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In the name of all that is holy, warfighting first, I presume. As they say at the end of a long, sketchy game; "Scoreboard!"
No offense to our HR officers, .... but - let's ponder this a bit.
The second to third layer thoughts here are that they/we are selecting people based on the coded billets for that designator, more or less. In 2011, they said they have a community of, ahem, 800 - all O3 and above.
How may of these billets have been converted to civilians in the last decade as a percentage compared to other communities? How much have they grown? What jobs, exactly, are they doing? Is their attrition rate high - or has their billet structure grown?
It would be interesting to see the number of billets coded for HR types for each year over the last dozen years. They were set up in 2001. They laterally transfer from line communities usually as LTs.
In the warfare qualified communities, we all know that there were some quality people lost in the crunch. Maybe not your best, but some good people - more than a few that may not have looked good in the tank - but would have made up for a lot as LCDR.
Look at who left the warfare communities we have been in, those who as soon as they could - jumped off to be a fonctionnaire. Were they the best officers in the wardroom? Top quartile? How about second quartile? Third, perhaps?
They transfer, and instead of being in a bucket where they could be one of the 3 in 10 failing to select - they now have put themselves in a bucket where only 1 in 20 fail to select. What are we letting go ... and more importantly ... what are we not letting go?
What message does this send to the warfighter?
Is this a good thing for our Navy? Were are we moving that needle along the line of good to great by having a system such as this?
What would Jack Welch have to say about our system? That would be interesting to say the least. Ponder that as you review what he says about the 20-70-10;
Top 20%
When people differentiation is real, the top 20 percent of employees are showered with bonuses, stock options, praise, love, training, and a variety of rewards to their pocketbooks and souls. There can be no mistaking the stars at a company that differentiates. They are the best and are treated that way.
Middle 70%
The middle 70 percent are managed differently. This group of people is enormously valuable to any company; you simply cannot function without their skills, energy, and commitment. After all, they are the majority of your employees. And that’s the major challenge, and risk, in 20-70-10—keeping the middle 70 engaged and motivated.
That’s why so much of managing the middle 70 is about training,positive feedback, and thoughtful goal setting. If individuals in this group have particular promise, they should be moved around among businesses and functions to increase their experience and knowledge and to test their leadership skills.
To be clear, managing the middle 70 is not about keeping people out of the bottom 10. It is not about saving poor performers. That would be a bad investment decision. Rather, differentiation is about managers looking at the middle 70, identifying people with potential to move up, and cultivating them.But everyone in the middle 70 needs to be motivated and made to feel as if they truly belong. You do not want to lose the vast majority of your middle 70—you want to improve them.
Bottom 10%
As for the bottom 10 percent in differentiation, there is no sugar coating this—they have to go. That’s more easily said than done; It’s awful to fire people—I even hate that word. But if you have a candid organization with clear performance expectations and a performance evaluation process—a big if, obviously, but that should be everyone’s goal—then people in the bottom 10 percent generally know who they are. When you tell them, they usually leave before you ask them to.
The warfighting communities - some more than others - are seeing the post-war crunch. As the tooth wanes, why does the tail wax?
... and yes, I must. Now more than ever.
Final style note: that pic in the middle of the post of the surround-sound of paperwork h311? That is actually from the sales sheet for the HR community linked to at the opening of the post.
May Crom have mercy on us.
Hat tip L.
How do we best honor the memory of those who have, by their actions, set the example for those who follow?
We can remember their names and the deeds of their Shipmates and the ships they sailed on. While their acts speak for themselves, one can easily forget the very real people they were.
When you see their face, not in a rigid pose or official photo, but their face as their friends knew them - it adds depth and context to the people who made our history.
So much as been lost or never captured, that those rare collections are of a value difficult to measure. One thing you can measure however, is the cost it takes in the very real world to ensure that those how follow us have an opportunity to look at those examples themselves.
It takes effort by every generation to ensure the legacy remains for the next.
Please take a moment to see the below about the rare photos from the USS Indianapolis and WWII, and the effort to preserve the collection of Alfred Joseph Sedivi, the ship's photographer.
You can be part of this effort, the details of the USNI kickstarter is here.
This has to be the least funny caption contest I have ever done.
Yesterday, President Obama and his team met with Texas Gov. Rick Perry and his in Dallas about the very serious crisis we are having not just on the Texas-Mexico border, but the entire southern border.
The deserts of El Norte are filling with the bodies of children left to die by the coyotes paid to transport them by immoral parents looking for a quick way to get a foothold in the USA from Central America. Of the estimated 57,000 unaccompanied children who have recently illegally crossed into the United States, untold numbers of them are victims of abuse at the hands of those who transported them, sick, and otherwise direct victims of our nations leadership's desire not to enforce the laws of our nation.
From the White House to Congress - but mostly the Executive Branch that is responsible for executing the laws that are passed and controls the agencies that are responsible - there is very real blood on our hands, and responsibility for abuse, sickness and general lawlessness impacting our citizens and resident aliens.
On the left, you have the former sovereign nation of Texas. On the right, our Federal government - at a table to discuss the failure of our Federal Government to carry out its most basic duty, control of our international borders.
The Federal government is smiling and laughing, as children suffer and die due to their inaction, and American citizens see their neighborhoods fall in to the shadow outside the rule of law.
The visual here is, in a word - sublime.
Hat tip PJM.
There is so much wrong here, I don't know where to start.
Many may wonder what Sailors are investing millions of man hours in CMEO training in the Navy for. What are they getting out of it? What are they learning? What is the focus?
There are so many directions one could go here, I just about have vapor lock. No need for me to deconstruct it for you.
I'll let you work it out in comments - so - from CMEO training in NKO.
BEHOLD!
Hat tip TB.
I have little use for the Tomorrowland Transforationalists who sell you their snake oil with flash, glitter and distraction.
One thing I do have an unending appetite for are fact based, historically grounded, and hopefully - statistically supported assumptions and inferences.
In that light I give you 200 countries, 200 years in only 4-min with Hans Rosling.
A few things I want you to keep close attention to, as all of these are critical to advanced planning:
1. The power of free markets and relative political & cultural openness (there was a reason GBR and NLD started at the top).
2. The regular downward spikes and recovery due to war and disease. We are overdue.
3. The internal split in China - that never ends well.
4. The unending basket case that was, is, and will be sub-Saharan Africa.
Hopefully you caught the Foggo-Berube back and forth over the last week.
It started with the CNO, Admiral Greenert and Rear Admiral Foggo, USN's bit in the May Proceedings, Forging a Global Network of Navies.
Sigh. Here we go again. The Bad Idea Ex-Girlfriend is going to make you love her.
One of our advantages, as a nation and as a Navy, has been our extensive network of alliances, partnerships, and coalitions.
In 2007, Admiral Mike Mullen addressed more than 100 leaders of the world’s navies gathered at the 18th International Seapower Symposium in Newport, Rhode Island. He challenged the international community to act in concert when responding to threats to the global maritime domain, and he shared his vision of a “1,000-Ship Navy” fueled by the common interest of global stability and economic prosperity. The “1,000-Ship Navy” stimulated much discussion among our partners across the globe. Some wondered how contributions would be solicited, what the command-and-control structure would look like, and how binding the concept would become. The debate prompted Admiral Mullen to explain:
The ‘1,000-Ship Navy’ is a fleet-in-being of nations willing to participate in global maritime partnerships (GMP). To face the challenges we do today, nobody can do it alone. Many countries are looking for ways to help create security through an international navy. The barriers to entry here are very low. You don’t have to join; you don’t have to sign a treaty.
I really don't need to do another paragraph by paragraph fisking, do I?
Much of the article is a collection of well worn concepts, diplo-speak, and aspirational goals. Then end of the above quote shows the feet of clay this all is with, ".. you don't have to sign a treaty."
Of course not. You can show the flag, but when things get hairy or wet work needs to be done, you'll leave the work to the USN.
On top of that - some of the transformationalist verbiage is ahistorical and slightly insulting to our heritage;
GMP was a new approach to cooperation among maritime nations.
No it isn't. Combined naval operations have been around thousands of years, in peace and war.
The international community has become an economically hyper-connected global network of independent states pursuing prosperity and security. Trade and commerce transcend borders, while globalization drives interdependence among nations.
Again, this has been true for thousands of years - in fits and starts - but true. Heck - we hear the same argument about how such condition precluded war .... right before WWI.
Why am I making such a pedantic fuss over the above? Simple, the transformationalist mumbling cant that "all is new" is deadly to the intellect and any military organization.
It is deadly as it gives people the invitation to do the intellectually lazy thing and not read and reference thousands of years of lessons. Equipment and names may change - but by and large, the big picture concepts are exactly the same.
Many generations have been right where we are. We can save a lot of treasure, and some blood as well, by being humble and discuss what the world was and is - not as we wish it to be.
As such, the Global Network of Navies provides the opportunity for countries to more effectively meet the challenges of insecurity in the maritime environment in spite of resource constraints. The only requirements are a willingness to collaborate and the creation of a network that is scalable, durable, responsive, flexible, and interoperable. This makes the Global Network of Navies key to the collective future security of all maritime nations.
They can plug in .. but ... here is the tricky part - what do you do when they unplug and go home?
The authors do nod to this concern - but continue forward;
There are those who may say that we cannot, and should not, rely on coalitions or partnerships to solve all of our problems. We have to “go it alone” because coalitions or partnerships are not enduring or binding, and they are sometimes limited by differing perspectives on authorities, rules of engagement, and national caveats. But a Global Network of Navies already exists. No singular response to crisis is ever the same. A network construct must be flexible and adaptable to different circumstances. Not all nations with the requisite maritime capacity or capability will always see it in their best interests to participate. That is their option, but there is compelling evidence that when like-minded nations get together, the whole of their contributions is always greater than the sum of their parts. Several vignettes illustrate how this network is already confronting common threats to our collective security around the globe.
Who is saying we need to "go it alone?" Who is this cabal? No one I know is asking for a go it alone mindset - what many are saying is, "Prepare to have to go alone."
To do otherwise is to give other nations' politicians veto power over the US Navy conducting operations in our strict national interest.
I know what Greenert and Foggo are trying to do, and I am sure they are heartfelt - but I'm sorry; it is bad theory that puts too much riding of unicorns pooping skittles on the rainbow lines of operation.
It is an important part of the conversation and part of the solution - but it is an unalloyed vision of the future that does not survive first contact with the past or present.
They starts off their penultimate paragraph with a strangely off-centerline sentence;
We are all facing similar fiscal pressure and rising challenges at sea, and no one nation has the ability to be everywhere all the time or to act alone.
Again, no. First, we are not all facing similar fiscal pressure.
China announced on Wednesday that it would increase its military budget for 2014 to almost $132 billion, a 12.2 percent rise over last year.
Second - again,
"no one nation has the ability ... to act alone"
Excuse me. The USN can act alone. The Russian Navy can act alone. The Chinese Navy can act alone. What a silly line.
I like both Greenert and Foggo, but to be frank, I really don't hear their voice here - they and we are better than this.
The above is my quick jab at a few pull quotes - better minds have been at work at is too.
Over at WarOnTheRocks, our friend Claude Berube sallied forth - you need to read it all
... interconnectivity presents both opportunities and challenges. While the Navy and the country may hope more for the opportunities, they must however resign themselves to the inherent realities of regional and global challenges to partnerships.
As it has for more than two hundred years, the U.S. Navy works with other navies – whether in underway replenishment, patrols, or other operations. In the late eighteenth century, Thomas Jefferson suggested to John Adams that the U.S. should organize an “international task force comprised of all European nations whose shipping was being victimized” by the Barbary States, although Adams responded that it was an idea whose time had not yet come. During the Barbary War, both the U.S. and Swedish navies cooperated against Tripoli until the latter made peace in 1802 and left America to continue alone. In the early nineteenth century, the U.S. Navy sent warships to West Africa to suppress the slave trade at the same time the Royal Navy had its own Africa Squadron.
...
In a more ideal world where countries do find common cause, it is unclear where the fleets will come from. The article states that there are 12,000 ships in the service of navies globally, only 5,000 of which are blue-water capable. How many of these 5,000 are adequately resourced and maintained? How many crews receive sufficient training? How many could actively deploy on a moment’s, a week’s or even a month’s notice? Most importantly, which of those navies have countries that would have the national interest and political will to conduct out-of-area operations? The authors note that “on any given day 685 [ships] are under way.” However that number does not distinguish between being deployed and being under way, the latter a term used for any day away from the pier which might include exercises or preparing for deployments. For example, the Navy’s own website stated on 30 June 2014 that it has 289 battle force ships with 99 deployed and 29 under way. In addition, the authors admit that 42 percent of international ships under way are ships of less than 1,000 tons and therefore unlikely to contribute to major blue-water operations.
Those are good questions and hard facts. Items, sadly, not found in depth in Greenert and Foggo's article.
One of the great things about Berube's insight, is the fact he brings to the table a multi-disciplinary method that looks at an issue from not just a military viewpoint, but a historical, practical, and in this case - political one.
Political decisions – not naval relationships – will determine what forces to use and when in response to incidents, challenges and crises. The article also fails to address the political realities of multinational operations including funding, compatibility, various rules of engagement and access denial not only by potential adversaries but by allies and partners. For example, as the U.S. Army’s 4th Infantry Division prepared to assault Iraq through Turkey, access through that nation – a NATO ally – was denied despite the offer of billions of dollars. Then-Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Vice Admiral Charles Moore later stated that this was a “glimpse of the future…where Turkey was able to significantly alter our war plan in that they denied access.” Negative perceptions about the United States are on the rise globally further eroding U.S. opportunities and increasing them for peer competitors.
BZ to RADM Foggo, he jumped in to comments on Berube's post. However, I was very disappointed to see a tired strawman in Foggo's response that we see dragged out now and then, a complete non-starter - especially if you are responding to WOTR and Berube readers,
"I don’t see America going it alone in the near future unless it is defense of the homeland."
Eeeek! That again. Just stop.
Seriously, to repeat again: no one is saying that American should go it alone - though it should be ready too as time and time again, from when Sweden broke formation in the Barbary War, to Veracruz, to Vietnam, to FONOPS in the Gulf of Sidra - sometimes we have to - and it is something the American people demand that we maintain the ability to do.
The norm is, and our Navy does it every day, to operate in a combined environment.
Here is the undeniable less of history that Berube holds out;
...naval partnerships are important but they aren’t always reliable – not because of the navies with whom we the honor to work with every day but because of the decisions that rest with the political authorities and public opinion among our partners and even ourselves to appropriate invest in their own capabilities.
From the caveat laden allied forces of flaccidity that we all had to work around in Afghanistan, to the ships-in-being that joined us off the Horn of Africa, that is the hard truth of allied operation.
Even in the most right wars - even with the best allies - they can just go home. In one of my favorite little gems in Max Hastings Retribution, in moment of indecision and selfishness in the middle of a fight, some allies will just steam out of sight like the HMCS UGANDA off Okinawa.
To put yourself in Strategic Risk based simply on the promises - especially implied and theoretical - is folly. Or, as Berube puts it,
In the end, affirming phrases like “global maritime partnerships” cannot rationalize, justify or compensate for the lack of national will to appropriately invest in the country’s own naval capability at the risk of maritime force codependency.
Amen. I would much rather see the intellect and political capital of Admiral Greenert and Rear Admiral Foggo invested in explaining to the American people how in a period of strategic change after a decade of land combat, the Navy needs more than an even slice of the budgetary pie.
A little reminder to all. Call it "1,000 Ship Navy" - "Cooperative Maritime Partnership" - or if you must grab your thesaurus and make it a bit more buzzwordy-poetic - "Global Network of Navies," the end effect is the same.
Let me do one of the few things that brings joy in to my life - quote myself - from 7.5 years ago on this blog;
"1,000 Ship Navy" with all due respect, is a mirage. When the shooting starts, they will be about as useful as the Italian and Vichy French Fleets were to the Germans in WWII - or NATO in the South and East of Afghanistan.
A positive note here; the whole interaction with Foggo & Berube specifically is exactly how it should be done. On the more refined side of creative friction, you have two professionals with the same goal, the best maritime forces out nation can provide, working it out tit-for-tat.
As it should be.
Remember how we have been saying for most of the last decade that eventually, the Navy will run out of HappyTalk Juice? That as shadows do not appear on the deck and water is not displaced pierside ... that it would have to admit what it denied?
It really is heartbreaking to see, as we wasted so many years in happy talk, rosy scenarios, and best case projections. Those who made this bed have long retired to well paying gigs in boardrooms of companies and K-Street - to be dealt with by the leaders in place now.
Not a good thing to gloat about - but .... behold.
The U.S. Navy can’t meet its funding needs for surface warships and a new class of nuclear attack submarines from 2025 to 2034, according to the service’s latest 30-year shipbuilding plan.
The congressionally required blueprint, submitted late last week and obtained by Bloomberg News, says the Navy’s plan “requires funding at an unsustainable level” unless spending on shipbuilding is increased.
The document outlines challenges facing the plan to increase the Navy fleet to 306 vessels from the current 289 while building 12 new Ohio-class submarines, part of the nation’s nuclear triad of air, land and sea weapons.
Yea, it's that bad - and a tad more.
The average cost of the Navy plan during the period when the service will be spending the most on the new submarine is $19.7 billion a year, including more than $24 billion at the peak year of fiscal 2032, according to the report.
This budget “cannot be accommodated by the Navy from existing resources -- particularly if” the Pentagon remains under congressionally mandated automatic cuts known as sequestration, the report said.
The Navy’s historical shipbuilding budget has averaged about $13 billion a year, in fiscal 2014 dollars.
“Even if the Ohio-replacement program is removed” from the Navy plan, the average shipbuilding funding required beginning in fiscal 2020 is as much as $15 billion annually, the report found.
What the heck - no one paid me for my consult almost half a decade ago. From my Feb 2010 phrase-coining post, Looking towards the "Terrible 20's";
Let's look at 2020 again. What else is happening in the 20s? Well, for one, we will have to find money to re-capitalized the SSBN fleet. I offer to you that the 20 JAN HASC SEF Subcommittee meeting has an outstanding money discussion about that challenge. Deputy SECNAV Work has also discussed this challenge in other venues, and I think he has a very firm grasp of the problem, as do most in positions to know.
You have to look at it in the broader context of the budget as well. The hangover in the 20s from this decade's drunken frenzy of spending will couple with another cohort of Baby Boomers retiring and putting stress on the budget in ways we still do not have a firm grasp on.
In 2020 - that ship built in 1990 will be at 30 years. That LCS built in 2009 will only have 9 years or so of service life (LCS is expected to only last 20-25 years) - so by the end of the 2020s, LCS will be dropping like flies.
When you consider that we will be limited this decade to LCS and DDG-51 for our non-amphib surface ship program (don't throw JHSV at me, that is just a truck - full stop - all else is spin and hope) - you have about a perfect story for the 20s of limited shipbuilding funds and a stunted fleet.
Stunted? If you continue to assume that CG(X) is dead, then you might get funding for the much needed DDG(X) follow-on for the DDG-51 class - might. That will be requested in light of the SSBN money sponge - and I don't see how with all the other needs in the 20's, we will be able to afford both a DDG(X) and a CG(X) - and there is a good chance that we will simply have to live with DDG-51 Flight III as our "new" platform through the beginning of the mid-21st Century.
I know that looking into the future is a fuzzy hobby. Heck, if you outlined in 2000 where we were in 2010 people would have said you were a nutty pessimist - so we can only see 2020 in very large, fuzzy pixels. The beginning of the mid-century (2030) is just a silly exercise in many ways - but one that needs to be done. There are known-knowns (DDG-1000 will be a rump, expensive class of ships, Ticos history, DDG-51 backbone, LCS decomm'n like flies), known-unknowns (will LCS even meet some of its promised ability and numbers, will DDG(X) be moving forward), and unknown-unknowns (Black Swan events), but still - 2020 is closer than we think, and there are economic facts that need to be looked at.
Huge challenge, one whose source is the lost decade we just came out of. You know, that "transformational" decade. The one that was to build the Fleet of the future. Well, it sure did, didn't it?
Look at what the Royal Navy is dealing with today, and it isn't a stretch to see similar challenges for ourselves. Look and learn - and perhaps we can mitigate the pain.
We'll be blogg'n about the 20's a lot down the road; let's call this an introduction to the Terrible 20's.
We have very rough seas ahead. As you will see in my post tomorrow, we still have not set the proper condition, read the night orders, or adjusted the watch bill accordingly.
Solutions? Sure, there are some - but no one is talking about them as they require sharp elbows, flexible intellect, and the ability to not be invited to the right parties - or post retirement gigs of fortune.
Hat tip CGB.
