
Jerry is a retired USN Captain, author, and a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, in Indianapolis. His most recent book is To Provide and Maintain a Navy (2020).
Proactively “From the Sea”; an agent of change leveraging the littoral best practices for a paradigm breaking six-sigma best business case to synergize a consistent design in the global commons, rightsizing the core values supporting our mission statement via the 5-vector model through cultural diversity.

As a naval officer, what legacy do you wish to leave?
Few mortals know the day and time, but if you are looking for a benchmark, you would be hard pressed not to look to Captain Paul Rinn, USN and say, "That. Him. There."
As skipper of the frigate Samuel B. Roberts, Capt. Rinn took his crew into the war-torn Persian Gulf where they joined other U.S. warships protecting Kuwaiti tankers that had been reflagged as American vessels during the Iran-Iraq War. Returning from a convoy on April 14, the frigate struck an Iranian contact mine, which blew a massive hole in the hull.
The explosion broke the Roberts’s keel and knocked out its electrical power. The ship immediately began taking on water. But Capt. Rinn had prepared his crew for such an emergency, crew members recalled, and over four grueling hours they saved the vessel, which the Navy repaired and kept in service for another 27 years.
The fight to save Samuel B. Roberts remains a case study in combat preparedness and a model emulated by successive generations of commanding officers, said Bryan McGrath, a retired U.S. Navy destroyer captain and consultant.
“Captain Rinn had enormous influence in the way that captains who commanded after him approached their job,” Capt. McGrath said. “What we all heard from our captains and what we all heard from the training pipeline was a similar story: We’re going to practice this over and again, until it’s perfect. And then we’re going to practice it perfectly over and over again.
“That’s what I told my crew maybe 500 times. That is the legacy of Paul Rinn and the lessons that came out of Samuel B. Roberts: They were ready. They had prepared. They had actually thought through things. And they performed when it was most important.”
Paul X. Rinn, a Vietnam War veteran and ship captain who in 1988 led a desperate effort to save a U.S. Navy vessel from sinking after it struck an Iranian mine, died Aug. 3. He was 75.
His inspirational leadership in the face of crisis made him an icon among fellow sailors long after his retirement at the rank of captain in 1997. He served 29 years in the Navy and settled in Fairfax Station, eventually turning full-time to lecturing on military leadership and shipboard operations at the service’s professional schools and elsewhere.
Capt. Rinn died unexpectedly while in Boston for a speaking engagement, his family said. A cause of death was not provided.
Very nice job by David Larter and Brad Pensiton. You should take the time to read the whole obit.
If you didn't catch the interview we did with Brad on Midrats about his book on Captain Rinn's crew and the Sammy B., No Higher Honor.
You can catch the podcast here.

"Eight CIA officers are dropped into the mountains of northern Afghanistan on October 17, 2001. They are Team Alpha, an eclectic band of linguists, tribal experts, and elite warriors: the first Americans to operate inside Taliban territory. Their covert mission is to track down Al- Qaeda and stop the terrorists from infiltrating the United States again."


He brought to life to a huge audience the great deeds of others in the naval service. He did it in a way that made people think about the example set and the lessons that could be useful for today and the future.
Brain cancer took him this week, too soon, but he left behind a legacy generations will benefit from.
Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors, Neptune's Inferno, Ship of Ghosts, A Fleet at Flood Tide and more. Regulars here know these books and their author, James D. Hornfischer.
He was always a gentlemen and always responded to DMs and emails. I am mad I never tried harder to have him on Midrats more than just once. I looked at the emails I exchanged with him in 2016 for A Fleet at Flood Tide and we just couldn't get the schedule right. It's my fault, really.
A lesson for me here. I'm sorry I didn't try harder Jim. Your books deserved it. My bust.
James D. Hornfischer; author, historian, navalist, and an all around great guy. Thanks for the gifts you've given us all.
Fullbore.
The latest iteration of the People’s Republic of China’s highly successful island hopping campaign in the Southwest Pacific has brought us to another round of the US national security nomenklatura and chatterati pounding away at their keyboards trying to figure out not just what is going on, but what China’s goals are.
Everyone continues to talk each other in circles, your humble blogg’r included. Towards the end of last week it started to dawn on me that perhaps part of the problem is that “we” continue to think ourselves in to the same intellectual box canyons. As a result, at the end of each iteration we don’t make progress and the Chinese get more islands.
The last decade saw the Chinese get the low hanging fruit with little substantive pushback or consequences, effectively creating a new normal in the South China Sea concerning who controls what. There really is nothing new here. As a matter of fact, it is old school, “This is mine, do something about it." mentality. As the saying goes, the mighty do what they will, the weak suffer what they must.
OK, there I go again – the usual intellectual box canyon. It sounds right, makes sense, explains a lot, but at the end of the chain, it just does not “feel right.” Why?
Let’s go back to the “old school” comment above and pick at it.
Is that really “old school?” Am I suffering, as many other US natsec people may be, from an unfortunate byproduct of playing “Risk” too much? The Risk-Trap seems to get us in a lot of trouble trying to figure out what is going on in the real world. The game is all based on grabbing bit of territory in a manner to gain world conquest. It also sounds right, makes sense, explains a lot, but at the end of the chain, it just does not “feel right.” I mean, is Irkutsk really that important? Really?
I don’t think Risk is all that popular in China, and perhaps that is the problem; cultural context.
Old school, especially in the Chinese context, is OLD. I always try to keep in mind that they have a continuous culture going back 3,000 years just with the written word. Only the Jewish people have a longer record. The USA is less than a 10th of that age.
Our military history is also dramatically different, and it is there that I am trying to look at what the Chinese are doing in a different context. It is much more than China being a continental power while – contrary to Army fever dreams – the USA is a maritime and aerospace power. No, much deeper than that.
Though flavored with the "people’s army" insurgency foundation that is the modern Chinese military (even their navy is the People’s Liberation Army Navy), the Chinese military tradition, habits, and reference points go back thousands of years steeped in the fundamental nature of steppe warfare.
Where the only American experience in steppe (Great Plains) warfare was a few decades at the end of the 19th Century against … well … a people who immigrated from the Asian steppes over 10,000 years earlier, the Chinese for thousands of years faced Mongols, Manchurians, and other people who inhabited the grasslands and deserts on the periphery of the Han heartland.
What are the characteristics of steppe warfare? Raids, Probes, and Scouting Parties. Light, fast moving parties crossing empty spaces to isolated pockets of important terrain, cities, and resources. First in small groups to check the reaction, strength, and resiliency of the locals, and if the odds look right, sending for larger forces to take what is worth taking, plundering what is worth plundering, and laying waste to anything that might encourage the previous inhabitants to come back.
Perhaps we need to be thinking and studying more about that cultural reference as we try to get our minds around what is happening in the Western Pacific.
As the great philosopher Lloyd Cole encouraged, lean over on the bookcase if you really wanna get straight.
Because I’ve already read his entire canon twice, at first I thought of Hopkirk's works, specifically "Setting the East Ablaze" & "Foreign Devils on Silk Road."
Where to go from there? This weekend led me down the rabbit hole of bits and pieces elsewhere of the Mongol conquests – and to the Russian experience with the same, especially their 17th and 18th century expansion of the Russian Empire in to Central and Eastern Asia.
From there, I found a gold mine of “I wish I didn’t have a paying gig so I could read all of these this week” list from the University of Michigan’s Erik Hildinger’s article Nomadic Steppe Warfare.
In the article he has a simply fascinating reading list. I need more bookcases.
The subject of nomadic steppe warfare is narrow enough that no general work of any depth seems to have been written exclusively on this topic apart from Hildinger 1997. However, there are useful chapters or passages on the campaigns and tactics of various nomadic warrior societies in other general works on the history of warfare, notably Keegan 1994, Jones 1987, and Lot 1946. Grousset 1970, monumental and easily available, although primarily a general political history, touches on the details of steppe-style warfare in its first chapter. Although these last four works do not treat nomadic steppe-style warfare in exhaustive detail, they are informative as to its general characteristics and, by contrasting it with the more familiar aspects of warfare as practiced by sedentary peoples, they are helpful.
Davies, Brian L. Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500–1700. London: Routledge, 2007.
As the title suggests, this book covers more than steppe warfare, though it has sections of some specificity regarding the equipment, tactics, and strategy involved in this area. Lithuanian, Russian, Polish, and Crimean Tatar interests are covered. It appears to be the only book-length treatment in English to focus on Russia’s expansion to the south.
Di Cosmo, Nicola. Warfare in Inner Asian History, 500–1800. Handbuch der Orientalistik 8. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2002.
Detailed academic study of warfare with, and between, nomadic peoples and their empires. There is a good deal of emphasis on Chinese responses to nomadic opponents, and a section dealing with the Manchu integration of the Mongols into their state in as they prepared to conquer China.
Drews, Robert. Early Riders: The Beginnings of Mounted Warfare in Asia and Europe. New York: Routledge, 2004.
DOI: 10.4324/9780203389928
A brief general history by a well-known academic. It treats the domestication of the horse, its use in warfare, steppe-style tactics, and the author’s view of the aims of those who practiced nomadic warfare.
Grousset, René. The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia. Translated by Naomi Walford. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1970.
Treats briefly the essential military characteristics of the steppe warrior, though with some exaggeration about the practical range of the composite bow. Though dated, the book is still useful and was long a standard text on the history of the many steppe tribes of central Asia. Now superseded by Sinor 1990 (cited under Modern Works Treating Specific Peoples).
Hildinger, Erik. Warriors of the Steppe: A Military History of Central Asia, 500 B.C. to 1700 A.D. New York: Sarpedon, 1997.
Apparently the only general history of nomadic steppe-style warfare. It contains chapters dealing with nomadism, the essential combination of horse and bow, strategy and tactics, and the activities of the most significant of the nomadic warrior societies, or those settled societies that retained or adopted their military techniques.
Jones, Archer. The Art of War in the Western World. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987.
Chapter 2, “The Diversity of the Medieval Ways of War,” treats briefly, but perceptively, the Mongol approach to war from a primarily strategic and logistical viewpoint.
Keegan, John. A History of Warfare. New York: Vintage, 1994.
Chapter 3, “Flesh,” discusses in some detail the various aspects of nomadic life that work to mold nomads into successful warriors.
Lot, Ferdinand. L’art militaire et les armées au Moyen Âge. Paris: Payot, 1946.
Several chapters treat the more significant nomadic warrior societies with whom the West had contact. The work is long (two volumes) and detailed. There is unfortunately no English translation.
Warfare is downstream from culture. Perhaps we all need to do a better job of getting to know the Chinese military culture, and then we can get a better grasp of what they are doing as Chinese, and not what we think they are doing as if they were Americans.
In steppe warfare, what do the raids, probes, and scouting parties look like?
What follows?

How do you report history as you live it? When, why, and how do you write about it?


Rely upon this then, all you who are here assembled, now is your great opportunity. The soldiers outside have their eyes fixed upon you; if they think that you are faint-hearted, they will turn cowards; but if you show them that you are making your own preparations to attack the enemy, and setting an example to the rest--follow you, be assured, they will: imitate you they will. May be, it is but right and fair that you should somewhat excel them, for you are generals, you are commanders of brigades or regiments; and if, while it was peace, you had the advantage in wealth and position, so now, when it is war, you are expected to rise superior to the common herd--to think for them, to toil for them, whenever there be need.
"At this very moment you would confer a great boon on the army, if you made it your business to appoint generals and officers to fill the places of those that are lost. For without leaders nothing good or noble, to put it concisely, was ever wrought anywhere; and in military matters this is absolutely true; for if discipline is held to be of saving virtue, the want of it has been the ruin of many ere now.
Well, then! when you have appointed all the commanders necessary, it would only be opportune, I take it, if you were to summon the rest of the soldiers and speak some words of encouragement. Even now, I daresay you noticed yourselves the crestfallen air with which they came into camp, the despondency with which they fell to picket duty, so that, unless there is a change for the better, I do not know for what service they will be fit; whether by night, if need were, or even by day.
The thing is to get them to turn their thoughts to what they mean to do, instead of to what they are likely to suffer. Do that, and their spirits will soon revive wonderfully. You know, I need hardly remind you, it is not numbers or strength that gives victory in war; but, heaven helping them, to one or other of two combatants it is 42 given to dash with stouter hearts to meet the foe, and such onset, in nine cases out of ten, those others refuse to meet.
This observation, also, I have laid to heart, that they, who in matters of war seek in all ways to save their lives, are just they who, as a rule, die dishonorably; whereas they who, recognizing that death is the common lot and destiny of all men, strive hard to die nobly: these more frequently, as I observe, do after all attain to old age, or, at any rate, while life lasts, they spend their days more happily.
This lesson let all lay to heart this day, for we are just at such a crisis of our fate. Now is the season to be brave ourselves, and to stimulate the rest by our example."The March of the 10,000, or if you wish - Anabasis: The March Up Country. Nothing but hardcore. If you don't know the story - buy the book
A gap has opened between the study of history and the construction of theory, both of which are needed if ends are to be aligned with means. Historians, knowing that their field rewards specialized research, tend to avoid the generalizations upon which theories depend: they thereby deny complexity the simplicities that guide us through it. Theorists, keen to be seen as social "scientists," seek "reproducibility" in results: that replaces complexity with simplicity in the pursuit of predictability. Both communities neglect relationships between the general and the particular—between universal and local knowledge—that nurture strategic thinking. And both, as if to add opacity to this insufficiency, too often write badly.As the review notes, there is a problem in academia - one we've discussed often here on on Midrats. It is a problem of narcissistic curiosity; when one is only interested in what happened in your lifetime or that of your parents.
Moreover, young people interested in geopolitics are very likely to get their first meaningful exposure to the subject not from a history department or a classics-oriented course in grand strategy like the one at Yale, but from an introductory course in international relations. A yet-unpublished study by the Alexander Hamilton Society—an organization dedicated to promoting debate on the first principles and contemporary dilemmas of American foreign policy—reviews the syllabi of such courses at the 10 universities atop the 2017 U.S. News & World Reportrankings and finds that of the most commonly assigned readings, only one author (Thucydides) was not born in the 20th century; the other nine are contemporary or near-contemporary political scientists of the likes of John Mearsheimer and Robert Jervis. Such a pedagogical approach implies that our knowledge of statecraft, like our knowledge of materials science or of how to treat cancer, is steadily accumulating. Each generation of theorists will know more, or at least will know better, than the last.I've got to pick this up.
...
On the evidence of the results of the last 25 years of American foreign policy, it seems as though the question of how to educate strategists ought to be acute for us. In particular, Gaddis's general hostility toward dogmatism of any variety deserves attention: He gets a great deal of mileage out of one of F. Scott Fitzgerald's glittering and somewhat glib aphorisms, that "the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function." For Gaddis, the strategic value of such an observation is the suggestion that one might take "the best from contradictory approaches while rejecting the worst."
Fitzgerald's remark ultimately leads Gaddis to the observation that terrible strategic dilemmas can only be resolved by "stretching them over time. We seek certain things now, put off others until later, and regard still others as unattainable." The American project of self-government began with a compromise between the high moral principle of the Declaration of Independence and the barbarity of slavery, a dilemma that took a century to resolve; we redressed the balance of power in Eurasia three times in the last century, and on two of those occasions succeeded through cooperation with an ideologically hostile power (with Stalin to defeat fascism; with Mao and his successors to defeat the Soviet Union). Each resolved dilemma, each geopolitical success, vindicated the reputation of our bold project of self-rule. Acting creatively within such tensions—between the dreams of "idealism" and the demands of "realism"—is the very stuff of the American approach to strategy. Or as Gaddis puts it, quoting Isaiah Berlin, "Perhaps there are other worlds in which all principles are harmonized, but 'it is on earth that we live, and it is here that we must believe and act.'"