Where is Our Admiral William Small? Rep. Luria Would Like to Talk to Him.

The Front Porch got some nice top-cover to start the week off. This is good.

As we covered here and on Midrats, sadly, the US Navy’s uniformed and civilian leadership over the last decade left a record of a serial inability to plan for the future of our Navy and worse, clearly define its importance to the security of our republic. 

Compounding the errors at the dawn of this century in the Age of Transformationalism, in the middle of the last decade it became clear to me in stark relief that the key to avoid further compounded errors lies in Congressional action.

We need to identify and support Representatives and Senators of all parties (remember, there are (I) in the Senate), who show the right focus and understanding to lead the required change through legislative change. DOD/DON is incapable of reforming itself, but it will follow the law and the holder of the purse. 

Ultimately, legislative change will need to replace Goldwater-Nichols, the COCOM structures, and accretion bound and ossified procurement system. Until then, we can do other things in parallel that can help shape the future – and must shape our fleet now. 

One such action is strategy.

During to the last Navy strategic effort of heft back in 2007, I dug out my hard copy of the 1986 Maritime Strategy I received as a Midshipman. As this is 2021, let us take a moment to contextualize those timelines.

Here we are in 2021 referencing 2007, 14 years ago, and 1986, 35 years ago. 14 years is the length of time from the end of WWII and the commissioning of our first ballistic missile submarine, the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (SSBN-598). 35 years is the same length of time from the end of WWI to the de facto end of the Korean War.

Yes, we are thinking at the speed of smell.

What about today? What can we do when our uniformed and civilian leadership seem hobbled by socio-political distractions or intellectually frozen in aspic? Again, we need to look to Congress.

One of the congressional leaders navalists should keep in their scan is Rep. Elaine Luria (D-VA). Consistently solid on naval matters, as one would expect from a fellow member of the exalted order of retired Navy Commanders, her article out today at WOTR is worth your time to review.

In it she states one of the most important concepts people in 2021 need to understand about the urgency of the needed change in the direction of our Navy;

As the Navy focuses almost exclusively on future capabilities, it risks overlooking the immediate threats posed by that competition today. A Battle Force 2045 plan does little to ensure a ready battle force in 2025. Today, no longer in uniform, but as the vice chair of the House Armed Services Committee, I believe the constitutional role of Congress “to provide and maintain a navy” should be based on something more than future hopes in technology and budget expectations. We need to be prepared now for any contingencies that may occur on our collective watch.

...

U.S. maritime leaders need to answer the question: How would the U.S. Navy deter or defeat Chinese naval aggression, which may perhaps be compounded and complicated by other states such as Russia, Iran, or North Korea acting opportunistically while U.S. Navy forces are engaged elsewhere?

...

...the U.S. Navy has lost a generation of shipbuilding to failed programs. For example, the DD-21 program office (which resulted in the Zumwalt-class destroyer) was established in 1998. Originally scheduled for a 32-ship production line, but pared down to just three, the Zumwalt and her two sister ships have not deployed. ... Similarly, the CVN-21 program executive office, which was set up to produce what became the Gerald Ford-class aircraft carrier, was established in 1996. The USS Ford has not yet deployed.

...

 Multiple challenges with the Littoral Combat Ship program have resulted in some of those ships being slated for decommissioning only a few years into their intended lifespan. The Constellation-class frigates, intended to provide a more capable alternative to the lightly armed littoral combat ship, will not be present in the fleet in significant numbers for a decade or more.

Hard truth, and glad to hear it from Congress. 

Time is of the essence, and we are late.

Today, U.S. Navy leadership should heed the words of Lehman: “First strategy, then requirements, then the POM, then budget.” The global situation and America’s competitors and adversaries may have evolved, but the process by which the U.S. Navy designs and builds the fleet should take a valuable lesson from the 1980s. If the United States is to remain a global power, it needs a Navy fit for the purpose and the United States, as a nation, needs to make the commitment to prioritize national defense and make this investment.

Verily. 

CS21 Rev.1 Pre-show: Shadow Boxing Without a Light

When does schmaltz hide substance? When has good thinking become too socialized, chopped through too many stakeholders, overstaffed to the point there is nothing to grab hold of?

If you put yourself out there in front of some of your best officers, there are a few things to keep in mind; 1. Don't over-promise and under-deliver, 2. Your audience has finely tuned BS meter, and 3. Don't let your talking points get out of phase with what you are actually bringing to the discussion.

As most of you know, we about to see the roll out of the latest version of our maritime strategy. Rumbles and rumors are starting to come out.

Today we have a guest post anon to you, but not to me. A report from the front lines. The CNO has asked for a "crowd sourced" discussion. I don't think he is using that phrase right, but I know what he means. Well, I think he is going to get it.

The best thing for our nation and its navy is the creative friction only an open, critical, enthusiastic, and sharp elbowed discussion will bring out. When it hits the street, I plan to look at it as an invitation, not a solution.

As our author outlines ... perhaps it is best to keep your expectations low and your powder dry.

Shipmate, over to you.

---

It’s been thirty years since Clara Peller uttered the now well-known phrase “Where’s the beef?” Having just attended the Naval War College’s Current Strategy Forum, I’m left asking the same question. What was touted as an opportunity for the CNO to roll out his updated version of Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power (CS21) came and went with many asking another question: Did I miss something?

Admiral Greenert delivered an engaging and upbeat message addressing the importance of an “all hands on deck” effort to review and reexamine CS21. Suggesting that nobody has been seriously thinking about maritime strategy for the past few years, CNO took off his coat, rolled up his sleeves, and announced that now is the time to get down to work. Unfortunately, getting down to work will prove difficult, because ADM Greenert chose not to share any of his CS21 updates with the hundreds of mid-grade and senior officers in attendance. Perhaps in keeping with his statement, “if you talk about it openly, you cross the line and unnecessarily antagonize,” he instead chose to assemble a small group of hand-selected officers for a late afternoon roundtable discussion. An attendee described the focus group as a perfunctory “check in the block” where the only topic discussed was the PowerPoint outline of what the strategy brief might look like – not the actual strategy.

Admiral Greenert kicked off the symposium by stating, “Everyone – from junior, mid, and senior officers, to scholars, civilians, and retirees – owns a piece of this [strategy].” The problem is that not “everyone” was provided the requisite material to get to work. Why? Is it so heavily classified that it could not be discussed in an open forum? If that is the case, it would stand in stark contrast from previous strategies. Further, if our governing maritime strategy is too sensitive to discuss openly, is it really focused at the strategic level, or have we again mistaken tactics for strategy? Has the CNO grown self conscious of, or as he stated, overly concerned with unnecessarily antagonizing the Chinese? If that is the case, the CNO might have been wise to cancel the entire Current Strategy Forum, since while much of what was discussed during the two-day symposium was enlightening, the overwhelming theme was one of PRC/US alarmism. Does the CNO not really desire an open, “crowd-sourced” discussion (as he suggested)? If that is true, one must ask why he went to such lengths imploring the audience to roll up their sleeves and get to work. Or, is it the case that there are no appreciable changes to the Navy’s grand maritime strategy, and that this version so closely mirrors each previous edition as to be indistinguishable from them, save for new platforms (read: LC$ and J$F procurement). This seems to be the most likely answer. After all, maritime strategy (and military strategy writ large) hasn’t actually been about strategy in a long time.

This bit of the tail wagging the dog is particularly concerning as we sail towards a horizon clouded with fiscal uncertainty. Previous versions of CS21 told us what we were expected to accomplish and to what effect, but came up short of explaining how, and certainly didn’t have an eye toward sequestration. The 2014 rebranding gave the CNO an opportunity to provide an increasingly skeptical Congress (as well as the country in general) reasonably specific objectives and justifications for the funding he’s requested, without trespassing the line of “unnecessarily antagonizing” the Chinese. In choosing to punt, the CNO leaves the door open for us to wonder whether we need LCS and JSF to execute our strategy, or if we’re writing a strategy to justify LCS and JSF.

The author is a carrier aviator and student at the Naval War College. He does not believe Navy leadership fosters an environment such that junior and midgrade officers can write critically, yet respectfully of their seniors.

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UPDATE: Solid additional thoughts by SteelJawScribe. Check 'em out.

URR - we need to start our lecture series ....

Strategery is hard. One of the more common mistakes people make is to confuse the Strategic and Operational in war. Heck - over beers, URR even tripped me up to the point that I am still kicking myself - and I profess to be .... well ... what I was at least.

One of the greater challenge is to talk with those who don't understand that the Strategic is a response to the Political - as in civilians in control - and the direction and guidance they give.

Well - the folks at 6GW are pondering. I have some issue with them conceptually - but they have a good point - one that comes directly from the inadequacy of the latest Maritime Strategy.

... with the US as the sole superpower for the last 20 some-odd years it has been damn tempting to ignore the need to have a deep and cogent strategy, as we’ve had the one military able to project force into where ever we chose and win in terms never before paralleled in history.

Global Maritime Partnerships, Global Commons, and Global Force for Good ain't cutting it. As I mentioned when it came our - 1/3 of The Maritime Strategy is good - but the balance is a muddled bucket of FOD. As a result, the confusion over what our Navy is for and what it should do. If we had what we needed - posts like 6GW just did wouldn't be out there.

Reforming the Confederate Navy

What characterized the Confederate Navy? Though many things - she was scrappy, inventive, and had some outstanding leaders - in line with many things in the Confederacy though, she suffered a fatal flaw that doomed her. In her case, the Confederate Navy placed her bet on a few grand ships to make the "transformational" break.

When we think of the Confederate Navy, we think of the CSS VIRGINIA, CSS HUNLEY, and at least I think of the CSS SHENANDOAH. Wonderful platforms, but in the end did little but absorb people and resources.

The Confederate Navy adapted where she could, but when faced with having to build a fleet from scratch - she threw her lot in with transformationalism. VIRGINIA and HUNLEY were wonderful ground breaking designs and concepts - built against tremendous odds - but in the end they were like the nation they served - beautiful losers destroyed by their own fatal conceits.

What was their conceit? They thought that a few high technological breakthroughs thrown into a few hulls and applied with a bit of tactical verve could triumph over the many primarily pushing sound fundamentals.

I think alternative history is a goofy subject when real history is so much more interesting, but if Sherman never made it through the Atlanta defensive lines and the Democrats won the '64 election - someone would have had the opportunity to look at the wartime record of the Confederate Navy and set about building a better, more balanced fleet based upon what worked.

Funny the things that will tangentially come into one's mind. When I got through looking over the PPT and PDF from the exceptionally poorly titled The New Navy Fighting Machine, what came to mind was the conceptual challenge of a post-war Confederate Navy.

Goofy, no? Well, work with me a bit; tell me if you see it.

---

NPS Professor and retired CAPT Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. and his crew deserve congrats for a very good and thought provoking work - one that if not related, then at least that folds in well with the conversation CDR Henry J. Hendrix, Jr. brought forward in Buy Ford not Ferrari.

You could spend a few thousand words discussing in detail their work - which we don't have time for right now - but let me take some time to point out the good, bad and others.

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The good;
First of all, the PDF shows a great focus on China, and the China challenge influences a lot of their ideas. That intellectual honesty and clear headed view of the future makes the discussion in and from the document of much greater use than the 2/3 of our latest Maritime Strategy that I find so useless. As that touchstone, the China challenge is an important reference when looking at what they offer.

... we anticipate formidable Chinese sea-denial capabilities that will threaten to reduce American influence in East Asia.

Already taking place. I have called it the Porcupine Strategy. They don't have to be the biggest or most dangerous - they just need to make it look too painful to mess with.

Submarines in greater numbers are central to the maritime strategy, but within a constrained budget the larger force cannot be exclusively nuclear powered. We find that diesel submarines with air-independent propulsion not only allow twice as many submarines, but they also nicely complement the SSNs in the critical scenario.

That is for the USA - and I don't think you can buy and maintain twice as many SS as SSN - but perhaps close to 3 to 2. Still a sound concept. If an early 20th Century designed Type VII, then a 21st Century SS can handle a little transit time.

Perhaps most important of all, we emphasize maritime power as the foundation of present American influence and international prosperity. Sea power’s value is well appreciated by our friends around the world, but is taken too much for granted by the American public. The United States is a maritime nation and the United States Navy is its great manifestation.

That last sentence should be put on a bumper sticker and some JOPA DC DET types should put it on cars in all the nice parking spots at the Pentagon.

Concurrent with broad agreement on the new fighting machine’s characteristics, it is necessary to calculate whether its personnel costs will be more or less than the cost of manning, training, and supporting the 313-ship Navy. Our impression is that:
- In numbers, manning 650 mostly smaller ships will be about the same.
- In terms of individual, shipboard team and fleet tactical training, the cost will be somewhat less.
- The cost to support recruiting, assignment, and education will be determined by the outcome of the manning and training calculations.
Here and there we highlight the easier training to competencies for the smaller and more focused warships of the new fighting machine. But, in a different way, the training must be just as sophisticated. Examples are (1) the need to prepare junior commanding officers of patrol craft in the art of theater security and nation building; and (2) the return to professionalism in warships devoted to mine warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and countering swarms of small missile boats—as compared to the well-developed capability to deliver accurate strikes ashore. There is time to change the training as the new fleet is produced, but only if both the different tactics and new training are developed simultaneously with the new operational emphasis.

Manpower. That is the key - sell with sound work manpower considerations.

American nation needs a fleet that is more distributed for flexible presence, adjustable intensities, short and long durations, survival against surprise attack, and which is capable of fighting in tight corners and taking affordable losses. The new fighting machine incorporates many simpler and more single-purposed vessels so that the Fleet can respond more quickly in an unforeseeable direction to a particularly severe threat or rewarding opportunity—what has been called “a Black Swan.” We are arguing against a Navy with warships so hard-wired that an unforeseen surprise will be fatal, because our present fleet is an organization of long lived big warships, some programmed to last 40 years in order to amortize their construction costs.

We are not as hard-wired as we used to be. I think we are already moving in this direction - though we can do better.

Preserving the industrial base for an abrupt expansion is a DoD (Department of Defense) obligation. The industrial base does not appear explicitly in designing the new fighting machine, but an awareness of the need for competition and greater cost controls is implicit everywhere.

Of course, anyone who uses my favorite example of doing it right will always get a gold-star-happy-face. Seriously - this is a story that every officer should know by heart.

Here is an illustration of design experimentation with a happy ending. It is the story of the Treaty Cruisers built under terms of the 1921 Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty. During the 1920s and 1930s, heavy cruiser standard displacement of 10,000 tons was the limiting design factor instead of construction costs. Four classes were designed and built under the treaty, in 1925, 1927, 1929, and 1931-34, each successive class being obviously superior to the previous one. How much superior was a hotly debated question answered in World War II. The first two, supposedly much inferior, ships of the Pensacola class saw as much action as any cruisers, were repaired after battle damage, and survived the war. Looking at the 15 supposedly much improved later cruisers built under treaty limitations, seven—almost half—were sunk. Our impression is that the effectiveness of USS Pensacola and Salt Lake City was about 90% that of the culminating seven-ship USS Astoria class, three of which were destroyed in the Battle of Savo Island in about 15 minutes. Equally important, when the treaty terms were lifted in 1936, we were ready with the design for 17 more heavy cruisers of the magnificent USS Baltimore and Oregon City classes. All were ordered by July 1940 and commissioned before the end of the war. None were sunk.

The following suggestion/compromise about LCS needs to be acted on before we have a few dozen "test beds." As a face-saving move, it iss a good compromise as a chance to move forward with alternatives .... but there isn't much time left to act.

...LCS must not be regarded as a design failure, but as a technological, tactical, and training test bed. The fact that it is suited well neither as a blue water or green water combatant can be useful. On one hand, it can help to design a better armed, less costly blue water frigate. On the other, LCS shows what not to do to develop affordable green water designs to perform inshore patrol missions, clear mines, defeat small missile boats, and screen against coastal submarines.

In a discussion of Green Water, they discuss "Coastal Combatants" ... can we just be clear and call them Corvettes though?

The coastal combatant is not a patrol vessel for theater security operations. It is a small fighting vessel intended to “clear out the clutter” of enemy or neutral vessels in littoral waters. The afloat clutter may be swarms of enemy small craft, fast attack craft carrying surface-to-surface missiles such as the Chinese 220-ton Houbei class, and fishing boats and coastal traders that might serve as reconnaissance posts in a targeting system. Coastal combatants are heavily armed, but small enough to accept affordable losses. They should operate in tactical formations of two, four, eight, or twelve vessels. They carry no surveillance aircraft, so depend on CVLs or shore-based reconnaissance.

Well described, and there are designs already out there (Visby) that fit the bill (BZ to them from bringing up the losing but superior option for LCS). However, as an institution, everyone should stop references the b@st@rd stepchild of Bu11sh1t B1ngo that is Streetfighter and Sealance et al. That buzzword PPT spawn are part of the reason we are where we are in 2010. Use proper naval terms that sound like they are coming form a professional and less like some video game designer. It insults an officer's intelligence and drops everyone's IQ by half a standard deviation every time it goes in the ear.

After the bait and swich snake oil salesmanship of the last decade + that got us where we are today, I am not the only one who is immediately suspicious every time someone starts using too-clever-by-half, cheesy marketing words for what are simply new designs to meet established naval warship niches that have a pedigree which dates back over a century. We should stop trying to be cute - and focus on being professional. Most of the NNFM is good professional work - but the unsightly smear of snake oil degrades its brand a bit ... just a bit.

Off rant and back to the document.

The CVN/CVL discussion is worth almost a specific post in itself. Read the details - but I find this pull quote the best in outlining the argument. Especially if ASBM technology works out in the next decade to the right side of spectrum where we think in will be - having your air assets on more platforms is a progressive risk mitigation strategy that needs much more support.

A calculation of the smaller, but roughly comparable, life-cycle cost of what we argue to be a suitable mix of six CVNs and ten CVLs. The mix carries 620 aircraft, or 12% fewer. We believe the smaller number of aircraft is more than made up for by its flexibility: the CVNs’ powerful short-term punch in a major contingency, complemented by the CVLs’ advantage of greater distributability.

The Navy has service life remaining in many existing CVNs, but a CVL needs to be debated, designed, and built at once to test its compatibility with the F-35B, to develop an early warning aircraft capability, and to explore mixes of aircraft for green water operations, including UAVs. Absent such a CVL, we believe that on affordability grounds alone, the total number of aircraft carriers will shrink to eight within the next two decades and, absent the development of a CVL, with no redress possible.

Like the CVN/CVL discussion, the SSN/SSK discussion is worth a post all its own. The work is VERY Salamanderesque - so you can assume, rightly, that I pretty much agree with 95% of it. They had me at the start when they use a story I tell every time people tell me that that they tell me, "We have plenty of ASW weapons."

The Falklands War of 1982 is a cautionary tale of two submarine fleets having major effects on the enemy in a maritime war. Early in the war, the United Kingdom’s HMS Conqueror, an SSN, sank the aged Argentine cruiser General Belgrano. Seemingly as a result, the Argentine Navy withdrew into port and took itself out of the war, thus isolating the Falklands from substantial reinforcement or resupply. On the other side, one old Argentine submarine harassed the British task force out of all proportion to its nominal combat value. Literally hundreds of ASW torpedoes were fired by the screening destroyers on contacts that proved to be false. Submarines as sea denial systems can influence enemy operations disproportionate to their numbers and cost.

If we go to war - it will be criminal what has happened to our ASW capabilities. It will make the unarmored HUMVEE look like a success. I will leave it at that.

Here is the Salamderesque nature of it squared - sure to upset the usual suspects, which makes it all the more fun.

A total of 80 submarines, with special emphasis on China.

- Of these, there will be 40 SSNs at $2.5B each (if the price can be reduced, the number can rise) and 40 AIP submarines at $500M-$700M each (we show $700M in Table 2 and make the same comment as to the latter’s price and numbers).
- A set of 100 submarines would be better than 80 to defeat China, but in the absence of detailed operating plans and analysis, 80 seems sufficient and an acceptable risk, especially based on our premise that we must have allies in the unlikely case of a war with China.

Admiral Dönitz nods his head in agreement,

Some submarines should be equipped and trained for minelaying.

Serious, dedicated training - not spitting a few out and running.

On the amphibious side of the house, they outline well the Tiffany Green Eyeshade amphibious problem.

In history, opposed landings involved scores of ships and we expected to lose ships and assault craft as well as troops. Today, the large-capacity, efficient amphibious assault ships—LHAs, LHDs, LPDs, etc., are few in number compared to the LSTs, APAs, and AKAs that were the backbone of the opposed assaults in World War II and Korea. Now, the loss of even one amphibious ship would probably terminate the operation in failure.

The solution - well - call it a "prepare and ponder" strategy. Leesea, call your office.

For $1.0B of annual SCN, a fleet composed of between 100 and 150 ships can be maintained for amphibious lift, delivery and sustainment. Many sealift ships will be large, high-capacity RoRos, container ships, and tankers, constructed or purchased at an average cost of about $500M. Others will be small, simple “HSVs,” to quickly move ground forces to a scene of action demanding swift response. Some will be amphibious ships of 15,000 to 25,000 tons for unopposed delivery across a beach or at an undeveloped landing site. In Table 2, we show a sealift fleet of 125 ships, including propositioning ships. This capability will suffice for any likely conflict involving ground combat overseas. The current numbers are between 80 and 90 reasonably modern, large-capacity vessels, plus 31 large ships for amphibious lift. If a large regional war ensues, the U.S. merchant fleet can be requisitioned, but it is relatively small, so leasing from neutrals around the world might be necessary, as was done for Desert Shield.

We espouse a ten-year holiday in which no high-cost amphibious ships are built. Much of the existing amphibious assault force can serve for many more years in the unlikely case of the need to conduct an opposed Marine assault (e.g., in Lebanon or Syria). The amphibious ships will also serve effectively as interim Global Fleet Station ships.

Almost a punt on their part. I think this part of their plan in not as mature as the others and needs more work. I like the direction they are going in - but it isn't fully baked.

The bad;

Although our green water fleet of about 240 vessels is more attuned to the needs of the nation than anything else we have seen,..

Snerk. Of course you silly geese - it is your proposal. You almost have the confidence of a blogger ......

For example, the green water component also includes an additional 400 affordable and easy-to-operate inshore patrol craft to help build up the capabilities of some countries without navies or coast guards.

Still trying to grasp that concept, and "affordable" needs a lot of defined truth in 2010 as we have destroyed that meaning in Congress and with the taxpayer over the last decade. Also, that is a LOT of LT and LCDR Commands .. might be a good way to break the present officer career path diktat --- and get more sea and Command time -- but to make that happen would require a complete manpower restructure. Also a chance to break a lot of paradigms WRT how we man our Navy ... but that needs a lot more fleshing out and in the end, I think 400 is way too large - at least at the start.

We do not believe the present U.S. Navy organization will achieve a green water force, and so our most important recommendation is to create a new command with the authority to foster professionalism in coastal operations similar to that by which the Navy developed naval aviation in the 1920s and 1930s.

Ungh. No. Only if you kill two U.S. Navy organizations will Emperor Salamander permit you to create a new one. Too much Staff Bloat as it is.

Large, multipurpose warships are not, as is frequently argued, more flexible and adaptable than smaller, more focused warships. We repeatedly found cases in which “single purpose” warships are superior in effectiveness and for swift modernization. As an example, the green water component includes 12 gunfire support ships because we believe embedding guns in DDGs, CGs, or other missile-firing surface ships will not result in effective naval gunfire support.

Ehhhh, maybe. Hedging you bets with a High-Low is a better path, methinks.

The smaller, more distributable ships can free the inevitably fewer high-end warships for more demanding operations.

Correct. Piracy is a perfect example, as we have often discussed - but if you only have a few high-end ships, they aren't going to do much for a global Navy - remember, you can't be at sea forever.

Training and career development of Navy officer and enlisted personnel will be enhanced with more single-minded ships. For example, after 1990, ASW (Antisubmarine Warfare) skills atrophied in the surface navy because of its emphasis on offensive and defensive missile warfare. ASW proficiency will be hard to restore in missile ships. By contrast, the Israeli Navy’s training allowed them to quickly adopt new tactics for its highly focused Sa’ar boats, which defeated Egyptian and Syrian missile boats in the first significant missile war in 1973, despite their Gabriel missiles being seriously outranged by the enemy’s Soviet-built SS-N-2s.

Good point, in parts - but "single-minded" is neither the cure or for Israel the reason.

Neither good nor bad:
A broader area of disagreement I have with the authors is a focus on single purpose ships. As described, especially the Gun Support Ship - I think it is worth looking at, especially if you can give it a basic AAW capability which isn't too hard with the ESSM as described. Then it is a little more multi-purpose that makes me feel better, as when possible - you need multi-mission capability as the enemy decides how he is going to attack you, be ready. My bias is towards multi-mission, but as you get smaller, you have less of that luxury .... though even the WWII face DE's had quite the multi-mission capability .... as did PT boats .... so the "it's too small" argument may need work.

Strange and sad thing though is a desire to remove the gun from CG and DDG. Again, they seem to want to pull away from a multi-mission capability. Uni-mission ships simply do not have a good history.

Remember the quote by LT Copeland? As was amply shown during the Falkland Islands War and 5-inch Friday - a multipurpose gun is needed on every warship that can carry it - the larger the better. A multipurpose gun is the Leatherman of naval warfare - all sorts of uses in one package. I would caution being too binary when it comes to NGFS (nee NSFS)- but following is on balance good - quite good.

These are single-purpose ships carrying two of the best guns available for naval gunfire support (NGFS), such as an advanced gun system (AGS), with 2,000 rounds, precise navigation, countermine underwater search, and evolved sea sparrow missiles (ESSM) combined with softkill defense at short range. The Gunfire Support Ship need have only a small surface search radar (because it will operate in company), no stealth properties (because it will reveal its position in action), and no sonar or ASW (antisubmarine warfare) ordnance (as a cost-saving measure). Hull size will be determined by the minimum space and sturdiness required for two guns and their ammunition, which in turn will determine what form of UAV for reconnaissance it may carry.

Littoral warfare operations ashore can be greatly enhanced by the low cost, high volume, and overall efficiency of naval weaponry over aerial bombing or land attack missiles. When in range, the ships are also superior to land-based artillery, which has a large support tail.

Guns in CGs and DDGs are ill-matched because their land attack missiles reach deep inland but must be fired safely from their maritime sanctuary, which is now sometimes 100 miles or more offshore. Missiles are expensive and so best suited for select, fixed, high-value targets to complement the Gunfire Support ships that produce rapid, high-volume fire in support of the battlefield. ... NGFS is an important responsibility of the Navy and if and when any new technology has been demonstrated, swift introduction is unlikely without a force component dedicated to the mission, the value of which was amply demonstrated in the European and Pacific theaters of World War II, in Korea at the Pusan perimeter, Inchon, and Hungnam, and repeatedly during the long Vietnam War.

The Blue Water discussion is interesting - but has some problems.

An ominous trend (although the data sample is small) is that the success percentages of the attackers have gotten better since 1975. Since it seems predictable that the offense will continue to regain the advantage over a defender’s surface-to-air missiles, it is a mistake to rely heavily on expensive DDGs and CGs with Aegis and SAMs. We do not want to eliminate these capable ships and we think new ones should be added periodically as technology advances. If the ships were more easily and quickly updated to neutralize the natural advantage that is possible with ASCMs and TBMs (Theater Ballistic Missiles), we would be more optimistic about their future value. In the meantime, we propose to let attrition at end of life reduce the number of DDGs to a steady state force of 30.

Sure ---- but no one has ever tried to attack an Aegis ship with a ASCM. The HMS SHEFFIELD and USS STARK that they reference earlier are not Aegis ships. I understand the need to decrease funding of large ships to buy more smaller - but I think they might be going too heavy on the small side than the Blue Water side. Just my opinion. I share their concerns with ASCM and ASBM - but better AAW is the answer, not fewer AAW platforms with legacy systems.

On the lower side of the Blue Water force though, they get it exactly right.

To maintain total surface combatant numbers for offensive action and screening at around 140, we conjecture a new blue water frigate similar to those in the other navies of the world. They emphasize sea control but are capable of escorting large and small carriers, amphibious lift, and delivery and sustainment shipping. They carry at least eight long-range surface-to-surface missiles, a helicopter or UAVs, have a capable ASW suite, and strong, short-range hard and soft kill defenses.
There are many international frigates and corvettes that serve as examples for developing an affordable design, which should be evolutionary, but cost, at most, $400M in series production. These include Turkey’s new MILGEM class corvette, Singapore’s Formidable class frigate, Indonesia’s Sigma class corvette, India’s Project 28 frigate, and the Russian Steregushchiy class frigate.

Airtight. Their concept for dedicated land attack Corvettes - different than the Gun Corvettes, also has some merit for discussion - and I like this "influence squadron."

A compact task group with a land-attack mission might consist of four missile corvettes carrying 200 improved Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs), plus a CVL, a DDG, and two new frigates.

They end up with a proposal. Could I live with this?

- Build DDGs at a limited rate, sufficient to keep one shipbuilder’s line open, and to keep technology current, but with the intent of reducing the Aegis force to 30 warships within 25 years. The steady state force of 30 ships costs $60B, so the SCN per year for a 30-year combat life is $2.0B.
- Introduce several affordable frigate designs of 2,500 to 3,000 tons and about 25 knots, with the goal of creating a force of 90 ships at a unit cost of $400M. Essential features are at least eight upgraded TASMs (tactical Antiship Missiles), strong close-in defense, and a modern ASW suite. The ships will emphasize sea strikes and ASW. Each must carry a helicopter or pair of UAVs.
- Design and build simple corvettes carrying about 50 land-attack missiles—upgraded TLAMs as it were. They are not fast, but 25 knots is desirable. They operate in silence, with any radiating platform being in the air or scores of miles away. Because of their simplicity and American shipbuilder design experience with stealth properties, the first design will probably be very much like the final one.

Merely for completeness we include here a component of 20 auxiliaries. The numbers and costs are unchanged from the 313-ship Navy plan.

Absolutely. This is much better than the mix we have right now.

Why is there so much here I agree with? Well, on balance I think it is because they tried their best to root their program in an understanding of history and a realistic expectation of what technology can gain you in the foreseeable future.

NOT A TRANSFORMATIONAL FLEET

Doubtless the structure herein is jarring to those content with the Navy’s current emphasis on power projection and faith in a continuing sanctuary at sea. Nevertheless, insofar as possible, the new fighting machine comprises only well-developed and tested capabilities responding to current circumstances in the spirit of Bradley Fiske’s goal of unity between policy, strategy, and warship characteristics. We often illustrated the fighting machine’s ship characteristics with existing foreign warships, especially borrowing their ideas for coastal operations. We also drew from nascent domestic attempts to create a more distributed force.

Nowhere does the new fighting machine depend upon technological innovations such as the sensors, SAMs, and command-control for advances in BMD; directed energy weapons, rail guns, robots, dirigibles with surveillance radars, and exotic hull forms.

Radical? No; a refreshingly sound and professional work. You can discuss the ideas in this work as adults because there is a minimal amount of "fairy dust" in here - told with simple and direct language; things often missing in such documents produced over the last 15 years.

Finally, back to the Confederate Navy. What would a Confederate Navy look like if they looked at what did and did not work for them in the war while maintaining their curious intellect? Perhaps in a modern sense, such a POV could produce a scaled down version of this.

- CVLs for both blue and green water operational flexibility.
- Land-attack missile ships, each carrying 50 missiles and numbering about 20 inexpensive vessels that can be deployed in pairs or task forces tailored to the risks and demands.
- A new class of AIP diesel submarines to complement the more expensive SSNs for an increasingly important role in sea denial.
- At least 12 dedicated naval gunfire support corvettes that can quickly and affordably go where the ground action demands, be put at risk according to circumstances on the ground, and more readily embrace new NGFS technology when it is tested and ready to install.
High-speed mine clearance vessels that can be on station quickly to clear the way for the operation.
- A large number of smaller, less expensive frigates to complement a smaller number of DDGs and boost surface combatant numbers at less SCN cost.
- At least nine single-purpose strategic defense BMD-DDGs for deterrence.

In many ways, though the name gives me heartburn - but that is just me. the NNFM document and PPT that go with need to be looked at as the very serious and usefull thought pieces that they are. In my view, they are a much more useful document than the last Maritime Strategy when it comes to looking forward to why we need a Fleet and what we can do with it.

Galrahn's discussion at his place on the work is well worth your time, so give him a visit too.

CNO's 2010 Guidance

Two words: lost opportunity.

If you have not done your homework - then click here, read it then come back.

Before we plow in, let's look at the message traffic.

R 021754Z SEP 09
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC
TO AL NAVADMIN
NAVADMIN
INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC
BT
UNCLAS
PLEASE PASS TO ALL OFFICE CODES:
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC//N00//
TO NAVADMIN
UNCLAS //N05000//
NAVADMIN 255/09
MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/N00/SEP// SUBJ/CNO GUIDANCE FOR 2010// GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. I HAVE RELEASED MY GUIDANCE FOR 2010 AND POSTED IT ONLINE AT WWW.NAVY.MIL.
2. MY 2010 CNO GUIDANCE REAFFIRMS MY FOCUS AREAS AND 18 INTENTIONS, WHICH I ARTICULATED IN MY PREVIOUS GUIDANCE. IT ALSO HIGHLIGHTS SOME OF OUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS OVER THE PAST YEAR IN EXECUTING THE MARITIME STRATEGY. WE WILL BUILD UPON THIS PROGRESS AND SEEK NEW OPPORTUNITIES IN THE YEAR AHEAD.
3. MY 2010 GUIDANCE CONSIDERS THE STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND FISCAL CHALLENGES WE FACE TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE. TO FURTHER REFINE OUR COURSE, THIS YEAR'S GUIDANCE PROVIDES ADDITIONAL FOCUS FOR MY 18 INTENTIONS AND IDENTIFIES 5 INTENTIONS ON WHICH I WILL PLACE PARTICULAR EMPHASIS:
A. CONTINUE TO BE THE DOMINANT, READY NAVAL FORCE ACROSS ALL MARITIME MISSIONS B. BUILD A NAVY WITH APPROPRIATE FORCE STRUCTURE AND STRATEGIC LAYDOWN C. ACHIEVE DECISION SUPERIORITY D. ALIGN THE REQUIREMENTS, RESOURCES AND ACQUISITION PROCESSES E. EVOLVE AND ESTABLISH INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 4. READ MY GUIDANCE CLOSELY AND USE IT TO INFORM YOUR ACTIONS AND COMMUNICATION.
5. WE ARE ON THE RIGHT COURSE TO SEIZE THE MANY OPPORTUNITIES AHEAD. YOUR IMPRESSIVE WORK AFLOAT AND ASHORE MAKES ALL OF US PROUD AND IS KEY AS WE TAKE OUR NAVY INTO THE FUTURE AT THIS IMPORTANT TIME IN OUR NATION'S HISTORY. THANK YOU FOR YOUR DEDICATED SERVICE AND FOR THE STEADFAST SUPPORT OF YOUR FAMILIES.
6. RELEASED BY ADMIRAL G. ROUGHEAD, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.//
BT
#0001

NNNN

Now some general comments. First things first - it is way too long. At 15 pages it is at least twice the length is should be. The format is part of the problem.

Because of the format, it reads like what it probably was - a "block responsibility" work of different authors glued together at the end with an intro and conclusion thrown in for good measure. As a result, it is irritatingly repetitived. Not only within "blocks," but between them as well. Some ideas and topics are repeated three to four times. A secondary problem - and I feel the pain of the final editor - is the logical result of having too many people in the chop chain - basic editing problems that get lost in the "move this to here and then back again" nature that MS Word allows.

Just one example of the type; PPBE is defined on page 12 but is used first on page 9. The SME specific acronym overload is too high for such a document as well. Way to wonkish unless you have spent most of your career assigned to the Potomac Flotilla. The end result is that even for a wonkish squid like myself, interest in going further sinks like a stone after about page 4.

Yes, I know I sound critical - but I wanted better. I wanted better because now more than ever the Fleet hungers for clear, precise, jargon-free Direction and Guidance from its Commander. We really need to think like we are sending something manually on HF TTY. Keep that mindset, and we would all be better.

I worked for a great Admiral that had a habit of handing things back to you saying, "Cut it in half." Sigh, where is that attitude when you need it most?

Enough of the general, let's go to the specific from my POV.

First paragraph starts out strong with pulling out some of the useful bits from the Maritime Strategy. It follows up with a shout-out to those parts of the Navy participating in the Long War, and follows up with core at-sea mission areas. At this point, I was very happy about what might follow. Very strong opening.

The second paragraph starts to wander a bit. Did you notice the,

"...stretched in our ability to meet additional operational demands. Our budget is pressurized..."

... bit? I believe that these are the "challenges" referred to later in,

... we are well prepared to meet (the challenges) and transform them into opportunities ...

Excuse me? I don't care who you are - you cannot transform a tight budget in the face of an overused capital base into opportunities unless you plan on setting the conditions to sell a massive downsizing and restructuring at lower but more efficient output level. That is just happy-talk.

Oh, and how in Neptune's name can a budget be "pressurized?" Like a space suit? An A/C system? A bike tire? Ungh. Horrible Potomac Flotilla phrase. Kill it now before it can reproduce.

This is when things started getting wobbly as the above followed another solid review of the CNO's Focus Areas. Next is a nice emphasis of his "Top 5 Intentions." Five is a good number for Commander's Intent - 18 is too many. It would be better to stick with the Top 5 and turn the other 13 into 2010 Key Indicators of Progress. But this ain't my show....

The next section goes through Building the Future Force. We show a little leg from the smart-set with this bit,

... improve our capability and capacity to meet increasing Combatant Commander demands for integrated air and missile defense and open ocean anti-submarine warfare.

Hey! Phiby like! I don't seem so crazy anymore with an eye to the Long Game ....

However - I soon felt like I just had a Midwatch boloney sandwich, you know - the ones where the boloney is getting green but you can't tell in red lighting - with the following.

... conducted the "Leveraging the Undersea Environment" wargame...

That is the worst wargame name for FY09.

Things turn up again with this long waited move,

We moved Navy Expeditionary Combat Command operations into our base budget.

Took almost as long as it took to defeat Germany in WWII - but I'll take it.

Moving to page 4, I snickered at this mention,

We created navyformoms.com as a virtual community for parents and other key influencers to communicate with each other.

Snerk. Better late than never to come out, I guess.

At the bottom is a good example of a "what" that avoids the "so what." It is the "so what" that we need- as I don't see a Fleet size mention anywhere.

Our FY10 budget better aligned our program with the path our maritime Strategy has set; however, we are progressing at an adjusted pace.

That needs to be fleshed out. I'll call it now - by the end of FY10 we will have a new, lower "minimum Fleet size."

Sometimes we try too hard to bang that MBA square peg in the round hole of the military.

We will seek out and embrace "Game Changers" .... at the left end of the kill chain.

Ummm, ok. Claim your MSM at the desk after you get your plaque.

How many ways can you say "Strategic Homeporting?" I hope this is a new one, because I will take "strategic laydown" if that means we can mitigate the "Christmas Eve at the pier" scenario.

We are moving towards a strategic laydown of our forces that will ensure effective operations in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

I also think that "man-made disaster" is the new "global replace" phrase for "terrorist attack." Good Salamander-approved thinking though.

We have a "where is the accountability" moment on page 7,

We will restore discipline and rigor in our requirements...

Great. First apologize for all the hate mail sent to me over the last half-decade by those who said we did not have a "discipline and rigor" problem - and send Sid and Byron a gift card at the NEX for the grief they got as well. Second, who was in charge when we were "undisciplined and lacked rigor" and will they be held accountable? Do you, as CNO, accept any responsibility for it? If so, why and for what reason did you/we lose the bubble? That is important to know so we don't make the same mistakes in the future - and that others are comfortable talking about the mistakes they have made in their career.

By the end of page 7, things just drag, repeat, and made me grumpy. A few examples:
- Page 9: Bu11sh1t Bingo phrase of the day, "Tone of the Force."
- Page 10:

"We will continue to focus on diversity accessions and retentions, focusing outreach efforts on key influences in diversie communities to ensure the face of the nation is reflected in our Navy."

Normal font, good: bolded font, racist thinking unworthy of our Navy.

How silly and tired that is getting. Do you want those who do the recruiting for your favorite football team to "...ensure the face of the nation is reflected in our Team."?

Of course not - you want the best you can possibly get from the best. It is that simple. If a coach in 2009 went out with the attitude to have his team strictly reflect the DNA of the USA he would rightfully be fired on the spot.

Enough of that shameful habit of our Navy - I want to end on a strong, happy note - the last paragraph.

We are privileged to serve in the United States Navy at this time in history. Seek out and create the opportunities that will sustain our maritime dominance today and in the future.

That we can all nod our head to. NB: throughout our history those who have sought out new ideas and concepts have run into great head winds.

Turn into the wind.

Martime Strategy Monday: Internal STRATCOM

BZ to all involved in this. Regardless of what you may think of the present MARSTRAT - this was smart.

Issue: Discovery Channel Documentary

Discussion: Discovery Channel continues work on a 3-part documentary focusing on various aspects of the Maritime Strategy in action. The series is expected to air around Labor Day 2009. The intent of this project is to provide the American public with a comprehensive view of the Navy through interesting and compelling television. A Discovery Channel embark was recently completed in the C5F AOR for the at-sea mini series. The trip was a success, with filming aboard various ships to include the USS BOXER (LHD 4) and USS EISENHOWER (CVN 69). The next step is the production of vignettes for use by Navy Recruiting. A Discovery production crew will be traveling to Monterey, CA this week to shoot a segment on the CTI community. CTI1(NAC) Angel Diaz, serving as an instructor at the Defense Language Institute, will be interviewed for the segment. He is fluent in both Spanish and Arabic and is an outstanding Sailor.

Desired effect: Showcase the 21st century Navy in a unique and compelling way across a multitude of communication mediums. Discovery Channel intends to air this production in both English and Spanish.

Action: None. FYSA only.

I know Galrahn hit it earlier this year, but it is worth repeating.

Hat tip BUPERS Spy.

Maritime Strategy Monday: Realist, Academic, Historian, Theorist

How do you start an intellectual Naval War? Simple, you publish something like The Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Anthony H. Cordesman's new report, "Abandon Ship: The Costly Illusion of Unaffordable Transformation."

In general, the Realists embrace the power of good, the Academics are easily seduced by the succubus of perfection - but let's not let my own bias bleed in too much...

The below is collection of selected portions of an email thread (origins described in the disclaimer at bottom) with my comments where needed. As there is no room to put in the entire thread, I think the selected pull quotes outline broadly the multiple camps that helped put together the latest Maritime Strategy and continue to work the issues that revolve around it and its aftermath.

Though there is a lot of violent agreement, the different perspectives represent in general two distinct areas of thought; the Realists who accept imperfection and reflect on historical norms, and the Academics who embrace the complicated, cleverly crafted constructs of the future perfect. The Academics' belief in the wisdom of their own insight often lead them to believe that they have grasped the previously unseen, allowing them to use the alchemy of their desire to transmute the lead of the known into the gold of the hoped for. All would be fine if their opponents would just shut up and do what they say --- but what fun would that be?

Without question, both sides are populated by exceptionally smart, patriotic, and talented writers well versed in their profession. They just happen to see things from different angles and contexts.

Enough of my babble though, let's look at the thread. A style note; I have removed all trace of the author's names and where they work, but otherwise their words are as they came in the email. There are four players here; the two major ones; The Realist and The Academic, and two smaller players; The Theorist and The Historian.

First of all, you need to read Cordesman's article if you have not already, then you will be ready to go.

---

Here are the parts of the executive summary of Cordesman's article that started it all that I like.

The Navy's procurement policy is in serious disarray. Unrealistic force plans, overoptimistic cost estimates, unrealistic projections of technical feasibility, and inadequate program management have created an unaffordable ship building program, led the Navy to phase out capable ships for new ships it cannot fund, and threaten the US Navy's ability to implement an effective maritime strategy.
...
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the execution of the Navy's current 30-year shipbuilding plan would cost an average $25 billion per year, 30 percent above Navy estimates. Cost overruns, such as estimated $1 billion for the CVN-78 aircraft carrier jeopardize the entire program. Overoptimistic cost estimates have led Navy officials to shift funding to the outyears. This will cause a temporary shortfall of carriers and a breach of US law.

Unrealistic cost estimates and doubts about requirements have led to the cancellation of the DDG-1000 guided missile destroyer project. After expenditures of over $10 billion, the program is abandoned at two ships, and the production line of the older Arleigh Burke-class destroyer will be reopened. A similar fate has struck the Littoral Combat Ship program, where a threefold cost increase and unrealistic schedules led to the cancellation of appropriations for the next two ships and to consequential rescheduling of the program. The discrepancy between plans, strategy, and reality will further produce a shortfall of nuclear submarines of up to seven boats over twelve years.

Summarized the shipbuilding, LCS, DDG-1000 tags below well - nothing real new or shocking in the summary.

This reality-strategy disconnect in the entire shipbuilding program is a case study in failed leadership on the part of the most senior officers and civilians in the Navy. No reforms in procurement, changes in program management, cost analysis, and test and evaluation can begin to compensate for taking hard and realistic decisions at the top, and holding senior flag officers, senior civilians, and the Secretary of the Navy accountable.

The correct cure mostly, though ... SECNAV Winter is not the problem. Neither is the present CNO.

If, like me, you initially stopped reading at the Summary be warned before you sing its praises too high - the body of the report isn't all that great in many respects. That being said, I don't want to focus to fisking it - I'll let smarter folks do that - no it is the response to it I am interested in.

---

Rising to the bait, The Academic starts the conversation,

Perhaps Mr. Cordesman has ammunition to back up his rather shotgunned and scathing assertions,

Yep, hoped for Effect generated - and the argument is joined. The Academic continues,

...(Cordesman) also says:

"A strategy that cannot be implemented or resourced is not a strategy, but rather a critical failure in leadership and management. It is nothing more that a statement of hopes and good intentions without credibility."

There is no blank sheet of paper available to the Navy nor is there a clean slate date when we can say "that was then, this is now." The maritime strategy was plopped down on a whole bunch of existing programs and documents. What Cordesman is missing is the fact that the Navy has a strategy that was developed to actually produce beneficial strategic effects for the US around the world (which it is doing). We have just completed a Global Wargame which is another step in a disciplined process to go from strategy to force structure. This process will probably not produce a definitive position on forces until maybe POM-12 or later, but neither did we put together a clear picture of the "600 ship navy" overnight, much less the Big Blue Fleet that won WWII in the Pacific. Regardless of preexisting difficulties, current leadership (including Mullen) should get credit for putting the rudder over in the best possible way - turning the Navy into a strategically thinking organization.

Interesting disconnect. We seem to be inside our own OODA Loop. If we are so lost, then who is being held responsible (including Mullen)? Who had the con while when we got lost? When did we stop thinking Strategically? Why? Did we really, or did only certain parts? Nice start.

If we can weather the spurious critiques such as this, I predict the Navy will be looking real good about this time next year.

Ick. Being dismissive of an opposing force gets you killed at sea; intellectually it can make you look a itty-bit arrogant and your argument vulnerable. There are holes in the article, and in some places can bring a giggle or harumph -- but it isn't a total fabrication --- nor are better critiques like it. Don't dismiss, dismember.

---

Back to the email. From the deep reaches of cyberspace's To: and Cc: lines though, the battle-hardened and over-caffeinated Realist just can help himself and responds.

The bottom line is that until the Navy demonstrates it can design affordable ships and execute a stable shipbuilding program within reasonable future budget projections, it will continue to take these shots, deserved or not. This is true regardless of the soundness of the strategy. The "inside the beltway political maneuvering" --which I see collectively as the strategic budgeting process...you know, the part about Congress maintaining a Navy...is an important part of making any strategy a reality. I don't think you should dismiss it so lightly.
...
Now don't get me wrong. I think there is a lot of good in the maritime strategy. However, I am less convinced than you it is some sort of seminal document. It conforms with the broad outlines of cooperative partnership building outlined in the 2004-2005 National Defense and National Military Strategies and 2006 QDR. It is a nice packaging of many traditional naval concepts of persistent forward presence, etc. It codifies the transition to two fleet hubs which occurred after the end of the Cold War. It elevates maritime security and HA/DR to core capabilities (I would argue these always were core capabilities). But it is so very broad that almost any force structure the Navy comes up with from here out could be "justified" by the strategy. Still a lot of work to do.

---

With The Realist's cannonade reverberating through his hull, The Academic starts to back off a bit .. just a little ... as the battle has now moved far beyond the initial catalysis.

On the other hand, I think it can be used as a criterion for judging the suitability and acceptability of various options. Feasibility is at least partially a matter of issues outside the strategy such as valid cost estimating, etc. At heart, the document is a strategic communication. I believe this because of the reaction I have seen from naval colleagues around the world (even China), which has been positive in ways I did not anticipate. In a similar vein, the Global game we just did, with the participation of reps from 19 other navies, served as both an analytical tool and a vehicle for the execution of the strategy.

Ungh. Quickly falling into the pit of the Global Maritime Partnership (nee 1,000 Ship Navy), seduced by the fool's gold that ignores the experience of Afghanistan and JTF-HOA when it comes to relying on other nations to execute your Strategy and achieve your desired End State. There is one simple word that needs to be said; caveats.

We should be a Navy with global reach, not a Global Navy. 19 nations are not under the control of the CINC, and are not accountable to the American taxpayer.

In the context of the way that machinery operates, the number is both reasonable and justifiable. Until he has something underpinned by newer and supportable analysis, the CNO can't easily jump around to other numbers. As the Navy's Strategic Planning Process matures and progressive issues of the Navy Strategic Plan flow into the N8 processes, we are liable to see the number change, but this will take a while. In the meantime, the CNO has to manage the atmospherics of transitioning from the process we have had for some years to the new one. I don't see how he moves off 313 without support from the new process, despite what you and many others justifiably see as quite apparent and compelling disconnects between budget realities and the POR.

There. You had to throw in N8 and POR somewhere, didn't you? He is, of course, exactly right. Pesky facts again.

Then again, I want everyone to think of the build-up of the navy from '39 to '45 (same time frame as 2002 to 2008) and then read that quote again then flow right to the next. You will start to see, if you don't work in it, the self-generating bureaucratic goo that we are stuck in. The Mastodons and Saber Tooth Tigers still think that it is simply mud. They are too close - they just don't see it.

The maritime strategy development process explicitly and persistently banned any talk of numbers or types of ships, mostly to avoid the wrangling that was going on between the supporters and detractors of the "3/1 Strategy." There are some folks who adamantly hold to the notion of a general purpose force and others who are equally passionate about the need for a tailored force. These opinions seem to be cultural rather than analytic. There is no solution by continuing to argue at the level of budgets and forces; you have to, as Mullen ordered us, "elevate the discussion." We did, and that discussion was hard enough. There did not seem to be any way to get to force structure in good order given our geostrategic starting point and the time we had available. Ten months down the road from the strategy's signing, Global Wargame didn't even get us there. The N8 folks will have to take the game's output and figure out what it all means in terms of numbers and types.

Tar. Hot, sticky, thick tar. Look at that time line again.

---

Off the top rope! The Realist warms my heart.

At the risk of turning this into a blog (!): We are in broad agreement. Lots of change going on. Coupled with uncertainty over the next administration, the planning horizon is extremely muddled. Navy is well served by sticking with the strategy and riding out the turbulence until things start to clear. In the meantime, lots of choppy water ahead, especially on the program side.
...
The 1980s maritime strategy benefited from being congruent with war planning. And I would note that the 600-ship Navy was already built in the mind of John Lehman before the strategy was published; just read the speech he gave on the day he was sworn in: 15 CVBGs, 4 BBSAGs, 100 SSNs, etc, etc. The numbers drove the strategy as much as the strategy drove the numbers. The strategy's great usefulness was to explain broadly how we intended to use the 600 ships in time of war, and the strategic value the nation would get from building them. Congress bought was sold, and the Navy was off to the races.

Perfect. Cutting to the core,

... the big question is not whether the strategy is a good or bad one, it is this: can we design a "300-ship Navy" that is affordable over the long run?

The Realist also deflates The Theorist's recurring theme of The Maritime Strategy --- that it is a Strategic Communications device. If so, they were too clever by half in that it undermines the whole. If they wanted it to be, or others are going to use it as a StratCom device, that would explain some of the problems I have with it.

I see the current maritime strategy as simply telling the world how we intend to use the ships we build for war in peacetime. That is quite fine as far as it goes, and is very good for strategic communication. However, I think the Navy made a fundamental mistake by not making this point perfectly clear up front, since, it seems to me, that Congress still buys a Navy fundamentally to win wars. Hence their frustration in the strategy not saying more about how the Navy intends to handle China.

Exactly the concern many of you have voiced here.

...there is as great a value to telling the Congress in unclassified strategies how the Navy will help defend the homeland, win the Long War, contend with Chinese anti-access strategies, and confront nuclear-armed regional adversaries as there is to tell our allies how we intend to work with them in cooperative maritime partnerships in peacetime. That is the real way to garner resources.

Here he hits again at what I see as a critical failure in parts of our MarStrat -- hoping other nations will supply the means to do our job. It is a false hope, and hope isn't a strategy. We always have and will work with other navies, often with great success - often without. One thing we must keep in mind is that they, like us, have their own nation's interests at heart. Nations have permanent interests; not permanent allies. Allies can go away at any moment - a Fleet takes decades to build.

---

As The Theorist attempts to disengage, he returns to his argument that Operational concerns should be influenced and directed by the Strategy and not the other way around. True at first glance from a static, academic, and doctrinal point of view; the hierarchy of Strategic-Operational-Tactical is sound and exact, but historical fact describes a more complicated interrelationship.

The French and German Strategic reasons for invading Russia were sound, but the Operational concerns of logistical support, reinforcements (..and in the German case insufficient long range air..) negated the Strategic goals. The Strategy must be informed by Operational and fiscal reality or it is just a academic paper lying around and getting in the way of getting the job done. Intellectual gear adrift is an invitation for Strategic failure. It must be secured by reality. The point,

In any case, it isn't that I don't get that force structure is and should be driven by things other than the maritime strategy; I just don't think that the strategy should be created as a justification for force structure, regardless of how it was derived. It seems to me that Cordesman is saying just the opposite. There are too many subtle ways the strategy dog can be wagged by the operational tail - and making strategy a handmaiden of DC political maneuvering is one.

The dog and the tail's relationship is much more complicated - at least with my dog.

---

At this point in the discussion, a third player comes in; The Historian. He is just having too much fun and doesn't want anyone to disengage. I agree.

Jumpin' Jehoshaphat, gents! Don't stop now!

This is the best dialogue on the connection between strategy and force structure that I've heard/read in a long time.

True. True.

After a review of what happened in the 1980s (I would love to publish that in whole, maybe later), The Historian gives a 1-2-3 that just nails it, and provides a bridge between The Realist and The Academic.

First, the application of enduring principles of American sea power will help navigate the way ahead: resolute flexibility; global strategic mobility; exploiting the external lines of communication; persistence and sustainability; the preference for the offensive; leveraging maritime coalitions when possible; and defending the global system.

Second, it makes no sense to disconnect the strategic planning process from the force structure design and acquisition process. If I am wrong about any of this say so, but as near as I can tell, the irony here is that what is meant to be a sequential process - this is what we are going to do; this is how we are going to do it; this is what we are going to do it with; this is what we need to do it -- has been disrupted by consolidating it in the Navy's programming process. This dispenses with the special qualifications for and independence of the first two steps. If the last two steps come first (this is what we are going to do it with; and this is what we need to do it), it makes no difference where the rest is written down , whether at the Naval War College, on the Navy Staff, in the Fleets, or in conversations with the country.

Third, we don't have it right yet, in part because the entire national strategic planning process has broken down. You would never know it, given the proliferation of scores of so-called "National Strategy for XXX" documents.

...and then brings it all up to date.

If you think about it, our strategic constructs have no basis for coming to grips in a substantive way with the Russian invasion of Georgia. It's one thing to have to say "we want to deploy, but can't get there", as in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. It's another to ask if we're supposed to do something.

Less than a year ago, the 6th Fleet Commander declared that we no longer needed naval forces in the Mediterranean. Just after his tour finished, the Russians deployed into the North Atlantic and the Med. I'll bet you a vodka martini on the rocks with six olives at the Pentagon City Ritz Carlton lobby bar that Moscow read his remarks before deciding to deploy. C6FLT presented the North Sea Fleet commander an intellectual and geostrategic gap of historic proportions that was too good to pass up.

Skippy, that was your buddy!

Frankly, I'm tired of the Navy getting beaten up and knocked around. American maritime power is of epochal importance to us and everyone else. We have a good story to tell, and we should tell it well, having convinced ourselves first, and then get down to the business of designing, building, and operating the fleet.

Others outside the Navy are thinking this through, in this country and elsewhere, obviously in preparation for a new administration. I recommend that you read the attached Center for New American Security Solarium Strategy Series document, "Making America Grand Again: Toward a New Grand Strategy", by Shawn Brimley, Michèle A. Flournoy, Vikram J. Singh, June, 2008. It argues for using as an organizing principle the application of American power and influence to sustain the international system upon which all modern states depend.

Absolutely outstanding advice.

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The Theorist starts to get a bit annoyed and retreats, sadly, a bit to the redoubt of the intellectual - of bit of talking down to the unwashed heathen masses.

...we conducted a long strategic game to explore the possible challenge and response cycles among key strategic actors over the next 20 years. In doing so, we discovered that all states, including Iran and North Korea, had some kind of stake in the effective functioning of the current global system. In a certain sense, it looked to some of us like the world has reset itself to the period before August, 1914. The outbreak of WWI halted the globalization process that was in full swing at that time (see Niall Ferguson's book The War of the World), and the downstream effects of that disaster continued until the Soviet Union fell. US maritime strategies in that 75 year "dark age" had a clear context of warfighting against militant, geopolitically dangerous Eurasian hegemons. Today's geopolitical conditions are fundamentally different and the context of a maritime strategy must follow suit. Our answer to context was defense of the global system of commerce and security, and specifically the prevention of war among major powers. This approach might have been much more intelligible to the cognizenti of 1900 than it is to those contemporaries who think exclusively in terms of the 20th Century dark age.

No, no, no, no ... and damblit no! Let me pull some economic history into this perhaps. Globalization has ebbed and flowed throughout history. Mercantilistic global interdependencies have always been with us. The Romans have been here. The Renaissance players have been here.

But, ah ha - wait! Who said that the Cold War was a dark age? The huge growth in the Free World's standard of living in that time and the advance of technology and trade doesn't seem so dark, but ... here we go. The Theorist finds a little political angle, i.e. the problem is US power and if we surrender our power - we will gain Strategically. The worst of Albrightism.

A Canadian colleague said we have created a strategy of co-option. We are trying, he says, to bring as many nations as possible into the fold of cooperation by offering benefits, much as the US did in the post-WWII era when it stitched together the grand system of alliances to counter an expansionist Soviet Union. In that era, offering a defensive umbrella to nations who could not defend themselves from the Soviets was the benefit. Today, the implied benefit in the maritime strategy is that the US will act as a status quo power and itself operate within the confines of the system (via this implicit promise, the Sea Services have written a policy check to the world that future administrations may or may not cash). That is no small carrot to nations that have been spooked by our post-Cold War and especially our post-9/11 actions in Iraq and elsewhere. This soothing effect was illustrated to me when we were conducting a maritime strategy seminar over at Shrivenham, England at their staff college. At one point during a discussion of defense of the global system, a retired Royal Navy flag officer got a thoughtful look on his face and said he thought this approach denoted a return of "American benevolence." He was groping for the right words, and perhaps benevolence is not the right term, but I think the important word is "return" - as if we have not been very benevolent lately. Similarly, the press the maritime strategy is getting in China is more positive than that emanating from inside the Beltway. Given a choice I would opt for plaudits from the PRC. Cooption may have a shot.

Then again, it might not; and at what cost if you are wrong? I ask, in a world governed by the use and abuse of force, when has it been better to be like than to be respected? What has the track record of best preserving the national interest?

Oops, a little more talking down here. Not a good thing to do if you want to sell others on your ideas.

If you follow and accept the rationale I have set out so far, you might get a glimmer that attempting to calculate force structure from the additive requirements of potential MCOs did not relate well to the logic that was emerging from our analysis, nor did it seem advisable to ask ourselves first what kind of Navy we thought Congress might give us and spin out a story from there.

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Others can make that argument better. One thing I do know about The Realist - he doesn't like being talked down to.

I must frankly admit I am taken aback by your very good and detailed explanation. It went along way toward confirming what I have long thought, but not really confirmed. Bottom line up front: I guess you must count me as one who thinks the Navy went WAY off the reservation. I apologize if my following reply is too blunt; I am quite fired up. With that said, here goes:

Realists often have blunt, but effective tools.

You actually undercut your own argument by writing: "A Canadian colleague said we have created a strategy of co-option. We are trying, he says, to bring as many nations as possible into the fold of cooperation by offering benefits, much as the US did in the post-WWII era when it stitched together the grand system of alliances to counter an expansionist Soviet Union." Exactly. These alliances were part of a grand strategy aimed at both protecting the global system and preventing war with another great power. The "dark age" was actually quite enlightened. Moreover, unlike the cognizenti of 1900, the strategy actually worked after 1945.

This point brings great light to the discussion.

...that this entire effort was less trying to develop a service "strategy" and more an attempt to propose a national grand strategy: "Today, the implied benefit in the maritime strategy is that the US will act as a status quo power and itself operate within the confines of the system (via this implicit promise, the Sea Services have written a policy check to the world that future administrations may or may not cash). ... let me be perfectly blunt: The US Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard HAVE NO FRIGGIN BUSINESS MAKING ANY SUCH a PROMISE, IMPLIED OR OTHERWISE. I am absolutely astounded you and your cohorts could conceive otherwise.

Right at the heart of the ill-conceived globalist agenda.

He also points out a danger to all Academics; they can often forget what team they are on.

Then you say: "Similarly, the press the maritime strategy is getting in China is more positive than that emanating from inside the Beltway. Given a choice I would opt for plaudits from the PRC. Cooption may have a shot." Well. I'm not sure how I should respond to this. The entire US approach toward China across successive administrations has been to encourage its assimilation into the global system and to be a responsible stakeholder. I would prefer not to use the term co-option in our dealing with China; I think it is a loaded term that will actually work against our long established strategic aims. Be that as it may, there is no way the Navy should take credit for being the first to foster such a notion. Furthermore, the people inside the beltway you keep dissing include the Congress--the elected reps of the American people--who are tasked with maintaining the Navy. Unless I am mistaken, the PRC doesn't buy US Navy ships and planes. I therefore think you should be far more concerned if your strategy is not resonating with the Congress than more happy that the Chinese are saying it's great. Regardless of the nice words emanating from the PRC, this strategy will not change the Chinese build up of a formidable anti-access network aimed squarely at the US 7th Fleet, or the need for the US Navy to respond directly to it.

As many of us have been saying with SECDEF Gates; there is a lot of next-war-itis out there. Next-war-itis delenda est!

I am calming down somewhat. The current strategy is PERFECTLY aligned with national strategy in its embrace of pursuing cooperative relationships and working through and with partners. It follows, it does not lead. But it has some serious shortcomings, chief among them: it doesn't explain fully how the US Navy will help win the war we're in, or which wars it is most concerned about deterring. For example, I was told by a principal author of the strategy that after great debate, the consensus was that the sea services had no major role to play in the "GWOT"/Long War, etc, in the maritime environment. I disagree fundamentally with this. If this is a Navy position, they should expect to lose budget share, and would deserve it if that happened.
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In sum, by attempting to develop a new grand strategy rather than explaining how the US Navy supports the current national defense strategy, I think the Navy did indeed wander far off the reservation, and squandered a golden opportunity.

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Via The Academic, the fourth player comes in at this point; The Theorist.

In response to the original article, he provides some background to a frustration many of us have; donde esta el shipbuilding plan?

...VERY SENIOR Navy leaders (were asked) about force structure and strategy. ... were (we) to produce a strategy that supported the 313 ship Navy. "No" was the answer. What if we produce a strategy that would logically infer a smaller Navy...was this ok? "Yes" Was the answer. What if the strategy logically infers a larger Navy? "No problem" was the answer. So we went and did our job. I think even a casual reading of the document would infer a larger Navy more globally distributed than the one we have today (which is incidentally, some 30 ships or so shy of even the 313 ship figure...I believe that the Navy MUST put out a new shipbuilding plan, one that responds to operational planning, strategic thinking, budgetary realities and telling the truth with numbers and dollars. And I think the Navy has done itself a disservice by not putting that plan out already.

(Linkage to force plan, modernization plan, program or budget)

I am disappointed that the Navy hasn't moved out faster to provide this linkage. This was the unspoken assumption when we put out a strategy that did not have a force structure. We wanted to get the ideas out there without the fratricide of a force structure debate, and put off the bloodletting for later. That bloodletting should have occurred by now.

That is follow-through leadership. Speaking of gear adrift, DDG-1000 ...

If we were going to advocate a "maritime boots on the ground" strategy of sustaining a global system favorable to us, we couldn't do it with 6 or 8 $3.8B ships. We needed NUMBERS, and the shipbuilding plan we had before us didn't support it. In some forum or another, someone (maybe one of you!) asked me directly what I thought might happen, and termination of DD1000 was the first thing I answered (as on opinion). The strategy gave CNO and others the arrows they needed in their quiver. That they chose not to fire them is disappointing, and perhaps reflective of the limited traction the document has gotten.

The Theorist then makes a step to playing peacemaker.

I stand in awe of those who worked so hard to create the Maritime Strategy of the 80's. They produced an ideology and documents that were visionary, far-reaching, and inspirational. That they did so under the rubric a coherent grand strategy (essentially unchanged at that point for 30 plus years), and budgets flush with support is not their fault. The perfect storm occurred then, and they got it right.

But theirs is not the only way, and in time, perhaps this new approach will also be successful. But in a world in which we do not have the luxury of deducing grand strategy (and maritime strategy) from the machinations of a single opponent, the move to a defensive strategy always struck me as a good one...as it seems to strike the CNAS folks too.

Best to all of you, and thanks to those who made it this far.

Nice shot - but he brings up a question for me. Do we want a defensive strategy? Is that a strategy for victory?

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We have one more run by The Historian.

...if the navy is committed to shaping, where is the added year in the Naval academy curriculum for language training and study abroad to prepare new officers for these tasks? Where is the funding for additional fleet billets for language-trained personnel? Have Naval Attaché billets been doubled, or even increased?

What an outstanding point. There are some of our finest officers out front, alone and unafraid, waiting in this area for the Navy to catch up. Perhaps too late for the early adopters, but what about our sharp JOs who want to take this path?

The Historian also provides a strong response to The Academic's attempt along with others, to shoehorn the globalist agenda in The Maritime Strategy.

...watching CNO Rougheads introductory briefing at Newport, presented in front of practically the entire international class of Navy Chiefs. He mentioned the idea of defending the global system once, in passing. If defending the global system was central to the current strategy, wouldn't CNO have been leaning forward, figuratively poking the audience in the chest, telling them that the U.S. Navy was declaring its intent to protect, preserve, and command the maritime commons for the use of all because the world had changed dramatically in the last 20 years; that the 21st century global economy was radically different from earlier periods; that the Navy would do so because our mutual security depended upon it; that this included for the benefit of potential strategic competitors like China; and that he was inviting the Navy Chiefs to sign up to participate for the common good, behind American leadership and to American specifications? CNO Roughead certainly did not do this, nor does strategy say this. Without this, its a bit of a stretch to claim an achievement for the current strategy.

I will wind up where The Historian wound up -- bringing the clear lessons of the past into the situation we find ourselves in today -- and why if today's MarStrat leaves you feeling unsated, you are not alone.

Admiral Hayward's thinking had the added virtue of being immediately, intuitively obvious, despite its direct and career threatening contradiction of the prevailing conventional wisdom. He pointed out what the Navy had to do, in quite explicit terms.

I guess my point is that the ADM Hayward Maritime Strategy was hardwired into the Navy system. The current strategy isn't. That may be why ADM Roughead is asking Michelle Flournoy for advice.

For my readers: I know many of you have this email as well. All I ask is if you comment to extend the courtesy and not reveal the names involved - use the ones I did. Also of interest, Galrahn discussed Cordesman's report earlier last week as well.

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Disclaimer: Doing my best to parallel the "fair use doctrine" the above are selections are from a ~26 page email thread by some of the best thinkers in Navy matters. After one attempt to get an author's permission to post in full, I received a "Who are you and who are you affiliated with.." responses. You could almost hear the shields going up. As a result, I have kept the authors unidentified by name and instead gave them descriptive names. My apologies to the authors of the email if they are not happy that they have not been given credit by name - but being who they are I am sure they are happy they are not. I hope they do not mind my using their quotes - though as they state better some ideas we have heard here and in other places over the last year+ - I felt they needed a larger audience. Also, I have received multiple copies of this email by readers and therefore consider it in the public domain. My readers sent it to me knowing what I do in light of CDR Salamander being a open forum. They know this was an important conversation to share, and I agree.