You talk about a subject ripe for discussion;
A newly inaugurated Iranian destroyer test fired a surface-to-surface missile in the Gulf on Tuesday, Iran's Fars news agency reported.Funny - I though Noor was Persian for "Saccade" or maybe "Target."
According to the IRNA news agency the anti-ship missile, dubbed Nour, or Light, destroyed its target.
The test is considered part of an assessment of the ship's capabilities. The missile has been used regularly in war games over the past years.
If you want more info on the Iranian domestically build "Destroyer" (really just a basic Corvette) - here is a primer.
Iran has put into service the country’s first domestically produced guided-missile destroyer, the Jamaran.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei launched the 94-meter (308-foot), 1,400-ton vessel at a site in the Persian Gulf, state-run Press TV said today.
Iran’s success in developing the ship shows the country is technologically self-sufficient though it is under international sanctions, the state-run broadcaster said. All research, design and production of the ship took place in Iran, where the project benefited from the work of 120 universities and research institutes, according to state television.
President Barack Obama is accelerating the deployment of new defenses against possible Iranian missile attacks in the Persian Gulf, the New York Times reported Jan. 31, citing administration and military officials. Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain, where the U.S. Navy has its regional base, agreed to host the systems, the Times said.
The new Iranian destroyer’s maximum speed is 30 knots and it can carry a crew of 140, Press TV said. It has anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles, torpedoes, naval cannons and a helipad, the channel said. More ships in the Jamaran class are under construction, Press TV cited Iran’s navy as saying.So - how is the ASCM inventory, training, and capability in our Surface Navy? Ahem.
"-1" if you take the lame LCS ASW weapons dodge of "... our helicopter/aviation/off-board weapon system will do that... " answer - as if aircraft are always in an up status, with weapons, with the right weather, with the right crew rest, with a timely targeting solution ... etc ... etc ...
112 comments:
You know the US almost, ALMOST had a SSASCM like the SS-N-22.
I once talked to my old CO about it, he replied after looking at how awesome a missile it was, "You know what I think when I look at that? That is an offensive weapon. The Navy hasn't been an offensive Navy for a very long time." He said that to me without hesitating.
We need a missile like that. Especially considering the relative changes occuring between our strength and the strengths of other Navies. We really are the only significant Navy without one.
But...but...
What about the smart and elegant NLOS??!!!
Oh yeah.
Don't suppose NAVSEA has "studied" the LCS predicted operations do you ?
Wonder how many GALLONS per day of Aviation Fuel each LCS will burn since so much of its sensors and weapons depend upon manned and unmanned air vehicles ?
I think LCS-1 is woefully inadequate in the Propulsion fuel carried. So, I'll bet her Aviation fuel capacity vs. predicted UAV / Helo op's is equally ridiculous.
I used to play a LOT of Harpoon. One thing we all bitched about was the Harpoon and the TASM. The only way to kill the big Soviet ships like Kirov was to load up everthing that could carry a HARM and simply saturate the defenses. I launched EIGHTY Harpoons at a Kirove once, and got exactly ONE hit. It's slow, it's got a dinky warhead, it's dumb and it flies pretty much straight and level.
Granted, we used open source material for our databases. Still, it was proof enough to me that the Harpoon was a dog of a missile. Especially since it was first developed to hang under a wing and kill subs...
Now someone tell me why we haven't come up with a better ASM that stands a good chance of a mission kill with one and a sink your ass with two?
you guys are going to make do math with this one...this is the old ASMD problem that surfaced in the mid 80's with the advent of sea skimmer...this could be a nasty little weapon in a knife fight in the SOH...let's take .9 mach and say a launch range of 20 miles...that would give the defending missle 2.2 minutes or 133 seconds of reaction time if detected at launch...the likely detection I am guessing is going to be between 15 and 17 miles so I will go with the greater of those two...that puts us down to 113 seconds to react and if you want to intercept away from the ship even with guns and we say 20K yards we are now down to 66 seconds...good luck...it is going to take a really good crew looking for the weapon to be able do this...I find it difficult to believe that we have had over 20 years and we still don't have anything much better than guns, CIWS, SRBOC for this close range threat...anyone from the AEGIS community want to pipe in...I think even the mighty AEGIS will have problems with this scenario...does SM2 have a surface mode????????
and I forgot to mention the potential problem of stream raids...something is bound to slip through or CIWS will run out of bullets...and not to mention that not all CIWS are created equal...my fist ship DDG 995 had two of course and one was very aggressive and would shoot anything in its range, the other one did not like crossing targets or targets it percieved as crossing...the Iranians may not be in the big leagues but they are no longer playing A ball they have moved to AA....
Yeah, it's called instead of trying to shoot the arrows you shoot the archer in the snot locker.
Is it me or the fates of HMS Sheffied and USS Stark are being forgotten? Harpoon in a skimmer mode is as hard to kill as Exocet which was responsible for both mentioned ships. Not that USN should forego seeking replacement with higher effectiveness.
And dont let me start on the fate of any LCS hit by any ASM, even old Styx,,, and stealth won't help much - I somehow doubt it can protect it against say IR homing missile - and boy those turbines generate IR at 40 knots! Add to this 57mm gun as only active defence and recipe for disaster is complete.
And as an old Harpooner (we should spare someday, Byron!) I admit nothing beats saturation attacks. 40 Backfires with 3 AS-6 each were BAD news for any NATO TF everytime I played, whatever side. Regarding Kirov, I think it was created as an exercise in "bristling with weapons", and of course size matters too...
but will the ROE let us him in the snot locker, and as you so eloquently described below the Poon ain't the best ASM out there...not the worst but I sure do miss the having an SM 1 that can operate in surface mode....
the outer air battle was an easier fight then the ASMD threat...just my opinon...
Fire control system was not energized on Starke. She literally never had a chance. And FWIW, I got the whole sad story from a Fire Controlman who was on the Starke when she was hit.
Remind me to tell you about a little scenario I wrote depicting what would happen if the USN went north against the Kola...Bears and Badgers and Backfires, oh my!
Byron, that's because her CO was badly misinterpreting his ROE and getting ready for his "Outchop OPPE".
yeah Stark was a cluster, we got to read the lessons learned before we deployed in 1988, nasty, but they were doing there deconfliction like they were supposed to...
The Iranians have been sticking a variety of ACSMs aboard their ships since they installed a bunch of Standard ARM on an old FRAM back in the '70s. The question of their readiness is a valid one since the Harpoon they fired at one of the "Praying Mantis" SAGs went ballistic shortly after it left the launcher.
That said, basing one's tactics on the assumption that the enemy's weapons won't work is a bad idea. Proactive plans, shipboard readiness and a clear understanding of ROE are what's necessary.
Tom, I went through the PCO pipeline for the first time in 87-88. Lessons learned from the STARK incident were taught in several areas ranging from damage control, to weapons posture, to leadership. I learned a lot from those sessions and they were extremely valuable to me in how I approached those topics while deployed. I'm curious how much of this is still being taught or if, because of the time that's passed, that the training establishment has decided that they are no longer worthwhile.
Maybe we can buy some ASMs from the Chinese. Everyone else seems to be able to...
SM-2, Surface Mode: Yes
Don't they see that in the SOH, what they should be building is something designed for littoral combat. What no helo? Missiles? That's so old school - reminds me of OSAs, Nanuchkas, and Tarantuls.
This assumes that SAMs were as effective as modelled in the game. There is still a lot of uncertainty whether some SAMs (e.g. SAN-6) could engage a target flying that low or if the associated radars could track them. If I recall correctly, "Harpoon" assumed minimum altitude was 30 m, which is about twice the altitude at which most of these weapons are described (in open sources) as flying. That makes a big difference in terms of the radar horizon and therefore the reaction time. It also assumes every component in the SAM would work against a very low-altitude target. In the Falklands, the RN ships had trouble maintaining a track on Exocet and could not lock-on. Aegis could track those types of targets and presumably shoot them down. Still, faster, more modern ASCMs would be welcome.
To date, there has been exactly one confirmed hard-kill of an ASCM by SAMs (in the first Gulf War) with maybe another (Styx) shot down off Vietnam. Maybe another couple of possibles by gunfire during the Arab-Israeli war in 1973. Virtually all anti-ASCM successes so far have come from the proper use of soft-kill systems.
The Sheffield's fire control was offline as well. She had to shut down to use her SATCOM because of RF interference. That's why she never detected the inbound Exocets. If she had, she would have had a pretty good chance of splashing them.
YNSN,
"<span>"You know what I think when I look at that? That is an offensive weapon. The Navy hasn't been an offensive Navy for a very long time." He said that to me without hesitating. "</span>
Say that louder, please! Scream it, in fact! We need to be a "global force for killing sh*t"!
Ahem.... while I quite agree with the sad state of offensive weapons (mighty scarce) on our surface ships, Mk 48 (plain and extra crispy....err.. ADCAP) torpedoes are most definitely most offensive vis-a-vis anything on or under the water. Regretably, airplanes present a challenge as yet unmet. Except by airplanes from carriers. Although TLAM attacks by 20 or so of them from a SSGN, conceptually at least, have a certain charm. Not that anyone would come up with such a rough beast. Submunitions dispensed by sub munitions. Mmmmm.....
The LCS is the product of a long standing trend, perhaps the culmination. Can't hurt much, can't defend against just about anything.
Submarines not littoral? Look up USS Barb.
But I digress.
I would like to know the same thing, they did help to prepare us for our deployment, one thing that I took from the lessons learned was that Stark was in a Lose Lose situation, it was not quite a black swan but close, I just don't think they thought it could really happen to them, and I think that attitude is resurfacing, a friend of mine who was an OS then an LDO retired recently after 27 years he told me to much business and not enough war fighting...
excellant observation during our deployment to PG for Operation Ernest Will we assured that they did not have the spare parts for the Harpoons that they had, that intel came from CIA, they were wrong, they had the parts and they launched 2 duing Operation Preying Mantis...you can't prepare for what the enemy will do only what the enemy can do...
I saw a piece about that on the blow em up channel (Military Channel), 20th Century Battlefields I think...it should be required viewing or everyone in the LCS program....
Sae problem with have with our ASM defense, ROE for ASMD is typically shoot shoot look shoot.
Thank you.
C-dore we had a class of PCO's come visit us on board FFG 58 during that time frame for a visit...
xbrad, Some debate there since Sea Dart had a poor record in the Falklands, partially because the BG sensors didn't allow a lot of warning time. You are correct about the SATCOM interference issue, 'though.
yeah we can complete the circle and buy back technology that we sold
Grandpa, I'm seriously gonna have to sit down and buy you a beer or five one day.
Anthony, even after Harpoon2002 where we were able to crack the database and edit it for the very first time, Harpoon still didn't stack up well. A frigate sized ship took 2 for mission kill and 3 to sink it. It's like the situation with trying to sink Oscar II with Mk 46. I put FOUR into an Oscar and it still launched on me.
I know that this simulation is not entirely accurate...nor should it be. None of use ever intend to "get things right"..op-sec. But...a good friend of mine who was Weps on an SSBN told me that we were very scary to be around, that we knew just enough to figure things out. I was always very careful to stay away from hardware discussions. Certain things I do not want to know.
Heck, Sahand ate what, 3 Harpoons + 2 Skippers, and only sank when the fire reached her magazines?
And just a reminder, Sahand was ~1500 tons full load...
Thank you for providing a real world example of the pitiful explosive effects of Harpoon, a missile originally designed for aircraft to fire at surfaced missile subs...
oh well, can I visualise this:
http://www.badgerbadgerbadger.com/
Russians would go nuke release if someone was going into thier home waters - NVM the fact strategy documents uncovered after Berlin wall fall indicated their massive first strike policy - contrary to all official statements beforehand.
Sea Dart (and SM1 btw too) was designed to counter high and fast targets, not skimmers, anyway
hahahahahah! Ewok, I think of that video every time I see Scott the Badger's avatar. I was wondering if anyone would ever post it....
Byron, the point is that if you want to actually sink a ship, poking holes in it above the waterline isn't very effective.
You gotta poke holes in the bottom.
Yes, we are everywhere, fighting agaist evil, such as dachshunds, snakes and mushrooms. We are even in great works of literature. Badgers are even in Lord Of The Rings, ( Tom Bombadil found us absurd, which shows what Tom Bambadil knows ).
You may want to talk to the Brits about that ... and the Japanese .... and the Germans ..... and the .....
You sink a ship by letting water in the bottom, not air in the top.
Good fill someone in on and this fill someone in on helped me alot in my college assignement. Gratefulness you for your information.
Well, Roma went down with 2 ~700lb-warhead glide bombs... but just like Sahand, it wasn't the primary effects of the warhead that sent her under, it was the secondaries from a large magazine going up (and I'm not sure but what that might have been caused by an electrical fire, rather than blast/frag damage).
<span>In reality, the strategic guidance we have from "from the Sea" on is not going to be applicable in the mid-term. The way that Navies are being built from the Indian to the Western Pacific means that we may still have more hulls afloat than others, we will not be able to concentrate them in sufficient numbers to insure real sea control, especially when you consider the worst case. Nor will our budgets ever return to where we can have enough hulls to do so around the world. Add into this the fact that China is putting itself in the position to deny us the use of both the Suez and Panama Cannals. Because of this parity and the demands that can and possibly will be put upon us by the NCA, we have to have at least one class of ship that carries a missile that can knock out another surface combatant that is comparable to our DDGs tonnage wise. </span>
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<span>Either numbers, or sharp teeth and survivability. Those are the only two options we have to ensure freedom of navigation. If we continue to assume that we will always have freedom of navigation our current primary mission of (basically) humanitarian assistance will be impossible. </span>
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<span>Given the current time line of spiral development (whatever that really means) we need to start now, in building a new missile a new capability. When I say new, I mean new. Not a re shuffling of already developed subsystems into a new configuration like we have with our defensive RAM system. </span>
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<span>I want to see a super-sonic missile capable of at least 120NM that has passive or active radar, IR and can default to being guided by the ship's radar that also has a reduced RCS. </span>
Absolutely understand that process; a Mk 48 ADCAP will ruin any ships day. The problem is we still have to have surface ships, and they have these dinky little Mk 46 fish...It still leaves surface warfare ships in the AAW and force protection business.
http://www.ausairpower.net/ascms.pdf
very troubling , cool and calm analysis of the supersonic ASCM threat
BTW did you know Taiwanese, of all "western" nations are developing supersonic ASCM?
http://www.defencetalk.com/taiwan-plans-to-produce-supersonic-anti-ship-missiles-report-6639/
for stealth approach look at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Strike_Missile
Go Vikings! Though it may be smallish to take out DDG, is enough for the corvettes in brown water scenarios.
Byron you are not far off with needing four or more MK 46 to take out Oscar, it was that gosh darn double hull, now the good news is if she is running from a torp she is making noise and has her head down and tail between her legs, if you are lucky and one of those torps can cause a secondary explosion you can get this
butch you are right to point but it does depend on where you hit the ship, not all holes are fatal...see the approximately 24 foot hole in the bottom of FFG 58 attached, now this did create a soft kill
<span>Heck, Sahand ate what, 3 Harpoons + 2 Skippers, and only sank when the fire reached her magazines?</span>
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<span>Good example of ASCMs not being the automatically lethal wunderweapons some try to make them can be seen here and here...</span>
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<span>Of course you have some -waayyy too many SWOs's by the looks of things- that make the bullsh?t argument, that since "modern weapons are so lethal," there is little need to build survivability into modern ship designs.</span>
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<span>As the Shahand, and the Ahi Hanit cases prove, that need not be. Ships in that size range can take hits and survive...And as warships, they should be built to sustain such damage and continue at least some mission effectiveness.</span>
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<span>STAYING POWER...</span>
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<span>It wins battles at sea.</span>
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<span>True then True now. No matter how elegant or smart you may think you are....</span>
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<span>Fire control system was not energized on Starke.</span>
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<span>Plus the EW community was more interested in working on the SLQ than actually operating it to any semblance of real world usefulness...</span>
<span>Either numbers, or sharp teeth and survivability. </span>
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<span>It takes a careful balance of those attributes in a force. And thats exaclty what is missing in the USN's current and projected force structure.</span>
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<span>Today, there is too much of a focus on "magic" solutions, such as speed, and stealth, and elegant networks...</span>
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<span>The kinds of things that the Suits are real quick to hawk, because its good money for them, and it appears to be the clearest solution.</span>
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<span>The Germans went down that path too in order to overcome their lack of numbers and resources, and to enhance the effectiveness of their superb forces.</span>
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<span>Of course, we all know where it got them.</span>
<span>Sid,
Thank you for pointing that fact out. Other than modern torpedoes of the Mk48 variety, I have yet to find this "ultra-lethal modern naval weapon" that no ship can stand up to. I have doubts that the effect of a 8" (203mm) 260 pound HC projectile striking a modern unprotected steel/aluminum warship (Sheffield, Stark) would do significantly less damage than the Exocets that struck them. (An AP projectile would likely slice through without detonating. See: Samar and the escort carriers.) For that matter, a 6" (152mm) 105-lb HC projectile would be damned destructive, as well.
A modern ballistic design, similar to the ERFB artillery projos, fin-stabilized with a GPS fuse, fired by more efficient modern propellants, might get you a 100km supersonic anti-ship weapon in 8" caliber for a fraction of the cost of an ASCM. I continue to find it astounding that we have left the potential of this technology untapped. A warship can carry a hell of a lot more projectiles than it can missiles. And so can the taxpayers....</span>
Remember that Sheffield was lost at sea, being towed clear of the AO, in heavy weather. The damge done to her was the result of poor materials and planning, and the fires set by unused fuel in the Exocet's motor. It penetrated the hull, but the warhead failed to detonate.
Me too.....
A TAO's worst nightmare is WILL we detect it, and CAN I engage it, and WHAT will happen if we hestitate...?
Sid,
I completely agree. The military we are today, is the military that the we defeated in Europe in WWII. Or, at the very least we're going that way fast.
I believe it is because guns aren't cool enough.
When you read the War Damage Reports from WWII (the NAVSEA DCFP Museum site is still down btw), you will find that the majority of the lethal damage is cause by what can be termed as "cascading failures" within the hull. Either munitions, or other stores, have been compromised. Add degraded DC efforts which occurred for various reasons, and you have some truly ugly scenarios...
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3.
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<span><span>Structural damage to ASTORIA, although extensive, was not</span></span>
3. <span>Structural damage to ASTORIA, although extensive, was not<span> </span>such that loss of the vessel was inevitable. The fires which resulted,<span> </span>however, effectively prevented control of damage. Fires<span> </span>could not be controlled because of the initial lack of certain<span> </span>facilities, the destruction of some facilities initially available,<span> </span>and the fact that certain others were inoperable because of thelack of power. Thus, damage and uncontrolled fires resulted in<span> </span>the loss of ASTORIA.<span> </span></span>
SS-N-19 with 1 ton warhead is exactly what its codeword in NATO boks is: Shipwreck. Fortunately it is so big only Kirov and Oscar were able to carry it...
GPS won't do much against moving targets unless you add a datalink, though, and then you need a "painter" to update the target coordinates in a manner not unlike SARH or laser guidance... honestly, datalink terminal guidance is really not all that different from the old Fritz X, just a few generations improved.
I'm not that keen on guided gun rounds--if anything, they're more expensive than guided missiles, not cheaper, because of the launch environment that the expensive bits have to withstand. Personally, I still want to see somebody put real numbers to a semi-ballistic, multi-purpose, multi-packed VLS weapon. Something like the naval GMLRS+datalink several of us have been calling for here and on other boards for years. An upsized NLOS-LS would do the trick... except that apparently the IR seeker is an expensive ($400K?!?) dud.
Sorry, Big D, but I doubt that a guided gun round is nearly as expensive as a guided missile. Technology for course-correcting fuzes is maturing rapidly, and extended-range full-bore base burn projectiles have been around for decades. An ability to have a downlink data "flash" into a hardened receiver (able to withstand the shock of firing) is an attainable feature.
Compare the price of a 155mm M795 projectile with a course correction fuze with that of an ATACMS Blk IA.
Unit cost of a "one-up" M795 with a CCF is significantly under $10,000.
Cost of one ATACMS IA? About $750,000.
Experiments with 5"/54 cannon have been successful, and the technology is at the very beginning of its technical potential. A larger (203mm) projectile would be a ship-killer. Ranges beyond 100km are achievable.
Ships can carry many more projectiles than missiles, and the logistical burden of rearming and resupply, all the way back to the depot, is eased significantly. The advantages are legion. We are foolish to ignore it.
Ewok, True that...however you fight with what you have. If I remember the after action reports correctly "seduction" was the best tactic in the AA battle (although not so for the ATLANTIC CONVEYOR). SEA WOLF (a PD system) had the best reputation.
Tom, Not my group...you guys were deployed when I went through the combat systems phase. I did, however, visit FFG 58 and talked with the CO (CDR Townes) the Monday after you were floated off the heavy lift ship. We deployed a week later.
although not so for the ATLANTIC CONVEYOR
The single most valuable shot the Args scored in that scrap. One more like it on the Brit assault forces,and they would have had to go home.
C-dore, that makes sense, CDR Townes was a good CO though I did not deploy with him, I left for shore duty in April 1989, before all the repairs were complete....well I am glad that you made it back safely, what ship
sid, We spent some time studying the Falklands Campaign when I went through PCO school in the late 80s. The Brits initially tried to minimize the impact of the loss of ATLANTIC CONVEYOR but eventually acknowledged that they were one ship loss away from having to withdraw their naval forces.
Another bit of trivia was the effectiveness of machine guns in low altitude AA defense.
AW1,
fires caused most of the damage on the Stark also, only one of the exocets exploded on impact, no check valve on the overflow forward fuel oil settling tank, the tank boiled over and the fuel continued to feed the fire, that is why during our deployment we pressed that tank with water, bad design there
Dont forget the tanks below the 3-100 berthing, and the tank below the missle bolster, the 5-84. All were fuel tanks. Biggest issue was the firemain COV that was destroyed just aft of BHD 100 on the port side; it shut down all firemain forward of BHD 100. There were many lessons learned, the most important being that if you're going to steam in between two belligerents, both of whom are slinging missles, it behooves you have your stuff together and radiating like nobody's business.
URR, I'm going to have to disagree with that. Apologies in advance for the thread drift.
M-795 has roughly the same all-up mass and HE mass as a Hellfire (admittedly, counting a Hellfire's propellant). That doesn't spell "one-shot ship-killer" to me. In addition, even with base bleed, range is <15NM. You're not going to see 50NM+ gun ranges with 5"/54, and it's not worth discussing rounds that only 3-4 DDG-$$$$s or BBs will/could ever carry; any ASuWs worth buying need to be Burkeable, because that's what we're stuck with for the next few decades. Also, it's a lot more feasible to cram VLS onto 1000-3000t ships than 8", and with multipack, you can fit a lot of SAM/SSM onto one.
CCF has a CEP of "<50m". With no terminal guidance, that's not going to provide a great Ph. The Increment 3 Objective of 10M CEP is much better, but I await proof. I also cannot find any confirmation that they are/will approach the $10K mark--with or without a secure, hardened datalink.
GMLRS, meanwhile, is putting a 200lb warhead (10x that of M-795--which means fewer hits needed for Pk, which dramatically lowers average Pk cost) out to 35NM today, with tests past 40NM, proving (outside of the same occasional failure CCF/PGK would experience) highly accurate. I'm not having much luck finding any form of apuc for GMLRS, though, and it would need a partial redesign at any rate to make it Mk41-compatible (primarily, it'd need a softer launch motor).
Again, if NLOS-LS worked, an ER version for naval combat would be a great idea; $400K+ APUC ain't gonna cut it, though...
Tom, Let's just say she was a Newport-based, non-NRF 1052. (Some guys have figured it out) ;) BTW, DDG-995 was my flagship during our '95/'96 deployment.
Let's not also forget that STARK survived partially because she never lost power, enabling her crew to mount an effective DC response. Tom is right as well in that only one of the missile warheads exploded although the residual fuel contributed to temperatures (if I remember correctly) in excess of 2500 deg F.
However, I feel that the main reasons she survived were effective DC training prior to deployment, strong leadership by those directing her DC groups from the forecastle and flight deck, and the heroism of several individuals (two of whom were recommended for the Navy Cross---downgraded to a N&MC Medal).
sid, Agree, although I will always remember the CPO at DCA school who told us that "...flooding will always put out the fires..." ;)
<span></span><span>Big D, (part II)</span>
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<span>I beg to differ, also, in that I believe it IS worthwhile to talk about lower-cost and more adaptable solutions than what are currently available or projected. The logistical tail of VLS (like MLRS on the ground) is massive, and will IMHO, more often than not end up as a point of failure in any sustainment efforts of fleet operations. </span>
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<span>If we keep insisting on the highest-cost, most complex technological solutions for what are centuries-old problems, we will spin our wheels until we have our own Royal Navy, eighty-odd vessels of questionable value without the ability to project power or sustain presence.</span>
<span><span>Big D, </span>
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<span>The M795 is a standard 155mm artillery projectile fired from a 39-caliber tube (M198 or M777). Rockwell-Collins is advertising costs per fuze at $3000. Even if they are under by an order of magnitude of 150%, the price is still $7,500. CEP at this point is 50m, unguided. That is a threefold improvement in ten years, with a planned CEP for the projectile at 20m. With a migration of some of the more capable technology of Excaliber, CEP of 10m is possible. </span>
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<span>First: </span>
<span>Yes, the GMLRS can deliver ten times the payload of the M795. The first time. At nearly one hundred times the cost. How many volleys can an artillery battalion fire while MLRS is reloading? (Hint: A lot more than ten.) And before you mention the need to displace, both systems will be required to displace at some point, with the speed advantage all on the side of the cannon. </span>
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<span>Second: </span>
<span>Let's talk about projectile design, modern and more efficient propellants, much higher MVs, and greater range of naval cannon. A more ballistically efficient ERFB BB design could increase the range of a projo by as much as 40% with no change in propellant efficiency. An optimal-burn propellant that adds an additional 25-30% in range. A longer caliber tube (70 calibers) would increase the range further still. Not long until a 203mm projectile approaches a range of 100km. The technology is there. As for the vessels to carry such tubes, the Ticos (as well as the Spruances) were all built with reinforced forward hulls to take the Mk 71 8" mount. The newer DDG-51s could be built with the same reinforcement. Heck, the Mk 71 was mounted on a Forrest Sherman for trials! </span>
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<span>A 118-130kg 203mm projectile would indeed be a ship killer. The munition would have about 2.5X the mass of Hellfire, with a much bigger bursting charge. </span></span>
<span>Big D (part II),</span>
<span>I beg to differ, also, in that I believe it IS worthwhile to talk about lower-cost and more adaptable solutions than what are currently available or projected. The logistical tail of VLS (like MLRS on the ground) is massive, and will IMHO, more often than not end up as a point of failure in any sustainment efforts of fleet operations. </span>
<span> </span>
<span>If we keep insisting on the highest-cost, most complex technological solutions for what are centuries-old problems, we will spin our wheels until we have our own Royal Navy, eighty-odd vessels of questionable value without the ability to project power or sustain presence.</span>
Looks like a lot of you new guys have yet to read the post about my baby; sniff - the Mk-71.
I love a puzzle..1.I just have to go into the way back machine for a night,,,1052 was a better class ship then most people give them credit for...nice staff accomodations on DDG 995, I was temporarily assinged to staff with Desron 14 in 1983 during our Unitas cruise, SBR's CHENG did his XO tour on the DDG 995 91 to 92, small world...plus I believe that DDG 995 produced at least two flags from what I have heard :) it would have been an honor to meet you
Phib,
Did read your post. I believe you pointed me there recently. Propellant efficiency and ability to guide and stabilize for accuracy will eventually point us back toward cannon for many ground fire support tasks, for the reasons I state above. The cannon may not be rifled in the same way, and may possibly be smoothbore, but for short and medium range (inside 50-70km) engagements, we may find ourselves looking at propelling with a firing charge rather than a rocket motor.
URR: $3K? I'm a little suspicious of that number, considering that it's well below JDAM, yet has to survive a far harsher environment. If the final APUC stays under $10K, I'll grant you a good bit of what you're claiming, but you still have to deal with the fact that ships maneuver, and that means that you need terminal guidance, especially at extended ranges. What does that do to your price? Remember that ATGMs aren't expensive because rocket fuel costs so much...
Also, I don't care what Spru-cans were designed to be able to carry; they're mostly reefs now (thanks Navy). We have a zillion I/II/IIA Burkes. They (and smaller vessels, which will hopefully NOT be LCS) will be the ships most likely to engage in ASuW. Dreaming up superguns doesn't help anything; the answer needs to come out of a 5" gun or a Mk41, or otherwise be deployable out of the box on our existing ships. That, among other reasons, is why I never said anything about ATACMS.
I don't believe that we have a huge need for massive anti-ship capability; we need a capability to defeat a swarm of speedboats at point-blank/ROE-restricted range, a similar capability against FACs at longer ranges, and one to at least mission-kill the odd frigate or destroyer that could threaten the ship. I do not believe that our newest warships (Burkes or LCS) have all of these capabilities, and I believe that we need to find a way to cheaply retrofit those capabilities (or in the case of the LCS, dump it before it's too late).
Big D,
Nobody is dreaming up "superguns". If we consider the 8" a super gun we ought to outsource naval power (or at least naval engineering) to someone who knows what they're doing. The point on the Spruances is that the hull was well capable of handling the ordnance without top weight, structural, or stability problems.
The trick with the "data link" will be to have a finite number of corrections in the projectile's ballistic trajectory. Whether that comes in the form of a surface targeting solution based on course and speed data or some other similar thing seems likely. Ships cannot change course on a dime, or accelerate/decelerate rapidly. The gunnery solution at the time of firing will include predicted target location already. The ability of a warship of any type to alter course and speed to be very far outside of a small prediction ellipse in a 130-second TOF is very limited. This makes any ballistic adjustments required of the projectile to be very small.
What does that add to the cost? Beats me. But if we are networked together as we claim, then it needs not be the vessel who fired the round to have the data link.
The answer sure ain't the 127mm projectile. The Mk 41 logistical trail is considerable, if not prohibitive in sustained combat. Not to mention cost, cost, cost.
I agree we need to dump LCS, because it can do none of what we need. And not a whole bunch of what we don't. I also agree that a close-in defensive armament is sorely lacking. Not sure, however, that we don't need a robust and rapidly deployable anti-surface ship capability, particularly as our numbers grow smaller while others grow larger.
The $3,000 figure was mentioned in a number of places, but the one I went back to first was Wikipedia. Don't knock it. That is how I found out that Abe Lincoln shot JFK....
Oh, and did I mention that an 8" gun with range and hitting power comes in handy for amphibious operations?
That's only because back in those days, Lincoln could still by the AK-47 he did the deed with via the Post Office.
I think DDG-995 and FF 1071 had the coolest names in the USN inventory.
I like the idea of a modern USS CARRONADE, the final development of the true LCS. Let's make some! Switch Marinette Marine over from False LCSes to making real ones.
That was the post that got me hooked on this place.
If I were sitting in the Oval Office today, my first order to SecDef would be "Kill LCS" (and about a half a dozen other boondogles), and within about 3 minutes, we'd get to the question of why there aren't Mk-71s being built.
Sure... but you do realize that that's how we wound up with 3(?) DDG-$$$$s? The Mk57s and DBR were sort've tacked on along the way, but the primary weapon was always the AGS, which was intended for *exactly* the sorts of things for which you're advocating building a new ship design with a new 8" gun around. Do you honestly expect things to turn out well "this time"?
Meanwhile, what do you intend to do with the dozens of Burkes already in the fleet? Consign them (especially the IIAs) to their fate, armed only with unguided 5" and SM2/ESSM (in WVR) against surgace threats? My whole point is that *they* are the weak points in surface actions, and need a capability that has been sorely neglected.
Look, refighting the war over DD-21, with the benefit of a decade's worth of tech improvements and lessons learned in gun designs, superior shell guidance, etc., sounds fun, but it doesn't fill the gaping hole that exists within the fleet today. If you can't put your solution into our existing ships at reasonable costs, it ain't gonna happen, and ain't worth taking seriously right now, especially in the budget climate that is closing in on us.
Finally, your allergic reaction to VLS based upon the cost of missiles (vs. a $2B ship?) and inability to reload at sea (which IMHO is a stupid mistake on our part) just doesn't match up with the frequency and duration of the threat. I'm not talking about putting Burkes on the gun line firing GMLRS at shore targets and running dry on Day 1 (I'd like to, but not without a second discussion about UNREP and VLS). I'm talking about restoring the ability of a Burke (or FF/FF replacement) to defeat a swarm of small surface threats or a couple of large ones, if either situation should arrive--and even if not a single shot is fired, just having the capability yields serious benefits in peacetime, just by providing a potential threat to our opponents.
Personally, I think the Navy kinda has the right idea with "the best anti-ship platform is a sub, followed by a plane"... I just think it's reckless to deprive our warships of any significant capability whatsoever to engage minor and/or major surface threats when they arise, particularly since ROE provides the (potential) enemy with considerable leeway and initiative.
Big D,
Who in the world mentioned designing a ship around the Mk 71 except you? Myriad hulls exist out there right now capable of carrying it. One of the reasons I think it makes sense. DD-21 never enters into the argument. Future Burkes could have similarly reinforced hulls as with the Ticos. Hardly designing a ship around a gun.
My "allergic reaction" to VLS is not that, and is not to say it does not have a place. Perhaps it is a short-term answer to a large cap that currently exists. But I have watched the logistical maelstrom involved with resupplying MLRS from CONUS to using unit. It isn't pretty, even in a permissive environment. Taint gonna be easy with gray hulls, and if we are expending munitions at greater than peacetime estimates (since when don't we?) then we have a sustainment problem.
The proposal is for a naval gun. Leveraging technology that is maturing rapidly or is already well proven. We used to have a lot of naval guns. We sure as hell didn't have to build ships around them. And we don't need to always select the sexiest and most exorbitantly expensive solution.
My point remains--can you put it on the ships we have afloat? Can you do so at a reasonable cost? If so, great, I don't have as much of a problem with it as you think I do.
If not--if you can't put this 6" or 8" capability on our existing ships, then I don't see how it brings much to the table. We have an immediate gap in our surface force right now where our existing ships are short on ASuW firepower. Fixing our next generation of designs is critical, but no less so is fixing the stuff we would actually go to war at sea with within the next few years.
Also, when you bring up issues with resupplying MLRS... do you mean VLS? I just want to make sure I'm not misunderstanding you, here, because I'm not seeing a good connection between supplying the two.
C-dore just a SWAG but would you have flown N-F-V-C from the mast ;)
maybe I need to start using an alias here and go by my ATACO (I know they changed it but I am stubborn) call sign Fangs
Kidd class was built with the bracing for the MK 71, our first CSO had the drawings of what DDG 995 would look like with the mount, he used to bring them up to CIC on the midwatch to tease the GM's and FC's, even if the US Navy wasn't gong to by the mount our understanding was that the Shah intended to install them during the first overhaul after delivery
Sid-I hadn't thought about it, but you have a point. The difference is that the German military, while emphasizing complex "silver bullet" solutions (Me-262, Type XXI submarine, etc) still understood the importance of giving the weapon system some significant firepower. It seems to me that we (the USN) are not even doing that with the LCS.
Big D,
I see a lot of similarities between the supply and logistics difficulties with MLRS and VLS. The ordnance is much larger per unit than a one-up round. The weight, space, and handling requirements stress logistical transport. This is true all the way from CONUS to using unit. I don't see this being any different for VLS. The requirements of shipboard handling and storage won't make things any easier. And the quantities delivered for the same logistical effort are significantly less than those of conventional cannon ordnance.
Agreed that we need to remedy both the present and future gaps. Yes, we have hulls capable of carrying the Mk71 or a modified version. The Ticonderogas are built to do so. The Burkes can be modified to mount the system similarly to how the Spruances were reinforced, and future DDG-51s built with those mods. If the US Navy can FRAM the Gearings so extensively in the middle of their service lives and serve another two decades, then the modest modifications to the 51s are more than achievable.
I'm not talking about putting Burkes on the gun line firing GMLRS at shore targets and running dry on Day 1 (I'd like to, but not without a second discussion about UNREP and VLS).
Nice shot of one of my old boats preparing to take on SM1 ER's aft while also taking on 5'54" forward (where I was) just prior to landing the Marines in Beirut (not me in the pic also check out the LST off the port bow which was just outside the surfline by the airport)...
Never made any sense to me why the USN abandoned the capability to UNREP missiles...and even at the time I thought it was shortsighted that we couldn't bring aboard 'poons.
I see a lot of similarities between the supply and logistics difficulties with MLRS and VLS.
Wonder how this is coming along?
Sustainment at sea used to be the strong point of the USN.
We would never have prevailed in this battle without it.
My BROOKE-Class FFG deployed with HULL in '76-77 while she had the Mk 71 installed. Interesting idea but several problems with the system had several problems beyond the hydraulic and micro-switch issues common to the Mk 47 5"/54. Her CO, whom I worked with later in the Pentagon, tried to put a positive spin on the op-test but admitted that it wasn't all that satisfactory. Concussion from firing caused a great deal of damage on the bridge and the wardroom, although I never heard what the structural results were. The biggest limitation, however, on a destroyer-sized ship was in the magazine. HULL only had space for 75 rounds in a forward magazine that normally carried 600 5" rounds. Not sure what a SPRUANCE magazine would have carried but having been aboard NEWPORT NEWS on a night raid when she fired 475 rounds in 17 minutes can see where magazine capacity would have been a significant issue for a shore bombardment system.
When HULL returned in '77, the Carter Administration had taken over and they weren't spending a lot of money on new military programs. It's interesting, however, that the Reagan Administration never sought to resurrect the Mk 71 during the naval expansion of the early '80s. Assume that's because the emphasis was on recommissioning the four IOWA class BBs.
big D:
i believe that they gang was getting 50nm= out of an experimental 5" 54 in the late 70's. (i remember seeing a brag in that little safety/publicity newsletter that the aberdeen gang used to publish.)
C
cd-14:
the sad fact of the matter is that during the viet nam fun and games the 5"54's would destroy the compartments beneath them by the recoil shock of shooting. this was especially true of the 01 level mount aft. most of the ships that had them had the chiefs mess and quarters just below the mount. as a west pac cruise went along and they got down to work the mess cooks would gradually sweep almost all of the insulation, paint, light fixtures..... into dust pans and over the side. i was on a destroyer tender stateside and in hawaii and whenever one of those ships would return our shipfitters would work 12 hour shifts putting those compartments back together.
C
retired now:
sirrah ( i may be wrong) but i believe that the fuel on board for main propulsion once it gets through the various purifiers and filters just might be aviation grade.
diesels will burn av jet fuel and gas turbines are what its for.
C
... but a ship the size of a BROOKE FFG (test platform not designed to carry an 8" gun) is not the size ship that would have the MK-71. A Flight II BURKE sized ship - that is where I want to talk to the engineers.
Sid, not sure about the newest DDG's, but the earlier flight of Arleigh Burke's reportedly carried right around 450,000 gallons or slightly more, of fuel for their gas turbines, plus a very small amount of diesel fuel. From everything I've heard about LCS-1 class, they hold just about exactly 50,000 gallons of gas turbine fuel, plus a much smaller amount specifically for diesels. I read a Naval Post Graduate School report showing LCS-2 class carried just about 200,000 gallons of fuel, or 4 times the total of LCS-1 class. You've obviously been around long enough to experienced fuel conservation measures while underway all over the world: running on one engine per shaft, or just using one shaft and dragging the other, limiting max speed as much as possible, etc. Most likely, LCS-1 class will be topping off their fuel every single day so that they do not get below a _____ certain percentage in reserve. And the MSC has insufficient quantitiy of underway replenishment oilers. Perhaps Navy amphibious ships will be able to give fuel to LCS's while they are deployed in the future. Otherwise, LCS will be just a showboat adorning calendars, because Fleet commanders will not be sending them into many ports all over the world, since USS COLE trajedy. Or perhaps, the Fleet Commanders will just say No Thanks when they INCHOP for deployments. We will see.
What is the 5" stowage on a BURKE?
CDR S, It was USS HULL (DD-945), a FORREST SHERMAN Class DD, not the BROOKE-class FFG that was the test platform for the MK 71. She had a forward magazine capacity of 600 rounds of 5/54, as did most 5/54 ships of that vintage. At the time they were considering installing the MK 71 on the CALIFORNIA and VIRGINIA class CGNs where they had space to expand the magazines. But, as I noted above, the lackluster test results from the HULL op-eval, restricted funding during the Carter years, and an emphasis on the BBs in the '80s that killed the program.
As for the BURKE class, I believe they carry 600 rounds of 5" but will defer to someone who has served in one.
very nice shot
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/03/mach-6-cruise-missile-ready-for-prime-time/?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter
lookie what I've found...
mach 6 ASCM anyone? Defend against this, Kirov!
Like General Turgidson says in "Dr. Strangelove":
"Boy I wish we had one o' those things, huh, Charlie?"
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