Mini Hospital Ships and Influence Squadrons

The end of July brought us this little nugget that I have not pulled out of draft yet;

Republican senators want to include $2.2 billion for Navy shipbuilding in the latest round of relief funds meant to combat the coronavirus pandemic.

According to the text of the bill, lawmakers would allot $1.45 billion of that money so the service could buy four “expeditionary medical ships.”

The proposed funds for medical vessels come after the Navy dispatched its two hospital ships, USNS Mercy (T-AH-19) and USNS Comfort (T-AH-20), earlier this year to aid in pandemic relief efforts. Austal USA, which builds the Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) vessels in Mobile, Ala., has evaluated the potential to use the EPF hull for missions like hospital ships.

Here and over on Midrats we've asked for more hospital ship and for more "unsexy but important."

From both a manning and utility point of view - there is a whole lot of potential for presence, public relations, and info ops with these vessels inline with Jerry Hendrix's "Influence Squadrons" concept from the previous decade.

It is as correct now as it was then. Many of the naysayers when it comes to hospital ships touch on the fact our existing hospital ships are hard to man, have obsolete engineering plants, etc, etc.

These are smaller, more flexible, easier to ... well ... as VADM Merz said more professionally;

“The problem with those [hospital] ships is, there’s only two of them, and they’re big, and we’re moving to a more distributed maritime operations construct,” Merz explained at the April 2018 hearing. “There’s no lack of commitment [to this medical capability]; matter of fact, we’re taking a broader look at the capabilities on whether or not they are aligned with the way we plan to fight our future battles. So you’re going to see that requirement surface probably this year, and then we’ll start the process on how we’re going to fill that requirement.”

I think we should at least experiment with a variation of Jerry Hendrix's influence squadrons with these at the core.

Maritime Strategy Monday: Influence?

As I am entering a period of limited time to blog (about a week and a half at first guess - one of those short notice things - I'll blog some, but not more than one or two short posts a day max) - this will wind up being a bit shorter than I wanted, but here we go.

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When an organization finds itself at a pivot point in crisis, it naturally looks to its leadership for direction and a viable plan forward. The Navy is at such a point, and has been for the last two years.

A problem we have, however, is that we are on the tail end of a lost decade of false hope and forgotten promises where those in the Navy now have little faith in their leadership's ability to honestly build a Fleet, discuss its challenges, and direct a course towards a successful future. Much of that has to do with the fact to a large measure, our senior leaders have taken the Soviet model of a unified message. Essential in wartime, but in peace a sure recipe for stilted group think.

If you look at the complete cock-up that is DDG-1000, the rest of the Tiffany Navy as represented by the schizophrenic LCS Corvette, the Titanium-gilt LPD-17, the too-heavy-to-go-anywhere ACS, the "no slack because all we have is light attack" FASKE-18A-G, rolled around "1/3 good, 2/3 babble by committee" updated Maritime Strategy - looking to our senior leadership for clear direction and guidance, with a few exceptions, is about as helpful as dropping to your knees in the Temple of Jupiter and praying for the king of the gods to deliver you from the harpies that haunt your life.

An organization in need of ideas will not accept a vacuum. Into the gap will come more more junior officers, Sailors, industry, and concerned citizens with ideas to try to find a way out of the hole we find ourselves in. CDR Henry J. Hendrix Jr is one of those officers. You don't have to agree with all his ideas, I don't, but you owe it to yourself and the Navy you love to read them and think about them.

It is the ideas and proposals of smart, thinking, and thoughtful officers like CDR Hendrix that the Navy should be welcoming and examining - regardless of what discomfort they cause. Jerry comes from a line that traces its lineage to Admiral Sims. It is never an easy thing to put your ideas out there with your name attached to it - to accept the slings and arrows that come with it.

With that dose of love thrown Jerry's way and to take up the assignment from last WED - on with the show.

As a reminder, in this month's Proceeding, CDR Henry J. Hendrix Jr, has an article titled Buy Ford not Ferrari - that is what we are going to discuss today.

Let's take that thing apart and spread the bits on the table and talk about what we have here. Not a full fisking, I don't have the time (feel free to hit areas I don't in comments) - but let me comment on those areas that jumped out to me.

Like I said earlier - I don't agree with all the author puts out there, but I could be all wrong and he could be all right. Not the point - the point is that he has some solid ideas worth looking at. With our maritime future challenged going forward with very real fiscal terrain issues, his ideas need to be taken in and chewed on.

In many ways, that is the great underlying strength the article - it offers options that are realistic given the limited amount of money we have to put hulls in the water and get ships underway. The time of the PPT program has past. That wiggle room is gone. It is time to put up or shut up.

The problems that will have the most impact on the Navy's future force structure are large and can be categorized in two groups. The first is the growing expense of building new ships. The costs involved in research, development, and production of destroyers, cruisers, and carriers, each of which fields new, leading-edge technologies, have placed the price of the future force out of reach, even with four percent of the gross domestic product funding the Department of Defense.

Second is the growing mismatch between the Navy's strategic vision and its acquisition plan.

Correct. A Fleet should meet the Strategy. As we have outlined here - hope, wish, and desire have prevented that up to now.

At a conservative estimated price tag of $30 billion to construct and a daily operating cost in excess of a million dollars, carrier strike groups are quickly becoming prohibitively expensive to both build and deploy. When these characteristics are considered alongside rising threats and increasingly challenging operational environments, even more questions arise.

If this idea holds for 10-11, it holds for 9 - but I think I know what he means. This is one of the weaker parts of the article. It does not match with the later CVN numbers he proposes, but from a cost-mitigation perspective it holds. CVN, for all their issues, are still the only global sustained strike capability we have. I don't think his CVN critique is fleshed out well and may be worth a dedicated article - but let's move on.

Talking about SS,

Torpedoes launched from these boats, and shore- and ship-based missiles can sink outright most of the world's surface combatants and would, at least, significantly degrade the mission effectiveness of American super-carriers.

Spot on with the threat. For ASCM, it isn't the Exocet, Silkworm, Harpoon and the other subsonic threats that bother me - it is the supersonic ASCM and ASBM that keep me up at night. They are not insurmountable, but need more attention than they are getting.

The venerable deep-strike A-6 Intruder and the long-range F-14 interceptor have vanished into the boneyard with their spots on the flight deck taken by the F/A-18 Hornet variants, which were intended to be replacements for the A-4 and A-7 short- and medium-range light attack aircraft. ... we find ourselves in a circular argument reminiscent of the late Admiral Hyman Rickover, that "I must defend my force, Sir, so that I can defend my force." The CSG is, remarkably, a construct that can operate effectively only in a permissive environment, or be committed to an anti-access environment only under the most extreme conditions when national interests compel leadership to risk what amounts to a significant percentage of the Navy's annual budget in a single engagement.

The loss of a dedicated carrier based tanking asset remains a critical failure by Navy Air. Just short sighted in the extreme. Buddy tanking is a joke - doesn't count. What follows is the pull quote.

What is needed is a Navy cheap enough to be built in large numbers while remaining sufficiently effective to defend American interests on the high seas. We need Fords, not Ferraris.

Hi-Lo; the only way to go. Can't argue with him in any way on that point, however ....

Step one is to abandon the idea of a Navy built around 11 or 12 carrier strike groups.

Only for the money reasons in my book - for the reasons stated before. A larger DoD question is how do you replace the national need for global strike as the B-3 now is pushed to the right? Give it up? Tough problem.

Next, in a word, ungh.

A key tenet of post-9/11 strategic thought is that extremist religious terrorism is avoidable. Societies with infrastructural resources such as electricity, clean water, public education, and some modicum of medical care do not generally incubate extremist groups in their midst. Naval forces that have basic abilities to police the sea lines of communication while also seizing port call opportunities to build the basic communal building blocks of productive life ought to be an important component of the future Navy.

I am sorry my friend - this is just plain wrong and debunked. Read here, here, and here to start - but I cannot let that comment stand. The 911 hijackers, OBL and almost all of Al Qaeda's mid-level and higher leaders and operators are well educated sons of the middle to upper classes. Lack of opportunity, frustration, and envy resulting from living in a culture that denies basic human desires compared to the best of western culture is more of the cause. The Navy cannot do anything to counter that.

All the things that the author offers that the Navy can do helps in a broader extent our national image - on the margins - but will do nothing to negate the source that breeds Islamist terrorism. A port visit by every USN ship to Karachi doing nothing but charity work will do nothing to change what is going on with the larger cultural and religious trends in Pakistan driving terrorism.

The next step on the Navy's path to a new future should be the creation of "Influence Squadrons" composed of an amphibious mother ship (an LPD-17 or a cheaper commercial ship with similar capabilities), a destroyer to provide air, surface, and subsurface defensive capabilties, a Littoral Combat Ship to extend a squadron's reach into the green-water environment and provide some mine warfare capabilities, a Joint High Speed Vessel to increase lift, a Coastal Patrol ship to operate close in, and an M80 Stiletto to provide speed and versatility.

Sounds like a tailored Task Force, but the use of the phrase "Influence Squadron" (INFRON) is very problematic as its very name creates a significant STRATCOM problems.

Most of the leaders of the nations we would like to influence will have nothing to do with any USA force that publicly advertises that it is there to influence them. Influence is a loaded word that opens you up to charges of paternalistic imperialism. If that is what you are after, fine, just don't advertise it.

On balance though, the substance and mission of the "INFRON" as presented and constructed,

The hypothetical Influence Squadron would, in part, be composed of (clockwise from top left): an amphibious mother ship like the USS San Antonio (LPD-17); a guided-missile destroyer like the USS The Sullivans; a Littoral Combat ship like the USS Freedom (LCS-1); an M80 Stiletto; and a joint high-speed vessel like the USS Swift (HSV-2).

... is interesting and deserves to be looked at from a budgetary and sustainability standpoint - but it needs a new name out of the box.

These forces, operating every day around the world, would represent the preponderance of visible U.S. naval power. Their understated capabilities would epitomize America's peaceful, non-aggressive intent, and would carry out the new maritime strategy's stated purpose of providing positive influence forward. However, the Influence Squadron, carrying credible firepower across a broad area of operations, could also serve to either dissuade or destroy pirate networks that might seek to prey upon increasingly vulnerable commercial sea lines of communication.

Creating 16 of these squadrons, ten in the Pacific, six in the Atlantic, would allow the Navy to forward deploy six to eight squadrons at any given time, expanding American influence around the world. Pacific-based squadrons would routinely deploy to the east coast of Africa, the Persian Gulf, the waters off Malaysia to include the Strait of Malacca, the archipelagic waters of Indonesia, the waters in and around the Philippines, and the regional waters near Japan and Korea.

Atlantic-based squadrons would visit the Caribbean, South America, the north and western coasts of Africa as well as pushing up into the Black Sea to visit Georgia, the Ukraine and other partners in the region. Sometimes, however, Influence Squadrons, no matter how well they are placed, will not have the necessary concentration of capabilities to meet the emergent challenges. It would be at this point that the next force along the scale of naval response would be dispatched.

Well, that looks a lot like a modern day version of colonial fleets - which have a long and successful history of doing just what is proposed for the INFRON. All that being said though, I go back to the author's critique of the vulnerability of the CVN - and INFRON's are exceptionally vulnerable. Vulnerability isn't a deal killer for me, everything is vulnerable if you have a smart guy under the Red Hat, it is what you do to mitigate it that is important.

After sending spit-balls teacher's way for a while, here is where I warm up to some of the other parts of the article.

If it is accepted that the aircraft carrier, with its aviation strike packages, represents the sledgehammer of America's arsenal, then the ESG, with its Tomahawk-firing cruisers and destroyers, as well as its scalable squad-to-battalion Marine force, represent the wrenches, screwdrivers, and pliers within the nation's war on terrorism toolbox. When the introduction of the MV-22 Osprey and the short take-off/vertical landing (STOVL) Joint Strike Fighter is factored into the strategic equation, the ESG represents a force that is ideally structured to counter terrorist actions anywhere from oceanic blue water to ground operations 150-200 miles inland. The flexibility of this unit makes it the ideal candidate to serve as a critical response force, capable of dealing with threats short of those large enough to justify a surge force deployment.

Merge some of the INFRON concepts with an expanded and scalable ESG concept, and there you have something I can very easily embrace.

Instead, the aircraft carriers (nine or ten for the sake of this discussion) and their support ships and airwings will remain in home waters, exercising as required to maintain six CSGs in a high state of combat readiness. The assumption underlying this force is that one carrier will be involved in reactor upkeep, one will be coming home from either a regional deployment or a major international exercise, and another will be on her way out. This leaves roughly six carriers in standby, ready to surge at a moment's notice. Where they surge from is a critical question. A smaller carrier force needs to be redistributed to get the most out of a decreased number of ships.

Most of America's strategic interests in the decades to come will be in the Asian Pacific region, and that is where the majority of the nation's aircraft carriers should be as well. Of the force of nine or ten carrier strike groups, six should be home ported in the Pacific; two in Bremerton, two in San Diego, one in Japan, and one in another forward base to be determined. The remaining east coast carriers should be strategically dispersed between Norfolk and Mayport. This distribution scheme will both help ensure the survivability of the force against surprise attacks, and cut the transit time to crises around the globe. The bottom line is that the United States should always have six carrier strike groups ready to surge to a point of conflict within 15 to 30 days.

Here we go. Solid, solid - and you know he had me at "...carriers should be strategically dispersed...," but wait - it gets even better from a Salamander perspective.

Another critical component of the surge force will be the Expeditionary Strike Groups and their light amphibious carriers. Long considered to be the central core of the amphibious force, these highly capable aircraft carriers can serve in new roles within surge operations. Assuming one is in dry-dock for maintenance, a force of ten LHAs can provide nine small flattops for surge operations. Five of them will go to sea with their embarked Marine Expeditionary Units serving as their primary strike assets (again, the assumption would be that two of the MEUs would either be deploying or returning from deployment at any given time) while the remaining available LHAs deploy with each of their decks and hangars populated by two squadrons of STOVL Joint Strike Fighters.

Return of the CVS/CVL? Yes, yes .... solutions, yes.

Now, you 1120's get your inhalers ready,

Another area of focus for the future force should be in undersea warfare. Perhaps no place poses a greater threat to the current U.S. force structure or suggests the greatest potential for improvement in a future Navy than the underwater environment and the vessels that populate it. The first major proposed shift is the inclusion of diesel-powered submarines that incorporate air-independent propulsion (AIP) technologies. These submarines can be purchased for a fraction of the cost of a nuclear-powered fast-attack submarine such as those of the Virginia class.

Diesel/AIP boats are very quiet, and can be equipped with effective torpedoes, antisurface missiles, and even antiair missiles. These relatively inexpensive yet highly capable subs should replace the Virginia-class boats in the shallow-water environment alongside the new Influence Squadron surface force, allowing the Virginias to concentrate on their antisubmarine warfare mission in the blue-water environment. The one significant drawback of the non-nuclear design is shorter patrol intervals because of limited fuel supply. But this can be offset by forward-basing them near their patrol areas. A number of nations may welcome permanent basing of diesel/AIP submarines but have rejected nuclear-powered submarines in their ports for political reasons.

Ick. -1 point for Jerry. It is ASW not USW. Anti-X isn't bad, it is clear ... but I'll give you a pass. Let us not speak of it again. Besides that, major golf-clap - you know my 6/6 LANT/PAC split of SS/SSK dream.

Another proposed area of change is the permanent inclusion of guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) in the U.S. inventory. The advantages inherent in the deployment of these concentrated strike packages either in conjunction with a strike group, or by operating alone are only now being recognized. However, the U.S. Navy has made a mistake along the path to an SSGN force by tying the capability to a back-fit program for Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines. Future guided-missile submarines should be built new as adaptations of the Virginia class, perhaps offsetting the decreased buy of Virginias as the diesel/AIP boats come online.

More yummy stuff. This will be essential to bridge the initial deep strike gap that you will have with fewer CVN and tankers to bring the Light-Attack-Little-Legs carrier aircraft deeper .... though as all TLAM guys know - all the VLS cells in Christendom cannot match the sustained combat power of a gaggle of CVN off an enemy's shore ... SSGNs are good - even if they are not perfect. I'll never see a flight deck of new production F-14D and A-6G - so I will take what I can get.

More goodness follows,

Rampant "next-war-itis" needs to stop, and the Navy needs to commit itself to fighting the very real, and very relevant conflict of today. To be sure, the Navy will need to retain its current, high-end capabilities in such numbers and at such readiness as to dissuade future competitors from entering into conflict with the United States. The data suggest that if the Navy were to pursue a future fleet as described here, with both high- and low-end capabilities in an appropriate ratio, it could have 320 hulls in the water within 12 years for three quarters of the acquisition budget it intends to spend. This represents a net savings of almost five billion dollars a year. Again, I say the Navy needs to buy Fords, not Ferraris.

Bring back Hi-Lo? Yes, Great Caesar's Ghost, Yes!

So, there we go. That reflects some of my thoughts, how 'bout yours? Remember, you don't have to like all or agree with all. CDR Hendrix has a thick skin and the confidence in his informed decisions. Remember, creative friction without conflict.

As a side-bar, let me approach again a topic I brought up at the top of this post. We need more idea and solution pieces like the author's out there to discuss. Closed door processes and blind obedience to personal, not professional, loyalty is what got the Navy to the point it is at now. Aggressive discouragement of thought and publication needs to stop.

CDR Hendrix is the exception - he puts himself out there, not the rule. I tip my hat to him and the chain of command that supports him.

I get email all the time from Active Duty and civilian personnel who state, "I would like to bring this up, but .... " and what follows the "but" is a common story of fear of retribution, or a command/community policy that anything published must be in full alignment with official policy or community diktat.

That is sad, and in spite of Admiral Stavridis' plea, it is a reality in our Navy more often than not. I wish more of our leadership shared Admiral Stavridis' understanding of the critical importance of debate,

The process of reading and writing is important, he said, because the nation faces an “innovative” enemy like the Sept. 11, 2001, attackers and South American smugglers who transport drugs at sea in semisubmersible vessels.

“The most important reason is that the people who want to do harm to this country are doing so,” he said. “They are thinkers.”

Either through published works or through weblogs, the goal is an exchange of ideas, knowledge and information — such as on the participator-driven Wikipedia, he said.

“No one of us is as smart as all of us together,” he said. “

- but they do not - and they let their subordinates know they do not.

We should exchange ideas, and we should take those ideas apart into their constituent parts; feel them, smell them, hold them up to the light. Embrace those that we think fit and are workable, discard the perfect pipe dream, and argue publicly about what may or may not be a good idea. Whatever we do though, we need to publicly talk. More creative frictions without conflict - less Borg-like group think.

Well outside the demands of "Shut Up" we need to talk. We don't do it enough.

I mean absolutely no disrespect with the following, but it tells a story: everyone has their reasons and I do not walk in his Corframs. However, in a time when we are going to violate law on CVN numbers, we have a limited-duty non-multimission Corvette called LCS, a Fleet rotting pierside due to years of bad maintenance and oversight - we have a non-traditional enemy growing at sea and new conventional powers on the rise (just to mention a few challenges) - what do we have the Chief of Naval Operations focused on and discussing with the Fleet?

While visiting the Annapolis High School Navy Junior ROTC program yesterday, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead said his top long-term priority is increasing diversity in the officer corps.

In what is believed to be the first-ever visit by a CNO to a high school JROTC program, Roughead told the roughly 90 cadets that the ethnic diversity of the officer corps must parallel the makeup of the fleet.

"If you looked at the Navy, you would say it kind of looked like America - it has the right mix of whites and African Americans and Asians," Roughead said.

But take a closer look at the officer corps, he said, and "you would see the complexion ... change to largely white male."

He isn't just saying that to the kids - I have stood 10 feet from the CNO as he told a room full of Sailors and Marines the same thing. Take that and do with it what you will. I have to work today, I have a very long two-week thingy coming up, and it is too early to drink.

Last note - CDR Hendrix has a book out - give it a look-see - if you noticed, his article is Bu11sh1tBingo free (more or less ;) ) - I would bet you a round at Trader Johns pre-Tailhook his book is even better.

A Decade Late, but We'll Take Them

Well before AFG we knew we needed these - I still remember people saying, "It would be nice to have a few OV-10s around ... "

From the start of the march from Camp Rhino, we doubly knew we needed this capability.

The same mentality that hates the A-10 hates this even more. They are the same people, BTW, who will tell you with a straight face that the F-35 can replace the A-10. Yep - "those" people.

Anyway, a decade late and a "good enough" - if we can keep them. This doesn't pack quite the punch it should - but it is good enough.

It’s official, the Air Force has selected Embraer’s A-29 Super Tucano as the Light Air Support (LAS) aircraft, better known as a counterinsurgency (COIN) plane. ... a couple of years ago the Air Force planned to buy dozens of cheap, turboprop-driven COIN aircraft that could be used to provide light air support and ISR for troops fighting insurgents in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. The planes were supposed to take the burden for such unglamorous missions off of jet fighters like the F-16, which cost far more to operate. However, the draw-down from Iraq combined with shrinking defense budgets forced the air service to dramatically reduce the program. Now, the service will use the small fleet of turboprop planes to help build up the nascent Afghan air force, and “other nations.” Those last two words leave the possibility open for more Super T sales beyond those to the U.S. Air Force and Afghan air force.

I know that the USAF will try to kill this as soon as they can - just like I know there are many in the Navy who want to kill Riverine again - but for now let us say, "Good."

... and yes - they will be built in the USA; can someone get me a ride?

The A-29 Super Tucano will be built in Jacksonville, FL by American employees with parts from American companies. Aircraft training will be provided in Clovis, NM. More than 70 U.S. suppliers in 21 states will supply parts or services for this contract. At least 1,200 U.S. jobs will be supported through this contract

It would be nice if the USN could get a squadron or three for NSW support. Put them in the Reserves if the active duty Hornet Mafia gets the vapors. Two squadrons in Norfolk, two squadrons in San Diego. Better yet - make is six total; 3 & 3. One active and two reserve squadrons per coast.

I know Captain Hendrix could tell us how they would fold in well with influence squadrons - if you could get the NSW folks to let a DET or two go for a few months.

You will have no problem getting pilots to sign up that's for sure; it has guns in the wings for goodness sakes!

Partnership, Influence, Presence and the role of the MSC, with Chris Rawley - on Midrats

This week we will return to the “unsexy but important” topic, specifically that of “alternative naval platforms and missions.”

In part, the concepts that underlay Jerry Hendrix’s “Influence Squadrons” are in practice on a smaller scale today. In most cases they are being conducted using Military Sealift Command assets and the Navy Reserve.

To focus on this part of our maritime power, our guest for the full hour this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern will be Commander Chris Rawley, USNR. 

President of Periplus Holdings in his day job, he is also Commanding Officer of the Military Sealift Command Afloat Mission Command and Control Units in the Navy Reserve, in addition to being Vice President of the Center for International Maritime Security.

Join us live if you can with the usual suspects in the chat room and offer up your questions for our guest, but if you miss the show you can always listen to the archive at blogtalkradio. 

If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here.

Listen to internet radio with Midrats on Blog Talk Radio

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Test driving Influence Squadrons?

Though I am still iffy on the name - the concept is solid.

Strip out the DDGs ... and what do you have? CAPT Hendrix, call your office.

... diving and salvage ship USNS Safegurd (T-ARS 50), ... US Navy Seabees, representatives from the US Coast Guard Maritime Safety and Security Team (MSST), the US Navy Mobile Security Squadron, a US Navy Riverine Force and Medical Support personnel.
...
Ashore training includes Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) exercises; diver training; salvage operations; joint medical, dental and civic action projects, and aircrew familiarization exchanges.
...
The at-sea phase of CARAT focuses on developing maritime security capabilities in areas such as maritime interdiction, information sharing, combined operations at sea, patrol operations and gunnery exercises, to include the anti-piracy and anti-smuggling exercises.

... and liberty - one hopes - in The Philippines.

Don't Plow the Back-40 With the BMW

While we are talking about Jerry's long-legged bit from '09 - the concept of "Influence Squadrons" is growing roots all over the place. Going beyond just naval units, I'm discussing it over at USNIBlog.

Come by and give it a read - but read it with a British accent.

Caption Contest!

If there was a picture that needed a caption contest, this would be it; the inquisitive & slightly patronizing professor, the grinning politician, and the badda55 with the “soon” look on his face.

As I was posting this though, I thought that some of you would like the opportunity to discuss something that should be more than just a cheeky Caption Contest.

I’ll give it a start.

First of all; no one, especially on the Front Porch, should be in any way shocked about the depth of the cuts that are coming. We have been discussing for years it was on the way; the question was only the degree and emphasis. The reasons are self-evident:

1. Political: the politicians have structured the budget such that the area easiest to cut to any degree is DoD. They are cutting DoD because it is easy and they can say they are doing something. They are not serious about debt reduction though – if they were you would see cuts everywhere; and you won’t. Additionally, no one is going to surround a Congressman’s car and pound on his hood, or march on Washington (pun intended) because the budget for the military is being cut.

This is political in two ways; it feeds the blood-lust of the President’s supporters on the Left to punish the military by taking away money (though there is blowback already for not being enough), and it gives him talking points to the right about being concerned about the budget. There is no downside here for the President – especially as if you read the document there is a lot there that is good. Just watch the money.

2. President Obama: The Commander in Chief comes from the far-Left of the Democrat Party. If you need more help understanding what he is doing at Defense, review “Scorpion and Frog.” He has a long and clear record of opposing both the conduct and the ability of the USA to conduct extended ground combat overseas. He has a long record of wanting a much smaller military, he is just being consistent; elections have consequences. I do not subscribe to the line of thought that this is done with malice. The President just sees things differently than some when it comes to the place of the military in the American project. It is not an unusual perspective, it has a lineage that goes back to the founding of this nation. Though left of center, his D&G is well within a standard deviation of the norm when it comes to our history.

3. Operational: We have left the field in IRQ and soon will in AFG. A draw-down of land forces, like we saw a build-up when combat expanded, is natural.

What about his strategy? Well, you can read it here.

The actual bucket-o-money that goes to DoD will be determined by Congress, so we will just have to watch things as they develop. What is important is the Direction & Guidance that comes from the Commander in Chief. From that you will see planning revised and priorities set, as it should be.

In that light, let’s look at it. There is actually a lot here to like, at least for me. Perfect? No. What I would produce? No. Better than expected? Let's see. Some pull quotes:

“As we end today’s wars and reshape our Armed Forces, we will ensure that our military is agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies. In particular, we will continue to invest in the capabilities critical to future success, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; counterterrorism; countering weapons of mass destruction; operating in anti-access environments; and prevailing in all domains, including cyber.”

ISR, CT, WMD, A2/AD, & Cyber. No issues there.

Out of the assessment we developed a defense strategy that transitions our Defense enterprise from an emphasis on today’s wars to preparing for future challenges, protects the broad range of U.S. national security interests, advances the Department’s efforts to rebalance and reform, and supports the national security imperative of deficit reduction through a lower level of defense spending.

This strategic guidance document describes the projected security environment and the key military missions for which the Department of Defense (DoD) will prepare. It is intended as a blueprint for the Joint Force in 2020, providing a set of precepts that will help guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force over subsequent program and budget cycles, and highlighting some of the strategic risks that may be associated with the proposed strategy.

That is what a responsible leader does. You cannot fault him for this. You may not agree with his proposals, but the process is sound.

For the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to take an active approach to countering these threats by monitoring the activities of non-state threats worldwide, working with allies and partners to establish control over ungoverned territories, and directly striking the most dangerous groups and individuals when necessary.
…
we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.

That is very close to Plan Salamander. The devil is in the details, but this represents continuity of broader concepts we have been operating under for a long time.

Our defense efforts in the Middle East will be aimed at countering violent extremists and destabilizing threats, as well as upholding our commitment to allies and partner states.
…
To support these objectives, the United States will continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied military presence in .– and support of .– partner nations in and around this region.

There is a subtle shift from trying to create a Middle East safe for democracy as we saw a decade ago, but in light of national will and present realities – that is very reasonable.

Speaking of reasonable and Plan Salamander, this was almost lifted from one of my posts over the years.

Most European countries are now producers of security rather than consumers of it. Combined with the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, this has created a strategic opportunity to rebalance the U.S. military investment in Europe, moving from a focus on current conflicts toward a focus on future capabilities. In keeping with this evolving strategic landscape, our posture in Europe must also evolve.

Verily. WWII and the Cold War are both over. Keep a few Combined training and logistics bases with our NATO allies and come home; lock, stock, and barrel.

Speaking of amphibian echoes … Jerry, call your office.

Across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations .–including those in Africa and Latin America .– whose interests and viewpoints are merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity. Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.

I am tempted just to do a bunch of “continuity” quotes of what is almost boilerplate national security concepts in this document, just to emphasize that everyone should take a powder. One will do, here is an example;

The United States will continue to lead global efforts with capable allies and partners to assure access to and use of the global commons, both by strengthening international norms of responsible behavior and by maintaining relevant and interoperable military capabilities.

That has been true for going on 70 years.

What about the Primary Mission Areas? Can you argue with these?

• Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
• Deter and Defeat Aggression
• Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges
• Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
• Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space
• Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent
• Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities
• Provide a Stabilizing Presence
• Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations
• Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations

The order and emphasis may be different, but Rummy or Dick Cheney could have put that list out.

Looking forward in the “Toward the Joint Force of 2020” there is more to thank the influence of those in the background who worked on this under the guidance of Secretary Panetta.

… we have sought to differentiate between those investments that should be made
today and those that can be deferred. This includes an accounting of our ability to make a course change that could be driven by many factors, including shocks or evolutions in the strategic, operational, economic, and technological spheres. Accordingly, the concept of “reversibility” – including the vectors on which we place our industrial base, our people, our active-reserve component balance, our posture, and our partnership emphasis – is a key part of our decision calculus.
… We will resist the temptation to sacrifice readiness in order to retain force structure, and will in fact rebuild readiness in areas that, by necessity, were deemphasized over the past decade. An ill-prepared force will be vulnerable to corrosion in its morale, recruitment, and retention.
… the Department must continue to reduce the .“cost of doing business..” This entails
reducing the rate of growth of manpower costs, finding further efficiencies in overhead and headquarters, business practices, and other support activities before taking further risk in meeting the demands of the strategy.

This sets the foundation for a lot of creative friction. This is a great opportunity. A2/AD, “Influence Squadrons,” rebuilding neglected readiness areas – these are all Navy areas. We need to embrace them and lean in to the President’s challenge.

Having trouble finding enough personnel to make this happen in an environment of decreasing resources? Balderdash. So much more was done by those who came before with fewer people. Take a broad axe to staffs. Cleave off our top-heavy force structure and decouple non value-added BA/NMP.

Heck, give me a stack of manning documents and a case of beer. I’ll grab 3-4 retried CDR/CAPT and ensconce our little cabal in my hunting cabin in the swamp for a fortnight and we’ll give you the cuts you need.

Wait, thinking about the people I would take with me – make that a half-dozen cases and a mixed case of scotch. Better yet – just make it two cases of beer, a bottle of Oban, and we’ll do it in a weekend instead – we have paying gigs to take care of.

We’ll do it pro-bono too.

So, put down the hair shirt. Pack up the sack cloth and ashes. Save the flail for post 2012 election results if needed. This is an opportunity to do some good. The fat of last decade only made our Navy distracted, lazy, and in an intellectual stupor. The stress on they system may fix things.

Be cheerful, rosin up your hands and pull on your oar with vigor.

To end things up like we started; I’m sorry. Can’t help myself.

HAYLER and the Never-was-has-beens

Here is a change I would really like to see in how we train our senior leadership; they need to act more like a customer of the defense industry - not sound like a paid defender of it.

Part of it is training, part of it is practiced art, but we had another example of it this weekend. The CNO's Public Affairs office rolled this quote out and it is a perfect example of a lot of what is wrong with the discussion about LCS.

Greenert spoke about the GAO report that was leaked days in advance during a Pentagon press brief held July 19 to discuss the status of the Navy with the Pentagon Press Corps. In his comments Greenert compared the LCS with debuts of previous first- in-class ships and said there was initial skepticism with those platforms too.

"My view is, what we are finding is not that significantly different from the Perry class of the ʻ60s and ʻ70s, the Spruance class of the ʻ70s, nor even the Arleigh Burke class when it comes to the size and the impact on it," Greenert said defending the initial hiccups of the LCS.

Not one for excuses and understanding of our nation's budget constraints Greenert added, "But we need to be vigilant, we need to follow up, and we have work to do."

Where to start?

1. No, no, no, no; you cannot have your cake and eat it too. You cannot take a ship like LCS that was sold as "transformational" and "unlike any other warship" and then when things go sideways say, "Well, it is just like all our other programs." That is both self-contradictory on its face, and also in this case, not in line with the facts.

2. The facts. LCS-1 was commissioned in NOV08. Almost 5 years ago, and we have 4 LCS commissioned; two of each sub-class of LCS. The USS SPRUANCE (DD-963) was commissioned in SEP75. Five years later, in 1980, we had just commissioned hull 30, USS FLETCHER (DD-992). That left one ship in the class left, the USS HAYLER (DD-993) that we'll get to in a minute. So, ummmm, no. Admiral Greenert, the experience we have having with LCS is quite significantly different than our experience with the SPRUANCE class. Shall we go on to OHP next? Let's not and say we did; I want to stick with the Spru-cans.

There were two sub-classes of the SPRUANCE; the TICO Cruisers (yes, I called it a sub-class), and MIDN Salamander's favorite ship, the KIDD class DDG (BTW, LT Salamander's favorite of that class for special reasons was USS SCOTT (DDG-995).)

No, the LCS is nowhere near the experience of any the classes mentioned. First in class always has growing pains, always has always will - but here is the biggest ball of gall that we are being asked to swallow by the CNO with that statement. Five years after its commission and LCS-1 cannot engage anything more challenging than a Boghammar, 1-on-1. Half dozen Boghhammar at sea-state ___ coming from between ___deg and ___deg relative at ___F and ___% humidity, well .... nuff said on that.

LCS isn't even really PMC in ASUW. She can only conduct ASW as a flaming datum for others. She can conduct MIW one mine at a time, once.

Almost out of the box, and unquestionably at the 5-yr mark when the class was almost complete, SPRUANCE could do her primary mission, ASW with style and verve with both sensors and LWT coming at the target from over the side and from on top via ASROC and helo. Heck, back in the day - she could even nuke the frack out of you. With Harpoon and two 5"-54 she could more than hold her own in ASUW if needed. Point defense AAW with Sea Sparrow, nice to have and effective for her day.

Room to grow? Yes, as designed and without affecting her primary reason for being; ASW. With LCS you can grow, but only if you want to give up her reason for being; speed. Once the SPRUANCE came in to being with the MK-41 VLS ... well there you go.

With proven technology mixed in with some new but tested improvements - SPRUANCE was a classic case of evolutionary success, not the transformationalist revolutionary dog's breakfast that is LCS.

The last of the straight-stick SPRUANCE was the HAYLER. Yep, that's her in the upper-right hand corner. Commissioned in MAR83, decommissioned in AUG03. Yep, do the math; 20-years of service; sunk as a target in NOV04.

Here is a fun fact about HAYLER, when she was funded in 1978, she was supposed to be DDH-997; yep, a helicopter destroyer.

This is about to get fun.

As regulars know, I was and will always be a fan of the Sea Control Ship (all praise the late great SPS PdA), so you know where I am going.

As the pogues at DOD-GAO still have the 1978 observations on the concept classified, we'll just free-form with what we have.

Litton-Ingalls completed sketch design work for DDH-997, which moved the helicopter deck aft, stretching the length of the hangar and displacing the Sea Sparrow launcher to the top of the hangar. The design would have accommodated two SH-3 Sea Kings or four smaller SH-60 Seahawk or SH-2 Seasprite helicopters.

From a very interesting 1991 USNI Press imprint, The Hybrid Warship: The Amalgamation of Big Guns and Aircraft, we have an outline of what Congress authorized.

From the same book, I am led to believe the DDH concept spawned quite a few ideas. My favorite - that yes I would gladly take 1 of for 2 SPRU - was from the 1977 Proceedings article by CDR Ronald J. Ghiradella, USN.

Length Over All (LOA): 606 feet
Beam (hull and sponsor): 66 feet

Overall beam (width) with the ducted uptakes and angled fight deck: 87 feet

Fight deck length: 470 feet and can support simultaneous takeoff of 5 medium-sized helicopters

Weapons: 1- 5 inch/54 dual purpose gun
4-30 mm General Electric GAU 8 (a) guns
1 Harpoon launcher (An ASROC could be substitute)
1 Basic point defense missile system

Elevator measures: 62 x 26 feet

Embarked aircraft: 12 medium-sized helicopters or 8 medium-sized helicopters and 4 Harrier-type aircraft

Let that soak in a bit and ponder this with me. HAYLER was commissioned in 1983, so let's assume that this ship was a go either as Congress said or CDR Goodchocolate's mod - and let's make a run of 4; add a couple of years for the mods and say HAYLER commissioned in 1985 with follow-on ships every two years after that. 85, 87, 89, 91. The oldest ship would be 28, the youngest 22.

Think about what we have actually used our Fleet for since 1980. Not what people wished it would be used for, not what they planned it to be used for - but actually no-kidding used for.

Because of our unique position and responsibilities on the world's oceans, our ships need as a baseline capability flexibility and capacity. The DDH has that in spades. The latest realization of this tradition that traces its line back to when we built big frigates well over 200 years ago, is the CNO's "payloads over platforms."

If you could have kept DDH and her sisters out of the Amphib Navy ghetto, the clear utility of that platform over the last few decades is clear. The original ASW mission is straight forward - but think of its utility in the decade+ Northern Arabian Gulf embargo ops. Disaster relief in places such as Haiti. Anti-piracy. Even a temporary home for the HMM when needed. 

The clearest utility to me though is support to Special Operations. Even has its own organic NSFS. The little mini-KIEV would have been nice to have around. I think our friend CAPT Hendrix would find a home for it in one of his Influence Squadrons.

A great addition to the toolbox.

Oh wait, here comes the buzzkill guy from OPNAV shaking his finger and saying in that high pitched whine that drives men nuts, "OK, fine Sal. What in the 1980s would you not fund in order to pay for this?"

My response as always, "Dude, that is your job. Give me a menu of options to choose from and I'll let you know."

Of course, the DDH was a never-was-has-been, but let's come full circle back to the CNO.

... what we are finding is not that significantly different from ... the SPRUANCE class of the ʻ70s, ...

If you change the time frame from the beginning of the program to the program in general - then yes, you may have something. Like the SPRUANCE, what can we do with the platform that we have in order to best make it most useful to the Fleet? What from a financial and engineering point of view, makes the most sense?

The LCS simply does not have the "wiggle room" that SPRUANCE had - so there aren't that many options. I am encouraged that there is a much more open mind in the Navy towards the clear short comings of LCS, and that is good, as only through a clear view can we find the best way to make this work.

SPRUANCE; don't insult her memory by throwing her in with LCS - she has been insulted enough in the last decade.

Irregular War's War on Thinking About War

Building a coherent intellectual foundation of an effective military force to be ready to defend the nation and its interests never ends. As a levee against a large and turbulent river must be constantly monitored, maintained, and reinforced – so too must support for reasoned, reality-based, up-to-date, and sound arguments continue against the constant erosion from doe-eyed “war is new” and sharper “this is my hobby horse” idea/concept sellers looking to grow an empire or to reinforce their world view.

For every “New Model Army,” “AirLand Battle” or “War Plan Orange,” there is a “New Look” or “Transformationalism.”  

Let me just put this marker out there: what we call “Irregular Warfare” is about as “Regular Warfare” as can be. There is nothing “new” here. There is nothing “exciting” here … but there is danger in selling it too hard or worse, bureaucratize the entire concept.

Just one example that should be top of mind to everyone. You know the last war that was started based on the concept of “Irregular War” being primary? Someone sold to their political bosses that war would be quick, cheap, and all the hard parts of traditional war could be solved by a few highly trained “irregular” forces?

The Russians in February of 2022, that’s who. The “Special Military Operation” that was supposed to be just a few days, lighting quick, transformational. 2014 but with Kyiv/Kiev instead of Crimea. Instead they have a grinding war regressing to the mean; mass, firepower, logistics, manpower.

As if the Russo-Ukrainian War isn’t happening, over the last year there has been a big push to sell the military cure-all of “Irregular Warfare.” 

As we have outlined here often through the years, from riverine to specialized helicopter squadrons, in peace too many short sighted people want to decommission capabilities in the irregular warfare area that we will need again in the next war - like we always do. I do not care if "thought leaders" find them icky, short of sponsorship, or "too specialized" (whatever that means), they will be needed. You can do a job with a good tool well, or with a bad tool poorly - but the job must be done.

This failure of vision from the uniformed and civilian leaders in the bureaucracy cannot be solved by growing the bureaucracy, can it? The intentional distraction and sub-optimization of our existing war colleges cannot be fixed by creating yet another, should it?

I am sympathetic to a desire to make sure this skillset does not die on the vine – I was there at C5F at 09/11/2001 in the opening months of the Afghan conflict - but we need to be careful about keeping it in the proper context. 

A solid overview of the challenges is in Sean McFate’s latest in The Hill. 

Warning here, it reads like two different articles. It starts off in a direction that triggered the first part of my post - McFate is the author of The New Rules of War: How America Can Win--Against Russia, China, and Other Threats, so this is kind of his bag. He also attacks wargaming - something I would think he would want more of, not less. Anyway, the second part that should stand alone has some solid observations on what/where such a a “Functional Center for Security Studies in Irregular Warfare” should be. It all revolves around Section 1299L of the Mac Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act of 2021.

Congress authorized the creation of a “Functional Center for Security Studies in Irregular Warfare” in Section 1299L of the Mac Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act of 2021. The center should fill critical gaps between thought leaders, irregular warriors, and international partners. Done well, it will vastly improve our irregular warfighting capabilities and understanding.

In some way, I guess this is Congress doing what I've asked it to do - force DOD to do its job - but this is such a blunt tool. It is the law though, so how do you execute it?

Let me get the bad part of his article out of the way first;

Today’s defense community has forgotten that strategic competition is won through irregular warfare — a dangerous mistake. Taiwan wargamers view ultimate “competition” as conventional warfare, and recreate the Battle of Midway in the Taiwan Straits with Ford-class carriers and F-35s. It proves the saying: “Generals always fight the last war, especially if they won it.” The conflict probably would go nuclear in hours or days, and the gamers’ artificially prolonged conventional war phase is fantasy. 

I'm sorry, but no. The last 10-months have clearly showed everyone that "prolonged conventional war" is a reality. It is the normal flow of events when major powers or their alliances reach near parity. "The last war" was/is where "irregular warfare" was the reality. When the next war comes, what haunts my mind is a cleverly briefed "72-hr War" turns in to 72-weeks or 72-months. 

McFate has 180-deg lockoff here.

Policymakers are equally misguided. Of the $780 billion defense budget, the Pentagon is overwhelmingly buying conventional war weapons like fighter jets and navy ships while ignoring irregular war capabilities. The budget for U.S. Special Operations Command, which oversees all American special operators everywhere, is 75 percent the cost of an aircraft carrier, and we’re building three at $13.3 billion a ship, with two more planned. Budgets are moral documents because they do not lie. The Defense Department is preparing for a war with China that looks like World War II with better technology, an improbable scenario.

Again, I'm not buying what he is selling. All evidence points to the greatest military threat in the short to medium term is from the People's Republic of China. If we are lucky, it will be for us at least a maritime and aerospace war. That is what we need to prepare and invest in. That means "fighter jets and navy ships." Their missions will be supported by properly funded "irregular forces" - not the other way around.

Again, "irregular warfare" is subset of "regular warfare." Always has been. Always will be.

Now to Part-2 of the article I like;

...there are four pitfalls the Irregular Warfare Center (or whatever it will be called) must avoid. First, it should not “reinvent the wheel.” There is a relatively small but robust infrastructure within the Defense Department that already delivers elements of the center’s mission. 

Yes. Agreed. Improve that. McFate does outline significant dangers of rent-seeking and poor thinking;

Second, some think the center should be housed at a civilian university, but this would be a mistake. Most universities eschew the study of war as distasteful, and academic literature is notoriously left-wing. It’s why war colleges exist. Last year, the director of Yale University’s Grand Strategy Program resigned in controversy over her public disdain for Henry Kissinger and teaching Black Lives Matter and “Strategies of U.S. Social Change.” When Yale demurred, she caviled it had succumbed to “donor pressure.” Yale’s Faculty Senate and History Department backed her up, stating professors and programs should never be “under outside surveillance.” Not a good omen for the Defense Department. Additionally, exceedingly few professors specialize in irregular warfare strategy, and there are zero programs dedicated to the topic. Housing the center at a place full of rookies makes no sense. The Defense Department’s desire to leverage academic institutions is principled but unwise.

This is correct. However, if he thinks in 2022 that the academic disease has not infected not just our war colleges but also our service academies, he is greatly mistaken. These are not "right wing" institutions, just the opposite. Especially in the last 15-years, in many areas and departments they are fully left-wing - and not very military.

Third, to do its job, the center must constantly interact with warfighters, the interagency, and policymakers, and that means Washington, D.C. You cannot influence from afar. The National Defense University might be the optimal choice because it’s located in D.C. and is the Defense Department’s premiere senior service school. It houses five war colleges, three regional centers, and a research arm. It offers an accredited master’s degree in Security Studies and its students are exclusively senior leaders (15+ years of service) from across the military, interagency and allied nations, and all are moving up in their organizations. This is the exact population the center is tasked to influence.

Sadly, I believe he is correct here. I say "sadly" because as many here can attest, DC is an abnormal carbuncle on our nation. Its social, intellectual, cultural, and informational stew is out of alignment with the nation it serves. The longer military personnel spend in DC, the more of them become "of" DC and not just "in" DC. It is not a healthy place. 

I don't like this reality, but I can accept it.

Fourth, some in the Pentagon overlook the importance of allies and imagine the center as inherently inward gazing. We are delusional if we think we can “go it alone.” Building partnership capacity is a form of integrated deterrence and mutual strength...In some ways, the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) offers a blueprint for the new center. It’s the U.S. military’s “Irregular War College” and resides at the National Defense University and Fort Bragg, home of the U.S. Army Special Operations Forces. 

This may be a better idea. Sure would get fewer people and brains being corrupted by DC, and the deer hunting is better if nothing else. Like the DC option, it would give us an opportunity to retool an existing institution. 

Give me 96-hours and the manning documents for the DC and NC operations, and I might be able to help pay for it out of hide - especially if I had the option of taking some of the paid positions in Newport, Carlisle, and Leavenworth. Some of those academic positions are, how does  one say, "sub-optimally aligned with the mission of the Department of Defense."

I have a list.

Typhoon Haiyan and the Demonstration of National Character

American is at its best when it is subtle, the "Speak softly and carry a big stick" school of national greatness. We set the example by our actions - actions based not of naked national interest of misty-eyes utopian wishfullness, but on simple Menchdom; doing the right thing because that is what a free republic does.

That is the source of "power" in the oft used phrase, "Soft Power."

That is the other side of the coin from the equally important "Hard Power" for what a great nation of free people must do. 

No modern nation can truely have global influence unless it has both the ability and the inclination to execute hard or soft power when the opportunity or requirement presents itself.

I great nation never cowers from a threat or an attack by aggressive evil, but also does not ignore need. It does not strive to do for others things they can do themselves, but to give a boost and an assist to those who have been knocked down and need that helping hand. By doing so, not only does the nation do good, it accrues good will credibility that it may need when the more risky hard power is called upon.

As a nation, American has always helped other nations. This is the "no greater friend" side of the "no worse enemy" phrase.


Culture matters as well. Other nations and cultures may play the game, but responding to natural disasters is ingrained in the culture we inherated from the Mother Country, as have all those in the primary and secondary part of the Anglosphere. In the USA, the very brutal nature of our weather also gives us a baseline understanding of what Mother Nature can do to even the most wealthy and gifted. Tornadoes, fires, hurricanes, blizzards, earthquakes; we have that. 

As we often see on the globe, as the big player in the Anglosphere, we have stepped up in response to the devastation from Typhoon Haiyan with the best of the usual suspects. It is also instructive who has not stepped in. Not so instructive to ourselves, but to others.

Hard power can send a message when needed, but in times of peace - soft power is essential. Because it has the organization, equipment, training, and discipline - the tool of hard power is also the best initial tool of soft power.

If you are a small to medium sized nation in the Pacific and want to see who wants to be a friend and who is being petty or opportunistic; look to see who is acting like a friend. Or, just follow the money. Via the WSJ;

The U.S. has donated $20 million in disaster relief, ... On Friday, Japan increased its offer of aid to $52 million. The country is dispatching 1,000 troops to the Philippines in what Japanese officials have described as the largest-ever deployment by the nation's Self-Defense Forces for disaster aid. ... The U.K. has pledged $40 million in aid, while Australia has earmarked $12 million. South Korea has pledged $5 million worth of assistance and offered to send a medical mission.
...
Indonesia offered $2 million in relief,...

Again at the WSJ, our friend Jim Holmes puts it well;

Naval analysts believe internal politics or China's simmering territorial dispute with the Philippines over islands in the South China Sea could explain Beijing's sluggish response to Typhoon Haiyan.

"China doesn't appear able to act apolitically, even though it could make itself look like a responsible great power in the process," said James Holmes, a professor of strategy at the Naval War College.

Mr. Holmes said the U.S. could benefit. "Glowering diplomacy by China drives Asians toward the U.S., the balancer of first resort, whereas smile diplomacy had Asians sitting on the fence," he said.

In a good strike of planning and thought, looks like we were ready.

U.S. Marines are tweaking the way they equip, train, and deploy their expeditionary units to better handle these kinds of missions. The III Marine Expeditionary Force, based in Okinawa, last year began stocking supplies needed for humanitarian assistance, such as water-purifying equipment, in the Philippines, a Marine spokesman said.

Other changes, such as the addition of cargo ships to Maritime Prepositioning Forces squadrons, are meant to make it easier for expeditionary units to carry out disaster-response operations.

"The faster Marines can get the right force, personnel and equipment, ashore, the faster we can mitigate human suffering," said Lt. Col. Maria McMillen, the deputy director of the Marine University's School of Advanced Warfighting.

While it is nice to get all Care Bear about this - and that is fine - over at FP they boil it down to the real importance.

The response to Haiyan could be a turning point for the United States in Asia: an opportunity to re-up the pivot, and to pour cold water on the narrative of a dominant China.

Bingo.

The world is well aware of what we can do with our military as designed - but we should also make sure that we remind everyone our real national character as a representative republic made up of a free people founded on Judeo-Christian values.

Oh, China?

China is the world's second largest economy and closer to the Philippines than other major donors of assistance to the typhoon-ravaged archipelago.

Yet the paltry $1.6 million in aid it pledged to its neighbor was less than the check written by Swedish furniture store Ikea.

Pick your friends. None are perfect - but some are less perfect than others.