The Existential Requirement to Maintain a Broad Defense Industrial Base

With all its inefficiencies, bloat, and error; with all its problematic revolving door issues between government/military and civilian sectors – there is no greater existential requirement for a mature nation than to have its own military-industrial sector.

In peace it is easy to forget that in times of war – times that will always come with our warlike species – the vanities of peace can soon become a bleeding ulcer at war.

While small nations simply cannot sustain the full spectrum of military equipment due to overhead and development costs, medium to large nations have options. You may on occasion have to partner with friendly nations, but what strings come with those partnerships? Regardless of whose insignia is on a certain system, who really controls its use?

At peace when decisions are made in the moment, a greater appreciation of political risk down the road at war is required. A lot of, “what if” type questions need to be asked, and little tolerance should be allowed for the “that will never” or “unlikely given present circumstances” hand-waving away of problematic assumptions that would avoid either investment in significant reserve stockpiles of finished product or raw materials, or in higher per-unit production locally.

A perfect example of this trap can be found in the tracked anti-aircraft gun produced by the Germans, the Gepard (Cheetah), retired over a decade ago but taken out of reserve and handed over to the Ukrainians to great effect. Via Bild;

With its 35mm machine guns, this cheetah alone has already been able to destroy two Russian cruise missiles and a double-digit number of drones, says Max, confirming for the first time that a cheetah can also deal with these targets very well under combat conditions.

"The Shahed drones are very easy to fight when we're within range," says Max. The cheetah's search radar can pick them up well, and the explosive incendiary ammunition then makes short work of the slow drones.

Advantage cheetah: The machine guns can also fight swarms of cheaply produced drones very well. During an operation near Odessa, ten drones were shot down within a short period of time. This countered the tactics of the Iranian kamikaze drones, which are usually sent out in swarms to overwhelm the air defenses.

The ghosts of the peacetime accountants will haunt you at war. Via FT;

Germany wants to send 12,000 Swiss-made 35-milimetre rounds that were bought by Berlin decades ago to restock the 50 Cheetah flak cannons it has pledged to Ukraine.

The Swiss government, as part of the original sales contract with Germany, has a veto over the munitions’ resale or donation. Politicians in the wealthy alpine state believe that sending them to Ukraine would jeopardise its neutrality. Switzerland refused a request from Denmark for the re-export of two dozen Swiss-made “Piranha” armoured personnel carriers to Ukraine in May.

The German government has been struggling to find more shells to send to Kyiv. Brazil, which makes suitable munitions for the Cheetah guns, has also refused to allow their re-export.

…

 “For once, the Swiss government is right,” said Thomas Borer, former Swiss ambassador to Germany and an architect of Switzerland’s current laws on neutrality. “It’s clear that delivering arms of weapons into a conflict would infringe the core principle of what neutrality means for Switzerland. As a friendly neighbour that is aware of our laws and obligations, Germany shouldn’t put Switzerland in this position.”

Lambrecht wrote to her Swiss counterpart Viola Amherd saying the Cheetah munitions were purely defensive. In the letter, she said the weapons were “vital” for the protection of Black Sea grain exports from potential bombardment, according to Ukraine’s military.

Bern has yet to formally respond to Berlin’s renewed request, which has been made in parallel with diplomatic lobbying from Ukrainian officials. The Swiss defence ministry has passed the new German request on to the finance ministry, which handles export licences, a Swiss government spokesperson said, declining to comment further.

A spokesperson for Germany’s defence ministry said: “We are always actively finding ways to support Ukraine through our partners and alliances.” Discussions with Switzerland were part of that process, they added.

Senior German politicians, including members of parties in the governing coalition, have been more forthright, with Germany being Switzerland’s largest arms export market.

As I’ve said often before, were I German I’d be a member of the FDP party. As such, this makes me nod my head a bit smugly; 

“Anyone who does not deliver munition to an attacked state for national defence can no longer be a reliable supplier of ammunition for us either,” Marcus Faber, head of the liberal Free Democratic party’s parliamentary defence group, wrote on Twitter on Sunday. “If Switzerland refuses this to Ukraine . . . then for security reasons, we can no longer get anything from there.”

Like the lessons from the 40-year old Falklands conflict still are of use today – of even more importance to this century are the legion of lessons that are coming out of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Smart people are taking note of the sometimes uncomfortable truths at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels that are emerging clearly with each month – truths that need to be look at with an unblinking eye. Some theories pushed by industry are being found to be garbage – and other proven “old think” as shown as immortal “new think” and the Gods of the Military Copybook Headings are validated once again.

There are also a bountifully supply of lessons in the diplomatic, economic, and informational domains that need attention as well. Military-Industrial policy is one of them.

Add this to the list.

The Market Will Tell You What You're Short of

For navalists, the very short answer to the question of, "How many carriers do we really need?" is "More." 

Why is that the answer? Simple ... look at the length of deployments and the foolish "double pumping" of the CVN we have.

"High demand - low density" is just a PPT way of saying we didn't buy enough of what we actually need.

Let's take that simple economics concept over to the Army.

What are they short of? Remember when we were naked to attack from the Iranians? We don't want to have that happen again.

The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Patriot missile batteries remain among the most frequently deployed units in the service, Army senior leaders have said previously. They’ve also acknowledged a need to ease the burden on soldiers manning those systems.

...

“Every Patriot unit assigned to the 32nd AAMDC was forward deployed during this period of time," Stewart said Wednesday at the conference. "More importantly, every weapon system in our arsenal, to include C-RAM, Stinger, Avenger, Sentinel Radar, Patriot, THAAD, all those were deployed forward during this time.”

Here is a question; our allies have a lot of air defense forces. How many of them have deployed to help us during this surge? 

In NATO alone, the Germans, Dutch, Spanish and Greeks have Patriot. The Romanians just got their last month, so we'll give them a pass.

The Army has been funding something ... but too much of that and not enough of this.

Imagine the requirements we would face in a war with even a half-peer.

Fullbore Friday

Your ship may have been designed to fight one type of battle, but as history shows, you will be asked to fight the battle at hand.

Your enemy will do things you will not expect. Luck will be a fickle lady; favoring you at one moment, spitefully coming after you the next.

When it comes to face the enemy, the economies of peace time will haunt you. As is true in the modern era, those who will never fight on your ship will not give you enough weapons to defend yourself or engage the enemy. You will improvise and pray that you have enough redundant systems to at least give you and your crew a fighting chance.

Your people will do extraordinary things and fight in ways and situations you would not have contemplated months before - but now faced with the battle at hand, see clearly how important they are.

We reference the experience of modern combat at sea, and how it will repeat lessons of centuries of naval warfare, of the Royal Navy and Argentinians in The Falkland Islands War. It is time to take a snapshot of one unit, then then 9-yr old Type-21 Frigate, HMS ARDENT (F184).

First a pull quote from Admiral Woodward's 100 Days;

By now another formation of Skyhawks, this time navy aircraft, had made a big swing around the Sound, swept over the land and, having cleared the Port Howard area, were heading, at sea-level, straight towards ARDENT. They were positioned right on Commander West’s six o’clock (stern) away from the arc of his 4.5” gun, as the British frigate made its way up to the North-West Islands to join YARMOUTH. Three of them made the attack together. ARDENT could bring her Seacat to bear, but the launcher refused to fire. That left just his 20mm Oerlikon guns and two other machine guns to open fire.

Everyone who could help did. Lieutenant-Commander John Sephton, the Lynx helicopter pilot and his observer Brian Murphy, were up above the flight deck, Sephton with a Sterling sub-machine gun and his assistant with a Bren gun, both blasting away at the Skyhawks. But the situation was hopeless. The Argentinians dropped nine bombs, three of them hitting ARDENT, two exploding in the hangar, the third failing to explode after smashing its way into the after auxiliary machinery room. The bomb that hit the hangar wreaked havoc, blowing the Seacat launcher, which was positioned on top of the hangar, into the air, only to crash down on to the flight deck killing Commander West’s cheerful supply officer, Richard Banfield. The blast also killed Lieutenant-Commander Sephton and Brian Murphy and one other crew member.

Commander West would a few decades later be Lord West. Let's go back to a 2007 article for another view.

In the operations room, Gough checked to see what weapons were still functioning. The news was not good. The main 4.5 inch gun was not responding, the Sea Cat missiles were gone and all that was left were the machine guns on the upper decks. He went down to the stern to assess the damage.

"It was very bad," he said. "There were fires in the hangar, there were people on the flight deck injured, and people trying to fight the fires." Gough returned to report the damage to West.

With the ship already listing, a second wave of Argentine aircraft attacked. Again, the stern of the ship bore the brunt of the attack. Enticknap heard the "brace" warning over the Tannoy and looked frantically for somewhere dry to lie down.

"I put my hands over my head and there was another thumping big bang and I don't remember anything after that. I must have come to some minutes after and the whole of the place was filled with black, acrid smoke. Clearly we had taken a big hit. I tried to get up and couldn't."

Enticknap, who was later awarded the Queen's Gallantry Medal, was pinned down by a piece of debris and his left hand was shattered. "There was lots of noise around me. People were crying out; you wouldn't think that some people would call for their mum, but they do."

He was saved by Able Seaman John Dillon, who won the George Medal for his efforts. Dillon dragged the debris off Enticknap's back and the pair made their way through the smoke towards a narrow gap in the side of the ship, crawled through, put on their life jackets and jumped into the water. They were picked up later by a helicopter.

In the most detailed account he has ever given of the sinking of the Ardent, Admiral West described how his ship was torn apart. "Between decks, when you get hit by a bomb it's an absolute shambles," he said. "The noise is huge. It feels like a great fist grabbing the ship by the stern and bashing it onto the water.

"And the areas where the bomb actually goes off, fires are raging, water is pouring in, people get very disoriented. It was really very unpleasant and it went on for quite a long time."

Twenty minutes after the second attack, a third wave of Argentine aircraft delivered the coup de grâce. By the time the attack ended, the ship had been struck by at least 14 bombs, though not all exploded. The ship was listing heavily to starboard, the steering was gone and the bulkheads were in danger of giving way.

"You get to the stage where you have to make a decision," West said. "Do you go on if you are going to lose more people? And is the ship actually going to keep going or not? I made the decision that the ship was going to sink - and that was a very hard decision. I was very loath to make it." He gave the order to abandon ship.

But he made sure he was the last to leave. "People started getting off and I didn't really want to leave but I was dragged down to our bows and I was dragged off and I said: 'No, you two have got to go first' and I stepped off as the last one, which was really very, very hard. I was heartbroken."

The Ballistic Missile Calculus Changes

Technology does not stand still.

Capabilities do not remain constant.

What was the great, unassailable threat today, may just be mitigated in to nuisance tomorrow.

In war - especially in long periods of peace - you need to be humble about the abilities of your weapons and your ability to see the future clearly. You also need to be careful not to make your enemy 10-feet tall or a petty threat to be dismissed.

Watch for developments that change the odds and calculus of threats and capabilities.

As we continue to think about the returning threat of ballistic missiles targeted to either land or sea, this development is significant.

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency ... conducted a successful test today against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) class target. This test was the first salvo engagement of a threat-representative ICBM target by two Ground Based Interceptors (GBI), which were designated GBI-Lead, and GBI-Trail for the test. The GBI-Lead destroyed the reentry vehicle, as it was designed to do. The GBI-Trail then looked at the resulting debris and remaining objects, and, not finding any other reentry vehicles, selected the next ‘most lethal object’ it could identify, and struck that, precisely as it was designed to do.
...
“This was the first GBI salvo intercept of a complex, threat-representative ICBM target, and it was a critical milestone,” said MDA Director Air Force Lt. Gen. Samuel A. Greaves. “The system worked exactly as it was designed to do, and the results of this test provide evidence of the practicable use of the salvo doctrine within missile defense. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense system is vitally important to the defense of our homeland, and this test demonstrates that we have a capable, credible deterrent against a very real threat.”

The GMD element of the ballistic missile defense system provides combatant commanders the capability to engage and destroy intermediate and long-range ballistic missile threats

Step by step. Increment by increment - a significant capability is emerging.

H/t MV.

Iron Domes and Wooden Doors

A potential catastrophic success?

Are there deeper 2nd and 3rd order effects from Israel's success with IRON DOME?

I'm pondering over at USNIBlog. Come on by and give it a read.

So, what do you put in the NLOS void?

One of the many original sins of the LCS program was the assumption that there would actually be a NLOS missile. As such, there is on both classes a void forward where the never was has been NLOS was supposed to be.

As a stop gap - still using the two decades old thinking about what threat is what - ideas have come up to include Hellfire missiles or other short-legged anti-surface options.

Well, we are sneaking up on 2018, and do we really need to worry about the threat that NLOS was supposed to take care of?

What about area denial problems coming from the air? As presently configured, LCS can barely protect itself while doing its best to stay out of the way. RIM-116 RAM/SEA-RAM is a nice bit of kit, but is a last ditch defense.

Let's put to the side how you would support the radar and take a peek at what the Israeli Navy has come up with to take to sea their combat proven IRON DOME system. My guess would be to give some support to their new offshore gas fields.

A proved medium range anti-missile, anti-artillery, "if it flies it dies" capability. A bit more range than RIM-116.

I'd love to give the problem to some good naval architects and engineers and just ask them, "Tell me how you make this work on an LCS using the NLOS void."

Maybe the answer is, "you can't" - but if I were tasked to tool around WESTPAC in one of these Tiffany gunboats, I would not be worried about Boghammars from the Bill Clinton administration.

SM-6 and the Changing Calculus

An ongoing story in the Darwinian nature of war is the contest between the dominance of defense and offense. Especially acute on land - something 100-yrs on from WWI we are still talking about - it also applies at sea.

The last decade, much talk on the surface side of the house has been A2AD, ASBM, and a buzzword I like less every time I use it "distributed lethality," and the need to somehow find a way to get back in the anti-surface warfare fight at range.

Slowly and deliberately making it to the fleet, the SM-6 is showing all the signs of being the weapon we need now, and need in number.

As reported by Kris Osborne at The National Interest;

The Pentagon simultaneously fired two Standard Missile-6 weapons in rapid succession at a single ballistic missile target to asses new seeker technology and solidify the weapon's ability to ensure destruction of approaching enemy targets.

Using an emerging "active seeker" technology, two SM-6 missiles were able to simultaneously track and destroy a single target, greatly improving the probability of a target kill.
...
The SM-6 is unique in several respects; the weapon uses what is called an "active" seeker, meaning it can send a signal or electromagnetic ping forward in addition to receiving them. Electromagnetic signals, which travel at the speed of light, send a signal forward before analyzing the return signal to determine the shape, size, speed or configuration of an approaching threat. Since the speed of light is known, and the time of travel is able to be determined, a computer algorithm is able to calculate the exact distance of an object. Portions of this technology are built into the SM-6, using software upgrades.

An "active seeker" gives the missile to better attack maneuvering or moving targets at sea, because it does not need to rely upon a ship-based illuminator to bounce a signal off a target for a merely "passive" seeker to receive.

This is the technology which allows a ship commander to fire several SM-6 missiles in more rapid succession or closer to one another in the event that a target needs to be attacked with more than one missile.

Yes, in my head I'm counting VLS cells and wanting more, but nothing is perfect;

Compared with the SM-3, the ship-fired SM-6 interceptor is designed to track and destroy closer-in-threats such as a ballistic missile in the "terminal" phase of decent to its target.

The weapon has been established with an ability to knock out ballistic missiles approaching from the sky.

Of course, it is one thing to have mastery of defense and break the confidence your opponent may have in his offensive systems, but what about your offense? Here's the sexy part;

More recently, the weapon has been developed for a number of new "offensive" missions including surface attacks against enemy ships or defensive intercepts against anti-ship missiles closer to the surface.

Back to what we had with SM-1 but lost with SM-2. Good.  We also have the standard AAW ability;

The SM-6 has also been capable of anti-air defense, equipped with an ability to attack or destroy enemy helicopters, drones and other approaching threats. The weapon has now been established as defensive, offensive and capable of three distinct missions; they are surface warfare, anti-air warfare and ballistic missile defense.

More testing and then ... get 'ye to the fleet.

One note of caution. We should be a bit more humble. Good-man-Mike had me sucking my teeth a bit;

"You now have absolute assurance of hit no matter what the threat is doing. If the threat takes a turn and does something weird and the first missile is unable to sense it and engage it, the second missile will," Mike Campisi, SM-6 Senior Director, Raytheon, told Scout Warrior in an interview.

Never say you have "absolute assurance" of anything at sea. Mother Ocean and Mars love to make a fool of you from your own over-confidence.

No, it wasn't a SAM

I feel dumb just having to do this, but via John Krempasky, there is a little something to stop some of you from just being silly.

For some reason, people are nibbl'n around the edges that the Russian airliner that went down over Sinai was taken by AQ/IS terrorists who got hold of Libyan or Syrian SA-2/3/6 etc.

No. Just no. Stop. Go to other theories - this one is bunk.

There is a huge step from a manpad to a no kidding air defense long range SAM. One does not simply throw a SA-3 in the back of a Toyota pickup, drive across a nation or two, plug it in to a Honda generator, go from SAFE to ARM, press a button, and nab an airliner over at 30,000 ft going almost 450kts.

These are complicated bits of kit that the Soviets/Russians built. They take talented and well trained professionals to maintain them, must less use them in an operational environment.

They are also huge. The SA-3 is a bit over 6-meters long. That doesn't even include the deliver truck sized command truck and radar.

Anyway, John's link will bring you to the page of a Hungarian who has built a rather fun Soviet/Russian SAM simulator. Play around his place, but as some seem to be in love with the SA-2/3/6 theories, below is a no-sound video of the simulation of the SA-3 hit against the F-117 by the Serbians.

If you follow the mouse arrow, you will get an idea of the complicated nature of it all, even for those of us who used to do stuff like this for a living.

Where is the checklist anyway ...

The CHANCELLORSVILLE Shrug

I don't know more than anyone else here, but I think that some are getting a little too excited over what happened with the USS CHANCELLORSVILLE (CG-62). Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar; a training incident is a training incident.

Most you need to know will come out in the investigation - but for those who need a refresher;

An aerial target drone malfunctioned and struck guided missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) off the coast of Southern California at approximately 1:25 pm local time today, Nov. 16, while the ship was conducting a radar tracking exercise during routine training at sea.

Our friend Galrahn over at ID really got a bone in his teeth on the incident the week after;

Based on where the rogue drone hit the ship, had it been a real ASCM - it could have easily been a mission kill for the ship. This is a very serious incident involving the most advanced AEGIS warship in the US Navy, and the Navy has started the incident with a press release that intentionally omits a critical detail - that the ship tried to defend itself and the specific technology designed to defend the ship for this specific situation failed.

This incident is a big deal, and on the first day there is already a deception effort underway to conceal key details of the incident - an omission that only serves to cast doubt upon the reputation of sailors for purposes of protecting the reputation of a piece of technology. Why did the Navy conceal from the public that the point defense system of the most advanced AEGIS ship in the US Navy failed to protect the ship from a direct hit from a rogue drone?

He raises some good points, but I hesitate to see any kind of malicious deception going on. I am willing to give everyone the benefit of the doubt and there could be very good reasons why there is conflicting information out there. We don't know what we shouldn't know.  

Training accidents happen all the time - I've been in the middle of them as have many of you - accidents where people die or are disfigured. That didn't happen here and I don't see the upside to hide anything, especially with so many people who will eventually know the truth. I'm going to go with my favorite cliche mash-up on Occam's Razor: don't contribute to conspiracy what is best explained by human incompetence. 

David Axe over at WiB decided to pick at the scab a bit too;

But there’s a more frightening possibility. BQM-74 drones are tailored to simulate different kinds of enemy anti-ship missile. If Chancellorsville’s Phalanx did indeed fully fire at the robot and failed to hit, it could mean the drone—either by design or by accident—found a gap in the gun’s fire control. Perhaps the drone was moving too fast, too slow or too low. Any enemy missile matching the drone’s physics could dodge American ships’ defenses.

I may owe someone beer over this, but let me put this out there; everyone take a powder. This isn't frightening, it is interesting.

I'll say here what I said SEPCOR to a few people after the pics came out, specifically the one above. Look where it hit and how it hit. I looks just like a perfect early-MOD Harpoon targeting algorithm hit. The drone hit wings level. Odds are this was a controlled hit. Wasn't planned by the humans to do that - but the drone thinks it did everything perfectly.

Now, all sorts of questions come up from here, many really don't need to be discussed or answered on this medium.

First up; where was range control? Was that link down?

Second, we don't know what profile this was programmed for .... or they thought it was programmed for, and that deserves more thought than most. Even drones are subject to human error either in their programming or their maintenance.

Third, so what if this were a live fire exercise? Let's discount that this might just be a standard-issue human screw up. Not all offensive and defensive weapon systems work as advertised all the time. Nothing is perfect or 100% guaranteed. Even if you have everything working, everyone qualified, and not a single CASREP on the ship - there is always blind stupid luck; good or bad. Sometimes you can make it through the SM-2, the ESSM, and CIWS on a clear, calm, beautiful day.

If this was a just a TRACKEX, when things start to go sideways with seconds to react, you really cannot expect a ship to respond as if they expected a regiment-sized formation of Tupolev Tu-22M3 coming over the horizon. It just doesn't work like that.

Either way - I don't think there are any larger lessons here about our defensive capabilities that we didn't already know. I'm not willing to place any bets on the cause right now - but I do like this effect; it is causing people to think again if we are doing what navies have done since the threat first appeared from the air; shortchanging defensive systems and defense in depth due to money issues and a faith in "magic bullet" technology that in peace promises easy war.

After WWII started in earnest, shipyards festooned all ships with as many anti-air weapons as possible - as in peace it was determined they weren't needed. In San Carlos Water four decades later, in addition to Sea Dart, Sea Wolf, Sea Cat, and 4.5" guns - the rails were full of Sailors and even civilians with all manner of side-arms, crew served weapons, and long guns shooting at A-4 and Mirage aircraft scooting down the sound. Why? Because, you see, modern systems were so good that you didn't need all those messy extras.

We all know that SM-2/3/6 are not really perfect even with RAM, 5" guns, ESSM, CIWS, and others backing them up. Very good and almost without peer? Sure - but not perfect. Shoot-Shoot-Look-Shoot; Shoot-Look-Shoot etc all are based on nice pretty assumptions in peace and the right things packed in the MK-41 VLS tubes when you need them. In war, WINCHESTER will be heard a lot. SHOOT-SHOOT-LOOK-OHSHIT-SHOOT-SHOOT-HOLYSHITIDONTCAREKEEPSHOOTING will happen; just ask the ASW Commander in the Falkland Islands Battle Group.

Does any of the above have anything to do with the CHANCELLORSVILLE? No, not really - but - it is a good excuse to ponder if our "perfect" systems really are that perfect. Before they were needed in war, did the homing torpedo, depth charge, 30-cal guns on aircraft, or AAA on the CV really worked as advertised? No. Is our AAW - untested in combat BTW - as good as our PPT say?

No. Not even close; you can take that to the bank.

Even when systems in the past were honed to almost perfection after years of war - did they still fail? Of course, as the crew of the USS FRANKLIN (CV-13) can tell you.

This is a tough business where things can go wrong even when you do everything right. If you can learn something from those occasions without anyone getting killed - like we did here - then be happy. 

In the final evaluation, you really can't buy training like that. I look forward to reading what the investigation finds - even if I can only read the low side now. Hopefully, we will have something of value to come out of it.

---

UPDATE: The shorter SJS comment;

60-year Evolutionary Success

You may have missed this yesterday - but you should at least give it a passing nod;

The Navy successfully tested its short range ballistic missile last week, destroying a complex moving target that soared over the Pacific Ocean on Wednesday, May 15.
...
“This test scenario was designed to challenge the discrimination capabilities of the SM-3 Block IB,” said Dr. Mitch Stevison, Raytheon SM-3 program director. “What we learned from this mission gives me great confidence in the missile’s production readiness.”
The test, code-named Stellar Hecate after a Greek goddess of magic, marks the 23rd successful intercept for the SM-3 program.

Ungh ... the media really needs to have military people edit their stuff. It was a test of a anti-ballistic missile against a short range ballistic missile ... but let's move past that goof.

Here is why you may have missed it; success. Why? Success, the proven way - and with the Standard Missile program, the expected outcome.

"Because we've been perfecting this technology for 60 years, we've seen it expand from defending ships to defending continents,” said Dr. Taylor Lawrence, president of Raytheon Missile Systems. “As we look back on all that has been accomplished in the last six decades, we can't help but recognize that what was impossible yesterday, is possible today."

It will get better and better - giving us some push back to the A2AD challenge; perhaps even getting ahead of it.

We should look at that timeline for surface-to-air missiles as we now look to laser and rail-gun technology. It will take time to reach great promise, but accept what it can offer now, and then build on it.

The best weapons systems are never "revolutionary;" they are products of sound evolution. More work to get done, but we're getting there.

On Tuesday, production is set to begin on a batch of missiles at the company’s new Redstone Missile Integration Facility in Huntsville, Ala., that will be deployed out to U.S. Navy ships.

Here; wallow in the SWO pr0n.

Weapons development; doing it right

2018 isn't really that far away. Got laser?

Existing anti-missile systems include rapid-fire guns designed to shoot down missiles at close range.

But a reliable laser weapon could do the same job with higher precision, speed-of-light engagement and without running out of ammunition.

It's an idea that's been in development at the U.S. Office of Naval Research since the 1980s. The goal is to create a megawatt, or 1 million-watt, laser weapon.

Last month, scientists at the Los Alamos National Lab demonstrated they are capable of producing the electrons needed to generate those megawatt-class laser beams. A preliminary design review began Thursday and continues today in Virginia, according to the Office of Naval Research.
...
"The FEL is expected to provide future U.S. Naval forces with a near-instantaneous laser ship defense in any maritime environment throughout the world," Quentin Saulter, program manager for the Office of Naval Research said in the release.
...
The free-electron laser project began as a science and technology program at the Office of Naval Research in the 1980s and matured into a 14-kilowatt prototype that was developed at the Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility in Newport News.

Work began last year on a 100-kilowatt prototype moving the program closer to the Navy's goal of a megawatt laser.

Its breakthrough in December puts researchers nine months ahead of schedule for its 2011 goals.

"This is a major leap forward for the program and for FEL technology throughout the Navy," Saulter said in the release.

There's still a long way to go before U.S. ships will be equipped with free-electron lasers. The earliest the Office of Naval Research is hoping to test a laser at sea is 2018.

Take it easy. Do it right. Plan to integrate it with existing technology to minimize technology risk. Rome wasn't build in a day. Yes ... Yes ....

I do see one LAWFARE problem with this though.

Sure it works great on missiles. Probably very good on on the anti-swarm front as well. Oops.

I can hear the brief now circa 2027.......

LT Laserswodaddy: In this vignette, the USS OBAMA (CVN-81) and its escorts are ambushed by a swarm of small boats while exiting the southern end of the Suez Canal after the first transit allowed by the Islamic Republic of Egypt since 2012. With minimal warning, the only systems available are crew served weapons and the onboard FEL-CIWS. At 500 yards the ....

CDR Lawfarecockblock: Wait - what are these "swarm boats?"

LT Laserswodaddy: They are mostly open skiffs loaded with explosives for suicide attacks and other fast boats with small arms and RPG. With warning time at 500 yards and the FEL-CIWS already warmed up, we would expect ...

CDR Lawfarecockblock: So, you are telling me that there are unprotected and exposed people exposed in these boats?

LT Laserswodaddy: Yes sir.

CDR Lawfarecockblock: Will they be exposed to this laser weapon?

LT Laserswodaddy: Yes sir.

CDR Lawfarecockblock: What impact will this laser have on them?

LT Laserswodaddy: Well, our hope would be that the heat generated by the laser will set off the explosives and fuel on the boats, but if the crew on those boats are in the way - I suppose the few thousand degrees of heat will fry them rather quickly.

CDR Lawfarecockblock: (after getting a dose of smelling salts by his assistant, LTJG Misscustomfittedkhakis) You mean they will be burned alive! Good God man! Don't you read history? Don't you know the evil of NAPALM? Don't you understand the concept of proportional response! Have you no decency! No, this won't do. This weapon will only be used on non-manned targets. I will not approve this weapon that might subject the Commander for prosecution under the 2019 Fuzzy Wuzzy Huggly Snuggly Conventions of War. Attorney General Kucinich simply will not like this. No, not at all.

Brief me again on the MDS and how we can employ this instead ....

Sigh.

---

UDATE: On a not unrelated subject - I also have a post over at USNIBlog asking the question, "What happened to experimentation."

My answer to Allah on ASBM

Over at HotAir, Dyer and Allah are asking about the development of the DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM).

Hey, I'll steal from myself - here is my comment to them.

It is a potential weapon that will need to be tested, evaluated and refined. As that takes place, other weapons will be developed to counter it either at its launching point or in the terminal phase.

Then it will have to be used in combat in order to know if it is effective.

130 years ago it was the torpedo boat. It did not mean the end of large surface ships.

105 years ago it was the Dreadnought. It did not mean the end of anything but large surface ships with and all gun battery.

90 years ago it was the aircraft. It did not mean the end of large surface ships.

70-80 years ago it was the dive bomber. It did not mean the end of surface ships or aircraft carriers.

60 years ago it was the nuclear weapon. If did not mean the end of surface ships or aircraft carriers.

40 years ago it was the anti-ship cruise missile. It did not mean the end of surface ships or aircraft carriers.

... and so today we are talking about Anti-ship cruise missiles.

There is an evolution and survival of the fittest in warfare. It is only a problem if ignored. It is only a reason to panic if you lack a historical perspective and a lack of confidence in your military to effectively meet a new threat ... at threat that is yet to be fully formed.

The only thing needed here is to ask the CNO - what is your plan to address this possible threat? Are your priorities aligned with preserving your nation's ability to project power into the future?

Midrats Episode 25: If it flies it dies

To project power from the sea - you need a sustained presence that has the ability to project power ashore. The enemy gets a vote - how do we protect our sea based forces from threats above sea level?

Join me and EagleOne this Sunday, 13 JUN at 5pm EST as we discuss 21st Century Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) will all their permutations.

Our guest for the full hour will be fellow blogger SteelJawScribe.

Steeljawscribe (SJS) is a former E-2C NFO with over 3500 hours and 525 traps in the E-2C and other TACAIR. Retiring as a Captain after 26 years, he held a number of Navy and Joint operational and staff positions afloat and ashore including VAW squadron command, CVN navigator, Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy, Navy Planner, and Reconnaissance Systems Officer. Currently employed as a senior analyst with a top 5 defense firm, he has been heavily involved in the policy and operational side of ballistic and cruise missile defense the past five years, to include Operation BURNT FROST, and several other real world contingencies. As part of a team drawn from across government, private and academic sectors, he is one of the authors of the recently published book, "Securing Freedom in the Global Commons" (Stanford University Press), that examines the challenges presented by current and emerging threats to access of the global commons (sea, air, space, cyberspace) by the US and its allies, friends and partners.

Join us live if you can and pile in with the usual suspects in the chat room during the show where you can offer your own questions and observations to our guests. If you miss the show or want to catch up on the shows you missed - you can always reach the archives at blogtalkradio - or set yourself to get the podcast on iTunes.

Listen to Midrats on Blog Talk Radio

Did you hug your SM-3 today?

Defending against the dive bomber of the 21st Century, perchance.

The greatest threat to U.S. missile defenses are short- and medium-range weapons, the director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency said today.

“Ninety-nine percent of the threat today” is from these types of missiles, Army Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly told Bloomberg Television in an interview. Defending against these missiles “is where the administration is focusing the majority of our funding.”

The administration’s proposed 13 percent cut in the agency’s budget wouldn’t affect current missile defenses because most of the funding lost would be for systems still being developed, O’Reilly said.

“We are not reducing the missile defense capability we have today and that we’ve built in the last couple of decades,” he said.

The approaches to the Taiwan Straits - if we still consider that inside our concerns - are looking tougher and tougher with each passing year.

Like I said before - the strategy of the porcupine is a good one. Make it not worth the trouble and you are fine.