Fullbore Friday

The Victoria Cross is their Medal of Honor.

Lance Corporal Joshua Leakey, 27, of the Parachute Regiment, who has been awarded the Victoria Cross, the premier award for gallantry in the presence of the enemy.

On the 22 August 2013, Lance Corporal Leakey, deployed on a combined UK/US assault led by the United States Marine Corp into a Taliban stronghold to disrupt a key insurgent group.

On leaving their helicopters, the force came under machine gun and rocket propelled grenade fire, pinning down the command group on the exposed forward slope of a hill. For an hour the team attempted to extract from the killing zone; a Marine Corp Captain was shot and wounded and their communications were put out of action.

Lance Corporal Leakey said:

When you hear there’s a man down, the hairs on the back of your neck stand up. Clearly then your plans change.

Realising the seriousness of the situation - and with complete disregard for his own safety he dashed across a large area of barren hillside being raked with machine gun fire. As he crested the hill, the full severity of the situation became apparent: approximately twenty enemy had surrounded two friendly machine gun teams and a mortar section, rendering their critical fire support ineffective.

Under fire yet undeterred by the very clear and present danger, Lance Corporal Leakey ran across the exposed slope of the hill three times to initiate casualty evacuation, re-site machine guns and return fire. His actions proved the turning point, inspiring his comrades to fight back with renewed ferocity. Displaying gritty leadership well above that expected of his rank, Lance Corporal Leakey’s actions singlehandedly regained the initiative and prevented considerable loss of life.

Hard Career Truth in One Slide

This is a USAF slide, but sadly, there is roughly 90% overlap with the Navy's officer career progression.

If you don't understand this by the LCDR level, then you are already lost. Don't keep your idealism too long. Don't let the exception make you think it is the rule. It isn't.

Know this truth; performance will not get you where you want to be. You can have the most sea duty, most operational experience, most success at war - but if you do not have the right "sponsorship" (AKA mentor) or you roll snake eyes on the selection board composition (i.e. your sponsors aren't heavy in that cycle, they retire, or you picked poor sponsors) then 87% odds are that you are done.

No, it isn't right, it isn't just ... it just is. And yes, I am posting this on a Thursday for a reason ... as under that rock ... you really don't want to know what is under that rock.

Blogger note: Rumor has it, this was part of brief by Mike Hornitschek, Colonel, USAF, who is now retired. If anyone knows him and how to get in touch with him, let me know.

Hat tip John Q. Public.

So, that's what that Iranian carrier was for ...

Personally, I thought it was going to be a cheap movie prop ... but they were even less imaginative than that.

Really kids.

Iran’s armed forces launched a speedboat attack on a giant model of a US aircraft carrier on Wednesday as the Revolutionary Guard staged military exercises in the Gulf.
The aim of the drill was to practise how to sink an American carrier, at least two of which patrol the Gulf at any given time.

Trolling Russia; Advanced Level 1

Whoever put this in the POAM gets a free Salamander coffee cup with matching thong.

U.S. military combat vehicles paraded Wednesday through an Estonian city that juts into Russia, a symbolic act that highlighted the stakes for both sides amid the worst tensions between the West and Russia since the Cold War.

The armored personnel carriers and other U.S. Army vehicles that rolled through the streets of Narva, a border city separated by a narrow frontier from Russia, were a dramatic reminder of the new military confrontation in Eastern Europe.

Yeh, that Narva.

Why we decommissioned all the SPRU so early ...

There are some wars that you will never win. Some opponents will always advance and all you can do is fight a holding action. You can slow the advance, but you will never halt it.

Why? Well, in this war your weapons are paint, primer, and needle guns;

“We’re fighting the second law of thermodynamics,” Dunmire likes to say.

For those who forgot their laws,

Exposed iron and steel naturally revert to their lowest energy states by giving up their electrons to oxygen and water.

Interesting article on, of all things, corrosion over at TheAtlantic by Tim Heffernan, Rust Never Sleeps;

In thrall to the era of Little Digital, we overlook that this is still the era of Big Analog. Our mobile, personal, wireless world is utterly reliant on a massive, interwoven, mechanical counterpart. And lots of that big stuff is rusting. Every four years, the American Society of Civil Engineers releases its Report Card for America’s Infrastructure. The latest, from 2013, gives the country a D+ overall. Broken down by category, our ports get a C; energy gets a D+; aviation, dams, drinking water, hazardous waste, roads, transit, and wastewater all get D’s; inland waterways and levees, each a D–. Rail manages a C+, as do bridges. Solid waste leads the class with a B–. Shortfalls in investment and innovation play a role in our poor showing. But the main problem is simple deterioration. Public and private dollars have been poured into building American infrastructure. They have been in limited supply for the task of maintaining it. I’m tempted to invoke a cliché and say that the deterioration is happening before our very eyes, but that would miss the key point: the deterioration is happening, and we’re not seeing it at all.

We all have heard what those in the yards have seen over the last two decades about how much more corrosion we have in our ships than we think we do, and it seems that this is not just a Navy problem, but a national problem.

We are doing something wrong. 

Are we always assuming the best when it comes to corrosion rates? Are we overestimating our corrosion prevention measures and technology? Are we simply "painting over things" on our watch so that someone else has do deal with it later?

When you look at money we're spending - that doesn't seem to be the answer either. Whatever the answer is, what we've been doing does not seem to be it.


Blogger note: I don't know who is doing this, but TheAtlantic is producing better than average work in the last few months. Still has a few bats in the belfry, but some of the newer stuff is ... well ... good. Time will take care of the bats; crack on.

I hereby grant SECDEF three (3) mulligans

There is a lot to like in how the new SECDEF Ash Carter has kicked off his tour.

If you have been too impatient to do the usual Beltway entrails reading or too busy to look for your bag of bones, then perhaps this might catch your eye to see how the guy thinks.

In a sign of how Carter intends to challenge his commanders’ thinking, he has banned them from making any PowerPoint presentations — a backbone feature of most U.S. military briefings.

Ahem.

"PowerPoint makes us stupid."
- General Mattis, USMC (Ret).

If Mattis approves, Salamander approves.

Take charge and carry out the plan of the day. Oh, and stow that quadchart.

Visualizing SLOC

Sublime ... but tells a very powerful story from the tactical, operational, and strategic level.

21st Century Sims, with LCDR BJ Armstrong, USN - on Midrats

Who was "The Gun Doctor," the officer who over a century ago led the revolution in naval gunnery, the development of torpedo boat and destroyer operations, and during WWI served as the senior US naval commander in Europe? More than the man instrumental in the establishment of the convoy system that helped keep the United Kingdom from starvation in the conflict, following the war his leadership as president of the Naval War College he help to established the creative and innovative Navy that in the interwar period developed the operating concepts for the submarines and aircraft carriers that led the victory in World War II.

What are the lessons of a century ago taught by Admiral William S. Sims, USN that are critically important for the serving officer today?

Our guest for the full hour this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern to discuss this latest book, 21st Century Sims, will be returning guest, LCDR Benjamin Armstrong, USN.

Benjamin "BJ" Armstrong is a naval aviator who has served as a helicopter pilot flying amphibious search and rescue and special warfare missions and as the Officer-in-Charge of a Navy helicopter gunship detachment deployed for counter-piracy and counter-terror operations. He is a PhD Candidate in the Department of War Studies, King's College, London.

Join us live if you can with the usual suspects in the chat room and offer up your questions for our guest, but if you miss the show you can always listen to the archive at blogtalkradio. 

If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here.

Listen to internet radio with Midrats on Blog Talk Radio

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UPDATE: Forgot to mention that you should also get BJ's first book if you have not already, 21st Century Mahan: Sound Military Conclusions for the Modern Era.

Fullbore Friday

We have a lot more readers now than we did back in 2009 when we had this FbF here and over at USNIBlog. Time to bring her back.

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Can you lose but win?

Of course you can. The key is to understand that the Tactical, Operational, and Strategic are linked - but they are not perfectly linked and in alignment.

Let's look at the Tactical.

In the battle, a US warship force of five cruisers and four destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Carleton H. Wright attempted to surprise and destroy a Japanese warship force of eight destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka. Tanaka's warships were attempting to deliver food supplies to Japanese forces on Guadalcanal.

Using radar, the US warships opened fire and sank one of the Japanese destroyers. Tanaka and the rest of his ships, however, reacted quickly and launched numerous torpedoes at the US warships. The Japanese torpedoes hit and sank one US cruiser and heavily damaged three others, enabling the rest of Tanaka's force to escape without significant additional damage but also without completing the mission of delivering the food supplies.

All you need to know about Operational and Strategic is right there, but let's stick with the Tactical for a bit.

Do Commanders feel today that they are too limited in their ability to exercise their best judgement in combat? Well, consider it a Navy tradition.

At 23:14, operators on Fletcher established firm radar contact with Takanami and the lead group of four drum-carrying destroyers. At 23:15, with the range 7,000 yards (6,400 m), Commander William M. Cole, commander of Wright's destroyer group and captain of Fletcher, radioed Wright for permission to fire torpedoes. Wright waited two minutes and then responded with, "Range on bogies [Tanaka's ships on radar] excessive at present."[20] Cole responded that the range was fine. Another two minutes passed before Wright responded with permission to fire. In the meantime, the US destroyer's targets escaped from an optimum firing setup ahead to a marginal position passing abeam, giving the American torpedoes a long overtaking run near the limit of their range. At 23:20, Fletcher, Perkins, and Drayton fired a total of 20 Mark 15 torpedoes towards Tanaka's ships. Maury, lacking SG radar and thus having no contacts, withheld fire.

Amazing even in hindsight. Recall - the action from initial radar contact by FLETCHER at 2306 Tanaka's withdraw at 23:44 was only 38 minutes .... roughly 13% of the battle was spent waiting to be micromanaged. Recall that the Japanese did not have radar.

There is a point here that one should keep in mind. As opposed to the leisurely combat the USN has engaged in since WWII - mostly keeping station, supporting TACAIR operations or leisurely TLAM missions - this was as it is - quick, deadly, and devastating combat. Luck, speed, training, and finally your weapons determines success.

Knowing your enemy, and acknowledging that you may not fully know him, is also critical.

The results of the battle led to further discussion in the US Pacific Fleet about changes in tactical doctrine and the need for technical improvements, such as flashless gunpowder and improved torpedoes. The Americans were still unaware of the range and power of Japanese torpedoes and the effectiveness of Japanese night battle tactics. In fact, Wright claimed that his ships must have been fired on by submarines since the observed position of Tanaka's ships "make it improbable that torpedoes with speed-distance characteristics similar to our own" could have caused such damage. The Americans would not recognize the true capabilities of their Pacific adversary's torpedoes and night tactics until well into 1943.

Logistics.

Due to a combination of the threat from CAF aircraft, US Navy PT boats stationed at Tulagi, and a cycle of bright moonlight, the Japanese had switched to using submarines to deliver provisions to their forces on Guadalcanal. Beginning on November 16, 1942, and continuing for the next three weeks, 16 submarines made nocturnal deliveries of foodstuffs to the island, with one submarine making the trip each night. Each submarine could deliver 20 to 30 tons of supplies, about one day's worth of food, for the 17th Army, but the difficult task of transporting the supplies by hand through the jungle to the frontline units limited their value to sustain the Japanese troops on Guadalcanal. At the same time, the Japanese tried to establish a chain of three bases in the central Solomons to allow small boats to use them as staging sites for making supply deliveries to Guadalcanal, but damaging Allied airstrikes on the bases forced the abandonment of this plan.[9]

On November 26, the 17th Army notified Imamura that it faced a critical food crisis. Some front-line units had not been resupplied for six days and even the rear-area troops were on one-third rations. The situation forced the Japanese to return to using destroyers to deliver the necessary supplies.

And that is where we get the success of the battle. If all you do is count ships sunk and damages, then sure The Battle of Tassafaronga was a loss for the USA. Cole and Wright sure saw it that way - as do many. But was it really?

What were the Japanese trying to do? What was their Operational Center of Gravity (CoG)? Of course, it was keeping their land forces supplied ashore. By preventing their resupply, you attack and weaken the Japanese CoG .... therefor, at the Operational (and arguably Strategic as well) you actually won.

Not too different from the American experience with Tet. The USA and South Vietnamese forces destroyed the Viet Cong during Tet - effectively removing them from being a threat to the existence of the South Vietnam government. That wasn't the point .... as that wasn't the war's Strategic CoG.

Thanks to a superior INFO OPS and PSYOPS campaign by the North Vietnamese along with their allies and useful assistance by the likes of Walter Cronkite, Tet was an exceptional victory by the Communists as it significantly undermined the Strategic CoG of the Americans - the support of the American people.

There are two examples of why one should be very careful when declaring a victory or defeat. Perspective and a clear understanding of the larger issue is key.

Finally, here is a nice lesson on how Senior Leadership should not act ... and how it should. CYA, wagon circling, and blaming subordinates for your own failure is nothing new.

In spite of his defeat in the battle, Wright was awarded the Navy Cross, one of the highest American military decorations for bravery, for his actions during the engagement. ... Halsey, in his comments on Wright's report, placed much of the blame for the defeat on Cole, saying that the destroyer squadron commander fired his torpedoes from too great a distance to be effective and should have "helped" the cruisers instead of circling around Savo Island.

I think history has done some justice to Cole - and it sure doesn't put a great deal of glory on Wright.

In contrast, look at what Tanaka said. This is a good way to end the post - Leadership 101.

After the war, Tanaka said of his victory at Tassafaronga, "I have heard that US naval experts praised my command in that action. I am not deserving of such honors. It was the superb proficiency and devotion of the men who served me that produced the tactical victory for us."

That and some great Japanese engineering in the Long Lance.

Diversity Thursday

Sometimes it becomes so banal and commonplace that you almost don't notice it. 

Kind of like the water fountains my parents remember growing up around - but there it is.

Buried in a standard issue Plan of the Week - can you spot the modern day paternalistic Jim Crow mindset? The soft bigotry of segregated expectations? You know, like the Negro baseball league of the last century that prevented truly great athletes from competing with everyone and showing their greatness?

Can you see it?

Marcel Leake was one of NAVAIR’s three 2015 Black Engineer of the Year Award winners for the Modern Day Technology Leadership Awards. These awards were presented Feb. 6 at the Black Engineer of the Year Awards Conference in Washington, D.C.

Let me put this out there right away; this isn't about Marcel Leake either, and none of this commentary is directed at him in any way. He is caught up in it like everyone else.

The implication is all rather simple by those that run, support, and recommend people for these awards; keep people thinking, acting and evaluating themselves as part of a sectarian group, not as an individual. Groups are easier to control and manipulate. 

The sad thing is, here we are in 2015, and we have organizations looking at groups the same as the KKK and the other racialist world view types out there. Not an attractive group to throw yourself in with, but our Navy is doing just that.

That is one side of the coin, the other is - as is often this century with diversity issues - about money. It doesn't take long in pulling the string on the BEOY to see this is just an arm of Career Communications Group, Inc. Who is CCGI?

We are a socially conscious diversity media company ... Our products are the vehicles to reach a diverse audience drawn from African-American and Hispanic associations and organizations. Our partnerships with Historically Black Colleges and Universities establish our products as the authority for unbiased information and career development for exceptional students working toward professional degrees.

Yep, a business founded in 1985 to make money off of sectarianism. Just check out their publications.

I would love to see their accounts receivable, as I doubt any significant amount of their income is derived from anything other than government sources or companies such as defense contractors who make their living from taxpayer money.

In addition to making a living out of sectarianism for those employed in this company, this is also a racket for organizations and others to get a check in the block in the most crass way appear to "do the right thing" when all they are doing is buying protection. 

This company and mindset does nothing to promote unity, a color blind society, unit cohesion, or in any way develop a culture of evaluating people by the content of their character vice the color of their skin. Why would it, there's no money in that.

All this does is to send a message that our black shipmates have to have their own special recognition separately, as opposed to competing with everyone else. At best that is Old South paternalism, most likely just inertial guided mindless feel-goodism, at worst it is outright racism. In cold analysis, tell me what else it is?

The Navy should be ashamed to be part of such an company and mindset as openly sectarian and divisive as this, stuck in the middle of the last century. We are better than this - and unquestionably all our Sailors regardless of DNA are better than this.

Do we still have a dark heart to choose the path where no-one goes?

Hopefully by now, everyone has had the chance to read Graeme Wood's article in The Atlantic, What ISIS Really Wants. (BTW, BZ to TheAtl, nice work putting it out)

If not, here is just one pull quote to set the stage - but you need to read it all;

For certain true believers—the kind who long for epic good-versus-evil battles—visions of apocalyptic bloodbaths fulfill a deep psychological need. Of the Islamic State supporters I met, Musa Cerantonio, the Australian, expressed the deepest interest in the apocalypse and how the remaining days of the Islamic State—and the world—might look. Parts of that prediction are original to him, and do not yet have the status of doctrine. But other parts are based on mainstream Sunni sources and appear all over the Islamic State’s propaganda. These include the belief that there will be only 12 legitimate caliphs, and Baghdadi is the eighth; that the armies of Rome will mass to meet the armies of Islam in northern Syria; and that Islam’s final showdown with an anti-Messiah will occur in Jerusalem after a period of renewed Islamic conquest.

The Islamic State has attached great importance to the Syrian city of Dabiq, near Aleppo. It named its propaganda magazine after the town, and celebrated madly when (at great cost) it conquered Dabiq’s strategically unimportant plains. It is here, the Prophet reportedly said, that the armies of Rome will set up their camp. The armies of Islam will meet them, and Dabiq will be Rome’s Waterloo or its Antietam.

“Dabiq is basically all farmland,” one Islamic State supporter recently tweeted. “You could imagine large battles taking place there.” The Islamic State’s propagandists drool with anticipation of this event, and constantly imply that it will come soon. The state’s magazine quotes Zarqawi as saying, “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify … until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq.” A recent propaganda video shows clips from Hollywood war movies set in medieval times—perhaps because many of the prophecies specify that the armies will be on horseback or carrying ancient weapons.
...
Given everything we know about the Islamic State, continuing to slowly bleed it, through air strikes and proxy warfare, appears the best of bad military options. Neither the Kurds nor the Shia will ever subdue and control the whole Sunni heartland of Syria and Iraq—they are hated there, and have no appetite for such an adventure anyway. But they can keep the Islamic State from fulfilling its duty to expand. And with every month that it fails to expand, it resembles less the conquering state of the Prophet Muhammad than yet another Middle Eastern government failing to bring prosperity to its people.

There's your shot. Now, if Graeme is close ... here is the chaser.

How do we help the bleeding? Forget the Weinberger (PBUH) Doctrine, and especially the archaic Powell Doctrine. Being that our political system, national character, and feckless allies have shown they cannot execute the Bush Doctrine, then perhaps we should dust off one of the pre-approved Salamander COAs; modify it slightly, and maybe we need to look at the Metz Doctrine.

... none of these tried and tested methods hold much promise in the conflict with IS. It is not a conventional military. Bolstering local partners is necessary but not sufficient. IS is not fragile like the governments that the U.S. military toppled in Panama or Grenada. And large-scale, protracted counterinsurgency by U.S. ground forces is politically infeasible.

There are, however, other possibilities. As is so often true, history offers clues. For millennia, advanced states sometimes made war on each other, but also used their military forces for a different purpose: to manage the “barbarians” who lived on, and often preyed upon, their peripheries. At times, civilizations such as ancient Rome and China found that it was easier to buy peace with these marauders, paying them to stay away. At other times, they empowered proxies to serve as a buffer or first line of defense. Some states built walls and fortifications to keep the barbarians at bay. Most of the time, these methods were combined in different ways as conditions changed.

What can this history tell us about today? In many ways, the conflict with IS mirrors the challenge faced by civilizations as they managed the barbarians on their periphery, but the traditional methods will not work. IS is too benighted to be bought off. There are no effective proxies. And walls don’t work in an interconnected world.

But there is one more technique from history that has fallen into disuse but may warrant a revival: punitive raids or expeditions. When the threat from the barbarians exceeded some threshold or their behavior became unacceptable, and buying them off, hiring proxies or building walls didn’t work, civilizations would launch punishing military expeditions intended not to impose permanent control over the land beyond their frontiers, but to strike and then leave, sending the message that if the barbarian behavior again became unacceptable, there would be another expedition.

With the Islamic State offers no quarter, none should be given. We just took one B-52 out of the boneyard - let's take some more. Plenty of gainful employment against targets with limited high-altitude AAW.

Hoist the red flag - it is the best of all the worst options. The longer a war goes, the harder the hearts grow - and frankly, not just supporting in, a large portion of the US population would welcome a few well placed punitive expeditions.

No longer an excuse to abandon the OLYMPIA - she has her proper home available

Few things will get me in a funk faster than pondering what we have done by omission to the OLYMPIA.

We've blogged about it before. She is, with MIKASA, the last of her kind. Her war record signaled the rise of our navy. Even from an artistic and architectural  point of view, there is no more perfect home for her.

The Navy is announcing today that it has decided to remove the (former) USS Barry from its longtime home along the banks of the Anacostia River at the Washington Navy Yard.

"After 30 years as a display ship with minimum maintenance performed, the hull is in poor condition and must be removed before construction begins in October 2015 on the Frederick Douglass Memorial Bridge replacement with a fixed span that would land-lock Display Ship Barry."

Find a way around the new bridge, but after a proper dry docking, let's bring OLYMPIA where he belongs.

We build monuments to fried air - this is an irreplaceable symbol of our nation and its navy. Bring her home.

Audio from the front lines

Make no mistake, what happened in Copenhagen over the weekend was a battle - just one battle in a war that will last longer then the life of anyone reading this today.

Almost right out of central casting, we have the audio from the BBC - the audio timed to perfectly outline what this war is, in many respects all about. When it comes to the essential freedoms of man, there can be no, "but" with the following clause defined by its enemies.

Listen to every word.



Nothing says that The Enlightenment lasts forever. In some places, such as the United Kingdom, it is already in retreat or under pressure.

“Ytringsfrihed er ytringsfrihed er ytringsfrihed. Der er intet men.”

While we still try to figure out what to do inside our lifelines, what little light there is in the Muslim world is fading, and shadow turns to black.

The Islamic State is expanding beyond its base in Syria and Iraq to establish militant affiliates in Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt and Libya, American intelligence officials assert, raising the prospect of a new global war on terror.

Intelligence officials estimate that the group’s fighters number 20,000 to 31,500 in Syria and Iraq. There are less formal pledges of support from “probably at least a couple hundred extremists” in countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Yemen, according to an American counterterrorism official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss confidential information about the group.
...
Western officials, especially in southern Europe, fear that the three Libyan “provinces” could evolve into bases for Islamic State fighters traveling across the Mediterranean, into Egypt or elsewhere in North Africa. Eastern Libya has already become a training ground for jihadists going to Syria or Iraq and a haven for Egyptian fighters staging attacks in the neighboring desert.

VADM Rowden; not a fan of Mission Command it seems

Out of the box, my initial instinct to to nod my head in agreement. After all, who wouldn't want to have a required live fire exercise every day? But ... there is always a but ... there came to the front of mind my favorite word in the English language, "Why?"

Every day underway? Are we selecting personality types and have a culture at sea such that it requires such detail from a Vice Admiral in order to have your warships ready for action - not to mention the metric sponge feeding in para 3

What happened or has been happening that caused such a message to go out? Is it a bit high-and-right, or is something going on in the fleet that requires such an action?

I'm the first one who likes the idea of working the weapons system as much as possible - as that is the only way to know they will work when you need it - but is this how we have to do it?

A final note, the last copy I received of the message has two para 11's. Not sure why besides perhaps a Salamanderesque level of self-editing, but I won't correct it.

1. ALL COMNAVSURFOR SHIPS WILL ENSURE THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF COMBAT READINESS. YOUR MAIN BATTERY, ALL CREW SERVED WEAPONS, SHIP/AREA DEFENSE SYSTEMS, AND ATFP WATCH STANDER QUALIFICATIONS AND PROFICIENCY WILL BE CAPABLE OF ENGAGING THE ENEMY AND DEFENDING YOURSELF AS WELL AS THE HIGH VALUE UNIT AT ALL TIMES. THE NAVY PROVIDES SUBSTANTIAL NCEA TO ENSURE WEAPON SYSTEM OPERABILITY, CREW PROFICIENCY, AND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROWESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCES A THRU G. SO SHOOT, ASK FOR MORE, AND CONTINUE TO SHOOT IAW REFERENCES A THRU D IN ORDER TO MEET VALID TRAINING REQUIREMENTS. YOU, YOUR CREWS, AND ALL YOUR WEAPON SYSTEMS MUST BE READY TO FIGHT!
2. ALL SURFOR SHIPS ARE REQUIRED TO CONDUCT LIVE FIRE EXERCISES DAILY WHILE UNDERWAY UNLESS FOR SAFETY, OPERATIONAL, OR ENVIRONMENTAL REASONS YOU ARE NOT ABLE TO FIRE. SHORT OF THE REASONS LISTED ABOVE, I WILL ASSUME IF YOU ARE NOT SHOOTING EVERY DAY WHILE UNDERWAY IT IS BECAUSE YOUR WEAPON SYSTEMS ARE BROKEN OR THERE ARE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES ON WHICH YOU HAVE PRE-BRIEFED YOUR ISIC AND IN TURN YOUR ISIC HAS BRIEFED MY CHIEF OF STAFF AND FORCE GUNNER.
3. IF FOR ANY REASON YOU CANNOT CONDUCT LIVE FIRE EVENTS ON ANY UNDERWAY DAY, A REPORT VIA E-MAIL IS DUE TO YOUR ISIC BY THE END OF THE DAY ON WHICH YOU DID NOT SHOOT. ISICS WILL CONSOLIDATE REPORTS AND SEND MY CHIEF OF STAFF ([redacted](AT)NAVY.MIL) AND FORCE GUNNER ([redacted](AT)NAVY.MIL) A BRIEF SUMMARY OF WHY THE SHOOT DID NOT OCCUR THAT DAY. IF YOUR OPERATIONAL COMMANDER LIMITS LIVE FIRE EVENTS, WE WILL COORDINATE SEPARATELY AND ACCORDINGLY IN ORDER TO SUPPORT HIS/HER INTENTIONS. A SUMMARY OF ROUNDS FIRED BY WEAPON TYPE WILL BE INCLUDED IN YOUR WEEKLY REPORT.
4. PER CIWS PACFIRE MIP 7112 MRC R-2M, FOR EACH PACFIRE EVENT YOU ARE REQUIRED TO SHOOT AT BOTH HIGH AND LOW BURST (ONCE EACH). THE PARAMETER IS FOR THE PAC BIAS (CODE 68 AND 69) TO BE 0 +/- 1 FOLLOWING EACH RATE OF FIRE. IF YOU ARE NOT WITHIN THOSE PARAMETERS, YOU ARE TO RE-SHOOT AT THAT RATE OF FIRE, NOT TO EXCEED
3 TIMES AT ONE RATE OF FIRE. PREVIOUS PACFIRE OFFSET VALUES ARE REQUIRED TO BE ENTERED PRIOR TO START, AND WILL RESULT IN PAC BIAS BEING WITHIN 0 +/- 1.
5. PER REFERENCES E, F AND G, CNSF WILL SUPPORT 300 ROUNDS PER MONTH PER MOUNT IN AIR MODE. AN ADDITIONAL 100 ROUNDS PER MONTH PER MOUNT FOR SHIPS WITH SURFACE CAPABLE (BLK 1B) GUNS TO FIRE IN SURFACE MODE. 1500 ROUNDS PER MOUNT PER YEAR FOR CE-12 AND AW-21, WHICH WILL ALLOW FOR THE PROPER EXECUTION OF THE PACFIRE REQUIREMENTS EXPLAINED ABOVE. YOU MUST REQUEST THIS NCEA AUGMENT 45 DAYS IN ADVANCE.
6. SHIPS THAT ARE EQUIPPED WITH TOWED ARRAY SONARS WILL HAVE THE ARRAY RIGGED FOR TOW AT EVERY AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY. YOUR SONAR SUITE WILL BE MANNED AND TRACKING SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE CONTACTS BOTH PASSIVELY AND ACTIVELY WHEN THE TACTICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SITUATIONS ALLOW. NIXIE WILL BE STREAMED WHEN REQUIRED AND ALL SETTINGS WILL BE IAW THE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES PROMULGATED WITHIN NTTP 3-21.33.
7. AS SPECIFIED ABOVE, THE COMMITMENT TO CONDUCTING LIVE FIRE EXERCISES ADDRESSED HEREIN IS APPLICABLE TO YOUR MAIN BATTERY, ALL CREW SERVED WEAPONS, AND ALL SHIP/AREA DEFENSE SYSTEMS. AS SUCH, IN ADDITION TO ALL MAIN BATTERY AND CREW SERVED WEAPONS AMMUNITION AND ORDNANCE, I EXPECT INCORPORATION OF THE FOLLOWING MUNITIONS INTO YOUR LIVE FIRE AND NCEA AUGMENT PLANNING: MK 214 SEDUCTION, AND MK
46 REXTORP.
8. RANGE CLEARANCE AND OVERALL WEAPONS SAFETY IS PARAMOUNT AS YOU TUNE YOUR WARFIGHTING SKILLS.
9. NCEA AUGMENTATION AND REQUISITIONING GUIDANCE. REFERENCES E, F, AND G GOVERN NCEA MANAGEMENT. NCEA AUGMENT REQUESTS MUST BE SUBMITTED NO LATER THAN 45 DAYS PRIOR. ENSURE YOUR WEAPONS OFFICER, GUNNERY OFFICER, LEADING GM, AND AMMO ACCOUNTANT HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE NCEA PROMULGATION MSGS AND ARE IN COMPLIANCE.
10. THIS ORDER IS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE THE ACCURACY, PRECISION, SAFETY, EFFICIENCY AND CONFIDENCE WITH WHICH YOU PLACE ALL TYPES OF ORDNANCE ON TARGET. YOUR ABILITY TO MASTER THE MATERIAL, TACTICAL, AND WATCH TEAM PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH CONDITION ONE WEAPONS SYSTEMS OPERATION IS FULLY IN LINE WITH OUR WARFIGHTING FIRST PHILOSOPHY. THE TACTICAL PROFICIENCY DEVELOPED THROUGH REPEATED LIVE FIRE EXERCISES FAR OUTWEIGHS ANY POTENTIAL MATERIAL CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH INCREASED USE OF YOUR MAIN BATTERY, CREW-SERVED WEAPONS, AND SHIP/AREA DEFENSE WEAPONS.
11. COMMODORES AND COMMANDING OFFICERS ARE WELCOME TO CONTACT MY STAFF AT ANY TIME REGARDING THIS, OR ANY OTHER ISSUE.
11. WARFIGHTING WILL REMAIN OUR #1 PRIORITY.
12. VICE ADMIRAL ROWDEN SENDS.//

If you are wondering what Mission Command is doctrinally, click here.

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UPDATE: For those who are interested in Mission Command; from the US Army Combined Arms Center:

Sixteen Cases of Mission Command by CDR Salamander

Fullbore Friday

Some times, a true story is better than any fiction one could right.

Almost a year ago, a great man passed on - a man whose story in WWII fits the bill. This is a longish quote from his obit, but do yourself a favor and go read the whole thing.

Colonel Tresham Gregg, well done.

In Italy, he was sent to Camp PG66 at Capua. After trying to walk out of the camp with a working party, he was detected. His persistent efforts to escape had earned him the label pericoloso, and the irate commandant sentenced him to a month’s “solitary” in an unheated tin shack. But for the arrival of a representative of the Red Cross, he might have perished of cold and hunger. 

In March 1942 Gregg was transferred to Camp PG35 at Padula. A failed attempt to tunnel his way out earned him another month in solitary confinement. As an additional punishment, he was then sent to Camp PG29 at Veano, a converted seminary near Piacenza - its commandant claimed that it was escape-proof. 

Calculating that the last place that the Italians would expect a tunnel to start would be in the middle of an open exercise yard, Gregg and a group composed mostly of RTR officers sank a 16ft shaft into the vegetable plots at the centre of this open space, concealing their excavations with lines of washing. 

There ensued six months of work in claustrophobic conditions. Hair oil provided fuel for a single lamp. Gregg dug with an iron rod wrapped in rope to give a firm grip. One night in July 1943, they reached a slit-trench outside the perimeter fence. 

Four of the six tunnellers broke out, and three were quickly captured. Gregg emerged three yards from a sentry and was shot in the head — but still succeeded in getting away. Disguised as a member of the Dutch Hitler Youth (his cover story being that he was on his way to a conference in Rome), he took a bus to Parma railway station, and seated himself in a carriage full of German soldiers. 

He even borrowed copies of their magazines to add to his camouflage. He hoped to reach the Vatican and use his Irish passport to get him a free passage home, but the Carabinieri were searching for him and picked him up while the train was still in the suburbs of Rome. 

Back in PG29 he was serving a third month in solitary confinement when, in September 1943, the Armistice was announced and he was released. He had relations in Switzerland and could have headed north; but he chose to stay with his closest friend, Captain “Donny” Mackenzie of the Cameron Highlanders, who was suffering from malaria.
The two men sheltered with a local family but, as winter set in, moved south-west into the mountains and settled in the Val Nure with a group of charcoal burners. They lived off an almost unrelieved diet of chestnuts. 

In spring 1944 they were contacted by the partisans. Gregg and Mackenzie led a successful raid on a police station at Ferriere, then ambushed two truckloads of troops sent to flush them out. 

As they moved down the Val Nure towards Piacenza, their force picked up recruits. They liberated Bettola and cleared the valley almost as far as Veano. Gregg (known as “Capitano Ganna” to the Italians) and Mackenzie commanded the fighting elements of what became known as the Stella Rossa artisan brigade. 

Contacts were established with MI9 (the intelligence agency which assisted resistance fighters in enemy-occupied territory) and with an SOE mission code-named “Blundell Violet”. The Prefect of Piacenza put a price on their heads; but they were in a natural stronghold, and when a Fascist Alpini battalion attacked over the mountains, Gregg not only forced its commander to give them all his heavy weapons as the price for freeing him, but also recruited many of his men. 

During September 1944 more than 100 downed Allied airmen passed through their hands towards safety in the south. They built an airstrip for supplies and raided German supply lines. In October they liberated Ponte dell’Olio, the northernmost town in the Val Nure. When Gregg’s partisans took the airfield, they were delighted to find 4,000 bottles of rum and brandy bricked up in a storeroom. 

Mackenzie was killed a few days later while on a patrol, and Gregg had to retrieve his body for burial at Bettola, several thousand people turning out for the funeral. Gregg was recalled to discuss future plans and ran a gauntlet of “friendly fire” on reaching the American lines near Serravezza on December 5. He was again mentioned in despatches for his attempts to escape.

Bob Work and the Future Imperfect

The kickoff keynote speaker this year was Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work. He gave a typically informative speech outlining the challenges he sees from his seat.

I review his major points and then pick up where he left off; the start of The Terrible 20s.

Come on over to USNIBlog, give it a read, and tell me what you think.

FA-XX; so far, so good

Now and then, you get a few nuggets in open source that gives one confidence that with FA-XX we may get things right.

First point, it looks like the Navy is going their own way. Second, we are bringing on a team with a good track record.

The US military is seeking to avoid the pitfalls of recent aircraft acquisition programmes as it plans for development of sixth-generation fighters.
...
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) will lead the effort in cooperation with the navy and air force, Kendall says. .

Both also the US air force and navy set aside small amounts of money in their 2016 budget proposals to quietly continue development of sixth-generation fighter aircraft that would enter service around 2030. DARPA’s budget for the AII is classified.

The air force included an $8 million next generation air dominance (NGAD) aircraft while the navy set aside $5 million for what it calls the FA-XX next generation fighter. Neither appropriation is a new-start for the services. Funding for NGAD fell from $15 million in the current fiscal year. Funding for the navy’s effort staid relatively flat from the $4.9 million it received in fiscal 2015.

Would be great to see a tight timeline to shadows on the ramp, the victory of the evolutionary over the revolutionary, and the triumph of the doable good over the illusional perfect. For now though, progress.

More tools please; and faster

One of the gaping maws in our warfighter capability is offensive anti-surface warfare. As we have become complacent in our dominance at sea, we have in many respects lost the ability to meet another fleet that may come out to greet us - greet us on their terms. We discussed this topic a couple of weeks ago on Midrats with Bryan McGrath - specifically with regards to later flights of DDG-51s.

The powers that be know this, but an effective and modern replacement for our Harpoon is many POM cycles away from being ready to stand in line in numbers to make a difference. 

There is also that nagging feeling that many have, including your humble blogg'r, that there is too much risk in only having one or two weapons systems. Too easy to counter, too much at stake.

Along those lines, something came up recently that our friend Bryan asked, "Son of TASM?"

A synthetically guided Tomahawk cruise missile successfully hit its first moving maritime target Jan. 27 after being launched from USS Kidd (DDG 100) near San Nicolas Island in California.

The Tomahawk Block IV flight test demonstrated guidance capability when the missile in flight altered its course toward the moving target after receiving position updates from surveillance aircraft.

“This is a significant accomplishment,” said Capt. Joe Mauser, Tomahawk Weapons System (PMA-280) program manager. "It demonstrates the viability of long-range communications for position updates of moving targets. This success further demonstrates the existing capability of Tomahawk as a netted weapon, and in doing so, extends its reach beyond fixed and re-locatable points to moving targets.”

Yes, Tomahawk is slow and is a big target. Yes, as an anti-ship missile in the second decade of the 21st Century it has its limitations, but that isn't what is important.

Take that capability and roll it in to what we're doing with LRASM.

The LRASM program aims to reduce dependence on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, network links, and GPS navigation in electronic warfare environments. Autonomous guidance algorithms should allow the LRASM to use less-precise target cueing data to pinpoint specific targets in the contested domain. The program also focuses on innovative terminal survivability approaches and precision lethality in the face of advanced counter measures.

The LRASM program began in 2009 to ensure that the United States leads technology advancement for best-in-world operational Anti-Surface Warfare capability into the future. The program, currently in the second of two phases, initially focused on technology for two variants, the LRASM-A and LRASM-B. LRASM-A leverages the state-of-the-art Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile Extended Range (JASSM-ER) airframe and incorporates additional sensors and systems to achieve a stealthy and survivable subsonic cruise missile. Designs for LRASM-B focused on operating at the other end of the spectrum for precision strike weapons—high-altitude and supersonic speed over stealthy penetration.

Working in close collaboration with the Navy to provide warfighters a capability that can make a difference at sea in the near term, DARPA decided in January 2012 to focus solely on technology development for LRASM-A, ceasing development of LRASM-B. By consolidating investments to focus solely on advancing LRASM-A technologies, DARPA aims to reduce risk and expedite delivery of cutting-edge capability to the fleet.

More tools in the toolbox - or just nothing more than more intellectual effort to addressing an obvious shortfall: as we focus on protecting our fleet from attack, so to must we make potential foes do the same.

With so many of our surface ships lacking even a Harpoon - any way to shoehorn in anti-surface capabilities the better. Worst case, like Torpedo-8, it can absorb the enemies attention while other platforms go in for the kill. 

Perfect? No. Good? Yes ... now to get that capability in to the Fleet - that is another matter.

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UPDATE: Video from our friend Sam LaGrone:

East Africa & CJTF-HOA with Major General Wayne W. Grigsby Jr., USA - on Midrats

Time to get to know better one of the commands generating the most bang for the long-war buck than any.

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) based out of Djibouti is playing the long game with the nations of east Africa, our allies, governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other concerned parties to not only help build a better future for the nations in that corner of the continent, but to ensure the security of the American homeland.

Our guest today from 5-5:50pm Eastern to discuss their role and more will be Major General Wayne W. Grigsby Jr., United States Army - Commander CJTF-HOA.

Join us live if you can with the usual suspects in the chat room and offer up your questions for our guest, but if you miss the show you can always listen to the archive at blogtalkradio. 

If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here.

Listen to internet radio with Midrats on Blog Talk Radio

Fullbore Friday

An encore FbF because, well ... it sings to me ... and it is always good to see the Navy-Marine Corps work together as designed.

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One. Hundred. Feet. Then pull closer.

The two steam cutters were fitted out as mini-gunboats to provide the sailing launches with covering fire and pin down the Spanish soldiers firing from the rifle pits along the beach and from the surrounding hills. For this purpose, each of the steam cutters, in addition to its crew of five, carried a sergeant and six Marines to act as sharpshooters. To supplement the Marines and provide greater firepower, additional armaments were added. A one-pound Hotchkiss cannon was mounted aboard Marblehead’s steam cutter, while Nashville’s cutter was fitted out with two Colt machine guns. Together, the two cutters provided the operation with significant firepower.

Just after dawn on the morning of May 11, 1898, Nashville’s cutter and launch pushed away from the gunboat. They were soon joined by the boats from Marblehead. Winslow was in command aboard Nashville’s sailing launch; Lieutenant E.A. Anderson of Marblehead, the expedition’s second-in-command, was in charge of the flagship’s sailing launch. En-sign T.P. Magruder commanded both of the accompanying steam cutters.

The task of the supporting naval squadron during the operation was to draw the Spaniards’ fire away from the work boats. And the gunboats wasted no time in putting their part of the plan into operation. At 6:45 a.m. both ships got underway. Marblehead was the first to open fire upon the Spanish positions on shore. And no sooner had the sound of Marblehead’s opening salvo faded than Nashville commenced firing as well. The ships soon found the range of their target, their shells falling regularly in the vicinity of the cable house.

There was no doubt about the effectiveness of the naval fire. The cable house on the beach was quickly destroyed.

Again and again the shells found their mark, bursting and sending clouds of stone and mortar into the air, Winslow would later write of the engagement, …until one shot, striking the tottering structure, burst, and brought it down, leaving nothing but a disordered pile of masonry covering the wreck of the electrical equipment.

At five minutes before 7 o’clock,, the second phase of the raid began when, with the bombardment continuing, the boat flotilla started moving toward its designated position offshore. The steam cutters led the way, each towing one of the sailing launches. When they were about 300 to 400 feet offshore, the steam launches threw off their tow lines, leaving the sailing launches to move in toward shore under their own oar power. The men in the sailing launches began throwing their grappling hooks overboard in order to locate the telegraphic cables.

The presence of coral, however, made the task of locating and raising the cable with grappling hooks particularly difficult. In order to grapple the cable, the men had first to be able to see it on the bottom through the clear Caribbean water. To do this, the launches were forced to move closer and closer to the shore — closer and closer to the source of enemy fire.

Almost from the beginning, the Americans had lost all hope of keeping their true intentions secret. A Spanish cavalryman astride a white horse spotted the boats as they moved toward the beach. The sharpshooters in the steam launches opened fire in an attempt to prevent him from escaping and raising the alarm among other Spanish troops in the area. The pitching of the boats in the Caribbean waves, however, made precise shooting impossible. The Spaniard was successful in his escape, and word of the American operation quickly spread among the Spanish troops.

The boats were about 100 feet from the shore when the sailors saw the first of the cables in about 20 feet of water. This particular cable ran east and connected Cienfuegos to Santiago.

The sailors aboard the launches wasted no time in trying to raise the cable, but pulling it up from the bottom and aboard the boats proved difficult. The heavy submarine cable, two inches in diameter, was shielded in so much lead and insulation that it weighed about 6 pounds per linear foot. The 30 men in both boats heaved and strained to pull the cable to the surface. The heavy cable, laid taut along the bottom, seemed to weigh tons, Winslow later wrote.

They finally did raise it, and now the steam cutters towed the launches to deeper water for the task of cutting the cable. Here inexperience at the task began to tell. The sailors aboard the launches at first tried to use axes to hack through the cable. Then, when this method proved unsatisfactory, they tried to cut through with cold chisels. They finally found, however, that hacksaws worked the best. All the experimentation took time. It took 20 to 30 minutes to complete the first cut, but the work went more quickly after that. The sailors finally managed to make two cuts in the cable, removing a section of about 150 feet to make it difficult for the Spanish to repair.

Despite the heavy labor, the first step of the operation had gone with surprising ease. The eastbound cable, though, had been out of the line of fire from the Spanish rifle pits on the beach. In addition, the task had been largely completed before reinforcements arrived from the town. All in all, the Spanish response so far had been weak and ineffective. Winslow later wrote that the Spanish fire was so desultory and ineffective that the working parties had paid no attention to it.

Such a lack of enemy resistance, however, was not to last for long. The search for the second cable took the boats farther and farther to the west, and when the American sailors discovered the second cable, their launches were directly in front of Spanish rifle pits on the shore. To make matters worse, the underwater coral again forced the boats to move closer to shore to search for cable. When the crews finally discovered it, the launches were within 100 feet of the shore — close to the Spanish rifle pits dug along the beach.

To ease the plight of the cable-cutting parties, the ships’ commanders increased their bombardment of the Spanish positions on shore. According to Winslow, the shells from the ships’ guns passed so close overhead that the crews instinctively ducked when the rounds passed. The shells could hardly have come closer to us without hitting the boats, Winslow said.

The close shelling was unnerving for friend and foe alike. We soon realized that we had to take the chance of an accidental hit from our ships or receive fire from the enemy at pistol range, Winslow wrote of the battle, and the men worked in disregard of both.

As if the location were not enough to contend with, the second cable proved to be even more difficult to snare than the first. The coral growth underwater made it hard for grappling hooks to reach the cable. Worse, rough water knocked the boats together and made it hard to see through the high waves.

Increasing fatigue also overtook the crews as they struggled to locate the second cable, which connected Cienfuegos with all-important Havana, and drag it to the surface. Nonetheless, the men persevered and eventually succeeded. As with the first cable, Marblehead’s men made the cut in the inshore end while Nashville’s men made the cut on the offshore end. A section of cable about 100 feet long was removed.

In lifting the second cable, Winslow and his party discovered a third, smaller telegraphic cable, too small to be an ocean cable. They assumed that it connected the cable house with the city of Cienfuegos, and before returning to the ships, Winslow and his men set about cutting it as well.

Under the intense naval bombardment that lasted throughout the morning, the Spanish small-arms fire from the shore had gradually faded. As the boat crews finished cutting the second cable, it almost seemed that the Spanish had given up the fight altogether. In response, the fire from the American warships had also nearly stopped.

The lag in Spanish gunfire, however, was only temporary. As work began on the third cable, the Spanish shore fire became stronger. By late morning, large numbers of Spanish reinforcements had made their way out from Cienfuegos and the surrounding area and taken up positions at Punta de la Colorados. Under cover of tall grass and bushes of the chaparral, the reinforcements were able to crawl unseen into the rifle pits and trenches, even into the lighthouse.

Locating and raising the third cable again took the boats perilously close to the Spanish positions. Both boats were within 100 feet of the shore and within 200 feet of the Spanish trenches. Because of the noise of sea and wind, the Americans at first did not notice the increase in fire. Moreover, the Spaniards’ Mauser rifles used smokeless gunpowder, so the men in the boats could not see the incoming fire. The only evidence of the gunfire for the men aboard the boats was the small splashes the bullets made as they struck the water.

Again the ships moved into position, firing their heavy guns upon the positions ashore in effort to quell the Spanish gunfire. And again the naval fire had its devastating effect. All along the ridge and down its sides our projectiles were falling, shattering the rocks, bursting, and sending fragments into the air, clouds of dust, Winslow later said.

Despite the shelling from the ships offshore, the Spanish fire remained concentrated on the launches and the cutters as their crewmen worked to destroy the enemy cable. The Spanish persistence led to the first American casualties of the Spanish-American War. Aboard Marblehead’s cutter, one of the Marines, Patrick Regan, was killed when struck in the head by a bullet. Another man, also struck by a bullet, fell in Nashville’s cutter as well. And in Winslow’s own boat, sailor Robert Volz was struck four times by Spanish bullets. Winslow himself was struck in the hand.

No longer using small arms only, the enemy now opened fire with a fieldpiece mounted in the vicinity of the lighthouse and with machine guns, as well. Clearly, the position of the men in the boats had become untenable. Winslow was forced to abandon the effort to destroy the third cable and ordered the boats back to the ships.

It was a fighting retreat. Some of the sailors took up their rifles to return the Spanish fire, while others bent over the oars. Ensign Magruder’s steam cutters quickly came up to take the launches in tow. They then all made their way back to the ships. Their ordeal, however, was far from over — the Spanish fire remained heavy. Especially hard hit were the boats from Marblehead, enveloped by shore fire as they passed in front of the lighthouse. Five of their men were badly wounded.

The heated Spanish fire also caused minor casualties aboard the gunboats. Spent bullets from the shore injured several men aboard Nashville. At one point during the action, a spent round struck a sailor, then hit Commander Maynard in the chest as he stood on the bridge of the gunboat. The impact was sufficient to put him out of action, and Nashville’s executive officer, Lieutenant A.C. Dillingham, was forced to assume command. The brief interruption in command, however, did little to disrupt the gunboat’s covering fire. We had to clear away very large numbers of Spanish troops, and you can tell [the volume] of our firing when I say we each [Marblehead and Nashville] fired 400 shells, an officer aboard the Nashville wrote home after the battle.

By 10:15 that morning, the boats had finally pulled alongside the ships after being under enemy fire for three hours. For about 30 minutes, the fire had been galling. Nevertheless, Americans casualties were amazingly light. One Marine had been killed, one sailor would later die of wounds, and several men had been seriously wounded. Winslow’s bullet had passed through his left hand.

About an hour later, the American ships got underway and put back out to sea. The raid on Cienfuegos was over.

What was that mission? Computer Network Attack before computers? Electronic attack with a hatchet? Still lessons, ahem satellite comms ahem, to be taken on board today.

The following men served in the cable-cutting party. Those with an asterisk (*) received the Medal of Honor:

From the NASHVILLE:

ERNEST KRAUSE, Coxswain. *
AUSTIN J. DURNEY, Blacksmith. *
JOHAN J. JOHANSSON, Ordinary Seaman*.
JOHN P. RILEY, Landsman. *
DAVID D. BARROW, Ordinary Seaman.*
BENJAMIN F. BAKER, Coxswain. *
LAURITZ NELSON, Sailmaker's Mate. *
HUDSON VAN ETTEN, Seaman. *
WILLARD MILLER, Seaman. *
ROBERT BLUME, Seaman. *
FRANK HILL, Private, U. S. M. C. *
JOSEPH H. FRANKLIN; Private, U. S. M. C.*
JOSEPH F. SCOTT, Private, U. S. M. C. *
THOMAS HOBAN, Coxswain.*
ROBERT VOLZ, Seaman. (severely wounded 4 times)*
ALBERT BEYER, Coxswain. *
GEORGE W. BRIGHT, Coal Passer. *
WILLIAM MEYER, Carpenter's Mate, 3d class.*
HARRY H. MILLER, Seaman. *
JOHN EGLIT, Seaman. *
MICHAEL GIBBON, Oiler. *
PHILIP GAUGHAN, Sergeant, U. S. M. C.*
POMEROY PARKER ,Private, U. S. M. C. *
OSCAR W. FIELD, Private, U. S. M. C. *
MICHAEL L. KEARNEY, Private, U. S. M. C. *


FROM THE MARBLEHEAD.

JAMES H. BENNETT, Chief Boatswains Mate. *
JOHN J. DORAN, Boatswains Mate, 2d class (shot through right buttock)*
FRANK WILLIAMS, Seaman. *
HARRY HENRICKSON,' Seaman (shot through liver, thought to be fatal)*
ALBERT BADAS, Seaman. *
AXEL SUNDQUIST, Chief Carpenter's Mate *
WILLIAM HART, Machinist, lst class. *
FRANZ KRAMER, Seaman. *
HENRY P. RUSSELL, Landsman. *
HERMAN W. KUCHMEISTER, Private, U. S. M. C. (shot through the jaw bone and neck; thought to be dead). *
WALTER S. WEST, Private, U. S. M. C.*
WILLIAM OAKLEY, G. M., 2d class. *
JULIUS A. R. WILKE, B. M., lst class.
JOSEPH E. CARTER, Boatswain. *
JOHN DAVIS, G. M., 3d class. (wound, right leg)*
WILLIAM, LEVERY, Apprentice, lst class. (wound, left leg, very slight)*
HERBERT L. FOSS, Seaman. *
NICK ERICKSON, Coxswain. *
FREEMAN GILL, Gunners Mate, 1st class. *
JOHN MAXWELL, Fireman, 2d class. *
LEONARD CHADWICK, Apprentice, lst class. *
JAMES MEREDITH, Private, U. S. M. C. *
EDWARD SULLIVAN, Private, U. S. M. C. *
DANIEL CAMPBELL, Private, U. S. M. C. *
PATRICK REGAN, Private, U.S.M.C. (fatally wounded)
E. SUNTZENICH, Apprentice, 1st Class
JULIUS A. R. WILKE, Boatswains mate, 1st Class*

Lt. Winslow was slightly wounded in the hand.

Is your crew ready?

John at Argghhh!!! hit this too and has some good Mauser gun talk to go with it .... but I felt this needed a FbF treatment.

Hat tip Tim.

A Global War Led by a King

With the major Arab powers doing their best to run away, the European powers shifting their eyes left and right waiting for someone to do what they willfully forgot how to do, and the USA pretending to be checking its twitter feed; it appears that at this phase of the long war, the leader of the forces of modernity is the Hashemite King of Jordan, Abdullah II.

Hey, at least he looks the part - and someone has to step forward. 

If you believe, like I do, that the Islamic State is only going to be destroyed by Muslim opposition, then you will need a Muslim taking the lead. When you look a the Arab and Muslim world, is there another leader who has both the will or the ability? A Hashemite King? That is about a central casting as you can get.

Europe lacks the will or ability to even do the right thing on their own continent, and the American people are getting what they voted for twice, good and hard. I would not expect much change in either condition any time soon. The world will just have to do with a diminished American effort and fill the best as it can, where it can.

So, who is he and we are fighting? The Islamic State's modern incarnation of Thulsa Doom's Snake Cult has a leader, structure, and in a fashion, a government, judicial and PR department ... but ... who are they?

Well - they are legion. They are them and they are us. They are there, and if not killed, they will be coming back to wherever you call here.

Look at the numbers; if you are the King of Jordan, you have more of a problem than most. If you must fight them, best to do it at the time and place that is best. Now is a good time.