Marine View from Down Under

There is a lot of good ... and sometimes not so good ... arguments pro and con on the decisions being made by and the direction where Gen.  David Berger, USMC is taking our Marine Corps - but the fact he has engaged a lot of minds and forced a lot of people to think is a service in itself to our nation's security.

In his visit earlier this month to Australia, he summarized some points that just cannot be said often enough.

You have to repeat the basics to as many people as you can as often as you can...because most people either don't know or don't understand the basics.

This is just superb, and I wish our Navy's senior leadership would use this mindset every time they have the opportunity.

Has Berger upset some people? Yes.

Good. That means he's standing for things and making people uncomfortable with their ideas.

Berger has done his thinking. If you are going to counter him - you had better done yours;

... in the long term, the marines’ value to the US military joint force was as an expeditionary element that was forward all the time and which could gather information while preventing an adversary from doing the same. That presence could ‘open the door to places’, Berger said.

‘Some of it is back to our roots where we came from.’

The marines have had to adjust their structure and posture, how they train and manage their people, their warfighting concepts, what platforms they use and what capabilities and weapon systems they need wherever they operate to make sure they stay ahead of change happening around the world, Berger said.

‘As a service chief, we have two responsibilities to make sure we provide the forces today for a conflict, but also to make sure that five, 10 years from now we’re in the right spot. We have made the investments in the right places so that the future is in a good place.’

A likely challenge for the marines and for allies such as Australia would be to keep maritime choke points open to allow commerce to flow freely and they would need to develop the tools to do that.

‘You have to be able to monitor that, to engage an adversary who wants to close it down. So, we need things like anti-ship capabilities, the surveillance, the collection capabilities in the maritime domain that we don’t have right now. We need the ability to move laterally, both by air and on the surface at a tactical level, with greater frequency and in smaller numbers than we do right now.

‘But I would say, beyond a piece of hardware, the most important part is that human part of operating in an austere, expeditionary, maritime environment without any developed infrastructure, but getting a job done. And being able to transition quickly if there’s a crisis.’

A little sidenote on the pic above (you see more on DVIDS); it represents a part of Marine culture I have always respected. The most senior Marine is visiting your command, and is just there talking to a few other Marines while everyone else just carries out the Plan of the Day as if he's just another Marine ... which he is.

Nice.

Japan Back in the Carrier Game ...

This really is an amazing video if you have a historically focused mind. 

Fresh from her modifications to fly F-35B, the Izumo is bringing the Japanese Navy back in the carrier business again … with some friends via United States Marine Corps F-35B.

The Japanese will be buying 42 F-35B and maybe more, so soon we will see the Izumo and her sister ships with the first Japanese fixed wing airwing at sea since the end of the Second World War.

I’d like more, faster – along with the South Koreans … and if we could get the Australians to play at some point that would be nice too … but this is all good news for navalists in the West.

Though not a “Western” nation, Japan is part of our network of allies and friends who stand for secure seas and the rule of law. The more of us who are strong and capable, the better we can contain other powers who see a darker future.

With USMC F-35B also underway for a full deployment with the HMS Queen Elizabeth – and even USAF CV-22B paying a visit – this is a good week for combined maritime operations that makes us all stronger and better.

Yes, this is a good week…but…more faster.

Bad Program Management Costs More Than Money

One little nugget I’ve said too much that last week or so is that to many in the national security nomenklatura – especially in DC – the process is the product. The measure of effectiveness isn’t the ultimate delivery of useful kit to the fleet, but adherence to the process.

Billions upon billions of dollars can be made for years and POM-cycles on end getting ready to think about possible things that might be of some use … maybe.

We wind up with dead end programs that produce nothing. No one really is held to account. At the end of the day you have to do one of two things:

1. Like with the fail to transition that was ZUMWALT, you have to restart the legacy ARLEIGH BURKE line in order to keep a steady state or so of battleforce ships.

2. Shrug your shoulders with a, “I failed” like we did with CG(X), and then stare in to the abyss with the worn out equipment it was supposed to replace, in this case the TICO. You hope something will show up before you are deploying with museum pieces.

As a nation, it isn’t just the Navy who failed to perform, to do its job, to at least match the performance of previous generations of program managers – the other services too.

This doesn’t just cost money or put the nation at strategic risk – it can cost lives.

The USMC has a perfect example of this.

The amphibious assault vehicle mishap that killed eight Marines and a sailor in July 2020 has spurred many “lessons learned” that leaders say will prevent anything so “tragic” from happening again.

...

When the 13 vehicles were delivered to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit in April 2020, 12 were not operational. But they were deemed ready for landborne operations after months of repairs by 15th MEU mechanics, and by July, the AAVs had achieved “what we thought” was waterborne capabilities, Olson said. 

However, the vehicles did not meet the standards required for waterborne operations, as became clear after the accident. More than 54 percent of the AAVs in the fleet did not meet watertight integrity standards, an investigation revealed. 

“What we found in our subsequent inspections after a safety of use message came up on the 31st of July was that we had a problem across the fleet with our watertight integrity,” Olson said. 

Only now finding that out? Really?

Why?

Make no mistake – those who failed to produce a viable replacement for the AAV share a lot of this blame. An institutional mindset that will take unnecessary risks with lives in order to not embarrass the Chain of Command who failed to properly equip it – they too share a lot of the blame.

Who will hold them to account?

We’ll see.

We May Need an Intervention for Our Navy-USMC Team

No, no, no ... let's not.

This tweet from The Krulak Center makes me break out in a cold, Bullsh1t Bingo sweat;

#TeamKrulak community, our latest #BruteTalk is live! Check out Maj Robert Spodarek’s SAW Future War project on “Mosaic Naval Force Operating Concept: Regaining US Naval Force Competitive Advantage:” @MarineCorpsU @MCUFoundationhttps://t.co/wwHuHj9I1b pic.twitter.com/A38ZKrFtEb

— The Krulak Center (@TheKrulakCenter) July 28, 2020

Just look at it!

Mosaic? Child please.

h/t Jack.

A Terrible Decision by the Commandant of the Marine Corps

What are the primary drivers when it comes to the unmanned systems we will deploy forward, ready for wartime use? 

Size, range, use, mission, flexibility, technology risk, commonality, basing, cost? What weight do you give each variable - and why?

With only a few systems that will end up getting a funding line, you need to make sure you thought it through correctly, and have the right set of priorities.

This week, let's take a look at the USMC's recent decisions on unmanned air systems from the point of view of friend-to-the-blog Bryan McGrath.

Bryan, over to you.

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Since assuming the duties of Commandant of the Marine Corps last summer, General David Berger has enjoyed a fairly smooth go of it, releasing a Commandant’s Planning Guidance to near-universal acclaim and putting forward a vision of naval integration around which the Department of the Navy has wisely moved to coalesce. And so, it was surprising earlier this week to see the Commandant make a decision that so starkly works against the principles of integration for which he has so forcefully advocated.

The decision, as the Naval Institute’s Megan Eckstein first reported, was to restructure the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Expeditionary program -- known as “MUX”--from one centered around a large, medium altitude long endurance (MALE) unmanned vehicle organic to the ships of the amphibious force to a “family of systems” approach that would rely heavily on a “very large land-based aerial vehicle and a medium sized one for shipboard operations”. There are three main reasons that this decision is wrong, and Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly should intervene quickly to reverse the Commandant’s error.

Reason 1: Kiss the “Lightning Carrier” concept goodbye

Commandant Berger expressed support for the “Lightning Carrier” concept in his planning guidance. As described in detail in the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment’s 2017 Fleet Architecture Study, the Lightning Carrier would evolve the current LHD/LHA from its current singular devotion to the support of troops ashore, to a multipurpose, multi-mission conventional deterrence platform built around the considerable capabilities of the F-35B. The LHD/LHA would become more of a small aircraft carrier and less of an amphibious assault platform. Key to this transformation would be the provision of the LHD/LHA or its escorts with a proper intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISRT) platform, one acting as an integral part of the planned and executed operations of the amphibious presence forces. As envisioned, MUX was the platform that would create this transformation. To put it another way, to achieve the Lightning Carrier, the F-35B was necessary, but not sufficient.

Barrels of ink have been wasted over time in the distinction—made primarily in the United States—between an aircraft carrier and an amphibious assault vessel. The most important distinction has been the availability of organic ISR/T from the aircraft carrier’s deck. The E-2D more than anything else, is what makes an aircraft carrier. Its huge wingspan requires a large ship. A large ship requires nuclear reactors to be efficient and effective. As capable as the LHD/LHA has been, it is utterly dependent on land-based ISRT and the ISRT provided by the carrier air wing. Had the Commandant made the decision to provision the amphibious force with a true MALE ISRT platform, the LHD/LHA would minimize its reliance on inorganic targeting and surveillance. Denying this organic capability regrettably makes an F-35B-packed LHD/LHA into a more lucrative and less well-defended target, and less of a maritime dominance/integrated naval power platform.

Reason 2: Missed Opportunity for Closer Integration with the Navy’s Surface Forces


There is no question but that a capable MALE UAV within the MUX program would have been a costly proposition, one that it would have been difficult for the Marine Corps to shoulder alone. This is why the true value proposition for this program would have come into sharp relief in a Navy/Marine Corps program that would provide the MAGTF with the ISRT it requires under the MUX program, and the Surface Navy with the additional ISRT it requires as a result of a new generation of longer-range anti-ship and strike missiles. One of the more innovative aspects of the MUX acquisition was the oft-repeated desire that the unmanned vehicle be capable of fitting into an ARLEIGH BURKE Class Destroyer helicopter hangar. A common solution based around modular sensor and weapons packages would have been a win-win for both the Marine Corps and the Navy, bringing with it considerably more and more responsive lethality and ISRT within the forces that make up the “contact” and “blunt” layers of our National Defense Strategy.

Reason 3: Unwise Reliance on Land-based ISRT

The most disturbing aspect of the Commandant’s decision is the degree to which he is sacrificing the precision and certainty of organically-controlled ISRT for the uncertainty and inefficiency of land-based solutions, a subject my former colleague Seth Cropsey and I studied in our November 2019 monograph “If You can’t See’em, You Can’t Shoot’em: Improving US Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting”.

Looking specifically at the Navy’s MQ-4C Triton system, we suggested that the Navy’s planned buy of 68 systems (in order to have 20 deployable at all times) was woefully inadequate to the task of consistent ISRT of the area inside the First Island Chain, a task made even more difficult by the extensive fly-in ranges of the land-based aircraft that would provide the coverage, in some cases using half their fuel simply to transit the huge distances in the Western Pacific.

A truly effective conventional deterrent in the Western Pacific is one in which each and every Chinese Navy ship captain understands that he is targeted as soon as he leaves port, the kind of targeting perception under which U.S. commanding officers currently operate within the First Island Chain. This certainty is not going to be provided by wide area search platforms ferrying in from thousands of miles away. It will be provided by ISRT platforms of enough mission duration that sensor to shooter kill chains can be maintained organically, while high altitude, long endurance land-based UAV’s remain the purview of theater commanders executing operational and strategic surveillance schemes.

Putting aside the wisdom of more heavy reliance on land-based ISRT, there is a roles and missions question here. Do we need yet another service buying and operating its own large, land-based ISRT systems? Does the Marine Corps really believe that even if it were to acquire such systems, that they would be able to exercise the same level of MAGTF level control of them in an age of Joint asset allocation? The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) should look long and hard at any USMC program that seeks to duplicate already existing and somewhat inefficient capabilities.


Conclusion

Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly has been exceptionally good at talking about Integrated American Naval Power, and he has an opportunity to strike a tangible blow for its future by halting the USMC MUX program in its tracks and directing the Commandant and the Chief of Naval Operations to report back to him on the prospects for an integrated, departmental solution to the mission requirements of the two services. An organic, MALE UAV that services the targeting needs of our nation’s conventional deterrence forces where they operate and under their control is a necessary step to providing a deterrence posture that influences the adversary to reconsider aggression.


Bryan McGrath is the Managing Director of The FerryBridge Group LLC, a national security consultancy. The ideas offered here should be considered his and are not those of any client he represents.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps Just Changed the Game

Ready to start your week off right? No better way than a Monday guest post by Bryan McGrath.

If you have not read the 38th Commandant's Planning Guidance yet, after reading Brian's post below, you can find it at the bottom of the post.

Here and on Midrats we've spoken often about the need to have more thinking at a higher, structural level. It looks like General David Berger, USMC has done doing exactly that.

Brian, over to you.

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When one’s life is spent thinking about American Seapower—specifically, its importance to the security and prosperity of the nation and how best to provide more of it more effectively—a great number of articles, papers, speeches, doctrines, concepts, and statements must be digested and sometimes produced. The overwhelming number of these efforts are pedestrian, self-evident, banal, controversial for the sake of being so, and or repetitive. And while the cause of American Seapower is advanced by some of them, the gains made are glacial and incremental. Until now.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Berger, recently issued the single most consequential bit of thinking to guide American Seapower since the series of articles and briefings that accompanied the Maritime Strategy of the 1980’s. Known as the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, the document is by definition, Berger’s statement of intent for the next four years, and the kind of thing new service chiefs promulgate in order to align their services behind their vision. If that were all this document is, it would be worth reading, if for no other reason than as is customary with the Marine Corps, 180,000 plus Marines and their enablers will read it and cite it as gospel. But that is not all it is. This guidance is a roadmap for the embrace of Integrated American Seapower, considerable Department of the Navy reform, tectonic shifts in the Marine Corps narrative, and innovative capability evolution. As soon as the new CNO (VADM Mike Gilday) is in office, he, Berger, and Secretary Spencer should head off to some secluded hideaway for ten days and figure out how to expand this guidance into authoritative vision for the entire Department. It is that good, it is that insightful.

There is a good bit on the back end of the document that I won’t cover here, not because it is unimportant but because it is less important to the purposes I have. Fitness reports, parental leave, training, recruitment, talent management, etc., fall into this category. I am concerned with the Marine Corps’ sense of self, its warfighting ethos and concepts, its force design, and its command and control. These subjects are front and center and form the most interesting portion of the document.

First, and this cannot be understated, General Berger has clearly articulated the Marine Corps’ role as a naval weapon system, a component of integrated American Seapower that influences from the sea to the land and the land to the sea. He has tied the Corps’ operational command and control to a unified joint functional commander (citing the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander—more on this here) with control of all elements of the maritime force, and has settled (forever, if USMC history is to be cited) the place of tactical level USMC forces within the Navy’s Combined Warfare Commander (CWC) concept. While USMC leaders have for a decade now, talked about “returning to our naval roots” after years operating as a second land army, Berger has cast his lot with the Navy in a warfighting partnership that offers considerable effectiveness and lethality to the nation’s defense strategy at the expense of what many will perceive as Marine Corps autonomy. Those who reach this conclusion are in error; what Berger is advocating places the Marine Corps advantageously within the naval force and will provide it with more influence as to how that force will be planned, composed, developed, acquired, exercised, postured, and employed.

To that end, Berger has walked away from the “requirement” for 38 amphibious ships and 2.0 MEBs worth of lift as the two most important statements out of any Marine’s mouth when talking about force structure. Ghosts of Commandants past are rolling in their graves as easily understood planning factors are eschewed in favor of a more complex understanding of force packaging and capability flexibility. This alone is perhaps the riskiest part of Berger’s vision, as it substitutes well-understood and easily understandable concepts for more fluid and situational modalities, and I do not envy USMC force planners the job of attempting to define and aggregate these ideas into service programs. That should not stop them from doing it.

As for service programming, Berger identifies a problem within Department of the Navy planning and programming, one that I have written about in the past, and that is the degree to which the two services build their Program Objective Memoranda (POM) in silos. Here is Berger (p.2): “In addition to the recent focus on operational integration, I intend to seek greater integration between the Navy and Marine Corps in our Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development process. We share a common understanding of the NDS, the pacing threat, the future operating environment, and of those capabilities that provide the greatest overmatch for our Navy. We must strive to create capabilities that support fleet operations and naval campaigns. We will integrate our POM wargaming efforts with the Navy’s, thereby, ensuring a common understanding and common baseline from which each Service can communicate their needs to the Secretary of the Navy, and ultimately, the Secretary of Defense.” Moving toward a common POM for Integrated American Seapower will likely require DoN, USMC, and USN re-organization, but this is something SecNav and his service chiefs can iron out at their aforementioned offsite.

The paragraph that knocked me back in my chair—for its bravery, its integrity, and its common-sense, is this one (p.2): “In 1933, the establishment of the FMF under the operational control of the Fleet Commander generated great unity of effort, operational flexibility, and the integrated application of Navy and Marine capabilities throughout the maritime domain. The 1986 Goldwater Nichols Act, however, removed the preponderance of the FMF from fleet operational control and disrupted the long-standing Navy-Marine Corps relationship by creating separate Navy and Marine Corps components within joint forces. Furthermore, Navy and Marine Corps officers developed a tendency to view their operational responsibilities as separate and distinct, rather than intertwined. With the rise of both land and sea-based threats to the global commons, there is a need to reestablish a more integrated approach to operations in the maritime domain. Reinvigorating the FMF can be accomplished by assigning more Marine Corps forces to the Fleet, putting Marine Corps experts in the fleet Maritime Operations Centers, and also by shifting emphasis in our training, education, and supporting establishment activities.”

How often in today’s world does a leader come forward and state that what enshrined his organization’s autonomy and full-partnership—went too far and diminished overall effectiveness? This is the statement of a man with the confidence provided by having a good story and the right set of answers and questions. Berger gets that future fights require a different Marine Corps. Berger gets that those fights require a stronger brand of Integrated American Seapower. Berger gets that the USMC may have to shed what have become traditional and much-loved capabilities—not only because they are less related to maritime functions, but because others can do them better—in order to achieve new and critical naval capabilities, and Berger gets that the USMC is now—33 years after Goldwater Nichols—a strong enough bureaucratic force to advocate for these changes without any diminishment of its service culture or role.

If it sounds like I am excited about this guidance, I am. For its goodness to be realized, CNO Gilday will have to meet Berger in the middle, and the Secretary of the Navy is going to have to be there with them. This “Maritime Holy Trinity” can – if aligned—accomplish great things for this country. If Berger isn’t met, antibodies will appear in the form of USMC traditionalists, jealous Navy interests, and confused politicians, and Berger’s visionary stance will become just another howl at the moon destroyed by the smallness of Washington DC. I urge all involved not to let that happen.

Bryan McGrath is the Managing Director of The FerryBridge Group where he provides consulting services to the Navy. He is also the Deputy Director of Hudson Institute’s Center for American Seapower. The views expressed here—and everywhere else for that matter—are his.

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_38th Commandant's Planning Guidance_2019 by CDR Salamander on Scribd

Moral Courage When the Call Comes

For those who have been following the case of LtCol Kate Germano, USMC I highly recommend that you take the opportunity to hear from her first person. Well worth your time to read her post at USNIBlog;

...for all of our talk of core values and ethics in the Marine Corps, many individuals I served with were more concerned with being liked than making difficult but necessary decisions. Some careerist commanders demonstrated that when assessing leadership, the words “negative command climate” carried far more weight than an officer’s actual ability to hold subordinates accountable for conduct and performance.
To that end, the greatest danger facing the military is not ISIS, but the failure of leaders to do the right thing even if it means being viewed as a problem by their superiors. As military officers, we must be willing to make difficult decisions, even when they are not popular. We must be able to look in the mirror and be satisfied with the person we see. We must also be willing to accept the consequences of decisions made on principle.
...
As military leaders, we must have the moral courage to make difficult decisions in the interest of our subordinates, our service, and our nation, no matter what the consequence. We must recognize that service is not about being popular and liked, but is about getting results.

A Casualty of Institutional Self-Contradiction

What happens when a leader strives to hold her female Marines to a standard in line with her male Shipmates - and makes a few waves in the process?

I'm pondering the story of LtCol Kate Germano, USMC over at USNIBlog. Stop by and give it a read.

21st Century Ellis - Edited by B.A. Friedman - on Midrats

The next book from USNI's 21st Century Foundations series is 21st Century Ellis, edited by Capt. B.A. Friedman, USMC.

This book covers the work of Lt. Col. "Pete" Ellis, USMC who in 1921 predicted the coming war with Japan.

Included in this collection are some o f his articles on counterinsurgency and conventional war based on his experiences in WWI and the Philippines.

Capt. Friedman will be with us for the full hour this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern to discuss this and more.

Capt. B.A. Friedman is a field artillery officer in the United States Marine Corps currently stationed at Camp Lejeune, NC. He is pursuing a master's degree in national security and strategic studies through the Naval War College.

Join us live if you can with the usual suspects in the chat room and offer up your questions for our guest, but if you miss the show you can always listen to the archive at blogtalkradio. 

If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here.

Listen to internet radio with Midrats on Blog Talk Radio

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UPDATE: Forgot to mention, if you didn't follow the link above, you can find all in the 21st Century Foundations series here.

A Movie on the USMC that Needs to be Made

We all owe Andrew deGrandpre and MilitaryTimes a respectful nod for their 5-part series on TASK FORCE VIOLENT that I posted on here after Part-1.

Part-5 is out, and take some time today to follow the link and read the series. This story shows our Marines at their finest, but our Navy-Marine Corp nomenklatura in a way only those who have been on the receiving end of this kind of behavior would understand.

If noting else, more people need to know this story to see an example of leadership as it is expected, not expected by your Chain of Command, not by your men per se; but morally.

There really is nothing more to say than, read this.

Widespread media coverage depicted them as out-of-control cowboys. The public scrutiny was embarrassing. The prospect of going to prison was terrifying. And their 10-month legal battle was relentlessly stressful. One enlisted Marine, a Mexican national, was convinced his mother would be deported. Others recalled their superiors telling them "it doesn't look good for you boys."

Collectively, the fallout left them physically sick, psychologically broken and deeply embittered toward the leaders they blame for causing and perpetuating their anguish and shame, including men who've earned generals' stars. For some like Galvin, there have been lasting professional setbacks, too.

But the betrayal from within, that shattered their trust in the institution. It defied the core values instilled in these men from the moment they joined the Corps: honor, courage, commitment. "This still haunts us," one of those Marines explained, "because no one has publicly acknowledged we did the right thing that day. We did our jobs — and we were crucified for it."

Galvin has been on a mission to restore honor for Fox Company, one that consumes him even when some suggest he should move on with a new life. But he's not wired that way. He believes he owes it to his men to secure the full and public vindication they've never had.

USMC to sea; back to the future

Looks like the USMC is getting remarried to the non "L" fleet. 

A little something old, a little something new, a little something borrowed, a little something blue.  What it has a lot of is goodness.

With a too small amphibious fleet and the positive aspects of a distributed ability to have forces in place to respond to short notice national security requirements - this move is to be welcomed and encouraged.

BZ to those who led the long march back to ... well ... in a fashion, something out Marines have always done, and done to great affect.

Via Joshua Stewart;

If Marines become fixtures on ships of Military Sealift Command, carriers, and surface combatants, they'll have a type of sea duty that's different from the deployments they've had on amphibious ships. They wouldn't be in a Marine expeditionary unit embarked on gators alongside thousands of other Marines, but rather with sailors who aren't used to deploying with leathernecks.
....
"We will evaluate and experiment with Marine detachments on ships other than amphibious vessels such as afloat forward staging bases, destroyers, littoral combat ships, mobile landing platforms, and joint high-speed vessels," they wrote in the June 2013 issue of the U.S. Naval Institute's June 2013 Proceeding Magazine.

That concept was also mentioned in Expeditionary Force 21, a long-term Marine Corps planning policy that emphasizes maritime missions and recalibrating the service after the wars in Iraq in Afghanistan.

Experimentation is good, but there are some things to keep in mind - always think about what happens when the enemy decides to shoot back.

The CSIS study also warns that putting Marines on non-combatants come with a unique set of risks and limitations. MSC ships are less survivable than amphibious ships and they have poor defenses. They also have limited support, they don't have the same command and control capabilities, nor can they do intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

Also, if Marines are on non-combatants, legal restrictions and treaties could limit the types of missions that they undertake, the study states.

Despite these shortfalls, the report said that non-amphibious ships can still help Marine missions, especially humanitarian relief efforts or bilateral training events. They might also be good options for chasing low-threat drug runners.

And following the recent experiments, Corps officials are trying to determine what Marines could do from other types of vessels, Wheeler said.

"Right now we have tested concepts from three vessels," he said. "We are expanding this concept and developing capabilities with additional platforms in the future."

Good. Good. Especially having USMC detachments back on CVN and DDG/CG.

Fullbore Friday

Cpl. William "Kyle" Carpenter, USMC (Ret).

Sgt. Maj. Paul T. Archie, USMC - Doing What Needed to be Done

I dearly hope that the USMC will take care of Sergeant Major Archie - though it looks like he may have dropped his retirement paperwork.

He did what others should have done ... as a Sergeant Major should have.

I won't second guess what happened between him and his Chain of Command.

Marine Sgt. Maj. Paul Archie has tendered his resignation and voluntarily stepped down from his post as senior enlisted adviser at Parris Island recruit depot, Marine Corps Times has learned.
...
Marine Corps officials released this statement concerning Archie’s decision: “Understanding the Marine Corps has very high standards of personal and professional conduct for its most senior leaders, Sgt. Maj. Archie voluntarily stepped down as the depot sergeant major, and the commanding general regrettably accepted his retirement.”

On Thursday, Archie stopped his vehicle in front of a protest near the gates, got out and proceeded to get into a verbal altercation with a protester, Ethan Arguello, who is also a former Marine drill instructor.

The official police statement on the incident has more detail: “During argument, Archie’s head struck the campaign cover knocking it off the head of the protestor. Archie took the campaign cover and proceeded onto MCRD Parris Island.”

Police later recovered the campaign cover.

No. That does not do what happened justice. You need to watch the video.



Oh and Ethan - you have no honor you pussy.

Bravo Zulu Sergeant Major Archie. Bravo Zulu.

USMC Asks God for a Training Time Out

This is all rather silly.

Females in the Marine Corps currently are not required to do even a single pull-up, and a deadline mandating that by Jan. 1, 2014, they be able to do at least 3 pull-ups as part of their training has been delayed for at least a year, the Corps quietly announced on social media.

Unlike their female counterparts, male Marines have long been required to do at least 3 pullups as part of the Physical Fitness Test (PFT). That's the minimum requirement for males.
...
The deadline for women to meet the men’s minimum standard of three pull-ups has been postponed a year and “will continue to be assessed,” Capt. Flanagan told CNSNews.com. The Marines' Twitter announcement on the topic was posted on Nov. 20. But by Dec. 27, few media outlets had mentioned the news.

Time delay will not change a few million years of evolution. This is only a delay so people can argue about the politics of trying to convince the irrational that water is wet and grass is green.

It will be very interesting if the USMC decides to be fact-based and honorable, or they will bend the neck to the socio-political fascists.

Who will replace CJCS Mullen?

Well, I think it is clear that it won't be Gen. Cartwright, USMC.

The Pentagon released a report of the investigation just weeks before Defense Secretary Robert Gates is due to recommend a candidate to succeed the current head of the military, Admiral Mike Mullen, to the White House.

Its timing is thought to have been designed to clear the air as rumours about the investigation circulated around the Pentagon.

Sources who have worked with the general believe the allegations may be part of a vendetta launched by those who do not want General Cartwright to get the post, Fox News reports.

According to the channel, his former aides said his relationship with the woman was closer than usual, but remained appropriate and fitted with his leadership style of having a close-knit circle of allies.

... but ... maybe ...

White House officials said President Obama is aware of the claim and was not deterred by it. Military sources say the general, a former fighter pilot, has a better relationship with Mr Obama than the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

He is thought to be the favourite to succeed Admiral Mullen, although General David Petraeus and Admiral James Stavridis have also been mentioned.

The heavily-redacted report, completed in 2010, clears the general of three of the four allegations made by an anonymous accuser, including one which suggested he had a sexual relationship with the aide.

Mmmmm ... top cover that can get you out of this?

An anonymous accuser claimed Gen. James Cartwright acted inappropriately during a 2009 overseas trip on which the aide traveled as a military assistant. Several sources confirmed that the former aide is a young woman, although her name and pronouns that would reveal her sex are blacked out in the heavily edited Pentagon inspector general's report. The sources spoke on condition of anonymity to describe aspects of the report that were not released.

The inspector general quickly cleared Cartwright of the most serious allegations, which involved claims that he may have had an improper physical relationship with the young woman. The report, completed in March 2010, did find that Cartwright mishandled an incident in which the aide, drunk and visibly upset, visited his Tbilisi, Georgia, hotel room alone and either passed out or fell asleep on a bench at the foot of his bed.

Cartwright claimed he had done nothing wrong and was later cleared of all wrongdoing by the top civilian Navy official.

"The investigation into the anonymous allegations was thorough. He cooperated fully and when it concluded the allegations were not substantiated," Cartwright spokesman Maj. Cliff W. Gilmore said Wednesday. "Gen. Cartwright believes it's important to have a system that allows anonymous complaints to be heard and appropriate for leaders, especially at his level, to be open to this degree of scrutiny."

Cartwright told investigators that he was working in his hotel suite when the woman entered after 11 p.m. the night of March 30, 2009, and began a conversation. She was seated on the bench, where at least one other aide later saw her slumped and apparently asleep, according to the inspector's report and interviews with officials knowledgeable about the trip.

The suite functioned as Cartwright's office, the door was ajar while the woman was inside and security personnel were nearby.

Cartwright, who is 61 and married, told investigators he thought it best to let the woman sleep it off, and she eventually returned to her own room. He said he worked most of the night and got about an hour of sleep.

The inspector general faulted Cartwright for not insisting that the aide leave or be removed. The report says she felt "license" to enter the general's room late at night and drunk, despite being advised by a security agent not to do so.

The report also faulted Cartwright for failing to act on an earlier incident in which the woman also apparently drank too much. In that case, she had a disagreement with a Secret Service agent guarding President Barack Obama at an elite annual dinner given by the Alfalfa Club in Washington.

Yes. Read that again. He does have some top-cover though,

While the investigation cleared Gen. James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of any improper relationship it did recommend nonjudicial punishment for Cartwright's failure to properly discipline the aide and for maintaining an overly friendly relationship.

After reviewing the evidence however, Navy Secretary Ray Mabus cleared Cartwright of any wrongdoing.

OK fellow recidivist Staff Weenies - how many of the Aides you know - or, ahem those of us who have worn a Loop of any kind - would have survived a drunken spat with a Secret Service person guarding the CINC-in-waiting ... in public?

This is neither here nor there - but when I was stationed in HI, we always used to make the observation that it seemed that the USMC female aides were all some of the most attractive women in uniform, bar none. They were sharp, professional - and to a woman drop dead gorgeous ... and we said that when we weren't even 4 months into a deployment.

People are human, and even if you do everything right - an older male General Officer with a much younger female Aide is a dangerous combination if you don't manage things right. People will talk regardless. Never give them fuel. Even if you give Gen. Cartwright the full benefit of the doubt, which I will, if you don't have the right person acting in the right way - you open the door to someone calling you out.

I don't know about you, but I have seen innocent people accused of sexual misconduct and ruined - and I have seen other people get away with open sexual congress with subordinates. Tough and imperfect world we have.

You can make your own luck. Best case for Gen. Cartwright - he exercised poor judgment in his choice and management of his Aide. As a result - I'd put a Franklin on this being his last position. Is that right? Probably not - but such it is as it is.

Decades of great service - stopped by a female aide almost young enough to be his granddaughter and her inability to handle her alcohol ---- and his reaction to it.

Watch and learn. Watch and learn. And no, this would not have happened if she were a he. Knowing the Staffs I was on - one incident of public drunkenness like that and you would be liaison to Thule AB, Greenland the next Monday.

We could also talk about the IG's hotline too if we want .... but .... sigh. What a can of worms that is.

Hat tip d'mole.

Diversity Thursday II - USMC Boogaloo

The new Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James F. Amos has just questioned the integrity of every officer and NCO in the Marine Corps and has decided to make things better by lead the charge to bring back institutional racism - kind of.

Nice.

From the CMC's Planning Guidance's retention portion;

Improve Diversity Representation Throughout our Corps ACMC, with DC M&RA & CG MCRC in direct support - chair a comprehensive review of the current diversity posture of and issues within the Marine Corps. This review will aim to develop a comprehensive, institutional strategy:
1) to improve the accession, retention and promotion of qualified individuals and 2) to foster immediate and marked adjustments for improved recruitment of minority Marines (officer and enlisted) along with their career development and mentoring. Upon implementation of an approved Service-wide strategy generated from this study, senior leaders will conduct periodic accountability reviews with CMC. (Due: 18 Feb 11)

Let me translate for you:

---

1) We have not done enough to improve the metrics that the Diversity Bullies demand. Stop looking at the best recruits and rewarding the best Marines - focus on the sectarian metrics.
2) Do what ever you need to in order to make our metrics look better. Again, I don't care about the best - I just want you to make it look different than it is because others tell me I need to.

When it is all done, I am going to sit down with you and we are going to look at your metrics. If I don't see preferential treatment to those racial and ethnic groups that I approve of - then you will be held accountable. You're a Marine, you know what accountable means. So, throw away fairness - I want you to stop looking at your Marines as Marines, I want you to look at them based on their race, creed, color or national origin and evaluate them differently because of their DNA. I want the metrics changed. I don't want to hear about fairness, equality, or any irratitating truths about multi-racial Marines or racial self-identification fraud. No, I don't care. I just want the metrics on my Diversity slides changed.

Oh, and all the CMC who came before me didn't care about racial and ethnic minorities as much as I do. The did not conduct accountability reviews the way I will. I am better than they were. I think you might be a bigot - that is why I want to see your numbers. So, start acting like a bigot by counting your Marines by DNA type .... and make sure you are ranking Marines appropriately too. I want to see that as well.

---

Sad, isn't it? The USMC and General Amos are better than this - and I don't think he thinks this way, but this is how it reads. This AM I have already had Marines send it my way with that concern.

Good news is that it is bullet #2 under priority #4 - but it is ahead of Review and Improve Transition Assistance, Examine and Improve Reenlistment Procedures, Integrate Behavioral Health Efforts, and Improve Personnel Administration. Small blessings, I guess.

My money is that it had to be in there somewhere. In this environment, he would be calling fire on his own position if he didn't bring it up - but it still looks like throwing virgins in the volcano and will directly impact people's career in the zero sum came that it is, simply for sectarian reasons.

Sorry CMC to personalize it - but it is in your P&G. Otherwise, I wish you the best.

Under SECNAV Bob Work gets an A-

In response a solid post over at SmallWarsJournal by Robert Haddick, Under Secretary of the Navy - and reader of CDRSalamander - Robert Work responded in an exemplary manner in comments.

...The Marine Corps will continue to focus, as it has since the end of World War II, on sea-based forward engagement and crisis response, and supporting joint campaigns of both short and long duration. The primary adversaries in the future will be "hybrid" in nature, with access to the full range of guided weapons--referred to as G-RAMM, Guided Rockets, Artillery, Mortars, and Missiles.

There is widespread agreement that there may be times in the future where access may be hard to come by, and we may have to fight to get it. This comes out strongly in Secretary Gates’ call to improve our ability to defeat anti-access/area denial threats.

In light of these circumstances, Secretary Gates has asked whether or not we should retain an amphibious assault capability--the ability to inject intact, ready-to-fight combat forces ashore from the sea--and if so, for what mission and how much capacity. We have been studying this question for the past year. We will be arguing our case this Fall.

We believe, and will argue, that the joint force should retain a modest amphibious assault capability, focused on the theater entry mission. As Phil Ridderhof explains, the USMC's WWII experience was conducting seizures of defended islands for the purpose of seizing an advanced naval base. We believe that a future amphibious assault, if conducted, would look more like US Army theater entry missions conducted in the ETO, which are designed to facilitate a follow-on joint land campaign. Since these types of missions will be relatively low probability, we think the ability to land 2 MEBs is the minimum capacity necessary, provided there is a rapid reinforcement capability. The inclusion of Army Airborne, MPF squadrons with new Mobile Landing Platforms, and JLOTS capabilities in our thinking will therefore be critical. And any theater entry will be a joint endeavor, relying on Air Force space and air support.

In an anti-access environment where the enemy has a capable battle network capable of firing salvos of guided weapons, the initial phase of any theater entry operation will require achieving air, sea, undersea, and overall battle network superiority. This will mean this type of operation will be deliberate and take some time to develop. This does not mean "damn the G-RAMM, full speed ahead." It means, "take your time, roll the G-RAMM threat back, and then land at a time and place of your own choosing." No 10-day landings in this environment.

Once ashore, the primary threat to the lodgment will come from G-RAMM "counter-attacks" and hybrid warriors who most likely will hide amongst the people. This will require the Marines to concentrate on establishing an inner G-RAMM perimeter designed to keep guided rockets, mortars, and artillery suppressed/out of range. The joint force, especially the defending Navy battle network, will concentrate on defeating the longer range-G-RAMM threat.

Let's posit that if we needed to, and we dedicated the assets to do so, we might be able to inject 2 ready-to-fight airborne BCTs into a joint lodgment over a 2-3 day period. We are recommending we retain a capability to inject just 2 MEBs. In other words, we are recommending we retain the ability to inject just four ready-to-fight BCTS out of a planned force of 86 BCTs equivalents (73 Army BCTs, 12 Marine RCTs, 1 Ranger Regt). The remaining 82 would have to be assembled in theater, once their equipment (generally delivered by sea) and people (generally delivered by air) arrive. Improving the rapid reinforcement/rapid assembly capability will obviously be critical.

We don't think this is a big force, and are not recommending a major increase in amphibious landing forces. However, we think retaining the capability to conduct a modest theater entry mission supported by sea-based forces is critical. We hope OSD and the Joint Staff will agree.

Best, Bob Work

I could nit-pic, but I won't. That is a solid concept to work with. He would have received an A+ if he hadn't used the phrase "hybrid warriors."

If he wasn't nice to me he would have been knocked down a full letter grade ... but today I am feeling happy with life and will be petty and play favorites.

What price SVTOL?

With wars still going on - those looking over the horizon to what they think will be the land of peace that nations have been looking for but have never found - are already going after the Marines.

They have fought this battle before - and their external enemies and challenges they will have to fight and overcome. In that battle - one over the next couple of decades that will be well seasoned with budgetary challenges unheard of in living memory for those leading the DOD - how much are they going to be weakened by decisions made over the last decade and more?

Over at ArmedForcesJournal, LCDR Perry Soloman looks at what has come to define Marine Air - SVTOL.

The Marine Corps has embarked upon a comprehensive overhaul of its aviation force that is scheduled to culminate in 15 years with the replacement of every airframe currently in service.

To reduce the compounding costs associated with operating multiple varieties of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, the Marine Corps will transition from 13 to six types or models of manned aircraft over the next 10 years. In doing so, Marine Corps aviation will attain a goal 40 years in the making: the fielding of an entire light attack force capable of short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) operations.

There is the set-up.

What is the good?

The doctrinal concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) recognizes the challenges faced by Marine logisticians as they phase combat power ashore. Gen. Charles C. Krulak envisioned that “with sea-based logistics, fire support, medical facilities, and command and control assets, [the] force maximizes its protection by limiting its footprint — and hence its vulnerability — ashore.” For the low-intensity littoral conflicts of the future, OMFTS will be the touchstone doctrine. Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) is the tactical application of OMFTS. With the publication of the STOM concept of operations, the Marine Corps paid recognition to the sometimes unnecessary and untenable requirements of amphibious lodgment and the inherent attrition-based strategy that accompanies securing an actively contested beachhead. With OMFTS and STOM, aviation units are not phased ashore. Therefore, STOVL attack aircraft capable of sustained operations from sea are a critical requirement for the successful execution of OMFTS.

Marines deploying from the deck of an amphibious assault ship and operating independently of a larger carrier strike group need fixed-wing tactical aircraft organic to the amphibious ready group that will support their movement ashore. The idea of a fifth-generation STOVL stealth fighter based near the front that will bring “unprecedented responsiveness to the fight” is a red herring that continues to propagate from the highest levels of the Marine Corps.

But the challenges ...

Marine Corps aviation is in an unnecessarily precarious position. As the price of the F-35 continues to climb, budgetary restrictions will force the Corps to make cuts in other programs or purchase fewer STOVL stealth fighters. Without argument, the F-35B is crucial to the future of Marine Corps tactical fixed-wing aviation. Without the F-35B to replace the aging Harrier fleet, Operational Maneuver from the Sea is a hollow shell of a concept. Marine Corps leadership is making an existential gamble on an untested and unproven weapons system. To guarantee that future amphibious assaults have organic fixed-wing assets in direct support, the Marine Corps must at least acknowledge a second course of action that involves a more diversified air arm.

The Department of the Navy should reduce the number of F-35Bs procured for the Marine Corps and buy only the number of aircraft required to fill Marine air wings dedicated to deploying with amphibious assets. This will cause the per-unit cost to rise even more, but the increased cost can be offset by transitioning F/A-18D squadrons to the much cheaper F/A-18F. The Marine Corps can buy three F/A-18Fs for the cost of a single F-35B.

Towards the end of the article he expands on the discussion of the FA-18F option; something I think we will hear a lot more of down the road.

The great thing about the USMC has always been that when you call them - they show up with all the tools they need to do their job, with a little help from their Navy sibling. A critical part of that is Marine Air. The bean counters have never understood that and for decades they have been trying to kill it. Once again, it seems, the battle is joined.

Turn to.

Global Force for Good?

Harumph.

For those who still throw up a little in their mouth when they think of the Navy's recruiting advertising - try this palate cleanser.



THAT is how a military recruits its future.

More like a "Global Force for Whup-a55."

Neoexpeditionaryism

There is a real nice companion the last episode of Midrats on the USMC and forcible entry by Frand Hoffman over at the Armed Forces Journal, titled Expeditionary ethos
Shifts in global security landscape demand changes in force posture.

You need to read the whole thing, of course, but here are a few pull quotes to tease you a bit.

The geo-strategist Halford McKinder once divided major states between Land and Sea Wolves. States that have an expeditionary capability are not limited to either/or status. They crossbreed their wolf packs to swim if needed and conduct operations ashore far from home when called upon. This expeditionary capability allows a state to apply strategic leverage across the physical domains. Most critically, expeditionary capabilities allow powers to deal with or minimize geographical and environmental constraints. Expeditionary forces allow maritime powers the opportunity to exploit their mastery of the seas to their advantage. Equally important, expeditionary forces can help offset the disadvantages of a purely maritime-based approach and provide even Continental Elephants the ability to project power when their interests are served by that capability.
...
It is a safe wager that war will always be with us. What is not a safe bet is the character and frequency of war. The causes, character and consequences of wars in the future will be influenced by many factors. Historical patterns and future trends point to shifts in the character and forms of warfare. Some of these shifts are captured by the interest in “new wars,” net wars, and “n-th generation” warfare. Most of these frameworks reflect an interest in novelty, overlook enduring elements of conflict and are short on prescriptions. A myopic focus on purely conventional threats leads us to dismiss rising challenges and the confluence of modes of conflict that led to 9/11. These two extremes should be avoided when trying to determine how to best posture U.S. forces to cover an expanding threat and mission spectrum in the 21st century.
...
The potential for major interstate warfare has been low, and will remain a rare but ever-present element in the international system. The fashionable presumption that interstate conflict is a thing of the past should be dashed with a clear understanding of history and human nature. “Over the past two centuries,” Donald Kagan noted, “the only thing more common than predictions about the end of wars has been war itself.”
...
The neat distinctions or intellectual bins we make between conventional and irregular warfare are useful, but only to a degree. The future portends potentially aggravating circumstances that will make the neat distinction between state and nonstate moot, and the delineation between conventional and irregular adversaries irrelevant. Thanks in part to globalization and the rapid transmission of ideas and technology, there is a recognizable fusion or blurring of regular and irregular modes of combat, into what might be called “combinational” or hybrid warfare.
...
Of course, “complex expeditionary warfare” implies a notion of complexity presumed to have been absent in the past, but one can look back three and half millennia when the Greeks fought against Troy and find the challenges no less complex. Homer’s “Iliad” dramatizes the complex expeditionary circumstances faced by the Greeks.

The Greek expedition was no simple matter. The assembly of their swift black ships was not a simple task, and the navigator originally landed miles off target. Nothing new here to veterans from Gallipoli or Normandy. Landing and storming Troy’s beaches and boggy plain was not easy. Likewise, sustaining the mission was a logistics nightmare.

Troy’s dense battlements pose no less danger or challenge than the sprawling megacities of Asia or Africa today. Achilles’ debasement of Prince Hector’s corpse should be seen in terms of its influence on the population of Troy. This effective imagery cowed the defenders of the city’s battlements and their families better than a posted video of a beheaded prisoner by al-Qaida. Clearly, the famous Trojan horse represents one of history’s first examples of the cunning inherent to the expeditionary mindset.

Whether the warriors are wearing greaves and bronze helmets, or leather boots and Kevlar headgear, the complexity is always present.

Yep - we need him as a guest.