UNCLASSIFIED//Do we set up our leaders and Sailors for failure sometimes? Is it always the CO and the Chief's Mess - or is there only so much a crew can do with the time, money, and ship they are given? How much deferred maintenance can you hold to those who were not responsible for it?
MSGID/GENADMIN,USMTF,2007/PRESINSURV NORFOLK VA//
SUBJ/INSURV REPORT FOR USS STOUT (DDG 55) MATERIAL INSPECTION (MI)// GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. THE BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY CONDUCTED AN MI OF USS STOUT (DDG 55) AT NORFOLK, VA DURING THE PERIOD 10-14 MAR 08 AT NORFOLK, VA.
2. SENIOR MEMBER COMMENTS:
A. USS STOUT WAS FOUND UNFIT FOR SUSTAINED COMBAT OPERATIONS.
B. ALTHOUGH THE SHIP CERTIFIED ITS READINESS FOR SEA, THE BOARD NOTED DISCREPANCIES THAT WOULD HAVE RESTRICTED UNDERWAY OPERATIONS OR DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS DURING THE POST-UNDERWAY PORTION OF THE MI: 2B GTM/1B GTM, 1 GTG, STEERING, RESCUE BOAT/MAN OVERBOARD, ANCHOR, SPY-1D, FCS ILLUMINATORS, AFT VLS, CIWS MT 21, MK 32 SVTTS AND MK 45 LWG, HALON, AND UHF LOS COMMS.
C. AAW, USW, AND SUW MISSION AREAS WERE SIGNIFICANTLY LIMITED BECAUSE: AN/SPY-1D POWER OUT WAS REDUCED BY APPROX 75 PERCENT AND THE PROCESSING ABILITY WAS REDUCED BY APPROX 13 PERCENT, 2 OF 3 MK 99 ILLUMINATORS WERE INOP (LOSS OF 360 DEG COVERAGE AND NUMBER OF MISSILES INFLIGHT), AFT VLS MAGAZINE WAS UNAVAILABLE BECAUSE OF THE FUEL TANK LEAKAGE IN THE EDUCTOR SUMP (LOSS OF 68 PERCENT OF THE MISSILE INVENTORY), CIWS MT 21 WAS INOP, PORT AND STBD MK 32 SVTT TRAIN MECHANISMS WERE BINDING AND MOUNTS COULD NOT BE QUICKLY TRAINED TO FIRING POSITION, AND MK 45 5 INCH GUN COULD NOT SUPPORT GUNNERY DEMO BECAUSE OF CORROSION IN THE GUN CRADLE. SEE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE, OPERATIONS, AND WEAPONS SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS.
D. THE ANCHORING DEMO WAS NOT COMPLETED BECAUSE THE ANCHOR WINDLASS WILDCAT/CAPSTAN SHAFT COUPLING UPPER AND LOWER SLEEVES HAD EXCESSIVE CONCENTRIC MOVEMENT (UP TO 1/4 INCH) AND THE MECHANICAL BRAKE WAS MISADJUSTED.
E. MOB RECOVERY METHOD WAS DEGRADED. CORROSION ON THE DAVIT FOUNDATION, PEDESTAL, FALLS TENSIONING DEVICE, DAVIT SHEAVE, AND THE HOOK SECURING PIN WAS SEVERE ENOUGH TO WARRANT A SAFETY INSPECTION (COULD NOT DEPLOY RHIBS). THE AS-FOUND SAR SWIMMER GEAR WOULD NOT PERMIT OPS IN WATER TEMP BELOW 60 DEG F.
F. THE SHIP INITIATED SELF-SUSPENSION OF FLIGHT OPS FOR DAMAGED FLIGHT DECK
NETS AND HARDWARE. AVIATION FACILITIES INSPECTION RESULTED IN 7 ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SELF-SUSPENSION OF FLIGHT OR AVIATION RELATED OPS. SEE AVIATION SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS.
G. ENGINEERING CONTROL SYSTEMS WERE DEGRADED. 8 OF 8 CONSOLES FOUND WITH RESISTANCE READINGS BETWEEN RETURN AND GROUND TO BE BELOW THE MINIMUM OF 250K OHMS IAW PMS 2521/051 A-18. 5 OF 62 DDG'S HAVE EXPERIENCED UNCOMMANDED MAIN PROPULSION/ELECTRICAL GENERATION EVENTS DUE TO GROUNDS.
H. 11 GTM RBOS AND 7 GTG RBOS WERE IDENTIFED DURING THE INPORT INSPECTION.
I. RUDDER INSPECTION OVER THE PAST 11 MONTHS INDICATED BARE METAL SURFACE AREA HAD INCREASED BY APPROX 700 PERCENT AND 270 PERCENT FOR STBD AND PORT RUDDERS RESPECTIVELY. ADDITIONALLY, PITTING OF UP TO 2 INCHES IN DIAMETER BY 0.25 INCHES DEEP HAD DEVELOPED ON THE RUDDER SURFACE AREA. THE SHIP'S IMPRESSED CURRENT CATHODIC PROTECTION (ICCP) SYSTEM WAS NOT OPERATING PROPERLY. ICCP IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT BARE METAL DAMAGE.
J. GROUNDS IN 60 HZ DISTRIBUTION AND IC SYSTEMS WERE A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE. 3 ICSM PANELS, 5 60 HZ POWER PANELS, 4 SOUND POWERED PHONE CIRCUITS, AND 1 SHORE POWER RECEPTACLE WERE FOUND GROUNDED DURING THE INSPECTION. 2 GROUNDS DISCOVERED BY SHIP'S FORCE IN JAN 08 HAD NOT BEEN CORRECTED. INVESTIGATION AND CORRECTION OF THE GROUNDS IAW NSTM 300 PARA 300-3.2.6 WAS REQUIRED.
K. KEEL REST AND BOAT CHOCKS DID NOT HAVE 90 PERCENT MINIMUM CONTACT WITH THE BOAT IN THE STOWED POSITION.
L. ACCOM LADDER WAS NOT OBSERVED. LADDER WAS OFF THE SHIP FOR REPAIR (CASREP 07094).
M. ANCHOR CHAIN'S 1ST AND 2ND SHOT DID NOT RIDE IN THE WELP OF THE WILDCAT IAW NSTM 581-5.1.4.1.
N. MK 39 GYRO DATA CONVERTER (GDC) DATA TO SPY-1D COMPUTER INTERMITTENTLY CHANGED STATUS FROM GOOD TO FAILED, CAUSING AFT GYRO INFORMATION TO BE UNRELIABLE BECAUSE OF FAULTY ADAPTATION DATA CIRCUIT CARDS. SYMPTOM WAS ORIGINALLY IDENTIFIED IN MAR OF 06 (CASREP 06049, USS STOUT MSG 311830Z MAR 06) WHICH ALSO IDENTIFIED UNRELIABLE DATA TO WCS, GUN FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM, AND N PLUS 1 COMPUTER.
O. AFT MK41 VLS HAD 10 DELUGE VALVES LEAKING AND FWD VLS HAD 3 VALVES LEAKING. SALINITY CHECK AFT HAD TWICE THE ALLOWABLE LIMIT (4 VICE 2 MICROMHO). SEDIMENT WAS ALSO PRESENT IN THE AFT DELUGE HOSES WHICH WILL LEAD TO VALVE FAILURES.
P. MT 51 CRADLE ROUND/POWDER POSITION SWITCHES WERE CORRODED, PREVENTING THE GUN FROM FIRING DURING THE GUNNERY DEMO. CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUIRED 4 HOURS (CORRECTED). ADDITIONALLY, SALT WATER CORROSION WAS ON THE CRADLE VALVE BLOCKS, LOADER DRUM PIPING/VALVE BLOCKS, FUZE SETTER ELECTRICAL SWITCH CONNECTORS, MAIN CABLE CONNECTOR TIE-POINT, LOWER HOIST ASSEMBLY, SHIELD ACCESS DOOR LINKAGES, AND UPPER HOIST CHAIN TRACK.
Q. SHIP'S UHF LOS COMMUNICATIONS WERE DEGRADED AND COULD NOT FULLY SUPPORT 80 PERCENT OF 5TH FLEET COMMUNICATIONS PLAN WITH AVAILABLE ASSETS. OVERALL COMMUNICATION ANTENNA MAINTENANCE AND CORROSION PREVENTIVE MEASURES, IF UNIMPROVED, WILL LEAD TO FURTHER COMMUNICATION SYSTEM DEGRADATIONS. SEE COMMUNICATIONS SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS.
R. AN/USQ-153 ISNS SIPRNET AND NIPRNET WERE DEGRADED WITH THE FOLLOWING DEFICIENCIES: SERVERS HAD UNAUTHORIZED USB 500GB HARD DRIVES CONNECTED, IAVA PATCHES WERE NOT CURRENT, SERVERS REQUIRED DEFRAGMENTATION, TAPE BACK-UP DEVICES WERE INOP OR MALFUNCTIONING, AND INTEGRATED NETWORK MANAGER (INM) WOULD NOT START.
S. AN/USQ-144 ADNS SYSTEM HAS BEEN INSTALLED FOR OVER 1 YEAR WITHOUT A COMPLETED SOVT.
T. FOOD SERVICE DIVISION'S ABILITY TO SAFELY OPERATE WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE OF THE GREASE INTERCEPTOR HOOD MATERIAL CONDITION. SEE SUPPLY SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS.
U. SHIP'S ABILITY TO STORE, PREPARE, AND SERVE FOOD WAS DEGRADED. SPECIFICALLY: WALK-IN FREEZER DID NOT MAINTAIN 0 DEG F OR BELOW (CORRECTED), 5 OF 13 REACH-IN REEFERS WERE INOP, 4 OF 13 REACH-IN REEFERS WERE DEGRADED, REACH-IN REEFER CONDENSER COIL FILTER CLEANING MAINTENANCE WAS NOT BEING COMPLETED (CORRECTED), 2 OF 2 SINGLE TANK DISHWASHERS WERE INOP, 3 OF 3 WASTE DISPOSAL UNITS WERE INOP, 3 OF 4 STEAM KETTLES WERE INOP, 1 OF 3 CONVECTION OVENS WAS INOP, AND 1 OF 2 SANITIZING SINKS WAS INOP.
V. SEALANT IN THE SHOWERS HAD FAILED, ENABLING 7 OF 12 SANITARY SPACE SHOWER DECKS TO BECOME SEPARATED FROM THE SURFACE AND ROT.
W. BERTHING 2 HAD NUMEROUS MATERIAL AND PRESERVATION ISSUES WITH THE BERTHING TIER FOUNDATIONS CORRODED TO THE POINT OF LOST METAL DUE TO A WATER FOUNTAIN THAT HAD BEEN LEAKING FOR A YEAR (SHIP REPORTED). BERTHING IS SCHEDULED FOR REHABILITATION IN 2011. FOUNDATIONS REQUIRE TESTING FOR QUALIFICATION TO SAFELY SUPPORT PERSONNEL FOR COMBAT STRESS/DESIGN STRESSES.
X. MAIN DRAINAGE WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE THE AUX 1 EDUCTOR OVBD DISCHARGE VALVE (MD-V 2-169-2) DID NOT SHUT REMOTELY, MER 1 EDUCTOR LOCAL AND REMOTE SUCTION GAUGES WERE INOP, THEREFORE PREVENTING SHIP'S FORCE FROM FOLLOWING EOP. AUX 1 BHD STOP VALVE (MD-V-31 4-173-6) MOV LOCAL OPEN INDICATOR LIGHT WAS OUT.
Y. HALON WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE THE PAINT LOCKER EXHAUST AND THE MER 2 SUPPLY VENTILATION DAMPENERS FAILED TO CLOSE.
Z. 22 OF 24 PORTABLE DAVIT SOCKETS HAD EXCESSIVE CORROSION AND REQUIRE LUBRICATION/CLEANING OF THE SOCKET COLLARS, DAVIT BEARINGS, DAVIT FEET, AND FOOT SOCKETS.
AA. 1 OF 2 CONREP STATIONS WAS INOP (SEE DECK SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR
DETAILS).
AB. SHIP'S SELF-ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY WAS EVALUATED AS MARGINAL.
AC. 26 OF 77 WATERTIGHT CLOSURES INSPECTED WERE NOT WATERTIGHT.
AD. 2 OF 2 IPDS WERE OPERATIONAL.
AE. 14 OF 20 VENTILATION AIRFLOW ALARMS WERE EITHER INOP OR MISADJUSTED.
AF. 9 CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES PRECLUDED OILY WATER SEPARATORS CERTIFICATION.
AG. DOSSERT CONNECTORS WERE FOUND IN THE NR 1 AND NR 3 SWBDS. THERMAL INDICATIONS REVEALED NO SIGNS OF LOOSENING OR LOCAL HEATING. CONNECTORS NEED TO BE DOCUMENTED FOR FUTURE INSPECTION.
AH. 2 SYSTEMS DID NOT HAVE PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM (PMS) INSTALLED. SEE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS.
3. THE FOLLOWING CASREPS WERE ACTIVE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MI:
NUMBER NOMENCLATURE CATEGORY
06026 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 2
06027 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 2
06028 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 2
07049 AFT MK41 VLS MODULE 3 2
07051 AFT MK41 VLS MODULE 2 2
07076 ACTS 2
07092 MSS CONSOLE 2
07094 ACCOMMODATION LADDER 2
07098 CONDITIONING SYSTEMS, AIR 2
08001 FLIGHT DECK NETS 2
08002 AIR SYSTEMS, HIGH PRESSURE 2
08005 SHF 2
08007 HULL STRUCTURE 2
08009 FCS NR 1 2
08011 STEERING GEAR W/CONTROL 2
08012 BFTT 2
08013 SPY HVPS 2
08016 STEERING GEAR W/CONTROL 2
08017 NR 1 HPAC WATER PUMP 2
08018 MT22 CIWS MAGAZINE 2
08019 PURIFIER NR 2 LUBE OIL 2
4. 23 DEPARTURES FROM SPECS (DFS) EXISTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MI.
A. THE FOLLOWING DFS WERE IN EXCESS OF 180 DAYS:
NUMBER NOMENCLATURE DATE ISSUED
DDG55-003-01 MILLING MACHINE 11/13/2003
DDG55-001-02 NR 1 CRP PUMP SEAL 1/23/2006
DDG55-002-02 NR 2 CRP PUMP SEAL 1/23/2006
DDG55-004-02 NR 1 CPP SHEAR PINS 9/26/2003
DDG55-005-02 NR 2 CPP SHEAR PINS 9/26/2003
DDG55-012-01 MRG MOST REMOTE BEAR 11/26/2002
DDG55-005-03 STBD BLKHD SEAL 220 3/13/2003
DDG55-006-03 STBD BLKHD SEAL 254 3/13/2003
DDG55-007-03 STBD BLKHD SEAL 300 3/13/2003
DDG55-008-03 PORT BLKHD SEAL 300 4/25/2003
DDG55-018-03 NR 1 MRG UNLOADER VLV 1/28/2006
DDG55-019-03 NR 2 MRG UNLOADER VLV 1/28/2006
DDG55-001-04 NR 1A GTM SHOCK MOUNT 4/9/2007
DDG55-002-04 NR 1B GTM SHOCK MOUNT 4/9/2007
DDG55-003-04 NR 2A GTM SHOCK MOUNT 4/9/2007
DDG55-004-04 NR 2B GTM SHOCK MOUNT 4/9/2007
DDG55-021-04 NR 2 MRG L/O COOLER 6/3/2005
B. NO DFS WERE ISSUED TO SUPPORT COMPLETION OF THE MI.
5. 15 ACTIVE TEMPORARY STANDING ORDERS (TSO) EXISTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MI.
A. NO TSO WERE IN EXCESS OF 45 DAYS.
B. NO TSO WERE ISSUED TO SUPPORT COMPLETION OF THE MI.
6. DEMO RESULTS: SAT (0.80-1.00)/DEGRADED (0.60-0.79)/UNSAT (0.00-0.59):
-AAW DTE DEMO WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.51) BECAUSE OF REDUCED AN/SPY-1 DETECTION RANGE AND FAILURE OF 2 OF 3 FCS ILLUMINATORS.
-SD DTE DEMO WAS DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.73) BECAUSE THE CIWS MT 21 WAS INOP AND DID NOT SUPPORT THE ENGAGEMENT.
-GUNNERY LIVE FIRE DEMO WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.30) BECAUSE MT 51 DID NOT FIRE UNTIL THE CORRODED BREECH SAFETY DEVICE WAS REPAIRED.
-USW DTE DEMO WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.91).
-FULL POWER DEMO COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED (SCORE: 0.00) BECAUSE REQUIRED EQUIPMENT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED. SHIP WAS ABLE TO ACHIEVE 80 PERCENT FULL POWER ON A 3 GTM CONFIGURATION AND A 1 HOUR HIGH POWER DEMO WAS CONDUCTED AT THAT SPEED.
-QUICK REVERSAL ASTERN WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.95). QUICK REVERSAL WAS CONDUCTED FROM 80 PERCENT FULL POWER AHEAD TO 100 PERCENT FULL POWER ASTERN.
-QUICK REVERSAL AHEAD WAS SAT (SCORE: 1.00). QUICK REVERSAL WAS CONDUCTED FROM 100 PERCENT FULL POWER ASTERN TO 80 PERCENT FULL POWER AHEAD.
-STEERING DEMO WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.95). STEERING DEMO WAS CONDUCTED AT 80 PERCENT FULL POWER.
-ANCHORING DEMO WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.00) BECAUSE OF ANCHORING DEFICIENCIES.
7. SHIPBOARD PRESERVATION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.79):
-CCIPT IN-SERVICE CORROSION CONTROL SURVEYS WERE CONDUCTED IN JUN 06 AND SEP 05. INSURV CORROSION INSPECTION VALIDATED THAT 80 PERCENT OF THE DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED DURING THE SURVEYS WERE STILL OUTSTANDING. SURFACE PREPARATION AND COATING APPLICATION HAS NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED PROPERLY OVER THE LIFE OF THE SHIP AND HAS ADDED TO THE OVERALL INCREASED WEIGHT OF 3.5 TONS IAW CCIPT SURVEY REPORT FOR USS STOUT (DDG 55), WHICH HAS DECREASED FUEL SAVINGS, SPEED, AND STABILITY.
-FLIGHT DECK STATUS LIGHTING SYSTEM WAS INOP BECAUSE OF CORROSION.
-CORROSION CONTROLS FOR BULKHEAD TO DECK INTERFACE IN BERTHING 5 AND 7 SANITARY SPACES WERE INADEQUATE (GRADE 1G).
-APPROX 210 SQ FT OF THE 05 LEVEL DECK WAS CORRODED. 65 PERCENT OF THE NON-SKID HAD RUST BLEEDING THRU, ALL DECK DRAINS WERE CORRODED WITH FLAKING METAL AND WASTAGE, THE KNIFE EDGE HAD MULTIPLE SPOTS OF FLAKING METAL, AND THE JUNCTION OF THE DOG HOUSE BULKHEAD AND DECK WAS CORRODED OVER THE ENTIRE LENGTH. ADDITIONALLY, THE FWD STBD CORNER WAS CRACKED.
-AFT ICCP MAGNETIC CONTROLLER WAS INCORRECTLY SET. HULL POTENTIAL READING
WAS .900 VDC, REFERENCE AND AUX CELL CHECK READINGS WERE AT .900 VDC AND CONTROLLER OUTPUT READING WAS .150 VDC (CONTROLLER OUTPUT SHOULD BE 0 VDC WHEN HULL POTENTIAL IS ABOVE .850 VDC ).
-1 OF 2 BRUSHES ON THE STBD SHAFT GROUNDING ASSY HAD LESS THAN 50 PERCENT CONTACT WITH THE SHAFT SLIP RINGS.
-PORT AND STBD SHAFT GROUNDING WIRE INSULATION WAS DETERIORATED.
-PORT AND STBD RUDDER GROUNDING STRAPS WERE THE WRONG MATERIAL AND INCORRECTLY BOLTED ON BOTH ENDS.
-VAPOR CONDENSATION INHIBITORS (VCIS) WERE NOT INSTALLED IN APPROX 75 PERCENT OF THE ELECTRICAL ENCLOSURES IAW MRC 3001/002-18M-4.
-ALL FCS DIRECTORS HAD EXTENSIVE CORROSION ON THE FASTENERS AND HARDWARE BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT WEATHER-PROOFED. ADDITIONALLY, THE FCS 1 TRAIN SEAL FAILED AND ALLOWED WATER INTRUSION INTO THE TRAINING GEAR FLUID WHICH WAS MILKY WHITE IN COLOR. THIS IS A CLASSWIDE ISSUE.
-HARPOON LAUNCHERS AND FOUNDATIONS WERE CORRODED. CABLE STUFFING TUBES TO THE LAUNCHERS HAD ASTM 1G CORROSION AND SHOWED 90 PERCENT METAL WASTAGE.
-TV-DTS ANTENNA 10-1 (STBD/FWD) HAD RUST GRADE 1-G (OVER 50 PERCENT RUSTED) ON THE CONDUIT SECURING PLATE.
-OE-567/WSC-6 SHF ANTENNA 3-17 (STBD/FWD) HAD RUST GRADE 1-G (OVER 50 PERCENT RUSTED) ALONG ANTENNA BASE.
-AN/SRQ-4 HAWKLINK ANTENNA WAS SHOWING SIGNS OF WAVEGUIDE CORROSION.
8. SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES AND EQUIPMENT OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (EOC) INCLUDE:
A. PROPULSION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.69):
-1 OF 4 GTMS WAS INOP.
-4 OF 4 GTMS HAD LUBE OIL LEAKS.
-2 OF 4 GTM MODULE HALON ALARM BELLS WERE INOP.
-NR 1B GTM HAD FOD ON THE INTAKE PLENUM SCREEN.
-NR 1 MRG WAS MISSING PHYSICAL SECURITY DEVICES ON VARIOUS FLANGES.
-2 OF 2 MAIN THRUST BEARING REAR SEALS LEAKED LUBE OIL.
-3 OF 4 LUBE OIL SERVICE PUMPS LEAKED LUBE OIL.
-NR 2 MRG LUBE OIL STRAINER DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALARM WAS MISADJUSTED (CORRECTED).
-2 OF 2 MER 1 FUEL OIL SERVICE TANK QUICK TRIP VALVES WERE INOP (CORRECTED).
-2 OF 2 MER 1 FUEL OIL PRE-FILTER DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALARMS WERE MISADJUSTED (CORRECTED).
-2 OF 4 GTM BLEED AIR CHECK VALVES WERE INOP.
-8 BLEED/MASKER/PRAIRIE AIR SYSTEM LOW POINT DRAINS HAD NO FLOW.
-14 FLEXIBLE HOSE ASSEMBLIES THROUGHOUT THE BLEED/MASKER AND PRAIRIE AIR SYSTEMS HAD LAGGING PADS INSTALLED THAT APPEARED NOT TO HAVE BEEN REMOVED IOT CONDUCT THE ANNUAL PMS INSPECTION REQUIRED BY MIP 5000/009.
-3 OF 3 GTGS HAD LUBE OIL LEAKS.
-2 OF 3 GTG PMA LUBE OIL PUMPS LEAKED INTO THE GENERATOR.
-NR 1 GTG THERMOCOUPLE BLOCK WAS BROKEN.
-NR 1 GTG BLOW-IN DOOR CONTROLLER WAS IN MANUAL DURING OPERATION.
-NR 2 GTG HALON TIME DELAY WAS MISADJUSTED (CORRECTED).
-NR 3 GTG HAD A FUEL LEAK ON THE FUEL FILTER HOSE.
B. AUXILIARIES: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.56):
-RUDDER ACCURACY CHECKS FAILED FOR BOTH ALPHA AND BRAVO STEERING UNITS.
-ALL STEERING HYDRAULIC POWER UNITS WERE LEAKING HYDRAULIC OIL IN SEVERAL PLACES, REQUIRING CONSTANT WIPERS.
-VERTICAL PACKAGE CONVEYOR WAS INOP BECAUSE OF IN-SERVICE LIMITS. THE TORQUE COUPLING PERSONNEL SAFETY GUARD WAS NOT INSTALLED, MAIN, 2ND AND 3RD DECK LOADER/UNLOADER GRAVITY CONVEYOR CONNECTION POINTS WERE NOT INSTALLED (ECP 572-02A-C021), CONVEYOR DID NOT STOP WHEN THE JAM LIMIT SWITCHES WERE ACTUATED UP TO 1.5 INCHES IAW SAFETY ADVISORY 033-00, 01 LEVEL SECONDARY DRIVE CHAINS WERE LOOSE, AND ALL LEVEL PERSONNEL SAFETY SHIELDS WERE IMPROPERLY MADE WITH SHARP EDGES.
-NR 1 A/C WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A LEAKING MECHANICAL SEAL ON THE COMPRESSOR (CASREP 07098).
-NR 1 REFRIGERATION UNIT WAS OOC BECAUSE OF AN INOP CAPACITY CONTROL.
-NR 4 A/C CHILLER WAS LEAKING CHILLED WATER INTO THE BILGE.
-NR 1 FREEZE BOX COIL TEMP CONTROL SWITCH WAS INOP, MAINTAINING THE TEMP AT PLUS 3 DEG F.
-NR 1 AND NR 2 COILS FOR THE FREEZE BOX AND THE COILS FOR THE CHILL BOX LOUVERS WERE INOP.
-2 OF 2 REVERSE OSMOSIS UNIT DUMP VALVES FAILED TO TRIP ON HIGH SALINITY (CORRECTED).
-2 OF 2 HPAC AND 1 OF 3 LPAC TYPE 1 DEHYDRATORS FAILED THE DEWPOINT TEST.
-NR 1 HPAC HAD A LEAKING WATER PUMP (CASREP 08017).
-NR 4 FIREPUMP SUCTION VALVE WAS INOP REMOTELY FROM THE MAIN DECK CONTROL STATION.
-3 OF 6 FIREPUMP SUCTION VALVE LOCAL POSITION INDICATORS WERE MISSING.
-NR 1 SWS PUMP HAD A SIGNIFICANT LEAK IN PUMP CASING VENT LINE. LEAK WAS VENTING 1 FT BELOW A POWER PANEL.
-4 OF 5 SWS SUCTION VALVE LOCAL POSITION INDICATOR DIALS WERE MISSING.
-NR 2 AND NR 5 SWS PUMPS HAD LEAKING MECHANICAL SEALS.
-2 OF 3 WATER HEATER HIGH TEMP SAFETY SWITCHES WERE MISADJUSTED ON HIGH TEMP.
-3 OF 3 WATER HEATER HIGH TEMP SAFETY SWITCHES DID NOT HAVE MANUAL RESET.
-2 OF 3 WATER HEATER OPERATING SWITCHES WERE MISADJUSTED.
C. ELECTRICAL: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.77):
-MAIN 60 HZ SWBD AND LOAD CENTER AQB-L AND AQB-LL SERIES CIRCUIT BREAKER ADJUSTABLE SHORT TIME PICK-UP AND SHORT TIME DELAY SETTINGS WERE NOT SET IAW TECHMAN (CORRECTED).
-CL Z VENT ZONE 3 PANEL NR 3 CIRCUIT BREAKER DID NOT TRIP DURING STAGE 1 LOAD SHED TESTING.
-ABTS 01-116-1 AND 02-305-2 DID NOT SHIFT IN AUTO WHEN TESTED.
-ABT 2-239-1 INTERMITTENTLY SHIFTED FROM NORMAL TO ALTERNATE POWER SOURCES WHEN IN THE AUTOMATIC MODE.
-ABT 1-127-1 EXTERIOR CABINET WAS SEVERELY CORRODED AND COULD NOT BE OPENED.
-POWER PANELS 2-50-2, 2-162-2 AND 03-173-1 HAD OVER-RATED CIRCUIT BREAKERS
INSTALLED.
D. DAMAGE CONTROL: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.69):
-MER 1 BILGE SPRINKLER SOPV DID NOT OPEN FULLY WHEN ACTIVATED (CORRECTED).
-3 GEN RE-ENTRY HOSE NOZZLE WAS INOP (CORRECTED).
-2 OF 3 EBACS DID NOT FILL BOTTLES IAW THE PMS TIME FRAME (15-18 MINUTES).
BOTH WERE IN EXCESS OF 20 MIN.
-3 OF 3 HPFAS DID NOT FILL BOTTLES IAW THE PMS TIME FRAME (45 SEC).
-23 OF 63 SCBAS WERE UNSAT.
-3 BERTHING SALTWATER SPRINKLERS DID NOT ALARM DURING TESTING.
-1 OF 2 AN/KAS WAS INOP (PORTSIDE).
-1 OF 3 PP-4276C/PD WAS INOP.
-AUX 1, MER 1, AND 3 GEN HALON PRIMARY ACTIVATION CO2 BOTTLES LEAKED.
-FIREMAIN PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE WAS INOP.
E. DECK: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.50):
-3 OF 3 MEDICAL MK 1 LIFE VESTS WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW MIP 5832/R-1.
-4 OF 7 RESCUE BOAT MK 1 LIFE VESTS FAILED TO PROPERLY INFLATE.
-1 OF 2 SAR LPU-28 LIFE VESTS FAILED TO PROPERLY INFLATE (CORRECTED).
-1 OF 2 SAR STROBE LIGHTS WITH THE BLUE LENS FAILED TO OPERATE IAW MIP 5832/U-1 (CORRECTED).
-1 OF 2 SETS OF SAR GLOVES WAS HOLED AND REQUIRED REPLACEMENT (CORRECTED).
-2 OF 2 SETS OF CPU-72P DRY SUIT LINERS WERE MISSING, PREVENTING SAR FROM ENTERING WATER IN TEMPS LOWER THAN 60 DEG F IAW NWP 3-50.1 FIGURE 5-59 WATER TEMPERATURE GUIDELINES.
-BOAT DECK SAR MEDIVAC LITTER WAS MISSING WEIGHT TEST DATA, 2 OF 2 ADJUSTABLE CARRYING HARNESSES AND A LUMBAR SUPPORT PAD (CORRECTED).
-4 OF 4 RETRACTABLE BITTS/CHOCKS REQUIRED MAINTENANCE IAW MIP 5821/Q-4. BITT BUSHINGS, UPPER AND LOWER GUIDES REQUIRED INSPECTION, CLEANING, AND LUBRICATION.
-3 OF 6 MOORING LINES HAD EXCESSIVE ABRASIONS, TWISTED STRANDS, IMPROPER SPLICES, SEVERE COCKLING, AND WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW MIP 5821/Q-11R.
-2 OF 4 FANTAIL BITTS HAD EXCESSIVE ABRASIVE CUT CONDITIONS AND SIGNIFICANT CORROSION.
-RAS NR 5 MANUAL OPERATION CUT-OUT WAS BENT AND MISSING SECURING LANYARD.
-RAS NR 5 WAS MISSING THE ELECTRIC DISK BRAKE RELEASE LEVER. THE PADEYE COULD NOT BE DEMONSTRATED IN THE MANUAL MODE.
-1 OF 2 LOWER LIMIT SWITCHES WAS INOP ON RAS STA NR 5.
-SLIDING PADEYE EMERGENCY PNEUMATIC DRIVE WAS MISSING.
-1 OF 2 TILT STOWED BACKSTAY YOKES WAS SEIZED ON STA NR 5.
-RAS NR 5 AND NR 6 WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW 5713/Q-3R-S-1. BOTH STAS HAS SEVERELY CORRODED CARRIAGES, WORM SCREWS, FOUNDATION MEMBERS, LOWER CONNECTION BOXES, AND ELECTRIC MOTORS.
-RAS NR 6 WAS ASSEMBLED INCORRECTLY AFTER OVERHAUL. THE KING POST REQUIRED RE-WORK TO PROPERLY INSTALL THE SLIDING BLOCK SO LUBRICATION MAINTENANCE OF THE BALL DRIVE CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED (SHIP REPORTED).
-4 OF 4 KINGPOST UNREP LIGHTS WERE DAMAGED AND INOP ON RAS STAS NR 5 AND NR 6.
-SEWING MACHINE WAS INOP BECAUSE OF MISSING POWER, SAFETY PLACARD, AND OPERATING ACCESSORIES.
-28 OF 28 TOPSIDE LIFEJACKET LOCKERS WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW PMS MIP 6111/S-1.
-AFT LOOKOUT LIFE RING WAS DETERIORATED AND PUNCTURED. DISTRESS MARKER LIFE
RING SECURING BRACKETS WERE MISSING AND STENCIL WITH SHIP'S NAME AND HULL NUMBER WAS UN-READABLE.
-SHIP'S BROW WAS MISSING 5 OF 10 LIFELINE STAPLES.
-6 OF 6 FENDER SECURING STRAPS WERE MISSING.
-PILOT'S LADDER WAS NOT RIGGED IAW NAVSHIP DWG 804-5000900.
-PILOT'S LADDER WAS NOT PROPERLY ADJUSTED TO TERMINATE AT WATERS EDGE.
-72 OF 187 (31 PERCENT) OF MAIN DECK KEVLAR LIFELINES WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW MIP 6121/S-5.
-60 PERCENT OF THE BAXTER BOLTS INSPECTED WERE NOT IAW PMS 6111/A-2R.
F. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE: SAT (SCORE: 0.90):
-S/F COULD NOT POWER ON THE ALTERNATE MK 116 UYH-3 BECAUSE OF FAULTY WIRING TO THE BACK SHELL.
-1 OF 6 TORPEDO BREECH CONTROL VALVES WAS STUCK OPEN BECAUSE OF CORROSION.
-TORPEDO BANDING TOOLS WERE MISSING.
G. OPERATIONS: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.62):
-AN/SPY-1D D/PD T20, FPA T26 MOD 3 (LOSS OF 4 OF 16 CHANNELS), AND FPA T27 MOD 3 (LOSS OF 4 OF 16 CHANNELS) WERE INOP BECAUSE OF FAULTY HVPS T138 (CASREP 08013).
-12 OF 16 CHANNELS IN FPA T26 WERE INOP (4 CORRECTED).
-12 OF 16 CHANNELS IN FPA T27 WERE INOP (3 CORRECTED).
-AN/SPY-1D SIGNAL PROCESSOR SIDE A DROPPED OFF-LINE BECAUSE OF DIGITAL FAULTY ISOLATION FAILURES AND THE INTERMITTENT FAULT WITH RADAR TARGET DATA PROCESSOR NR 2.
-AN/SPY-1D ARRAY T01 POWER SUPPLY WAS INOP (LOSS OF REDUNDANCY).
-AN/SPS-67 SHORT PULSE MODE WAS INOP.
-AN/SPS-67 MODULATOR CURRENT EXCEEDED 22 AMPS (CORRECTED).
-APX-118 IFF TRANSPONDER MODE 4 WAS INOP.
-ROTATING IFF ANTENNA (SPS-67) SUM AND DIFFERENCE VSWR WAS OUT-OF-SPEC.
-AN/URN-25 TACAN REFLECTED POWER WAS HIGH AND IPA TUBE CURRENT WAS OUT-OF-SPEC LOW.
-MK 137 MOD 4 SRBOC LAUNCHERS NR 1A AND NR 3A SAFE LAMPS WERE FAULTY (LAUNCHER NR 1A SHIP REPORTED). S/F COULD NOT DETERMINE SAFE/ARM STATUS AT AFFECTED LAUNCHERS.
-MK 137 LAUNCHER NIGHT LOADING LIGHTS WERE INOP (SHIP REPORTED).
-PCMS WAS DEGRADED (INSPECTION SCORE: 211).
-HD1140 SPY COOLING SYSTEM WAS NOT OPERATED IAW PMS 456/R08 W-1. COPPER NICKEL HEAT EXCHANGER WAS ON-LINE VICE TITANIUM HEAT EXCHANGER BECAUSE TITANIUM HEAT EXCHANGER WAS CLOGGED.
-BFTT DEMO WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE OF MULTIPLE FAULT INDICATIONS (CIU SETUP OR DMS FAULTY, 1553B STATUS ERROR-DUAL COMM FAILURE). FAULTS OCCURRED APPROX 3 TIMES PER MINUTE AND CAUSED OWN SHIP INFORMATION TO BE ERRATIC.
H. WEAPONS: SAT (SCORE: 0.88):
-MT 21 AMMO HANDLING SKIP BOX JUMPED DURING OPERATION AND WAS UNSAFE TO OPERATE.
-MT 21 WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A FAULTED ANTENNA VRU. PROBLEM COULD NOT BE REPLICATED WHEN RUNNING SOTS IN PORT.
-HARPOON LAUNCHERS AND FOUNDATIONS WERE EXTREMELY CORRODED. CABLE STUFFING TUBES TO THE LAUNCHERS HAD ASTM 1G CORROSION AND SHOWED 90 PERCENT METAL WASTAGE. PCMS HAD MULTIPLE LAYERS OF PAINT FLAKING OFF.
-26 OF 90 VLS LAUNCHER DELUGE GROUNDING STRAPS WERE CORRODED.
-AFT VLS LAUNCHER, MODULE 2, CELL 6 HATCH WAS BINDING AND REQUIRED REPLACEMENT.
-AFT VLS LAUNCHER, MODULE 3 FAILED SYSTEM BITE.
-AFT VLS LAUNCHER, MODULE 7 FAILED SYSTEM, LSEQ AND MCP BITE. CELLS 1-4 HAD MULTIPLE FAULT CODES.
-MT 51 AMMO ELEVATOR HOIST WAS NOT TESTED BECAUSE THE HATCH TRIPOD HOSES WERE DAMAGED AND FASTENERS WERE MISSING.
-FCS 1 TRAIN SEAL FAILED AND ALLOWED WATER INTRUSION INTO THE TRAIN FLUID WHICH WAS MILKY WHITE IN COLOR.
-FCS 1 MAN ALOFT SWITCH WAS INCORRECTLY LABELED. SAFE WAS UNSAFE AND VICE
VERSA (CORRECTED).
-FCS 3 TWT PARAMETERS WERE OUT OF ALIGNMENT, PREVENTING RADIATION.
I. NAVIGATION: SAT (SCORE: 0.90):
-GYRO REPEATER IN IC GYRO ROOM NR 2 WAS FAULTY.
-EM LOG NR 2 R1 POTENTIOMETER WAS FAULTY.
J. COMMUNICATIONS: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.77):
-12 OF 14 AN/WSC-3 UHF LOS TRANSCEIVERS WERE INOP OR DEGRADED: NR 1, NR 3, AND NR 12 HAD NO RF POWER OUT, AND NR 4, NR 5, NR 6, NR 7, NR 8, NR 9, NR 10, NR 11, AND NR 14 WERE NOT IAW PMS AND WERE OUT OF ALIGNMENT.
-2 OF 2 AN/WSC-3 UHF HAVE-QUICK LOS TRANSCEIVERS WERE DEGRADED.
-AN/SSQ-88 QUALITY MONITORING TEST SET WAS INOP BECAUSE TEST EQUIPMENT WAS AT CAL.
-AS-3771, AS-3772, AS-3773 HF RECEIVE ANTENNAS REQUIRED PRESERVATION AND HAD LOW INSULATION RESISTANCE.
-2 OF 2 AS-3226 VRC-46 VHF ANTENNAS HAD MISSING HARDWARE AND NR 2 FAILED VSWR TEST.
-AS-390 UHF ANTENNA NR 3-15 HAD HIGH VSWR AND THE AS-390 QMCS UHF ANTENNA PAINT WAS DETERIORATED.
-4 OF 4 AS-2815 SSR-1 UHF SATCOM ANTENNA HARDWARE PRESERVATION WAS DETERIORATED AND 1 OF 4 HAD A LOOSE BOND STRAP.
-1 OF 2 AN/VRC-46 VHF TRANSCEIVERS WAS INOP BECAUSE OF FAULTY AS-3226 ANTENNA.
-OA-9243 (HF ANTENNA TILTING GROUP) ANTENNA HANDCRANK TURNED VIOLENTLY WHEN USING THE ELECTRIC SWITCH TO RAISE OR LOWER THE ANTENNA, CREATING A SAFETY HAZARD.
-HF IMI FAILED.
-S/F COULD NOT DEMONSTRATE AN/USC-38 NECC BECAUSE OF NO CKT AVAILABILITY.
-AN/WSC-6 SHF WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A POOR SIGNAL TO NOISE RATIO (CASREP 08005).
-OE-567/WSC-6 SHF ANTENNA 3-18 (PORT/AFT) BASE GASKET WAS WORN AND SPLITTING.
-21 OF 27 TA-970/980/990 RED PHONES WERE DEGRADED OR INOP.
-LINK 4A WAS INOP BECAUSE OF AN INABILITY TO PASS TRACK DATA.
-3 OF 3 NAVY ORDER WIRE TERMINALS WERE INOP OR DEGRADED.
K. INFORMATION SYSTEMS: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.78):
-AN/USQ-185 CENTRIXS DOMAINS COULD NOT BE ACCESSED OR EVALUATED BECAUSE PASSWORDS WERE NOT AVAILABLE.
-AN/USQ-185 CENTRIXS FOUR EYES ENCLAVE COULD NOT BE TESTED BECAUSE PASSWORDS WERE NOT AVAILABLE.
-AN/UYK-163 NIAPS SERVER HAD SKED DATA TEMP FILES 500 GIG IN SIZE (CORRECTED).
-AN/UYK-163 NIAPS SERVER DID NOT BACK-UP SKED DATA NOR LIVE STATE IMAGES ONTO TAPES.
-NOMEX DECKING IN RADIO WAS SEVERELY DEGRADED BECAUSE NUMEROUS DECK PLATES HAD NO SECURING HARDWARE. THIS CREATED A TRIP AND MISSILE HAZARD. OF NOTE WAS THE FACT THAT THE DECKPLATES IN LOW OR NO TRAFFIC AREAS ALSO HAD NO SECURING HARDWARE BUT NO SIGNS OF DAMAGE.
L. SUPPLY: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.67):
-GIH WASHDOWN SYSTEM NOZZLE CLEANING AND ALIGNMENT MAINTENANCE WAS NOT BEING COMPLETED (CORRECTED).
-GIH 5 OF 6 FAIL-SAFE (DETROIT) SWITCHES WERE NOT WITHIN ANNUAL CALIBRATION PERIODICITY AND THE ONE THAT WAS WITHIN PERIODICITY DID NOT FUNCTION AS DESIGNED.
-GIH MAIN GALLEY DIVERTER DAMPER WAS INOP.
-MEAT SLICER WAS INOP.
-1 OF 3 SELF-SERVICE ICE MACHINES WAS INOP.
-ICE CREAM MACHINE WAS INOP.
-1 OF 3 COFFEE MACHINES WAS INOP.
-BUFFALO MACHINE WAS INOP.
-1 OF 2 60 LB WASHERS WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A SAFETY INTERLOCK SWITCH ON THE DOOR.
-CORROSION CONTROLS FOR CPO SEABAG LOCKER DECK WERE INADEQUATE (GRADE 4G).
-CORROSION CONTROLS FOR STOREROOM NR 4 BILGES WERE INADEQUATE (GRADE 3 G).
M. HABITABILITY: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.75):
-3 OF 7 CREW BERTHING WATER COOLERS WERE INOP AND 2 OF THE REMAINING 4 WERE
DEGRADED (S/F REPORTED REPAIRING 4 PRIOR TO OUR INSPECTION).
N. NAVOSH: SAT (SCORE: 0.85):
-3 OF 3 4-GAS ANALYZERS WERE INOP (1 CORRECTED).
-36 BOTTLES OF CALCIUM HYPOCHLORITE WERE STORED IN THE FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS STOREROOM (CORRECTED).
-5 OF 16 EYEWASH STAS HAD MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES.
-SAFETY NET BETWEEN GTMS 2A AND 2B WAS NOT INSTALLED.
-SAFETY GUARD CHAINS WERE MISSING ON 4 OF 6 ACCESS TRUNKS (1 CORRECTED).
-12 OF 17 TRUNK SAFETY NETS WERE NOT IAW NAVSEA GUIDANCE (NAVSEA DRAWING 804-5184163 REV A).
-BIOLOGICAL REFRIGERATOR ALARM (HIGH/LOW TEMP AND LOSS OF POWER) WAS INOP.
-STERILIZER WAS INOP.
-EMERGENCY POTABLE WATER WAS NOT AVAILABLE IN MAIN MEDICAL.
O. VENTILATION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.77):
-5 OF 13 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH SPACES HAD EXHAUST AIRFLOW BELOW DESIGN SPEC.
-4 OF 20 SANITARY SPACES HAD EXHAUST AIRFLOW BELOW DESIGN SPEC.
P. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.66):
-OIL CONTENT MONITOR LEAKED BY WHEN NOT ENERGIZED PREVENTING ACCURATE READINGS AND THE INLET PIPING DID NOT HAVE A RELIEF VALVE INSTALLED.
-WASTE OIL HOLDING TANK 5-220-1-F OIL/WATER TLI WAS INOP.
-1 OF 2 COMPRESS MELT UNITS WAS INOP (CORRECTED).
-LARGE PULPER WAS MISSING THE JUNK BOX CAUSING PULPED MATERIAL TO FLOW INTO THE PIPING SYSTEM AND CLOG THE DRAIN LINES.
-PMS WAS NOT INSTALLED FOR THE LARGE PULPER OR THE TOP-LOADING PARTS WASHER.
-FWD VCHT PUMP ROOM VENTILATION AND SUMP FLOODING ALARMS WERE INOP.
-S/F COULD NOT OPERATE NR 1 VCHT EJECTOR PUMP BECAUSE OF VACUUM LEAKS IN THE NON RETURN VALVE.
Q. AVIATION: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.59):
-RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF FLIGHT OPS UNTIL THE FLIGHT DECK NETS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE ARE REPAIRED, DAMAGED PROXIMITY SUITS ARE REPLACED, AND THE DECK STATUS LIGHT IS REPAIRED.
-RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF NIGHT FLIGHT OPS UNTIL THE DROP-LINE LIGHTS ARE REPAIRED.
-RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF INSTRUMENT METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS (IMC) FLIGHT OPS UNTIL THE TACAN IS REPAIRED.
-RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF VERTREP OPS UNTIL THE STATIC WANDS ARE REPAIRED.
-RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF AIRCRAFT FUELING OPS UNTIL THE JP5 HOSES ARE HYDROSTATICALLY TESTED AND THE AIRCRAFT FUELING STA PRESSURE GAGE IS REPAIRED.
-RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF HIFR OPS UNTIL THE HIFR REFUELING NOZZLE IS REPAIRED.
-2 OF 3 PROXIMITY SUITS WERE DAMAGED AND UNSERVICEABLE.
-DECK STATUS LIGHT WAS INOP.
-2 OF 2 STATIC WANDS FAILED CONTINUITY CHECK.
-LINE UP LIGHTS WERE INOP (CORRECTED).
-DROP LINE LIGHTS WERE INOP.
-JP5 STORAGE TANK 4-402-0-J HAD SEDIMENT IN TANK.
-JP5 SERVICE TANK 4-390-0-J HAD SEDIMENT IN TANK.
-HIFR NOZZLE GROUNDING CLAMP WAS BROKEN.
-ALL JP5 HOSES WERE OUT OF HYDROSTATIC PERIODICITY.
-AIRCRAFT FUELING STATION PRESSURE GAGE READING WAS INACCURATE.
-HIFR REFUELING NOZZLE AND 2 OF 2 D1R REFUELING NOZZLES FAILED CONTINUITY CHECK (1 OF 2 DIRS CORRECTED).
-1 OF 2 WIND SPEED TRANSMITTERS WAS INOP.
-1 OF 2 ELECTRICAL GLOVE SETS WAS DAMAGED (CORRECTED).
9. COMMODORE R. TINDAL III, COMDESRON 2, WAS PRESENT FOR THE INSPECTION AND OUT-BRIEF. CAPT R. BONNER WAS THE SENIOR INSPECTOR.
10. PRESIDENT, BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY, CONCURS WITH THE FINDINGS.//
Looking past the amost-unique aspects of Sea Swap, as we look to extend some of our ships to a 40+ service life - what do we need to do for the long-term? Are there harder questions out there? Below is one pro's opinion, what are yours?
STOUT has had a rough go of it lately. This was sort of anticipated.BTW, for a variety of reasons, I have a soft spot for STOUT, so be gentle.
Obviously with a poor INSURV, many of the items identified will be loaded into the SRA package or, more likely than not, scheduled for CMAVs after the SRA (the beauty of MSMO contracts). One big discussion point here that people seem to forget...STOUT was one of three East Coast participants in the SeaSwap experiment (along with LABOON and GONZALEZ). She was not the ship on station but she was literally "de-crewed" for extensive lengths of time during crew swaps. The ISIC (RSO) was left as a care-taker but that can't be the same. Add in the "lack of ownership" issues that get discussed when you talk SeaSwap, I'm sure that contributed to the less than stellar material condition of the ship but to what degree, I couldn't say. But we are seriously short-changing these ships of needed maintenance for budgetary reasons... We defer lots of work. Just my two-cents...
Hat tip NAVSEA Spy.
UPDATE: Wait, there's more! Galrahn is all over the CHOSIN. Christopher Cavas is on the hunt as well in Defense News. He includes a bit on the equally ugly CHOSIN INSURV.
First, we have an interesting quote; considering that it comes from Buzz Lightyear,
"I don't think I have ever seen anything so bad," said retired Capt. Rick Hoffman, who commanded the cruiser Hue City, a sister ship of the Chosin.Here is the Chang of Command Block-41 verbiage from h311,
"InSurv is by its nature an inspection that will always reveal a fairly large number of deficiencies, hopefully most of them minor," said retired Capt. Jan van Tol, who commanded a destroyer and an amphibious assault ship. "However, the scale and scope of the deficiencies, spread across all of the ship's departments and including the [executive officer] and command master chief, suggests that there is a severe and long-standing problem with low standards; low initiative in finding/fixing/managing problems and following up on documented problems; poorly managed programs; and an apparent inability to train junior people in material management."I think we see where the red-dot is pointing,
High-ranking officers now are searching for what led to the problems revealed by the two inspections.Byron, talk to me Brother!
"There's a discussion active inside the community about self-assessment issues and processes," said Capt. David Lewis, the assistant chief of staff for maintenance and engineering with Naval Surface Forces in San Diego.
Lewis pointed out that a great number of the problems on the two ships were known even before the inspections. But the InSurvs turned up more problems than were expected.
"The thing that popped at me was the volume of the discrepancies. Normally, we don't get that much on a given ship," he said.
"DDGs have a corrosion trend, we are seeing that more and more," Lewis said. "We are starting to address that in our work batches for depot-level repair. It's in areas that are generally hard for ship's force to get into, places they don't go routinely. Uptakes and that kind of stuff."Ohhhh, boy. CDR FITREP fodder on the way....under the bus he goes...
The ships' material condition was not due to lack of funds, Lewis said.
"We are 100 percent funded to our requirement for maintenance," he said.Remember what I said pre-update?
Based on calculations in the most recent 30-year fleet plan, Chosin is meant to remain in service for 35 years, or until about 2026. The Stout and its sister ships are to last for 40 years - until 2034, in the Stout's case.The best questions,
"Where was the chain of command? Why did the parent squadron not know of the terrible material condition?" van Tol asked. The ship's command, he said, "has a lot to answer for, either in terms of not finding and fixing the problems, or at least advising his seniors of the problems."Bring out a very uncomfortable truth,
The ship's enlisted leaders also are partly responsible, van Tol said.
"One could also ask where the chief's mess was in all this, since they are the technical experts as well as the senior enlisted leaders onboard."
...
"Many of the problems noted should have been picked up in previous inspections of various kinds," he said. "What were the results of those inspections? Who should have followed up on deficiencies? Why did the chain of command - both within the ship and above the ship level - not monitor progress in fixing said deficiencies?"
Each of the ships has a crew of about 350 sailors. The Navy has been working for some years to reduce maintenance requirements on sailors in order to shrink crew sizes, and the smaller crews planned for future ships such as littoral combat ships and the Zumwalt-class DDG 1000 advanced destroyers mean maintenance issues could become more acute. Navy planners have said a key to maintaining readiness is to transfer more responsibility to land-based organizations.Tough statements,
"... there doesn't appear to be a lot of attention to detail going on." ... "I see in both of these ships a basic contempt for good Navy practices," the retired flag officer said. "Too much rust. Too many [preventive maintenance systems] checks that weren't done properly. Too much equipment InSurv had to tell them wasn't working."That being said, we should be carfull looking to burn witches and say that is the end of the story and we can move back to "optimal manning" and "hybrid sailors."
...
"There's a serious lack of command involvement in what's going on on the ship," the flag officer said. "That's basic."
There are plenty of people out there who should be thinking hard about their decisions and how it may have had a play in this goat rope.
However .... MCPON gets in his shot as well. Ouch.
"The success or failure of any commandwide inspection can be placed directly at the entrance to the CPO mess," Campa said. "There are all kinds of challenges, and reasons for failure. But it's been proven that the experience that resides in the mess can tilt the results of any inspection toward success if the chiefs are engaged on the deck plates."Hard to argue with that.