...LCS must not be regarded as a design failure, but as a technological, tactical, and training test bed. The fact that it is suited well neither as a blue water or green water combatant can be useful. On one hand, it can help to design a better armed, less costly blue water frigate. On the other, LCS shows what not to do to develop affordable green water designs to perform inshore patrol missions, clear mines, defeat small missile boats, and screen against coastal submarines.

In a discussion of Green Water, they discuss "Coastal Combatants" ... can we just be clear and call them Corvettes though?

The coastal combatant is not a patrol vessel for theater security operations. It is a small fighting vessel intended to “clear out the clutter” of enemy or neutral vessels in littoral waters. The afloat clutter may be swarms of enemy small craft, fast attack craft carrying surface-to-surface missiles such as the Chinese 220-ton Houbei class, and fishing boats and coastal traders that might serve as reconnaissance posts in a targeting system. Coastal combatants are heavily armed, but small enough to accept affordable losses. They should operate in tactical formations of two, four, eight, or twelve vessels. They carry no surveillance aircraft, so depend on CVLs or shore-based reconnaissance.

Well described, and there are designs already out there (Visby) that fit the bill (BZ to them from bringing up the losing but superior option for LCS). However, as an institution, everyone should stop references the b@st@rd stepchild of Bu11sh1t B1ngo that is Streetfighter and Sealance et al. That buzzword PPT spawn are part of the reason we are where we are in 2010. Use proper naval terms that sound like they are coming form a professional and less like some video game designer. It insults an officer's intelligence and drops everyone's IQ by half a standard deviation every time it goes in the ear.

After the bait and swich snake oil salesmanship of the last decade + that got us where we are today, I am not the only one who is immediately suspicious every time someone starts using too-clever-by-half, cheesy marketing words for what are simply new designs to meet established naval warship niches that have a pedigree which dates back over a century. We should stop trying to be cute - and focus on being professional. Most of the NNFM is good professional work - but the unsightly smear of snake oil degrades its brand a bit ... just a bit.

Off rant and back to the document.

The CVN/CVL discussion is worth almost a specific post in itself. Read the details - but I find this pull quote the best in outlining the argument. Especially if ASBM technology works out in the next decade to the right side of spectrum where we think in will be - having your air assets on more platforms is a progressive risk mitigation strategy that needs much more support.

A calculation of the smaller, but roughly comparable, life-cycle cost of what we argue to be a suitable mix of six CVNs and ten CVLs. The mix carries 620 aircraft, or 12% fewer. We believe the smaller number of aircraft is more than made up for by its flexibility: the CVNs’ powerful short-term punch in a major contingency, complemented by the CVLs’ advantage of greater distributability.

The Navy has service life remaining in many existing CVNs, but a CVL needs to be debated, designed, and built at once to test its compatibility with the F-35B, to develop an early warning aircraft capability, and to explore mixes of aircraft for green water operations, including UAVs. Absent such a CVL, we believe that on affordability grounds alone, the total number of aircraft carriers will shrink to eight within the next two decades and, absent the development of a CVL, with no redress possible.

Like the CVN/CVL discussion, the SSN/SSK discussion is worth a post all its own. The work is VERY Salamanderesque - so you can assume, rightly, that I pretty much agree with 95% of it. They had me at the start when they use a story I tell every time people tell me that that they tell me, "We have plenty of ASW weapons."

The Falklands War of 1982 is a cautionary tale of two submarine fleets having major effects on the enemy in a maritime war. Early in the war, the United Kingdom’s HMS Conqueror, an SSN, sank the aged Argentine cruiser General Belgrano. Seemingly as a result, the Argentine Navy withdrew into port and took itself out of the war, thus isolating the Falklands from substantial reinforcement or resupply. On the other side, one old Argentine submarine harassed the British task force out of all proportion to its nominal combat value. Literally hundreds of ASW torpedoes were fired by the screening destroyers on contacts that proved to be false. Submarines as sea denial systems can influence enemy operations disproportionate to their numbers and cost.

If we go to war - it will be criminal what has happened to our ASW capabilities. It will make the unarmored HUMVEE look like a success. I will leave it at that.

Here is the Salamderesque nature of it squared - sure to upset the usual suspects, which makes it all the more fun.

A total of 80 submarines, with special emphasis on China.

- Of these, there will be 40 SSNs at $2.5B each (if the price can be reduced, the number can rise) and 40 AIP submarines at $500M-$700M each (we show $700M in Table 2 and make the same comment as to the latter’s price and numbers).
- A set of 100 submarines would be better than 80 to defeat China, but in the absence of detailed operating plans and analysis, 80 seems sufficient and an acceptable risk, especially based on our premise that we must have allies in the unlikely case of a war with China.

Admiral Dönitz nods his head in agreement,

Some submarines should be equipped and trained for minelaying.

Serious, dedicated training - not spitting a few out and running.

On the amphibious side of the house, they outline well the Tiffany Green Eyeshade amphibious problem.

In history, opposed landings involved scores of ships and we expected to lose ships and assault craft as well as troops. Today, the large-capacity, efficient amphibious assault ships—LHAs, LHDs, LPDs, etc., are few in number compared to the LSTs, APAs, and AKAs that were the backbone of the opposed assaults in World War II and Korea. Now, the loss of even one amphibious ship would probably terminate the operation in failure.

The solution - well - call it a "prepare and ponder" strategy. Leesea, call your office.

For $1.0B of annual SCN, a fleet composed of between 100 and 150 ships can be maintained for amphibious lift, delivery and sustainment. Many sealift ships will be large, high-capacity RoRos, container ships, and tankers, constructed or purchased at an average cost of about $500M. Others will be small, simple “HSVs,” to quickly move ground forces to a scene of action demanding swift response. Some will be amphibious ships of 15,000 to 25,000 tons for unopposed delivery across a beach or at an undeveloped landing site. In Table 2, we show a sealift fleet of 125 ships, including propositioning ships. This capability will suffice for any likely conflict involving ground combat overseas. The current numbers are between 80 and 90 reasonably modern, large-capacity vessels, plus 31 large ships for amphibious lift. If a large regional war ensues, the U.S. merchant fleet can be requisitioned, but it is relatively small, so leasing from neutrals around the world might be necessary, as was done for Desert Shield.

We espouse a ten-year holiday in which no high-cost amphibious ships are built. Much of the existing amphibious assault force can serve for many more years in the unlikely case of the need to conduct an opposed Marine assault (e.g., in Lebanon or Syria). The amphibious ships will also serve effectively as interim Global Fleet Station ships.

Almost a punt on their part. I think this part of their plan in not as mature as the others and needs more work. I like the direction they are going in - but it isn't fully baked.

The bad;

Although our green water fleet of about 240 vessels is more attuned to the needs of the nation than anything else we have seen,..

Snerk. Of course you silly geese - it is your proposal. You almost have the confidence of a blogger ......

For example, the green water component also includes an additional 400 affordable and easy-to-operate inshore patrol craft to help build up the capabilities of some countries without navies or coast guards.

Still trying to grasp that concept, and "affordable" needs a lot of defined truth in 2010 as we have destroyed that meaning in Congress and with the taxpayer over the last decade. Also, that is a LOT of LT and LCDR Commands .. might be a good way to break the present officer career path diktat --- and get more sea and Command time -- but to make that happen would require a complete manpower restructure. Also a chance to break a lot of paradigms WRT how we man our Navy ... but that needs a lot more fleshing out and in the end, I think 400 is way too large - at least at the start.

We do not believe the present U.S. Navy organization will achieve a green water force, and so our most important recommendation is to create a new command with the authority to foster professionalism in coastal operations similar to that by which the Navy developed naval aviation in the 1920s and 1930s.

Ungh. No. Only if you kill two U.S. Navy organizations will Emperor Salamander permit you to create a new one. Too much Staff Bloat as it is.

Large, multipurpose warships are not, as is frequently argued, more flexible and adaptable than smaller, more focused warships. We repeatedly found cases in which “single purpose” warships are superior in effectiveness and for swift modernization. As an example, the green water component includes 12 gunfire support ships because we believe embedding guns in DDGs, CGs, or other missile-firing surface ships will not result in effective naval gunfire support.

Ehhhh, maybe. Hedging you bets with a High-Low is a better path, methinks.

The smaller, more distributable ships can free the inevitably fewer high-end warships for more demanding operations.

Correct. Piracy is a perfect example, as we have often discussed - but if you only have a few high-end ships, they aren't going to do much for a global Navy - remember, you can't be at sea forever.

Training and career development of Navy officer and enlisted personnel will be enhanced with more single-minded ships. For example, after 1990, ASW (Antisubmarine Warfare) skills atrophied in the surface navy because of its emphasis on offensive and defensive missile warfare. ASW proficiency will be hard to restore in missile ships. By contrast, the Israeli Navy’s training allowed them to quickly adopt new tactics for its highly focused Sa’ar boats, which defeated Egyptian and Syrian missile boats in the first significant missile war in 1973, despite their Gabriel missiles being seriously outranged by the enemy’s Soviet-built SS-N-2s.

Good point, in parts - but "single-minded" is neither the cure or for Israel the reason.

Neither good nor bad:
A broader area of disagreement I have with the authors is a focus on single purpose ships. As described, especially the Gun Support Ship - I think it is worth looking at, especially if you can give it a basic AAW capability which isn't too hard with the ESSM as described. Then it is a little more multi-purpose that makes me feel better, as when possible - you need multi-mission capability as the enemy decides how he is going to attack you, be ready. My bias is towards multi-mission, but as you get smaller, you have less of that luxury .... though even the WWII face DE's had quite the multi-mission capability .... as did PT boats .... so the "it's too small" argument may need work.

Strange and sad thing though is a desire to remove the gun from CG and DDG. Again, they seem to want to pull away from a multi-mission capability. Uni-mission ships simply do not have a good history.

Remember the quote by LT Copeland? As was amply shown during the Falkland Islands War and 5-inch Friday - a multipurpose gun is needed on every warship that can carry it - the larger the better. A multipurpose gun is the Leatherman of naval warfare - all sorts of uses in one package. I would caution being too binary when it comes to NGFS (nee NSFS)- but following is on balance good - quite good.

These are single-purpose ships carrying two of the best guns available for naval gunfire support (NGFS), such as an advanced gun system (AGS), with 2,000 rounds, precise navigation, countermine underwater search, and evolved sea sparrow missiles (ESSM) combined with softkill defense at short range. The Gunfire Support Ship need have only a small surface search radar (because it will operate in company), no stealth properties (because it will reveal its position in action), and no sonar or ASW (antisubmarine warfare) ordnance (as a cost-saving measure). Hull size will be determined by the minimum space and sturdiness required for two guns and their ammunition, which in turn will determine what form of UAV for reconnaissance it may carry.

Littoral warfare operations ashore can be greatly enhanced by the low cost, high volume, and overall efficiency of naval weaponry over aerial bombing or land attack missiles. When in range, the ships are also superior to land-based artillery, which has a large support tail.

Guns in CGs and DDGs are ill-matched because their land attack missiles reach deep inland but must be fired safely from their maritime sanctuary, which is now sometimes 100 miles or more offshore. Missiles are expensive and so best suited for select, fixed, high-value targets to complement the Gunfire Support ships that produce rapid, high-volume fire in support of the battlefield. ... NGFS is an important responsibility of the Navy and if and when any new technology has been demonstrated, swift introduction is unlikely without a force component dedicated to the mission, the value of which was amply demonstrated in the European and Pacific theaters of World War II, in Korea at the Pusan perimeter, Inchon, and Hungnam, and repeatedly during the long Vietnam War.

The Blue Water discussion is interesting - but has some problems.

An ominous trend (although the data sample is small) is that the success percentages of the attackers have gotten better since 1975. Since it seems predictable that the offense will continue to regain the advantage over a defender’s surface-to-air missiles, it is a mistake to rely heavily on expensive DDGs and CGs with Aegis and SAMs. We do not want to eliminate these capable ships and we think new ones should be added periodically as technology advances. If the ships were more easily and quickly updated to neutralize the natural advantage that is possible with ASCMs and TBMs (Theater Ballistic Missiles), we would be more optimistic about their future value. In the meantime, we propose to let attrition at end of life reduce the number of DDGs to a steady state force of 30.

Sure ---- but no one has ever tried to attack an Aegis ship with a ASCM. The HMS SHEFFIELD and USS STARK that they reference earlier are not Aegis ships. I understand the need to decrease funding of large ships to buy more smaller - but I think they might be going too heavy on the small side than the Blue Water side. Just my opinion. I share their concerns with ASCM and ASBM - but better AAW is the answer, not fewer AAW platforms with legacy systems.

On the lower side of the Blue Water force though, they get it exactly right.

To maintain total surface combatant numbers for offensive action and screening at around 140, we conjecture a new blue water frigate similar to those in the other navies of the world. They emphasize sea control but are capable of escorting large and small carriers, amphibious lift, and delivery and sustainment shipping. They carry at least eight long-range surface-to-surface missiles, a helicopter or UAVs, have a capable ASW suite, and strong, short-range hard and soft kill defenses.
There are many international frigates and corvettes that serve as examples for developing an affordable design, which should be evolutionary, but cost, at most, $400M in series production. These include Turkey’s new MILGEM class corvette, Singapore’s Formidable class frigate, Indonesia’s Sigma class corvette, India’s Project 28 frigate, and the Russian Steregushchiy class frigate.

Airtight. Their concept for dedicated land attack Corvettes - different than the Gun Corvettes, also has some merit for discussion - and I like this "influence squadron."

A compact task group with a land-attack mission might consist of four missile corvettes carrying 200 improved Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs), plus a CVL, a DDG, and two new frigates.

They end up with a proposal. Could I live with this?

- Build DDGs at a limited rate, sufficient to keep one shipbuilder’s line open, and to keep technology current, but with the intent of reducing the Aegis force to 30 warships within 25 years. The steady state force of 30 ships costs $60B, so the SCN per year for a 30-year combat life is $2.0B.
- Introduce several affordable frigate designs of 2,500 to 3,000 tons and about 25 knots, with the goal of creating a force of 90 ships at a unit cost of $400M. Essential features are at least eight upgraded TASMs (tactical Antiship Missiles), strong close-in defense, and a modern ASW suite. The ships will emphasize sea strikes and ASW. Each must carry a helicopter or pair of UAVs.
- Design and build simple corvettes carrying about 50 land-attack missiles—upgraded TLAMs as it were. They are not fast, but 25 knots is desirable. They operate in silence, with any radiating platform being in the air or scores of miles away. Because of their simplicity and American shipbuilder design experience with stealth properties, the first design will probably be very much like the final one.

Merely for completeness we include here a component of 20 auxiliaries. The numbers and costs are unchanged from the 313-ship Navy plan.

Absolutely. This is much better than the mix we have right now.

Why is there so much here I agree with? Well, on balance I think it is because they tried their best to root their program in an understanding of history and a realistic expectation of what technology can gain you in the foreseeable future.

NOT A TRANSFORMATIONAL FLEET

Doubtless the structure herein is jarring to those content with the Navy’s current emphasis on power projection and faith in a continuing sanctuary at sea. Nevertheless, insofar as possible, the new fighting machine comprises only well-developed and tested capabilities responding to current circumstances in the spirit of Bradley Fiske’s goal of unity between policy, strategy, and warship characteristics. We often illustrated the fighting machine’s ship characteristics with existing foreign warships, especially borrowing their ideas for coastal operations. We also drew from nascent domestic attempts to create a more distributed force.

Nowhere does the new fighting machine depend upon technological innovations such as the sensors, SAMs, and command-control for advances in BMD; directed energy weapons, rail guns, robots, dirigibles with surveillance radars, and exotic hull forms.

Radical? No; a refreshingly sound and professional work. You can discuss the ideas in this work as adults because there is a minimal amount of "fairy dust" in here - told with simple and direct language; things often missing in such documents produced over the last 15 years.

Finally, back to the Confederate Navy. What would a Confederate Navy look like if they looked at what did and did not work for them in the war while maintaining their curious intellect? Perhaps in a modern sense, such a POV could produce a scaled down version of this.

- CVLs for both blue and green water operational flexibility.
- Land-attack missile ships, each carrying 50 missiles and numbering about 20 inexpensive vessels that can be deployed in pairs or task forces tailored to the risks and demands.
- A new class of AIP diesel submarines to complement the more expensive SSNs for an increasingly important role in sea denial.
- At least 12 dedicated naval gunfire support corvettes that can quickly and affordably go where the ground action demands, be put at risk according to circumstances on the ground, and more readily embrace new NGFS technology when it is tested and ready to install.
High-speed mine clearance vessels that can be on station quickly to clear the way for the operation.
- A large number of smaller, less expensive frigates to complement a smaller number of DDGs and boost surface combatant numbers at less SCN cost.
- At least nine single-purpose strategic defense BMD-DDGs for deterrence.

In many ways, though the name gives me heartburn - but that is just me. the NNFM document and PPT that go with need to be looked at as the very serious and usefull thought pieces that they are. In my view, they are a much more useful document than the last Maritime Strategy when it comes to looking forward to why we need a Fleet and what we can do with it.

Galrahn's discussion at his place on the work is well worth your time, so give him a visit too.