Showing posts sorted by relevance for query DTS. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query DTS. Sort by date Show all posts

Tuesday, June 01, 2021

I Have Not Come to Bury DTS, but to Yell at it


Since I left active duty I really have not had all that much time to yell at DTS. I mostly just laugh at it from a distance as it was no longer my problem ... at least not directly.

DTS has been horrible from day one. I know it. You know it. Worse, those who promoted and enforced it know as well. But, they didn't really care enough to do anything about it ... until it was a teenager. 

I am just old enough to remember how an efficient system worked. LT Salamander went to Admin and told a PN3/YNSN or whoever had the billet, “I need to travel to Norfolk with OPS for this conference (hands hard copy of message and travel request form). We need to leave next Monday AM. The conference runs through late WED, so if we can get home that night, great, if not the next AM. If possible, we should be able to stay at the hotel there, as per the message. If not, closer the better. We’ll need a rental car too. Thanks.”

Within 24-hrs, all was set up. You went. When you came back, you put your travel claim in the PN3/YNSN’s in basket. If you screwed things up, you’d get a call or more likely, they would just fix it for you.

I also remember the time before the scam that was/is government travel cards. You got an advance, if needed, but more often than not used your own personal card and then filed receipts for things that could be reimbursed.

Government travel cards ... talk about an administrative burden ... but a different topic for a different day, perhaps. 

But no, the system that worked would not do. That wasn’t … well, you know the buzzwords. We sure couldn’t use COTS either. Oh, no.

You can see a few of my historical references to DTS via the DTS tag here, but let’s go back to the start and see how we’ve progressed since my post in January 2006 (yes, over a decade and a half ago), I wrote this.

I know a guy who is going on TDY to New Zealand. He wants to take his wife. SATO using DTS quotes the round trip of $4,000. Well, he wants wifey to come along, and using their own research on her ticket they knew that tickets on that flight were about $1900. He told the SATO folks and she said she was glad to find out. It seems that DTS doesn't look for the best price, though the flight info was from Travelocity as clear as day, but DTS doesn't have that same info.

Classic example. Gov'munt contract for something that already exists in industry. Can't outsource because the GS unions wouldn't have that ..... don't be shocked. Just more taxpayer money thrown away. If you think I am babbling, or you want to get upset - click here and here.

You don't want to know my story. Trust me - it is so bad - I really don't want to go over it.

What is the latest DTS update? 

Via the ever-wonderful Doctrine Man

So, when it was announced recently that the Pentagon is preparing to sole-source the contract to replace the Defense Travel System (a process that began three years ago), you might expect a rousing roar of approval from the masses. Masses, worth noting, that have been subjected to three decades of a system so convoluted and capricious that it was euphemistically known to many as the “Don’t Travel System.” But most of us who spent those decades with the Defense Travel System also understand that any replacement—even Defense Travel Modernization—is still going to be subject to the same arcane travel regulations and the same human error. That translates to a fairly high likelihood that even though the system itself might be a significant improvement over its Quasimodo-like predecessor, many of the frustrations common to official travel will remain.

Everyone knew DTS was bad from almost the start … but here we are over a decade and a half later for a resolution … and it won’t resolve the core of the problem.

That tells you a lot about the dysfunction in DC. Tells you a lot about why we seem frozen in aspic when it comes to bringing the fleet what it needs to win ... or hell, just travel to Norfolk and back without expending half a work-day setting up and resolving the travel for a 3-day trip. 

Our ossified and accretion burdened bureaucracy has lost the bubble on why it exists in the first place. 

Quod erat demonstrandum.

Let us hope we learned our lesson with DTS and bring the fleet something that saves time, money, and headaches. I am a closet optimist. We’ll see.


Monday, July 16, 2007

Defend Norm!

Bravo Zulu to Chap! Did you know that Senator Norm Coleman (R-MN) is trying to kill that bucket of FOD DTS! Oh, glory of glories! Almost the best news since calling the new killer UAV the "Raptor." Anyway, buckets of cluelessness, this time led by Bill Hobbs, are trying to make it look like something slimy and crooked. Ace picked it up and is keeping an open mind. Chap weighed in using one of my posts on DTS to tell Ace to look closer at what Sen. Coleman is doing - and folks are coming out of the woodwork to report on the garbage DTS is. Head on over to Ace's place if you have a DTS story that needs to be told. Ace is a Mensch, be polite - he is just looking for the truth - help a brother out.

A hearty Bravo Zulu to Senator Colman too. Keep it up!

Monday, August 27, 2018

DTS: How Long Does it Take to Get Rid of a Bad Military Program?

It looks like a bit over a dozen years. It was clear as early as 2006 that DTS was FOD, but ... well ... I guess DOD works on its own timeline;
The Defense Department has selected a new vendor to overhaul and replace the aging and widely-reviled IT system military personnel use to book airline flights and make other travel arrangements, the Pentagon said Thursday.

DoD issued a $9.3 million other transaction agreement (OTA) to SAP Concur to build a prototype that will eventually take the place of the current Defense Travel System (DTS), which processes nearly $9 billion in travel spending each year.

Concur is a subsidiary of the global software giant that focuses primarily on delivering travel and expense management as a service, a model that lines up with what Pentagon officials had previously said they wanted: a commercial “travel-as-a-service” offering to replace the government-owned systems that currently make up DTS.
Should we be optimistic?

Once can hope.


Tuesday, July 25, 2006

DTS: can you kill the undead?

Yes, someone needs to be fired. Read other posts here and here on DTS, then let's look some more.
After eight years of development, the Defense Travel System will finally approach full deployment in 2006. But only a fraction of Defense Department travelers use the system, and its costs have risen. So the Senate is using its budget powers to force accountability and reward performance by switching from appropriated funding to a fee-for-service system. ... The original contract anticipated full deployment by 2002.
...
Sen. Tom Coburn (R-Okla.), ... “most Pentagon employees would be better off to go to Travelocity or Orbitz.”
That's a fact.
DOD said the system will save the government $13 million this year. But the calculations that produced that figure are unclear.
...
Northrop Grumman’s six-year DTS contract expires at the end of fiscal 2006. According to the Government Accountability Office, DTS will have cost $474 million by that time,
Let's do the math. Save $13, not let's round up to $15 million a year. Cost is $474 million. Break even in 2037 if you start from FY06. Mmmmm. Given Moore's Law, what'cha bet technology in industry will have a better answer by then? Oh, I know, the savings were this year when the system isn't fully up and running (DOD says that represents a 60% usage figure for the first year. This would give you ~ $21 million a year at full utilization and a run to 2026 to break even).

Ok then. Let's say it generates 10 times the savings of the original figure to $130 million. That still gets you to 2009. Moore's Law. Think the Pentagon will change its already outdated computers that caused a lot of the coding problems by then? One would hope. Then what?

Don't even get me started on the user interface, documentation, and personnel training of the system.......

Tuesday, January 24, 2006

DTS vs. Travelocity

OK Navy travel pros, when you get done with your Society Of Government Travel Professionals meeting, reviewing your union gouge, and trying to figure out your acronyms - you may want to riddle me this.

I know a guy who is going on TDY to New Zealand. He wants to take his wife. SATO using DTS quotes the round trip of $4,000. Well, he wants wifey to come along, and using their own research on her ticket they knew that tickets on that flight were about $1900. He told the SATO folks and she said she was glad to find out. It seems that DTS doesn't look for the best price, though the flight info was from Travelocity as clear as day, but DTS doesn't have that same info.

Classic example. Gov'munt contract for something that already exists in industry. Can't outsource because the GS unions wouldn't have that ..... don't be shocked. Just more taxpayer money thrown away. If you think I am babbling, or you want to get upset - click here and here.

You don't want to know my story. Trust me - it is so bad - I really don't want to go over it.

Thursday, September 28, 2006

DTS: can you kill the undead II: Electric boogaloo

DTS, again. You just can't kill this thing....though we are getting closer.
"It's been a pig," said Sen. Tom Coburn (R-Okla.), chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs subcommittee on federal financial management, who is trying to kill the travel system contract.
One of the best statements coming out of the Senate this year.
After a decade and more than $500 million in costs, the Defense Department's new travel booking system doesn't work, it doesn't save money, and most staff members don't use it, a new study says.

A Government Accountability Office report released yesterday slams the Northrop Grumman-designed Defense Travel System and calls Pentagon estimates of usage and cost savings into serious question. So poor is the Pentagon's analysis of the system's merits, the report says, that defense officials offered a credit card company news release as sole proof for its claim that the system saves millions of dollars each year.
...
The Defense Department has spent more than $500 million on the program since 1998, an overrun of about $200 million, according to figures compiled by Congress from GAO and Defense Department reports.
...
The system was born of a 1995 Pentagon task force recommendation to replace the department's outmoded, chaotic travel procedures with one standardized system for booking official travel, from airlines to hotels. But technical problems have foiled efforts to coax employees to use it.
Think about your IT requirements in 1995. Do they matter if 11 years they still are not addressed.....and you are trying to make them work in a 2006 environment? 1995, what was that Windows 95?
Asked for proof that its system would save $31 million yearly in personnel costs, the Pentagon provided a copy of an American Express news release that discussed savings achieved through a completely different booking system, in a private company.

In a written response to the report, Undersecretary of Defense David S.C. Chu strongly objected to criticism of the Pentagon's estimates of personnel cost savings. "The Department is facing an enormous challenge and must successfully prosecute today's war while still making investments that safeguard the future," he wrote.
I'll let Skippy deal with Dr. Chu.
"It's time to close this program down," said Sen. Norm Coleman (R-Minn.), who chairs the Senate's Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee's investigations panel, which held a hearing last year on the bill.
More Senate sanity.

Hey, $500 million - you might be able to buy a Corvette, errrr, Little Crappy Ship, for that (1 mission module included - when developed). OK, it can't defend itself very well in the Littoral against ASM like the C-802, but that is why the "L" stands for Little.

Monday, February 04, 2013

Yea .... I retired at the right time ...

I am going to anonomize this as I don't want everyone to tease this COS. Those who have been in the rodeo awhile will be able to narrow down who this is .... but .... Shipmate has to be thinking to himself, "I am a senior Captain in the world's largest navy. I have a respectful record of service at peace and war. I am the Chief of Staff at a significant command with oversight of thousands ... nay ... tens of thousands if you count in right ... and ... sigh ... sequestration can bite me."

From: [redacted] CAPT [redacted] , N01
Sent: Wednesday, January 30, 2013 17:30
To:[redacted] _ALL_[redacted]
Subject: STAFF BUDGET REDUCTION

Staff,

I am sure that you all have been hearing quite a bit about
sequestration recently.  With that, we have been directed to reduce
our admin costs and limit our travel to Mission Essential only.  Below
is a summary of what we are currently doing, and what I am expecting
from every employee.

Reduce Printing:

- Be mindful of what you are printing.  Where possible, review the
document/data electronically. PowerPoint presentations should also be
reviewed electronically and only be printed when finalized.

- If you print, ensure that for documents/emails that you are printing
on both sides of the page, front and back.  For PowerPoint
presentations, you should print two slides to a page on both the front
and back page.

- If you attending a brief that will be presented on a large screen,
printing of the brief should be limited to only those that are
briefing.

- Effective immediately, if [redacted] is going to be briefed with a
PowerPoint brief that is greater than four (4) slides, the Flag
Conference room should be reserved to brief [redacted] utilizing the
large screens.  Only one copy of the brief should be printed, which
will be used by the briefer for notes.  N6 and the Flag Secretary will
coordinate the logistics of the brief.

Government Vehicles:

- I have directed a 50% reduction in the number of vehicles that we
are leasing.  To support this effort, we will be developing a pool of
vehicles that will support all of our codes.  The process for this
will be provided in the near future.

Blackberries, Cell Phones, and Air Cards:

- We are currently reviewing individual requirements for communication
needs, and we will possibly reduce staff blackberries, cell phones,
and air cards.

Mission Essential Travel:

-  We must reduce travel immediately to Mission Essential only. Travel
is authorized for requirements that would negatively impact [redacted] ’s
mission, if not executed. All travel should be discussed with COS via
your ACOS/SA prior to entering the Authorization Request into DTS.

Admin Supplies:

-  Funding for admin supplies has been reduced.  Admin supplies that
will be provided will be limited to basic requirements; we will not be
providing any specialty type of items.

Information about sequestration is coming out regularly, and I will
provide you all with an update when appropriate.  Thank you all for
your hard work and dedication in supporting our ships, units, and
sailors.  Together we will get through this.

Regards,
COS

Tuesday, July 16, 2013

SECNAV and USPS: Fonctionnaire Follies at its Worst

So, what is para 2 actually saying to grandma - ruck up and make it snappy?

The internet is forever ... and so more often than not are those addresses that at the start of a deployment or tour are either online with address books, or like grandma - offline with dead-tree address books, yellow-stickies on the wall next to the desk, or just the return address on the note that Seaman Timmy sent her about where to send those cookies while he is gone.

From the people who brought you DFAS and DTS ... BEHOLD!


R 121811Z JUL 13
FM SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
TO ALNAV
INFO SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
BT
UNCLAS
ALNAV 047/13
MSGID/GENADMIN/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC//JUL//

SUBJ/MANDATORY USE OF NINE-DIGIT ZIP CODE FOR MOBILE UNIT ADDRESSES//

REF/A/LTR/USPS USE OF NINE-DIGIT ZIP CODE/13FEB2013/-/NOTAL//
AMPN/REF A PROVIDES DETAILS ON ZIP+4 REQUIREMENTS FOR NAVY MOBILE UNITS//
RMKS/1. The United States Postal Service (USPS) is resizing military mail processing operations from two coastal locations to one location in Chicago, IL to gain efficiencies in military mail delivery. As part of this effort, new procedures affecting configuration of mobile Fleet Post Office (FPO) addresses have been implemented to completely leverage automated mail sorting equipment and reduce manual sorting workload.

2. Each Navy mobile unit (i.e., ships, squadrons, and detachments)has a unique, nine-digit (ZIP+4) FPO ZIP code. Per reference (a), and effective immediately, the sender must include the full, correct, nine-digit ZIP code on all classes of mail, or USPS will return mail to sender marked undeliverable as addressed.

3. Service members must ensure all correspondents, personal and professional, are aware of and use the full, correct, nine-digit ZIP code. Navy mobile units should promulgate this policy change, with their nine-digit ZIP code, via plan of the day notes, site TV announcements, family-grams, and/or any other media means available.

4. Released by Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy.//

BT

#0000
Even though the SECNAV's signature is on this message, odds are he never saw it - or at least I hope so. In that case, this is just an example of horrible staff work. Has anyone in the chop chain here or at USPS ever been deployed? Do they know, even in the era of email and Skype - the power of the note and the package .... and the heartbreak of those who poured their love in to that letter or package, only a week or more later to have it returned as "undeliverable as addressed."

Al Qaeda couldn't think of a greater subliminal PSYOPS campaign against the home-front than this.

This is fixable - let's hope the better hearts and minds in DC get this fixed before we have a bunch of confused, frustrated, teary-eyed and probably angry family members who just want Seaman Timmy to get grandma's cookies before they get moldy.

Hat tip JB.

Monday, January 11, 2010

DC centric warfare

My last few years on active duty were spent, how does one put it, in interesting places doing interesting things.

One of the primary characteristics of my last few years was that more often than not I was very far away from a NIPR machine, NMCI, or other Navy centric IT support.

As a result, I finely honed an already sever dislike of the arcane, narrow focused, rigid and non-operational NCMI and CAC series of hoops we were sold on. The system could work better if it was more flexible and used commercial access options - but its rigidity is almost Soviet in its application.

If you find yourself overseas and are forced to use Army, USAF, or allied systems - you are S.O.L. CAC works great when you are on shore duty in DC, Norfolk or San Diego ..... but be in any slightly different environment and it will take days of waiting and potentially hours sitting through Army CBT just to get access.

Of course, you can laugh or cry. I prefer to laugh, especially when hazing the Reserves.

From one of my USNR spies;
.... most navy websites that require a login now require a CAC for access. On the active duty side, where NMCI machines are readily available, it doesn't pose much of a problem. Us reservists have to rely on the poorly supported CAC readers installed on our personal computers. .... From what I've been able to figure out, the NMCI help desk will spend a few hours with you on the phone, but after that, their solution seems to be "go use an NMCI terminal. We can't fix your home PC."

Anyway, I got a letter in the mail a few weeks ago about a Reserve on-line survey regarding CACs, CAC readers, and problems with them. It contained the standard "we know there are problems...your input is vital...the VADM will see the results...we will address the problems..." You know, the usual.

I've had my share of problems with my CAC and CAC reader in the past, so I decided to fill out the survey.

Got on my computer and typed in the link to the site, only to find out that you need to use your CAC in order to complete the survey about CAC problems.

Sigh...
Reminds me of the Staff I was on in a CONUS backwater in the 90s as computers were just coming into common use. The new Admiral came in and started asking for this and that .... it was fun to watch the "Sir, we don't have enough funding for that .... we can't get that access from here .... that service isn't available here .... " and all the new N00 could say was, "Well, Admiral Soandso in DC can .... it works in Norfolk ....."

Good times .... good times .... of course the Staff was the problem.

Sad thing is - the CAC problem, like the
DTS problem - is well known but won't be fixed. Why? "We don't have that problem in DC. My Flag Writer and Flag Sec take care of that for me. I hear next FY more funding will address .... "

Thursday, January 16, 2020

From DDG-1000 to CA-154?

So, we have a rump, 3-ship class of land attack destroyer, the ZUMWALT Class, that was designed about a bespoke 6.1-in (nee 155mm) naval gun that we are not going to use because we did not have an economist or historian on the program team.

As such, and we don't have to even go in to the problematic manning and other issues, we have your classic white elephant tooling around with the most expensive 30-mm batteries in Christendom with nothing forward of bridge of any lethality unless you are an unfortunate Cetacean that can't get out of the way of its bow on the few occasions it gets underway.

Well, we spent billions of dollars borrowed in the name of children yet unborn to get these in the fleet ... what can we do with them besides relegate the trio to technology demonstrators, CAPT Commands, or missile possible sponges as we try to keep the Chinese Fleet from moving east of Oahu?

It seems smart people with hard jobs have been looking at options and they may have found a way to get something moving forward.

To get a better idea we'd need a few artists rendering informed by competent marine engineers - but before we start getting the blow torches and blueprints out, let's see what they have to say.

The Navy’s newest destroyer may fire a not-yet-to-be fielded Conventional Prompt Strike conventionally-armed missile engineered to hit anywhere on earth within an hour, service program managers said. The weapon, now being considered by Navy weapons developers for the emerging USS Zumwalt, will bring new attack options to the stealthy destroyer being prepared for combat as soon as 2021, Capt. Kevin Smith, Zumwalt-class destroyer Program Manager
OK, let's unpack this a bit. First of all, let's define the most sparkly item; CPS;
Navy Starts Conventional Prompt Strike Missile Program Evidence of the growing Pentagon interest in hypersonic missiles, several exploratory programs have been shifted into engineering development over the past year. In 2019, DARPA relinquished control over the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program, with the effort transferred to the Navy’s Strategic Systems Program. Now called Conventional Prompt Strike, the effort became a program-of-record in late 2019. The aim of the program is to examine a new intermediate range missile that can be fired from Ohio-class missile submarines that have been converted to launch cruise missiles (SSGNs) and Virginia-class attack submarines equipped with the Virginia Payload Module.
...
On 30 October 2018, the Navy flew the first CPS test, designated Flight Experiment 1, more than 2,000 nautical miles from Hawaii to the Marshall Islands. ... The Navy expects to conduct the CPS Flight Experiment-2 in 2020 and FE-3 in 2022. So far, there is no estimate regarding an introduction into service.

The CPS missile is not called a ballistic missile since it employs a hypersonic maneuvering body to carry its warhead, called the Common Hypersonic Glide Body(C-HGB). On 30 August 2019, Dynetics Technical Solutions (DTS)of Huntsville, AL, was awarded a $351.6 million contract to build at least 20 Common Hypersonic Glide Bodies for both the Army and the Navy. The Army’s counterpart to the CPS is the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW). Lockheed Martin was awarded a $347 million contract in September 2019 for this program.
So, that is what we are looking at. First step, we need to find a way to shoehorn the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) in to the Zumwalt.

Not sure you will be able to do that by the end of FY21, but we'll see.

There is limited real estate - believe it or not - in this Graf Spee sized "destroyer." As such, what presently is fallow ground looking for highest and best use?  That's right kiddies, those mothballed 6.1" gun mounts. Let's extract those.

How many VPM can you fit in that space?


Each VPM is 87" wide. I can't seem to find a good open source diagram to ponder with, but let's make some assumptions using these two as reference points.


For planning purposes, let's remove both 6.1" mounts. In place of the forward, lets say you can install 3 VPM. Where the aft mount is, because it gets a bit wider, you can fit 5; 3 down the centerline like you did with the forward mount, and then two to the side between the two closest to the bridge.

The VPM can hold 7 TLAM. Will CPS use up the same space as a TLAM? If we assume so, that will give you 8x7=56 CPS if you did a full load out.

That ain't nothing. That is something. Could we do that ship modification for the cost of a LCS? If so, I'd approve that ship modification if for no other reason than not buying more LCS ... but for my approval you'd have to do the right thing and classify this pocket battleship sized warship to what it actually is; a cruiser.

As this would not be an air defense cruiser, but a cruiser designed around surface and land attack, then let's call it what it is; an attack cruiser. CA-154 is the next available number. If you insist on keeping the redundant "G" then fine, CG-74 - but that is lame.

This has the potential of salvaging something of use. Also, being that the VPM was designed for submarines, it will be more than fit-to-purpose for the bow of that tumblehome hull. That thing will be wet.

Wednesday, November 06, 2013

What happens when decision makers never go to sea or deploy ...

This is absolutely insane. It should be at duffleblog, but no - this is what happens when you create entire career paths that are not actually involved in warfighting and no one in the chain of command has any clue what it means after over a decade of war and, well for the Navy, centuries of getting underway working 18 hr days with little to no bandwidth.

Even in 2013 ... via Mark D. Faram at NavyTimes;
The following mandate went out Tuesday via the official Navy Detailer’s Facebook page: Sailors must now log in to “most Navy systems” every 30 days or their accounts will be deactivated. A reactivation will require a call to the Navy and Marine Corps Internet help desk (and possibly a long wait).

The Facebook post fails to mention which websites will require regular logins. However, the Navy Reserve posted a list of 18 sites (provided below) that are impacted by this new policy. Three of those sites are reserve specific. The rest impact everyone in uniform.The Navy Reserve posted the following list of websites and applications requiring monthly logins:

Apply
BUPERS Online
Career Management System/Interactive Detailing
DEERS Verification/Self Service
Defense Travel System
Enterprise Safety Applications Management Systems
MyPay
Navy College Program
Navy Education and Training Command
Navy Family Accountability and Assessment System
Navy Knowledge Online
Navy Reserve Data Warehouse
Navy Reserve Order Writing System
Navy Reserve Readiness Module
Navy Standard Integrated Personnel System
Total Workforce Management Services
Travel Risk Planning System
Tricare
YHGTBSM.

I'm sorry - can we have someone gibbeted as a warning to others?

Not torqued of about the tail wagging the teeth enough yet? Check the incredibly wrong headed attitude of the Facebook post. The Millington Diktat delenda est.


They even advertise that NMCI customer service blows. What's next? DTS slamathon?

I know CNP is a P-3 bubba soaked in lots of bandwidth and all ... but dude; someone between the good-idea fairy in the N6 Dept and N00 didn't say, "Stop, this is stupid."?

Hat tip Chap.

Thursday, October 13, 2016

Diversity Thursday

The USAF has a problem.

Of course, you say, Sal must be talking about;

The Air Force’s growing shortage of fighter pilots is a “quiet crisis that will almost certainly get worse before it gets better,” the service’s new chief and its top civilian leader said in an opinion piece published Thursday. But how bad is it? According to data obtained by The Washington Post, the number of fighter pilots in the service has fallen five years straight, and plummeted in the last two despite increasing need.
Well, yes - a serious organization focused on mission and having an ear towards accountability to the taxpayer and the very serious mandate to promote national security would be focused on this - but this is the American military's Air Force, so...

Don't be such a militarist.

The adoption of the worst parts of 1970s racial theory, self-loathing, rent seeking political calculus, and just plain intellectual cowardice has combined along with the tens of millions of dollars of diversity slush money to meet its logical conclusion in the USAF.

Our friend John Q. Public got the first sniffs of it about a year ago;
Earlier this year, Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James introduced a series of new personnel initiatives geared toward enhancing diversity, inclusiveness, and equality across the force.

At the time, I offered criticism that her ideas appeared more politically expedient than substantive, and that some of what she wanted to do would require contending with various legal obstacles and regulatory challenges. I also worried aloud at the time that implementation of her initiatives, if done clumsily, could prove divisive, and that this might trigger new backlash and disharmony across a force already exhausted from a solid decade of human resource malpractice.

Others came right out and predicted that these policies would lead inevitably to race and gender quotas, creating unintended consequences that should be carefully considered before implementation.

“It’s quotas,” said retired Col. Terry Stevens at the time. Stevens spent 35 years in the Air Force and held a high-level post at the personnel center for 8 of those years. Stevens added:
“They won’t say that, but … [it’s] quotas. If you’re going to do that instead of picking the best qualified of any applicant, then you’re actually downgrading the quality of the force. A lot of people are not going to agree with that, but it’s true.”
What is the uniformed head of the USAF saying?
The officials said they are working on a plan for an increased retention bonus to get pilots to stay longer. Currently, they offer $25,000 a year to stay up to nine years.
"We've got to make sure that we remain competitive," Goldfein said.

In addition to a pay boost, Goldfein, a former fighter pilot, added that it was necessary to improve the "quality of service," which he said involved making sure pilots can remain engaged when not flying combat operations.

"The reality is, pilots who don't fly, maintainers who don't maintain, controllers who don't control are not going to stay with the company because we're not allowing them to be the very best they can be," he said.
Well, that was November. In less then 10 months, then this happened.
The first new initiative mandates that at least one diverse candidate will have to be in the running for important developmental positions like aide-de camp, senior enlisted advisor and executive officer, among other roles.

A second proposal, however, declares that Development Teams (DTs) and Command Selection Boards (CSBs), both intimately involved in the selection process, must have a certain number of diverse candidates sitting on them.

More dramatically, the CSB or DT president must “assess the diversity of both the selectees and those not selected for command following the board’s decision.” In other words, the heads of these boards will have to provide clear justification if they decide to make decisions that run-up against diversity goals.
Let's take a moment to clearly define this for you. "Goals" are quotas. If you don't meet them, you will be reported to the Star Chamber. It really is that simple.
To head-off immediate criticisms of the far-reaching proposals, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein recently insisted to Air Force Times in an interview: “This is not about social engineering. This is about maintaining a competitive advantage.”

Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James put down her foot and said she wants to make the demographics of the service match more closely with the changing demographics of America.
Sorry General Goldfein, no one believes you, and I would bet a tank of gas that you don't believe that either. It simply is not supported by the evidence.

If you define "competitive advantage" getting budgetary brownie points inside the Administration and in Congress, then sure. If you mean anything to do with combat effectiveness - which is color blind - then no. If you believe that race, creed, color or national origin has a competitive advantage, then you must believe in eugenics and genetic difference in races. If so, what do you believe, and how do they apply to races.

Please, tell us more about the racialist theories you support.
But even as diversity increases, there are still numerous key positions that don’t seem to attract diverse candidates, namely pilots, cyber operations, intelligence operations and space and missile operations, which is very upsetting to Air Force officials.

So in careers where there isn’t a lot of diversity, commanders will have to come up with plans explaining why airmen in those positions are mostly white, male heterosexuals and how commanders can work towards changing that representation.
So, the USAF is going to start asking Airmen about their sexual proclivities? That is a metric now as well? What if you are gender-fluid and your desires change one FY to another? How do you update that? What if one area has too many homosexuals, do we ... what - give preference to heterosexuals?

Yes friends, the USAF is well outside the, "best qualified for the job" circle of excellence.
Although the Air Force already has unconscious bias training, the service wants to change the dates of the training to take place just before officials make key career decisions.

“To the fullest extent possible, unconscious bias training will be given immediately prior to promotion boards, prior to DT meetings on school assignments, prior to civilian hiring panels, and prior to annual performance evaluations,” the fact sheet notes.
I warned you years ago that "unconscious bias" was going to get mainstreamed. You see, regardless of what you do, you are a bigot.

All this does is ensure employment for an otherwise unemployable cadre of Diversity Bullies.
“Diversity and inclusion are national security imperatives,” Air Force Director of Diversity and Inclusion Chevalier Cleaves said in 2015. “So we must succeed. There is no second place for us. In order to do that, we need to make sure that we leverage the talent of all Americans, not just some.”
No its not. What is a national security imperative is national unity and fair treatment to all. You can't have that when you promote sectarianism, race based preferences, and a science-free and merit blind system of promotion.

The military is a serious business. If you do not have the best and brightest, your people get killed and your nation is put under strategic risk.

Let's take a moment and play their game.

Here are the national demographics (2012);
White 77.4%
Black Americans 13.2%
Asian Americans 5.3%
Multiracial Americans 2.6%
Hispanics/Latinos (of any race) 17.8%

What are the USAF Demographics?
White 72.0%
Black Americans 14.0%
Asian Americans 3.6%
Multiracial Americans 3.8%
Hispanics/Latinos (of any race) 13.6%
Declined to respond 4.4%

OK. Tell me what you see. Look harder.

No. There isn't a problem. This is completely manufactured. The impressive thing is that we are doing so well.

Especially for Black and to a much lesser extent "Hispanic" Americans, all you need to do is look at the education and crime statistics - both of which are sure show stoppers to joining - and you see that even in a perfect world, you are going to have exceptional problems getting the same objective criteria results by racial and ethnic cohort - all subjective areas such as tradition and free will aside.

If you look at the new racialist guidelines the USAF is going to saddle itself with, you see that it isn't the aggregate numbers they are focused on. When you dig deeper in to the numbers, which we have done often in previous DivThu and won't repeat here today, there can be significant differences in racial representation as a percentage. Especially in what the Army calls, "Combat Arms" where your senior leaders, rightfully, mostly come from.

If they really cared about that discrepancy, they would work on those educational and societal factors that impact the pipeline before a recruiter even talks to someone. That is outside the USAF's control, so why punish the institution and its personnel for it through acts of commission and omission based on such divisive criteria as race, creed, color or national origin?

Let's go back to that smear on the honor of all good people and our nation, the lie of unconscious bias. Brendan Kirby over at Lifezette has a great review of what African immigrants are doing when given the opportunity this nation provides anyone who wants to work hard.
Black immigrants, on average, earn more money and use less welfare than blacks born in the United States, raising doubts about the reach and impact of systemic racism.

The income data, which comes from the Census Bureau, is not new.
...
The median household income for black immigrants, $48,232, is more than $14,000 higher than the median income for blacks born in the United States. Whites, Hispanics, and Asians born in the United States all out-earn their racial or ethnic counterparts who have immigrated to the United States. American-born blacks also are more likely than black immigrants to be enrolled at least one government-assistance program and more likely to be living in poverty. Those two categories also are the reverse of other racial and ethnic groups.

“There are some things about black immigrants that would make them do better,” said Steven Camarota, director of research at the Center for Immigration Studies.
...
Black immigration, like immigration generally, is quickly rising. Since 1980, the number of foreign-born blacks in the United States more than quadrupled. Blacks currently make up nearly 10 percent of all immigrants, up from 3.1 percent in 1980.

“Many black migrants perceive things are better overall in the U.S. than where they are coming from,” said Carl Lipscombe, who is on the senior leadership team at the left-leaning Black Alliance for Just Immigration. “I think many of them don’t realize or don’t expect to face discrimination based on race.”

But some black immigrants said dark-skinned immigrants from Africa and Caribbean perceive better opportunities in America because there are better opportunities.

Rick Nugent, president of the National Association of Jamaican and Supportive Organizations, said he originally came on a student visa in 1967 because there were few opportunities in his homeland. At the time, Jamaica had a single university, he said.

“Once you get adjusted to the lifestyle and the opportunities, you don’t go back,” he said. “There are jobs for people who want to work. Same with education.”
I was hoping they would get to the Caribbean immigrants of African extraction. That is what I grew up seeing first hand.

The difference is cultural. It isn't racial. That isn't a comfortable thing to say, but it is what it is. That doesn't mean we should ignore it - it is a very American problem that American of all backgrounds need to work on - but it also isn't an Air Force problem to solve.

Right now the USAF needs to focus why it can't keep its core competency capital - its pilots - inside its lifelines, regardless of their background.

Perhaps the solution is in Congress. As we covered six years ago, at the end of the Democrat control of Congress, they did the following;
Buried in the annual Coast Guard authorization act passed this week by Congress is wording that would strike from the U.S. Code the statement that all appointments to the Coast Guard Academy "shall be made without regard to the sex, race, color or religious beliefs of an applicant."
Yep. Until 2010, the USCG was one of the last places where they were prevented from discriminating on the basis of sex, race, color, or religious belief. In order to open the door to the Diversity Bullies - which they have done with great vigor - they had to be allowed to do that.

A great disgrace to the Republican Party, they have done nothing to get rid of this red in tooth and claw discriminatory change.

So, those of us who desire a military that does not care what your DNA says, just that you do your job well, have a setback. No reason to give up, we have made so much progress, but we just have to care more than the race obsessed bigots who care about nothing else.

If you'd like to review the "Diversity and Inclusion Initiatives fact sheet, here you go.

Tuesday, December 18, 2007

Worst symposium title of the quarter

Can we please get some more people on Staff that have a Communications or Public Relations degree? Heck, we don't need that - just a solid English major that took a few courses in logic and debate.

From the, "If you have to tell them...." school, I give you, - well - , ....

BEHOLD!
THIS YEARS THEME IS, A READY AND RELEVANT SURFACE NAVY:
Soooooo, we're not "READY" and "RELEVANT" right now? If we are, then who do we and why do we need to remind? Awwww heck; everyone should read the below for two reasons:
  1. The only time "ENTERPRISE" should be used in the USN is when "USS" goes in front of it. "Enterprise" this and that is getting reaaaaallllll old.
  2. Why travel is such a red@55. I also note, with glee, the complete non-DTS nature of the discussion.....
UNCLASSIFIED//
PASS TO OFFICE CODES:
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC//DNS//
TO NAVADMIN
UNCLAS
NAVADMIN 337/07
MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/DNS/DEC// SUBJ/NAVY ATTENDANCE AT THE
ANNUAL SURFACE NAVY ASSOCIATION (SNA) /NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM//
REF/A/DOC/OPNAV/27JUL1989// REF/B/DOC/BUPERS/17SEP2007// NARR/REF A IS OPNAVINST 4651.4C, POLICY REGARDING SECURITY ISSUES AND COST ASSOCIATED WITH PARTICIPATION IN NON-FEDERALLY SPONSORED SEMINARS, CONFERENCES AND COURSES. REF B IS BUPERSINST 1001.39F ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR NAVAL RESERVISTS ON INACTIVE DUTY.// RMKS/1. THE SURFACE NAVY ASSOCIATION (SNA) WILL HOLD ITS 20TH ANNUAL NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM IN ARLINGTON, VA AT THE HYATT REGENCY CRYSTAL CITY FROM 15-17 JANUARY 2008. THIS YEARS THEME IS, A READY AND RELEVANT SURFACE NAVY: AN ENTERPRISE APPROACH TO WARRIORS, SHIPS, AND SYSTEMS.
2. SNA MEMBERSHIP, NEARLY 5,500 STRONG, INCLUDES OVER 3,700 ACTIVE DUTY AND FORMER MILITARY MEMBERS DEDICATED TO THE GOAL OF ENHANCING PROFESSIONALISM IN THE SURFACE NAVY. THE SNA ANNUAL NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM PROVIDES THE OPPORTUNITY FOR ARMED FORCES-WIDE DISCUSSIONS ON A BROAD RANGE OF PROFESSIONAL AND CAREER ISSUES OF INTEREST AND CONCERN TO ITS EXTENSIVE AND DIVERSE MEMBERSHIP. THIS IS A FORUM WHERE MEMBERS CAN ADDRESS AND WORK TOWARDS INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS TO TODAYS ISSUES AND TOMORROWS SURFACE WARFARE CHALLENGES.
3. PER REFS A AND B, COMMANDING OFFICERS MAY ISSUE ORDERS FOR ATTENDANCE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE AFTER DETERMINING THAT THE EXPENSES, INCLUDING FEES, TRAVEL COSTS, AND OTHER COSTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO PARTICIPATION, JUSTIFY THE OBJECTIVES TO BE ACHIEVED. COMMANDING OFFICERS ARE DIRECTED TO FOLLOW THE GUIDANCE IN REFS A AND B WHEN MAKING THIS DETERMINATION. GOVERNMENT EXPENSE SHOULD BE MINIMIZED BY DESIGNATING THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS NECESSARY TO ACQUIRE AND RELATE INFORMATION FROM THE MEETING TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THEIR ORGANIZATION. TAD ORDERS MAY COVER EXPENSES INCIDENT TO ATTENDANCE AT AND PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE INCLUDING TRANSPORTATION, PER DIEM, AND REGISTRATION FEES PER JFTR AND JTR. IF FUNDS ARE NOT AVAILABLE, PERMISSIVE TAD ORDERS MAY BE ISSUED.
USE OF AVAILABLE GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION IS ENCOURAGED TO ENHANCE CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION AND TO DEFRAY TRAVEL EXPENSES.
4. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE MOST COST-EFFECTIVE TRANSPORTATION AVAILABLE, AGGREGATION OF SYMPOSIUM TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS IS ENCOURAGED. USE OF NAVY OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AIRLIFT (OSA) AND NAVY UNIQUE FLEET ESSENTIAL AIRCRAFT (NUFEA), IS THEREFORE AUTHORIZED SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES:
A. AIRLIFT NOT TO INTERFERE WITH FLEET REQUIREMENTS OR OTHER HIGHER PRIORITIES.
B. AIRLIFT WILL BE SCHEDULED PER APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING NUMBER OF PASSENGERS ON FUNDED ORDERS. REMAINING SEATS MAY BE USED BY OTHER ATTENDEES ON A SPACE AVAILABLE BASIS.
C. SPACE AVAILABLE FOR SNA ATTENDEES SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO NAVY/MARINE CORPS AND COAST GUARD PERSONNEL (IN UNIFORM) WHO WILL ATTEND AND ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THE SYMPOSIUM.
5. PER REF B, SELECTED RESERVE PERSONNEL ARE AUTHORIZED TO PARTICIPATE IN A PAID DRILL STATUS AT THE SNA SYMPOSIUM.
6. QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SYMPOSIUM SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE SNA ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE AT (703) 960-6800 OR VISIT WWW.NAVYSNA.ORG.
7. RELEASED BY VADM J. STUFFLEBEEM, DIRECTOR, NAVY STAFF.//
Hat tip Fleet LT.

Tuesday, October 04, 2005

Subs a top threat in PACOM – no kidding!!

In a painful-to-read puff piece in Stars and Stripes, Jennifer H. Svan gives Admiral Roughead a head-to-toe baby oil massage with a happy ending.

Under the heading Pacific Fleet commander: Sub threats top priority, this is written as if someone just discovered that the coastal regions of the NW Pacific are awash in small submarines, and by golly, they are hard buggers to find and kill. Lets watch the loving hands work.
Pacific Fleet Commander Adm. Gary Roughead said he’s made anti-submarine warfare, or ASW, his biggest priority since assuming command this summer.
So, it hasn’t been? What other threat is more likely to send a HVU to the bottom of the sea west of Guam, south of Alaska and north of the Philippines? When was ASW not a priority? Why was it not a priority? Who made that decision in the past, and who is going to be held accountable?
Improvements in underwater detection technology make the job easier but it still takes coordinated effort by the Navy’s ASW triad: helicopters and P-3 sub hunters in the air, ships on the surface and the Navy’s own submarine force.
Improvements since when? Your standard issue fleet P-3, SH-60 and surface ship have acoustic technology that date back to the 80s. Can anyone say AN/UYS-1? For Pete’s sake, the Canadians and British acoustic systems are two generation ahead of ours. We have some “neat” stuff out there, but not in any numbers to make a difference or that can be put in production after a war warning. Yep, our stuff is cool, but I don’t call two decade old technology improvements. Then again, you can put radial tires on a 57 Chevy and call that an improvement, so sure, it is an accurate statement. Don’t believe the PPT, go with what displaces water and makes shadows on the ramp.
.. he implemented “a cyclic approach” to training, using more frequent quarterly assessments. “We’re going to say, ‘OK, what all are we doing in ASW? What objectives did we have? Did we realize those and then what are we going to be doing in the next quarter?’”

The cycles include training exercises with other navies and integrating new technologies.

Among them is Composable Force Net, which integrates and displays multiple sources of information quickly for faster decision-making, Roughead said. It gives submarines an immediate view of something detected by a plane, for example.
CFN. Another acronym, buzz-worded PowerPoint improvement. No change in FUNDEMENTALS. Every Fleet LT just shook his head and laughed.
ASW even is cropping up in other types of training. During this summer’s Singapore phase of Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training — a general naval training exercise — Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light 45 pilots had the rare opportunity to hunt a real Singaporean navy submarine.

Helicopter pilots usually hunt subs solely in simulators, said pilot Lt. j.g. Amy Sadeghzadeh.
Rare only because we choose it to be rare. Amy spends more time a quarter spelling her name phonetically to others than learning how to kill a submarine. That is because her leadership chooses other priorities; priorities like spending over $400 million on a travel system that doesn’t work and duplicates existing COTS programs. If you want to get pissed read this and listen to this about DTS.
Roughead said that type of training opportunity, with more or larger-scale ASW-specific training, will help the U.S. Navy remain dominant. “Make no mistake, we are very good at anti-submarine warfare,” Roughead said. “But as we look at how capability is growing in the world, we can’t simply sit here” and be satisfied with that.
Why are we "sitting here?" Who made that decision, and, again, where is the accountability? When gross tonnage lies at the bottom of the sea of your choosing, who is going to stand in front of the Senate and make excuses?

Admiral, the only thing close to real ASW training to be found in the Pacific that will support an OPLAN is RIMPAC. The Japanese, South Korean and odd Aussie SS are a godsend. We need real targets, regular periods that don’t involve a sled, an augmented LA, a predictable course full of REGEN points, or a damn simulator. You cannot do anything more than basic procedure practice in a SIM. We believe our own BS if we think we satisfy real readiness in a SIM. It just isn’t true.


Here is heresy – we are proving that the nuke SSN mafia “all nuclear” line is full of holes. It is nice to have a Swedish sub tooling around, but where is our Submarine Squadron full of US SS? Key West will take them back. The old NB Charleston has room. Mayport is nice. You want to kill a SS, you had better practice, a lot, on the real thing.

And Admiral, tell them to shove it when they pull the “it takes forever to deploy a SS operationally” line of crap. We really need them for training; the OPS side is a nice benefit. They know you employ an SS/SSK like an SS/SSK – not an SSN. If we really didn’t need the capabilities of an SS, then why did we have to use a (now gone) Danish SS in OIF? .. and one of the last Brit O-boats in Gulf War 1 (with a cool paint job) doing things we can't talk about. Nuke subs are the crown jewel, but can't we afford a ruby or sapphire to go around it?

Keep the sub yards busy building a couple SS a year for us and a few select allies. Heck, save money and license build the German Type 212 or one of the Dutch subs. The Aussies worked out the kinks on the Collins – license build that. Japan is changing their laws all the time; use their latest design if they will sell it to us. We will have a pack of SS to play with, and use if we need to.

While we are at it, let's go secure and talk about hard kill……..

UPDATE: Well, all sorts of churn on this critter. I should read Bubblehead every day, he was on this a bit before me here, and has a good follow-on post here. PigBoatSailor is using the same hymnal as I am - mostly, here, and links to a great you-won't-read-this-in-Groton article here. Make sure and check out the comments for more give and take.

Oh, in case anyone is too binary about China and NORK, I do not believe they are the Red Banner Fleet full of perfect subs. You don't need that. Look again at the '71 Indo-Paki and Falklands conflict. It doesn't take much: you have to plan for that one good skipper in the shitty boat that can make things happen. Don't underestimate your enemy - especially one in a submarine. All David had was as sling and a stone - Goliath had nice armor, a sword, a shield, probably a lance. Wargame that.

Thursday, June 21, 2012

Diversity Thursday

I really don't know what is worst about this whole, hot mess.

Wait, that is easy - it is the core retrograde racialist mindset of it all - that was easy. It is the rest of the list that is hard to prioritize.

Let me see what I can do.

Well; sectarian, divisive, patronizing, insulting, bigoted, and wasteful. There' a start. Read the whole thing, then we'll chat about some of the gems.
R 151804Z JUN 12
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC
TO NAVADMIN
ZEN//OU=DOD/OU=NAVY/OU=ADDRESS LISTS(UC)/CN=AL NAVADMIN(UC)
INFO ZEN/CNO WASHINGTON DC
BT
UNCLAS
QQQQ
SUBJ: 2012 NATIONAL NAVAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPME
NT AND TRAINING CONFERENCE
UNCLASSIFIED/
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC//N1//
TO NAVADMIN
INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC//N1//
UNCLAS//N05050//
NAVADMIN 187/12
MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/N1/JUN//
SUBJ/2012 NATIONAL NAVAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
AND TRAINING CONFERENCE//
PAGE 02 RUEOMFA1101 UNCLAS
REF/A/DOC/DOD/6AUG1998//
REF/B/DOC/DOD/14APR2009//
REF/C/DOC/BUPERS/17SEP2007//
NARR/REF A IS DOD PUBLICATION 5500.7-R - JOINT ETHICS REGULATION REGARDING OFFICIAL PARTICIPATION IN NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES. REF B IS DOD DIRECTIVE 4500.56 - POLICY ON THE USE OF GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT AND AIR TRAVEL. REF C IS BUPERSINST 1001.39F - AIR TRAVEL.//
SUBJ/2012 NATIONAL NAVAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING CONFERENCE//
RMKS/1. THIS NAVADMIN ANNOUNCES THE NATIONAL NAVAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION (NNOA) PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING CONFERENCE BEING HELD 23-27 JULY 2012 AT THE ROOSEVELT HOTEL NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA.
2. NNOA FOSTERS THE ADVANCEMENT AND RECOGNITION OF MINORITY OFFICERS IN THE UNIFORMED NAVAL SERVICES. THE 2012 CONFERENCE THEME IS "NNOA: CELEBRATING 40 YEARS OF SEA SERVICE, ENHANCING DIVERSITY IN THE SEA SERVICES."
3. THE UNIFORM WILL BE SUMMER WHITE FOR NAVY PERSONNEL AND BUSINESS ATTIRE FOR CIVILIANS. NAVY UNIFORM FOR THE FORMAL AWARDS BANQUET WILL BE DINNER DRESS WHITE JACKET (OR OPTIONAL SERVICE DRESS WHITE FOR O3 AND BELOW) AND BLACK TIE (OR EQUIVALENT) FOR CIVILIANS AND GUESTS.
4. AUTHORIZATION TO EXPEND APPROPRIATED FUNDS FOR ATTENDANCE OR SUPPORT AT THIS CONFERENCE IS PENDING OSD APPROVAL AND WILL BE PROMULGATED AT A LATER DATE.
5. REGISTRATION, TRANSPORTATION, AND LODGING INFORMATION CAN BE FOUND ON THE NNOA WEBSITE AT WWW.NNOA.ORG. CONFERENCE FEES ARE $350 FOR LIFE MEMBERS, $375 FOR MEMBERS, AND $475 FOR NON-MEMBERS. AN ADDITIONAL FEE WILL BE APPLIED FOR ATTENDEES WHO REGISTER AFTER 7 JULY 2012. NNOA IS WAIVING REGISTRATION FEES FOR THE FIRST 100 JUNIOR OFFICERS (LIEUTENANT COMMANDER AND BELOW). OFFICERS WHO ARE PLANNING TO ATTEND SHOULD REGISTER EARLY FOR THE CONFERENCE AND THE HOTEL TO ENSURE RESERVATIONS ARE AVAILABLE.
6. POINTS OF CONTACT ARE:
A. CAPT JOEL PARKER AT (301) 400-[redacted] OR VIA E-MAIL AT [redacted](AT)NNOA.ORG OR [redacted](AT)MED.NAVY.MIL.
B. LCDR BEULAH HENDERSON (RET) AT (703) 231-[redacted] OR VIA E-MAIL AT [redacted](AT)NNOA.ORG
7. RELEASED BY VICE ADMIRAL S. R. VAN BUSKIRK, N1.//
BT
#1101
NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED//
Here we go.
NNOA FOSTERS THE ADVANCEMENT AND RECOGNITION OF MINORITY OFFICERS IN THE UNIFORMED NAVAL SERVICES.
That really tells you all you need to know. This is an organization that at its core is exclusionary, bigoted, racialist, and views people the same way as the KKK - by the color of someone's skin.

Whatever good intentions and use this organization may have once had - it is nothing but a negative well in to the second half of the 21st Century.


Harsh? Perhaps - but I have no use for anyone in the US military, regardless of their DNA - who either defines themselves or others by something as useless as self-identified race. Nothing good will every come of it.

And the Navy supports it. Nice. Then again - judging from their website, they have no pretense than to be anything but sectarian.
AUTHORIZATION TO EXPEND APPROPRIATED FUNDS FOR ATTENDANCE OR SUPPORT AT THIS CONFERENCE IS PENDING OSD APPROVAL AND WILL BE PROMULGATED AT A LATER DATE.
Well, we can at least try to stop that. Anyone hear anything yet?
CONFERENCE FEES ARE $350 FOR LIFE MEMBERS, $375 FOR MEMBERS, AND $475 FOR NON-MEMBERS.
That does not include air fare, hotel fare, or per diem.

This is a 5-day conference. Two travel days for seven total. An entire work week lost. Tally that opportunity cost yourself.

Do I need to mention that this hotel - which I know very well - is off Canal St. one block diagonally from the intersection of Bourbon St. & the French Quarter? There is no major DoN presence any more in New Orleans. You can easily bookend two weekends in New Orleans if your liver can take it.
UPDATE: Want to go to San Diego in August? Decide to join Richard Nixon's administration's invented group.
UPDATE II - Electric Boogaloo: I'd love to take credit, but let's just say the timing of this email is just superb.

Oh what the heck;
BEHOLD THE POWER OF THE SALAMANDER
-----Original Message-----
From: All Hands Messages
Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2012 15:57
To: [redacted]
Subject: Hold in Place on ALL Conference Attendance


Based on recent guidance, there is a hold in place on all conference attendance and sponsoring unless funds were obligated (e.g., travel authorizations were approved in DTS) prior to 03 June 2012. We are expecting further guidance on the matter and will send notification when the hold is lifted.

Respectfully,
Jennifer [redacted], Esq.
Ethics Counselor, [redacted]
11.0, Code [redacted]
[redacted], DSN [redacted]
Fax: [redacted]

Monday, April 21, 2008

Sea Swap and the INSURV

Byron, C-14; get a cup of coffee and get comfortable. The INSURV from the STOUT is making its rounds. Give it a read and then ponder the thoughts below it from a pro whose name I will keep to myself.
UNCLASSIFIED//
MSGID/GENADMIN,USMTF,2007/PRESINSURV NORFOLK VA//
SUBJ/INSURV REPORT FOR USS STOUT (DDG 55) MATERIAL INSPECTION (MI)// GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. THE BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY CONDUCTED AN MI OF USS STOUT (DDG 55) AT NORFOLK, VA DURING THE PERIOD 10-14 MAR 08 AT NORFOLK, VA.
2. SENIOR MEMBER COMMENTS:
A. USS STOUT WAS FOUND UNFIT FOR SUSTAINED COMBAT OPERATIONS.
B. ALTHOUGH THE SHIP CERTIFIED ITS READINESS FOR SEA, THE BOARD NOTED DISCREPANCIES THAT WOULD HAVE RESTRICTED UNDERWAY OPERATIONS OR DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS DURING THE POST-UNDERWAY PORTION OF THE MI: 2B GTM/1B GTM, 1 GTG, STEERING, RESCUE BOAT/MAN OVERBOARD, ANCHOR, SPY-1D, FCS ILLUMINATORS, AFT VLS, CIWS MT 21, MK 32 SVTTS AND MK 45 LWG, HALON, AND UHF LOS COMMS.
C. AAW, USW, AND SUW MISSION AREAS WERE SIGNIFICANTLY LIMITED BECAUSE: AN/SPY-1D POWER OUT WAS REDUCED BY APPROX 75 PERCENT AND THE PROCESSING ABILITY WAS REDUCED BY APPROX 13 PERCENT, 2 OF 3 MK 99 ILLUMINATORS WERE INOP (LOSS OF 360 DEG COVERAGE AND NUMBER OF MISSILES INFLIGHT), AFT VLS MAGAZINE WAS UNAVAILABLE BECAUSE OF THE FUEL TANK LEAKAGE IN THE EDUCTOR SUMP (LOSS OF 68 PERCENT OF THE MISSILE INVENTORY), CIWS MT 21 WAS INOP, PORT AND STBD MK 32 SVTT TRAIN MECHANISMS WERE BINDING AND MOUNTS COULD NOT BE QUICKLY TRAINED TO FIRING POSITION, AND MK 45 5 INCH GUN COULD NOT SUPPORT GUNNERY DEMO BECAUSE OF CORROSION IN THE GUN CRADLE. SEE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE, OPERATIONS, AND WEAPONS SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS.
D. THE ANCHORING DEMO WAS NOT COMPLETED BECAUSE THE ANCHOR WINDLASS WILDCAT/CAPSTAN SHAFT COUPLING UPPER AND LOWER SLEEVES HAD EXCESSIVE CONCENTRIC MOVEMENT (UP TO 1/4 INCH) AND THE MECHANICAL BRAKE WAS MISADJUSTED.
E. MOB RECOVERY METHOD WAS DEGRADED. CORROSION ON THE DAVIT FOUNDATION, PEDESTAL, FALLS TENSIONING DEVICE, DAVIT SHEAVE, AND THE HOOK SECURING PIN WAS SEVERE ENOUGH TO WARRANT A SAFETY INSPECTION (COULD NOT DEPLOY RHIBS). THE AS-FOUND SAR SWIMMER GEAR WOULD NOT PERMIT OPS IN WATER TEMP BELOW 60 DEG F.
F. THE SHIP INITIATED SELF-SUSPENSION OF FLIGHT OPS FOR DAMAGED FLIGHT DECK
NETS AND HARDWARE. AVIATION FACILITIES INSPECTION RESULTED IN 7 ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SELF-SUSPENSION OF FLIGHT OR AVIATION RELATED OPS. SEE AVIATION SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS.
G. ENGINEERING CONTROL SYSTEMS WERE DEGRADED. 8 OF 8 CONSOLES FOUND WITH RESISTANCE READINGS BETWEEN RETURN AND GROUND TO BE BELOW THE MINIMUM OF 250K OHMS IAW PMS 2521/051 A-18. 5 OF 62 DDG'S HAVE EXPERIENCED UNCOMMANDED MAIN PROPULSION/ELECTRICAL GENERATION EVENTS DUE TO GROUNDS.
H. 11 GTM RBOS AND 7 GTG RBOS WERE IDENTIFED DURING THE INPORT INSPECTION.
I. RUDDER INSPECTION OVER THE PAST 11 MONTHS INDICATED BARE METAL SURFACE AREA HAD INCREASED BY APPROX 700 PERCENT AND 270 PERCENT FOR STBD AND PORT RUDDERS RESPECTIVELY. ADDITIONALLY, PITTING OF UP TO 2 INCHES IN DIAMETER BY 0.25 INCHES DEEP HAD DEVELOPED ON THE RUDDER SURFACE AREA. THE SHIP'S IMPRESSED CURRENT CATHODIC PROTECTION (ICCP) SYSTEM WAS NOT OPERATING PROPERLY. ICCP IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT BARE METAL DAMAGE.
J. GROUNDS IN 60 HZ DISTRIBUTION AND IC SYSTEMS WERE A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE. 3 ICSM PANELS, 5 60 HZ POWER PANELS, 4 SOUND POWERED PHONE CIRCUITS, AND 1 SHORE POWER RECEPTACLE WERE FOUND GROUNDED DURING THE INSPECTION. 2 GROUNDS DISCOVERED BY SHIP'S FORCE IN JAN 08 HAD NOT BEEN CORRECTED. INVESTIGATION AND CORRECTION OF THE GROUNDS IAW NSTM 300 PARA 300-3.2.6 WAS REQUIRED.
K. KEEL REST AND BOAT CHOCKS DID NOT HAVE 90 PERCENT MINIMUM CONTACT WITH THE BOAT IN THE STOWED POSITION.
L. ACCOM LADDER WAS NOT OBSERVED. LADDER WAS OFF THE SHIP FOR REPAIR (CASREP 07094).
M. ANCHOR CHAIN'S 1ST AND 2ND SHOT DID NOT RIDE IN THE WELP OF THE WILDCAT IAW NSTM 581-5.1.4.1.
N. MK 39 GYRO DATA CONVERTER (GDC) DATA TO SPY-1D COMPUTER INTERMITTENTLY CHANGED STATUS FROM GOOD TO FAILED, CAUSING AFT GYRO INFORMATION TO BE UNRELIABLE BECAUSE OF FAULTY ADAPTATION DATA CIRCUIT CARDS. SYMPTOM WAS ORIGINALLY IDENTIFIED IN MAR OF 06 (CASREP 06049, USS STOUT MSG 311830Z MAR 06) WHICH ALSO IDENTIFIED UNRELIABLE DATA TO WCS, GUN FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM, AND N PLUS 1 COMPUTER.
O. AFT MK41 VLS HAD 10 DELUGE VALVES LEAKING AND FWD VLS HAD 3 VALVES LEAKING. SALINITY CHECK AFT HAD TWICE THE ALLOWABLE LIMIT (4 VICE 2 MICROMHO). SEDIMENT WAS ALSO PRESENT IN THE AFT DELUGE HOSES WHICH WILL LEAD TO VALVE FAILURES.
P. MT 51 CRADLE ROUND/POWDER POSITION SWITCHES WERE CORRODED, PREVENTING THE GUN FROM FIRING DURING THE GUNNERY DEMO. CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUIRED 4 HOURS (CORRECTED). ADDITIONALLY, SALT WATER CORROSION WAS ON THE CRADLE VALVE BLOCKS, LOADER DRUM PIPING/VALVE BLOCKS, FUZE SETTER ELECTRICAL SWITCH CONNECTORS, MAIN CABLE CONNECTOR TIE-POINT, LOWER HOIST ASSEMBLY, SHIELD ACCESS DOOR LINKAGES, AND UPPER HOIST CHAIN TRACK.
Q. SHIP'S UHF LOS COMMUNICATIONS WERE DEGRADED AND COULD NOT FULLY SUPPORT 80 PERCENT OF 5TH FLEET COMMUNICATIONS PLAN WITH AVAILABLE ASSETS. OVERALL COMMUNICATION ANTENNA MAINTENANCE AND CORROSION PREVENTIVE MEASURES, IF UNIMPROVED, WILL LEAD TO FURTHER COMMUNICATION SYSTEM DEGRADATIONS. SEE COMMUNICATIONS SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS.
R. AN/USQ-153 ISNS SIPRNET AND NIPRNET WERE DEGRADED WITH THE FOLLOWING DEFICIENCIES: SERVERS HAD UNAUTHORIZED USB 500GB HARD DRIVES CONNECTED, IAVA PATCHES WERE NOT CURRENT, SERVERS REQUIRED DEFRAGMENTATION, TAPE BACK-UP DEVICES WERE INOP OR MALFUNCTIONING, AND INTEGRATED NETWORK MANAGER (INM) WOULD NOT START.
S. AN/USQ-144 ADNS SYSTEM HAS BEEN INSTALLED FOR OVER 1 YEAR WITHOUT A COMPLETED SOVT.
T. FOOD SERVICE DIVISION'S ABILITY TO SAFELY OPERATE WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE OF THE GREASE INTERCEPTOR HOOD MATERIAL CONDITION. SEE SUPPLY SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS.
U. SHIP'S ABILITY TO STORE, PREPARE, AND SERVE FOOD WAS DEGRADED. SPECIFICALLY: WALK-IN FREEZER DID NOT MAINTAIN 0 DEG F OR BELOW (CORRECTED), 5 OF 13 REACH-IN REEFERS WERE INOP, 4 OF 13 REACH-IN REEFERS WERE DEGRADED, REACH-IN REEFER CONDENSER COIL FILTER CLEANING MAINTENANCE WAS NOT BEING COMPLETED (CORRECTED), 2 OF 2 SINGLE TANK DISHWASHERS WERE INOP, 3 OF 3 WASTE DISPOSAL UNITS WERE INOP, 3 OF 4 STEAM KETTLES WERE INOP, 1 OF 3 CONVECTION OVENS WAS INOP, AND 1 OF 2 SANITIZING SINKS WAS INOP.
V. SEALANT IN THE SHOWERS HAD FAILED, ENABLING 7 OF 12 SANITARY SPACE SHOWER DECKS TO BECOME SEPARATED FROM THE SURFACE AND ROT.
W. BERTHING 2 HAD NUMEROUS MATERIAL AND PRESERVATION ISSUES WITH THE BERTHING TIER FOUNDATIONS CORRODED TO THE POINT OF LOST METAL DUE TO A WATER FOUNTAIN THAT HAD BEEN LEAKING FOR A YEAR (SHIP REPORTED). BERTHING IS SCHEDULED FOR REHABILITATION IN 2011. FOUNDATIONS REQUIRE TESTING FOR QUALIFICATION TO SAFELY SUPPORT PERSONNEL FOR COMBAT STRESS/DESIGN STRESSES.
X. MAIN DRAINAGE WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE THE AUX 1 EDUCTOR OVBD DISCHARGE VALVE (MD-V 2-169-2) DID NOT SHUT REMOTELY, MER 1 EDUCTOR LOCAL AND REMOTE SUCTION GAUGES WERE INOP, THEREFORE PREVENTING SHIP'S FORCE FROM FOLLOWING EOP. AUX 1 BHD STOP VALVE (MD-V-31 4-173-6) MOV LOCAL OPEN INDICATOR LIGHT WAS OUT.
Y. HALON WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE THE PAINT LOCKER EXHAUST AND THE MER 2 SUPPLY VENTILATION DAMPENERS FAILED TO CLOSE.
Z. 22 OF 24 PORTABLE DAVIT SOCKETS HAD EXCESSIVE CORROSION AND REQUIRE LUBRICATION/CLEANING OF THE SOCKET COLLARS, DAVIT BEARINGS, DAVIT FEET, AND FOOT SOCKETS.
AA. 1 OF 2 CONREP STATIONS WAS INOP (SEE DECK SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR
DETAILS).
AB. SHIP'S SELF-ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY WAS EVALUATED AS MARGINAL.
AC. 26 OF 77 WATERTIGHT CLOSURES INSPECTED WERE NOT WATERTIGHT.
AD. 2 OF 2 IPDS WERE OPERATIONAL.
AE. 14 OF 20 VENTILATION AIRFLOW ALARMS WERE EITHER INOP OR MISADJUSTED.
AF. 9 CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES PRECLUDED OILY WATER SEPARATORS CERTIFICATION.
AG. DOSSERT CONNECTORS WERE FOUND IN THE NR 1 AND NR 3 SWBDS. THERMAL INDICATIONS REVEALED NO SIGNS OF LOOSENING OR LOCAL HEATING. CONNECTORS NEED TO BE DOCUMENTED FOR FUTURE INSPECTION.
AH. 2 SYSTEMS DID NOT HAVE PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM (PMS) INSTALLED. SEE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS.
3. THE FOLLOWING CASREPS WERE ACTIVE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MI:
NUMBER NOMENCLATURE CATEGORY
06026 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 2
06027 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 2
06028 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 2
07049 AFT MK41 VLS MODULE 3 2
07051 AFT MK41 VLS MODULE 2 2
07076 ACTS 2
07092 MSS CONSOLE 2
07094 ACCOMMODATION LADDER 2
07098 CONDITIONING SYSTEMS, AIR 2
08001 FLIGHT DECK NETS 2
08002 AIR SYSTEMS, HIGH PRESSURE 2
08005 SHF 2
08007 HULL STRUCTURE 2
08009 FCS NR 1 2
08011 STEERING GEAR W/CONTROL 2
08012 BFTT 2
08013 SPY HVPS 2
08016 STEERING GEAR W/CONTROL 2
08017 NR 1 HPAC WATER PUMP 2
08018 MT22 CIWS MAGAZINE 2
08019 PURIFIER NR 2 LUBE OIL 2
4. 23 DEPARTURES FROM SPECS (DFS) EXISTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MI.
A. THE FOLLOWING DFS WERE IN EXCESS OF 180 DAYS:
NUMBER NOMENCLATURE DATE ISSUED
DDG55-003-01 MILLING MACHINE 11/13/2003
DDG55-001-02 NR 1 CRP PUMP SEAL 1/23/2006
DDG55-002-02 NR 2 CRP PUMP SEAL 1/23/2006
DDG55-004-02 NR 1 CPP SHEAR PINS 9/26/2003
DDG55-005-02 NR 2 CPP SHEAR PINS 9/26/2003
DDG55-012-01 MRG MOST REMOTE BEAR 11/26/2002
DDG55-005-03 STBD BLKHD SEAL 220 3/13/2003
DDG55-006-03 STBD BLKHD SEAL 254 3/13/2003
DDG55-007-03 STBD BLKHD SEAL 300 3/13/2003
DDG55-008-03 PORT BLKHD SEAL 300 4/25/2003
DDG55-018-03 NR 1 MRG UNLOADER VLV 1/28/2006
DDG55-019-03 NR 2 MRG UNLOADER VLV 1/28/2006
DDG55-001-04 NR 1A GTM SHOCK MOUNT 4/9/2007
DDG55-002-04 NR 1B GTM SHOCK MOUNT 4/9/2007
DDG55-003-04 NR 2A GTM SHOCK MOUNT 4/9/2007
DDG55-004-04 NR 2B GTM SHOCK MOUNT 4/9/2007
DDG55-021-04 NR 2 MRG L/O COOLER 6/3/2005
B. NO DFS WERE ISSUED TO SUPPORT COMPLETION OF THE MI.
5. 15 ACTIVE TEMPORARY STANDING ORDERS (TSO) EXISTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MI.
A. NO TSO WERE IN EXCESS OF 45 DAYS.
B. NO TSO WERE ISSUED TO SUPPORT COMPLETION OF THE MI.
6. DEMO RESULTS: SAT (0.80-1.00)/DEGRADED (0.60-0.79)/UNSAT (0.00-0.59):
-AAW DTE DEMO WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.51) BECAUSE OF REDUCED AN/SPY-1 DETECTION RANGE AND FAILURE OF 2 OF 3 FCS ILLUMINATORS.
-SD DTE DEMO WAS DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.73) BECAUSE THE CIWS MT 21 WAS INOP AND DID NOT SUPPORT THE ENGAGEMENT.
-GUNNERY LIVE FIRE DEMO WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.30) BECAUSE MT 51 DID NOT FIRE UNTIL THE CORRODED BREECH SAFETY DEVICE WAS REPAIRED.
-USW DTE DEMO WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.91).
-FULL POWER DEMO COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED (SCORE: 0.00) BECAUSE REQUIRED EQUIPMENT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED. SHIP WAS ABLE TO ACHIEVE 80 PERCENT FULL POWER ON A 3 GTM CONFIGURATION AND A 1 HOUR HIGH POWER DEMO WAS CONDUCTED AT THAT SPEED.
-QUICK REVERSAL ASTERN WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.95). QUICK REVERSAL WAS CONDUCTED FROM 80 PERCENT FULL POWER AHEAD TO 100 PERCENT FULL POWER ASTERN.
-QUICK REVERSAL AHEAD WAS SAT (SCORE: 1.00). QUICK REVERSAL WAS CONDUCTED FROM 100 PERCENT FULL POWER ASTERN TO 80 PERCENT FULL POWER AHEAD.
-STEERING DEMO WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.95). STEERING DEMO WAS CONDUCTED AT 80 PERCENT FULL POWER.
-ANCHORING DEMO WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.00) BECAUSE OF ANCHORING DEFICIENCIES.
7. SHIPBOARD PRESERVATION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.79):
-CCIPT IN-SERVICE CORROSION CONTROL SURVEYS WERE CONDUCTED IN JUN 06 AND SEP 05. INSURV CORROSION INSPECTION VALIDATED THAT 80 PERCENT OF THE DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED DURING THE SURVEYS WERE STILL OUTSTANDING. SURFACE PREPARATION AND COATING APPLICATION HAS NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED PROPERLY OVER THE LIFE OF THE SHIP AND HAS ADDED TO THE OVERALL INCREASED WEIGHT OF 3.5 TONS IAW CCIPT SURVEY REPORT FOR USS STOUT (DDG 55), WHICH HAS DECREASED FUEL SAVINGS, SPEED, AND STABILITY.
-FLIGHT DECK STATUS LIGHTING SYSTEM WAS INOP BECAUSE OF CORROSION.
-CORROSION CONTROLS FOR BULKHEAD TO DECK INTERFACE IN BERTHING 5 AND 7 SANITARY SPACES WERE INADEQUATE (GRADE 1G).
-APPROX 210 SQ FT OF THE 05 LEVEL DECK WAS CORRODED. 65 PERCENT OF THE NON-SKID HAD RUST BLEEDING THRU, ALL DECK DRAINS WERE CORRODED WITH FLAKING METAL AND WASTAGE, THE KNIFE EDGE HAD MULTIPLE SPOTS OF FLAKING METAL, AND THE JUNCTION OF THE DOG HOUSE BULKHEAD AND DECK WAS CORRODED OVER THE ENTIRE LENGTH. ADDITIONALLY, THE FWD STBD CORNER WAS CRACKED.
-AFT ICCP MAGNETIC CONTROLLER WAS INCORRECTLY SET. HULL POTENTIAL READING
WAS .900 VDC, REFERENCE AND AUX CELL CHECK READINGS WERE AT .900 VDC AND CONTROLLER OUTPUT READING WAS .150 VDC (CONTROLLER OUTPUT SHOULD BE 0 VDC WHEN HULL POTENTIAL IS ABOVE .850 VDC ).
-1 OF 2 BRUSHES ON THE STBD SHAFT GROUNDING ASSY HAD LESS THAN 50 PERCENT CONTACT WITH THE SHAFT SLIP RINGS.
-PORT AND STBD SHAFT GROUNDING WIRE INSULATION WAS DETERIORATED.
-PORT AND STBD RUDDER GROUNDING STRAPS WERE THE WRONG MATERIAL AND INCORRECTLY BOLTED ON BOTH ENDS.
-VAPOR CONDENSATION INHIBITORS (VCIS) WERE NOT INSTALLED IN APPROX 75 PERCENT OF THE ELECTRICAL ENCLOSURES IAW MRC 3001/002-18M-4.
-ALL FCS DIRECTORS HAD EXTENSIVE CORROSION ON THE FASTENERS AND HARDWARE BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT WEATHER-PROOFED. ADDITIONALLY, THE FCS 1 TRAIN SEAL FAILED AND ALLOWED WATER INTRUSION INTO THE TRAINING GEAR FLUID WHICH WAS MILKY WHITE IN COLOR. THIS IS A CLASSWIDE ISSUE.
-HARPOON LAUNCHERS AND FOUNDATIONS WERE CORRODED. CABLE STUFFING TUBES TO THE LAUNCHERS HAD ASTM 1G CORROSION AND SHOWED 90 PERCENT METAL WASTAGE.
-TV-DTS ANTENNA 10-1 (STBD/FWD) HAD RUST GRADE 1-G (OVER 50 PERCENT RUSTED) ON THE CONDUIT SECURING PLATE.
-OE-567/WSC-6 SHF ANTENNA 3-17 (STBD/FWD) HAD RUST GRADE 1-G (OVER 50 PERCENT RUSTED) ALONG ANTENNA BASE.
-AN/SRQ-4 HAWKLINK ANTENNA WAS SHOWING SIGNS OF WAVEGUIDE CORROSION.
8. SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES AND EQUIPMENT OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (EOC) INCLUDE:
A. PROPULSION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.69):
-1 OF 4 GTMS WAS INOP.
-4 OF 4 GTMS HAD LUBE OIL LEAKS.
-2 OF 4 GTM MODULE HALON ALARM BELLS WERE INOP.
-NR 1B GTM HAD FOD ON THE INTAKE PLENUM SCREEN.
-NR 1 MRG WAS MISSING PHYSICAL SECURITY DEVICES ON VARIOUS FLANGES.
-2 OF 2 MAIN THRUST BEARING REAR SEALS LEAKED LUBE OIL.
-3 OF 4 LUBE OIL SERVICE PUMPS LEAKED LUBE OIL.
-NR 2 MRG LUBE OIL STRAINER DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALARM WAS MISADJUSTED (CORRECTED).
-2 OF 2 MER 1 FUEL OIL SERVICE TANK QUICK TRIP VALVES WERE INOP (CORRECTED).
-2 OF 2 MER 1 FUEL OIL PRE-FILTER DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALARMS WERE MISADJUSTED (CORRECTED).
-2 OF 4 GTM BLEED AIR CHECK VALVES WERE INOP.
-8 BLEED/MASKER/PRAIRIE AIR SYSTEM LOW POINT DRAINS HAD NO FLOW.
-14 FLEXIBLE HOSE ASSEMBLIES THROUGHOUT THE BLEED/MASKER AND PRAIRIE AIR SYSTEMS HAD LAGGING PADS INSTALLED THAT APPEARED NOT TO HAVE BEEN REMOVED IOT CONDUCT THE ANNUAL PMS INSPECTION REQUIRED BY MIP 5000/009.
-3 OF 3 GTGS HAD LUBE OIL LEAKS.
-2 OF 3 GTG PMA LUBE OIL PUMPS LEAKED INTO THE GENERATOR.
-NR 1 GTG THERMOCOUPLE BLOCK WAS BROKEN.
-NR 1 GTG BLOW-IN DOOR CONTROLLER WAS IN MANUAL DURING OPERATION.
-NR 2 GTG HALON TIME DELAY WAS MISADJUSTED (CORRECTED).
-NR 3 GTG HAD A FUEL LEAK ON THE FUEL FILTER HOSE.
B. AUXILIARIES: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.56):
-RUDDER ACCURACY CHECKS FAILED FOR BOTH ALPHA AND BRAVO STEERING UNITS.
-ALL STEERING HYDRAULIC POWER UNITS WERE LEAKING HYDRAULIC OIL IN SEVERAL PLACES, REQUIRING CONSTANT WIPERS.
-VERTICAL PACKAGE CONVEYOR WAS INOP BECAUSE OF IN-SERVICE LIMITS. THE TORQUE COUPLING PERSONNEL SAFETY GUARD WAS NOT INSTALLED, MAIN, 2ND AND 3RD DECK LOADER/UNLOADER GRAVITY CONVEYOR CONNECTION POINTS WERE NOT INSTALLED (ECP 572-02A-C021), CONVEYOR DID NOT STOP WHEN THE JAM LIMIT SWITCHES WERE ACTUATED UP TO 1.5 INCHES IAW SAFETY ADVISORY 033-00, 01 LEVEL SECONDARY DRIVE CHAINS WERE LOOSE, AND ALL LEVEL PERSONNEL SAFETY SHIELDS WERE IMPROPERLY MADE WITH SHARP EDGES.
-NR 1 A/C WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A LEAKING MECHANICAL SEAL ON THE COMPRESSOR (CASREP 07098).
-NR 1 REFRIGERATION UNIT WAS OOC BECAUSE OF AN INOP CAPACITY CONTROL.
-NR 4 A/C CHILLER WAS LEAKING CHILLED WATER INTO THE BILGE.
-NR 1 FREEZE BOX COIL TEMP CONTROL SWITCH WAS INOP, MAINTAINING THE TEMP AT PLUS 3 DEG F.
-NR 1 AND NR 2 COILS FOR THE FREEZE BOX AND THE COILS FOR THE CHILL BOX LOUVERS WERE INOP.
-2 OF 2 REVERSE OSMOSIS UNIT DUMP VALVES FAILED TO TRIP ON HIGH SALINITY (CORRECTED).
-2 OF 2 HPAC AND 1 OF 3 LPAC TYPE 1 DEHYDRATORS FAILED THE DEWPOINT TEST.
-NR 1 HPAC HAD A LEAKING WATER PUMP (CASREP 08017).
-NR 4 FIREPUMP SUCTION VALVE WAS INOP REMOTELY FROM THE MAIN DECK CONTROL STATION.
-3 OF 6 FIREPUMP SUCTION VALVE LOCAL POSITION INDICATORS WERE MISSING.
-NR 1 SWS PUMP HAD A SIGNIFICANT LEAK IN PUMP CASING VENT LINE. LEAK WAS VENTING 1 FT BELOW A POWER PANEL.
-4 OF 5 SWS SUCTION VALVE LOCAL POSITION INDICATOR DIALS WERE MISSING.
-NR 2 AND NR 5 SWS PUMPS HAD LEAKING MECHANICAL SEALS.
-2 OF 3 WATER HEATER HIGH TEMP SAFETY SWITCHES WERE MISADJUSTED ON HIGH TEMP.
-3 OF 3 WATER HEATER HIGH TEMP SAFETY SWITCHES DID NOT HAVE MANUAL RESET.
-2 OF 3 WATER HEATER OPERATING SWITCHES WERE MISADJUSTED.
C. ELECTRICAL: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.77):
-MAIN 60 HZ SWBD AND LOAD CENTER AQB-L AND AQB-LL SERIES CIRCUIT BREAKER ADJUSTABLE SHORT TIME PICK-UP AND SHORT TIME DELAY SETTINGS WERE NOT SET IAW TECHMAN (CORRECTED).
-CL Z VENT ZONE 3 PANEL NR 3 CIRCUIT BREAKER DID NOT TRIP DURING STAGE 1 LOAD SHED TESTING.
-ABTS 01-116-1 AND 02-305-2 DID NOT SHIFT IN AUTO WHEN TESTED.
-ABT 2-239-1 INTERMITTENTLY SHIFTED FROM NORMAL TO ALTERNATE POWER SOURCES WHEN IN THE AUTOMATIC MODE.
-ABT 1-127-1 EXTERIOR CABINET WAS SEVERELY CORRODED AND COULD NOT BE OPENED.
-POWER PANELS 2-50-2, 2-162-2 AND 03-173-1 HAD OVER-RATED CIRCUIT BREAKERS
INSTALLED.
D. DAMAGE CONTROL: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.69):
-MER 1 BILGE SPRINKLER SOPV DID NOT OPEN FULLY WHEN ACTIVATED (CORRECTED).
-3 GEN RE-ENTRY HOSE NOZZLE WAS INOP (CORRECTED).
-2 OF 3 EBACS DID NOT FILL BOTTLES IAW THE PMS TIME FRAME (15-18 MINUTES).
BOTH WERE IN EXCESS OF 20 MIN.
-3 OF 3 HPFAS DID NOT FILL BOTTLES IAW THE PMS TIME FRAME (45 SEC).
-23 OF 63 SCBAS WERE UNSAT.
-3 BERTHING SALTWATER SPRINKLERS DID NOT ALARM DURING TESTING.
-1 OF 2 AN/KAS WAS INOP (PORTSIDE).
-1 OF 3 PP-4276C/PD WAS INOP.
-AUX 1, MER 1, AND 3 GEN HALON PRIMARY ACTIVATION CO2 BOTTLES LEAKED.
-FIREMAIN PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE WAS INOP.
E. DECK: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.50):
-3 OF 3 MEDICAL MK 1 LIFE VESTS WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW MIP 5832/R-1.
-4 OF 7 RESCUE BOAT MK 1 LIFE VESTS FAILED TO PROPERLY INFLATE.
-1 OF 2 SAR LPU-28 LIFE VESTS FAILED TO PROPERLY INFLATE (CORRECTED).
-1 OF 2 SAR STROBE LIGHTS WITH THE BLUE LENS FAILED TO OPERATE IAW MIP 5832/U-1 (CORRECTED).
-1 OF 2 SETS OF SAR GLOVES WAS HOLED AND REQUIRED REPLACEMENT (CORRECTED).
-2 OF 2 SETS OF CPU-72P DRY SUIT LINERS WERE MISSING, PREVENTING SAR FROM ENTERING WATER IN TEMPS LOWER THAN 60 DEG F IAW NWP 3-50.1 FIGURE 5-59 WATER TEMPERATURE GUIDELINES.
-BOAT DECK SAR MEDIVAC LITTER WAS MISSING WEIGHT TEST DATA, 2 OF 2 ADJUSTABLE CARRYING HARNESSES AND A LUMBAR SUPPORT PAD (CORRECTED).
-4 OF 4 RETRACTABLE BITTS/CHOCKS REQUIRED MAINTENANCE IAW MIP 5821/Q-4. BITT BUSHINGS, UPPER AND LOWER GUIDES REQUIRED INSPECTION, CLEANING, AND LUBRICATION.
-3 OF 6 MOORING LINES HAD EXCESSIVE ABRASIONS, TWISTED STRANDS, IMPROPER SPLICES, SEVERE COCKLING, AND WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW MIP 5821/Q-11R.
-2 OF 4 FANTAIL BITTS HAD EXCESSIVE ABRASIVE CUT CONDITIONS AND SIGNIFICANT CORROSION.
-RAS NR 5 MANUAL OPERATION CUT-OUT WAS BENT AND MISSING SECURING LANYARD.
-RAS NR 5 WAS MISSING THE ELECTRIC DISK BRAKE RELEASE LEVER. THE PADEYE COULD NOT BE DEMONSTRATED IN THE MANUAL MODE.
-1 OF 2 LOWER LIMIT SWITCHES WAS INOP ON RAS STA NR 5.
-SLIDING PADEYE EMERGENCY PNEUMATIC DRIVE WAS MISSING.
-1 OF 2 TILT STOWED BACKSTAY YOKES WAS SEIZED ON STA NR 5.
-RAS NR 5 AND NR 6 WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW 5713/Q-3R-S-1. BOTH STAS HAS SEVERELY CORRODED CARRIAGES, WORM SCREWS, FOUNDATION MEMBERS, LOWER CONNECTION BOXES, AND ELECTRIC MOTORS.
-RAS NR 6 WAS ASSEMBLED INCORRECTLY AFTER OVERHAUL. THE KING POST REQUIRED RE-WORK TO PROPERLY INSTALL THE SLIDING BLOCK SO LUBRICATION MAINTENANCE OF THE BALL DRIVE CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED (SHIP REPORTED).
-4 OF 4 KINGPOST UNREP LIGHTS WERE DAMAGED AND INOP ON RAS STAS NR 5 AND NR 6.
-SEWING MACHINE WAS INOP BECAUSE OF MISSING POWER, SAFETY PLACARD, AND OPERATING ACCESSORIES.
-28 OF 28 TOPSIDE LIFEJACKET LOCKERS WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW PMS MIP 6111/S-1.
-AFT LOOKOUT LIFE RING WAS DETERIORATED AND PUNCTURED. DISTRESS MARKER LIFE
RING SECURING BRACKETS WERE MISSING AND STENCIL WITH SHIP'S NAME AND HULL NUMBER WAS UN-READABLE.
-SHIP'S BROW WAS MISSING 5 OF 10 LIFELINE STAPLES.
-6 OF 6 FENDER SECURING STRAPS WERE MISSING.
-PILOT'S LADDER WAS NOT RIGGED IAW NAVSHIP DWG 804-5000900.
-PILOT'S LADDER WAS NOT PROPERLY ADJUSTED TO TERMINATE AT WATERS EDGE.
-72 OF 187 (31 PERCENT) OF MAIN DECK KEVLAR LIFELINES WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW MIP 6121/S-5.
-60 PERCENT OF THE BAXTER BOLTS INSPECTED WERE NOT IAW PMS 6111/A-2R.
F. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE: SAT (SCORE: 0.90):
-S/F COULD NOT POWER ON THE ALTERNATE MK 116 UYH-3 BECAUSE OF FAULTY WIRING TO THE BACK SHELL.
-1 OF 6 TORPEDO BREECH CONTROL VALVES WAS STUCK OPEN BECAUSE OF CORROSION.
-TORPEDO BANDING TOOLS WERE MISSING.
G. OPERATIONS: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.62):
-AN/SPY-1D D/PD T20, FPA T26 MOD 3 (LOSS OF 4 OF 16 CHANNELS), AND FPA T27 MOD 3 (LOSS OF 4 OF 16 CHANNELS) WERE INOP BECAUSE OF FAULTY HVPS T138 (CASREP 08013).
-12 OF 16 CHANNELS IN FPA T26 WERE INOP (4 CORRECTED).
-12 OF 16 CHANNELS IN FPA T27 WERE INOP (3 CORRECTED).
-AN/SPY-1D SIGNAL PROCESSOR SIDE A DROPPED OFF-LINE BECAUSE OF DIGITAL FAULTY ISOLATION FAILURES AND THE INTERMITTENT FAULT WITH RADAR TARGET DATA PROCESSOR NR 2.
-AN/SPY-1D ARRAY T01 POWER SUPPLY WAS INOP (LOSS OF REDUNDANCY).
-AN/SPS-67 SHORT PULSE MODE WAS INOP.
-AN/SPS-67 MODULATOR CURRENT EXCEEDED 22 AMPS (CORRECTED).
-APX-118 IFF TRANSPONDER MODE 4 WAS INOP.
-ROTATING IFF ANTENNA (SPS-67) SUM AND DIFFERENCE VSWR WAS OUT-OF-SPEC.
-AN/URN-25 TACAN REFLECTED POWER WAS HIGH AND IPA TUBE CURRENT WAS OUT-OF-SPEC LOW.
-MK 137 MOD 4 SRBOC LAUNCHERS NR 1A AND NR 3A SAFE LAMPS WERE FAULTY (LAUNCHER NR 1A SHIP REPORTED). S/F COULD NOT DETERMINE SAFE/ARM STATUS AT AFFECTED LAUNCHERS.
-MK 137 LAUNCHER NIGHT LOADING LIGHTS WERE INOP (SHIP REPORTED).
-PCMS WAS DEGRADED (INSPECTION SCORE: 211).
-HD1140 SPY COOLING SYSTEM WAS NOT OPERATED IAW PMS 456/R08 W-1. COPPER NICKEL HEAT EXCHANGER WAS ON-LINE VICE TITANIUM HEAT EXCHANGER BECAUSE TITANIUM HEAT EXCHANGER WAS CLOGGED.
-BFTT DEMO WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE OF MULTIPLE FAULT INDICATIONS (CIU SETUP OR DMS FAULTY, 1553B STATUS ERROR-DUAL COMM FAILURE). FAULTS OCCURRED APPROX 3 TIMES PER MINUTE AND CAUSED OWN SHIP INFORMATION TO BE ERRATIC.
H. WEAPONS: SAT (SCORE: 0.88):
-MT 21 AMMO HANDLING SKIP BOX JUMPED DURING OPERATION AND WAS UNSAFE TO OPERATE.
-MT 21 WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A FAULTED ANTENNA VRU. PROBLEM COULD NOT BE REPLICATED WHEN RUNNING SOTS IN PORT.
-HARPOON LAUNCHERS AND FOUNDATIONS WERE EXTREMELY CORRODED. CABLE STUFFING TUBES TO THE LAUNCHERS HAD ASTM 1G CORROSION AND SHOWED 90 PERCENT METAL WASTAGE. PCMS HAD MULTIPLE LAYERS OF PAINT FLAKING OFF.
-26 OF 90 VLS LAUNCHER DELUGE GROUNDING STRAPS WERE CORRODED.
-AFT VLS LAUNCHER, MODULE 2, CELL 6 HATCH WAS BINDING AND REQUIRED REPLACEMENT.
-AFT VLS LAUNCHER, MODULE 3 FAILED SYSTEM BITE.
-AFT VLS LAUNCHER, MODULE 7 FAILED SYSTEM, LSEQ AND MCP BITE. CELLS 1-4 HAD MULTIPLE FAULT CODES.
-MT 51 AMMO ELEVATOR HOIST WAS NOT TESTED BECAUSE THE HATCH TRIPOD HOSES WERE DAMAGED AND FASTENERS WERE MISSING.
-FCS 1 TRAIN SEAL FAILED AND ALLOWED WATER INTRUSION INTO THE TRAIN FLUID WHICH WAS MILKY WHITE IN COLOR.
-FCS 1 MAN ALOFT SWITCH WAS INCORRECTLY LABELED. SAFE WAS UNSAFE AND VICE
VERSA (CORRECTED).
-FCS 3 TWT PARAMETERS WERE OUT OF ALIGNMENT, PREVENTING RADIATION.
I. NAVIGATION: SAT (SCORE: 0.90):
-GYRO REPEATER IN IC GYRO ROOM NR 2 WAS FAULTY.
-EM LOG NR 2 R1 POTENTIOMETER WAS FAULTY.
J. COMMUNICATIONS: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.77):
-12 OF 14 AN/WSC-3 UHF LOS TRANSCEIVERS WERE INOP OR DEGRADED: NR 1, NR 3, AND NR 12 HAD NO RF POWER OUT, AND NR 4, NR 5, NR 6, NR 7, NR 8, NR 9, NR 10, NR 11, AND NR 14 WERE NOT IAW PMS AND WERE OUT OF ALIGNMENT.
-2 OF 2 AN/WSC-3 UHF HAVE-QUICK LOS TRANSCEIVERS WERE DEGRADED.
-AN/SSQ-88 QUALITY MONITORING TEST SET WAS INOP BECAUSE TEST EQUIPMENT WAS AT CAL.
-AS-3771, AS-3772, AS-3773 HF RECEIVE ANTENNAS REQUIRED PRESERVATION AND HAD LOW INSULATION RESISTANCE.
-2 OF 2 AS-3226 VRC-46 VHF ANTENNAS HAD MISSING HARDWARE AND NR 2 FAILED VSWR TEST.
-AS-390 UHF ANTENNA NR 3-15 HAD HIGH VSWR AND THE AS-390 QMCS UHF ANTENNA PAINT WAS DETERIORATED.
-4 OF 4 AS-2815 SSR-1 UHF SATCOM ANTENNA HARDWARE PRESERVATION WAS DETERIORATED AND 1 OF 4 HAD A LOOSE BOND STRAP.
-1 OF 2 AN/VRC-46 VHF TRANSCEIVERS WAS INOP BECAUSE OF FAULTY AS-3226 ANTENNA.
-OA-9243 (HF ANTENNA TILTING GROUP) ANTENNA HANDCRANK TURNED VIOLENTLY WHEN USING THE ELECTRIC SWITCH TO RAISE OR LOWER THE ANTENNA, CREATING A SAFETY HAZARD.
-HF IMI FAILED.
-S/F COULD NOT DEMONSTRATE AN/USC-38 NECC BECAUSE OF NO CKT AVAILABILITY.
-AN/WSC-6 SHF WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A POOR SIGNAL TO NOISE RATIO (CASREP 08005).
-OE-567/WSC-6 SHF ANTENNA 3-18 (PORT/AFT) BASE GASKET WAS WORN AND SPLITTING.
-21 OF 27 TA-970/980/990 RED PHONES WERE DEGRADED OR INOP.
-LINK 4A WAS INOP BECAUSE OF AN INABILITY TO PASS TRACK DATA.
-3 OF 3 NAVY ORDER WIRE TERMINALS WERE INOP OR DEGRADED.
K. INFORMATION SYSTEMS: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.78):
-AN/USQ-185 CENTRIXS DOMAINS COULD NOT BE ACCESSED OR EVALUATED BECAUSE PASSWORDS WERE NOT AVAILABLE.
-AN/USQ-185 CENTRIXS FOUR EYES ENCLAVE COULD NOT BE TESTED BECAUSE PASSWORDS WERE NOT AVAILABLE.
-AN/UYK-163 NIAPS SERVER HAD SKED DATA TEMP FILES 500 GIG IN SIZE (CORRECTED).
-AN/UYK-163 NIAPS SERVER DID NOT BACK-UP SKED DATA NOR LIVE STATE IMAGES ONTO TAPES.
-NOMEX DECKING IN RADIO WAS SEVERELY DEGRADED BECAUSE NUMEROUS DECK PLATES HAD NO SECURING HARDWARE. THIS CREATED A TRIP AND MISSILE HAZARD. OF NOTE WAS THE FACT THAT THE DECKPLATES IN LOW OR NO TRAFFIC AREAS ALSO HAD NO SECURING HARDWARE BUT NO SIGNS OF DAMAGE.
L. SUPPLY: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.67):
-GIH WASHDOWN SYSTEM NOZZLE CLEANING AND ALIGNMENT MAINTENANCE WAS NOT BEING COMPLETED (CORRECTED).
-GIH 5 OF 6 FAIL-SAFE (DETROIT) SWITCHES WERE NOT WITHIN ANNUAL CALIBRATION PERIODICITY AND THE ONE THAT WAS WITHIN PERIODICITY DID NOT FUNCTION AS DESIGNED.
-GIH MAIN GALLEY DIVERTER DAMPER WAS INOP.
-MEAT SLICER WAS INOP.
-1 OF 3 SELF-SERVICE ICE MACHINES WAS INOP.
-ICE CREAM MACHINE WAS INOP.
-1 OF 3 COFFEE MACHINES WAS INOP.
-BUFFALO MACHINE WAS INOP.
-1 OF 2 60 LB WASHERS WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A SAFETY INTERLOCK SWITCH ON THE DOOR.
-CORROSION CONTROLS FOR CPO SEABAG LOCKER DECK WERE INADEQUATE (GRADE 4G).
-CORROSION CONTROLS FOR STOREROOM NR 4 BILGES WERE INADEQUATE (GRADE 3 G).
M. HABITABILITY: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.75):
-3 OF 7 CREW BERTHING WATER COOLERS WERE INOP AND 2 OF THE REMAINING 4 WERE
DEGRADED (S/F REPORTED REPAIRING 4 PRIOR TO OUR INSPECTION).
N. NAVOSH: SAT (SCORE: 0.85):
-3 OF 3 4-GAS ANALYZERS WERE INOP (1 CORRECTED).
-36 BOTTLES OF CALCIUM HYPOCHLORITE WERE STORED IN THE FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS STOREROOM (CORRECTED).
-5 OF 16 EYEWASH STAS HAD MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES.
-SAFETY NET BETWEEN GTMS 2A AND 2B WAS NOT INSTALLED.
-SAFETY GUARD CHAINS WERE MISSING ON 4 OF 6 ACCESS TRUNKS (1 CORRECTED).
-12 OF 17 TRUNK SAFETY NETS WERE NOT IAW NAVSEA GUIDANCE (NAVSEA DRAWING 804-5184163 REV A).
-BIOLOGICAL REFRIGERATOR ALARM (HIGH/LOW TEMP AND LOSS OF POWER) WAS INOP.
-STERILIZER WAS INOP.
-EMERGENCY POTABLE WATER WAS NOT AVAILABLE IN MAIN MEDICAL.
O. VENTILATION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.77):
-5 OF 13 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH SPACES HAD EXHAUST AIRFLOW BELOW DESIGN SPEC.
-4 OF 20 SANITARY SPACES HAD EXHAUST AIRFLOW BELOW DESIGN SPEC.
P. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.66):
-OIL CONTENT MONITOR LEAKED BY WHEN NOT ENERGIZED PREVENTING ACCURATE READINGS AND THE INLET PIPING DID NOT HAVE A RELIEF VALVE INSTALLED.
-WASTE OIL HOLDING TANK 5-220-1-F OIL/WATER TLI WAS INOP.
-1 OF 2 COMPRESS MELT UNITS WAS INOP (CORRECTED).
-LARGE PULPER WAS MISSING THE JUNK BOX CAUSING PULPED MATERIAL TO FLOW INTO THE PIPING SYSTEM AND CLOG THE DRAIN LINES.
-PMS WAS NOT INSTALLED FOR THE LARGE PULPER OR THE TOP-LOADING PARTS WASHER.
-FWD VCHT PUMP ROOM VENTILATION AND SUMP FLOODING ALARMS WERE INOP.
-S/F COULD NOT OPERATE NR 1 VCHT EJECTOR PUMP BECAUSE OF VACUUM LEAKS IN THE NON RETURN VALVE.
Q. AVIATION: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.59):
-RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF FLIGHT OPS UNTIL THE FLIGHT DECK NETS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE ARE REPAIRED, DAMAGED PROXIMITY SUITS ARE REPLACED, AND THE DECK STATUS LIGHT IS REPAIRED.
-RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF NIGHT FLIGHT OPS UNTIL THE DROP-LINE LIGHTS ARE REPAIRED.
-RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF INSTRUMENT METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS (IMC) FLIGHT OPS UNTIL THE TACAN IS REPAIRED.
-RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF VERTREP OPS UNTIL THE STATIC WANDS ARE REPAIRED.
-RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF AIRCRAFT FUELING OPS UNTIL THE JP5 HOSES ARE HYDROSTATICALLY TESTED AND THE AIRCRAFT FUELING STA PRESSURE GAGE IS REPAIRED.
-RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF HIFR OPS UNTIL THE HIFR REFUELING NOZZLE IS REPAIRED.
-2 OF 3 PROXIMITY SUITS WERE DAMAGED AND UNSERVICEABLE.
-DECK STATUS LIGHT WAS INOP.
-2 OF 2 STATIC WANDS FAILED CONTINUITY CHECK.
-LINE UP LIGHTS WERE INOP (CORRECTED).
-DROP LINE LIGHTS WERE INOP.
-JP5 STORAGE TANK 4-402-0-J HAD SEDIMENT IN TANK.
-JP5 SERVICE TANK 4-390-0-J HAD SEDIMENT IN TANK.
-HIFR NOZZLE GROUNDING CLAMP WAS BROKEN.
-ALL JP5 HOSES WERE OUT OF HYDROSTATIC PERIODICITY.
-AIRCRAFT FUELING STATION PRESSURE GAGE READING WAS INACCURATE.
-HIFR REFUELING NOZZLE AND 2 OF 2 D1R REFUELING NOZZLES FAILED CONTINUITY CHECK (1 OF 2 DIRS CORRECTED).
-1 OF 2 WIND SPEED TRANSMITTERS WAS INOP.
-1 OF 2 ELECTRICAL GLOVE SETS WAS DAMAGED (CORRECTED).
9. COMMODORE R. TINDAL III, COMDESRON 2, WAS PRESENT FOR THE INSPECTION AND OUT-BRIEF. CAPT R. BONNER WAS THE SENIOR INSPECTOR.
10. PRESIDENT, BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY, CONCURS WITH THE FINDINGS.//
Do we set up our leaders and Sailors for failure sometimes? Is it always the CO and the Chief's Mess - or is there only so much a crew can do with the time, money, and ship they are given? How much deferred maintenance can you hold to those who were not responsible for it?

Looking past the amost-unique aspects of Sea Swap, as we look to extend some of our ships to a 40+ service life - what do we need to do for the long-term? Are there harder questions out there? Below is one pro's opinion, what are yours?
STOUT has had a rough go of it lately. This was sort of anticipated.

Obviously with a poor INSURV, many of the items identified will be loaded into the SRA package or, more likely than not, scheduled for CMAVs after the SRA (the beauty of MSMO contracts). One big discussion point here that people seem to forget...STOUT was one of three East Coast participants in the SeaSwap experiment (along with LABOON and GONZALEZ). She was not the ship on station but she was literally "de-crewed" for extensive lengths of time during crew swaps. The ISIC (RSO) was left as a care-taker but that can't be the same. Add in the "lack of ownership" issues that get discussed when you talk SeaSwap, I'm sure that contributed to the less than stellar material condition of the ship but to what degree, I couldn't say. But we are seriously short-changing these ships of needed maintenance for budgetary reasons... We defer lots of work. Just my two-cents...
BTW, for a variety of reasons, I have a soft spot for STOUT, so be gentle.

Hat tip NAVSEA Spy.
UPDATE: Wait, there's more! Galrahn is all over the CHOSIN. Christopher Cavas is on the hunt as well in Defense News. He includes a bit on the equally ugly CHOSIN INSURV.

First, we have an interesting quote; considering that it comes from Buzz Lightyear,
"I don't think I have ever seen anything so bad," said retired Capt. Rick Hoffman, who commanded the cruiser Hue City, a sister ship of the Chosin.
Here is the Chang of Command Block-41 verbiage from h311,
"InSurv is by its nature an inspection that will always reveal a fairly large number of deficiencies, hopefully most of them minor," said retired Capt. Jan van Tol, who commanded a destroyer and an amphibious assault ship. "However, the scale and scope of the deficiencies, spread across all of the ship's departments and including the [executive officer] and command master chief, suggests that there is a severe and long-standing problem with low standards; low initiative in finding/fixing/managing problems and following up on documented problems; poorly managed programs; and an apparent inability to train junior people in material management."
I think we see where the red-dot is pointing,
High-ranking officers now are searching for what led to the problems revealed by the two inspections.

"There's a discussion active inside the community about self-assessment issues and processes," said Capt. David Lewis, the assistant chief of staff for maintenance and engineering with Naval Surface Forces in San Diego.

Lewis pointed out that a great number of the problems on the two ships were known even before the inspections. But the InSurvs turned up more problems than were expected.

"The thing that popped at me was the volume of the discrepancies. Normally, we don't get that much on a given ship," he said.
Byron, talk to me Brother!
"DDGs have a corrosion trend, we are seeing that more and more," Lewis said. "We are starting to address that in our work batches for depot-level repair. It's in areas that are generally hard for ship's force to get into, places they don't go routinely. Uptakes and that kind of stuff."

The ships' material condition was not due to lack of funds, Lewis said.
Ohhhh, boy. CDR FITREP fodder on the way....under the bus he goes...
"We are 100 percent funded to our requirement for maintenance," he said.
Remember what I said pre-update?
Based on calculations in the most recent 30-year fleet plan, Chosin is meant to remain in service for 35 years, or until about 2026. The Stout and its sister ships are to last for 40 years - until 2034, in the Stout's case.
The best questions,
"Where was the chain of command? Why did the parent squadron not know of the terrible material condition?" van Tol asked. The ship's command, he said, "has a lot to answer for, either in terms of not finding and fixing the problems, or at least advising his seniors of the problems."

The ship's enlisted leaders also are partly responsible, van Tol said.

"One could also ask where the chief's mess was in all this, since they are the technical experts as well as the senior enlisted leaders onboard."
...
"Many of the problems noted should have been picked up in previous inspections of various kinds," he said. "What were the results of those inspections? Who should have followed up on deficiencies? Why did the chain of command - both within the ship and above the ship level - not monitor progress in fixing said deficiencies?"
Bring out a very uncomfortable truth,
Each of the ships has a crew of about 350 sailors. The Navy has been working for some years to reduce maintenance requirements on sailors in order to shrink crew sizes, and the smaller crews planned for future ships such as littoral combat ships and the Zumwalt-class DDG 1000 advanced destroyers mean maintenance issues could become more acute. Navy planners have said a key to maintaining readiness is to transfer more responsibility to land-based organizations.
Tough statements,
"... there doesn't appear to be a lot of attention to detail going on." ... "I see in both of these ships a basic contempt for good Navy practices," the retired flag officer said. "Too much rust. Too many [preventive maintenance systems] checks that weren't done properly. Too much equipment InSurv had to tell them wasn't working."
...
"There's a serious lack of command involvement in what's going on on the ship," the flag officer said. "That's basic."
That being said, we should be carfull looking to burn witches and say that is the end of the story and we can move back to "optimal manning" and "hybrid sailors."

There are plenty of people out there who should be thinking hard about their decisions and how it may have had a play in this goat rope.

However .... MCPON gets in his shot as well. Ouch.
"The success or failure of any commandwide inspection can be placed directly at the entrance to the CPO mess," Campa said. "There are all kinds of challenges, and reasons for failure. But it's been proven that the experience that resides in the mess can tilt the results of any inspection toward success if the chiefs are engaged on the deck plates."
Hard to argue with that.