Proactively “From the Sea”; an agent of change leveraging the littoral best practices for a paradigm breaking six-sigma best business case to synergize a consistent design in the global commons, rightsizing the core values supporting our mission statement via the 5-vector model through cultural diversity.
An email from an exceptionally solid First Class Petty Officer who is a long time friend of this blog outlines the internal STRATCOM failure on our part the last couple of weeks. This isn't the first I have heard of this - what is your take?
... if you have even paid attention to nearly all the talking heads in all of media is basically asking “Where is 5th Fleet, the world wonders?” (to paraphrase a famous message). If I was NAVSEA, the VCNO for ship building, or even the CNO himself. I would be on all the Sunday shows, in front of congress, and with various editorials in main stream papers; basically going “Well golly geez, America I would love to protect our shipping, but…” and throw out the numerous reasons why we need to have better ships, more people, more ships, hell maybe even bring up the idea of the sea basing again from “Seapower 21” as a place to have berthing facilities closer to the region in question. Instead everyone is playing the classic CYA game, ....
We all know what the USAF would do with this opportunity ....
Who does this insult more, the Chinese, the American military, or any thinking person reading it?
As China's first aircraft carrier takes to the open seas today for its inaugural sea trials, the U.S. government directed a pointed question at the Chinese military: Why would you need a warship like that?
"We would welcome any kind of explanation that China would like to give for needing this kind of equipment," U.S. State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland told reporters today. "We have had concerns for some time and we've been quite open with them with regard to the lack of transparency from China regarding its power projection and its lack of access and denial of capabilities."
This is not helpful.
The PRC is a sovereign nation with legitimate maritime security requirements that are easily understood by anyone with an even rudimentary understanding of where maritime strategy and commerce come together.
The fact that the DOS would ask this in public does too things; it insults the Chinese through its patronizing tone and it makes our nation look like it is led by arrogant imperialists at best, simpletons at worst.
STRATCOM fail.
If I were the Chinese I would respond thusly;
"Here are our plans for our follow-on carrier development. Also, the Chinese people would like to know what plans the United States government has to bring its credit rating to back AAA. Our people worry about their investments. Until the Americans do that and assure worries in the investments by the Chinese people in the sovereign debt of the American government, we do not see the reason for their continued spending on such an unnecessarily large and offensively-minded military.
We have had concerns about the American ability to service their debt for some time and we've been quite open with them with regard to the lack of transparency from the Americans regarding their capabilities to ensure their own economic stability."
As a final note - I find all the wide-eyed panting over the Chinese carrier immature and silly.
It is a limited carrier with a limited airwing. The French CVN Charles de Gualle is a much more capable platform and we have seen what it can do off Libya. Nice, but no biggie.
I am more interested in how we would kill the Chinese carrier if we ever needed to. That is no problem at all.
As a matter of fact - in the case of general war, I would give the job to the Japanese. Their SS could take care of that quite well and no one would know whose submarine took it out until the conflict was over. I've tangled with the Japanese submarine community in RIMPAC. They would do just fine with the mission. Just fine.
Anyway, it would be fun to watch the US 1120s whine that they didn't get the mission.
If you want to nibble your nails over the Chinese, then nibble over the multi-axis "Porcupine Strategy" they have for the Taiwan Strait that wants to make the prospect so painful to contemplate that we simply won't go there. They don't need a carrier for that. SS, Houbei Class, ASCM, ASBM, H-6M and other land based long range strike aircraft; that is what you should focus on; that is the challenge. Simple, but in numbers and worth a sober ponder.
Against our carriers coming across the Pacific, they only need to get lucky once; we have to get lucky every time.
That "Smart Power" is doing wonders on the Global War on Terrorism we no longer talk about. I will give the guy credit - he does some fairly good smack talk. Oh, and his part of the world - the is getting a nice STRATCOM win. He and his people need to be killed - not talked to - killed. Wholesale if possible, retail if necessary. We don't have to smack talk back. Just kill. Everyone understands that.
Oh, and yes - I understand that kidnapped people are the responsibility of the nation those people are taken from. This isn't about them. Though this line of thinking is out of vogue (but will come back after a few thousand Americans are killed again), as a general rule - I believe that any group that states that it is a fundamentalist Islamic terrorist organization is, de facto, an enemy of the USA. When found and their position fixed, they should be killed. Anyone who has property with fire ants on it understands the principal. You don't have to wait for the ants from a specific mound to sting you. No, you know their nature and know that that eventually the will and even if not - if left alone they will spread and become a greater problem. Simple, find a new mound (you can never get rid of them, they are always sprouting up), you go get the Amdro and take care of business. That is all this is - pest control - and this pest needs to be shut up sooner more than later.
Yes, I understand INFO-OPS/STRATCOM, etc; but I also understand its limits as reported by Andrew Scuto at NavyTimes.
First, in your mind I want you to capture your MK1 MOD0 Somali pirate or his ilk elsewhere. These people don't give a d@man what you think of them. Most are functional illerates who are just trying to find a buck the best way they can -- and some even thing that their religion allows it.
Do you think they give a donkey's a55 about this?
“Part of our message is to de-romanticize piracy,” said Rear Adm. Scott Sanders, commander of counter-piracy Task Force 151. “Pirates are bad people. They are holding over 100 people against their will.”
What are you going to do, run PSAs on "Pimp My Ride?" MSNBC?
New flash - these are not First World Westerners. They don't care what their international image is - and they don't even know what it is anyway.
What is the only thing worse than sociologists running Strategic Concepts? Ah, yes -- LAWFARE.
“The number of opportunities for a ‘legal finish’ — the term we use for a successful prosecution — those avenues are expanding all the time. So I’d fully expect to see more successful legal prosecutions,” said Capt. Keith Blount, of the British Royal Navy and chief of staff for 151. “If we frame a good case, that case will go to Kenya, it will go to the Seychelles, and these criminals will be put behind bars. Absolutely.”
I know this isn't popular, but this is what we know from a few thousand years of dealing with pirates. It works every time.
You kill them and you destroy their bases and support structure - rinse, repeat. They then go away to the point they only need occasional spot cleaning.
That simple. Unless, of course, you had no top cover politically to do what needs to be done. Then you do a bunch of ineffective steaming until the pirates find a better economic model to make a living off of, you take 10 years to do a 2 year job .... or you just go away and let someone else solve the problem for you.
Interesting stats here though --- maybe we are on the 10 year slow boil.
And while 2008 and the first half of 2009 saw high levels of hijackings, including several high-profile situations, Blount said the pirates are indeed working harder for the money.
“In 2007, there were 19 attacks, and 12 were successful. That’s a pretty good strike rate. There are a number of people who became pretty rich in that particular year,” he said. “The year after that there were 130 attacks, of which 44 were successful. This year alone we’ve seen 137 attacks, but only 28 of those have been successful.”
According to 5th Fleet, 199 small arms have been captured, along with 85 rocket-propelled grenades, 41 RPG launchers, assorted climbing gear and communications devices have been captured since last August.
Of the 514 pirates “encountered,” in that time, 10 were killed and 235 were turned over for prosecution in Kenya, France, U.S. and Seychelles.
BZ to all involved in this. Regardless of what you may think of the present MARSTRAT - this was smart.
Issue: Discovery Channel Documentary
Discussion: Discovery Channel continues work on a 3-part documentary focusing on various aspects of the Maritime Strategy in action. The series is expected to air around Labor Day 2009. The intent of this project is to provide the American public with a comprehensive view of the Navy through interesting and compelling television. A Discovery Channel embark was recently completed in the C5F AOR for the at-sea mini series. The trip was a success, with filming aboard various ships to include the USS BOXER (LHD 4) and USS EISENHOWER (CVN 69). The next step is the production of vignettes for use by Navy Recruiting. A Discovery production crew will be traveling to Monterey, CA this week to shoot a segment on the CTI community. CTI1(NAC) Angel Diaz, serving as an instructor at the Defense Language Institute, will be interviewed for the segment. He is fluent in both Spanish and Arabic and is an outstanding Sailor.
Desired effect: Showcase the 21st century Navy in a unique and compelling way across a multitude of communication mediums. Discovery Channel intends to air this production in both English and Spanish.
Action: None. FYSA only.
I know Galrahn hit it earlier this year, but it is worth repeating.
After deciding to go to Copenhagen to pitch Chicago for the 2016 Olympics, Obama failed to bring home the bacon or the Olympics. Chicago was eliminated from consideration which is now down to Rio and Madrid.
To get the right story - you have to ignore the legacy media both TV and print and go elsewhere; again.
Let us be clear about one thing. That was not Mr. and Mrs. Barak H. Obama that went to Copenhagen - that was the President of the United States. That was not Chicago that got rejected; with the CINC there, that was the United States that got rejected.
Let us be clear about another thing. We are at war with a culture and mindset that is by and large shame based. In the mind of our enemies our President, and therefore the nation he leads, has lost face in a very public and personal way. This has done huge damage to our short, medium, and long term image in the world - especially amongst our enemies and those who do not wish this nation well.
When the President took off, I thought that it was a done deal. Staff Weenie 101 - you do not set your boss up for failure.
The more public and important the event you invest his time and resources in, the more you need to make sure that you know the outcome, and at the minimum have done a proper risk analysis.
The downside of not knowing the outcome and investing the CINC's credibility into a situation such as this where he could fail are way beyond any possible up-side should Chicago win. I am just gobsmacked at the Strategic damage that has been done to this nation by this absolute epic failure of proper staff support and leadership positioning.
Again, this is not the President's fault (though as President, the responsibility is his in the end - the President is smart, the should have see this) - this is all in the lap of his Chief of Staff.
When Air Force One lands and the stairs come up to the aircraft; once they open the door we should see heads roll down to the tarmac - and then picked up by a detachment of Air Force Senior NCOs who will place those heads on pikes on the front gate of Andrews AFB as a warning to all that the President of The United States will not tolerate being shamed in other countries.
OK, we can't do the head on pikes thingy .... I will let the President do what he wants with his staff. If the CINC is looking for some advice though - there are some unfilled billets at Thule Air Base that need to be filled before winter sets in hard.
Take important lessons from this. Never set the boss up for failure. Never.
As I thought about the CINC's speech at West Point today, in hindsight I have to admit I was being an optimist. In my head, I decided that I had a rough idea what was coming, and as a result was going to title this post, "Give the CINC some room to work." I wanted to support my President. Take 3/4 of the package and push on.
I have a buy-in in AFG - I want us to succeed, victory if you will. As you have read here, I have been confident that with with the USA taking back the keys from NATO, strategic patience, and going with what we know works - this is doable - doable with the right military and political leadership.
Our military leadership at the in-theater operational and strategic level is good and sound. Our COIN built around Shape-Clear-Hold-Build is sound. As in all war though, you need the political to be at the same level. That is the CINC. That is why this speech was so important. We are at an inflection point - we needed a home run.
He lost me at 20:18. I'll explain.
There are three parts to his strategy (it is unquestionably his now); a military surge - a civilian surge - and a "Pakistan" surge. The civilian surge cannot produce desired effects in AFG without the safe and secure environment created by military forces. A stable Pakistan, in terms and in line with our security needs, cannot exist without a safe and secure AFG. For the civilian and Pakistan part of his plan - the military must be given the resources and time to make it happen.
Here is how the President put it.
We will meet these objectives in three ways. First, we will pursue a military strategy that will break the Taliban's momentum and increase Afghanistan's capacity over the next 18 months.
That is when I looked over to Mrs. Salamander and said, "I hope I just didn't hear a timeline."
The 30,000 additional troops that I'm announcing tonight will deploy in the first part of 2010, the fastest possible pace, so that they can target the insurgency and secure key population centers. They'll increase our ability to train competent Afghan security forces and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight. And they will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans.
What you have here is the continuation of the plan that has been in the works since mid-08 and extended by a few more brigades - the McChrystal expansion of the McKiernan uplift. Good - but that previous paragraph was still echoing in my head.
Start sucking your teeth now.
Because this is an international effort, I've asked that our commitment be joined by contributions from our allies. Some have already provided additional troops, and we're confident that there will be further contributions in the days and weeks ahead.
Where are they coming from? Jones-Craddock tried and failed. McNeill-McKiernan tried and failed. Will Stavridis-McChrystal succeed now that we are telling everyone that we intend to leave come h311 or high water?
Here is what we do know. In a year from now, the Canadians and the Dutch (together ~3,500 relatively caveat-free forces) are leaving AFG. This has been known for awhile. The French stated earlier that they will send no more. The Brits can throw a few hundred in the south - but they are already looking at the door. You could double the Spanish, Italian, or German numbers if you want - but due to their ROE/Caveats, they will have little effect.
Former Warsaw Pact NATO economies are under so much stress and their militaries so small - they aren't going to give you thousands. Turks? Please.
I hope that the CINC has some surprises in his back pocket - really he as to. If we do not see allied contributions in the high four to low five-figures in the next, "days and weeks" - then do I really need to tell you what that means tactically, operationally, or strategically?
From an INFO OPS & STRATCOM POV, I just cannot see the CINC saying the above without firm commitments that will be made public in that timeframe. If not; trainwreck. This is varsity football, you can't say things like that unless they happen. This is not domestic politics. This is significant national strategic risk.
Our friends have fought and bled and died alongside us in Afghanistan. And now we must come together to end this war successfully. For what's at stake is not simply a test of NATO's credibility; what's at stake is the security of our allies and the common security of the world.
Now, taken together, these additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011. Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground.
This was at approx 20:18 according to the clock in my car. I am glad Mrs. Salamander was driving. My head fell into my hands, literally. I didn't yell or pound the dashboard. I just said, "Oh, sh1t."
Now, everyone put on your red hat ... or red turban, if you will.
18 months is a fortnight at best for the Taliban, a weekend really. They will wait us out. The AFG government, just like the AFG government after the Soviet withdrawal, will hold on for awhile after we leave - but it is all baked in the cake.
Right now every smart AFG that can is transferring money and making plans to get out. Calls and emails are going to family in the USA, Canada, Germany, The Netherlands, The UK - wherever they have a connection - making a Plan B if they haven't already because they were foolish enough to believe in the USA.
By moving from a conditions based (or effects based depending on planning school you come from) plan to a time based plan, we just solved the Taliban's and Al Qaeda's problem.
We just validated all that has been said about the West. The weak horse is at a canter for all to see.
We'll continue to advise and assist Afghanistan's security forces to ensure that they can succeed over the long haul. But it will be clear to the Afghan government -- and, more importantly, to the Afghan people -- that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country.
They can't do it in 18 months if they know we are leaving them. They know their history better than we do. They know what happened when the Soviets left. They know.
Everyone on the military side of the house knows the AFG will not be ready in 18 months. If anyone does - they sure have been keeping it to themselves. I would like to hear them say it to. Not, "I will carry out the orders .... " mantra - but a not kidding, "Yes, this is outstanding!" true believer stuff.
If the Afghans knew we were there for the long haul, would they be on the readiness curve to be ready once conditions were set? Sure. We just threw that away. You can't force this and expect it to work. This isn't politics - this is the building of a military and civil infrastructure that did not exist before.
By putting an 18-month stamp on things, we just stated that we don't care about the conditions on the ground or if we have desirable or undesirable effects - we are just looking at the countdown.
Success, victory - whatever you want to call it - is never achieved on a chronological basis. You retreat on a timetable - you succeed by reaching decisive conditions, objectives, effects, and end states as defined by your mission. Military 101. This can't be the best military advice he is getting.
Second, we will work with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy so that the government can take advantage of improved security. This effort must be based on performance. The days of providing a blank check are over.
President Karzai's inauguration speech sent the right message about moving in a new direction. And going forward, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our assistance.
We'll support Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people. We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable. And we will also focus our assistance in areas such as agriculture that can make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people.
None of that can be done in a nation larger than Germany in 18-months. Just talk to our Agricultural Development Teams in the east of AFG. They just started two years ago, and are only now impacting a few districts. It takes time to do this right.
Now, the people of Afghanistan have endured violence for decades. They've been confronted with occupation by the Soviet Union, and then by foreign al-Qaeda fighters who used Afghan land for their own purposes.
So tonight, I want the Afghan people to understand: America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country. We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens. And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect, to isolate those who destroy, to strengthen those who build, to hasten the day when our troops will leave, and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner and never your patron.
The AFG didn't hear a word of that. All they heard was,
"...transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011."
Everything else is background noise.
Third, we will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan. We're in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. And that's why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border.
That is/was what we have been doing as a nation. It will all be for nothing if we abandon AFG.
I am not going to fisk the entire speech, read it yourself if you missed it, but there is one more thing I want to cover before I hit the rack.
He had three explanations in his speech. The first two were aimed at the political Left who either wants to retreat now - or do nothing. The third was aimed at, I believe, those who are seeped in a few thousand years of military best practices. Here it is.
Finally, there are those who oppose identifying a timeframe for our transition to Afghan responsibility. Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort, one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade. I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost and what we need to achieve to secure our interests.
Furthermore, the absence of a timeframe for transition would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan.
No one in a uniform has counseled an "open-ended escalation." No one. No, there are just those who are trying to achieve the mission in AFG. The only way to do that is through the proven methods of defining your mission, your end state, your objectives, your decisive points (or conditions or effects - depending on your flavor), your tasks and then the troops you need to achieve them.
There is no "time." If you are given a time limit - then you plan for that and work backwards. Usually though, the planning goes like this - "When the following conditions are met, we can transition to the next phase .... " With time-based plans, all that matters is the time. You know that - the enemy knows that.
If your enemy does not have a chronological restraint, then to achieve their decisive points, objectives, end states and mission - then all they need to do is hit the mattresses and wait you out.
If your enemy sees your Strategic Center of Gravity as the political will to continue - then when you set a conditions-free chronological end to your campaign; then you just advertised that your Center of Gravity has been compromised and is falling apart.
The President in the end wanders into a discussion of costs. OK, we can do that. There is another thing that has stood true for thousands of years - war is always less expensive than defeat. Ask the Khwarezm Shahs, the Confederates, the Soviets, the Baathists, well ... you get the idea.
Here is a question I have for our 4-Stars:
Where in the history of warfare has a time-based strategy worked? When has it ever been determined to be a superior plan for success/victory/mission than a conditions based or effects based plan? Conventional warfare or COIN, when? So, for the pro-victory coalition - what is there in this speech?
Well, hope isn't a plan - but there is hope.
This was a political speech, not a military speech. In politics there is nuance and the truth can change. We must hope for the truth to change. We can hope that "transition" if fudged enough to allow the Commander on the ground to have enough troops for a long enough time to build and expand the Afghan security forces.
Maybe the decision will be made to not start the withdraw in 18-months until conditions are better. Hope, maybe - but it is what it is.
As leaders, there is nothing illegal in the CINC's orders, so you pursue them as best as you can. You can push hard for 18-months with the hope that the largely Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and the other parts of the Afghan National Security Forces can significantly up their game to the point that when the American resources start to draw down - that the Afghans can keep it going. Hope that the drawdown will be manageable and that the financial and material support continues so the Afghan government isn't abandoned like we abandoned the South Vietnamese in '75.
That is, of course, if you think that the hope has a chance to succeed. What do you do if you are faced with the situation that you can no longer plan to win - instead you have to plan an orderly withdraw?
From a moral position - if your mission is strictly chronologically based - what is the risk level you take with the lives of your men and women? For what purpose are you expending lives? What are you "buying" with them?
Ahhh, that pesky thing called the operational art. A Decision Point. How do you define the conditions where further expenditure of resources will not bring about a sustainable desired effect inside an artificial timeline - and as a result when do you decide to pull back to the cantonment?
Tough nut. It would be great to be able to talk to John C. Pemberton about it.
History. How will she read this speech? How will history judge the uniformed leadership?
It doesn't have to end this way - but if you surrender to a time-based plan - history says it does.
If it does - it will be the fault of the elected leaders we have - though they will, like they did in Vietnam, falsely blame the military - but we know that.
President Bush today nominated Navy Vice Adm. Eric T. Olson to lead U.S. Special Operations Command, replacing Army Gen. Bryan "Doug" Brown, according to a Pentagon release.
Olson would be the first Navy officer to head Socom. The command is responsible for about 48,000 elite troops, such as Army Green Berets, Rangers, Delta Force operatives, Navy SEALs and Air Force rescue teams. Olson is now Socom's deputy commander.
What am I missing? Does it matter? Navy/Marine Corps team gets 7 out of 11. Not sure what it says, if anything - but I do find it funny in a way. After all, everyone of a certain age knows that 7/11 gets you super-rock cups.
On Saturday, hackers who say they are members of the collective known as Anonymous claimed responsibility for crashing the Web site of the group, Stratfor Global Intelligence Service, and pilfering its client list, e-mails and credit card information in an operation they say is intended to steal $1 million for donations to charity. The hackers posted a list online that they say contains Stratfor’s confidential client list as well as credit card details, passwords and home addresses for some 4,000 Stratfor clients. The hackers also said they had details for more than 90,000 credit card accounts. Among the organizations listed as Stratfor clients: Bank of America, the Defense Department, Doctors Without Borders, Lockheed Martin, Los Alamos National Laboratory and the United Nations.
The group also posted five receipts online that it said were of donations made with pilfered credit card details. One receipt showed a $180 donation from a United States Homeland Security employee, Edmund H. Tupay, to the American Red Cross. Another showed a $200 donation to the Red Cross from Allen Barr, a recently retired employee from the Texas Department of Banking.
Hey, I like those guys. Why didn't they pick on Greenpeace or sump'n? Now, I'm not a Ron Paul supporter, but my first instincts were to ponder - there must be some deeper conspiracy going on here ... what was REALLY on STRATFOR's servers .... and was this REALLY Anon ..... but then ....
Stratfor didn't just expose a website to the public. It also, apparently, put all this other stuff online, in the clear, for the taking.
It's true that websites are like storefronts, and that it's more or less impossible to stop determined people from blocking or defacing them now and again.
Here, however, it looks like Stratfor left private files in the window display, waiting to be grabbed by the first guy to put a brick through the glass.
Now, I'm not America's premier intelligence and security research group, and I'm not a member of its national IT security planning task force. But I'm pretty sure that putting unencrypted lists of credit card numbers and client details on public-exposed servers isn't quite explained by "no matter what you do, every system has some level of vulnerability."
Oh come on. Talk about an easy target. Ummmmm .... let me guess - no one will be contracting STRATFOR for cyber security work in the near future.
SUBJ/AFG TIMELINE// REF/A/020118ZDEC/CINC// RMKS/1. REF A SHOULD BE SEEN AS A STATEMENT OF CINC STRONG INTENT. CINC ALWAYS HAS THE FREEDOM TO RE-EVALUATE HIS DECISIONS.// BT #0000 NNNN R 022308ZDEC FM CINC/PAO TO ALLWORLD BT
REF/B/020118ZDEC/CINC// RMKS/1. CANCEL REF A. REF B REMAINS IN EFFECT. 2. CINC EMPHASIZES REF B IS LOCKED IN - THERE IS NO FLEXIBILITY. TROOPS WILL START COMING HOME IN JUL11. IT IS ETCHED IN STONE. PAO HAS CHISEL.// BT #0000 NNNNFollow the links Shipmates. I don't make this stuff up.
SECDEF - you were just punked.UPDATE: The goat roping spaz's along in a great expanding grabastic cluster.
Looks like McChrystal and SECSTATE were punk'd too. Hey - when you follow this link to Allah at HotAir and watch the video, you would almost think that SECSTATE learned Operational Planning from 'ole Phibian Salamander. Strange bedfellows, indeed.
July 2011 is not a withdrawal date, but a specific target date for beginning to transition security responsibility to Afghan forces, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said on several morning talk shows today.
“We’ve been given very clear direction from the president to start the transfer of responsibility for security to the Afghan security force,” Navy Adm. Mike Mullen said on “American Morning” on CNN. “July of 2011 is a time where we can start to transition, … but it’s not a hard deadline to leave.”
That does not match with what the CINC and his spokesman said yesterday.
I know very well what the transition phase of an operation is. I also know that a successful transition date is decided on by conditions. You set yourself up for failure if you don't have a conditions based transition date.
From a military planning perspective, what Admiral Mullen says in the clip below makes absolute sense and if it is the plan - then things are fine and well going forward (though mentioning any conditions free start date is a rookie planner mistake).
Thing is - what Mullen says isn't in alignment with what the CINC said yesterday.
On both the firmness of the date and the withdraw of US troops; we have a condition where the public statements of the CINC and his Spokesman are not in agreement with his SECDEF, SECSTATE, and CJCS are not in alignment.
If this confuses military professionals, Senators, and press - what is this doing to our STRATCOM and an understanding of our purpose to the rest of the world?
My $.02: the CINC needs to make a clear statement - soon.
I fully understand trying to clean up behind your boss - but it is the CINC's word that matters. He needs to clarify what his plan is.
Right now it just looks like our national security leadership is in chaos. No way to run a railroad, much less fight a war.
Well, we now know the size, shape and generally frightening nature of the People's Liberation Army Navy that drove the Running Dog Round-eye Devils from the seas.
On a professional note, all you need is the caption.
A crewmember on a Chinese trawler uses a grapple hook in an apparent attempt to snag the towed acoustic array of the military Sealift Command ocean surveillance ship USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23). Impeccable was conducting routine survey operations in international waters 75 miles south of Hainan Island when it was harassed by five Chinese vessels. (U.S. Navy photo/Released)
On our part, what a STRATCOM epic fail. Another photo here.
First things first - this is in no way a swipe at Admiral Harvey over as CFFC and his blog. He is one of the good guys. He gets it - and is a solution guy with an open mind.
What this is though, is an opportunity to talk about images, master messages, STRATCOM, institutional blindness, and once again, poor staff support. Heck, I'm mad at myself for not getting this sooner.
This is a fairly audacious thing to do for a guy who fat-fingers posts all day - but I don't have a Staff looking after me. I am a Navy of one.
Check out the header on his blog. You have 5 seconds to figure out the problem.
It was the forward EHF antenna that gave it away.
Here you go. We have four ships. Left to right we have a PERRY Class FF(not-so-G), a BURKE Class DDG, a SPRUANCE CLASS DD, and a TICONDEROGA Class CG.
Our PERRY's are mostly gone geldings on their last legs - our last SPRUANCE was decommissioned in 2005.
I think we have a nice representation here about where we are with our Fleet. The disconnect between what is actually there, and what kind of face we put on it, is a chasm. It is somewhere between the Fleet we used to have, the one we wish we had, the one we actually have, and the Fleet we will one day have. The picture is of a balanced fleet. What we have is a Aegis and Corvette Battle Fleet - about as unbalanced as you can get.
I know ADM Harvey didn't pick this picture to headline his blog, but someone did. Someone on his staff made the conscience decision to. That is poor staff work. Fleet Forces Command is not the Navy History and Heritage Command.
Ponder ..... and will someone at CFFC please pass on to ADM Harvey that you have fixed the picture issue before this post is emailed to him. He deserves that.
Just don't replace it with a LCS picture or I will have to let Sid and Byron do a guest post on it.UPDATE: ...and now you know the rest of the story.
Hey, I look like a putz. From CFFC Actual in comments here,
CDR S, I commanded DD 971, CG 71 and was in the commissioning crew of FFG 8. This was a picture that represented the ships that meant (and still mean) a great deal to me.
In that case; great pic! Boy, I come out looking like a jerk; sorry about that Admiral.
March has been a month where a lot of very smart people have spent a lot of time reminding everyone how weakness invites aggression. Trying to get everyone to see the world as it is - not as we wish it to me. Well, they need to speak some more. We do not seem to be playing long ball very well. First of all - PACOM decides to tell everyone that his knob goes to 11;
The head of U.S. Pacific Command believes America does not possess the capacity to conduct amphibious assaults in the wake of a crisis, as it did during World War II.
Adm. Samuel Locklear III, commander of U.S. Pacific Command gave his assessment of the deficiency in readiness on Tuesday, Stars and Stripes reported.
“We have had a good return of our Marines back to the Asia-Pacific, particularly as the activities in the Middle East wind down in Afghanistan. … But the reality is, is that to get Marines around effectively, they require all types of lift. They require the big amphibious ships, but they also require connectors (meaning landing craft and other amphibious vehicles). The lift is the enabler that makes that happen, so we wouldn’t be able to [successfully carry out a contested amphibious assault without additional resources],” Adm. Locklear said, Stars and Stripes reported.
Of course we need more in order not to have too much mission-risk, etc ... but if we can't do amphibious landings, no one can ... right?
The admiral’s comments come only weeks after Capt. James Fannell, the chief of intelligence of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, said that he believes China is training for war with Japan.
“[We] concluded that the PLA has been given the new task to be able to conduct a short sharp war to destroy Japanese forces in the East China Sea following with what can only be expected a seizure of the Senkakus or even a southern Ryukyu [islands] — as some of their academics say,” the captain said in February after witnessing “massive” Chinese military exercises in the Pacific.
Oh, good googly moogly, people. Admiral Locklear, if I may be so bold - you're not in DC playing word games on The Hill. Words matter, and the way this is being reported in the press is simply not helpful. I'm sure this isn't what you wanted, but there it is. There are PLAN intel types who do nothing else but parse every word you say like some druid elbow deep in sheep entrails. Then we have this jewel. Power projection. You know - that "From the Sea" thingy. In the last few decades we have removed our deep strike capability by going to all light strike-fighter and no organic tanking (buddy Hornet doesn't count, Shipmate). As a former TLAM guy myself, I know how well one can clear out the cells in theater and the effort to get reloads to port. Magazine, magazine, magazine - in theater would be nice - pre-positioned better. War won't wait ... So, this sends an interesting message;
The Tomahawk missile program—known as “the world’s most advanced cruise missile”—is set to be cut by $128 million under Obama’s fiscal year 2015 budget proposal and completely eliminated by fiscal year 2016, according to budget documents released by the Navy.
...
In addition to the monetary cuts to the program, the number of actual Tomahawk missiles acquired by the United States would drop significantly—from 196 last year to just 100 in 2015. The number will then drop to zero in 2016.
The Navy will also be forced to cancel its acquisition of the well-regarded and highly effective Hellfire missiles in 2015, according to Obama’s proposal.
There's your risk. Remember, in three days of DESERT FOX, we launched ~325 TLAM. TLAM are good for the kind of punitive expeditions we should expect to have to do - not to mention a very useful weapon to have against static targets like, oh I don't know, S/IRBM launching bases used or A2AD. If you respond with "UCLASS UCLASS UCLASS" prior to even IOC, I will have BM1 slap off the front porch. In summary, we started the week telling our nation's enemies that we have no confidence in our ability to land Marines ashore, and that, really, we don't think we want to attack any major power anytime soon. Risk; it's what for Spring.
While it is a fun distraction to see smart people talk about sexy, but ill-defined shapes just outside of a clear view in the misty future – and don’t get me wrong, I love pondering and ideating about those things as much as the next guy as they are wonderful distractions – there is a lot of very real, hard work that needs to be done now. There are national security requirements that are here. They are not sexy. They are messy, they are hard, and they don’t make the listener breathless as a gaggle of easily distracted unattached young men waiting in line for the latest Star Wars movie. These represent the hard work of national security. Many are trying to ignore them, but they will not leave. If ignored, they will grow in to a crisis. These are the leaking pipes and dirty air filters of the house that the owners are only thinking about replacing the driveway with pavers and putting solar panels on the roof. Those thinks are nice, but … Step away for a moment from thinking about Syria. Divert your eyes from the Russian Navy popping off at Turkish commercial vessels. Let’s look at our leaking pipes in a very sobering and spot on article by Sydney Freedberg, Jr., derived from a recent report from CNAS, Uncertain Ground: Emerging Challenges in Land Warfare;
You thought roadside bombs were bad? Imagine off-the-shelf mini-drones bombing US troops. Homebrewed high explosives got you down? Imagine extremists with 3D printers and a database of weapon designs. Suicide car bombs? Imagine explosive-laden cars that drive themselves. US military transmissions jamming each other by accident? Imagine guerrillas getting cheap GPS and radio jammers online. Media revealing military secrets or reporting faux pas that get the local population up in arms? Imagine that local population, enemy informants included, tweeting video of everything US forces do.
“The problem of war among the people is getting harder,” said Paul Scharre, a former Army Ranger and civil affairs officer. “It’s getting more lethal, and people are empowered by information technology: They’re able to communicate and organize for action in ways they weren’t ten years ago. All of that makes war on the ground much more challenging.”
...
“In many ways,” Scharre told me, “the root of intellectual stagnation here in US defense circles comes from watching too many World War II movies.” In those films, there’s a clear start to the war, clearly uniformed combatants (except for the occasional partisan), and a clear happy ending. Historically, he said, “that’s the exception rather than the rule.”
...
Similarly, ad hoc networks of likeminded individuals could swarm military forces, disrupting their movements via digitally-empowered ‘smart mobs’ on landing zones or roads. Unarmed mobs could incite military forces to respond, all the while filming their actions for broadcast. Militaries will be hard pressed to hide their movements in a world of radical transparency, and greater connectivity will enable enemies to rapidly organize to attack U.S. forces.”
...
As a result, “even in a conflict against a nation-state, enemies will still be able to employ significant lethality after the U.S. military has destroyed major military combat capabilities,” Scharre writes. “After seizing ground and destroying the enemy’s major military units, U.S. forces cannot simply [declare victory]. The unfortunate reality is that, in many conflicts, seizing ground may be the equivalent of merely grabbing hold of the hornet’s nest.”
As we have discussed before, this is something that is not just a land problem. As Israel demonstrated in Gaza, precision strike from the sea to an urban environment is a requirement for even the smallest warship - and to do that, you need to get close. You get close, the ASCM parked in the neighborhood garage becomes an issue too. Now to the second uncomfortable truth. Neglected, yet steadily growing problem of our ignored and clogged air filters. Something that properly serviced by a little expense each year will save you a huge problem when at the worst of times, it demands immediate attention; For you old Cold Warriors I have two words for you; Yankee Box;
China has begun patrols with nuclear missile submarines for the first time, giving Beijing a new strategic nuclear strike capability, according to the U.S. Strategic Command and Defense Intelligence Agency.
U.S. intelligence and strategic nuclear officials, however, remain uncertain whether China’s four Jin-class missile submarine patrols are being carried out with nuclear-tipped JL-2 missiles on board.
...
The real question, the Stratcom leader said, is: “Have they put the missile we’ve seen them test, the JL-2, in for a package that is doing strategic deterrent patrols? I have to consider them today that they are on strategic patrol,” he said, meaning the submarines were equipped with nuclear missiles.
For the U.S., that means “there’s another capability that’s out there having nuclear capability of ranges that can strike the United States of America,” the admiral said.
The patrols mark a significant turning point for the Chinese. In the past, Beijing stored all nuclear warheads separately from its missiles, in part to demonstrate what China calls its policy of “no first use” — that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict and would use them only in retaliation for hostile nuclear attacks.
Another reason warheads are kept separate is the Communist Party’s near-paranoid obsession with political control. Separating warheads from missiles allows for a greater centralized control over the nuclear arsenal, which is estimated to be 300 warheads but is likely far larger.
Chinese authorities fear giving a submarine commander control over the launch of nuclear missiles and worry that one of the military’s hawks could ignore the party’s nuclear chain of command and order a nuclear strike on his own.
A build off of the previous post on the rolling train wreck that is the Rolling Stone McChrystal story.
You can read the whole article here - but here are the pull quotes that makes you understand why General McChrystal is in full “on his back, exposing his belly to the alpha dog.” I thought that this might be a bit of an exaggerated story - but let’s assume it is what McChrystal’s signals are sending - it is 85%+ accurate.
Behold,
Last fall, during the question-and-answer session following a speech he gave in London, McChrystal dismissed the counterterrorism strategy being advocated by Vice President Joe Biden as "shortsighted," saying it would lead to a state of "Chaos-istan." The remarks earned him a smackdown from the president himself, who summoned the general to a terse private meeting aboard Air Force One. The message to McChrystal seemed clear: Shut the fuck up, and keep a lower profile
Now, flipping through printout cards of his speech in Paris, McChrystal wonders aloud what Biden question he might get today, and how he should respond. "I never know what's going to pop out until I'm up there, that's the problem," he says. Then, unable to help themselves, he and his staff imagine the general dismissing the vice president with a good one-liner.
"Are you asking about Vice President Biden?" McChrystal says with a laugh. "Who's that?"
"Biden?" suggests a top adviser. "Did you say: Bite Me?" ... Even though he had voted for Obama, McChrystal and his new commander in chief failed from the outset to connect. The general first encountered Obama a week after he took office, when the president met with a dozen senior military officials in a room at the Pentagon known as the Tank. According to sources familiar with the meeting, McChrystal thought Obama looked "uncomfortable and intimidated" by the roomful of military brass. Their first one-on-one meeting took place in the Oval Office four months later, after McChrystal got the Afghanistan job, and it didn't go much better. "It was a 10-minute photo op," says an adviser to McChrystal. "Obama clearly didn't know anything about him, who he was. Here's the guy who's going to run his fucking war, but he didn't seem very engaged. The Boss was pretty disappointed." ... Part of the problem is structural: The Defense Department budget exceeds $600 billion a year, while the State Department receives only $50 billion. But part of the problem is personal: In private, Team McChrystal likes to talk shit about many of Obama's top people on the diplomatic side. One aide calls Jim Jones, a retired four-star general and veteran of the Cold War, a "clown" who remains "stuck in 1985." Politicians like McCain and Kerry, says another aide, "turn up, have a meeting with Karzai, criticize him at the airport press conference, then get back for the Sunday talk shows. Frankly, it's not very helpful." Only Hillary Clinton receives good reviews from McChrystal's inner circle. "Hillary had Stan's back during the strategic review," says an adviser. "She said, 'If Stan wants it, give him what he needs.' McChrystal reserves special skepticism for Holbrooke, the official in charge of reintegrating the Taliban. "The Boss says he's like a wounded animal," says a member of the general's team. "Holbrooke keeps hearing rumors that he's going to get fired, so that makes him dangerous. He's a brilliant guy, but he just comes in, pulls on a lever, whatever he can grasp onto. But this is COIN, and you can't just have someone yanking on shit."
McChrystal reserves special skepticism for Holbrooke, the official in charge of reintegrating the Taliban. "The Boss says he's like a wounded animal," says a member of the general's team. "Holbrooke keeps hearing rumors that he's going to get fired, so that makes him dangerous. He's a brilliant guy, but he just comes in, pulls on a lever, whatever he can grasp onto. But this is COIN, and you can't just have someone yanking on shit." ... McChrystal and his team were blindsided by the cable. "I like Karl, I've known him for years, but they'd never said anything like that to us before," says McChrystal, who adds that he felt "betrayed" by the leak. "Here's one that covers his flank for the history books. Now if we fail, they can say, 'I told you so.' "
First, look at Lincoln vs. McClellan. Then Truman vs. MacArthur. Then look at Bush vs. Fallon. Then Obama vs. McKiernan.
President Obama only has two choices here - neither of which is good for the nation he leads.
COA 1: Fire the S.O.B. Recommended: - This is the action fully in line with precedence and is what must be done. A four-star general who does not have the good sense to have a staff that understands what a reporter is - and what his place is in a Representative Republic is - must be brought down, and brought down hard. I have no beef with McChrystal and I know that this will significantly hurt our STRATCOM in the short term; but this needs to be done quickly and publicly. ---- Pros: In line with other Presidents’ actions. Firmly establishes the COC and the proper civilian-military relationship; Move on. Story will move off the front page earlier. ---- Cons: Another Commander will need to do the Hill kabuki dance, but the domestic political opposition will not get in the way or make much political hay out of it; new Commander too soon, in the middle of fighting season.
COA 2: Keep him closer. Not recommended. If there is no appetite for COA 1, then this is the only other COA ; there is nothing in between. ---- Pros: Avoids the domestic problem of another General having to testify on the Hill. Keeps continuity of Command during fighting season and avoids another turnover of the in-theater Operational Commander. ---- Cons: Both the CINC and McChrystal will have lost face in a public manner and will be looked at as weaker; McChrystal will have more enemies in the Administration’s National Security Structure; McChrystal has shown support for your only significant Democrat rival, SECSTATE Clinton. Worst part again is the CINC will also lose face to much of the world - especially with our enemies. In most of their cultures, a General Officer saying such things would be shot or have an unfortunate helicopter accident. They will not view keeping McChrystal on as a signal that President Obama is a firm leader.
Both are bad options - but being CINC is often picking the least worst of two bad options. The CINC will be attacked for what ever choice he makes. My advice - look to what is best for the nation in the long run. Keeping the military in its box is critical (see Founder‘s opinion on a standing Army for a reference).
So, in summary from a guy who has supported Gen. McChrystal in the past - if even half the stuff in the RS article is accurate, there is only one option: Fire McChrystal.
As I am entering a period of limited time to blog (about a week and a half at first guess - one of those short notice things - I'll blog some, but not more than one or two short posts a day max) - this will wind up being a bit shorter than I wanted, but here we go.When an organization finds itself at a pivot point in crisis, it naturally looks to its leadership for direction and a viable plan forward. The Navy is at such a point, and has been for the last two years.
A problem we have, however, is that we are on the tail end of a lost decade of false hope and forgotten promises where those in the Navy now have little faith in their leadership's ability to honestly build a Fleet, discuss its challenges, and direct a course towards a successful future. Much of that has to do with the fact to a large measure, our senior leaders have taken the Soviet model of a unified message. Essential in wartime, but in peace a sure recipe for stilted group think.
If you look at the complete cock-up that is DDG-1000, the rest of the Tiffany Navy as represented by the schizophrenic LCS Corvette, the Titanium-gilt LPD-17, the too-heavy-to-go-anywhere ACS, the "no slack because all we have is light attack" FASKE-18A-G, rolled around "1/3 good, 2/3 babble by committee" updated Maritime Strategy - looking to our senior leadership for clear direction and guidance, with a few exceptions, is about as helpful as dropping to your knees in the Temple of Jupiter and praying for the king of the gods to deliver you from the harpies that haunt your life.
An organization in need of ideas will not accept a vacuum. Into the gap will come more more junior officers, Sailors, industry, and concerned citizens with ideas to try to find a way out of the hole we find ourselves in. CDR Henry J. Hendrix Jr is one of those officers. You don't have to agree with all his ideas, I don't, but you owe it to yourself and the Navy you love to read them and think about them.
It is the ideas and proposals of smart, thinking, and thoughtful officers like CDR Hendrix that the Navy should be welcoming and examining - regardless of what discomfort they cause. Jerry comes from a line that traces its lineage to Admiral Sims. It is never an easy thing to put your ideas out there with your name attached to it - to accept the slings and arrows that come with it.
With that dose of love thrown Jerry's way and to take up the assignment from last WED - on with the show.
As a reminder, in this month's Proceeding,CDR Henry J. Hendrix Jr, has an article titled Buy Ford not Ferrari - that is what we are going to discuss today.
Let's take that thing apart and spread the bits on the table and talk about what we have here. Not a full fisking, I don't have the time (feel free to hit areas I don't in comments) - but let me comment on those areas that jumped out to me.
Like I said earlier - I don't agree with all the author puts out there, but I could be all wrong and he could be all right. Not the point - the point is that he has some solid ideas worth looking at. With our maritime future challenged going forward with very real fiscal terrain issues, his ideas need to be taken in and chewed on.
In many ways, that is the great underlying strength the article - it offers options that are realistic given the limited amount of money we have to put hulls in the water and get ships underway. The time of the PPT program has past. That wiggle room is gone. It is time to put up or shut up.
The problems that will have the most impact on the Navy's future force structure are large and can be categorized in two groups. The first is the growing expense of building new ships. The costs involved in research, development, and production of destroyers, cruisers, and carriers, each of which fields new, leading-edge technologies, have placed the price of the future force out of reach, even with four percent of the gross domestic product funding the Department of Defense.
Second is the growing mismatch between the Navy's strategic vision and its acquisition plan.
Correct. A Fleet should meet the Strategy. As we have outlined here - hope, wish, and desire have prevented that up to now.
At a conservative estimated price tag of $30 billion to construct and a daily operating cost in excess of a million dollars, carrier strike groups are quickly becoming prohibitively expensive to both build and deploy. When these characteristics are considered alongside rising threats and increasingly challenging operational environments, even more questions arise.
If this idea holds for 10-11, it holds for 9 - but I think I know what he means. This is one of the weaker parts of the article. It does not match with the later CVN numbers he proposes, but from a cost-mitigation perspective it holds. CVN, for all their issues, are still the only global sustained strike capability we have. I don't think his CVN critique is fleshed out well and may be worth a dedicated article - but let's move on.
Talking about SS,
Torpedoes launched from these boats, and shore- and ship-based missiles can sink outright most of the world's surface combatants and would, at least, significantly degrade the mission effectiveness of American super-carriers.
Spot on with the threat. For ASCM, it isn't the Exocet, Silkworm, Harpoon and the other subsonic threats that bother me - it is the supersonic ASCM and ASBM that keep me up at night. They are not insurmountable, but need more attention than they are getting.
The venerable deep-strike A-6 Intruder and the long-range F-14 interceptor have vanished into the boneyard with their spots on the flight deck taken by the F/A-18 Hornet variants, which were intended to be replacements for the A-4 and A-7 short- and medium-range light attack aircraft. ... we find ourselves in a circular argument reminiscent of the late Admiral Hyman Rickover, that "I must defend my force, Sir, so that I can defend my force." The CSG is, remarkably, a construct that can operate effectively only in a permissive environment, or be committed to an anti-access environment only under the most extreme conditions when national interests compel leadership to risk what amounts to a significant percentage of the Navy's annual budget in a single engagement.
The loss of a dedicated carrier based tanking asset remains a critical failure by Navy Air. Just short sighted in the extreme. Buddy tanking is a joke - doesn't count. What follows is the pull quote.
What is needed is a Navy cheap enough to be built in large numbers while remaining sufficiently effective to defend American interests on the high seas. We need Fords, not Ferraris.
Hi-Lo; the only way to go. Can't argue with him in any way on that point, however ....
Step one is to abandon the idea of a Navy built around 11 or 12 carrier strike groups.
Only for the money reasons in my book - for the reasons stated before. A larger DoD question is how do you replace the national need for global strike as the B-3 now is pushed to the right? Give it up? Tough problem.
Next, in a word, ungh.
A key tenet of post-9/11 strategic thought is that extremist religious terrorism is avoidable. Societies with infrastructural resources such as electricity, clean water, public education, and some modicum of medical care do not generally incubate extremist groups in their midst. Naval forces that have basic abilities to police the sea lines of communication while also seizing port call opportunities to build the basic communal building blocks of productive life ought to be an important component of the future Navy.
I am sorry my friend - this is just plain wrong and debunked. Read here, here, and here to start - but I cannot let that comment stand. The 911 hijackers, OBL and almost all of Al Qaeda's mid-level and higher leaders and operators are well educated sons of the middle to upper classes. Lack of opportunity, frustration, and envy resulting from living in a culture that denies basic human desires compared to the best of western culture is more of the cause. The Navy cannot do anything to counter that.
All the things that the author offers that the Navy can do helps in a broader extent our national image - on the margins - but will do nothing to negate the source that breeds Islamist terrorism. A port visit by every USN ship to Karachi doing nothing but charity work will do nothing to change what is going on with the larger cultural and religious trends in Pakistan driving terrorism.
The next step on the Navy's path to a new future should be the creation of "Influence Squadrons" composed of an amphibious mother ship (an LPD-17 or a cheaper commercial ship with similar capabilities), a destroyer to provide air, surface, and subsurface defensive capabilties, a Littoral Combat Ship to extend a squadron's reach into the green-water environment and provide some mine warfare capabilities, a Joint High Speed Vessel to increase lift, a Coastal Patrol ship to operate close in, and an M80 Stiletto to provide speed and versatility.
Sounds like a tailored Task Force, but the use of the phrase "Influence Squadron" (INFRON) is very problematic as its very name creates a significant STRATCOM problems.
Most of the leaders of the nations we would like to influence will have nothing to do with any USA force that publicly advertises that it is there to influence them. Influence is a loaded word that opens you up to charges of paternalistic imperialism. If that is what you are after, fine, just don't advertise it.
On balance though, the substance and mission of the "INFRON" as presented and constructed,
The hypothetical Influence Squadron would, in part, be composed of (clockwise from top left): an amphibious mother ship like the USS San Antonio (LPD-17); a guided-missile destroyer like the USS The Sullivans; a Littoral Combat ship like the USS Freedom (LCS-1); an M80 Stiletto; and a joint high-speed vessel like the USS Swift (HSV-2).
... is interesting and deserves to be looked at from a budgetary and sustainability standpoint - but it needs a new name out of the box.
These forces, operating every day around the world, would represent the preponderance of visible U.S. naval power. Their understated capabilities would epitomize America's peaceful, non-aggressive intent, and would carry out the new maritime strategy's stated purpose of providing positive influence forward. However, the Influence Squadron, carrying credible firepower across a broad area of operations, could also serve to either dissuade or destroy pirate networks that might seek to prey upon increasingly vulnerable commercial sea lines of communication.
Creating 16 of these squadrons, ten in the Pacific, six in the Atlantic, would allow the Navy to forward deploy six to eight squadrons at any given time, expanding American influence around the world. Pacific-based squadrons would routinely deploy to the east coast of Africa, the Persian Gulf, the waters off Malaysia to include the Strait of Malacca, the archipelagic waters of Indonesia, the waters in and around the Philippines, and the regional waters near Japan and Korea.
Atlantic-based squadrons would visit the Caribbean, South America, the north and western coasts of Africa as well as pushing up into the Black Sea to visit Georgia, the Ukraine and other partners in the region. Sometimes, however, Influence Squadrons, no matter how well they are placed, will not have the necessary concentration of capabilities to meet the emergent challenges. It would be at this point that the next force along the scale of naval response would be dispatched.
Well, that looks a lot like a modern day version of colonial fleets - which have a long and successful history of doing just what is proposed for the INFRON. All that being said though, I go back to the author's critique of the vulnerability of the CVN - and INFRON's are exceptionally vulnerable. Vulnerability isn't a deal killer for me, everything is vulnerable if you have a smart guy under the Red Hat, it is what you do to mitigate it that is important.
After sending spit-balls teacher's way for a while, here is where I warm up to some of the other parts of the article.
If it is accepted that the aircraft carrier, with its aviation strike packages, represents the sledgehammer of America's arsenal, then the ESG, with its Tomahawk-firing cruisers and destroyers, as well as its scalable squad-to-battalion Marine force, represent the wrenches, screwdrivers, and pliers within the nation's war on terrorism toolbox. When the introduction of the MV-22 Osprey and the short take-off/vertical landing (STOVL) Joint Strike Fighter is factored into the strategic equation, the ESG represents a force that is ideally structured to counter terrorist actions anywhere from oceanic blue water to ground operations 150-200 miles inland. The flexibility of this unit makes it the ideal candidate to serve as a critical response force, capable of dealing with threats short of those large enough to justify a surge force deployment.
Merge some of the INFRON concepts with an expanded and scalable ESG concept, and there you have something I can very easily embrace.
Instead, the aircraft carriers (nine or ten for the sake of this discussion) and their support ships and airwings will remain in home waters, exercising as required to maintain six CSGs in a high state of combat readiness. The assumption underlying this force is that one carrier will be involved in reactor upkeep, one will be coming home from either a regional deployment or a major international exercise, and another will be on her way out. This leaves roughly six carriers in standby, ready to surge at a moment's notice. Where they surge from is a critical question. A smaller carrier force needs to be redistributed to get the most out of a decreased number of ships.
Most of America's strategic interests in the decades to come will be in the Asian Pacific region, and that is where the majority of the nation's aircraft carriers should be as well. Of the force of nine or ten carrier strike groups, six should be home ported in the Pacific; two in Bremerton, two in San Diego, one in Japan, and one in another forward base to be determined. The remaining east coast carriers should be strategically dispersed between Norfolk and Mayport. This distribution scheme will both help ensure the survivability of the force against surprise attacks, and cut the transit time to crises around the globe. The bottom line is that the United States should always have six carrier strike groups ready to surge to a point of conflict within 15 to 30 days.
Here we go. Solid, solid - and you know he had me at "...carriers should be strategically dispersed...," but wait - it gets even better from a Salamander perspective.
Another critical component of the surge force will be the Expeditionary Strike Groups and their light amphibious carriers. Long considered to be the central core of the amphibious force, these highly capable aircraft carriers can serve in new roles within surge operations. Assuming one is in dry-dock for maintenance, a force of ten LHAs can provide nine small flattops for surge operations. Five of them will go to sea with their embarked Marine Expeditionary Units serving as their primary strike assets (again, the assumption would be that two of the MEUs would either be deploying or returning from deployment at any given time) while the remaining available LHAs deploy with each of their decks and hangars populated by two squadrons of STOVL Joint Strike Fighters.
Return of the CVS/CVL? Yes, yes .... solutions, yes.
Now, you 1120's get your inhalers ready,
Another area of focus for the future force should be in undersea warfare. Perhaps no place poses a greater threat to the current U.S. force structure or suggests the greatest potential for improvement in a future Navy than the underwater environment and the vessels that populate it. The first major proposed shift is the inclusion of diesel-powered submarines that incorporate air-independent propulsion (AIP) technologies. These submarines can be purchased for a fraction of the cost of a nuclear-powered fast-attack submarine such as those of the Virginia class.
Diesel/AIP boats are very quiet, and can be equipped with effective torpedoes, antisurface missiles, and even antiair missiles. These relatively inexpensive yet highly capable subs should replace the Virginia-class boats in the shallow-water environment alongside the new Influence Squadron surface force, allowing the Virginias to concentrate on their antisubmarine warfare mission in the blue-water environment. The one significant drawback of the non-nuclear design is shorter patrol intervals because of limited fuel supply. But this can be offset by forward-basing them near their patrol areas. A number of nations may welcome permanent basing of diesel/AIP submarines but have rejected nuclear-powered submarines in their ports for political reasons.
Ick. -1 point for Jerry. It is ASW not USW. Anti-X isn't bad, it is clear ... but I'll give you a pass. Let us not speak of it again. Besides that, major golf-clap - you know my 6/6 LANT/PAC split of SS/SSK dream.
Another proposed area of change is the permanent inclusion of guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) in the U.S. inventory. The advantages inherent in the deployment of these concentrated strike packages either in conjunction with a strike group, or by operating alone are only now being recognized. However, the U.S. Navy has made a mistake along the path to an SSGN force by tying the capability to a back-fit program for Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines. Future guided-missile submarines should be built new as adaptations of the Virginia class, perhaps offsetting the decreased buy of Virginias as the diesel/AIP boats come online.
More yummy stuff. This will be essential to bridge the initial deep strike gap that you will have with fewer CVN and tankers to bring the Light-Attack-Little-Legs carrier aircraft deeper .... though as all TLAM guys know - all the VLS cells in Christendom cannot match the sustained combat power of a gaggle of CVN off an enemy's shore ... SSGNs are good - even if they are not perfect. I'll never see a flight deck of new production F-14D and A-6G - so I will take what I can get.
More goodness follows,
Rampant "next-war-itis" needs to stop, and the Navy needs to commit itself to fighting the very real, and very relevant conflict of today. To be sure, the Navy will need to retain its current, high-end capabilities in such numbers and at such readiness as to dissuade future competitors from entering into conflict with the United States. The data suggest that if the Navy were to pursue a future fleet as described here, with both high- and low-end capabilities in an appropriate ratio, it could have 320 hulls in the water within 12 years for three quarters of the acquisition budget it intends to spend. This represents a net savings of almost five billion dollars a year. Again, I say the Navy needs to buy Fords, not Ferraris.
Bring back Hi-Lo? Yes, Great Caesar's Ghost, Yes!
So, there we go. That reflects some of my thoughts, how 'bout yours? Remember, you don't have to like all or agree with all. CDR Hendrix has a thick skin and the confidence in his informed decisions. Remember, creative friction without conflict.
As a side-bar, let me approach again a topic I brought up at the top of this post. We need more idea and solution pieces like the author's out there to discuss. Closed door processes and blind obedience to personal, not professional, loyalty is what got the Navy to the point it is at now. Aggressive discouragement of thought and publication needs to stop.
CDR Hendrix is the exception - he puts himself out there, not the rule. I tip my hat to him and the chain of command that supports him.
I get email all the time from Active Duty and civilian personnel who state, "I would like to bring this up, but .... " and what follows the "but" is a common story of fear of retribution, or a command/community policy that anything published must be in full alignment with official policy or community diktat.
That is sad, and in spite of Admiral Stavridis' plea, it is a reality in our Navy more often than not. I wish more of our leadership shared Admiral Stavridis' understanding of the critical importance of debate,
The process of reading and writing is important, he said, because the nation faces an “innovative” enemy like the Sept. 11, 2001, attackers and South American smugglers who transport drugs at sea in semisubmersible vessels.
“The most important reason is that the people who want to do harm to this country are doing so,” he said. “They are thinkers.”
Either through published works or through weblogs, the goal is an exchange of ideas, knowledge and information — such as on the participator-driven Wikipedia, he said.
“No one of us is as smart as all of us together,” he said. “
- but they do not - and they let their subordinates know they do not.
We should exchange ideas, and we should take those ideas apart into their constituent parts; feel them, smell them, hold them up to the light. Embrace those that we think fit and are workable, discard the perfect pipe dream, and argue publicly about what may or may not be a good idea. Whatever we do though, we need to publicly talk. More creative frictions without conflict - less Borg-like group think.
Well outside the demands of "Shut Up" we need to talk. We don't do it enough.
I mean absolutely no disrespect with the following, but it tells a story: everyone has their reasons and I do not walk in his Corframs. However, in a time when we are going to violate law on CVN numbers, we have a limited-duty non-multimission Corvette called LCS, a Fleet rotting pierside due to years of bad maintenance and oversight - we have a non-traditional enemy growing at sea and new conventional powers on the rise (just to mention a few challenges) - what do we have the Chief of Naval Operations focused on and discussing with the Fleet?
While visiting the Annapolis High School Navy Junior ROTC program yesterday, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead said his top long-term priority is increasing diversity in the officer corps.
In what is believed to be the first-ever visit by a CNO to a high school JROTC program, Roughead told the roughly 90 cadets that the ethnic diversity of the officer corps must parallel the makeup of the fleet.
"If you looked at the Navy, you would say it kind of looked like America - it has the right mix of whites and African Americans and Asians," Roughead said.
But take a closer look at the officer corps, he said, and "you would see the complexion ... change to largely white male."
He isn't just saying that to the kids - I have stood 10 feet from the CNO as he told a room full of Sailors and Marines the same thing. Take that and do with it what you will. I have to work today, I have a very long two-week thingy coming up, and it is too early to drink.
Last note - CDR Hendrix has a book out - give it a look-see - if you noticed, his article is Bu11sh1tBingo free (more or less ;) ) - I would bet you a round at Trader Johns pre-Tailhook his book is even better.
?" MSNBC?
