Breaking my Flag

 

For those who missed the previous announcements, please read the previous posts for the details, but after 18 2/3 years here, I will no longer be posting on blogspot.

Worry not, just click here to go to substack.  

That is where I'll be.

Fullbore Friday

Housekeeping Note: As I mentioned earlier this month, as our British friends might say, this "blogspot" hosted part of the blog is "going in ordinary." 

The archived posts here back to the beginning in 2004 will remain, but all new posts will be going over to CDR Salamander on Substack. 

The reasons are simply, really. Google owns blogspot and for some reason has decided to turn it in to a very creator-unfriendly environment. 

As noted in my earlier post, they are going through and marking all sorts of posts going back over a decade and new as "SPAM" or worse, "dangerous" or a variation of the usual etc. Most of it derives, I believe, from some automated system that looks for images of guns or discussions of violence. 

I don't know what they plan blogspot to be ... but since google bought it, they have neglected it in a variety of ways. 

Well, this is a milblog ... so ... if I can't discuss violence...

I will put out a simple note tomorrow as well - and no this is not an April Fool's joke - directing everyone not already subscribed to my substack to go there. 

A note about "subscribe." This just signs you up to receive email notifications of new posts. You do not have to subscribe to read substack. The link will let you in. All posts are, and will continue to be, free. There is an option for a pay subscription as well that I have not turned on yet. I'm rather humbled by the number of pledges I've received to throw a few shekels in the tip jar if I turn it on ... so for those who have, thanks. I may in the future, but if I do I feel I should offer paying subscribers a little extra content - maybe a "message board" like podcast discussion of those things I found interesting but didn't write about. I'm not sure right now - still pondering.

So, to mark a pivot point in the history of this blog, let's go back to 2006 and the first Fullbore Friday entry. The FbF aperture is a bit more open than when we started, but it is a popular regular feature.

Remember, switch to substack if you have not already - this is the last functional post I'll put here.

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Something new and regular, I think. Kind of like Sunday Funnies except I will post more than one thing on Fridays.

Each Friday I will start with a view of something near and dear to my heart, and that of Marines. Big guns. When able, I will provide a link to the Navy Historical Center if you want to see and learn more about the boat in question.

Of all the old battlewagons, none are closer to my heart than the one my Grandfather served on in WWI. The USS Arkansas.

Note the details. Always love the details. One more thing. Here is a cruise book from their 1913 Med Cruise.

The Weapons Gap With the PRC the USA Created and Funded: it Goes Boom

If you don’t wake up every morning cursing those responsible for defense and China policy in the 1990s … the gobsmackingly short sighted arrogance of it all – then what use are you, actually?

With a few exceptions, from partially completed CV rusting in Ukraine to teaching the Communist Chinese how to MIRV ICBM warheads, to opening up our best research institutions to spies an assets, the USA was beset internally by unserious people with the attention span of a hamster and the historical perspective of a newborn in serious jobs requiring long-term thinking and decision making.

The harvest of this decade of frivolity continue to ripen, and via Jeremy Bogaisky, at Forbes – get ready to rage – we have just one more example; one that if we actually come to blows with the People’s Republic of China or those who buy their weapons – will result in more dead American men and women – more mutilated wounded. 

People and perspective matter. It appears the PRC has known this for decades;

In 1987, U.S. Navy researchers invented a new explosive with fearsome capabilities. Named China Lake Compound No. 20 after the Southern California base where it was developed, it boasted up to 40% greater penetrating power and propellant range than the U.S. military’s mainstay explosives, which were first produced during World War II.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the Pentagon’s urgency evaporated. So did the expensive task of perfecting CL-20 and designing weapons to use it.

…and how did they get CL-10? Where was the CIA, the FBI? Oh, that’s right – playing around in domestic politics. 

Meanwhile, the PRC was sending grad students; inserting citizens in the right companies. Doing just plain good old fashioned espionage. 

China, however, saw the potential. The country has invested heavily in developing long-range missiles with the aim of forcing U.S. warships and non-stealthy aircraft like refueling tankers to operate at a distance if Chinese forces invade Taiwan. Some of those weapons are believed to be propelled by a version of CL-20, which China first fielded in 2011 and now produces at scale.

“This is a case where we could potentially be beaten over the head with our own technology,” Bob Kavetsky, head of the Energetic Technology Center, a nonprofit research group that does work for the government, told Forbes.

Kavetsky and other experts in energetics, the niche field of developing things that go boom, have been warning for years that the U.S., long the world leader, has fallen dangerously behind China. The Pentagon last year outlined a plan to spend $16 billion over 15 years to upgrade and expand its aging network of munition plants, but Kavetsky warns that doesn’t include developing the advanced manufacturing capabilities needed to mass produce new explosives like CL-20.

Criminal malpractice. 

No, we are not being led by the best and brightest™ - we are not promoting our best - we do not have the right mix of incentives and disincentives.

…the U.S. depends on China as the single source for about half-dozen chemical ingredients in explosives and propellants, and other countries of concern for another dozen.

Yes, you read that correctly. I am sure Russia is in there too.

Like I said, criminal. You cannot commission new chemical plants overnight.

“We can’t build enough ships and airplanes to carry the number of missiles necessary to reverse the firepower imbalance we have inside the first island chain,” said retired Major General Bill Hix, who served as the Army’s director of strategy after commanding forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has consulted for the Energetic Technology Center.

“The only solution is new energetic materials,” he said. That would allow the U.S. to produce smaller missiles with the same power, so more could be carried by warplanes and ships, as well as to enable weapons that can shoot farther and pack more of a punch.

The PRC has over a decade head start building on R&D the USA paid for.

Wittman said he supports the idea of retrofitting existing missiles with CL-20 and creating a high-level office devoted to energetics under the secretary of defense. While decision makers at the Pentagon are aware of the issues, “I don’t think they see a sense of urgency with it,” Wittman said. “We’re going to instill a sense of urgency with them.”

Chinese scientists account for about three-quarters of the published research on energetics and in related fields over the last five years, nearly seven times as much as U.S. researchers, according to analyses from the Hudson Institute and Georgetown University. They’re working on materials that have improved performance over CL-20, Kavetsky said.

I would really like to see where those Chinese scientists got their degrees from, but you pretty much know.

As for the sense of urgency, what have we discussed here through the years about the 2nd and 3rd order effects of our accretion encumbered acquisition process? What does it cause? Just re-read the above.

Want another example of an existential threat to the Cult of Efficiency created? 

Nearly all U.S. explosives are produced at a single Army-owned plant in Holston, Tennessee, that dates back to World War II and is run by U.K.-based defense contractor BAE Systems (2022 revenue: $25.5 billion). The production processes generally are as old, Kavetsky said, with explosives prepared in 400-gallon vats that resemble cake mixers. Many advanced energetic materials can’t be made that way, including CL-20, which he said is synthesized in smaller amounts in chemical reactors.

All one needs is a pickup truck and a mortar team and game over. Single point of failure. As if you designed something to make you combat ineffective at D+1.

It would be possible to make 20,000 pounds of CL-20 a year with current amounts of precursor chemicals, Kavetsky said, but broad use would require 2 million pounds a year, which he believes could take three to five years to scale up to. “If DoD says we want large quantities,” he said, “industry will respond.”

“If DoD says we want large quantities, industry will respond.”

Not if we lose our one plant or run out of the chemicals – which I am sure are just in time delivered – that China is nice enough to export to us.

How long would it take for just then environmental impact statement to be completed?

Hix said he doubts those promising technologies will be ready for prime time this decade, but the U.S. could fairly rapidly boost its firepower with better explosives and propellants.

“A concerted effort on [explosives] is possible,” he said. “But we have to invest in it.”

Oh yes, our “decade of concern” … 

The Terrible 20s just keep giving.

Seriously ... Who's Been Running Our Wargames Then ...

One of the things that will get my eye twitching faster than about anything else is when someone responds to a question or concern with a, "Well, in our wargames ... "

Bullshit.

That may work for civilians or under-briefed lawmakers who lack the depth in military matters, but anyone who has run or been part of a wargame knows that you can design one to give you the outcomes you want. 

Planning assumptions etc ... it is all flexible.

Wargames, done right, don't tell you the future, but they do help inform gaps in your OPLAN, thinking, or expectations of the enemy ... and shortfalls you might have.

At the POLMIL level - where our most senior uniformed and civilian leaders live - you have distinctly different concerns than Tactical, Operational, or - if your Planning Confession separates Strategic from the POLMIL level - Strategic level.

For the senior uniformed leader to make this statement, as if it were a bolt out of the blue, is simply gobsmacking;

A “big lesson learned comes out of Ukraine, which is the incredible consumption rates of conventional munitions in what really is a limited regional war,” General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House Armed Services Committee.

“If there was a war on the Korean peninsula or a great power war between United States and Russia, United States and China, those consumption rates would be off the charts,” he said.

Whose charts? Who made them and using what metrics and dataset?

Yes ... that is a lesson for most out there ... but it should not be for the CJCS. Hell, I remember certain aspects of updating the OPLAN for Korea a quarter century ago when we beat the drum that, "We don't have enough ____ and only a few days of ____ before we are combat ineffective."

This. Is. Not. New.

As we mentioned last July, magazine depth has been a chronic shortfall for a long time.

I have trouble believing that the CJCS is shocked, SHOCKED, that this is an issue. 

It isn't a "lesson learned" - it is a lesson ignored.

I'm just some guy who left active duty over 13-years ago plugging away generating taxable income as a civilian and ...

Eight months before the Russo-Ukrainian War kicked off;

In many ways, not just "novel ways" but remembering traditional ways. For instance, how many missiles you can put to sea is one measure but even more important: what reloads do you have ashore & how long will it take to replenish stocks expended/lost in combat? Tour the magazines

— cdrsalamander (@cdrsalamander) June 3, 2021

   

The Army knew this was a problem ~4.5 years ago;

Now let's review our naval magazines at sea & ashore starting with ASW weapons, search stores, & countermeasures ... wait ... what .... oh. https://t.co/Lw6BXDTpGA

— cdrsalamander (@cdrsalamander) May 18, 2017

We also need to remember something we discussed back in 2018 ... it isn't so much how much stuff we buy, but that we store them in the right place;

Land based missiles (conv or nuke), unless mobile, are little more than a day-1 target list item. Anything static you have at best 24-hrs to use or lose. If mobile, you are 1-shot and done.

Static magazines in any peer/near-peer maybe have 24-hrs even if properly defended.

— cdrsalamander (@cdrsalamander) November 1, 2018

At the end of the day, I'm just happy we're having this conversation, but we need to stop telling half-truths and happy-talk to each other - and Congress needs to call these people out. It is all just so insulting.

We made mistakes in our estimates of the nature of war, and we're moving to correct them.

Why is that so hard to say?

In a Fight, Having Your Reloads at Home in the Safe Won't Help

There was a topic as a JO in the 1990s that we bandied about when we started to think about what we wanted to see show up in the fleet before we had to fight a no kidding war at sea for any length of time.

Of course, at the end of the Cold War when "there was no other place I'd want to be" was in the air with the world waking up from history etc ... no one was really interested in spending the shrinking Clinton Era defense budget on something that, at best, maybe should be on the bottom of the unfunded priorities list from the perspective of the Potomac Flotilla.

At the end of the decade and the experience of Desert Fox, the requirement came in to even sharper relief. With the 330+/- TLAM we fired over those few days, we emptied out one DDG's VLS cells of TLAM and left the remaining DDG, DD, and CG with a land of misfit toys with either "interesting" warheads that we did not have good targets for, or were fail-to-fire duds taking up space.

That was just the surface ships. Though the Persian/Arabian Gulf's floor was littered with tube-launched TLAM that failed to fire at a silly rate - a few of them were left along with the handful that had VLS cells with one or two, but were pretty much emptied as well.

We were, in just a few days a spent force except for the ships in the Mediterranean Sea  whose TLAM we underutilized but would come in handy in Kosovo. 

More strikes? With what exactly? Call a training time out for a few weeks?

No, we were lucky it was only a 72-hr war or so.

We knew we would not be that lucky at some point in the future ... or at least should plan for it.

This shortfall was known a decade prior - even earlier I am sure - yet in at the end of the 20th Century, there was no longer a way to deny it, but we did anyway.

And yet, via Megan Eckstein at Defense News, here we find ourselves in the third decade of the 21st Century ... 

In early October, the U.S. Navy reloaded a destroyer’s missile tubes using a crane on an auxiliary ship pulled alongside the destroyer, rather than a crane on an established pier.

Reloading a vertical launching system, or VLS, is a challenging maneuver, given the crane must hold missile canisters vertically, while slowly lowering the explosives into the system’s small opening in the ship deck.

It’s also a maneuver the Navy cannot yet do at sea. This demonstration took place while the destroyer Spruance was tied to the pier at Naval Air Station North Island, as a first step in creating a more expeditionary rearming capability.

But in the near future, that same evolution between a warship and an auxiliary vessel could take place in any harbor or protected waters around the globe. One day, it may even take place in the open ocean, thanks to research and development efforts in support of a top priority for the secretary of the Navy.

Ponder for a second and then I want you to bring to mind the geography of the Pacific to get ready for the next paragraph; 

Carlos Del Toro is eyeing this rearm-at-sea capability as one of a handful of steps the service must take to prepare for conflict in the Pacific; other steps include strengthening logistics capabilities and identifying foreign shipyards that could conduct repairs to battle-damaged ships.

Today, the Navy’s cruisers and destroyers can only load and unload offices at established piers with approved infrastructure. For the Pacific fleet, these reload sites are in Japan, Guam, Hawaii and California.

In any large conflict in the Western Pacific, we can pretty much plan on most, if not all, of the facilities in Japan and Guam not being usable for an undetermined period of time. 

What option does that give us? That's right - transit all the way to Hawaii or the West Coast to rearm.

That isn't just unacceptable - that is almost a criminal in 2023.

More and faster please. As our friend Brian McGrath likes to say; winter is coming. 

Transcript from the Defense Breakfast Seminar

Remarks by Commander Salamander before the Congressional Research Service, Defense Breakfast Seminar, Wednesday, 22 March 2023

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss some of my views on current topics affecting our defense posture and the future of our country. The views I will express are my own from my perspective after 35 years as a naval officer, defense journalist, and student of history.

I will not dwell on the specifics of the broad breadth of topics I’ve written on because they are available for anyone with access to a computer. I would like to share with you thoughts on the importance on one topic I’ve been writing about since 2004; the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) naval threat as compared to our naval strength.

The PRC’s Naval Threat

Recent PRC aggression in the western Pacific has brought renewed realization of PRC intentions for world power and concern for the adequacy of our own defense. What many may not realize is that the PRC’s threat in naval power, as in other areas, has been growing more ominous. Past warnings by many in the military have been greeted with some indifference. However, today we are faced with a naval threat more serious than any since the end of the Cold War.

Forty-One years ago, Admiral Liu Huaqing, Commander-in-Chief of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), headed a navy which was little more than a defense oriented extension of the People’s Liberation Army. Under him and the three-step plan he developed, the PLAN was transformed. Since 1982, the PRC built hundreds of new ships and combatant craft, a program of naval expansion that in recent decades surpasses the efforts of any other naval power. From a defensive fleet in the Cold War, it has evolved into a major blue-water navy that challenges the U.S. for control almost everywhere in the world. 

The PRC’s momentum for superiority in naval warfare continues while U.S. naval plans fluctuate every year. Never this century has there been anything comparable to the growth of the Chinese naval power. This certainly raises concern over the PRC’s desire to maintain the peace.

Here are some comparative examples to illustrate these concerns.

• In the past 10 years the PRC has built over 151 major surface combatants, mine warfare, and amphibious ships, while the U.S. has built 42, or just over 25 percent as many.

• The PRC has more major surface combatants than we, and are introducing new ships at a greater rate. These include a new class of cruisers, though they call it a destroyer, while we have none.

• Their program has strong support and stable funding. They are striving for qualitative equality. They already have numerical superiority. Our shipbuilding program is uncertain and does not get strong support from the Defense Department.

Any comparison of the Chinese and the U.S. Navy must be viewed from the context that we are a maritime power dependent upon being able to maintain sea lanes of communication necessary to conduct military operations overseas and to support our allies. The mission of our navy is a far more difficult one than that of the PRC’s of denying us free use of the seas as they are already doing in the South China Sea.

We have given up any chance of matching the PLAN in numbers of ships. Therefore, the quality of our ships must continue to be superior. It is axiomatic that a nation dependent on the quality of its weapons must design its forces around an offensive strategy if it is to prevail over a numerically superior foe. It cannot afford to fight a defensive war of attrition.

Need for Flexible and Capable Ships

A few years ago, few people gave much though to deploying naval forces through hostile waters to the Indian Ocean or the once-American lake known as the Pacific Ocean to protect our interests. Today that has become a reality. Few appreciate how difficult it is to maintain a significant naval force half way around the world. The supply line, particularly for conventionally powered ships, is tenuous. There may be a new realization that war of attrition as sea is a real possibility. In these circumstances, our naval forces must be able to defend the sea lanes and carry the battle to the enemy as well. In a global wartime situation we will not have the time to build the complex ships we need the way we did in the last world war. The ships we build in peacetime are those we will have to rely upon in the event of hostilities.

If we miscalculate or succumb to the easy economic choice of putting off decisions, and do not build ships adequate to face the threat, our choice will be to either give in to our enemies or resort to nuclear war. The cost of adequate strength to ensure peace is small compared to the cost of war.

Current Issues

1. The Attack Submarine Issue

2. New SSBN

3. Need for a New Cruiser

4. Retention of Experienced Naval Personnel

Closing Comments

Without congressional actions and help throughout the years, we simply would not, today, have what fleet we have. You have the constitutional responsibility to maintain this nation’s ability to defend itself. Indeed no other national issue is more critical than national defense. If we are not able to prevail against our enemies, all other issues, however significant, become irrelevant. It is to the Congress that we all must look for a defense posture strong enough to assure our survival as a nation. 

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BT BT BT BT

OK, I'm having a little fun with you here ... these aren't my remarks ... and at least yet, no one has invited me to speak at a breakfast meeting ... but these are, with minor changes, the words of a much more intelligent and influential person than just your humble blogg'r - these are the words of Admiral H.G. Rickover, USN before the Congressional Research Service, Defense Breakfast Seminar, Wednesday, 4 June 1980.

Friend to the blog known well by regular readers here, Claude Berube, is in the process completing a new book about Admiral Hyman Rickover that I can't wait to read, as I do with all his books.

For those new here, Claude has written non-fiction before, as with his last naval history book “On Wide Seas: The US Navy in the Jacksonian Era,” and his third fiction novel in the Connor Stark series, “The Philippine Pact,” will be released this spring.

Claude saw this in his research and was kind enough to share the text of Richover's speech, as he knew I'd find it interesting. That share prompted a little exchange between the two of us - as we like to do. 

Claude, rightfully so, observed that with a few words changed, the 1980 view of the USSR aligns pretty well with the 2023 view of the PRC.

Considering that more of a challenge than an observation, I did just that.

Below is the original text from 1980. Give it a read - you'll see exactly what Claude saw.

It begs the question: what lessons could we learn from that critical last decade of the Cold War that began with such worry, but ended with the coming collapse of a system that could not compete with the West - economically, militarily, or morally?

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Remarks by Admiral H.G. Rickover before the Congressional Research Service, Defense Breakfast Seminar, Wednesday, 4 June 1980

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss some of my views on current topics affecting our defense posture and the future of our country. The views I will express are my own from my perspective after 50 years as a naval officer, engineer, and student of history.

I will not dwell on the specifics of the naval nuclear propulsion program I am responsible for because I have testified on that subject before several congressional committees. I would like to share with you thoughts on the importance of the Soviet naval threat as compared to our naval strength.

The Soviet Naval Threat

Recent Soviet aggression in Afghanistan has brought renewed realization of Soviet intentions for world power and concern for the adequacy of our own defense. What many may not realize is that the Soviet threat in naval power, as in other areas, has been growing more ominous. Past warnings by many in the military have been greeted with some indifference. However, today we are faced with a naval threat more serious than any since World War II.

Twenty-four years ago, Admiral Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, headed a navy which was little more than a defense oriented extension of the Soviet Army. Under him, the Soviet navy has been transformed. Since 1958, the Soviets have built over 1800 new ships and combatant craft, a program of naval expansion that surpasses the efforts of any other naval power. From a defensive fleet in World War II, it has evolved into a major blue-water that challenges the U.S. for control almost everywhere in the world. The Soviet momentum for superiority in naval warfare continues while U.S. naval plans fluctuate every year. Never in peacetime has there been anything comparable to the growth of the Russian naval power. This certainly raises concern over the Soviet desire to maintain the peace.

Here are some comparative examples to illustrate these concerns.

• In the past 10 years the Soviets have built over 900 major and minor surface combatants, mine warfare, and amphibious ships, while the U.S. has built 100, or just over 10 percent as many.

• The Soviets have more major surface combatants than we, and are introducing new ships at a greater rate. These include 4 new classes of cruisers, one of which will likely be nuclear powered. AT about 22,000 tons, it would be the world’s largest nuclear powered cruiser and will carry a formidable array of weapons.

• The Soviets have almost 3 times as many submarines and one-third more nuclear submarines.

• They have 5 submarine construction yards; we have two. All U.S. submarine construction capacity could fit into one Soviet submarine yard.

• Since 1970, they have introduced 10 new submarine designs; the U.S. two. During this period, the Soviets have put to sea more new design submarines than any other country during a comparable period in all of naval history.

• Their program has strong support and virtually unlimited funding. They are striving for qualitative superiority. They already have numerical superiority. Our program is uncertain and does not get strong support from the Defense Department.

Any comparison of the Soviet and the U.S. Navy must be viewed from the context that we are a maritime power dependent upon being able to maintain sea lanes of communication necessary to conduct military operations overseas and to support our allies. The mission of our navy is a far more difficult one than that of the Soviets of denying us free use of the seas.

We have given up any chance of matching the Soviet Navy in numbers of ships. Therefore, the quality of our ships must be superior. It is axiomatic that a nation dependent on the quality of its weapons must design its forces around an offensive strategy if it is to prevail over a numerically superior foe. It cannot afford to fight a defensive war of attrition.

Need for Flexible and Capable Ships

A few years ago, few people gave much though tot deploying naval forces to the Indian Ocean to protect our interests. Today that has become a reality. Few appreciate how difficult it is to maintain a significant naval force half way around the world. The supply line, particularly for oil fired ships, is tenuous. There may be a new realization that war of attrition as sea is a real possibility. In these circumstances, our naval forces must be able to defend the sea lanes and carry the battle to the enemy as well. In a global wartime situation we will not have the time to build the complex ships we need the way we did in the last world war. The ships we build in peacetime are those we will have to rely upon in the event of hostilities.

If we miscalculate or succumb to the easy economic choice of putting off decisions, and do not build ships adequate to face the threat, our choice will be to either give in to our enemies or resort to nuclear war. The cost of adequate strength to ensure peace is small compared to the cost of war.

Current Issues

1. The Attack Submarine Issue

2. Trident

3. Need for Nuclear-Powered Aegis Cruisers

4. Retention of Experienced Naval Personnel

Closing Comments

I have shared with you my thoughts from my vantage point of being involved in our nation’s defense for a long time and in charge of the nuclear propulsion program since its inception over 25 years ago. From that perspective, I am particularly sensitive to the role that the Congress has played. Without congressional actions and help throughout the years, we simply would not, today, have the strong nuclear fleet we have, now representing over 40% of the Navy’s major combatants. You have the constitutional responsibility to maintain this nation’s ability to defend itself. Indeed no other national issue is more critical than national defense. If we are not able to prevail against our enemies, all other issues, however significant, become irrelevant. It is to the Congress that we all must look for a defense posture strong enough to assure our survival as a nation.

NATO's Evolution in Response to the Russo-Ukrainian War with Jorge Benitez - on Midrats

The last 13-months has seen a scenario few in NATO’s uniformed or civilian leadership either predicted, or for that matter, though was possible.

How has the alliance reacted, grown, succeeded, or shown cracks under the pressure of the growing war in Ukraine as it moves it to its second year?

Returning to Midrats for the full hour this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern will be Jorge Benitez, Associate Professor of International Relations at the Marine Command and Staff College in Quantico, Virginia.

He is also a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He specializes in NATO and transatlantic relations, European politics, and US national security. He previously served as assistant for Alliance issues to the Director of NATO Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

He has also served as a specialist in international security for the Department of State and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Dr. Benitez received his BA from the University of Florida, his MPP from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and his PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

Join us live if you can, but it not, you can get the show later by subscribing to the podcast. If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here. You can find us on almost all your most popular podcast aggregators as well.