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Proactively “From the Sea”; an agent of change leveraging the littoral best practices for a paradigm breaking six-sigma best business case to synergize a consistent design in the global commons, rightsizing the core values supporting our mission statement via the 5-vector model through cultural diversity.
The U.S.-Canadian military commands responsible for protecting North America from terrorists have changed the names of key readiness exercises to more politically correct words that do not offend American Indians.WARRIOR is not a
U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs have struck the word "warrior" from one major exercise and replaced it with "phantom," according to a July internal message from command headquarters.
"We did change them because of the references to Native Americans," Sgt. Tomassi said. "And the initiative wasn't U.S. or Canadian. It was just NORAD. We are sensitive to such issues. We don't have a professional sports team like the Washington Redskins. But we still are sensitive to the same sorts of issues that those organizations are. When Admiral Keating arrived, the staff was already in progress, saying this was an initiative we wanted to take on, and Admiral Keating embraced it."The crap your people are feeding your PAO pogue just stinks. What a shitty decision, sir. Send an officer out to do this stuff. You don’t pay Master Sgt. John Tomassi enough to spout this stuff without a sarcastic tone or a snicker.
Sgt. Tomassi said the word "warrior" often connotes an American Indian, so it was struck.
(NORAD’s) largest exercise to practice those tactics is the twice-yearly Amalgam Warrior, which is scheduled for next April and is now Amalgam Phantom. … And an exercise dubbed "Amalgam Fabric Brave" is now "Amalgam Fabric Dart."“Fabric Dart?” Oh, that gets my fighting spirit (can I use spirit? Could someone think I am talking about “The Great Spirit?”) up. Dart. Fabric-frigg’n-dart!!!!!!!! Does anyone out there in NORAD’s chain of command EVER fly an airplane? Do they have any concept of “Fabric Dart”, "
U.S. Marine Lance Cpl. Shawn M. Gallagher , a dog handler attached to the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, and Youry, a Belgian Malinois, stand guard in Ramadi.
(Cpl. Tom Sloan / U.S. Marine Corps)
4. My friends laugh out loud when they read Deepak Chopra's posts. But I find the posts deeply spiritual. Is that normal?
It is normal if you're a rich, well-educated but confused individual who finds organized religion too difficult to fit into her schedule and far too demeaning to her ego-driven intellect. While real faith requires sacrifice and a willingness to look outside yourself, "spirituality" alone is internal, ego-based and easy to do. Spirituality without religion is like pretending you won the game without playing. Instead of contemplating God, you contemplate your navel. "And it's an endless, ever-expanding navel," Deepak might say.
[FLASH HUFFPO CORRECTION! In his recent post, Deepak wrote, "Death can be viewed as a total illusion because you are dead already." The Huffpo would like to point out that we are not dead already, even if Bill Maher appears to be.]
I don't know about you, but reading the Huffington Post can be mentally and physically exhausting. I thought it was just me, but after talking to many other people - including assorted medical experts - I have found that even just a moderate exposure to the Huffpo can make you sick!
Scientists maintain we have two timekeeping centers in our brains. Research shows that after reading the blog, these "time centers" no longer match up - and your body's natural (circadian) rhythms are no longer in sync. In medical circles, this is called Huff Lag. And it occurs after reading particularly cumbersome entries in which their conclusions in no way validate the time and effort it took to actually read the posts.
"When you arrive at the end, you are disoriented, groggy and confused," says one expert. "Huff Lag is exactly like jet lag, except you haven't gone anywhere to get it."
“With an irresistible mix of moral relativism and false consciousness, THE HUFFPO GUIDE TO GOOD AND EVIL helps me handle any debate involving terrorism - or any subject dealing with evil!” - Greg Gutfeld, 40, writer, pet owner and part-time Pilates instructor. “Passing judgment is so expensive! This seminar teaches me how to make everything relative - so I don't have to defend my country - or my relatives!”Melike.
So far, I've learned so much from Deepak Chopra! Like, when faced with one act of terror, simply equate it to an act of non-terror!
“Why is killing a person in uniform more acceptable than a person in civilian clothing? Who makes the rules about "civilized vs. uncivilized" killing? Can we begin to question these rules?”
Thanks to Deepak, we can pose such questions! But we can't answer them, because there are no answers! As Chopra explains - no one is right, and no one is wrong!
"This is the bias that of course 'we' are good and mostly right while 'they' are bad and mostly wrong. It's on that basis that unacceptable slaughter continues on all sides."
…the eerie silence over the sound was broken by the rolling thunder of Chokai's first eight-inch volley, aimed at Canberra.
On the latter, the sudden shock of gunfire from the north brought the bridge watch into action and Captain Getting to the bridge, but her engagement that night would be swift and violent. Turning northeast to unmask her aft batteries, Canberra was hit some twenty plus times in a matter of five minutes, lost power for her armament and pumps, and was rendered unable to fight with not a single main gun round fired. A single torpedo, fired by the destroyer Bagley, had also hit Canberra.
On Chicago, hints at the presence of enemy ships had been seen earlier but not triggered a response. Captain Bode, in tactical command, was in his cabin, and hurried up. Even as aircraft flares blossomed over the Southern Group, and Canberra started her turn, few on Chicago figured out the facts. Chicago did not get to fire her 203mm guns either, when she began a series of maneuvers undertaken to evade torpedoes. Alas, confusion reigned on her bridge. Captain Bode, who had come up from his cabin, reports came in of torpedoes approaching from starboard. Bode turned his vessel towards that direction, leading his to comb the Japanese torpedo spread. However, moments later, the bridge lookouts spotted torpedoes to port, from on the unengaged side, possibly from the same spread of Bagley that had hit Canberra. Bode swung his ship around again, trying to comb the new thread, but by doing so, exposed the entire length of his ship to the Japanese torpedoes. One slammed in Chicago, crippling her. Slowly, she swung westward (via a southerly heading), out of the battle. Captain Bode, immersed in the plight of his ship, and fighting the damages incurred, ignored his role as task group commander and failed to issue orders to his ships or to inform his superiors of what had happened. Chicago shortly rendered fire support to the destroyer Patterson, which was dueling with Japanese light cruisers Yubari and Tenryu. From Patterson, the only contact report had been made by the Southern Group, issued by Commander Frank Walker via radio at 0146.….or be a Gunner's Mate on the Patterson….
Mikawa could allow himself a moment of pleasure when at 0150 the searchlights of three Japanese cruisers snapped on to light the U.S. line up. A moment later, the first salvo left Chokai's gun tubes, and soon the entire Japanese line was firing, with torpedoes added for good measure.The Allied navies stood around in shock.
On the U.S. ships, disbelief was the common reaction to the sudden illumination. Captains Riefkohl and Greenman (of Astoria) were certain they faced the Southern Group, accidently assuming their Allies to be the enemy. Soon, however, shells erased all hope that a peaceful conclusion could be found with a radio call or flag hoisting (although Riefkohl tried the latter with curious success lasting several minutes). Riefkohl ordered battle stations and twenty knots, the latter being made impossible by untimely interference from a torpedo from Chokai.
Neither of the three heavy cruisers put up much of a fight, though two salvoes from Quincy slammed into Chokai, destroying a gun turret.
… not later than 0220 that all three U.S. cruisers were reduced to swimming wrecks. There remained little to do for Mikawa, who kept to a new northwest course he had established during the brief engagement with the Northern Force. There, U.S. picket destroyer Ralph Talbot blundered into the Japanese path and was given an unhealthly large dose of fire. Burning and lisiting, only a rain squall at the right time saved the little ship from becoming another victim of Mikawa's. The Admiral, after consulting his staff,decided at shortly before three in the morning to cancel any further attacks and retire at top speed to Rabaul.
Vincennes had slipped under at 0300 already … Thirty minutes past midday, Astoria accompanied Vincennes and Quincy, having already sunk at 0238, down to the ground of Ironbottom Sound.
There is, however, much more blame to spread around than could possibly be laid upon the commanders on the spot. The Allied operations plan was poor. Although the distribution of the forces could not be helped, the fact that there were only two flag officers with the three screening groups necessarily led to command problems. Captain Bode of Chicago can not be considered ill-suited for a task group command, but to control damage control efforts on his ship, designated a new course and general approach to the action for his vessel, worrying about torpedoes and the like, in addition to trying to control the rest of his force proved too much. The dogged skill of the Japanese torpedo men and gunners and the coolness of the Japanese approach added to the completeness of the victory by ascertaining that the initial blows would come out of the dark and be deadly at the same time. The engagement with the Southern Force had been decided in five minutes, and not much more time was needed to deal with the Northern Force, which had a slight advantage of strength, position and alertness over its southern counterpart. This combination of near flawless execution of a well-exercised operation by the Japanese, and the problematic layout of command and control arrangements on the Allied side led to the defeat of Savo; the worst naval defeat ever suffered by the U.S. Navy.
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