The Bear is Hungry; the Oceans are Vast; Uncle Sam & The Mountie are Far Away

It is easy to see why the Russians are encouraged. They are not in an easy spot - but their security situation relies on fewer fragile assumptions.

I pull the thread on a few North Atlantic scenarios coming out of my Red Hat over at USNIBlog.

Come by and give it a ponder.

Your F-35A/B/C Cheat Sheet

There are WAY too many people who even this late in the game just do not understand the difference between the USAF, USMC, and USN variants of the F-35.

As part of a nice catch-up on some of the latest rough spots in the program, the folks at BreakingDefense cribbed this graphic from AOL of all places that fits the bill as a nice review.

Know what has a gun and what doesn't. Know the significant compromises in the B-model that allowed vertical lift.

Does our broader Middle East strategy need "recalibration?"

Do you get the feeling now and then that our thinking about the American role in the Middle East is a bit ossified - that in some ways we are just going through the motions not so much from thought, but from motor memory?

Bruce W. Jentleson from The Century Foundation, has some thoughts on the topic worthy of your consideration.

I am not fully in line with some of his points as they come from the other sides of the world-view spectrum from me, but in general his call for a "recalibration" of America's position in the Middle East is spot on. His entering argument is a reasonable frame of reference for a conversation.

This reappraisal of interests and reassessment of strategy—here more broadly termed “strategic recalibration”—has four fundamental elements when applied to the Middle East.3 First, strategy needs to shift from regional dominance to regional balance. The United States must accept that Russia and China are global powers with interests in the region, and stop seeking to minimize their presence and assure American preponderance. Instead, a forward-thinking strategy should combine competition, collaboration, and complementarity. Second, in relations with traditional Arab allies, and Saudi Arabia in particular, the United States has to move beyond the “support our friends” mantra and be more assertive of its own interests where they differ on counterterrorism, domestic political reform, and overall regional security architecture. Third, even if U.S. policy toward Iran will continue to focus on containment, depending on the latter’s aggression, Washington should also seriously and creatively pursue diplomacy, and probe possibilities for substantial improvement in relations with Tehran. Fourth, even though the United States and Israel have faced divisive issues in the past, their greater divergence on the issues of Israeli-Palestinian peace and Iran, combined with political changes in both American and Israeli domestic support bases for the U.S.-Israeli relationship, poses significant challenges that must be addressed. The United States needs to maintain its commitment to Israel’s core security even as it supports a two-state solution.

His first point is best. The USA should act more like a mercantile republic, and less like an empire. Russia, China, and others have interests there. As long as they don't interfere in a hostile way with ours, why not accept that fact? What is the cost/benefit that we are willing to accept to keep them out if the nations of the area want them in?  

Russia;

Russia now clearly wants back into the Middle East. Syria is the most obvious example. Russia’s September 2015 military intervention in the Syrian conflict has had a number of objectives. These include direct, tangible objectives such as supporting the regime of Bashar al-Assad and solidifying an ongoing military presence in the region through expanded military basing in Syria. But Russia’s actions also have indirect, message-sending objectives such as taking a stand against yet another American-supported regime change and—along with its moves in Ukraine—demonstrating that it is back in the global geopolitical game. But Syria is not the sole focus of attention, as Russia has also been increasing relations with other major countries in the region.

Russian-Egyptian relations have grown closer since General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power in his 2013 military coup. Moscow and Cairo convened their own tracks of Syrian peace talks as alternatives to the official United Nations (UN) Geneva talks, which were dominated by the United States. Egypt supported Russian efforts to block UN Security Council resolutions seeking to end the September 2016 Aleppo siege and the humanitarian crisis it caused. In October 2016, Russia and Egypt held joint military exercises, something the United States and Egypt had done regularly until 2011. More meetings have been taking place at the ministerial level in search of new economic and military agreements. Russia supplies close to 60 percent of Egyptian wheat imports; with inflation projected as high as 36 percent and Sisi trying to maintain bread subsidies to avoid food riots, this external economic support is vital to Egypt’s internal political stability.7 In March 2017, Russia deployed special forces to western Egypt. These forces then reportedly moved into Libya in support of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, head of the Libyan National Army, who had been receiving some U.S. support but now is referred to as “Moscow’s man.”8

China;

China’s Middle East role is also increasing. Oil is China’s principal interest in the region. It imports almost 60 percent of its oil, and over half of that comes from the Gulf. The United States imports just 28 percent of all the oil it consumes, with just 16 percent of imports coming from the Gulf. It has been estimated that by 2020 (albeit based on pre-Trump policies) imports will be down to 11 percent of total American oil consumption, which the United States could satisfy solely with imports from Canada and Mexico.18 Still, it is doubtful that the United States would choose that option. Even if it did, security of world oil supplies would still be a U.S. interest because of both its allies’ dependencies and the broader economic effects, including on financial markets, of such security. But given the shared interests in Gulf oil, and China’s arguably greater interest, the United States does not stand to lose much if anything by letting China take on some of the responsibility for, stakes in, and costs of assuring the security of Gulf maritime shipping routes. China already conducted joint navy exercises in the Gulf with Iran in 2014 that, while focused more on their bilateral concerns, did show the Chinese Navy’s oceanic reach (“blue-water capacity”).

China’s own natural preference is to free-ride on the U.S. Navy. It is not Trumpian economic nationalism or Rand Paulian isolationism to propose shared roles and shared costs. Indeed, having more than just American ships in those waters could provide further disincentive for terrorists or Iran to attack or otherwise disrupt Gulf shipping. Shared operations could be structured like the multilateral antipiracy operations off the Horn of Africa, with more informal complementarity than direct coordination. Much detail would need to be worked out, but this collaboration could be an example of collective interests taking precedence over zero-sum competition. Those concerned that expanded economic relations and military presence will bring China greater influence can take some comfort in the fact that U.S. leverage remains limited despite Washington’s far more extensive economic, military, and diplomatic ties.19

His conclusion should be, if nothing else, a conversation starter.

Given that Russia and China have interests in the region, and a number of regional states are interested in increased relations with them, regional dominance is simply not a viable strategy. Nor is it necessary for American interests. A combination of competition, collaboration, and complementarity is more likely to be effective. Traditional allies should not be abandoned, but the United States needs to be more honest with itself and with them—Saudi Arabia in particular—about the mix of shared and divergent interests, and be more assertive of its own interests where they differ on counterterrorism, domestic political reform, and regional security architecture. Opportunities as well as threats need to frame relations with Iran. To the extent that Iran’s aggression continues, containment needs to be the principal response. But the United States should pursue, creatively and seriously, possibilities for a breakthrough that would improve relations, and do so in ways that allow it to be consistent with commitments to regional allies. Further, the United States needs to maintain its commitment to Israel’s core security while supporting a two-state solution and, as warranted, pursuing diplomacy with Iran.

The makers and implementers of American foreign policy may well need to reappraise U.S. interests and corresponding strategies worldwide, but such a reappraisal, the essence of strategic recalibration, is especially crucial for the Middle East.

Sealift, Logistics, & MSC with Salvatore Mercogliano - on Midrats

It feeds, fuels, and makes everything a fleet does possible - we're talking logistics for the full hour this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern with returning guest, Salvatore Mercogliano.

Sal sailed with MSC from 1989 to 1992, and worked MSC HQ as Operations Officer for the Afloat Prepositioning Force 1992-1996.

He has a BS Marine Transportation from SUNY Maritime College, a MA Maritime History and Nautical Archaeology from East Carolina University, and received his Ph.D. in Military and Naval History from University of Alabama.

Moving to academia, he's taught at East Carolina University, Methodist University, UNC-Chapel Hill, & the U.S. Military Academy.

Currently an adjunct professor at the US Merchant Marine Academy teaching a graduate course on Maritime Industry Policy and an Associate Professor of History at Campbell University in Buies Creek, NC teaching courses in World Maritime History, Maritime Security, and American Military Experience.

Recently published “We Built Her to Bring Them Over There: The Cruiser and Transport Force in the Great War,” in the Winter 2017-18 issue of Sea History; author of Fourth Arm of Defense: Sealift and Maritime Logistics in the Vietnam War, published by the Naval History and Heritage Command in 2017, and 2nd Prize winner in the 2015 US Naval Institute Naval History Contest with Semper Sealift: The U.S. Marine Corps, Merchant Marine, and Maritime Prepositioning.

He also serves as a Captain on the Northwest Harnett Volunteer Fire Department and currently working on a history of military sealift during the First World War.

Join us live if you can, but if you miss the show you can always listen to the archive at blogtalkradio or Stitcher. 

If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here.

Fullbore Friday

A war is winding down - but more work needs to be done.

The Henry Bacon was one of the thirty-eight merchant ships in convoy RA-64, which departed Kola Inlet, Murmansk, North Russia bound for Loch Ewe, Gourock, Scotland on Friday, 17 February 1945. The crew complement under Captain Alfred Carini was forty-one merchant seamen and twenty-six US Navy Armed Guard. The Henry Bacon was in ballast and carrying nineteen Norwegian civilian refugees, including women and children, as passengers.

Before the convoy set sail, news had been received of a German attack on Norwegian patriots living on the island of Sørøya, in the approaches to the former German naval anchorage at Altafjord. The British Royal Navy had sent four destroyers to the scene and had rescued 500 men, women and children. These refugees were distributed among the ships of the convoy for passage to England.

On the afternoon of the Saturday, 18 February, the weather deteriorated to force 8 on the Beaufort scale, and the escort carriers were unable to operate aircraft. That night the storm intensified with winds gusting up to sixty knots (110 km/h) with a heavy sea and swell. The convoy split up and began to disperse. The storm continued through Sunday, 19 February.

On 20 February, the storm abated and the escort vessels started to round up the scattered ships. At 4 am the convoy had been detected by aircraft, and by 9 am twenty-nine of the ships were back on station with four still straggling.

Then, on 22 February, the convoy ran into one of the worst storms ever recorded in the Barents Sea. Once again the convoy began to split up and was blown apart. The weather deteriorated to Beaufort scale force 12 with winds at 70 to 90 knots and temperatures 40 below zero. During this storm, one of the main springs on the Henry Bacon's steering gear was broken, and the retaining pin was sheared. This damage caused the Henry Bacon to drop out of the convoy to effect repairs.

Like the wounded Wildebeest - you can almost see this coming ...

Around 1500 GCT on 23 February 1945, the Henry Bacon was some 50 to 60 nautical miles astern of the main convoy when she was attacked by twenty-three Junkers Ju 88 and Ju 188's torpedo bombers of Luftwaffe Group KG26, out of Bardufoss, Norway, some 250 miles (400 km) away. The Germans were on their way to attack the main convoy, and thought they could finish the lone straggler easily.

One merch vs. 23 JU-88s .... so, who's taking bets?

The Henry Bacon was armed with eight 20 mm anti-aircraft guns, with a 5 inch (127 mm) gun aft and a 3 in (76 mm) gun forward. The ship’s Naval Armed Guard gunners fought the attacking planes for over an hour, shot down five planes, damaged at least four others and managed to defend against several torpedoes by causing their detonation before they reached the ship.

Over an hour under attack. An eternity ... and then;

At 1520 GCT, one torpedo struck the starboard side of the No.5 hold, and detonated the aft ammunition magazine. A large hole was torn in the hull. The rudder, propeller and steering engine were destroyed. The ship settled by the stern and sank within an hour. This action helped save the main convoy, as most of the German planes were forced to return to base owing to battle damage, low fuel, and low ammunition.

Mission.

The Henry Bacon was abandoned at 1600 GCT at 67.38N 05.00W. Lifeboats #1 and #2 were launched safely. The #3 boat capsized while being lowered, and because the davits to the #4 boat had been damaged in the storm, this boat was also lost. Three of the four life rafts had been released prematurely and had drifted away. The two surviving lifeboats were filled to capacity with all of the Norwegian passengers and some members of the crew.

This left a number of crew members stranded aboard the Henry Bacon. When this situation became known to Chief Engineer Donald Haviland, he insisted that he would give his place in the lifeboat to a younger crew member and died with the ship. That crew member's name was Robert Tatosky. For his sacrifice, Chief Engineer Haviland was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, the highest award for the men of the Merchant Marine.

The Bosun, Holcomb Lammon, collected dunnage from the deck and lashed it into a makeshift life-raft. Six Armed Guard and five merchant crew owe their lives to this raft. Lammon also died with the ship, and he was awarded the Meritorious Service Medal.

The survivors were rescued by crew members from three British destroyers, HMS Zambesi, HMS Oppotune and HMS Zelast. By this time the men in the water were so cold they were unable to help themselves, so the British sailors had to jump into the freezing sea with ropes tied around their waists to help them. When it was over, all of the Norwegian civilians had survived, nine Naval Armed Guard gunners, and two Navy signalmen were lost at sea. Captain Carini and fifteen fellow Merchant Marine crewmen were also lost.

Timing.

The Liberty ship SS Henry Bacon was the last allied ship sunk by the Luftwaffe in World War II.

Lessons on how to arm a ship for war, how to fight, how to win, and how to live.
Fullbore.

Hat tip E40.
First posted JAN2011.

Diversity Thursday

It's been awhile since I visited the diversity bullies at NPC, so this MSG got me thinking it was time for a visit;

UNCLASSIFIED
ROUTINE
R 221411Z JAN 18
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC
TO NAVADMIN
INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC
BT
UNCLAS

NAVADMIN 009/18

PASS TO OFFICE CODES:
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC//N1//
INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC//N1//
MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/N1/JAN//

SUBJ/INCLUSION AND DIVERSITY COMMANDERS TOOLKIT//

RMKS/1. This NAVADMIN announces the creation of a Commanders Inclusion and
Diversity Toolkit, available on the Navy Inclusion and Diversity website:
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/support/inclusion/Pages/Commander's-
Toolkit.aspx

2. The Toolkit provides Navy leaders with resources to effectively assess
and promote an inclusive culture.

3. Toolkit key features include Inclusion and Diversity Fundamentals,
Principles and Objectives, Assessment Library with current Navy demographic
data, assessment tools including the Defense Equal Opportunity Management
Institute (DEOMI) Diversity Management Climate Survey and Navy Culture
Workshops, mentorship program information, Inclusion and Diversity Frequently
Asked Questions, recent statements by Navy leaders on Inclusion and Diversity
and other briefing materials.

4. This NAVADMIN will remain in effect until superseded or cancelled,
whichever occurs first.

5. Point of contact is Inclusion and Diversity Office (OPNAV N1D), which can
be contacted via e-mail at altn_usn_inclusion_and_diversity(at)navy.mil.

6. Released by Vice Admiral R. P. Burke, N1.//

BT
#0001
NNNN
UNCLASSIFIED//

Well, still the online little shop of intellectual horrors as always their webpage is; as modern looking as NAVFIT98.

What a mess.

I have a couple of months of DivThu here if I want - but why do that to my valued readers. I'll share a little. There is this jewel;

The implication is, of course, that they have some secret knowledge of what is in between the lines. Literary entrails reading, if you were. 

Ummm, OK. Here, read the linked articles. None of these articles have anything to do with what the diversity bullies at NPC are focused on. Did they even read the articles in context? 

The articles may speak to, "diversity of thought, of education and background" but that is not what NPC's diversity bullies do. That isn't what they track.

Nope. None of their metrics follow those variables. They don't track them. They don't report them. What do they care about, track, report, and rent-seek about?

Well, don't take my word for it, they'll tell you.

That is it. The most base kind of sectarianism. All they want to know is if you are a white, non-hispanic, male. If so, you are unwanted.

How do we know that? Again, they'll tell us. It is all here, here, and other places in their sad little corner of the Navy.

One thing that warms my heart - even though the cancer of identity politics creeps in to more and more areas, is that the younger generation on a whole has little time for all this divisive junk. When they have wonderfully mixed groups of friends - this stuff reads hollow. When more and more families have a whole scattershot of DNA - you start checking all the blocks for ethnicity, or none.

I shouldn't leave THU empty as much as I have recently. Too many of you from E-3 to O-10 have asked me to keep it going ... and the diversity bullies cannot stand the light of day. Their sectarianism, divisive, and racialist worldview is gross, toxic and indefensible.

WABG, LCC, AS, and AD, oh my!

It is time to embrace the unsexy but important.

I'm discussing over at USNIBlog.

Come on by and give it a read.