So, I guess it will be "Sino-Saudi" as "Saudi-Sino" is Even Harder to Say

This was only a matter of time given the events and personalities in the last couple of years. The foundation has been built over the last decade for something much larger to be built. 

It is a cliché, but it is true; nations don't have friends - they have interests.

Saudi Arabia is rich in two things; hydrocarbons and problems. They have a human capital problem, a religious problem, and a Persian problem - not to mention their troublesome neighborhood. All both support and threaten the power of thee House of Saud.

They need good friends who will help them on the outside with trade and military assistance, but will not interfere with their delicate domestic concerns.

In parallel with a lower level of reliance on hydrocarbons from the Middle East and a weariness from over three decades of fighting low-level wars in the area, the United States is openly trying to decouple. To encourage this decoupling - or to virtue signal - our established chattering classes take almost hostile positions in the open against the Saudis, from their human rights acts against opponents, to their ongoing conflict in the civil war in Yemen.

There is one global power who is more than happy to buy oil at market prices and has zero interest in Saudi internal affairs - the People's Republic of China.

As we are insulting the Saudis, the PRC is courting them. 

The Smartest People in the Room™ didn't give the Saudis much of an option; 

Xi landed in the Saudi capital Riyadh on Wednesday for a multiple-day visit to the oil-rich kingdom and received a lavish welcome from MBS and other Saudi dignitaries on Thursday. Saudi military jets accompanied the Chinese president’s aircraft, a purple carpet was rolled out upon his arrival and canons were fired. On Friday, Xi invited Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud to visit China, according to Saudi state TV.

Xi’s visit includes his attendance at a “Saudi-Chinese summit,” a China-Arab and a China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit, SPA reported.

On Thursday, China and Saudi Arabia signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement that includes a number of deals and memoranda of understanding, including on hydrogen energy, on coordination between the kingdom’s Vision 2030 and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and with regards to direct investment, SPA reported, without providing details.

Low hanging fruit for the PRC, and the Saudis have been carefully keeping this option open - as you'll note there have been little to no protests from the Islamic world over the PRC's actions against the Uyghurs. We all know what would be happening if France, Britain, Germany, or the USA did such things against their Muslim minority.

For a nation who spent much of the last quarter of the 20th Century exporting one of the most extreme forms of Sunni Islam to the world, the 21st Century Saudi leadership seems to have different motivations - mostly survival in an increasingly divergent future.

I don't blame the PRC here at all, and we're making this an easy call for the Saudis. Heck, were I Saudi, I would do the same thing. If I were a PRC supporter, I would just smile.

Saudi's MBS rolls out the red carpet for China's Xi, in a not too subtle message to Biden.

Xi’s warm welcome stood in stark contrast to the frigid atmosphere surrounding US President Joe Biden’s visit to the kingdom earlier in the year.

Biden, who previously vowed to turn Saudi Arabia into a “pariah” after the murder of Khashoggi, in October said the US needs to “rethink” its relationship with the kingdom after the Saudi-led oil cartel OPEC+ slashed oil production.Washington has also been at odds with China over Taiwan, a democratically governed island of 24 million people that Beijing claims as its territory despite never having controlled it, and China’s expanded influence in the Middle East.

The world is constantly in motion. Friends and alliances change. The Middle East is ripe for change, and the PRC is there to help them.

If you pour a fresh cup of coffee and play this out for the next 5-10 years, some very interesting - and radically different - worlds emerge. 

Nice Oil Trade You Have There. Shame if Something Happened to it

Have you been surprised that Iran and her Houthi proxies in Yemen have not gone after the Saudi's oil industry more?

What are your thoughts on home-grown cruise missiles and mines?

I'm pondering both over at USNIBlog.

Come on over and give it a read.

Drones and a New Age of Economic Terrorism

5% of the world’s oil production is knocked out … and days-on no one has any evidence who and from where.

The assumption – and I think it is a good one – was that the Yemeni Houthi rebels launched the attack using either drones or a combination of drones and missiles.

What we don’t know right now is what kind of drones and/or other weapons were used, where they were launched from, or really if it were actual Houthi who did it.

Whatever delivery platform(s) they used, you have to give a professional nod to those who carried out the operation. What an incredible bang for the buck.

This is not a “new” threat. Attacks against economic targets are as old as history – but to do it effectively usually took overt displays of nation-state military forces … or mercenary/piracy that were easy to track back to their benefactors. No more.

What to do?

1. Well, to start with, we need to “learn to code.” The threat is from the air, and we are not ready for it. I am reminded here one of the interesting accidents in the development of the Israeli Gabriel ASCM. When they were trying to develop a seeker head, they made a math error. As a result, they “over-engineered” their seeker head making it incredibly accurate for its time.

We have great AAW defensive sensors weapons – many we’ve exported to Saudi Arabia … but they are not designed to find and defeat this threat from small RCS and slow “drones” – especially if they come in low launched from nearby locations. You can transport drones for these type operations in a backpack on the small end, to the trunk of a car on the more capable end. There are some EW issues – but none that we’ll discuss on this net – but there are ways around it (you need to pony up some consulting fees for this advice). In any event; advantage to the aggressor, as we’ve seen.

We and the Saudis have good kit, but it is not optimal for this threat.

2. Diversity and disaggregation is the key. If you think the Saudi’s have a lot of refining eggs in a few baskets, you should look at the USA. That and our electrical grid…but I’ll try to focus on the topic at hand.

The cult of efficiency and NIMBYism resulted it a lot of critical capacity packed in to just a few locations. We are one natural or man-made disaster from having problems that will make the Saudi attack look small.

There are also military vulnerabilities to this threat.

Case in point – look at this pic.

Now, instead of oil storage tanks - here's your oldie-but-goodie - think ships lined up at Christmas in Norfolk. Think subs at Kings Bay or New London.

You get the idea. And no, you don't have to sink anything ... you just have to make a point. 

“We’ve” been chatting about this threat for a very long time, and the technology is reaching the point of where the chatting needs to move towards action.

In the attack, you don’t need a lot of money. You don’t need a big footprint; all you need is will and imagination. Do it right, and no one will even know how to retaliate.

In the defense, you do need a lot of money. You need more real estate. You need leadership, vision, and persistence. Do it right, and you will still be vulnerable, but not to the point of strategic risk.

There is a very good chance that this is simply an opening of a new type of global threat. I’ve had my Red Hat on too long this AM, I’m going to take it off – I’m scaring myself.

Does our broader Middle East strategy need "recalibration?"

Do you get the feeling now and then that our thinking about the American role in the Middle East is a bit ossified - that in some ways we are just going through the motions not so much from thought, but from motor memory?

Bruce W. Jentleson from The Century Foundation, has some thoughts on the topic worthy of your consideration.

I am not fully in line with some of his points as they come from the other sides of the world-view spectrum from me, but in general his call for a "recalibration" of America's position in the Middle East is spot on. His entering argument is a reasonable frame of reference for a conversation.

This reappraisal of interests and reassessment of strategy—here more broadly termed “strategic recalibration”—has four fundamental elements when applied to the Middle East.3 First, strategy needs to shift from regional dominance to regional balance. The United States must accept that Russia and China are global powers with interests in the region, and stop seeking to minimize their presence and assure American preponderance. Instead, a forward-thinking strategy should combine competition, collaboration, and complementarity. Second, in relations with traditional Arab allies, and Saudi Arabia in particular, the United States has to move beyond the “support our friends” mantra and be more assertive of its own interests where they differ on counterterrorism, domestic political reform, and overall regional security architecture. Third, even if U.S. policy toward Iran will continue to focus on containment, depending on the latter’s aggression, Washington should also seriously and creatively pursue diplomacy, and probe possibilities for substantial improvement in relations with Tehran. Fourth, even though the United States and Israel have faced divisive issues in the past, their greater divergence on the issues of Israeli-Palestinian peace and Iran, combined with political changes in both American and Israeli domestic support bases for the U.S.-Israeli relationship, poses significant challenges that must be addressed. The United States needs to maintain its commitment to Israel’s core security even as it supports a two-state solution.

His first point is best. The USA should act more like a mercantile republic, and less like an empire. Russia, China, and others have interests there. As long as they don't interfere in a hostile way with ours, why not accept that fact? What is the cost/benefit that we are willing to accept to keep them out if the nations of the area want them in?  

Russia;

Russia now clearly wants back into the Middle East. Syria is the most obvious example. Russia’s September 2015 military intervention in the Syrian conflict has had a number of objectives. These include direct, tangible objectives such as supporting the regime of Bashar al-Assad and solidifying an ongoing military presence in the region through expanded military basing in Syria. But Russia’s actions also have indirect, message-sending objectives such as taking a stand against yet another American-supported regime change and—along with its moves in Ukraine—demonstrating that it is back in the global geopolitical game. But Syria is not the sole focus of attention, as Russia has also been increasing relations with other major countries in the region.

Russian-Egyptian relations have grown closer since General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power in his 2013 military coup. Moscow and Cairo convened their own tracks of Syrian peace talks as alternatives to the official United Nations (UN) Geneva talks, which were dominated by the United States. Egypt supported Russian efforts to block UN Security Council resolutions seeking to end the September 2016 Aleppo siege and the humanitarian crisis it caused. In October 2016, Russia and Egypt held joint military exercises, something the United States and Egypt had done regularly until 2011. More meetings have been taking place at the ministerial level in search of new economic and military agreements. Russia supplies close to 60 percent of Egyptian wheat imports; with inflation projected as high as 36 percent and Sisi trying to maintain bread subsidies to avoid food riots, this external economic support is vital to Egypt’s internal political stability.7 In March 2017, Russia deployed special forces to western Egypt. These forces then reportedly moved into Libya in support of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, head of the Libyan National Army, who had been receiving some U.S. support but now is referred to as “Moscow’s man.”8

China;

China’s Middle East role is also increasing. Oil is China’s principal interest in the region. It imports almost 60 percent of its oil, and over half of that comes from the Gulf. The United States imports just 28 percent of all the oil it consumes, with just 16 percent of imports coming from the Gulf. It has been estimated that by 2020 (albeit based on pre-Trump policies) imports will be down to 11 percent of total American oil consumption, which the United States could satisfy solely with imports from Canada and Mexico.18 Still, it is doubtful that the United States would choose that option. Even if it did, security of world oil supplies would still be a U.S. interest because of both its allies’ dependencies and the broader economic effects, including on financial markets, of such security. But given the shared interests in Gulf oil, and China’s arguably greater interest, the United States does not stand to lose much if anything by letting China take on some of the responsibility for, stakes in, and costs of assuring the security of Gulf maritime shipping routes. China already conducted joint navy exercises in the Gulf with Iran in 2014 that, while focused more on their bilateral concerns, did show the Chinese Navy’s oceanic reach (“blue-water capacity”).

China’s own natural preference is to free-ride on the U.S. Navy. It is not Trumpian economic nationalism or Rand Paulian isolationism to propose shared roles and shared costs. Indeed, having more than just American ships in those waters could provide further disincentive for terrorists or Iran to attack or otherwise disrupt Gulf shipping. Shared operations could be structured like the multilateral antipiracy operations off the Horn of Africa, with more informal complementarity than direct coordination. Much detail would need to be worked out, but this collaboration could be an example of collective interests taking precedence over zero-sum competition. Those concerned that expanded economic relations and military presence will bring China greater influence can take some comfort in the fact that U.S. leverage remains limited despite Washington’s far more extensive economic, military, and diplomatic ties.19

His conclusion should be, if nothing else, a conversation starter.

Given that Russia and China have interests in the region, and a number of regional states are interested in increased relations with them, regional dominance is simply not a viable strategy. Nor is it necessary for American interests. A combination of competition, collaboration, and complementarity is more likely to be effective. Traditional allies should not be abandoned, but the United States needs to be more honest with itself and with them—Saudi Arabia in particular—about the mix of shared and divergent interests, and be more assertive of its own interests where they differ on counterterrorism, domestic political reform, and regional security architecture. Opportunities as well as threats need to frame relations with Iran. To the extent that Iran’s aggression continues, containment needs to be the principal response. But the United States should pursue, creatively and seriously, possibilities for a breakthrough that would improve relations, and do so in ways that allow it to be consistent with commitments to regional allies. Further, the United States needs to maintain its commitment to Israel’s core security while supporting a two-state solution and, as warranted, pursuing diplomacy with Iran.

The makers and implementers of American foreign policy may well need to reappraise U.S. interests and corresponding strategies worldwide, but such a reappraisal, the essence of strategic recalibration, is especially crucial for the Middle East.

The Attack on the Saudi Frigate, RSS Al-Madinah

I'll try to keep the commentary to a minimum today, as I think these videos tell the story quite well. A story in three videos, as it were.

First, everyone should be up to speed on the first video; the one the Yemeni forces took of their attack on the RSS Al-Madinah in the Bab Al-Mandab Strait.



Next is a video of the attack taken from the ship. Now, don't be like Sal and be distracted by the gear adrift (unmanned lawn chair on the flight deck), but look at the attack.



This was a clear, bright day. These waters have seen attacks over and over. This is a littoral zone at war. These waters are thick with small boats. Small boat attacks, solo or swarm, are decades old.

Think about a few things: watchstanding; number and diversity of weapons; etc. What are the top lessons you bring from it?

This next video was of the Al-Madinah's return to port. From the band at the opening to the formation discipline at the end, what are the details that you see and how does that inform your opinion on why this ship was successfully attacked - if at all?

Iran & Saudi Arabia: A Festival of Proxies

Douglas Murray over at TheSpectator outlines what with each passing week starts to come more clearly in to view; the Sunni and Shia are not going to take a break in a rising spiral of escalation in their unending centuries of conflict. You will read "Iran" and "Saudi Arabia" but what you need to hear is "Shia" and "Sunni";

Some years ago, before the Arab ‘Spring’ ever sprung, I remember asking one top security official about the region. What, I wondered, was their single biggest fear? The answer was striking and precise: ‘That the region will clarify.’ That is a fear which now appears to be coming true.

Part of what is encouraging this is the fundamental internal weakness in the birth of most of the nations at the center of conflict of the latest phase, Iraq and Syria. Almost a century later the world continues to suffer from the awful Treaty of Versailles where the best and the brightest set the stage for generations of conflict;

The Middle East is not simply falling apart. It is taking a different shape, along very clear lines — far older ones than those the western powers rudely imposed on the region nearly a century ago. Across the whole continent those borders are in the process of cracking and breaking. But while that happens the region’s two most ambitious centres of power — the house of Saud and the Ayatollahs in Iran — find themselves fighting each other not just for influence but even, perhaps, for survival.
...
the first from al-Qa’eda’s Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [ISIS], the second from the Free Syrian army [FSA]. ‘You apostate infidels,’ says the first. ‘We’ve declared you to be “apostates”, you heretics. You don’t know Allah or His Prophet, you creature. What kind of Islam do you follow?’ To which the FSA fighter responds, ‘Why did you come here? Go fight Israel, brother.’ Only to be told, ‘Fighting apostates like you people takes precedence over fighting the Jews and the Christians. All imams concur on that.’

Combine the sloppy map making of Versailles along with built in sectarian and ethnic friction - there is no simple path to the way things were. In reality, there is probably no path at all.  The events of the last half decade lead me to believe that this will have to be resolved the old fashioned way, through blood and iron.

Feeding off their own apocalyptic traditions, the whole region is regressing to a Game of Thrones all-against-all free for all.

What is the non-Muslim world to do? At this stage of the game, probably the best thing is to contain and shape the edges. Support the least/worst - and accept good allies as opposed to trying to create perfect allies out of our own vanity.

The major Shia power is Iran. The major Sunni (Egyptians will have to pardon me for a bit) is Saudi Arabia. For the past few years, they have ratcheted up their proxy wars in Yemen, Syria and other places. The last week as see more fuel throw on the fire;

First, one man's execution spurred sectarian protests and violence in the Middle East. Now, it appears to have sparked a serious diplomatic rift.

Saudi Arabia's foreign minister said Sunday that his country is severing ties with Iran. Iranian diplomats in Saudi Arabia have 48 hours to leave the country, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir told reporters.

The two countries have long been at odds, but Saudi Arabia's execution of Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr Saturday kicked off a new round of sparring between them that analysts say could mark a dangerous shift in an already volatile region.

"I think you're going to see a period of very harsh rhetoric, and the cutting of diplomatic ties comes at a very bad time. ... This is Saudi Arabia saying, 'The gloves are off,' " said Bobby Ghosh, a CNN global affairs analyst and managing editor of Quartz.
...
Three Sunni-led countries joined Saudi Arabia on Monday in severing or downgrading diplomatic ties with Iran, worsening a geopolitical conflict with sectarian dimensions in one of the world’s most volatile regions.

The diplomatic protests from the three countries — Bahrain, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates — came as Iran accused Saudi Arabia of using an attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran two days earlier as a pretext for diverting attention from its problems.

Back to TheSpectator article;

From the outset of the Syrian uprising, it was inevitable that Iran would weigh in on the side of its client in Damascus. Indeed, so desperate were the mullahs in Tehran to do everything they could to protect their own interests that they even put up with protests at home from people starved of basic supplies complaining about their own government pouring millions into Syria’s civil war.

But the next step was just as predictable. Saudi Arabia, which fears Iranian influence spreading any further than it has already throughout the region, began to back the opposition. Starting cautiously, in recent months that caution has retreated and Saudi is now supporting groups as close to al-Qa’eda-linked forces as to make little difference. Desperate measures, certainly. But for the Saudi leadership these are desperate times. Though it is a battle that has been brewing for decades.

Let's stop the review there. Let's talk about what we should do.

Contain in two ways.

We have two things to contain, first ourselves, then second their culture.

For ourselves, we need to be very clear headed about where our interests are and what the American people will support. We need to contain our desire, and the desire of others, to have the USA fix their problem for them.

Our interests are always to promote stability ... but the American people want stability on the cheap. If we cannot/willnot/shallnot have 19-yr old Americans on every street corner, then we will have to shape where we can and not let stupidity or ego cause us to do things that could lead to involvement in places no one wants it to go. 

We cannot force stability on the cheap, but we can help shape it. Shape it by supporting relatively modern forces like the Kurds, the Jordanian monarchy, the Egyptian military, and even relatively unsavory but better than the alternative strongmen like, yes, Assad. If we won't, then get out of the way of others who will do what needs to be done like the Russians.

War is a dark room. If you only step in a bit with one hand on the door and only one foot in - you can usually back out if needed. If you jump in screaming ... well ... that usually does not end well. Airstrikes and limited ground forces to support our allies doing the hard work on the ground? That is the right move. Combat brigades engaging as maneuver units? No, we tried that. Doesn't work with the numbers, ROE, and political support we have at home. Even if we did, it still would not work.

What is dangerous to our national interest are those sects who are not content with killing their neighbors, but want to kill internationally. That is the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. Those also happen to be Sunni. That doesn't make us Iran's ally, we just are fighting the same people. That is what the balance of our shaping needs to be. Kill the radical Sunni elements, and let the others fight for what is left.

That is fine for now, but what if the Sunni/Shia battle goes larger beyond the proxy wars already being fought? Well, what other cards does Iran have left to play? Iran has strong cards.

1. Eastern Saudi Arabia is Shia. That is also where their oil is.
2. The Gulf Arab states have huge Shia populations ruled by Sunni monarchs.
3. The Hazara of Afghanistan are Shia, surrounded by AFG and IS allies who hate them from both an ethnic and a religious point of view.

Let's go through a little Course of Action exercise. Red and Blue does not work all that well because depending on which proxy war we are looking at, good in one place is bad in another. So, let's make Sunni "Black" and Shia "Yellow."

Yellow Most Likely COA: A Proxy for all my Friends - Iran will huff and puff, but will be patient. It will remove the stops, what few are left, in agitating the Shia in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. It will keep the Saudi agitation to a slow boil, but will ratchet up hard on the her edges from Bahrain to Yemen. It will see which is the weakest and will reinforce agitation in those places, looking for a cheap victory. It will make the Saudis lose face and increase their paranoia until they do something stupid against their own Shia minority. At that point, it all falls apart in a great Shia uprising in the eastern oil provinces of the kingdom. While this is going on, they double down in Syria while building their ties with Russia and China. With a feckless Europe distracted by waves of hundreds of thousands of young Muslim men let loose among their people, and a distracted America in a waning phase of international involvement following a divisive election, this is their moment and they are going to take it.

Yellow Most Dangerous COA: Last Turban Standing - The Iranians start with the Most Likely COA, but either they lose patience with it, or the Saudis decide they don't want to play. In addition to the proxy wars, conventional forces are on the move. Some other external power or powers join in on the Saudi side, Turkey or perhaps Egypt. Arabian and Persian oil not being what it once was, there is no Western existential reason to get involved. America is self-sufficient, there are other ways for Europe to get oil. With a planning assumption that the Gulf States subdued and Oman compliant, there is no problem getting oil to China. The world economy is hit hard, but is not hit so hard as to motivate anyone to want to get involved. Result; they fight it out from the Transoxiana to the Nile. That is best case. Worse case, some major power outside the area gets involved, and/or the nuclear Jinn gets let out. Eventually, they bleed each other white. Only then may we find what Douglas Murray would like;

...perhaps the region is going to descend into a complex miasma of slaughter as surely as Europe did a century ago. Either way there will be a need for a Treaty of Westphalia-style solution — a redrawing of boundaries in a region where boundaries have been bursting for decades.

That would be a Muslim solution to a Muslim problem.

Ugly, but what other options are out there that have any chance of political support in the West? We are not going to build an army of millions to liberate a people who do not want liberation, and even if they had liberation, recent history shows they don't know what to do with it. We are not going to nuke the place from orbit just to be sure either.

Finally, did you think I forgot the other containment? That is containing the culture which is creating this conflict. The instability of that region's culture is being exported. As I have mentioned before, the mainstream politicians have a narrowing window to address this problem. If they don't, the people of the West will empower non-mainstream politicians to fix it when it is almost too late.

In small numbers, there is no significant issue with taking refugees from toxic cultures - but as Europe is seeing, Muslim immigrants in large numbers do not play well with others. They do not assimilate. They do not contribute. They will cause you to become something you don't want to be, but have to be.

In addition to closing borders, they need to be sent back. Invest billions to support nations like Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon with their refugee camps, but that is it. Those refugees we do take in should only be religious minorities that have no land to come back to ... or ... we could support the waring parties that do protect religious minorities, Assad and the Kurds, to take back territories that once belonged to religious minorities.

In summary, perhaps what we should do as Yellow and Black decide which COA they want, is to follow some sound advice - don't just do something, stand there.

Stand there on the edges, shield in one hand stabbing sword in another, but in general - stay out of the scrum.

A Muslim Treaty of Westphalia? Maybe. Perhaps a Battle of the North Inch would be better first.