Thursday, February 25, 2010

Keeping an Eye on the Long Game: Part XXX


Who is keeping an eye on the long game? James Kraska is.

Over at Orbis, he has an article that is worth reading, How the United States Lost the Naval War on 2015. Sure, the article has been out a few months --- but it lingers; it has a flavor.

Let's look at it.

First thing; I won't pick too much on his 2015 date. Who knows - I wouldn't call that time ripe (if I were Chinese I would push that to the right a decade and a half) - but hey - this is a just a vignette to spark a discussion, and no one called 1939 or
1914 either.

That isn't what is important. The vignette is just the wrapper - the concepts he brings out via the vignette is its meat.

He hits center mass however or some critical "shaping" issues. Starting in the first paragraph - you get a good idea where he is coming from and going to.
With a maritime strategy focused on lower order partnerships, and a national oceans policy that devalued strategic interests in freedom of navigation, the stage was set for defeat at sea.
Yes, a few Salamanderesque things to talk about.

He outlines well the second and third order effects of military exchanges and technology transfer. Short term thinking with long term consequences.
Globalization, developments in the international law of the sea, and the revolution in military affairs aided the emergence of China and other new naval powers. Globalization was a democratizing force among navies. The wealth effect of expanding trade and rising economies combined with the spread of doctrine, training and operational art, serving as a force multiplier. The result of globalization was a vastly improved Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) Navy in terms of its force structure and warfighting skills. The proliferation of advanced weapons technology helped nations that historically had never exercised naval power to make generational leaps in precision-guided munitions.
Just for starters, review Loral from the '90s. You know the background.

In addition to being very good at reverse engineering (though more work needed on the quality side) - the Chinese are also a good are understanding history, especially their history.

There are a few things that I would pop Kraska on the back of the head for though, as some good stuff got lost in poorly chosen buzz-words we could have done without. Here is one pop on 'da head.
A collection of unfriendly coastal states had invested heavily in asymmetric anti-access technologies and strategies to counter the power of U.S. naval forces. In 1991, Iraq used a mixture of crude pre-World War I contact navalmines and sophisticated magnetic and acoustic influence mines launched from small rubber boats. The country deployed over 1,100 mines in the first Gulf War, but most of them were either inoperable or improperly positioned. Yet Baghdad still reaped success in using mines to secure its seaside flank off Kuwait City. The USS Tripoli struck a moored contact mine, which ripped a 16 20 foot cavern below the waterline; hours later, and despite proceeding with deliberate caution to avoidmines, the USS Princeton struck a mine that cracked her superstructure and caused severe deck buckling.
...
Fueled by a dynamic economy and impressive ingenuity, Beijing developed and fielded a bevy of
asymmetric weapons. One game-changing weapon, an anti-ship ballistic missile, could hit an underway aircraft carrier.
The good stuff is the note on "Sea Denial" weapons - or as I call it, the "Porcupine Strategy." You don't have to be the biggest, strongest, or most intelligent - you simply have to make it too painful and dangerous for anyone to get close to you.

The bad part - "
asymmetric."

No, no, no. Sigh, sorry - I have to do this.
Adj. 1. asymmetric - characterized by asymmetry in the spatial arrangement or placement of parts or components

asymmetrical
irregular - contrary to rule or accepted order or general practice; "irregular hiring practices"
There is nothing asymmetrical about mine warfare - good googly moogly, there is a Union Ship a mortar shot away from me sunk by a "mine" in the Civil War. There is nothing "contrary" about it - it is about as much of the environment as typhoons - and like typhoons, they are only asymmetrical if you ignore them and/or don't prepare for them.

Same thing as ASBMs. Was the Dive Bomber asymmetrical? Was the Motor Torpedo Boat? Was the Submarine?

No. They were evolutionary developments in warfare - the eternal Darwinian battlefield. One technology begets a defensive response to them, that begets the need for another weapon, etc. Once again, they are only asymmetrical if you are so hide-bound and myopic as an institution that you refuse to improvise, adapt and overcome. Ahem.

I do not like the use of the "A-word" because it gives some mystic glint to what is a straight-forward professional challenge. A nit-pic? Sure. Detracts from the good stuff in his article? Not at all.

The core of his vignette,
Without warning, a Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile – a variant of the 1,500 km-plus range DF-21/CSS-5 solid propellant medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) specifically designed to decapitate U.S. carrier strike groups operating in East Asia – struck the USS George Washington causing the ship to erupt in a cataclysm.
There is some nice "PSYOPS-INFO OPS" vignette play that I will skip through because this part is what interests me - but if that is your thing, make sure and read it all. Back to my stuff though.
Nations that had little respect for offshore or littoral freedom of navigation were courted, and regional commanders favored the benefits of partnership over the value of preserving navigational rights. Winning ‘‘hearts and minds’’ trumped age-old principles. The U.S. Navy struggled with how to conduct combined, lower-order maritime security operations. China was concentrating on how to win a naval war.
...
Furthermore, most of the other nations with large navies were allies. While technically true when measured in fleet tonnage and missile tubes, his testimony obscured the fact that while the U.S. Navy perhaps could outmatch any other navy in a fair fight, her
rivals were not looking for a fair fight. Allies would prove unreliable partners, more intent on avoiding war than deterring it. U.S. adversaries were thinking asymmetrically.
Those are two paragraphs that are very difficult to talk about in "polite company" but represent two significant strategic risks that we have adopted. Oh, and I will ignore the A-word. Read Sun Tzu (the Chinese do) - its all there.

He reminds us of another challenge of the American Fleet - we have more than one ocean to worry about,
The fourteen-to-one advantage in naval power also assumed that the United States had time to collect and concentrate its far-flung ships against a single foe. The ephemeral 313-ship force structure was never achieved, but it called for eleven carriers, eighty-eight cruisers and destroyers, forty-eight submarines, fifty-five littoral combat ships and thirty-one amphibious warfare ships. But these forces were spread thinly throughout the world maintaining a bewildering and multi-tasked agenda. Given that a 1.0 force presence—maintaining one ship on station—typically requires three ships—one in work-ups and evaluation, getting ready to deploy, one on deployment, and one in the yard being refurbished after deployment—the 313 ships never really promised more than about 100 ships at sea at any given time, and these would be spread over the entire globe.
...
No sooner had warships from the U.S. Second Fleet in Norfolk gotten underway, however, than did Cosco, the Chinese company operating the Panama Canal, declare the passageway closed for four weeks for urgent repairs to the Atlantic and Pacific locks. Closure of the 40-mile long canal added 3,000 miles to transits from the East coast of the United States to the Far East.6 The alternative was to take the laborious route through the Strait of Magellan in southern Chile. Considerably safer than Drake Passage, Magellan was still difficult to navigate. The narrow passage was dogged by fierce winds and the inhospitable climate. Half the U.S. fleet anchored in Norfolk was temporarily cut off from the Pacific. At the same time, street protests to stop the impending transit of U.S. warships through the Suez Canal stung the government in Cairo. The Suez Canal shaves 40 percent of the distance off a trip from the Sixth Fleet operating area in the Mediterranean Sea to the Far East.
Actually, the Straight of Magellan is a challenge, but isn't that difficult, but inside the vignette, both canal challenges are well described.

... and here is the Porcupine in action,
In 2015, China’s navy was somewhat smaller, numbering only a handful of aircraft carriers, sixty submarines and seventy major surface combatants. Beijing also operated hundreds of fast offshore patrol vessels, many that packed a punch with anti-ship cruise missiles. Whereas an adversary like China could marshal its entire national fleet for a crisis immediately off its shore, as well as land-based missiles and aircraft, to face down the United States, the U.S. Navy would have to fight with the forces that happened to be in the region.
Back to the critique - there is another problem from a historical perspective, though I don't blame the author. It came from the 2009 DOD Capstone Concept for Joint Operations,
Foreign sensitivities to U.S. military presence have steadily been increasing. . . .
Balderdash. I remember the Sane-Freeze gaggle anti-GLCM/Pershing II et al from the Cold War. This is nothing new - we have it easy.

Speaking of balderdash,
The Army could fail, as it did in Vietnam;
No, no, and no. The military part of the Vietnam War was won. The defeat of the '72 invasion proved that. Vietnam was lost in '75 when Congress cut off all support for South Vietnam, inviting the North to invade. Political, not military defeat. Rinse, repeat.

He makes up for these historical oversights with a more critical historical reference that is a foundation stone to understanding th Chinese mind.
When China was weak, it suffered the indignity of routine U.S. and foreign naval operations off its shores. But as the U.S. Navy declined and the Chinese Navy became more powerful, China became less willing to tolerate the ‘‘foreign invasions.’’
All you need to do is pull the string from The Sand Pebbles and you will know what he is talking about. Still a huge issue for the Chinese. Their cultural historical memory is a order of magnitude greater than ours - and they hold grudges.

Towards the end, Kraska plays gadfly rather well.
When China acted, it was the culmination of a patient and focused national plan to couple naval technology and resources to a corresponding political, legal and diplomatic strategy in the oceans. The U.S. Naval force plans had been in disarray for decades. The nation was implementing a ‘‘cooperative’’ naval strategy designed for peace—preventing brushfire wars rather than deterring great power conflict. Meanwhile, the White House, through both Republican and Democratic administrations, placed environmentalists in charge of strategic U.S. oceans policy. These environmentalists championed coastal state control over the offshore areas – both in the United States and in multilateral diplomacy – and this focus played into China’s hands by de-legitimizing freedom of the seas in the littorals.

From the Battle of Lepanto to the Battle of Okinawa, major fleet action was the decisive event in many modern wars. Over the past five hundred years all of the world’s foremost powers achieved their position of leadership through reliance on unsurpassed naval capabilities.16 Even a traditional continental power such as Russia reached the apex of its standing on the global stage through naval power.17 The West had forgotten that the history of international security and freedom of the seas was a story intimately woven into the material of world politics, forming the basis for an Anglo-American world order.
True, we lost focus on Neo-Mahanian ideal - but a good Navy can do both. "Distributed and Networked" warfare with many small units has a long history in the USN. From the Union blockade of the South to the Battle of the Atlantic and the unrestricted submarine warfare against Imperial Japan - we did that while being able to pivot to major fleet actions as well.

Yes, we do need to focus on what I call the Long Game - but we can and must do both. I am not too pessimistic on the technology side. Sure, they (might) have a MRBM - but we will have SM-3. They may sink one carrier - but with the political will, we can handle that. History also proves that fixed shore sites are no match for mobile strike from the sea.

What we do need to do is to shorten our lab-to-Fleet technology cycle. Get technology demonstrators to sea. We don't do that like
we used to.

Why did I call Kraska a gadfly? Well - he got a reaction - reaction in the right places.

Let's start with the
Financial Times. In their article you find a common problem - the "official" thinkers in both locations seem to have the same mission; tell everyone to ignore the poor innocent military expansion by the world's most populous nation - who BTW is run by an authoritarian government.
Some analysts express caution against overstating China’s naval prowess. Even sending a small group of ships to take part in anti-piracy operations off the east coast of Africa this year proved to be a large logistical challenge for the Chinese navy.

“China lacks many of the capabilities to project power abroad,” says David Shambaugh, a China specialist at George Washington University in the US.
...
“The focus of our foreign policy will be in assisting development, not in signing up to expensive new commitments,” says Shi Yinhong, an international relations professor at People’s University in Beijing.

Or as another Chinese academic, who asked not to be named, says of protecting seaborne trade: “Why should we spend billions of dollars paying for something that is already being paid for?” Largely paid for, he did not need to mention, by the US.
Can anyone say, "Don't plan based upon stated intentions, but by capability." Wait, I did.

Thomas E. Ricks isn't all that happy, here is the part he didn't like.
The U.S. Navy also suffered problems in readiness and proficiency. Diversion of thousands of officers and enlisted sailors to fill Army shortfalls in Iraq and Afghanistan deprived the service of years of training and operational experience at sea. Promotions were tied to disassociated augmentation tours for stability operations and reconstruction rather than excellence afloat. An entire generation of mid-career commissioned and noncommissioned officers tried to learn counterinsurgency land warfare in the desert and mountains of of central Asia while their counterparts in China conducted fleet exercises to learn how to destroy them."
Ricks snarkily replies,
Really? Has the Navy sent "an entire generation" to Iraq and Afghanistan?
Well, yes; or at least a large part of it. I spent the last part of my career largely doing nothing but that - Navy CDR doing a LTC's job. I didn't mind though - I picked that set of orders around what "my community" wanted me to do. The taxpayer got much more out of me than the "busy make-work" the folks in Millington would have had me do. So yes, Ricks has a point - but so does Kraska.

Ricks then shifts fire here.
Also, does national security rest ultimately only on the Navy, as this hydrocentric article tendentiously asserts?:
Only more slowly did people begin to realize that the maintenance of the world order had rested on U.S. military power, and that the foundation of that power was U.S. command of the global commons. The Army could fail, as it did in Vietnam; the Air Force was ancillary to the Army. To secure the U.S. position and the nation's security-and indeed for world order-the Navy could never fail."
Well, when you are fighting China - the Navy and the USAF better be at the front. Land war in Asia? No thank you.

In his final broadside, I think Ricks tells us more about himself than Kraska,
But what stuck in my craw most of all was Kraska's casual poke at "the apologizing Obama administration," which he asserts that, combined with the "unpopularity" of the predecessor administration, is undermining national security. I think it is acceptable for active duty officers to critique strategy, but I think here Kraska is sailing a little too close to politically attacking his commander in chief, especially since he offers no evidence, and footnotes this sentence to an article by Henry Kissinger that appeared months before Obama became president.
That is a funny snit. James - you made Tom look cross-eyed! Bravo Zulu!!! Oh, and for the record; Ricks is totally off base on this argument - Kraska is well clear. No one is perfect though, we'll give Ricks a pass.

Intellectual churn - it keeps you healthy. There has been a push, General Mattis and Admiral Stavridis have pushed the most I think, for officers to read, think, and write. James Kraska has answered that call.


One note of warning though - Mattis and Stavridis are rare. Many of their peers - and many more between O6-O9, do not share their enthusiasm for discussion. Cultivate those who support your efforts - but watch your back. Sad, but even this month I have received emails from people on active duty who have had the person who ownes paper on them threaten them professionally for "reading, thinking, writing." But hey - Sims, Mitchell, Connolly - you're in good company.

36 comments:

Grumpy Old Ham said...

<span>No sooner had warships from the U.S. Second Fleet in Norfolk gotten underway, however, than did Cosco, the Chinese company operating the Panama Canal, declare the passageway closed for four weeks for urgent repairs to the Atlantic and Pacific locks.</span>

Jimmy Carter:  the gift that just keeps on giving.  He's the Energizer Bunny of stupid.

Byron said...

Prior planning prevents piss poor performance: I'd have had an MEU punch early and helo Marines to all the locks. Amazing the cooperation you can get with a gun to someones head. And yes, the SEALS and Green Beanies would have made sure there was no demo.

And since we're "at war" with the PRC, we KEEP the damn locks this time.

Jay said...

Ham -- what is your source re: closing?

I can't find anything on-line re: a month-long closure.

You can easily Wiki the project to add new locks.

Instead of being Grumpy...look North -- it appears the NW passage just might be a better answer -- for Middle Atlantic USEC ports & north of them -- it is shorter by ~3K NM to Pacific ports.

Jimmy Carter did the right thing -- it was time to turn it back over to the Panamanians. 

MR T's Haircut said...

<span>"They may sink one carrier - but with the political will, we can handle that."</span>
<span></span>
<span>Not so sure.. .we measure casualties to the single man or woman now.. every personal tragedy is national loss... Look at the media circus around the USS COLE... </span>
<span></span>
<span>If we lost a carrier.. it will be devastating.  Materially, it would take us 10 years to replace with current ship building and we would have a reluctant naval force made up of consensus taking Admirals who wont want to share the risk.</span>
<span></span>
<span>The Chinese are taking notice.. and so are the Indians.</span>

Byron said...

Jay, think hard on the context of Phibs article, and the fact that GOH put that in italics. Hopefully you'll get it.

The Brickmuppet said...

Regards delays involving canals, it would not be the first time a fleet was denied use of Suez.

http://www.amazon.com/FLEET-THAT-HAD-DIE-New/dp/1841580449

Thats an extreme case to be sure but it bears emembering that the Panama canal was built in large part as a response to the lessons learned from this debacle.

Note that mines can be ued offensively too. A sub or disguised merchant ship could cause a good deal of mischief were it to secrete a few dozen of the little boogers between Cape Henry and Cape Charles.

ewok40k said...

MTH nails it with will to sustain casualties status... And imagine some mines from auxiliary cruiser aka corsair in the Eastern seaboard... just enough to sow panic, have everyone chase subs that dont exist etc...

Skippy-san said...

Rick is right on one thing-there is no free lunch and the Navy is paying and will continue to pay a price in its level of expertise of its war fighters thanks to the IA program. Guys who should have been doing things to cement their proficiency as Naval Officers and SWO,s , Aviators, and Submariners were wasting their time in Iraq and Afghanistan.

YNSN said...

A few things...

1)  Lepanto was a major fleet action that turned a result.  However, it was the economic consolidation after that battle that really turned the Ottoman Empire back.  As it was Economic ruin that made the French Fleet and Nation secondary to the British. 

-- "Maritime Supremacy and the Opening of the Western Mind" by Peter Padfield.  Exellent book!  It has totally reworked the way I view Naval operations and how battles are truly won.

2)  These IA billets.  According to my Detailer are teh #1 priority.  I won't say to much right now.  But, my Ship back in Norfolk needs me more than the Army does.  Litterally.  There are a number of things I did for my Ship and I was intergral in.  So far in this IA tour, I am integral in nothing.  Once I had been with a unit out here for a month or so, they relied on me.  But, integral:  As in, YNSN is on the VBSS boarding team and watching his shipmates 6.  YNSN is the DCRL 5S Investigator, one of 10 truly qualified Sailors to do the job aboard the Ship.  As in YNSN the assistant ESWS coordinator for his department.  As in STBD bearing taker, keeping us off the rocks.... No, I do awards for the Army, and I do them to the extent that the SPC I work with doesn't have to work 12 hour days any more.  They don't need to utilize me for anything else.

My. Ship. Needs. Me.

With Iraq winding down the Navy NEEDS to take a Serious look at our IA/GSA comittments.  We did this out of desperation.  Will the Army help clean my ship's bildge if we need that sort of help one day?

I am not trying to sound like I am not a team player, or that every IA billet is as unnessary as mine.  The Sailors on those PRT teams ARE needed.  But, to have more Sailors In DJI, IRQ, BAH, AFG than we do at Sea.  I don't quite think that is something to brag about.  Especially when you look at what everyone is saying over at ADM Harvey's place in regards to Readiness.

virgil xenophon said...

Sociologists who study the military like Charles Moskos (now deceased) of Northwestern were writing over 40 yrs ago in the 70s about the degree to which JOs were stifled from publishing and thinking controversial thoughts at the risk of their careers in all branches of the armed services in contrast to the old SU where, paradoxically, outspoken comment by JOs was actively encouraged and the publishing of a major critque in important journals was practically "de reguir" for promotion to mid and upper levels of command.

Moskos and others noted the particular problems of Command &Staff schools/War Colleges where the instructors that one might cross swords with might be your CO in the next assignment and visa versa, for that matter, leading to a reticence to broach controversial views for honest discussion.

How savagely ironic that a totalitarian system would show more open encouragement and be more tolerant of controversial and novel views from its' professional officer corps than the command structure of the world's leading democracy..

Andrewdb said...

Jay - My family did a Panama Canal cruise just over a year ago.  The docks on the Carib side are filled with containers as far as the eye can see - all of them from COSCO.  That Chinese company now "manages" the canal for the Panama Canal Authority.  If they decided it was in their strategic national interest to declare the canal "closed for repair" do you seriously think they wouldn't find a way? 

And if the US tried to force it's way through? - that stuff is mighty fragile,  They said it would take two years to refill the lake if it ever drained. The economic impact of that, to say nothing of the military, would be a disaster.

Anon said...

You are off base on your Jimmy Carter comment.  The Panama Canal issue had been boiling for YEARS and the Carter Administration took a step in the right direction for America's influence in the entire region.  I think Americans would be upset if we had a waterway cut through Florida or Maine that was completely "owned" by another country, and the political strife would be almost uncontainable.  Read your history.

Steeljaw said...

I noted in yesterday's post the the above fold headline screamed "US approaches 1,000 dead in Afghan war"  In March  1945, the Franklin was struck by one suicide aircraft as she was preparing for flight ops.  Franklin alone lost over 800 killed/wounded in that one strike.  Then there is the tiny town of Bedford, nestled in the coal hills of south-western VA,  Ask the residents there about casualty counts following D-Day.  Today?  I don't know -- may be the average Joe, but the elite policymakers, etc.? -- probably not.
- SJS

Anonymous said...

A whole generation in the desert? It's 2.5% of the surface force at any one time. Flag officers are the highest percentage on IA/GSA at 9% of SWO Flags. Your assertion is not supported by the facts. Don't let the facts get in your way though!

Byron said...

Hey, Anon, were it not for the US, would there be a Panama Canal? Were it not for the US, would there be a PANAMA?

UltimaRatioRegis said...

SteelJaw,

You made the very point that adversary military policy makers are hammering.  The national will to see things through to victory.  I don't make light of the loss of young life, but any perspective is entirely missing.  The offensive in Marjah was described as a "massive attack", in which US Marines were taking "heavy casualties". 

The total number of US troops involved?  Under 6,000.  Total killed to this point is eleven.  Even if tyhe wounded outnumber KIA ten to one, casualties are just over 100.  A small half-hour battalion firefight in a major conflict. 

The loss of Abe Lincoln would indeed make the political Admirals extremely gunshy.  And policymakers (this lot, anyway) collapse in paroxysms of fear and indecision. 

Franklin Roosevelt was a socialist whose liberal social programs put us on the road to the dependent state we live in today.  He tried to stack the Court, and his economic policies were largely ineffective.  The precedent he set for government meddling in economic and social issues has done great damage.  BUT.....  he was a Warlord, whose resolve during the tragic and dark times of 1941-3 led this nation to victory against the greatest war machines extant.  And on that merit, Franklin Roosevelt achieved greatness.

Current administration also has a socialist-communist philosophy, and believe government meddling is the solution to every problem, including the ones created by government meddling.  But a warlord?  Not hardly.  And there is our NATIONAL critical vulnerability.

MR T's Haircut said...

<span>SJS, that is my point exactly...</span>

Jay said...

Hi Byron.

Jay said...

Oh URR...

You guys have pretty much cheapened the terms socialist & communist by slinging them so much when they aren't warranted.    Any scare tactic or slight you may have hoped them to cause, simply isn't there.

UltimaRatioRegis said...

Okay, Jay.  I will be sure to let Bill Ayers, Van Jones, Bernadine Dohrn, Anita Dunn, Eric Holder, Mark Lloyd, and Adolfo Carrion know. 

Navymic said...

We will be sailing the seas most of our careers.  The vast majority of IA/GSAs are for 1 year (at most).  I realize there are guys who did two tours, but mostly by choice.  There are benefits of moving outside you community: learning new methods, gaining different perspectives , or just realizing your platform or community doesn't smell of roses.  This broadening will help offset the one-year-loss of professional expertise.   Most people still have not done an IA.

You will do this in the Navy most likely anyway.  At some point in your career you will do some "crappy" job for the Navy, or now, you will do some "crappy" job for the army. 

If this war is causing an erosion in core Navy skills, it not from IAs; it is from the shifting of national priorities caused by nine years of ground warfare. 
Even the emphasis on humanitarian aid missions, or counter-piracy probably have more of an effect than 1 year away from the ship. 

BTW: my IA is completely unnecessary as well.  Only 10 months left!

Skippy-san said...

It was US territory. We had soverignty over the Canal Zone.  The Panamanians did not "deserve" it because it was never "their" canal anyway. Carter was wrong to give it to them and we should have abrogated the Panama Canal treaty in 1989.

DeltaBravo said...

Dear Lord, forgive me this day.  I heartily agree with Skippy about something.  Amen.

SCOTTtheBADGER said...

Let's not forget the near vaporization of LISCOMBE BAY, nor the loss of JUNEAU, with most of her crew.  Or the 25,000 casualties it took to take Okinawa.  The press has no idea of what has happened in history.

SCOTTtheBADGER said...

LOL, me, too. YAY SKIPPY-SAN!

DeltaBravo said...

Speaking of the will to sustain casualties....  they're lamenting in the press this week the 1,000 death of a serviceman in Afghanistan.  Every one of them a valued American.

But....

If the Chinese lost 1,000 men an hour in a war, how long before they would run out?  (Or be allowed to quit?)

Someone else can do the math.  I'm just a girl.  ;)

C-dore 14 said...

Got to agree with navymic on this one.  In the long run it probably won't make much difference.  From 66-70 a one year "in-country tour" in Vietnam (the functional equivalent on an IA tour) was the "top priority", especially if you were a Blackshoe coming off your first sea assignment.  Some jobs, like the Riverine Force and NGFS spotters, were worthwhile from a career standpoint.  Most guys, however, went to staffs, were advisors to the RVN Navy, or (like a LT I knew) held jobs like Gunnery Officer of the barracks barge, USS BENEWAH.

OnceAMarine said...

Right there with you DB

xformed said...

DB;

The math is those 1000 wold probably like to have you more than just wear a uniform to work off their maturing systems chemical output...let alone die just because.

The math is to many male in a society makes for war on the neighbors...history says so, time and time again.

DeltaBravo said...

So Russia should worry about Chinese wanting lebensraum?

Anthony Mirvish said...

It's worth reading together with Hughes' "New Navy Fighting Machine" the CDR posted a few weeks ago.  Kraska's piece identifies important issues but doesn't offer any suggestions on what to do about them.  Hughes took the same strategic context and offered some constructive ideas.

Redeye80 said...

Anon,

Stop trying to rewrite history.  Carter made a bad call.  We had a chance to "fix" the issue in '89 but we didn't have the political will to do so.

Grumpy said best "Jimmy Carter:  the gift that just keeps on giving.  He's the Energizer Bunny of stupid."

ewok40k said...

Well, btw, Japan when first achieved its maritime power status, didnt pounce on the RN or USN, but Russian Navy, a force in decline. As for the USN, they might as well wait into 2020s with continuing trends...

Grumpy Old Ham said...

I'm with DB, mark the date and time on this one...

We never seem to learn that "making nice" is a mostly ineffective foreign policy strategy, especially with those who value strength more than goodwill.  We surrendered control of a strategic asset and got bupkis in return.

Sure, the new treaty guarantees us the right to defend the canal...but at this point, as Byron points out, we'd have to fight our way in instead of defending the canal with assets already in place.  Seems to me the latter is easier than the former but I'm just a REMF and would have to defer to others better qualified to make an assessment.

Old NFO said...

Just curious, do you how the nation of Panama come about in the first place?  If Carter had really wanted to do the right thing he would have give the entire thing to Columbia, not an artificial country set up as a support system for a canal.  One thing about Carter though, he's consistent.  Still looking for ways to advance the enemies of America.  Now, thanks to president Jimmy, probably the most strategic asset in the Western Hemisphere is operated by an ever more openly hostile power.  What next?  Maybe Obama can find a way to contract with Hugo Chavez to operate the petroleum distribution system in the US.

ewok40k said...

definitely yes, with own demography in decline and low population density of Siberia, and most of the armed forces facing west at "aggressive NATO"