Breaking my Flag

 

For those who missed the previous announcements, please read the previous posts for the details, but after 18 2/3 years here, I will no longer be posting on blogspot.

Worry not, just click here to go to substack.  

That is where I'll be.

Fullbore Friday

Housekeeping Note: As I mentioned earlier this month, as our British friends might say, this "blogspot" hosted part of the blog is "going in ordinary." 

The archived posts here back to the beginning in 2004 will remain, but all new posts will be going over to CDR Salamander on Substack. 

The reasons are simply, really. Google owns blogspot and for some reason has decided to turn it in to a very creator-unfriendly environment. 

As noted in my earlier post, they are going through and marking all sorts of posts going back over a decade and new as "SPAM" or worse, "dangerous" or a variation of the usual etc. Most of it derives, I believe, from some automated system that looks for images of guns or discussions of violence. 

I don't know what they plan blogspot to be ... but since google bought it, they have neglected it in a variety of ways. 

Well, this is a milblog ... so ... if I can't discuss violence...

I will put out a simple note tomorrow as well - and no this is not an April Fool's joke - directing everyone not already subscribed to my substack to go there. 

A note about "subscribe." This just signs you up to receive email notifications of new posts. You do not have to subscribe to read substack. The link will let you in. All posts are, and will continue to be, free. There is an option for a pay subscription as well that I have not turned on yet. I'm rather humbled by the number of pledges I've received to throw a few shekels in the tip jar if I turn it on ... so for those who have, thanks. I may in the future, but if I do I feel I should offer paying subscribers a little extra content - maybe a "message board" like podcast discussion of those things I found interesting but didn't write about. I'm not sure right now - still pondering.

So, to mark a pivot point in the history of this blog, let's go back to 2006 and the first Fullbore Friday entry. The FbF aperture is a bit more open than when we started, but it is a popular regular feature.

Remember, switch to substack if you have not already - this is the last functional post I'll put here.

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Something new and regular, I think. Kind of like Sunday Funnies except I will post more than one thing on Fridays.

Each Friday I will start with a view of something near and dear to my heart, and that of Marines. Big guns. When able, I will provide a link to the Navy Historical Center if you want to see and learn more about the boat in question.

Of all the old battlewagons, none are closer to my heart than the one my Grandfather served on in WWI. The USS Arkansas.

Note the details. Always love the details. One more thing. Here is a cruise book from their 1913 Med Cruise.

The Weapons Gap With the PRC the USA Created and Funded: it Goes Boom

If you don’t wake up every morning cursing those responsible for defense and China policy in the 1990s … the gobsmackingly short sighted arrogance of it all – then what use are you, actually?

With a few exceptions, from partially completed CV rusting in Ukraine to teaching the Communist Chinese how to MIRV ICBM warheads, to opening up our best research institutions to spies an assets, the USA was beset internally by unserious people with the attention span of a hamster and the historical perspective of a newborn in serious jobs requiring long-term thinking and decision making.

The harvest of this decade of frivolity continue to ripen, and via Jeremy Bogaisky, at Forbes – get ready to rage – we have just one more example; one that if we actually come to blows with the People’s Republic of China or those who buy their weapons – will result in more dead American men and women – more mutilated wounded. 

People and perspective matter. It appears the PRC has known this for decades;

In 1987, U.S. Navy researchers invented a new explosive with fearsome capabilities. Named China Lake Compound No. 20 after the Southern California base where it was developed, it boasted up to 40% greater penetrating power and propellant range than the U.S. military’s mainstay explosives, which were first produced during World War II.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the Pentagon’s urgency evaporated. So did the expensive task of perfecting CL-20 and designing weapons to use it.

…and how did they get CL-10? Where was the CIA, the FBI? Oh, that’s right – playing around in domestic politics. 

Meanwhile, the PRC was sending grad students; inserting citizens in the right companies. Doing just plain good old fashioned espionage. 

China, however, saw the potential. The country has invested heavily in developing long-range missiles with the aim of forcing U.S. warships and non-stealthy aircraft like refueling tankers to operate at a distance if Chinese forces invade Taiwan. Some of those weapons are believed to be propelled by a version of CL-20, which China first fielded in 2011 and now produces at scale.

“This is a case where we could potentially be beaten over the head with our own technology,” Bob Kavetsky, head of the Energetic Technology Center, a nonprofit research group that does work for the government, told Forbes.

Kavetsky and other experts in energetics, the niche field of developing things that go boom, have been warning for years that the U.S., long the world leader, has fallen dangerously behind China. The Pentagon last year outlined a plan to spend $16 billion over 15 years to upgrade and expand its aging network of munition plants, but Kavetsky warns that doesn’t include developing the advanced manufacturing capabilities needed to mass produce new explosives like CL-20.

Criminal malpractice. 

No, we are not being led by the best and brightest™ - we are not promoting our best - we do not have the right mix of incentives and disincentives.

…the U.S. depends on China as the single source for about half-dozen chemical ingredients in explosives and propellants, and other countries of concern for another dozen.

Yes, you read that correctly. I am sure Russia is in there too.

Like I said, criminal. You cannot commission new chemical plants overnight.

“We can’t build enough ships and airplanes to carry the number of missiles necessary to reverse the firepower imbalance we have inside the first island chain,” said retired Major General Bill Hix, who served as the Army’s director of strategy after commanding forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has consulted for the Energetic Technology Center.

“The only solution is new energetic materials,” he said. That would allow the U.S. to produce smaller missiles with the same power, so more could be carried by warplanes and ships, as well as to enable weapons that can shoot farther and pack more of a punch.

The PRC has over a decade head start building on R&D the USA paid for.

Wittman said he supports the idea of retrofitting existing missiles with CL-20 and creating a high-level office devoted to energetics under the secretary of defense. While decision makers at the Pentagon are aware of the issues, “I don’t think they see a sense of urgency with it,” Wittman said. “We’re going to instill a sense of urgency with them.”

Chinese scientists account for about three-quarters of the published research on energetics and in related fields over the last five years, nearly seven times as much as U.S. researchers, according to analyses from the Hudson Institute and Georgetown University. They’re working on materials that have improved performance over CL-20, Kavetsky said.

I would really like to see where those Chinese scientists got their degrees from, but you pretty much know.

As for the sense of urgency, what have we discussed here through the years about the 2nd and 3rd order effects of our accretion encumbered acquisition process? What does it cause? Just re-read the above.

Want another example of an existential threat to the Cult of Efficiency created? 

Nearly all U.S. explosives are produced at a single Army-owned plant in Holston, Tennessee, that dates back to World War II and is run by U.K.-based defense contractor BAE Systems (2022 revenue: $25.5 billion). The production processes generally are as old, Kavetsky said, with explosives prepared in 400-gallon vats that resemble cake mixers. Many advanced energetic materials can’t be made that way, including CL-20, which he said is synthesized in smaller amounts in chemical reactors.

All one needs is a pickup truck and a mortar team and game over. Single point of failure. As if you designed something to make you combat ineffective at D+1.

It would be possible to make 20,000 pounds of CL-20 a year with current amounts of precursor chemicals, Kavetsky said, but broad use would require 2 million pounds a year, which he believes could take three to five years to scale up to. “If DoD says we want large quantities,” he said, “industry will respond.”

“If DoD says we want large quantities, industry will respond.”

Not if we lose our one plant or run out of the chemicals – which I am sure are just in time delivered – that China is nice enough to export to us.

How long would it take for just then environmental impact statement to be completed?

Hix said he doubts those promising technologies will be ready for prime time this decade, but the U.S. could fairly rapidly boost its firepower with better explosives and propellants.

“A concerted effort on [explosives] is possible,” he said. “But we have to invest in it.”

Oh yes, our “decade of concern” … 

The Terrible 20s just keep giving.

Seriously ... Who's Been Running Our Wargames Then ...

One of the things that will get my eye twitching faster than about anything else is when someone responds to a question or concern with a, "Well, in our wargames ... "

Bullshit.

That may work for civilians or under-briefed lawmakers who lack the depth in military matters, but anyone who has run or been part of a wargame knows that you can design one to give you the outcomes you want. 

Planning assumptions etc ... it is all flexible.

Wargames, done right, don't tell you the future, but they do help inform gaps in your OPLAN, thinking, or expectations of the enemy ... and shortfalls you might have.

At the POLMIL level - where our most senior uniformed and civilian leaders live - you have distinctly different concerns than Tactical, Operational, or - if your Planning Confession separates Strategic from the POLMIL level - Strategic level.

For the senior uniformed leader to make this statement, as if it were a bolt out of the blue, is simply gobsmacking;

A “big lesson learned comes out of Ukraine, which is the incredible consumption rates of conventional munitions in what really is a limited regional war,” General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House Armed Services Committee.

“If there was a war on the Korean peninsula or a great power war between United States and Russia, United States and China, those consumption rates would be off the charts,” he said.

Whose charts? Who made them and using what metrics and dataset?

Yes ... that is a lesson for most out there ... but it should not be for the CJCS. Hell, I remember certain aspects of updating the OPLAN for Korea a quarter century ago when we beat the drum that, "We don't have enough ____ and only a few days of ____ before we are combat ineffective."

This. Is. Not. New.

As we mentioned last July, magazine depth has been a chronic shortfall for a long time.

I have trouble believing that the CJCS is shocked, SHOCKED, that this is an issue. 

It isn't a "lesson learned" - it is a lesson ignored.

I'm just some guy who left active duty over 13-years ago plugging away generating taxable income as a civilian and ...

Eight months before the Russo-Ukrainian War kicked off;

In many ways, not just "novel ways" but remembering traditional ways. For instance, how many missiles you can put to sea is one measure but even more important: what reloads do you have ashore & how long will it take to replenish stocks expended/lost in combat? Tour the magazines

— cdrsalamander (@cdrsalamander) June 3, 2021

   

The Army knew this was a problem ~4.5 years ago;

Now let's review our naval magazines at sea & ashore starting with ASW weapons, search stores, & countermeasures ... wait ... what .... oh. https://t.co/Lw6BXDTpGA

— cdrsalamander (@cdrsalamander) May 18, 2017

We also need to remember something we discussed back in 2018 ... it isn't so much how much stuff we buy, but that we store them in the right place;

Land based missiles (conv or nuke), unless mobile, are little more than a day-1 target list item. Anything static you have at best 24-hrs to use or lose. If mobile, you are 1-shot and done.

Static magazines in any peer/near-peer maybe have 24-hrs even if properly defended.

— cdrsalamander (@cdrsalamander) November 1, 2018

At the end of the day, I'm just happy we're having this conversation, but we need to stop telling half-truths and happy-talk to each other - and Congress needs to call these people out. It is all just so insulting.

We made mistakes in our estimates of the nature of war, and we're moving to correct them.

Why is that so hard to say?

In a Fight, Having Your Reloads at Home in the Safe Won't Help

There was a topic as a JO in the 1990s that we bandied about when we started to think about what we wanted to see show up in the fleet before we had to fight a no kidding war at sea for any length of time.

Of course, at the end of the Cold War when "there was no other place I'd want to be" was in the air with the world waking up from history etc ... no one was really interested in spending the shrinking Clinton Era defense budget on something that, at best, maybe should be on the bottom of the unfunded priorities list from the perspective of the Potomac Flotilla.

At the end of the decade and the experience of Desert Fox, the requirement came in to even sharper relief. With the 330+/- TLAM we fired over those few days, we emptied out one DDG's VLS cells of TLAM and left the remaining DDG, DD, and CG with a land of misfit toys with either "interesting" warheads that we did not have good targets for, or were fail-to-fire duds taking up space.

That was just the surface ships. Though the Persian/Arabian Gulf's floor was littered with tube-launched TLAM that failed to fire at a silly rate - a few of them were left along with the handful that had VLS cells with one or two, but were pretty much emptied as well.

We were, in just a few days a spent force except for the ships in the Mediterranean Sea  whose TLAM we underutilized but would come in handy in Kosovo. 

More strikes? With what exactly? Call a training time out for a few weeks?

No, we were lucky it was only a 72-hr war or so.

We knew we would not be that lucky at some point in the future ... or at least should plan for it.

This shortfall was known a decade prior - even earlier I am sure - yet in at the end of the 20th Century, there was no longer a way to deny it, but we did anyway.

And yet, via Megan Eckstein at Defense News, here we find ourselves in the third decade of the 21st Century ... 

In early October, the U.S. Navy reloaded a destroyer’s missile tubes using a crane on an auxiliary ship pulled alongside the destroyer, rather than a crane on an established pier.

Reloading a vertical launching system, or VLS, is a challenging maneuver, given the crane must hold missile canisters vertically, while slowly lowering the explosives into the system’s small opening in the ship deck.

It’s also a maneuver the Navy cannot yet do at sea. This demonstration took place while the destroyer Spruance was tied to the pier at Naval Air Station North Island, as a first step in creating a more expeditionary rearming capability.

But in the near future, that same evolution between a warship and an auxiliary vessel could take place in any harbor or protected waters around the globe. One day, it may even take place in the open ocean, thanks to research and development efforts in support of a top priority for the secretary of the Navy.

Ponder for a second and then I want you to bring to mind the geography of the Pacific to get ready for the next paragraph; 

Carlos Del Toro is eyeing this rearm-at-sea capability as one of a handful of steps the service must take to prepare for conflict in the Pacific; other steps include strengthening logistics capabilities and identifying foreign shipyards that could conduct repairs to battle-damaged ships.

Today, the Navy’s cruisers and destroyers can only load and unload offices at established piers with approved infrastructure. For the Pacific fleet, these reload sites are in Japan, Guam, Hawaii and California.

In any large conflict in the Western Pacific, we can pretty much plan on most, if not all, of the facilities in Japan and Guam not being usable for an undetermined period of time. 

What option does that give us? That's right - transit all the way to Hawaii or the West Coast to rearm.

That isn't just unacceptable - that is almost a criminal in 2023.

More and faster please. As our friend Brian McGrath likes to say; winter is coming. 

Transcript from the Defense Breakfast Seminar

Remarks by Commander Salamander before the Congressional Research Service, Defense Breakfast Seminar, Wednesday, 22 March 2023

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss some of my views on current topics affecting our defense posture and the future of our country. The views I will express are my own from my perspective after 35 years as a naval officer, defense journalist, and student of history.

I will not dwell on the specifics of the broad breadth of topics I’ve written on because they are available for anyone with access to a computer. I would like to share with you thoughts on the importance on one topic I’ve been writing about since 2004; the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) naval threat as compared to our naval strength.

The PRC’s Naval Threat

Recent PRC aggression in the western Pacific has brought renewed realization of PRC intentions for world power and concern for the adequacy of our own defense. What many may not realize is that the PRC’s threat in naval power, as in other areas, has been growing more ominous. Past warnings by many in the military have been greeted with some indifference. However, today we are faced with a naval threat more serious than any since the end of the Cold War.

Forty-One years ago, Admiral Liu Huaqing, Commander-in-Chief of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), headed a navy which was little more than a defense oriented extension of the People’s Liberation Army. Under him and the three-step plan he developed, the PLAN was transformed. Since 1982, the PRC built hundreds of new ships and combatant craft, a program of naval expansion that in recent decades surpasses the efforts of any other naval power. From a defensive fleet in the Cold War, it has evolved into a major blue-water navy that challenges the U.S. for control almost everywhere in the world. 

The PRC’s momentum for superiority in naval warfare continues while U.S. naval plans fluctuate every year. Never this century has there been anything comparable to the growth of the Chinese naval power. This certainly raises concern over the PRC’s desire to maintain the peace.

Here are some comparative examples to illustrate these concerns.

• In the past 10 years the PRC has built over 151 major surface combatants, mine warfare, and amphibious ships, while the U.S. has built 42, or just over 25 percent as many.

• The PRC has more major surface combatants than we, and are introducing new ships at a greater rate. These include a new class of cruisers, though they call it a destroyer, while we have none.

• Their program has strong support and stable funding. They are striving for qualitative equality. They already have numerical superiority. Our shipbuilding program is uncertain and does not get strong support from the Defense Department.

Any comparison of the Chinese and the U.S. Navy must be viewed from the context that we are a maritime power dependent upon being able to maintain sea lanes of communication necessary to conduct military operations overseas and to support our allies. The mission of our navy is a far more difficult one than that of the PRC’s of denying us free use of the seas as they are already doing in the South China Sea.

We have given up any chance of matching the PLAN in numbers of ships. Therefore, the quality of our ships must continue to be superior. It is axiomatic that a nation dependent on the quality of its weapons must design its forces around an offensive strategy if it is to prevail over a numerically superior foe. It cannot afford to fight a defensive war of attrition.

Need for Flexible and Capable Ships

A few years ago, few people gave much though to deploying naval forces through hostile waters to the Indian Ocean or the once-American lake known as the Pacific Ocean to protect our interests. Today that has become a reality. Few appreciate how difficult it is to maintain a significant naval force half way around the world. The supply line, particularly for conventionally powered ships, is tenuous. There may be a new realization that war of attrition as sea is a real possibility. In these circumstances, our naval forces must be able to defend the sea lanes and carry the battle to the enemy as well. In a global wartime situation we will not have the time to build the complex ships we need the way we did in the last world war. The ships we build in peacetime are those we will have to rely upon in the event of hostilities.

If we miscalculate or succumb to the easy economic choice of putting off decisions, and do not build ships adequate to face the threat, our choice will be to either give in to our enemies or resort to nuclear war. The cost of adequate strength to ensure peace is small compared to the cost of war.

Current Issues

1. The Attack Submarine Issue

2. New SSBN

3. Need for a New Cruiser

4. Retention of Experienced Naval Personnel

Closing Comments

Without congressional actions and help throughout the years, we simply would not, today, have what fleet we have. You have the constitutional responsibility to maintain this nation’s ability to defend itself. Indeed no other national issue is more critical than national defense. If we are not able to prevail against our enemies, all other issues, however significant, become irrelevant. It is to the Congress that we all must look for a defense posture strong enough to assure our survival as a nation. 

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BT BT BT BT

OK, I'm having a little fun with you here ... these aren't my remarks ... and at least yet, no one has invited me to speak at a breakfast meeting ... but these are, with minor changes, the words of a much more intelligent and influential person than just your humble blogg'r - these are the words of Admiral H.G. Rickover, USN before the Congressional Research Service, Defense Breakfast Seminar, Wednesday, 4 June 1980.

Friend to the blog known well by regular readers here, Claude Berube, is in the process completing a new book about Admiral Hyman Rickover that I can't wait to read, as I do with all his books.

For those new here, Claude has written non-fiction before, as with his last naval history book “On Wide Seas: The US Navy in the Jacksonian Era,” and his third fiction novel in the Connor Stark series, “The Philippine Pact,” will be released this spring.

Claude saw this in his research and was kind enough to share the text of Richover's speech, as he knew I'd find it interesting. That share prompted a little exchange between the two of us - as we like to do. 

Claude, rightfully so, observed that with a few words changed, the 1980 view of the USSR aligns pretty well with the 2023 view of the PRC.

Considering that more of a challenge than an observation, I did just that.

Below is the original text from 1980. Give it a read - you'll see exactly what Claude saw.

It begs the question: what lessons could we learn from that critical last decade of the Cold War that began with such worry, but ended with the coming collapse of a system that could not compete with the West - economically, militarily, or morally?

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Remarks by Admiral H.G. Rickover before the Congressional Research Service, Defense Breakfast Seminar, Wednesday, 4 June 1980

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss some of my views on current topics affecting our defense posture and the future of our country. The views I will express are my own from my perspective after 50 years as a naval officer, engineer, and student of history.

I will not dwell on the specifics of the naval nuclear propulsion program I am responsible for because I have testified on that subject before several congressional committees. I would like to share with you thoughts on the importance of the Soviet naval threat as compared to our naval strength.

The Soviet Naval Threat

Recent Soviet aggression in Afghanistan has brought renewed realization of Soviet intentions for world power and concern for the adequacy of our own defense. What many may not realize is that the Soviet threat in naval power, as in other areas, has been growing more ominous. Past warnings by many in the military have been greeted with some indifference. However, today we are faced with a naval threat more serious than any since World War II.

Twenty-four years ago, Admiral Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, headed a navy which was little more than a defense oriented extension of the Soviet Army. Under him, the Soviet navy has been transformed. Since 1958, the Soviets have built over 1800 new ships and combatant craft, a program of naval expansion that surpasses the efforts of any other naval power. From a defensive fleet in World War II, it has evolved into a major blue-water that challenges the U.S. for control almost everywhere in the world. The Soviet momentum for superiority in naval warfare continues while U.S. naval plans fluctuate every year. Never in peacetime has there been anything comparable to the growth of the Russian naval power. This certainly raises concern over the Soviet desire to maintain the peace.

Here are some comparative examples to illustrate these concerns.

• In the past 10 years the Soviets have built over 900 major and minor surface combatants, mine warfare, and amphibious ships, while the U.S. has built 100, or just over 10 percent as many.

• The Soviets have more major surface combatants than we, and are introducing new ships at a greater rate. These include 4 new classes of cruisers, one of which will likely be nuclear powered. AT about 22,000 tons, it would be the world’s largest nuclear powered cruiser and will carry a formidable array of weapons.

• The Soviets have almost 3 times as many submarines and one-third more nuclear submarines.

• They have 5 submarine construction yards; we have two. All U.S. submarine construction capacity could fit into one Soviet submarine yard.

• Since 1970, they have introduced 10 new submarine designs; the U.S. two. During this period, the Soviets have put to sea more new design submarines than any other country during a comparable period in all of naval history.

• Their program has strong support and virtually unlimited funding. They are striving for qualitative superiority. They already have numerical superiority. Our program is uncertain and does not get strong support from the Defense Department.

Any comparison of the Soviet and the U.S. Navy must be viewed from the context that we are a maritime power dependent upon being able to maintain sea lanes of communication necessary to conduct military operations overseas and to support our allies. The mission of our navy is a far more difficult one than that of the Soviets of denying us free use of the seas.

We have given up any chance of matching the Soviet Navy in numbers of ships. Therefore, the quality of our ships must be superior. It is axiomatic that a nation dependent on the quality of its weapons must design its forces around an offensive strategy if it is to prevail over a numerically superior foe. It cannot afford to fight a defensive war of attrition.

Need for Flexible and Capable Ships

A few years ago, few people gave much though tot deploying naval forces to the Indian Ocean to protect our interests. Today that has become a reality. Few appreciate how difficult it is to maintain a significant naval force half way around the world. The supply line, particularly for oil fired ships, is tenuous. There may be a new realization that war of attrition as sea is a real possibility. In these circumstances, our naval forces must be able to defend the sea lanes and carry the battle to the enemy as well. In a global wartime situation we will not have the time to build the complex ships we need the way we did in the last world war. The ships we build in peacetime are those we will have to rely upon in the event of hostilities.

If we miscalculate or succumb to the easy economic choice of putting off decisions, and do not build ships adequate to face the threat, our choice will be to either give in to our enemies or resort to nuclear war. The cost of adequate strength to ensure peace is small compared to the cost of war.

Current Issues

1. The Attack Submarine Issue

2. Trident

3. Need for Nuclear-Powered Aegis Cruisers

4. Retention of Experienced Naval Personnel

Closing Comments

I have shared with you my thoughts from my vantage point of being involved in our nation’s defense for a long time and in charge of the nuclear propulsion program since its inception over 25 years ago. From that perspective, I am particularly sensitive to the role that the Congress has played. Without congressional actions and help throughout the years, we simply would not, today, have the strong nuclear fleet we have, now representing over 40% of the Navy’s major combatants. You have the constitutional responsibility to maintain this nation’s ability to defend itself. Indeed no other national issue is more critical than national defense. If we are not able to prevail against our enemies, all other issues, however significant, become irrelevant. It is to the Congress that we all must look for a defense posture strong enough to assure our survival as a nation.

NATO's Evolution in Response to the Russo-Ukrainian War with Jorge Benitez - on Midrats

The last 13-months has seen a scenario few in NATO’s uniformed or civilian leadership either predicted, or for that matter, though was possible.

How has the alliance reacted, grown, succeeded, or shown cracks under the pressure of the growing war in Ukraine as it moves it to its second year?

Returning to Midrats for the full hour this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern will be Jorge Benitez, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Marine Command and Staff College in Quantico, Virginia.

He is also a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He specializes in NATO and transatlantic relations, European politics, and US national security. He previously served as assistant for Alliance issues to the Director of NATO Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

He has also served as a specialist in international security for the Department of State and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Dr. Benitez received his BA from the University of Florida, his MPP from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and his PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

Join us live if you can, but it not, you can get the show later by subscribing to the podcast. If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here. You can find us on almost all your most popular podcast aggregators as well.

Fullbore Friday

For you fans of, "The Cruel Sea" ... it has been about six years since I last reposted this and it is about time to bring back the history and record of this scrappy class of warship.

Even if you've read this FbF in the past - give it another read.

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What happens when a Navy finds itself short and has to play catch-up until the yards can design and build a more capable fleet? Sink all its funds into a few big ships and then hold its breath? Perhaps build good enough until you get yourself straightened out? Go smart?

They were a stop-gap measure to take the strain of convoy protection until large numbers of larger vessels — destroyers and frigates — could be produced. Their simple design using parts common to merchant shipping meant they could be constructed in small commercial shipyards all over the United Kingdom and eastern Canada where larger ships like destroyers could not be built. Additionally, the use of commercial machinery meant that the largely reserve and volunteer crews that manned them were familiar with their operation.

Yep, you knew they were going to make it to FbF - The Flower Class Corvette from one of the books on Phibian's professional reading list (hey, there is an idea I never get around to), The Cruel Sea. For a 205', 33' beam 16 kt ship - she seems multi-mission to me.

* 1 x 4 in (102 mm) BL Mk IX gun,
* One QF 2 pounder naval gun (40 mm) "pom-pom"
* Six x 20 mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns
* One Hedgehog A/S Mortar
* Depth charge projectors

Range 3,500 nautical miles at 12 knots, and oh boy did they made a lot of them; 267. Duty is as duty does - the Battle of the Atlantic would have been lost without them.

Service on corvettes was cold, wet, monotonous and uncomfortable. The ships were nicknamed "the pekingese of the ocean". They had a reputation of being very bad at rolling in heavy seas, with 80-degree rolls (that is, 40 degrees each side of the normal upright position) (check out the pics here) being fairly common - according to Nicholas Monsarrat they "would roll on wet grass" - however, they were very seaworthy ships, and no seaman was ever lost overboard from a Flower during WW2.Flower corvettes provided the main escort duties during the critical Battle of the Atlantic, and so were in the thick of the fight. Their primary aim was to ensure that merchantmen survived the crossing rather than sink U-boats, and so if a convoy encountered a U-boat a typical action would involve the corvette forcing the submarine to dive (thus limiting its speed and manoeverability) and keeping it underwater (and pre-occupied with avoiding depth charge attack) long enough for the convey to pass unmolested. This tactic was stretched to the limits when the U-boats made a 'wolf-pack' attack, intended to swamp the convoy's defences, and the Flower's low top speed made effective pursuit of a surfaced U-boat impossible.

Radar, Huff-Duff radio direction finding, depth-charge projectors and ASDIC meant that the Flower was well equipped to detect and defend, but lack of speed meant that they were not so capable of joining the more glamorous fast hunter-killer surface groups which were in place by the end of the war. Success for a Flower, therefore, should be measured in terms of tonnage protected rather than U-Boats sunk. Typical reports of convoy actions by these craft include numerous instances of U-Boat detection near a convoy, short engagement with gun or depth-charge, followed by a rapid return to station as another U-Boat takes advantage of the fight to attack the unguarded convoy. Continuous actions of this kind against a numerically superior U-Boat pack demanded considerable seamanship skills from all concerned, and were very wearing on the crew.

35 were lost at sea, of which 22 were torpedoed by U-boats, and 4 sunk by mines. It is thought that Flowers participated in the sinking of 47 U-boats and 4 Italian submarines.

How is this for you Snipes out there.

2 fire tube boilers, one 4-cycle triple-expansion steam engine

Don't laugh at that plant - after the war they proved their value.

Of particular interest is the story of HMCS Sudbury, built in Ontario in 1941. After WW2 ended she was converted to a towboat and Harold Elworthy, owner of Island Tug & Barge bought her in 1954. The Sudbury and her crew specialized in deep-sea salvage and completed many dramatic operations, but made their reputation in November/December 1955 when they pulled off the daring North Pacific rescue of the Greek freighter Makedonia.

The Sudbury towed the disabled vessel for 40 days through some of the roughest weather imaginable before arriving safely into Vancouver to a hero's welcome. The incident made headlines around the world and for the next decade the Sudbury and her 65-meter sister ship Sudbury II, purchased by Island Tug in 1958 were the most famous tugs on the Pacific coast.

There is actually one as a museum ship, HMCS SACKVILLE (K-181) that is pictured below. What a class of ship.

The 2024 Defense Budget: A Mixed Bag for the Navy

It is with nations as with people; they will show you what they value by what they spend their money on.

Details always matter in a budget, but with inflationary pressures unseen in decades, a significant land war in Europe, and an accelerated naval challenge by the People’s Republic of China, the actual buying power of a budget and where you spend it matters more than usual.

Few are better positioned to explain the bold faced concerns with the 2024 Defense Budget  to navalists than our friend Bryan McGrath, returning again for a guest post that will bring you up to speed.

Over to you Bryan.

---

Last week, the Biden Administration delivered its 2024 Defense Budget to Capitol Hill, and it contained a mixed bag for the Navy. On one hand, all major Navy accounts were increased over the 2023 budget, and there were notable investments in readiness and weapons procurement. On the other hand, no major account’s increase kept pace with inflation, a problematic fact and the source of most defense hawks’ calls for increasing defense spending above the rate of inflation. In a time of growing great power competition and a massive naval buildup by China, the Navy is at best, treading water.

No account within the Navy budget is watched as closely as the shipbuilding account, often referred to by the abbreviation “SCN” for “Shipbuilding and Conversion (Navy).” The 2024 budget provides $29.5B to procure 9 battle force ships (1 ballistic missile submarine, 2 attack submarines, 2 destroyers, 2 frigates, 1 replenishment ship, and 1 submarine tender). The devil is in the details however, as while the $29.5B figure is 3% higher than the 2023 total, 12 ships were procured in the 2023 budget, including 3 destroyers and an LPD 17 Flight II amphibious ship. Additionally, in an age of Chinese naval expansion and a growing emphasis on American Seapower, the projected spend on new construction ships is $100M (constant dollars) less in the fifth and final year (FY28) of this budget than it is in the first (2024). It is difficult to understand how less money in FY28 will buy five more ships than in 2024, when one of the FY28 ships is an aircraft carrier and one is a ballistic missile submarine. Congressional budget hearings are likely to probe this question.

Returning to the LPD 17 Flight II mentioned in the previous paragraph, the 2024 budget submission eliminates future production of this vessel, something that is reported to have caused tension between the Navy and the Marine Corps (see here and here). Apparently, OSD directed at least a “pause” in LPD 17 production while the Navy and Marine Corps conduct amphibious shipping requirement studies. This does not sit well with Marine Corps Commandant General David Berger who recently said that “We cannot decommission a critical element without having a replacement in our hand”. Because the budget also calls for decommissioning three WHIDBEY ISLAND Class LSD’s, force levels will dip below the USMC’s requirement for thirty-one amphibs beginning in 2024. This 31-ship requirement also happens to be a matter of public law. A related issue flowing from a significant drop in the number of amphibious ships is a concomitant drop in demand for the Marine Corps “Ship to Shore Connector” (SSC), a surface effect ship that is being purchased to replace the Navy’s aging “Landing Craft Air Cushion” (LCAC). Five were acquired in 2023, with none in 2024 and two a year thereafter. It is difficult not to see a cause-and-effect relationship between the (then) new Commandant’s 2019 statements about legacy platforms and his willingness to trade force structure for innovation—and the 2024 budget’s realization of these positions.

Navy officials often cite the need to stabilize the shipbuilding profile to provide predictability and certainty to the shipbuilding industrial base, especially its workforce. There is within this budget, increased unpredictability, especially with respect to the ships and craft of the amphibious force. Added to the LPD 17 and SS uncertainty injected in this budget, the Landing Ship Medium (LSM, formerly the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW)) appears in 2025, suggesting that it is filling the gap left by truncating the LPD 17 Flight II line. As these ships are likely to be a fraction of the size of an LPD 17, they are not a useful substitute, either operationally or within the industrial base.

Additionally, the late budget submission did not include (for the second year in a row) the required 30 year shipbuilding plan, a document that among other things, signals to that shipbuilding industrial base the Navy’s future path. These signals are required to spur the kind of internal investment necessary to increase production capacity above what has been for decades, an industry tuned to meet bare minimums for peacetime production. In a controversial move in the 2023 shipbuilding plan, the Navy laid out three different shipbuilding plans, putting forward a menu of options that it could pursue if resources were made available.

Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro recently indicated that the 2024 plan will continue the practice of multiple alternative futures, saying “If you look at the numbers very carefully, you’ll see that in the first 10 years of that plan, the numbers don’t change. And that is important, because the industry does need a steady signal of what our intentions actually are…take a look at the numbers in those first 10 (year) tables and you’ll see a tremendous amount of stability and flexibility, even compared to last year.” Del Toro appears to suggest that unlike the 2023 plan (in which the second five-year tranche of ships differs), each of the three forthcoming options will put forward the same plan for the first ten years. This would be a helpful start toward providing stability, but it is far less of an impact than year-to-year consistency, which recent plans have lacked. Additionally, while submitting three plans provides a vehicle for surfacing repressed Navy desires, it undercuts the suggestion that the plans are tied in any meaningful way to strategy.

A look back at the FY2011 shipbuilding plan is insightful, if only as a means for displaying the predictive value of 30-year plans. If the Obama Administration’s plan had been followed, there would be 320 battle force ships in the Navy inventory in FY 2024. The Biden budget submitted last week supports only 293 battle force ships. In the meantime, numerous 30-Year Plans have been submitted in which year to year goals and force mixes have changed, sometimes significantly.

A final question that the 2024 budget submission raises is how OSD and the Navy responded to the change to the Navy’s Title 10 mission brought about by the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, a change that OSD was dead-set against. The most obvious sign of lukewarm implementation is the aforementioned truncation of the LPD 17 Flight II, a ship of significant flexibility and capability throughout the continuum of conflict. As the previous Title 10 mission was devoted to operations incident to combat at sea, OSD pressure on the Navy and Marine Corps led to a short-sighted (and strategically dubious) focus on capabilities more valuable AFTER the shooting starts than before, and the LPD 17 was seen as vulnerable. Putting aside the fact that part of that vulnerability resides in the Navy’s failure to make use of available deck space for offensive power, the new mission and its emphasis on peacetime operations that protect and sustain both security and prosperity created an even greater need for these ships.

Finally, not only was the mission of the Navy changed by the 2023 NDAA, but a Congressional Commission on the Future of the Navy was directed. This commission has not yet been named or begin its activities, but it seems clear that as it moves forward, it should take the enhanced Title 10 mission statement as its central framing notion and provide insight into appropriate fleet designs based on the funding levels specified by the enabling legislation.

 

Bryan McGrath is the Managing Director of The FerryBridge Group LLC. His opinions are his and do not represent those of his clients.

Japan Puts a Marker Down in Europe

The last few years have seen Japan take the very welcome steps out of the box her post-WWII constitution put her in and the habits of the post war generations.

With her size and wealth, even her 1% of GDP on defense created a significant military. As anyone who has operated can attest, it is a quality one in equipment, training, and material condition.

It's growing - and that is a good thing for the international order.

More than is apparent to the outside eye, her national security community – both uniformed and civilian – are very clear-eyed about the world in which they find themselves in 2023. They are taking steps to take her rightful and deserved place in the first tier of nations in national security, but they are small, direct, and cautious steps - but steps they are.

With all the above, the last few days brought a very significant moment for Japan and her friends. While most eyes were on the meeting between Russia’s Putin and the People’s Republic of China’s Xi, we had this;

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Tuesday in Kyiv, in a rare and unannounced visit that highlighted Japan's support for the war-torn country in the face of Russia's ongoing invasion.

The Japanese leader arrived in the Ukrainian capital on Tuesday afternoon local time by rail from neighboring Poland, becoming the final Group of Seven leader to visit the country since Russia's Feb. 24, 2022, invasion.

This is not just a photo op - this is a significant moment in Japan's ongoing evolution in to a proper 21st Century nation with responsibilities and the ability to help advance the cause of a more democratic planet.

Japan has not made such a statement with regards to events in Europe - I believe - since the presence of the 2nd Special Squadron in combat operations in the  Mediterranean WWI. 

That matters.

The next G7 Meeting is in Japan ... in a certain city of mention, Hiroshima;

"The world was astonished to see innocent civilians in Bucha killed one year ago. I really feel great anger at the atrocity upon visiting that very place here," Kishida said.

"I would like to give condolence to the all victims and the wounded on behalf of the Japanese nationals. Japan will keep aiding Ukraine with the greatest effort to regain peace," he added.

Earlier Tuesday, Japan's Foreign Ministry said Kishida would convey the “solidarity and unwavering support for Ukraine” of Japan and other G7 nations during the meeting while “firmly rejecting Russia's aggression and unilateral attempts to change of the status quo by force.”

...

"The situation in Ukraine and support for the country will be a major theme at the G7 Hiroshima summit,” NHK quoted LDP Secretary-General Toshimitsu Motegi as saying ahead of Kishida's arrival in Kyiv on Tuesday, saying it was "of great significance" that the prime minister "sees the situation on the ground firsthand.”

Not just Ukraine, the Japanese Prime Minister is sending a message by who he visits;

Kishida, who had been visiting India and was expected to return to Tokyo, entered Poland from India using a secretly chartered plane instead of the standard government aircraft, NHK reported.

Poland. India. Yes.

Japan continues to underline that she is part of the group of nations who will not allow Russia and China set a new global order.

Nothing in the diplomatic world is done by accident - especially when location and timing matter a lot for the unspoken messaging.

The decision to visit Ukraine came at an unusual — and perhaps fortuitous — time for Kishida, with Chinese leader Xi Jinping simultaneously in Moscow for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, ostensibly over Beijing’s proposal for a ceasefire between the neighbors.

Xi’s trip, his first abroad since winning an unprecedented third term as leader earlier this month, came just days after the International Criminal Court accused Putin of war crimes and issued a warrant for his arrest.

While Xi has sought to portray China as a potential peacemaker, even as he deepens relations with Putin, the two visits by the leaders of the world’s second— and third-largest economies served as a reminder of Tokyo’s robust support for Kyiv and Beijing’s ”no-limits” relationship with Moscow.

In Tokyo, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel said the day’s news told of “two very different European Pacific partnerships.”

“Prime Minister Kishida is making an historic visit to Ukraine to protect the Ukrainian people and promote the universal values enshrined in the U.N. Charter,” Emanuel tweeted. “Approximately 900 kilometers away, a different and more nefarious partnership is taking shape in Moscow.”

Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Weibin took aim at Kishida’s trip, saying that China “hopes Japan will push for an easing of the situation (in Ukraine), and not the other way around.”

Separately, Russia sent two strategic bombers over the Sea of Japan for about seven hours Tuesday, the country's Defense Ministry said. Moscow regularly sends the bombers, which are capable of carrying nuclear weapons, for missions in international airspace as a show of strength, but the timing was seen as more pointed with Kishida's trip.

A strong statement by Japan that is getting exactly the response you'd like. The response from the usual suspects means it matters.

Japanese defense planners and a number of senior lawmakers have been wary of the threat of conflict over Taiwan. Many have said a Taiwan emergency would also be an emergency for Japan.

These fears that Japan could be unprepared for a crisis in its own backyard have prompted Tokyo to pursue a dramatic hike in defense spending as well as closer ties with allies and partners.

The timing of the two visits could give more ammunition to claims that Tokyo and Washington sit firmly on one side of an increasingly divided world, while Beijing and Moscow find themselves on another.

“The coincidental timing of the trips does indeed create a stark contrast,” said Brown. “It presents the image of two blocs, with Japan and Ukraine on the side of democracy, and Russia and China representing an axis of authoritarianism.”

There are two blocks in the international world set in opposition, and the "realist" thing to do is accept that central fact.

We also need to accept that fact that "we" failed to win the post-Cold War peace.   

If you have not already, I highly encourage you to watch this 1992 interview with former President Nixon. If you have time, watch the whole thing - but this bit on Russia is spot on;

 

In the last decade of the 20th Century and the first decade of the 21st, Russia did not join the West. There was no "Peaceful Rise of China." The Smartest People in the Room™ failed us ... or it was a counter-historical fool's errand anyway. Pick whichever reason best fits your priors.

We have the 2023 that we have. We might as well crack-on with the slog.

Our friends are better than their friends anyway.

60-Minutes Does our Navy - and the Nation - a Solid. I'll take the "W."

A regular topic of conversation here and on Midrats (it came up quite a bit on Sunday’s podcast with Jerry Hendrix), is the lack of discussion in the public space about the importance of a strong Navy to our republic’s economic and military security. Sure, inside our salons, slack channels, and email threads we talk to each other a lot, but we seem to have a hard time getting our message out to the general public.

Sunday night’s 60-Minutes was an exception to the rule. There is a lot of credit to go around here. First of all, you have to give credit to the 60-Minutes team fronted by Norah O’Donnell and lead producers Keith Sharman and Roxanne Feitel. This two-segment effort was not just on a topic we all are interested in, it was just plain good journalism.

Sure, I have a nit to pic here and there, but that is just my nature. Perfect? No … but it is one of the best bits of solid, down the middle journalism about our Navy and its challenges I have seen from a major network for a long time. 

If you missed it, CBS has published the video and transcript that I’m going to pull some bits from below for conversation.

The second segment was more meatier than the first, but the first is important. It isn’t just where Big Navy got a chance to make a run at media capture with the "C-2 to the Big Deck at sea" show that we all love, but it will introduce many people to someone who is very good at his job and representing the Navy, Admiral Samuel Paparo, USN.

He gets your attention early by, even though clearly well prepared and sticking to scripted talking points and marketing pitches here and there of questionable utility, he also spoke in blunt terms in a way we don't hear enough in venues such as this;

Admiral Samuel Paparo commands the U.S. Pacific Fleet, whose 200 ships and 150,000 sailors and civilians make up 60% of the entire U.S. Navy.  We met him last month on the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz deployed near the U.S. territory of Guam, southeast of Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, or PRC.

Norah O'Donnell: You've been operating as a naval officer for 40 years. How has operating in the Western Pacific changed?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: In the early 2000s the PRC Navy mustered about 37 vessels. Today, they're mustering 350 vessels.

...

60 Minutes has spent months talking to current and former naval officers, military strategists and politicians about the state of the U.S. Navy. One common thread in our reporting is unease, both about the size of the U.S. fleet and its readiness to fight. The Navy's ships are being retired faster than they're getting replaced, while the navy of the People's Republic of China or PRC, grows larger and more lethal by the year. We asked the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Samuel Paparo, about this on our visit to the USS Nimitz, the oldest aircraft carrier in the Navy.

Admiral Samuel Paparo: We call it the Decade of Concern. We've seen a tenfold increase in the size of the PRC Navy. 

Norah O'Donnell: Technically speaking, the Chinese now have the largest navy in the world, in terms of number of ships, correct?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: Yes. Yes.

Norah O'Donnell: Do the numbers matter?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: Yes. As the saying goes, "Quantity has a quality all its own." 

This is exactly how the answer needs to be delivered. No squish, no excessive spin - acknowledge the reality of where we are. 

More of this from more senior leaders.

There was some subtlety as well. When he first said this, about 10-seconds later I decided to rewind to listen to it again. 

Norah O'Donnell: And if China invades Taiwan, what will the U.S. Navy do?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: It's a decision of the president of the United States and a decision of the Congress. It's our duty to be ready for that. But the bulk of the United States Navy will be deployed rapidly to the Western Pacific to come to the aid of Taiwan if the order comes to aid Taiwan in thwarting that invasion.

Norah O'Donnell: Is the U.S. Navy ready?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: We're ready, yes. I'll never admit to being ready enough.  

Did you catch that? He can't say, "We're not ready." as if the call comes, we can and will execute what we are tasked ... and initially will be ready to do what we can with the reduced numbers we have ... but everyone knows there is a huge asterisk next to "ready." 

We don't have enough escort ships. We don't have enough VLS tubes. We don't have a large enough airwing with long enough legs. We don't have enough reliable and robust tanking. We don't have much of a bench ... so, we are "ready" - but not even close to being "ready enough." A subtle distinction with not so subtle implications.

We also need to give a nod to our Navy for not having only the 4-stars talk to CBS. LCDR David Ash, USN got some good face time with the camera, and his fellow LCDR Matthew Carlton, USN blessed us with his superb deployment stash.

60-Minute's graphics department also gets credit for the video that the pic at the top of this post is a screen capture of. 

One of the most important things someone can do who is interested in understanding the western Pacific from the PRC's POV is to see it from their shores in an east-up orientation. Where only a small group of PRC focused navalists have shared the image or have that projection on their wall were blessed with that perspective, now it is in the minds of at least hundreds of thousands more people.

This is how the Chinese Communist Party sees the Western Pacific, including the South and East China Seas from Beijing. Taiwan is the fulcrum in what China's leaders call "the first island chain," a constellation of U.S. allies that stretches across its entire coast.  Control of Taiwan is the strategic key to unlocking direct access to the Pacific and the sea lanes where about 50% of the world's commerce gets transported.

Norah O'Donnell: China has accused the United States of trying to contain them. What do you say to China?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: I would say, "Do you need to be contained? Are you expanding? Are you an expansionist power?" To a very great extent, the United States was the champion for China's rise. And in no way are we seeking to contain China. But we are seeking for them to play by the rules.

...and that is where the friction lies. The PRC holds the "rules" in contempt because they had no role in making them. As they don't like the rules, they are bit by bit changing them. From creating no-go zones in the South China Sea that once were open seas, to putting their flag down on the island nations of the southwest Pacific, to bending policies in Latin American nations, to being an observer at the Arctic Council to match their Arctic strategy.

Rules can, and are, being changed.

There was another point where Admiral Paparo put a marker down that someone can pick up and run with ... hey, I think I'll do that now;

Norah O'Donnell: How much do you worry about the PLA Rocket Force?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: I worry. You know, I-- I'd be a fool to not worry about it. Of course I worry about the PLA Rocket Force. And of course I work every single day to develop the tactics and the techniques and the procedures to counter it, and to continue to develop the systems that can also defend-- against them.

Norah O'Donnell: About how far are we from mainland China?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: Fifteen hundred nautical miles.

Norah O'Donnell: They can hit us.

Admiral Samuel Paparo: Yes they can. If they've got the targeting in place, they could hit this aircraft carrier. If I don't want to be hit, there's something I can do about it.

Ahhhhh, yes. Time to bring back one of my favorite graphics.

Draw a 1,500nm circle from the PLARF launch sites and look at what land based airfields, bases, depots and facilities of all sorts are located under that threat. They cannot move. A navy and sea based facilities can.

Undersold point, but Paparo is leaving it there for you to run with.

As a recidivist staff weenie, I swelled with pride at this moment. Nothing happens by accident;

Norah O'Donnell: I just noticed out of the corner of my eye. 

Admiral Samuel Paparo: This is a 688 class, a Los Angeles-class attack submarine. This is the most capable submarine on the planet. You know, with the exception of the Virginia class, our newer class of submarines.

Someone on that staff needs a NCM. Having that SSN heave in to view at that time and that place is simply 5.0 staff work. BZ to everyone, and like most of this visit, just all around well done. 

We've all seen such opportunities not work out all that well, but the time on NIMITZ was simply our Navy at its best. Paparo's staff, the crew of NIMITZ, the Strike Group, and Airwing all just did a superb job. Yes, there were a few PAOisms and talking points, but the visit and interviews were honest and praiseworthy. Paparo will get most of the credit, but everyone underway on that visit just did a superb job.

However, the following comment gave me pause, and it serves to make a point...I think.

Norah O'Donnell: How much more advanced is U.S. submarine technology than Chinese capability?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: A generation.

Norah O'Donnell: A generation.

Admiral Samuel Paparo: And-- by generation, think 10 or 20 years. But broadly, I don't really talk in depth about submarine capabilities. It's the silent service.

OK, I left active duty 13 yrs ago or so, but ... ummm ... I recall the PLAN submarine force then, and I also know roughly what the state of the US SSN were in 2013 and 2003, 10 and 20 years ago. If the PRC is pushing out new construction on par with what we were building even in 2003, much less 2013 ... ummm ... eek. 

To avoid me having a drop, flop, and foam panic attack, we'll call it an overstatement mulligan.

Also, that SSN is an LA Class SSN. I'm not sure which one, but the last one was commissioned in 1996. That was 27 years ago.

So. Let's just leave that there to simmer.

Norah O'Donnell: One recent-- nonclassified war game had the U.S. prevailing but losing 20 ships, including two carriers. Does that sound about right?

Admiral Samuel Paparo: That is a plausible outcome. I can imagine a more pessimistic outcome. And I can imagine a more optimistic outcome. We should be clear-eyed about the costs that we're potentially incurring 

There are about 5,000 Americans on board the Nimitz.  The ship is nearly half a century old. Given the Navy's current needs in the Pacific and because there's fuel left in its nuclear reactors, the carrier's life at sea is going to be extended.

Again, Paparo does a superior job here, but I want to take the last bit to remind everyone what war at sea looks like. Does everyone here fully understand what a loss of two CVN and 18 other ships would mean? 

Let's go back to March 10th's FbF about the loss in combat of the USS Laffey (DD-459),

Out of that crew of 208?  57 KIA/114 WIA. That is an 82% casualty rate.

We have 5,000 Sailors on each CVN. That is 10,000 Sailors. Let's uses a round number from a Flight II Arleigh Burke DDG manning of 300 as we don't know in that wargame what the other 18 ships were lost. That gives you another 5,400 Sailors for 15,400 total. 

With a 82% casualty rate, that is 12,628 Sailors; 4,158 killed and 8,470 wounded. That is almost as many killed in the last two decades fighting in Iraq (4,431). 

Killed not in 20 years, but a few weeks to months - maybe days.

That is what it is all about, which leads us to a great point brought up by two of the best people who served in the last Congress, Representative Mike Gallagher (R-WI) and Representative Elaine Luria (D-VA). 

Again, the right people to talk to.

Norah O'Donnell: What is it about the U.S. Navy that has allowed the two of you to find common cause?

Rep. Mike Gallagher: I think we-- share a sense of the urgency of the moment. We see increasing threats from China in particular in the Indo-Pacific. We feel like we're not moving fast enough to build a bigger Navy.

...

Norah O'Donnell: What would you say the state of the U.S. Navy is today?

Rep. Elaine Luria: I think the Navy has not received the attention and resources that it needs over two decades. I mean, I served on six different ships. Every single one of those ships was either built during or a product of the fleet that was built-- in the Cold War. 

Both Mike Gallagher and Elaine Luria have lobbied for government money for the shipyards in or near their districts, but they say this is less about jobs and more about national security. 

Rep. Elaine Luria: If we don't get this right, all of these other things we're doing in Congress ultimately-- might not matter.

She is exactly right - it might not matter. That is a deep comment we should all stop and ponder a bit.

There were a few Easter Eggs here for the Front Porch. You should all take a moment to savor. We've been at this together for almost two decades. Our arguments have soaked in. Enjoy:

Over the last two decades, the Navy spent $55 billion on two investments that did not pan out. The first was a class of Destroyers known as the Zumwalt. The futuristic fighting ships were supposed to revolutionize naval warfare. Thirty-two were ordered, but only three were ever launched. The cost of each ship, by one estimate, was upwards of $8 billion, making them the three most expensive Destroyers ever put to sea.

Another example is the Littoral Combat Ship or LCS, designed to be a fast all-purpose warship for shallow waters. Thirty billion dollars later the program ran aground after structural defects and engine trouble. Within the Navy, the LCS earned the unfortunate nickname, little crappy ship.

Norah O'Donnell: The Navy's last few decades have been described as a lost generation of shipbuilding. Is that overly dramatic? 

Don't get too full of yourselves folks, but take a bow. It wouldn't be there without you.

Next we had the CNO. He was a bit more off then on here. He looked if not unwell, at least very tired. Where Paparo gets an A- for his appearance - well prepared but not over scripted - I think the CNO got at best a B- as he was over-prepared and ready with talking point phrases that were just not appropriate for the moment. 

There were some things that just clunked;

Norah O'Donnell: Is the Navy in crisis?

Admiral Mike Gilday: No, the Navy's not in crisis. The Navy is out on point every single day.

Norah O'Donnell: Is it being outpaced by China? 

Admiral Mike Gilday: No. Our Navy's still in a position to prevail. But that's not blind confidence. We are concerned with the trajectory that China's on, with China's behavior. But we are in a good position right now-- if we did ever get into a fight against them. 

Ummm, CNO; no one thinks our Navy is doing great right now. This was not a rah-rah moment, this was an opportunity to ask for help to get our maintenance, stores, and fleet numbers aligned with requirements. A lost opportunity. His comments are simply not aligned with an objective review of the facts on the ground.

We should be less concerned with the trajectory the PRC is on - which we can't control - but with the trajectory we are on - that we can.

Another morale booster for the Front Porch, the CNO did repeat something he states on a regular basis and good for him that he does. Spot on.

Admiral Mike Gilday: I think one of the things that we learned-- was that we need to-- have a design well in place before we begin bending metal. And so we are going back-- to the past, to what we did in the '80s and the '90s, the Navy has the lead.

In the first and second decades of this century, how many people rolled in to comments here to tell us our critique represented "old think," that we didn't get the "new Navy" or were disconnected from "new methods?" 

Well, ha! He who laughs last laughs best. We were right, and in 2023, the CNO is with us circa 2004.

Especially for those who are subscribers to the Midrats podcast (going in to its 14th year) and readers here through the years, one of our regular and favorite guests made and appearance, Toshi Yoshihara; 

Toshi Yoshihara: China will have about 440 ships by 2030. And that's according to the Pentagon.

Norah O'Donnell: Why is China able to build more warships more quickly than the U.S.?

Toshi Yoshihara: China has clearly invested in this defense industrial infrastructure to produce these ships, which allows them to produce multiple ships simultaneously, essentially outbuilding many of the western navies combined.

They then went on to discuss issues with industry that in addition to what we linked to at the top of the post, we also discussed with Jerry Hendrix on last Sunday's Midrats.

If you want more Toshi, you can listen to his January visit to Midrats, or read his latest book we talked about; Mao's Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China's Navy.

Again, the CNO lost another opportunity by refusing to state hard truths.

Norah O'Donnell: What do you see when you see China's shipbuilding program?

Admiral Mike Gilday: It's very robust.

Norah O'Donnell: Do we have enough shipyards?

Admiral Mike Gilday: No. I wish that we had more commercial shipyards. And-- over my career, we've gone from more than 30 shipyards, down to about seven that we rely upon on a day-to-day basis to build ships. 

Going back to his "no crisis" comments earlier - I'm sorry, but the above is a crisis and needs to be spoken of and acted on as such. We have allies in Congress ... we can make this push ... but we need out senior uniformed leaders to ... well ... lead on this fight.

If, as Paparo says, we have a "decade of concern" then we need to focus on what we can get to displace water and make shadows on the ramp in the next decade that we know can project power at range. It is time to push the pie-in-the-sky, perpetually oversold, transformationalist, bullshit Tomorrowland stuff to the back burner both in the budget ... and unquestionably on the public stage.

Admiral Gilday says the U.S. Navy's main advantage over China is America's sailors.  His goal is to modernize the U.S. fleet and have those sailors serving alongside hundreds of unmanned vessels by 2045.

Admiral Mike Gilday: I think unmanned is the future. And so I think that-- some 40% of our fleet in the future, I believe, is gonna be unmanned. 

Own goal. Complete distraction and off topic to the challenge at hand. On top of that, he's poorly briefed and wrong.

2045 is to today what today is to 2001. Look at what we deployed with in 2001 and what we have today. That is your slope.

There will not be that big of a shift to unmanned due to legal, technological, and C2 challenges as well as and simple logic and experience. 

What an incredibly irresponsible stance to say such thing at this in this venue. It hobbles future leaders and managers who have to put credible platforms at sea that our Sailor will need to go to war in well before some vapor-ware 2045 fever dream.

40% my ass. Whoever briefed him that this was a good place to bring this up should be fired...or he tripped himself on one of his preplanned talking points. 

We did have a recovery at the end. The show, and the CNO, ended strong. It was a great close that sells well and gets attention. We needed more of this, and maybe there was on the cutting room floor. Usually there is what, 5-hrs of interviews for a 5-minute segment?

So, nice end.

Norah O'Donnell: The U.S. defense posture is viewed as aggressive by the Chinese. The foreign minister just said, "Look, stop the containment. This may lead to conflict." 

Admiral Mike Gilday: Perhaps the Chinese minister doesn't like the fact that the U.S. Navy is operating in collaboration with dozens of navies around the world to ensure that the mar-- maritime commons remains free and open for all nations. The Chinese wanna dictate those terms. And so they don't like our presence. But our presence is not intended to be provocative. It's intended to assure and to assure-- to reassure allies and partners around the world that those sea lanes do remain open. The global economy literally floats on seawater.