Can You be Realistic About the Real World - with Emma Ashford on Midrats

 

A nation’s foreign policy is driven by more than just the whims and desires of the Chief Executive. Through government, academia, institutions, and individuals of influence there are a variety of different schools of thought on what should underpin the decision making process.

Well known general descriptors of these schools include “interventionist,” “isolationist,” “internationalist,” and even well known sub-species of the major schools who are known by the actions they wish to take - usually that involve the use of military power - “Responsibility to Protect,” to “Nation Building” to the old saw from over a century ago, “Make the World Safe for Democracy.”

One long-standing school that has gained attention and influence after the experiences of the last two decades from Afghanistan to Ukraine is, “Realism.”

What is the history of a “realist foreign policy,” its advocates, its intellectual foundations, and what does it have to offer the United States today?

Our returning guest for the full hour Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern is Emma Ashford.

Emma is a Senior Fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center. She is also a nonresident fellow at the Modern War Institute at West Point, and an adjunct assistant professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. 

Her first book, Oil, the State, and War: The Foreign Policies of Petrostates, was published by Georgetown University Press in 2022.  

She was previously with the Atlantic Council’s New American Engagement Initiative, and the Cato Institute. She holds a PhD in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia. 

Join us live if you can, but it not, you can get the show later by subscribing to the podcast. If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here. You can find us on almost all your most popular podcast aggregators as well.

Realism in Foreign Policy and its Discontents

 

Before diving into today’s post, as we have reached a lot of new readers in the last year, I would beg the indulgence of long-term members of The Front Porch to allow me to review some long-standing positions of mine.

On the foreign policy front, especially for the last decade, I have liked to consider myself a realist. I do not expect perfection in my personal friends, nor expect perfection in my nation’s friends. I am not an isolationist by any stretch, but I do find myself much closer to John Quincy Adams’s;

…admonition that “Americans should not go abroad to slay dragons they do not understand in the name of democracy.”

…than I am to that mindset that brought us to that now clearly disastrous invasion of Iraq in 2003 etc.

For firm realists, I am probably seen as a bit wobbly, but that’s OK as it is fair. I am, for a lack of a better description, a situational realist. For even longer than the 18 years I have put my thoughts down here, I continue to advocate for a complete restructuring of our imperial presence around the world, especially when it comes to our ground forces. All of our friends and allies can more that support significant ground forces to defend their lands. We are a maritime and aerospace power on the other side of the world. We can maintain combined logistics and training facilities with them, and even rotate forces in and out when desired, but we should not be garrisoning their nations with tens of thousands of ground forces as we approach the middle of the 21st Century.

I’m not dogmatic on the topic. I am open to the argument for some forces in South Korea – very few – because integration timelines are so short for that still unresolved war. Other locations, even in Europe, I am much more skeptical about. Even with recent Russian aggression, our allies in Europe should, if we can break their addiction to Uncle Sam’s umbrella, more than handle that threat until, if needed, we need to bring forces across the Atlantic.

I also depart realist dogma when it comes to Ukraine. As the record shows, I have been a regular supporter of helping Ukraine defend herself over the last decade. Russia is, and remains, a bully with an imperial mindset. She started this war, and it is in our interest that she is defeated as her present leadership clearly stated that this was the first of many wars of conquest. Best to stop the Russian neo-imperial effort with Ukrainians on the Dnieper than with Americans on the Oder.

America has a long record of helping those trying to secure self-determination. An imperfect record, but in line with our nation’s founding. We are not, however, to force our beliefs on others. Set and example for others to follow if they so wish, but not force.

That’s the outline, and with that, today I’d like to point you to an article by someone who I disagree with now and then – which is normal and healthy. 

You must read widely, and not just the people who think just like you. You need to challenge your ideas with well meaning people of good intention that see solutions to problems differently than you do in whole or in part. No one has a perfect picture, but some are mostly right and others history shows are mostly wrong regardless of their pedigree or alignment with the constellation of your priors. You may dismiss their ideas for lacking merit, find some challenges in them that refines and improves your own, or you might even be provided some insight which leads you to change your own. Normal and healthy.

I’m not aligned with her fully here, but if you want to hear – and you should – what a principled realist argument is, our friend Emma Ashford has a read worth your time over at Foreign Affairs. It is actually a review of the recent books, Matthew Specter’s The Atlantic Realists and Jonathan Kirshner’s An Unwritten Future,  but in practice it is much more.

First, let's allow Emma to define "realism" in this context;

What today is called “realism”—the school of thought most undergraduates are taught in their International Relations 101 class—is in fact structural realism or neorealism, a version of realism outlined in the 1970s by the scholar Kenneth Waltz. Neorealism is further divided into “defensive” and “offensive” variants, depending on whether one believes that states primarily seek security through defensive means, such as military fortifications and technology, or through an expansion that acquires power and territory. Both versions focus heavily on structural factors (the ways that states interact at the global level) and effectively ignore domestic politics, the quirks of bureaucratic decision-making, the psychology of leaders, global norms, and international institutions. Neorealism thus stands in stark contrast to the older school of classical realism, which counts Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Bismarck among its earliest practitioners, has strong roots in philosophy, and includes factors such as domestic politics and the role of human nature, prestige, and honor. It also contrasts with classical realism’s more modern counterpart, “neoclassical realism” (a term coined by Gideon Rose, a former editor of this magazine), which seeks to marry the two variants by reincorporating domestic and ideational factors into structural theories. 

Now let's dive in to a few pull quotes that hopefully lead you to read the whole thing.

None of these notions are pleasant or popular. The realist Robert Gilpin once titled an article “No One Loves a Political Realist.” All too often, pointing out the harsh realities of international life or noting that states often act in barbaric ways is seen as an endorsement of selfish behavior rather than a simple diagnosis. As one of the school’s founding fathers, Hans Morgenthau, put it, realists may see themselves as simply refusing to “identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.” But their critics often accuse them of having no morals at all, as the debate over Ukraine has shown.

That is something I find attractive about the realist argument. It accepts the reality of fallen man, our own limitations, and the need for the attenuation of emotion. At its core is humility - a rare but valuable commodity in our age.

Ukraine has long been a flash point for realist thought. Many realists argue that in the post–Cold War period, the United States has been too focused on an idealistic conception of European politics and too blasé about classic geopolitical concerns, such as the enduring meaning of borders and the military balance between Russia and its rivals. Policymakers who subscribed to liberal internationalism—the idea that trade, international institutions, or liberal norms can help build a world where power politics matter less—typically presented NATO’s expansion as a matter of democratic choice for smaller central and eastern European states. Realists, in contrast, argued that it would present a legitimate security concern for Moscow; no matter how benevolent NATO might seem from the West’s perspective, they would argue, no state would be happy with an opposing military alliance moving even closer to its borders. 

This argument aligns closely with one of my critiques that is mostly OBE but should be understood; our Ukraine policy was in no small measure run by people who could not see the situation from the Russian perspective. They were Russian experts who had a spreadsheet understanding of Russia, but not a cultural or historical perspective. That ignorance was fortified with an unalloyed belief in their own expertise. They/we were like a stumbling child - meaning no harm but unable to not damage things they/we don't understand.

Yet even if realism is largely present in today’s policy debates as a foil, pushing U.S. foreign policymakers to justify their choices and perhaps adopt slightly more pragmatic options, that may be the best that realists can hope for. As Specter points out, realists have had a complicated relationship with policymaking. Kennan, who served as the U.S. State Department’s director of policy planning, and Morgenthau, who worked under him, are among the best-known realist policymakers, and their influence has waxed and waned over time. The most realist administrations—those of Presidents Richard Nixon and George H. W. Bush—had some notable policy triumphs: ending the Vietnam War, managing the peaceful breakup of the Soviet Union, winning the Gulf War. But they also had mixed legacies, from Nixon’s troubled domestic political record to Bush’s 1992 electoral loss. That is still more than one can say for realist influence in the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama administrations, when unchallenged U.S. power allowed idealists to drive most policy. Yet as the world continues its shift toward multipolarity, realist insights will once again become more important for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. 

Perhaps realism at mid-century will have a better seat at the table. Perhaps.

Again, I encourage you to read it all, but in your busy life if you can't, I will leave you as Emma leaves her review. This is the core, and apologies to Hillel, all else is commentary;

Realists accept that foreign policy is often a choice between the lesser of evils. Pretending otherwise—pretending that moral principles or values can override all constraints of power and interest—is not political realism. It is political fantasy.

Photo credit ELACLARRISASIMAMORA.

The Use and Misuse of our Military Attachés - on Midrats

Networks, local knowledge, human terrain, and even gossip.  It does not matter if you are a tourist, a diplomat, or an invading army – if you come into a foreign nation you need local knowledge, a guide – someone who can not just tell you where the head is, but the important parts of the intangible nature of any culture that simply does not come from a briefing book.

And it needs to be someone you trust.

Likewise, as social animals, from the middle school lunchroom to the United Nations, we have our “in-group” and the “out-group.” Friendly, hostile, or aggressively neutral, out-group people are racked-n-stacked based upon their perceived threat or value.

Do they have power? Do they have access to power? Can they get information I need, or are they a reliable path to deliver information? Are they worthy of trust by me, and do they have the trust of their “in-group?”

When it comes to bi-lateral military relations between nations, at least on paper one of the most important players is the military attaché.

This Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern we will be looking at the United States’ military attaché ecosystem along the spectrum of how they should be used, how they are being used, and how we could better use them in the service of our nation’s interests.

Our guest for the full hour will be Colonel Raymond M. Powell, USAF former Air Attaché to Vietnam from 2013 to 2016, and the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché to Australia from 2017 to 2020.

We will use his recent article at DefenseOne, DOD’s Diplomats Don’t Need More Rank, Just Less Disdain, as a starting point for our conversation.

Join us live if you can, but it not, you can get the show later by subscribing to the podcast. If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here. You can find us on almost all your most popular podcast aggregators as well.

The Intersection of Integrated Delusion and Institutional Dishonesty

If you care about the truth, if you care about our ability to deter war west of Wake, then it is time to stand against one of the most destructive attempts to sideline our nation’s military power seen in a long time, the consultant-speakish concept being pimped throughout the Beltway, “Integrated Deterrence.”

As we must, let’s go to the source for a first-person definition. As per DODNews back in December;

Colin Kahl, the undersecretary of defense for policy, fleshed out the concept ... He said the concept "will inform almost everything that we do."

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III has spoken about the concept since taking office last January. He calls it a new way of approaching deterrence.

Kahl discussed both sides of the concept: integration and deterrence. "In terms of integrated … we mean, integrated across domains, so conventional, nuclear, cyber, space, informational," he said. "[It is also] integrated across theaters of competition and potential conflict [and] integrated across the spectrum of conflict from high intensity warfare to the gray zone."

The concept in this case also means integration of all instruments of national power. Most importantly it means being "integrated across our allies and partners, which are the real asymmetric advantage that the United States has over any other competitor or potential adversary," Kahl said.

So, how did that work out to keep Russia from Ukraine? And don’t say we’ve never integrated with allies and partners. I and millions of others literally mad a multi-decade career out of it. Don’t say diplomacy is something new. Don’t say economic sanctions are something new. No, this isn’t new - and neither is what is trying to be done. This is cover to weaken our military power in pursuit of a softer theory of power.

As typical from the group presently running our national security apparatus, they will not let real world experience get in the way of their too-clever-by-half theories emanating from their preferred think-tank holding pools and academic fever swamps. No. Can’t do that.

On Saturday from what I believe is a tear in the space-time continuum from a parallel universe, the WaPo has an outright bizarre article; Russia’s failures in Ukraine imbue Pentagon with Newfound Confidence;

I read this twice this weekend just to make sure I was reading what I just read. 

It is written as if no one has a memory longer than six weeks – or the authors don’t think their readers do.

BEHOLD!

…one month into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, senior Pentagon officials are brimming with newfound confidence in American power, spurred by the surprising effectiveness of U.S.-backed Ukrainian forces, Russia’s heavy battlefield losses and the cautionary lessons they believe China is taking from the war.

Who is this “senior Pentagon official” and will someone please get in touch with their doctor to confirm they are taking their meds?

Did we deter war? Didn’t we advise Zelenskyy to either retreat to Lviv or leave the country before the Russian invasion even start or not? Was our alliance ready? Did we show resolve when our own embassy evacuated? 

I ask this is a very serious question - who paid for this to be written? 

Gaslighting is an overused phrase, but in this case, there are few other words that describe what is being done. No objective, knowledgeable, and educated person can really believe what they are writing. 

Read it an come back. I’m serious. Don’t just ride my pull-quotes. Read it and come back.

I don’t have the time to fisk the whole thing – but if you are not concerned about who this nation defines as The Smartest People in the Room ™, well then you should be.

Start with someone who should know better than what he is saying, Obama’s ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder;

The United States also has relied heavily on European allies, who have often taken the lead in leveling crippling sanctions on the Russian economy at considerable costs to themselves. It’s not yet clear whether the current unity will fracture if the war drags on for months.

“We need to demonstrate our [collective] power every day, and we can only demonstrate it if we keep everybody together,” said Ivo Daalder, president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and a former U.S. ambassador to NATO. “This is not something the U.S. has traditionally done well.”

The European allies who did nothing to push back against Nord Stream I or II? The ones who initially balked at SWIFT sanctions?

Allies good; America bad. State good; Pentagon bad.

Fine, get it ... standard issue natsec left world view. Wonderful. Got it.

Also, we kept NATO together fairly well in the Balkans campaign in the 1990s. Even though laded with national caveats and capability gaps, we did a fairly good job getting NATO to run the AFG campaign from 2002 until shortly after they culminated in the summer of 2007, and we had to start taking the keys back.  Alliances of free nations is hard work … but we have a not-too-bad record of it considering there are now 30 nations in the alliance (as of today). When there have been problems, it wasn’t the USA who was the problem nation; DEU, TUR, HUN, FRA – pick your crisis – the USA was not the one who has a habit of not ponying up as a troop contributing nation. 

Traditionally we have done it very well for the right causes. 

That is an arguable point – but this is just … wrong;

Pentagon officials contend that there was little they could do to deter Putin, who expected a quick and easy victory in Ukraine, and argue that their broader strategy of “integrated deterrence” — which leverages economic, diplomatic and military power to dissuade potential aggressors — has so far worked to stop Putin from expanding the war into NATO territory. The Biden administration has made integrated deterrence the cornerstone of its soon-to-be released National Defense Strategy, which was delayed as the threat of an invasion grew.

Integrated Deterrence "so far worked to stop Putin from expanding the war into NATO territory."  What? Who is briefing these people? I guess Integrated Deterrence "so far worked to stop Cuba from joining the war and expanding the war into Florida."  OK. Fine.

I love the last part. “We realized what we wrote was immediately OBE, so we want to change things so we don’t look like idiots.”

Smart, but tells you how horrible that pig must have been. It will be interesting to see how they make a silk purse out of it.

They know – like last summer in AFG, that they failed. They are not good at their job. 

The diplomats failed. The intel community failed. The military aid we did supply to UKR was not enough to make her a tough enough target for RUS.

Regulars on the Front Porch have known for years in writing and on Midrats I asked that we send our best JOs to UKR as observers. We didn't. Hey, I'm a proud Floridian, but the last US unit in UKR was Florida National Guard. A lot of the training on the air side of the house was done by Air National Guard. The Pentagon was clearly looking elsewhere to employ their top units and career personnel. Like we saw in AFG and IRQ, they found priorities everywhere else but where the actual real-world threat was manifesting itself. 

The uniformed side of the house needs to own this failure, but – the uniformed military is but a tool of the Executive Branch and Congress. It does what it is told to do inside the laws of our nation. It does nothing on its own. It does nothing without oversight.

A longer-term challenge for the Pentagon, which is prone to its own fits of military hubris, will be to recognize the limits of its power and the crucial role U.S. allies will play in containing Russian and Chinese global ambitions, according to analysts and even some senior Pentagon officials. In the 1990s and early 2000s when the United States was at the height of its power, U.S. leaders often treated allies as an afterthought. Former President Bush launched the invasion of Iraq in 2003 over the objections of allies such as Germany and France.

“We had this sense where we could do it all and the allies were a problem,” said Daalder, the former NATO ambassador. 

Where do I start?

“The Pentagon” is not alone in hubris, but its hubris is a byproduct of what it received from CINC’s Intent and Direction and Guidance. Those are informed by civilian appointees and advisors. Department of State, Commerce, etc? What about their hubris? If you are going to sell “Integrated Deterrence” then you have to accept “Integrated Failure.”

Let’s go back to alternative-universe Daalder.

Did we treat our allies as an “afterthought” during Desert Storm? Look for yourself;

Did we treat our allies as an “afterthought” during the 1990s wars in the breakup of Yugoslavia? No.

Did we treat our allies as an “afterthought” in AFG? No. We gave it to them for most of the 00’s.

Did we treat our allies as an “afterthought” even in the 2003 invasion of Iraq? You tell me, here are the nations of the “Coalition of the Willing.”

Did we treat our allies as an “afterthought” in the 2011 attack on Libya? You tell me, here they are.

The map gets smaller, but so was the justifications for each war. That isn't the fault of The Pentagon.

This push for the already failed concept of “Integrated Deterrence” is just another way to attempt to dilute efforts to build a strong military deterrence against nations who wish to supplant us and our allies by themselves or with others from our premier position on the world stage. 

A strong military is the shield behind which diplomatic, economic and informational efforts can be made to best shape the international order to best serve the interests of our nation and its friends.

RUS invaded UKR because UKR was not in their mind a hard target. European NATO was seen as easily threatened into inaction due to their demilitarization and decades-long slide in to dependency to RUS energy. Our diplomats were seen as weak sisters on the stage willing to do almost anything to get a deal with Iran again.

Let’s go back to that first quote:

…senior Pentagon officials are brimming with new found confidence in American power, spurred by the surprising effectiveness of U.S. backed Ukrainian forces…” 

Again, taking credit for the performance of UKR when at D+0 we were trying to talk Zelenskyy to either bug out to Lviv or just leave the country? We were depressing their will to fight, not enhancing it. Will is the primary driver here – and all credit for that goes to the Ukrainians.

This “brimming” is either delusional or a bold-faced bluffing lie.

It is all kind of insulting, isn't it? It isn't that they are lying to everyone, it is that they expect you to join in their lie.

The only people who gain here from this attempt to dilute military power are neither the USA nor our partners and allies. 

---

UPDATE: For those who have a WSJ subscription, Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-WI) has a few thoughts on Integrated Deterrence as well.

We have good company.

The Battle for Friends and Influence in our Own Backyard

You know the Pacific theater of WWII. I'm not going to insult the intelligence of The Front Porch by repeating all the blood we expended to secure our stepping stones to defeat Imperial Japan.

We have warships named after battles, islands, and heroes. Just look at the map above, you all know it.

Since WWII, our victories with our allies secured the peace and established relationships generations ago with those who lived on these islands. Some are territories, others their own nations or commonwealths. 

Have we forgotten their importance? Do we act entitled to their friendship and the access they provide? Are we sending our best people with well crafted policies to ensure that an expanding China does not - with bags of cash in one hand and corruption in the other - weaken our comparative advantage? 

If you think we couldn't screw this up, you're wrong. 

Patricia O'Brien's article at The Diplomat is sobering;

Alarm bells are ringing in Washington, D.C. over ... The drawing up of the future relationships between the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), the Federated States of Micronesia (Micronesia) and the Republic of Palau (Palau) and the U.S. ... These three nations’ borders cover an immense area of the Pacific Ocean that in the age of acute competition with China is of the highest strategic importance. In addition, Palau and the RMI both host vital military bases. In recent days the Pentagon has announced these nations as possible sites for additional military installations, an eventuality that hinges entirely on the future roadmap of their U.S. relationships.

The reason why there is such alarm in some halls of American power right now is that the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) between the U.S. and these three nations should now be in the advanced stages of renegotiation before they expire in 2023 and 2024 in the case of Palau. Yet there is an unsettling lack of action on this front. In the case of the most complex negotiation, that with the RMI, there have been no formal meetings since December 2020.

...

In the context of escalating tensions between the U.S. and China, the COFA states have a unique position beyond their paramount strategic importance. Palau and the RMI are two of the last nations that diplomatically recognize the Republic of China government on Taiwan. Micronesia, by contrast, has had diplomatic relations with China since 1989 and has been expanding that relationship in conspicuous ways in recent years, to the point where Micronesia has been recently described as “the next U.S.-China battleground”. Yet Micronesia is widely relegated to the status of COFA partner of least importance in Washington, largely because it does not host military installations or have the nuclear legacy that shapes the U.S. relationship with the RMI. This is a situation that also clearly needs to change.

...

From every angle, the COFA negotiations are urgently in need of the highest level of attention and remediation. The clock is at one minute to midnight on all the justice, climate, and strategic aspects of U.S. relations with the COFA nations. It is high time to heed the alarms. It is high time to heed the alarms, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recently issued invitation to Pacific leaders to participate in meetings on February 12, when he is in Fiji, may be a sign that the U.S. is starting to do so.

Clearly the US Department of State did not put even the JV on the project. If the boss has to get involved, then so be it. We don't need to have to fight our way back through these islands ... again.

Australia and New Zealand have a play here as well...but they don't seem to be having an easy go of it. 

China cannot be allowed to degrade this natural advantage cheaply. We don't have to do all that much to set it right along with our allies - including the British and French.

Time to up our game. We have some smart Pacific minds ... we can do this.

We must do this.