DDG(X) Becoming a CG(X) Flashback?

Navalists should be forgiven if they have, on occasion, the mindset and habits of an abused partner. 

Slightly flenching with memory, but always hoping that this time - this time - things will be different.

There is good reason for scepticism and concern. Firstly, we know the mindset and process that begat LCS and DDG-1000. We know that there wasn't really any accountability to "the system" for this. A system that has remained unchanged. 

The only thing that was considered satisfactory from that era was LPD-17 - a program that had enough money thrown at it so this Tiffany amphib could be a functional class of warships. FORD is, well, you know that drill.

So, we lost a generation of warships due to smart people in hard jobs who couldn't stop getting high off their own .... arrogance in thinking that they knew better than generations of successful warship development that came before them.

On the smaller warship side of the equation, when even its greatest advocates had to admit the comical failure of LCS, we decided to go down a path originally suggested here 14-years ago: stop building them and build an existing EuroFrigate until we can design one ourselves.

That's the patch for LCS. Like you, I have heard rumors of rumors of issues that we are messing with a successful design attempting to make it an unsuccessful design under a cloud of Good Idea Fairies, but hull-1 is under construction and we shall see. Putting a 57mm on a warship designed for 127mm or at a minimum 76mm was a bad enough tell of the corruption in our system (got to give LCS mod a chance for FFG(X) dontchaknow), but you have to work with the system you have.

Of course, on the larger surface ship part of the fleet, we just plain blew ourselves up. In spite of the clear lessons even early on about LCS and DDG-1000, our leadership sailed CG(X) in to unbuildablestan. That book is still unwritten, but when it is, it will reinforce your worst assumptions.

People, programs, and systems failed again with no accountability. 

See a pattern?

Without a cruiser program displacing water and ZUMWALT being a white elephant, what is a navy to do? Well, we ran our TICO until they coughed across the decommissioning line and decided to restart a Cold War era Arleigh Burke in to a Flight III because we had no choice.

We still don't have a replacement for the TICO CGs, but we do have a program to replace the Arleigh Burke DDGs (which the green eyeshade efficiency cult that created the mess we are in writ large want to be a replacement for DDG and the rapidly disappearing CG).

Yes, that should set off alarm bells. 

As a closet optimist, I was hoping that - and yes hope is not a plan but no one will let me fire people and Congress won't change the rules - the last two decades would humble our Navy in to not letting requirements get out of control, would keep the Good Idea Fairies from every underemployed office hovering around her, and blowtorch anyone who still has a transformationalist mindset. Alas, there are concerns.

It is very simple what the US Navy needs; hulls displacing water. As smarter generations did before with the SPRUANCE DD etc; you can design white space to grow in to as expected systems mature...but you let them mature. Don't believe the hype and the promises of happy-talking defense industry types - it is hard enough to build a new hull and engineering plant in itself - you must minimized overall risk by at least starting with know systems, weapons, and manning concepts that will ride in that hull.

We are already late and the lack of urgency is almost criminal. This isn't 1998-2002 anymore.

It is with that background that this report starts out sounding promising;

The first design contracts were awarded this summer to General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works in Maine and Huntington Ingalls Industries in Mississippi for a large surface warship that would eventually follow production of the ubiquitous Burke destroyers.

All of that warfighting gear won't come cheap. The average cost of each new vessel, dubbed DDG(X), is projected to be a third more expensive than Burkes, the latest of which cost of about $2.2 billion apiece, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

The Navy has vowed that it won’t repeat recent shipbuilding debacles when it rushed production and crammed too much new tech into ships, leading to delays and added expense with littoral combat ships, stealthy Zumwalt-class destroyers, and the USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier.

“Rather than tying the success of DDG(X) to developmental technology, we’re using known, mature technologies on a flexible platform that can be upgraded for decades to come, as the technology of tomorrow is matured and demonstrated,” said Jamie Koehler, a Navy spokesperson.

...but there is a shadow;

Matt Caris, an analyst with Avascent, said the Navy is going to great lengths to prevent spending from getting out of control, from its view on mature technology and overall acquisition process to timetable. The first in the class of ship wouldn’t be commissioned until the mid-2030s.

“The Navy is trying to thread the needle with some potentially revolutionary capabilities in as low risk and evolutionary process as possible,” he said.

Others worry that the cost will become a drain on the rest of the fleet.

It’s possible that the Navy could afford only one of the ships per year, compared to current destroyer build rates of two to three per year, shrinking the size of the fleet over time, Clark said.

“They want to pile every mission on the the DDG(X) to make it sort of death star. They’re putting all their eggs in one basket financially,” he said.

The new destroyer represents the high end of the Navy’s aspirations.

To be frank, if anyone is using the word "revolutionary" in 2022 about such a critical warship, they should be reassigned to, oh I don't know, Thule.

This is the big danger though. I'll repeat it in case it didn't jump out at you the first time;

“They want to pile every mission on the the DDG(X) to make it sort of death star. They’re putting all their eggs in one basket financially,” he said.

The "they" there are the Good Idea Fairies, the agenda pimps, the transformationalists - the arrogant.

There is a battle right now with those who are correct in not rushing "revolutionary" and those who are convinced of their own perfection.

The time to fight and win that battle is right now before it is too late. 

This is what happens when you lack accountability for LCS and DDG-1000.

If like me you lack access to a lever of power, pray or support those who do. If you are someone who has access to a lever of power, now is the time to act. I have sat over adult beverages with those who regret their role in CG(X) enough - in a few years I want to raise glasses in support of a great new class of warships ... not have a somber table of regret.

PS: we still need a cruiser. Maybe we can build what the Japanese are pondering.

Overspec'd, Overpriced, all Navy: Bob Work on Institutional Addictions

Last Wednesday I had a few observations on Jerry Hendrix's latest article over at National Review, “The Navy’s Littoral Hubris.”

Yesterday in comments, a man familiar to readers here, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, weighed in with some counterpoints that I feel need to be brought above the fold for your consideration.

With his permission, I've copied his comments in full.

There are the bones of one hell of a book here in six short paragraphs.  

Bob, over to you;

---

As he always does, my good friend Jerry writes a compelling, well written post. However, I think he misses an important point. The problems the Navy has faced has less to do about technological hubris and more with incompetence in developing cost-informed requirements and executable support processes.

Let's start with the Ford CVN. Back in the day-- around the time of the 1993 Bottom Up Review, long before the word transformation had found its way into Pentagon thinking--the Navy and Air Force were competing for the "rapid halt" mission. The thinking went that the enemy could launch an invasion of allied territory at a time of their own choosing. The job of the Joint Force was to halt the invasion as quickly as possible through intense guided munitions bombardment. The Air Force argued the best way to do this was using bombers and regionally based aircraft, which enjoyed a big advantage in sortie rates from land bases. The Navy was intent on proving they could match sortie generation rates from forward deployed carriers. To do that, they needed a new electromagnetic catapult system; an electromagnetic arresting system; new high speed low drag elevators, etc etc etc. They called for these new capabilities with no clear understanding of the cost to get them, or a sensible land-based prototyping and testing approach to work out the bugs before shipboard integration. It is true that OSD demanded that all the new technologies be incorporated into the first ship of class of the new CVNX (later Ford), rather than inserting them over the first three hulls. That caused a technology integration overload. But the original sin was setting new requirements with no clue how much it might cost to get them.

Then came the DD-21, aka DD(X), aka DDG-1000. The surface community knew that the 31-ship Spruance class was going to start decommissioning starting in 2005 (that was the plan, anyway). The community needed a plan to replace them. The community was also tired of taking a back seat behind the carrier and sub forces, a circumstance they were force to tolerate throughout the long Cold War. And it wanted to get in on the rapid halt mission. The arsenal ship was a conceptual start point. But the surface community wanted something even more exotic. So they called for a stealthy surface ship with deep magazines--missiles, or guns, or both. OSD was not the one pushing the stealth design. That was all Navy. And, in the end, the Navy designed a 15,000-ton battle cruiser with a hull that was literally too expensive to produce. The ship suffered the same technological overload at the Ford class, but the over-spec-ing of the ship was all Navy, not OSD. Again, these were sins of the Navy.

The LCS is a more complicated story. OSD told the Navy that OSD would not support their DD(X) unless there was a smaller combatant in the Navy's battle force. The Navy decided to get out of the frigate business during the 1997 QDR--again, a Navy decision. This meant the smallest surface combatant in the 21st century fleet would have a full load displacement of nearly 9,000 tons (DDG-51 Flt I). OSD didn't think the Navy could afford to build and maintain such a fleet. They were, of course, spot on...see fleet of today. The ONLY requirement OSD levied on the LCS program was that the Navy needed to be able to build three of the ships for the same cost as a DDG-51. And guess what? The Navy hit that mark. We just forget about it--and how important a metric it was.

Cost aside, the crewing, training, maintenance and deployment process decisions were all the Navy's to make. But every choice ultimately proved to be beyond the ability of the surface community to execute them. This was a case of process, not technological, overload. It appears the surface community may be finally figuring things out on the ship. But no objective review of the LCS fleet transition plan would conclude anything other than it was abysmally bungled.

The reason I think we have to remember these vignettes is we need to ask ourselves if we are about ready to repeat the process. IT DOES NOT MATTER THAT THE NAVY CHOSE A PROVEN DESIGN FOR FFGX. The Navy is cramming as many requirements and capabilities into the FFGX hull as they can. Eric Lab at CBO is convinced the Navy has once again overspec'd the ship and underestimated the costs to build it. I hope he is wrong. But if we can't build a minimum of two FFGXs for the cost of a DDG FltIII, it is not clear it is worth the cost, or the smaller fleet it will inevitably lead to.

Robert O. Work spent 27 years on active duty as a Marine artillery and MAGTF officer. He is a former Undersecretary of the Navy and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security. He served as the Deputy Secretary of Defense alongside three Secretaries of Defense spanning both the Obama and Trump administrations.

DDG(X) Quicklook

At last week’s SNA, an initial concept for DDG(X) was put up on a slide for all to see;

Don’t get too excited though;

...the hull form shown in the concept image is not representative of the ship and that the service has not settled on a specific design yet.

...

The program office isn’t committed to a specific hull design but presented a swept, angular, bulbous bow design reminiscent of an Arleigh Burke rather than the tumblehome, wave-piercing design of the Zumwalts.

“We haven’t actually locked down the hull form, yet. That’s a concept,” Connelly said, referring to the concept drawing the office presented.

“It is one of the many options still in play. … We as the design team, are going through all the different options to see which one performs best for the long-term and the mission.”

Let me start out with saying what I do like. 

First of all, with a focus on fighting in Westpac you need range and dwell time. We seem to have it;

The Navy is also calling for a ship that can travel 50 percent farther ... (than an Arleigh Burke)

Second, after a couple of decades of serial debacles born from the Age of Transformationalism, we need minimal technology risk;

The combat system developed for the Flight III destroyers will be wrapped in a new hull that would be able to grow as weapon systems evolve, Connelly said.

“When we upgraded the Flight III … we took up all of the service life allowance on that platform. All of the space, weight and power has all been allocated. There is not enough room on that ship to put a new combat capability that takes more power or a larger footprint within the ship,” she said.

“The first ship will focus on a new hull form and a new integrated power system. We will use the proven combat system from the Flight III ship so we are designing the ship with the flexibility and the margins to accommodate the future of the Navy and the needs for where we’re going.”

In the spirit of the Spruance Class DD, we seem to be designing the platform with enough white-space so capabilities yet ripe can be included at a later date. The important thing is to displace water with the good now, and then make it better later. Very solid.

I do have some concerns, starting with weaponeering; 

Initially, the ship would feature a 32-cell Mk-41 Vertical Launch System forward of the superstructure that could be swapped for 12 larger missile cells capable of fielding the Pentagon’s emerging hypersonic weapons being developed for the Navy, Army and the Air Force.

The current DDG-51s field 96 MK-41 VLS cells and USNI News understands that Navy requirements keep the VLS cells for DDG(X) about the same.

I’m sorry, that simply is not enough VLS cells. Ripping out the 32 so you can put in a dozen hypersonics doesn’t seem all that wise either unless that is a mission swap out you can do from a (yet to be designed and built) destroyer tender. Looking at the slide, I get the aft end is helo country, but what is amidships? Where are the ASCM?

I don't think this part of the show was ready for prime time.

Let's take a look at Ronald O'Rourke's summary in the Congressional Research Service report;

The Navy’s DDG(X) program envisages procuring a class of next-generation guided-missile destroyers (DDGs) to replace the Navy’s Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers and its older Arleigh Burke  DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers. The Navy wants to procure the first DDG(X) in FY2028. The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget request $121.8 million in research and development funding for the program.

Non-concur here. We are repeating the mistake of trying to have a one-ship-fits-all false economy. Especially with long range hypersonics, we need to have a large surface combatant - yes a cruiser - at least the size of the ZUMWALTS that can carry dozens of hypersonics and still defend itself.

Navy’s General Concept for the Ship

Figure 1 shows a Navy rendering of a notional DDG(X) design concept. The Navy approved the DDG(X)’s top level requirements (i.e., its major required features) in December 2020. The Navy envisages the DDG(X) as having

- an integrated propulsion system (IPS) that incorporates lessons from the DDG-1000 IPS and the Navy’s new Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine;

- initially, combat system equipment similar to that installed on the Flight III DDG-51; and 

- more weapon capacity than the Flight III DDG-51.

Navy officials envision the DDG(X) as being larger than the 9,700-ton Flight III DDG-51 design, but smaller than the 15,700-ton DDG-1000 design. A DDG(X) design midway in displacement between the DDG-51 and DDG1000 designs would displace about 12,700 tons, but the DDG(X)’s displacement could turn out to be less than or more than 12,700 tons. The Navy states that the DDG(X) would

integrate non-developmental systems into a new hull design that incorporates platform flexibility and the space, weight, power and cooling (SWAPC) to meet future combatant force capability/system requirements that are not achievable without the new hull design. The DDG(X) platform will have the flexibility to rapidly and affordably upgrade to future warfighting systems when they become available as well as have improved range and fuel efficiency for increased operational flexibility and decreased demand on the logistics force. DDG(X) will provide an Integrated Power System with flexibility to enable fielding of high demand electric weapons, sensor systems and computing resources.

(Source: Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book, Volume 2 of 5, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, May 2021, p. 479.)

Here's my $.02 … they needed to put something out, so they put something out. Fine. However, we need to be building something. I fear we are stuck in analysis paralysis as we have not even selected a hull form yet? 

I’m not running anything, but if I were, I’d simply tell the team, “Pick one by 21 Jan 21 and let’s get moving with the most viable hull form. If the losing hull form in a couple of years looks like a player, then we can build it too as another class. Yes, we can build more than one class of DDG. Other generations did, it worked well for them, we can do it too … but we need to be building now.”

If they are not ready to do that, then fire the entire team and bring in a new one.

Faster please.