A little something "we" have been sharing around email the last few days I wanted to share with you. Something for the front porch's collective pondering.
The SAN ANTONIO Class is the gift that keeps on giving. Some of this can be explained away because of Katrina ... but ponder the numbers below.
For manufacturing in general - and shipbuilding in particular - the theory goes that with lessons learned during each production run, you get faster, show better quality production, and enjoy lower per unit costs.
Let me paraphrase something sent to me from a friend from the technical side of the challenge that tells a great story - this time the latest with the LPD-17's diesels.
What else would Sal like to see? I think the inspection reports as outlined in para 4.3 would be nice.
In the end - if you think LPD-17 and her sisters are expensive enough - imagine the cost of ripping out the diesels and replacing them - but it can't be any worse than when we changed out our BB from coal to oil (like we did with my grandfather's BB, USS ARKANSAS (BB-33) ). I don't think we need to go there though .... do we? Can we?
If you don't have any of those, then you have one of a few things going on; outright incompetence on initial concept, design, and management of the product development phase only discovered when concept became 3D; fraud of the same; an institution unable to function and perform even the most fundamental aspects of their profession.
In all cases of the above - or combinations of cases - what results in a sane world is that there are a series of wholesale firings of senior management and/or criminal investigations. When that doesn't happen, then usually you have a much larger systemic malfunction going on.
Well, that is the theory - now ponder the macro issue as outlined below.
| # | Name | Builder | Keel Laying | Launch | Delivery | KL to L (months) | L to D (months) | KL to D (months) |
| 17 | San Antonio | Avondale | 9-Dec-00 | 12-Jul-03 | 20-Jul-05 | 31.5 | 24.6 | 56.1 |
| 18 | New Orleans | Avondale | 14-Oct-02 | 11-Dec-04 | 22-Dec-06 | 26.3 | 24.7 | 51.0 |
| 19 | Mesa Verde | Ingalls | 25-Feb-03 | 19-Nov-04 | 28-Sep-07 | 21.1 | 34.8 | 55.9 |
| 20 | Green Bay | Avondale | 11-Aug-03 | 11-Aug-06 | 29-Aug-08 | 36.5 | 25.0 | 61.5 |
| 21 | New York | Avondale | 10-Sep-04 | 19-Dec-07 | 21-Aug-09 | 39.8 | 20.4 | 60.2 |
| 22 | San Diego | Ingalls | 23-May-07 | 7-May-10 |
| 36.0 |
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| 23 | Anchorage | Avondale | 24-Sep-07 |
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| 24 | Arlington | Ingalls | 26-May-08 | 23-Nov-10 |
| 30.4 |
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| 25 | Somerset | Avondale | 11-Dec-09 |
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| 26 | John P. Murtha | Ingalls |
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| 27 |
| Ingalls |
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If you need a kick-start, Tim Colton provides a very good overview.
NGSB's announcement of the launch of LPD 24 said that she is 77% complete, which the LPD Program Manager apparently thinks is good, although it isn't. And if it took them 30 months to do 77% of the work, it's going to take them well over a year to finish her, maybe close to two years. ... It would only take ten months on a straight-line expenditure curve, of course, but they don't happen in shipbuilding: in shipbuilding, it's an S-curve and the last 5% takes for ever.Why aren't we getting better and faster with time? Moving away from the macro theory I put out at the opening, the other micro reasons are legion and include things we have discussed here and on Midrats to include; inadequate priorities and manning at SUPSHIPS and NAVSEA (there are very good people there, look up the chain and manning document changes for the problem); loss of discipline in program management; and a loss of credibility in Congress towards our Flag Officers. That is on the military side. On the civilian side we have management, tort, and union malpractice that has warped what was once a first class shipbuilding industry.
Combine the two together and you have a gordian knot that is going to require our own Alexander to fix. It can be fixed though, and the easiest part to the fix is on the military side. We have to be ready to fix it. Judging from some attitudes though, I don't know if we are there yet.
We need to - as until we do - we will have problems like this that keep coming up.
Let me paraphrase something sent to me from a friend from the technical side of the challenge that tells a great story - this time the latest with the LPD-17's diesels.
When looking over the JAG investigation into the diesels, it comes down this: it doesn't appear that the diesels were ever flushed.
While doing a diesel job, in the work item (that spells out the step by step things you must do) there is a line item and a check point to conduct a flush of the lube oil system. The work item specifically calls out the size micron bag you must use and the amount of debris you are allowed (and it ain't much). It doesn't appear that there was ever a flush done on these diesels, even though there was clearly a large amount of contamination already present.
A technical expert states that the only way to get those diesels down is to literally tear them down to parade rest and flush then and clean the individual parts, to the point of even disassembling the block. He said that you still might not get everything out of it. More to the point, those diesels are always going to be a problem, especially if the Sailors can't even understand what the high temp readings mean on the bearings (and those diesels are all wired to a computer).
Bottom line, unless they do a complete diesel change out, those ships are going to be tied to the pier a lot.
It doesn't appear that NG had proper cleanliness protocols when the diesels were being installed and tested. When issues started happening, it appears that NAVSEA didn't follow or enforce their own procedures.
The Navy must get it's house in order. We're simply too far into the program to kill the LPD-17 Class. The real problem as I see it, is will the Navy come forward and admit that their own procedures weren't followed or enforced, since that's the cause of this whole mess? The second problem is that the engines are eating up main bearings and this need not ever happened. These diesels are wired up for telemetry to tell the operators whats going on inside of them.
For instance, there's a paragraph in the JAG findings where it clearly states that the Sailor on watch ignored high temp alarms on a main bearing telling him that there was a problem with oil flow.
To correctly lubricate these engines, it's not simply enough to have oil on the bearings; it must have a flow of cooled oil going around the bearings in order to protect the bearing. This situation could have been caught before damage occured had only the Sailor known what he was looking at.
How to correct the problem with the diesels? The only sure way to do it is to tear the diesels completely apart, down to taking the block apart and cleaning every orifice, cooling line inside the block, the cylinders, heads everything. Then put it together and do flushes until there is no contamination. That's going to cost a pretty penny, but what is the alternative?
On the Navy side, two problems: first, NAVSEA does not oversee the new construction end not nearly enough; second, the Navy is not training it's people correctly.That is one person's report based on what they have seen, and it largely matches with other reports that have come my way.
What else would Sal like to see? I think the inspection reports as outlined in para 4.3 would be nice.
In the end - if you think LPD-17 and her sisters are expensive enough - imagine the cost of ripping out the diesels and replacing them - but it can't be any worse than when we changed out our BB from coal to oil (like we did with my grandfather's BB, USS ARKANSAS (BB-33) ). I don't think we need to go there though .... do we? Can we?
No, we just need some experienced engineers with solid top-cover leadership to be given the mission to fix it. They will - if we let them. Part of that fix it an open, transparent, and brutally honest appraisal of how we got here and who let it happen.
69 comments:
What strikes me is how fundamental the errors are. Herman Wouk famously wrote that the Navy was an organization designed by geniuses to be operated by,,,mmm... simpletons (slight modification there, but let's be nice). But as he made clear in the Caine Mutiny, the simpletons have to do by the numbers and by the governing instruction. This requires a measure of humility, and a measure of self subordination.
Specifically, you have to let go of the notion that you, personally, are the greater genius, and therefore the governing instructions do not govern you. Then you must seek out the governing instructions, assemble them, and methodically see to it that their requirements are complied with, in the order and manner specified. This is something we were all taught as mids, truly learned as Div O's and methodically applied as Department Heads...and thereafter.
Except for the commissioning crew, who were the Naval Officers who should have done this? Well...Supships and the ISIC, for damn sure. These billets are not filled by junior or inexperienced officers, or, more properly, didn't used to be.
The ship is "optimally manned", a lie on its face. But with all the high priced, high ranking help, who was inspecting, doing liaison with, explaining, instructing, defending and enabling ship's force.?
Heads should roll. Including promoted heads, and I don't mean in the commissioning or subsequent crew. Of course, "did the contract incorporate compliance with the governing instructions" is a key question. If it's not in the contract, it doesn't happen. What JAG reveiwed that? Or are they too busy trying to treat infantry like street cops in quiet suburbs?
As usual, more questions than answers. As usual, these days.
I read in the JAG investigation that at one point carbon steel pipe was used. This is just dumber than dirt. The piping drawing invokes the type of pipe, the size of pipe, the size of weld and the mil standard characteristics of the pipe to be installed. You never, EVER use carbon steel pipe in a lube oil system; you use copper nickel or stainless.
A lot of stupid things happened, and every one of them can be laid at the feet of the Navy leadership.
How so Byron? NAVSEA is oh so diverse and I have been told time and again that diversity makes us more efficient and we work better when we focus on skin color and genitalia configuration of the group. I mean, hey, NAVSEA was the employer of choice! That has to account for something, right?
To that point, I have been on CIVMAR ships w/ good CHENGs and BAD CHENGs. They make a HUGE difference in the trip, efficiency, maintenance of the gear and over all strain on the crew. If we did not man the crew w/ a good engineering department in our optimally manned soup sandwich, I mean, ship, well, shame on us.
Byron...you just have to get your priorities straight...!
That pic was from 2007.
And exactly when where the problems being ignored in the LPD-17's?
Can someone please enlighten this clueless Old Fart on what else an SES "Executive Director" is supposed to be doing?
avondale is going tits up, and the workers know that. the talent has left, whatever talent they had that is.
Son, have you ever had your diversity shoved up your fourth point of contact?
No worries...
Just put out a bid to large marine diesel operators to run the ships....
As amphibs are no longer going to be regarded as WARships anyway, work out some long term lease back arrangements, and use to them to haul freight with some occasional block out times for the USMC.
Hey. Its a plan that worked out ok for the Brits in the Falklands.
(Well, kinda nearly not once the bullets got past the accountants' logic)
DADT... 8-)
Sid;
I'll interpret that as like we view taking the 5th Amendment rights when questioned...not that there's anything wrong with that, ya know...
In this day and age, to make sure mistakes, in such large organization isn't just stupid, it's criminal. No law on the bookes, but...you know it when you see it.
One of the LL I took away fro overhauling FCDSSA Dam Neck, applying the Carnegie-Mellon Software Engineering Institute's Capability Maturity Model (SEI CMM), which was for software at the time, was a "Level 5" organization had the ability to document problems and migrate fixes forward, not only to similar work, but to also know how to check to apply to any work, as was appropriate, so all work was more precise.
Net result, and only attaining a Level 3 certification, the same "shop" went from $34M/yr work to $100M year, with the same staff and the same facility. On the way, via many extra efforts, to Level 3, the entire model was implemented, and the certification reflected (I had just retired before the actual evaluation) the processes were there, but were not working at the optimum levels. The Level 5 attaining mindset went in to all that was done, and still, it was an opperation that benefited nicely, to the benefit of the fleet (dirty little secret: They pretty much took over the sub force's software management, as the bubbleheads had no centralized structure to effectively do it...so the former FFG/DD/DDG/CG support command broadened it's market and served another "customer base" well as a reuslt of applying lessons learned).
Yeah, all this done by 300 civil servants and 60 military people, you know, too stupid to get a real job in the business world.
Side note: The SEI CMM was the brainchild of a retired SVP of IBM, who partnered with CM SEI. The model was used by some big corporations successfully, and it was also modified to encompass project and supply management.
Ahh, the follies play on.
Now I see the F135 engine is too big to fit on a C-2 for COD...
Its not like the USN hasn't know it needs to deliver engines at sea, or that the Marines may need them ashore before commercial operators can get them there.
Has somebody checked the water system up there in the Royal City of DC?
Competence is all, save honor and effort. The latter lead to the first over time.
And yes, shame on us. Again and again and again.
"...<span>but it can't be any worse than when we changed out our BB from coal to oil (</span><span>like we did with my grandfather's BB, USS ARKANSAS (BB-33) )</span><span>."</span>
Well, considering that we hadn't had oil-fired boiler technology for FIVE DECADES when BB-33 was built (in fact, it was experimental), we can give the USN a pass on Arkansas. But the rest of the story?
Ay Carramba.
URR, or when we went from oil fired steam ships to DFM. HOLY COW! From the old gray beards I work with, they said every single tiny leak on the IOWA class battleships opened up making it a near impossible task to get them ready for Desert Storm.
LT B, seems like you and I have sat through similar briefings. I actually had it out with the head honcho of diversity over at a shall-not-be-named SYSCOM. Her only defense to the diversity directorate was to imply that I was racist before walking back from that stance.
XFORMED, I have no problem with bi-curious beautiful women. sal claims he dated one in college...we'll just take his word on that.
Do they have any pictures from "Let Your Children Design Navy Ships Day"?
It smelled like sewage on the way out to Reagan National this morning...that explains a lot of what goes on in DC.
The things people remember ..... and SG; who said there was only "one?"
Ok its a stretch...but there is a way to tie all the diparate elements of these comments together.
So, today, the last extant BB that was converted from coal to oil...which was a massive undertaking for its day btw...now has an ardent wiccan lesbian as her curator.
Interesting times these.
Salty, that was a very serious problem when the USN switched from NSFO to F76 years before...I would suspect that CDS-14 could wax eloquent on those fun times.
I bet the trees died too.
I bet the trees died too.
<span>"This situation could have been caught before damage occured had only the Sailor known what he was looking at."</span>
<span></span>
<span>This statement truly tells the tale...From the Navy side, anyways. Looking back at ANY Class-A mishap over the last several years (and I'm thinking collisions and groundings, though that's by no means all-inclusive) and you'll probably see this line in the JAGMAN somewhere.</span>
<span>What this really tells me is that we are (metaphorically-speaking) teaching our sailors to simply replace a blown fuse, rather than investigate why it blew in the first place. Deeper still; We're doing a piss-poor job of teaching our sailors to differentiate between symptoms and problems. Most telling of all: We are not implementing and, most importantly, ENFORCING a culture of <span>VERBATIM PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE</span>.</span>
<span>Back to Knowing Your Equipment: Two ships in the recent past GROUNDED because they DID NOT KNOW...</span>
<span>a. Which position source was being displayed as the primary source and;</span>
<span>b. That the position source they DID have (unknowingly) selected as primary was suspect.</span>
<span>Now we're dealing with kids who are told to monitor guages who;</span>
<span>a. Have little, if any, idea what those guages are for (I'll stipulate that they know what they ARE, but I'll stop short of assuming that their purpose is fully understood) and;</span>
<span>b. Have little, if any idea on the implications of readings that are unexpected.</span>
<span>Teaching in a schoolhouse, I've always tried to impart a very important lesson on my students:</span>
<span>The ship is constantly talking to you. Two things we, as sailors, must ALWAYS be in tune to:</span>
<span>a. We must UNDERSTAND what the ship is telling us (and WHY), and;</span>
<span>b. We must have the ability to RESPOND to what the ship is telling us she needs.</span>
<span>"A" simply states that you must KNOW YOUR EQUIPMENT while "B" dictates that you MUST KNOW YOUR PROCEDURES and, most importantly, USE THEM!! </span>
Geez, it was college. It seems almost all the women there were bi-curious. Beauty can be measured on the beer scale anyway. :)
I love when people call me racist. I school them on my background and when I get really pissed, you can even hear the SE DC/PG County come out in me. Foul mouthed, yes, racist, no.
Yeah, we used to say it was Blue Plains, but I guess it is the Washington Navy Yard. I was at the museum there this weekend, btw. Good times.
So.....why not truncate the LPD17 program as say #25 and use the money to buy existing foreign built one (oh the howls will start now!) OR buy another (foreign) desingn, then modify it, and then compete that amongst US shipyards.
Here are a short list of some possibilities (designs more so than ships themselves): Abaslon, Endurance, Bay, Albion, Dokho, Juan Carlos, Damen, Navantia, & TKMS has some others too.
Just so long was we limit NAVSEA technical barons from screwing up the basic design.... yeah sure~
Put NAVSEA 08 in charge of this goat rope. They will strangle people with procedures and required work process steps. Nothing like a little Nukie Nuke attention to detail.
LT B,
I'll share a sea story that might make you chuckle. During my JO tour (VP), one of my initial jobs was First Lieutenant which in a VP Squadron amounts to facilities cleaning and maintenance and running the geedunk (which was $20,000 in the black when I left, I will proudly say).
Staffed mostly with the new kids, I managed to get one guy who enlisted late (31 years old). He was also black and managed to throw the race card twice already before being sent to me (his third job change). Initially he worked out fine and I did make an effort to treat him a bit differently being he was a 31 year old airman. If we were going to make him clean toilets, the least I could do was treat him not like an 18 year old.
Anyway, he soon got upset with some decision I made and publicly ininuated that I might have some "racial issues" in my decisions. I quickly pulled out my wallet and showed him a picture of my wife (who is darker than him and BTW I am as white as the snowfall in Brunswick, ME) and watched him stutter, back step and basically look like a complete dolt. Sometimes things just work out.
Incidently, I grew up in Bowie myself. Go Bulldogs!
I still wonder if the LSD-41 hull could be used as the basis for an LPD platform. They seem to have worked out pretty well in the last quarter century.
Lt B:
From a long forgotten thread, but are you geolocated with me? If so...when is it beer time?
sid and Salty, I'll take the bait...we did the conversion from NSFO (it was to something called "Naval Distillate" initially) on my first ship in 72/73. All went well on sea trials until the ramp up to full power and then ND started spraying around from just about every flange from the fuel oil service pumps to the burner front. The snipes shut everything down and we were eventually towed back into SDGO.
Since my second ship, a DEG, burned JP-5 the conversion was much less dramatic.
QMC(SS):
That's THE gospel! PREACH IT, BROTHERS AND SISTERS, PREACH IT!
Oxon Hill, and ex wife is Black and I am well, quite Scottish looking.
Ha! I'm a Scot myself.
We won't be there tonight (crappy game) but typically frequent the wing house on 4th street in St. Pete for MNF. Also, hit up Phib, he can shoot you my contact info.
I SO wanted to wear a kilt when I went through TSA. :)
When she asked me what's under a Scottman's kilt, I answered, "Paradise lassy, paradise."
Ok...
It took for 9 Dec 00 to 20 Jul 05 for keel laying to delivery of LPD-17.
And by all accounts she was nowhere near ready then.
Contrast and compare to this singular ship type...
It only took a few months longer from keel laying to delivery, and after a series fo "oohh-ahhh" jaunts made her first extended deployment a year later with 4 new aircraft types aboard, and in company with two other spankin' new -quite transformative- ship types.
Any chance we can get back every Legion of Merit from every retired flag over the last decade that has any involvement with this mess?d
good question. my biggest fight is keeping LPD 17 from being turned into the next LSD!
ANAV's Rule #5: Procedural Compliance is not a Goal, it is a <span>STANDARD!</span>
Salty, want to know why the first LPD built at PASCAGOULA was only 21 months in that keel to launch table above ? while the 2nd LPD being built at PASCAGOULA jumped all the way up to 36 months keel to launch ? While the 3rd LPD at Pascagoula is back down to only 31 months ? Well, the very firm "rumor" that explains this is as follows:
LPD 19 (1st one at Pascagoula) was the regular standard from keel to launch. 21 months in that table. Then there was a gap while AVONDALE built LPD20, 21. So, in order to reduce costs of LPD-22 which is the 2nd LPD being finished off at Pascagoula, Nrothrop Grummun contracted many of the modules out to a yard called SIGNAL which has for decades built pieces for all the Pascagoula AEGIS DDG's. So, far, so good. So, NG in Pascagoula told NG in Avondale to send the drawings for the LPD down to Texas to SIGNAL INC. so they could build lots and lots of large modules which soon began arriving by barge back in Pascagoula where they were all being assembled ( I think they call it erected). However, as the months went by LPD-22 started to get slower and slower and fall further and further behind sked, taking much much longer than LPD-19 did at Pascagoula from Keel to Launch. Finally the mystery was solved, but far too late. Avondale (which does all the computer design work for LPD's) sent the wrong (old, incorrectly) set of DRAWINGS down to SIGNAL INC. who merrily proceeded to construct what they were contracted to do. So, when Pascaoula tried to erect (fit) all these SIGNAL pieces together back in Pascagoula, they ran into a nightmere that approached as bad as the original USS SAN ANTONIO. LPD-22 is now far behind sked and it was a real (expensive) challenge to actually get all the pieces with wrongly located foundations, etc. to fit together.
Avondale strikes again ! Please, somebody put them out of their misery. Soon. Can anyone spell QA ?
Oh, I'm afraid there's some kind of LSD involved in this goat-fark! ;)
LPD 17 is a foreign design... If what I've been told is correct, it was originally a French design.
Worse thing about the poor quality, slow and just plain inept shipbuilding. Is it has and will most likely cost Sailors their LIVES. Where a a Rickover or someone to get this POS ship program going? My recommendations: Fire the entire NAVSEA ship building office associated with this program. Do a complete from the deckplates up review of anything and everything associated with this program. Assign BIW as lead shipyard with total control over Ingalls and Avondale to correct quality control issues. If issues do not get completely fixed within 18 months. Cancel all contracts and tow all ships no matter the condition to BIW for final completion and bill all towingrepair costs to Ingalls.
Did not the shipyards ever hear of the Iwo Jima and her Boiler Room explosion in 1990 which was caused by using the wrong bolts.
Last ship in Navy with a CIVMAR ship. That engine room was the cleanest one I had ever seen in 20 years. It ran well and looked even better. Those CIVMARS had alot of pride of ownership. So much so I had to get permission from CHENG to go into his spaces.
<span>"...second, the Navy is not training it's people correctly." </span>
That's true, but there's more to it than that. A lot of this also has to do with lower standards. Lower standards of training, lower standards in quals and lower standards of discipline. As the years went on, I watched a steady decrease in the level of all three.
When I qualified in submarines, the program I was under was far more difficult that what I saw a few years later. A non-qual telling a Qual PO "I don't need to know that" or going to another guy for a sig when the first was was *cue whine* too haaard would bring a whole world of hurt down on said non-qual. That became commonplace as time went by. Commands were more concerned about hurting feelings than they were maintaining high standards. We have a lot of young sailors out in the fleet now who have a don't-give-a-$h*t attitude....not one of open hatred for the Navy, but one of quiet disinterest. Why? Because they lack firm leadership at the deckplate level. When I was a young NUB (ooops, that wasn't PC....sooo sorry [NOT]), I had guys on my first boat with <span>bad</span> attitudes. Real FTN-spoutin' types. But they gave hard check-outs, stood proper watches, had a high knowledge level and were professional and by-the-procedure. One had to look past the anti-Navy venom to see the real man. Now? It's more shrugged shoulders and "what<span>ever</span>."
If the Navy really, really, really wants to build good sailors and good crews, they will cut the touchy-feely crap, let the Chiefs and PO1 rattle some cages and hold all hands (at ALL levels) accountable for their conduct, attitude and in-rate knowledge. The commands also need to lock the doors to the Chief's and First Class messes and make them get down in the spaces or up on deck with the junior folks and make sure things get done and done right.
How could any qualified watchstander not know what a high temp alarm looks like? That guy had more than a training problem. I guarantee that.
<span>"...second, the Navy is not training it's people correctly." </span>
That's true, but there's more to it than that. A lot of this also has to do with lower standards. Lower standards of training, lower standards in quals and lower standards of discipline. As the years went on, I watched a steady decrease in the level of all three.
When I qualified in submarines, the program I was under was far more difficult that what I saw a few years later. A non-qual telling a Qual PO "I don't need to know that" or going to another guy for a sig when the first was was *cue whine* too haaard would bring a whole world of hurt down on said non-qual. That became commonplace as time went by. Commands were more concerned about hurting feelings than they were maintaining high standards. We have a lot of young sailors out in the fleet now who have a don't-give-a-$h*t attitude....not one of open hatred for the Navy, but one of quiet disinterest. Why? Because they lack firm leadership at the deckplate level. When I was a young NUB (ooops, that wasn't PC....sooo sorry [NOT]), I had guys on my first boat with <span>bad</span> attitudes. Real FTN-spoutin' types. But they gave hard check-outs, stood proper watches, had a high knowledge level and were professional and by-the-procedure. One had to look past the anti-Navy venom to see the real man. Now? It's more shrugged shoulders and "what<span>ever</span>."
If the Navy really, really, really wants to build good sailors and good crews, they will cut the touchy-feely crap, let the Chiefs and PO1 rattle some cages and hold all hands (at ALL levels) accountable for their conduct, attitude and in-rate knowledge. The commands also need to lock the doors to the Chief's and First Class messes and make them get down in the spaces or up on deck with the junior folks and make sure things get done and done right.
How could any qualified watchstander not know what a high temp alarm looks like? That guy had more than a training problem. I guarantee that.
<span>"...second, the Navy is not training it's people correctly." </span>
That's true, but there's more to it than that. A lot of this also has to do with lower standards. Lower standards of training, lower standards in quals and lower standards of discipline. As the years went on, I watched a steady decrease in the level of all three.
When I qualified in submarines, the program I was under was far more difficult that what I saw a few years later. A non-qual telling a Qual PO "I don't need to know that" or going to another guy for a sig when the first was was *cue whine* too haaard would bring a whole world of hurt down on said non-qual. That became commonplace as time went by. Commands were more concerned about hurting feelings than they were maintaining high standards. We have a lot of young sailors out in the fleet now who have a don't-give-a-$h*t attitude....not one of open hatred for the Navy, but one of quiet disinterest. Why? Because they lack firm leadership at the deckplate level. When I was a young NUB (ooops, that wasn't PC....sooo sorry [NOT]), I had guys on my first boat with <span>bad</span> attitudes. Real FTN-spoutin' types. But they gave hard check-outs, stood proper watches, had a high knowledge level and were professional and by-the-procedure. One had to look past the anti-Navy venom to see the real man. Now? It's more shrugged shoulders and "what<span>ever</span>."
If the Navy really, really, really wants to build good sailors and good crews, they will cut the touchy-feely crap, let the Chiefs and PO1 rattle some cages and hold all hands (at ALL levels) accountable for their conduct, attitude and in-rate knowledge. The commands also need to lock the doors to the Chief's and First Class messes and make them get down in the spaces or up on deck with the junior folks and make sure things get done and done right.
How could any qualified watchstander not know what a high temp alarm looks like? That guy had more than a training problem. I guarantee that.
<span>"...second, the Navy is not training it's people correctly." </span>
That's true, but there's more to it than that. A lot of this also has to do with lower standards. Lower standards of training, lower standards in quals and lower standards of discipline. As the years went on, I watched a steady decrease in the level of all three.
When I qualified in submarines, the program I was under was far more difficult that what I saw a few years later. A non-qual telling a Qual PO "I don't need to know that" or going to another guy for a sig when the first was was *cue whine* too haaard would bring a whole world of hurt down on said non-qual. That became commonplace as time went by. Commands were more concerned about hurting feelings than they were maintaining high standards. We have a lot of young sailors out in the fleet now who have a don't-give-a-$h*t attitude....not one of open hatred for the Navy, but one of quiet disinterest. Why? Because they lack firm leadership at the deckplate level. When I was a young NUB (ooops, that wasn't PC....sooo sorry [NOT]), I had guys on my first boat with <span>bad</span> attitudes. Real FTN-spoutin' types. But they gave hard check-outs, stood proper watches, had a high knowledge level and were professional and by-the-procedure. One had to look past the anti-Navy venom to see the real man. Now? It's more shrugged shoulders and "what<span>ever</span>."
If the Navy really, really, really wants to build good sailors and good crews, they will cut the touchy-feely crap, let the Chiefs and PO1 rattle some cages and hold all hands (at ALL levels) accountable for their conduct, attitude and in-rate knowledge. The commands also need to lock the doors to the Chief's and First Class messes and make them get down in the spaces or up on deck with the junior folks and make sure things get done and done right.
How could any qualified watchstander not know what a high temp alarm looks like? That guy had more than a training problem. I guarantee that.
Grrrrrr.....friggin' stuttering computer. *rolls eyes*
Well theres your problem....
I am sorry, I can't get past the list of ships. The name on LPD-26 makes me retch!
there is something to be said for the merchant crewing model where deck and engine officers advance in parallel AND engineers remain specialists throughout their careers. Its an open quesion IF the USN SWOs would adopt a similar system. The EDOs in big ship ERs did not seem to take ahold??
A couple or so years ago the USNI ran an article by a SWO urging that the Navy adopt the merchant marine model and an article by a Merchant Marine Officer urging the CG change to rules and make the merchant marine adopt the Navy model. They were on facing pages, I think.
It's no panacea either way. The Navy's problem is that it doesn't seem to value hands on instruction, adequate manning, or firm leadership that builds strong discipline (and no, I am not talking about Martinets, there is a difference).
The whole thing is a symptom of cutting personnel end strength, and training, and maintenance money. Nobody can survive a modestly serious mistake, so we cut training. Perfect. Expecting perfection from people who haven't even been taught how to make up a set of SP phones properly, or that dirty, ill stowed spaces are a fire hazard, or that clean lube oil systems are a sine qua non for diesel engine reliability.
As to discipline, officers need to put shoe leather on deck plate, ditto chiefs or (God help us, PO1's). Nobody can lead from behind a desk.
Don't forget to add in the devastation caused by Katrina. Not only did New Orleans get hammered (causing a lot of the Avondale workers homes to go under water, and them leaving work to find a place for their family to stay) but the entire Gulf Coast suffered an enormous amount of damage from storm surge and high winds.
WW2, if you are SEA 08, get lost. Those guys cook the books just as bad as anyone else when it comes to surface ships. Stick to your subs and aircraft carriers.
YNSN, that is inaccurate.
LCS's 1 and 2 are both foreign design with some internal re-design...originally both were ferries. But LPD 17 is an NGSS design.
I was going to look it up if I were challenged in the CDR Sal archives. :)
hey man I'm not knocking him for it, simply relating 8-) . ok, back to the subject matter at hand
BT BT
You could never make these comments on USNI without them losing their minds
BUG: Bi-curious Until Graduation.
well said Grandpa
Cancell for contractor non-performance of Gov't convienence?
Whoops-can't some politician(s) involved.
Canel for non-performance?
Govt. convienence?
Oh, sorry how stupid of me-some politician will cry boo-hoo.
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