Interesting in that a lot of it parallels what we have voiced concerns about the program, along with others, for over 3/4 of a decade. Case in point;
The Navy continues to buy LCS seaframes and modules even as significant questions remain about the program and its underlying business case. Elements of the LCS business case, including its cost, the time needed to develop and field the system, and its anticipated capabilities have degraded over time. There are also significant unknowns related to key LCS operations and support concepts and the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two seaframe variants.The potential effect of these unknowns on the program is compounded by the Navy’s aggressive acquisition strategy. By the time key tests of integrated LCS capability are completed in several years, the Navy will have procured or putunder contract more than half of the planned number of seaframes. Almost half of the planned seaframes are already under contract, and the Navy plans to award further contracts in 2016, before the Department of Defense (DOD) makes a decision about full rate production of the ships. The Navy will not be able to demonstrate that it can meet the minimum performance requirements for mission modules integrated with the seaframes until operational testing for both variants(Freedom and Independence) is completed, currently planned for 2019.Will be interesting how much traction the tale of woe will get this time.
My advice to the pro-LCS gaggle; SERPENTINE!
No comments:
Post a Comment