OK. Let's ponder this a bit, shall we? My sources in the USNS side of the house tell me that this is the USS PORT ROYAL (CG-73) right after UNREP.
OK - aggressive driving on a bright clear day and all ... but ... really?
17 minutes ago
Monday, February 06, 2012
SWO-Daddy to the Bridge!
OK. Let's ponder this a bit, shall we? My sources in the USNS side of the house tell me that this is the USS PORT ROYAL (CG-73) right after UNREP.
OK - aggressive driving on a bright clear day and all ... but ... really?
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Well, looks like someone lost their OOD qual.
aren't you supposed to turn the other way?
GPA said turn left . . . NOW!
Recalculating!
"Hey, somebody hold my coffee and watch this!" :-D
Too close for Mo board, we'll have to eye-ball it in.
Too close for a mo-board.....
As was said about the Italian cruise ship, few things end well that begin with, "watch this." There is a similar picture with the caption "Shift your Rudder" that shows the Hewitt corssing the bow of a carrier.
Damn, I had to look real close to see that. Can someone say "all back emergency?
Women, children, and logbooks first!
looks like everyone had their heads in a display set at the 180nm mark getting ready for the next air event.
What a bad time to practice a Breckinridge.
Well they're just trying to build on their reputation as the expert ship that ran hard aground on a well-charted reef right next to an international airport. Getting T-boned by an AO would certainly top that feat!
USS Crown Royal
"When possible...Make a 'U' Turn"
A co-worker used to command Hewitt -- I'd love to give him that pic!
I'm surprised that a bent-up ship like that was able to get up enough speed to make the turn.
An XO I had, who was DFCed, and "rehabed" via influence in the OP05 shop support structure, had the DD-963 that did this and did get T-Boned by a German oiler. He lost his career (finally). Actually, he wasn't hot dogging, as much as his temperment had him storming about mindlessly. IN this case, at breakaway, something on the bitch box from CIC wasn't to his liking, so he flew down there, leaving the Bridge watch to get stupid....
It's all fun, until someone gets in a major collision at sea. I began as an ENS on MLSF. Saw my share of miscalcutions, along with some blatantly stupid stuff, and a few "hold your breath and pray!" situations, because the laws of physics had already been enlisted....in one with a CGN, the stern came within 10-15 feet of ours before her plant could power her away from her "button hook" approach (they had seen the Brits do - successfully).
Ah, the days of passing gas and explosives and swiping the best 16mm movies enroute the CV, courtesy of our valiant aircrews in the H-46 dets, enroute the to flagship.
Oh, and I forgot: After that and retirement, he was a talking head for the MSM during GW I.
Now this is just me, and I am a silly airdale blackshoe sailor, shouldn't the clearing turn go in the opposite direction of the way your wingman is steaming? I mean CV NATOPS can have a simple rule for VFR operations that says:
<span><span>
Clearing turns — Clearing turns shall be made only during day VFR launches. Clearing turns will be made
to the right off the bow and to the left off the waist catapults. Clearing turns will be governed by ship’s policy.
Clearing turns are not normally required during CARQUAL evolutions, when only one set of catapults is in
use.
Then the older half of our service, the black shoe SWOs, would have had a similar thing since ships sailing near each other has been happening longer then 101 years of Naval Aviation. 8-)
</span></span>
Guess they still haven't learned navigation and seamanship....and like ole Ron White said, "You can't fix stupid"
SAP: A specific example here is in the "How not to do it" category. Not approved at all.....
Can you share which ship? I was on a DD-963 that a few years before I got there had the bulbous bow of a German Navy oiler poke a big hole in the stbd quarter, flooding aft steering. The DD had to steer by engines to Rosyth for repairs.
Just when you thought it couldn't get any better....
But who knows...Is the skipper even aboard?
Or off at some Diversity seminar?
And is the OOD literate enough to issue proper maneuvering commands?
Its a shame those are not obviously ridiculous questions.
I'm thinking it was HAYLER. Had to have been in the mid-later 80s, as he was last seen headed to the airport from the southern end of the world during UNITAS XXIV (83). I know he had (another) tour in OP05, before getting the PCO pick in his favor, so that would have been about 4-5 years later. It was on a NATO cruise, so I'm sure we're talking the same hull.
"<span>Or off at some Diversity seminar?</span><span> "</span>
MANDATORY FUN!....You may be right!
Funny how Navig8r and I hit the same comment within seconds of each other. Must be of the same generation. Amazing how that one line from a training film and the message it conveys has stuck with me all these years. That one and synthetic line snap-back are clear as day to me. Does the Navy still do training films that are worthwhile? I particularly liked the old ones with the dramatic music like the 16 inch gunnery video that was posted a few weeks ago.
I was at the head of the Bravo pier when that line snapped on the Barry...
(and the tug master had been the BMC on my boat)
Yes. Bad Things Happen....
Being a brown show who qual'd OOD on a bird farm (and not a gentleman's qual but a bonafide ship's company tour standing bridge watch), I always thought the shoes would be served well with a NATOPs like approach to ship driving and systems knowledge.
just what we need........an aviator telling us how to be SWOs.
<span>And lets not forget the MCM skipper that admitted he could not navigate without GPS.</span>
Well the SWOs are always tell us Aviators how to be better sailors so turn about could be fair play. ;)
You could benefit by not eating your young as well. :)
True story.
During one mid-watch as JOOW working on my qual, the OOD (younger guy, two ranks junior to me, but overall great bloke) said he would sign off my mo board line if I demonstrated a CPA, in and out and some other problem which I can't remember at this time. I quickly did the problems and presented them to him for review.
He immediately responded that they were clearly wrong because I didn't use a 5:1 scale on speed and he learned in SWOS that you absolutely had to use a 5:1 scale to make it work. I pointed out that I used an appropriate scale to maximize accuracy and beside the ship was on a 1:1 scale and "it" worked. My smart ass remark was made even more painful because the BMs understood what I was saying and begain laughing.
Young SWO spent the rest of the watch trying to prove me wrong.
Those were the words of the soon to be "former" CO of TRIPPE prior to her collision with PLATTE back in '89.
Make sure and check in Wednesday ....... something you will approve of ... and there WILL be beards on watch ....
@xformed, I know the guy from my days in OP-06 and that's the way I heard the story. Smart guy in the DC arena. At sea...not so much.
OK...we've all had a good laugh and, yes, the normal procedure would be to either haul out to starboard and come around astern of the AOE if the CG's next station is in the direction that this guy is heading or to pull out a mile or so ahead and then come across the AOE's bow.
OTOH, a maneuver like this is not unheard of and, yes, I've done it on a couple of occasions when required to investigate a "radar sinker" on the other side of the RAS group from where I was refueling. The trick is to make sure the AOE's CO/Master knows what your plans are and agrees with them. The other is to get somewhat farther ahead of them than this guy has.
However, I won't argue that the "Don't worry, I'm the best shiphandler in the Pacific Fleet disease" can diminish an O-6's better judgement.
<span>Honest question.
What would be wrong with dumping power and simply cutting across the AOE's stern after she passed and was opening?</span>
Could likewise be coordinated.
Ah, those are the names I've been trying to remember all morning! Thanks!
@Stu, True except that during an UNREP you probably have at least one other ship behind the AOE in lifeguard and/or waiting station and not wanting to get tangled up with those guys is another reason why you might choose to cut across the bow rather than go around. (Back in the day I remember having a line of three or more ships back there, although that's unlikely these days).
Another reason for not cutting power is the tendancy of some ships to lose maneuverability at slow speeds (especially true for a CG). Don't forget that when pulling away from an UNREP one of your goals is to clear the AO's side as quickly as is safely possible.
Rgr. From a bird farm perspective, it was all rather easy. Punch it and watch the AOE get small.
@LT Rusty, I knew both of the COs involved. TRIPPE was in our Squadron and I'd deployed with PLATTE the previous year. If you haven't seen it, there's a great YouTube video of the collision. CDR S posted it here a couple of years ago.
Ahh...
The halcyon days of the "fuzzy navy"...
Sad thing is, them days weren't so bad after all
When I saw the pic, I couldn't imagine that there had not been some serious coordinating prior to breakaway...
But in these days and times.
The World Wonders.....
Yep. Correction, it was OP06, the interantional relations shop. I had been aboard but a month when he went, but long enough to have seen some things not worthy of what it took to be the "head safety observer." Funny side story: The LAMPS Det OIC, LCDR "Buzz" Buzzell maneuvered winged self into a short stint as XO, until they flew off from Brazil to play at Grenada, while we had to sail to West Africa.....later he went on to DC and proposed LAMPS pilots be put in line for DD/FFG command, coz they were like really little CVs...sorta, in an alternate universe...there might also be a story about a special napkin ring the HTs made for him, too...looked like a crab, complete with HSL-32 logo. Not about his atitude, either.
Well, "we" pioneered PQS, an outgrowth of the brutal days of the early days of OPPE/PEB, as fallout of the poor engineering conditions/accidents/deaths during the Vietanm years. Those procedures morphed into the PQS system, from all the history I drew on, while I worked to tame the out of control system 89-96. Then again, the SWOs had to adopt EHPQCP because of the FORRESTAL fire, and I had the distinct pleasure of standing nose to nose with a LDO Ordie on a CVN telling him he damn well better get one in place, and it wasn't Black Shoe BS paperwork, that it came from his communities "deficiencies." The context was when I had to go to every NSSMS ship after the SARATOGA accident and verify everyone knew how to safely employ the system. Somehow, his CO, after a professional explanation of the OPNAVINST requirements, sided with me. I only had to do it on on ship, as we had been hammering the Black Shoe Navy with this program for a while, with big sledge hammers after IOWA, too. I know, I was the guy doing it daily. NATOPS...same idea, different system, and trust me, lots of pride of ownership, as my last hurrah was at PQSDEVGRU with sub, air and surface program reps, trying to get them to understand naval personnel needed training, training/qualifications had different acronyms, but the process remained the same. End result: "You don't understand. CDR, we do it differently!" Translated: We're afraid of getting megred, then downsized....and then I retired a few weeks later...
All,
I just happened to be there when this all went down. I will not say which ship I was on or comfirm nor deny which ships were in fact involved. Obviously this was not a standard breakaway. We were in the middle of a 13 degree turn for traffic, you know, 2 at a time when the two ships began to edge towards each other rather quickly. I'm told this had something to do with the venturi effect but I don't know the specifics so I'm not sure. The oiler did dump power and the CG went full. However due to the fact that there was only about 10 -15 feet separating the ships the CG couldn't go to stbd or else there would have been contact. If you know anything about CG's then you know what is located on the aft port side of the fantail. Due to this and extremely close distance between and the fact that the distance was still closing, the only option was to go to port as soon as the CG cleared the bow of the oiler. CG pulled around and hooked up to port side of oiler to finish the unrep. Lost a pallet of Dr. Pepper into the sea but I'm sure Davey Jones didn't mind.
I saw the video at SWOS, and heard about it from my first skipper. He was conning one of the other FF's, had a great view of it happening.
Port Royal, let's just say your family name AIN'T the best in the Navy...
I was preparing to get underway from Earle, NJ, after offloading "some" of my ASROC when the news of this collision came across 2ND FLT Secure. My Ops Boss started keeping a watch for traffic on it (something you could do w/o being caught back then) so we knew most of the details by the time we got back to Newport. BTW, this happened the same day that Turret 2 blew up on IOWA.
@xformed, I ran into your LAMPS OinC several times during my career. The kind of DC guy who gives "opportunism" a bad name. To the best of my knowledge he never commanded an HSL squadron, although he might have commanded a recruiting district. Still made O-6.
BTW, there was some support at the top of the SWO community back then for aviators commanding some of the FFGs, but only if they changed the law mandating that only aviators could command a CV or CVN. Needless to say the aviation community, and more importantly, John Lehman didn't support it so both proposals died a quiet death.
Just curious...
Is it a case of endemic hubris?
Because they are a bad A$$ BMD boat?
I just happened to be there when this all went down.
Fair 'nuff.
But yah kbnow, with all that has transpired in the USN over this past decade, yah just never know.
Case in point:
By Michael Fabey <span>mike_fabey@aviationweek.com</span>
WASHINGTON
The U.S. Navy has already altered its Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship, LCS-1, to address problems uncovered in testing, but the ship still needs to be fundamentally redesigned, say leading defense analysts.
They base their conclusions on briefings from the Aviation Week Intelligence Network (AWIN) on the findings of Navy and industry reports detailing the vessel’s hull and deckhouse cracking and engine problems. AWIN was given exclusive access to the documents. The analysts also call for an investigation into how the ship was accepted in such — in their view — questionable shape. LCS-1 was built by a Lockheed Martin-led team.
AWIN subscribers can click here to read the complete story on the reports’ findings and the rebuttal from the LCS team.
“What the documents show is grounds for questioning this LCS variant’s viability,” says Ben Freeman, national security investigator for the Project On Government Oversight, who also was briefed on the reports.
“If the reports outlined are as serious as indicated, then there may be some significant redesign work required — even beyond the modifications to LCS-1 that have been made based on initial lessons learned with the first hull,” says Bob Nugent, vice president of advisory services for consultancy AMI International’s Washington operations.
As a result of hull cracking issues on LCS-1, the ship designed to be the Navy’s cheetah of the seas and envisioned as comprising about half of the service’s future surface combatant fleet was limited to a “safe operating envelope” in which it could travel no faster than a laden cargo freighter in sea-state 5 conditions, the reports show.
Analysts were equally dismayed about the reports’ findings on the engine failure reported earlier with the ship. The Rolls-Royce Trent MT30001 gas turbine engine shut down when components failed because of corrosion and oxidation following a number of significant and unexpected ingestions of seawater over an 18-month period.
Lockheed Martin and the Navy say the Freedom has since been repaired and upgraded to address the issues identified during that time and is scheduled to be redelivered to Naval Sea Systems Command (Navsea) soon with an eye toward re-evaluating its operational limitations.
“Navsea isn’t familiar with any new official ‘reports,’ either from Navy or industry sources, indicating the issues ... either new or as alarming [as indicated],” said Navsea spokesman Christopher Johnson when asked about the report’s findings and analysts’ conclusions.
“If it were my boat, I would tie the ship up and have a commercial tug take it back to the builder and demand he fix her,” defense analyst and Navy-issues author Norman Polmar says. “I’d stop production until that first ship is fixed and guarantee that similar problems don’t occur on the follow-ons.”
Analysts were equally dismayed about the reports’ findings on the engine failure reported earlier with the ship. The Rolls-Royce Trent MT30001 gas turbine engine shut down when components failed because of corrosion and oxidation following a number of significant and unexpected ingestions of seawater over an 18-month period.
this was a major problem with the spruances. they managed to fix it. after demonstrating the quick engine change features of the uptakes on several ships.
there seems to be a "house problem" in the marine architect world. they don't seem to have a section in their text book about lessons learned.
ex:
we took almost all of the WWII warships in hand and cut a groove around the top of the taper in the rudder post for a seal to keep water out of the taper. (seawater would get in there and corrode and the fin would get loose.....) then when the new construction period in the 50's started they forgot that little detail and we did it all over again on the new ships.
then there was the lignum vitae thing. that was a wood from the phillipines that was slipperyer than sn&* when wet with seawater. but it had an expansion factor that you had to account for when installing it..... so we changed to brass strips with rubber wear surfaces. problem was that the rubber would come off of the strips that supply gave us (cheapest that will do the job you know), supply types can't seem to learn the difference between $100 more per strip for a couple of hundred strips and $25,000 per day drydock costs. so we would dog fight over that (in the 70's we had on one day 9 ships in dock waiting for a resolution of that fight, which recycled about every 20 years from 1947 to 1997 and maybe more)
there were spruances that had a cracking problem forward attributed to pushing the ship in hurricanes and gales. and then ticonderogas that had the same problem.
there was the quality assurance program that was trying to force bath iron works to build way below their established standard.
aaaaahhhhhhhh....................
C
Backed out of station once, I did...from starboard side of the MINEAS GERIAS, having gone there on a quickdraw. It was also my check the block for going alongside for Command Quals. CO whispered in my ears as to the directions. Easy when you have ITC control on the bridge...and no one else was in waiting station....and our screen assignment was on the port bow after we completed....
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