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...Littoral Combat Ship?
The Navy deployed a new ship pairing – a destroyer (DDG-51) and an amphibious transport dock (LPD-17) – to test out a new concept that could supplement amphibious squadrons and surface action groups as a formation in future operations.
USS Somerset (LPD-25), USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG-108) and Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SP-MAGTF)-Peru deployed together as Littoral Combat Group 1 in November and December.
Well, of course not. Over a decade after the commissioning of Hull-1 and 13 total in the fleet, they are still next to worthless.
What a mockery. What a sham. What a huge waste and blot on our Navy.
So, are you a fan of S. L. A. Marshall?
If so, you might the advice for the Navy you can find in his writing.
The quote is over at USNIBlog.
LCS has a cameo.
So, you want to get ready for a peer/near-peer conflict? Then act like it.
We need to break our intellectual adhesions. We need to send more of our most driven and career minded junior officers to Ukraine, Colombia, Vietnam, Mongolia and to work with those nations militaries during their most difficult exercises. Double down and expand our JO exchanges so they can be there for years.
We have a lot to learn from all those nations ... and they won't mind building relationships with us either.
At our own training facilities, as we hopefully decouple from imperial garrisoning hither and yon, we need extended and difficult exercises.
The last few decades we've assumed to much ownership of our FOBs, our airspace, our electromagnetic spectrum, our satellites. When the next big war comes, and it will, we cannot assume the safety and access to any of it.
Our ground combat forces are not ready for the harsh realities of combat against a near-peer adversary. Our enjoyment of air supremacy and uncontested control of the electromagnetic spectrum—and the unlikelihood that either will continue in a major combat scenario—have been well documented. But arguably, the characteristic of our recent wars that represents the largest vulnerability is our unchallenged theater logistics—and the culture it has created among our soldiers and Marines, across all ranks, who have become conditioned to expect (and demand) uninterrupted access to civilian-like communications systems and infrastructure. Internet cafes, readily available WiFi, and freedom to use smartphones and tablets have become normal features of even the most remote patrol bases in Iraq or Afghanistan. What’s more, such access to instant personal communications in war zones has transferred to our pre-deployment training environments. Soldiers and Marines in the field use their personal devices to stay in touch with friends and family, play video games, or otherwise occupy idle time.
Commanders err, though, in believing this is somehow essential to troop welfare. This is not troop welfare; it actually causes immense damage to readiness. The fact that these seemingly innocent and routine parts of modern American culture have been adopted, accepted, and embraced by even our most Spartan-like units has not received the critical examination it deserves. As a military, we do not yet understand the consequences to our formations when these privileges disappear. What happens to morale, discipline, and unit cohesion when—not if—constant access to technology and connectivity comes into conflict with the harsh realities of future warfare envisioned by our leaders? More immediately, how does it affect discipline and readiness now?
Great post by Maj. Travis Onischuk, USA over at MWI. Give it a full read - the concept applies to our navy too.
Going through my weekly stack of unread mail this weekend, I came across my annual statement from the VA. I overshot the “to file” stack and it fell on the floor. It landed face down, and that gave me an opportunity to review something I have not looked at in a long time; the definition of The Long War.
We all need a reference point. Most, including myself, usually use September 2001 as the starting point, but that never really seemed right. Perhaps the VA is closer to the correct answer.
Sure, this is more just a reflection of the Legislative and Executive Branches’ inability to effectively do their job, but there is a bit of truth to this.
02 AUG 1990 is when the VA says the war we are still in started. Over 28 years ago.
Here is where, in a way, things have come full circle.
As we got ready for 2QFY91’s DESERT STORM, you know who we fought along side during the liberation of Kuwait? Of note, they were held in reserve, but in actuality, neither they nor the Egyptians in this part of the line had much enthusiasm for the fight and mostly refused to engage when they were needed most. However, there they were.
And what did we see over the weekend?
The Unites States, France, and Great Britain standing shoulder to shoulder with the Syrian army against Turkish aggression.
What has changed since 1990? Well, besides Iran being the boogie man, a lot.
One of the foundation reasons for the Gulf War, the free flow of oil (to us) at market prices, has changed significantly; in North America, we are completely self-sufficient with oil. We have an inertia to our policy and we have managed to tangle ourselves in that areas internal problems to the point that we are policing internal Syrian security against another NATO ally. So, we’re still there and will be for … who knows – 2046?
And so, my final post of 2018 looks back at 1990 and thinks, “We’ve really got ourselves in a mess this time, didn’t we?”
While much has been written about the questionable operational and strategic use of the Imperial Japanese Navy's submarines in WWII, precious little has been written about some of the superb tactical leadership, performance, and effect some of their units had.
When re-reading portions of James Hornfischer's exceptional book, Neptune's Inferno, I was reminded of one of the most influential warships and commanders of the entire Pacific Campaign; then LCDR Kinashi Takakazu, IJN (later CDR and posthumously promoted to Rear Admiral).
It isn't just what he sunk or damaged (click here for his entire patrol record) - but the impact he and his crew had on the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal.
The first year of the war was not a good time to be an aircraft carrier, Japanese or American. USS YORKTOWN (CV 5) was sunk in June 1942 at the Battle of Midway. USS LEXINGTON (CV 2) was sunk a month before YORKTOWN at the Battle of the Coral Sea.
Then, one beautiful Pacific day,
15 September 1942:
At 0950, while running submerged, the soundman reports a contact with many heavy screws at 12-18S, 164-15E. LtCdr Kinashi orders I-19 to periscope depth. He makes a sweep with his 'scope but no ships are in sight.
250 miles SE of Guadalcanal. Captain (later Admiral) Forrest P. Sherman's USS WASP and Captain Charles P. Mason's (later Rear Admiral) HORNET (CV-8) are escorting a reinforcement convoy of six transports carrying the 7th Marine Regiment from Espiritu Santo to reinforce Guadalcanal. The carriers are steaming in sight of each other about 8 miles apart. Each carrier forms the nucleus of a task force. Captain George H. Fort's (later Rear Admiral) battleship USS NORTH CAROLINA (BB-55) is with the HORNET task force to the NE of the WASP force.
At 1050, Kinashi raises his periscope again. This time he sees a carrier, a heavy cruiser and several destroyers (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes' Task Force 18) bearing 045T at 9 miles. Kinashi estimates the task force's course at 330 and begins a slow approach. The Americans, zigzagging at 16 knots, change course to WNW. Then at 1120, the target group again changes course -this time to SSE. WASP makes a slow left turn into the wind to launch and recover her aircraft - and heads toward the I-19.
LtCdr Kinashi estimates that his target is on course 130 degrees making 12 knots. At 1145, from 50 degrees starboard, he fires a spread of six Type 95 oxygen-propelled torpedoes at the enemy carrier from 985 yards. Two or possibly three hit the WASP and start an uncontrollable fire.
HORNET force continues a right turn to a 280 degree base course. Suddenly, an alarm is heard the tactical radio speakers from USS LANSDOWNE (DD-486) in the WASP's screen "... torpedo headed for formation, course 080!"
At 1152, a torpedo from I-19's salvo hits NORTH CAROLINA in her port bow abreast of her forward main battery turret. The blast holes the side protection below the armor belt and NORTH CAROLINA takes on a thousand tons of water. She takes on a five-degree list but counter flooding quickly levels her and she makes 25 knots.
At 1154, a torpedo hits destroyer O'BRIEN's (DD-415) port quarter and another just misses HORNET.
I-19 dives to 265 feet under the carrier's wake. The first depth charge explodes six minutes after the last torpedo hit. Soon the depth charges were exploding all around. American destroyers try to surround I-19 to attack together and finish her off. They rain down 30 depth charges.
At noon, WASP's avgas tanks explode. At 1515, two cruisers and destroyers abandon WASP and withdraw to the south. At 1520, Captain Sherman orders "Abandon Ship". The carrier is scuttled by five torpedoes from LANSDOWNE and sinks by the bow at about 2100. WASP suffers 193 killed and 367 wounded.
The USN was spooked by I-19 for weeks and months - seeing her everywhere and avoiding every hint of her.
Six weeks later, on 26 October 42, USS HORNET (CV 8) was sunk at the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands by aircraft. That left just one carrier USS ENTERPRISE (CV 6) - safely kept 200nm or so south of Guadalcanal - for the upcoming naval battles in November that saw close in surface actions that chewed up battleships, cruisers, destroyers, aircraft and men unlike anything either navy had seen in its modern history.
If you want that extended story, you need to get the book.
Over at Defense News, Poland's defense minister Mariusz Błaszczak outlines some immediate steps Poland is taking in response to the changes she sees as a front line nation.
Imagine if each NATO nation took a comparable move relative to their size. You want to strengthen the alliance? That is how you strengthen the alliance.
We have decided to form a fourth division east of the Vistula river. The whole process will take approximately three years with the perspective of the division’s full operational capability in spring 2021. We will continue to develop the Territorial Defence Forces as the fifth service of the Polish Armed Forces with its 17 brigades spread across each Polish province. We also continue designating significant financial resources for military
Hat tip SP.
