Tactical objectivity and CO's .....

There have been more than a few cringe inducing quotes out there about the false-economy of speed in a warship as a trade-off WRT survivability.

Nothing sinister here - but people should be very careful in taking a Commanding Officer's feeling as objective fact when it comes to the platform they put their heart and soul into. Objectivity isn't their strong point.

Battle Cruiser CO's would always praise their speed, as the LCS CO's do.

Well, up in the sky there was also another speedy character - the RA-5 Vigilante.

Speaking of CO's - on the JUL70 Naval Aviation News edition, look at the bottom of page 11 where the CO of RVAH-3 says this to say about the Vig ... "

"...I have to rate it high in combat survivability. "

I invite you to read last week's, "A Chat Between Admirals."

A Very LPO Christmas

Long time reader, emailer, and Fleet Spy you see Hat Tip'd now and then, AT1, has a Christmas list for you procrastinators. Never, ever, underestimate a good First Class Petty Officer. Never.

AT1; over to you!

---

1. Queen of the Flat-Tops by Stanley Johnson.

Out of print for a few years (it was originally published in 1950), but if you want to read about the opening days of the SW Pacific Campaign from the carrier raids against Lae and Tulagi in February, this is your book. VADM Brown's attempt to bomb Rabual that lead to Edward O'Hare's engagement against five G4M Betty Bombers is in this book. This book also gives insight into what the Navy was like in the early days of the war; snap shots talking about crossing the line and some of the fun from that; dealing with his stateroom roommate. All of this from what would now be termed an embedded reporter from a newspaper in Chicago. Of course, this information is dated because it was basically filed as a series of news reports that were then gathered up and edited into a book. I think the best scenes in it was describing what the actual battle of Coral sea was like, then what the fuel line explosions felt like to him.

2. The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet by James Stevenson.

An in-depth discussion about the development of the F-18 from what it was originally viewed as, a light-weight tactical fighter to supplement the F-14 that would be cheap to purchase and maintain, over to becoming what it is today. Understand as you read this book that the author has an axe to grind since he fought against the USAF Fighter Mafia in the late-70's over the F-15 and F-16s. However, if you get past his axes you find an in-depth scathing attack on how military weapon systems are purchased by the US Department of Defense. How and original idea from the fleet gets added to, modified, and changed in is gestational period, when it hits prototype some of the plans get changed either because the technology isn't there or doesn't work to promised specs. Then when the system finally hits the fleet for operational use it isn't at all what was promised at the start. The biggest takeaway from this book for me was not so much how messed up the system is, but rather how an simple acquisition gets messed up as more people put their fingers (and careers) on the line to make it work. It isn't so much the process needs to be improved on, but rather you need fewer people involved. It seems the more people get involved the more the platform will be required to do.

3. Launch the Intruders: A Naval Attack Squadron in the Vietnam War, 1972 by Carol Reardon.

The author interviewed surviving members of the 1972 to 1973 surge deployment of VA-75 when they were attached to CVW-3 onboard the USS Saratoga. You want to read about how a surge back to an active combat zone did to the military unit? This book might be able to give you insight until the first series of OIF/OEF books start to come out. It is all here; a unit that is in a stand down process and slowly getting prepped for a deployment to cover our NATO requirements in the North Atlantic and Med, that is until the Easter Offensive starts and National Command Authority surges carrier air power to try and bring the North Vietnamese back to the peace tables. You read about having to try and get fifteen aircraft that are in various states of overhaul back together and ready to be deployed in 96 hours after receiving the deployment order. Having to send Sheriff's, Police, and even US National Park Rangers go hunting for folks who are on leave. Read about wives now worrying about their husbands because they are going back to that combat zone, compared to when they were just going on a standard six month to the Med. Read about On the Job training with certain missions and systems because not every one had a chance to get to the school or even do the live warshot until they hit the combat zone. Then when they arrive on station the loss of friends and senior leadership. Also most interesting is a minor debate that still seems to ripple amongst the veterans to this day, is how the junior guys didn’t get a chance to do some of the more dangerous missions. However the senior guys did and in turn get the awards for those more dangerous mission as well. You also see a cruise that was six, becomes seven, and then becomes just shy of twelve months long as the USS Saratoga is left out for the Easter Offensive, then Linebacker I and Linebacker II. A fine study from a civilian on a personal military history that was able to intermix the official war diary in with the memories of the veterans that were there.

4. War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 by Edward S. Miller.

A very dry but interesting history of how the war plans were developed between the end of the Spanish American War and the start of the Pacific Campaign of World War 2. As you read this, you will see the realization of the fights about the introduction of new forms of warfare from submarines to long range bombers into the war plans. Reading how the joint war planning board were fighting with each other over who would be responsible for what bases that were to be taken and how. You will also sense some of the frustration on the joint board as their hands were tied up due to various peace treaties during the interwar period. This book can really help you understand more of why Macarthur reacted the way he did during the opening months of the invasion of the Philippines and then why he chose to advance back to the Philippines. Also you can see the way that Nimitz and his staff's island invasion choices were made during the Central Pacific portion. All of it goes back to some basic choices made at the turn of the century to support the new global Navy that was being built. Also a very interesting thing about this book is how they started to influence the decision to have portable dry docks and other service craft built to keep the fleet in combat longer and closer to the fight. These would pay dividends during the Philippines operations and during the Okinawa Campaign. This should be on the book shelf of any Pacific War historians library.

5. The Son Tay Raid: American POWs in Vietnam Were Not Forgotten (Williams-Ford Texas A&M University Military History Series) by John Gargus.

Written by one of the helicopter pilots in the raid into North Vietnam by the USAF and US Army Rangers to try and free some of the POW's. The big take away from this book is that the POW's were not forgotten, and MAC-V and the National Command Authority were actively looking at ways to find them and get them. Only by dumb luck, a Recon Drone under a program titled Buffalo Hunter found the Son Tay compound with POW's in it. Then the DIA and various other service intelligence agencies were looking at ways to get them out. It was finally decided to crash land a HH-3 into the center of the compound and have US Army Rangers sweep the compound to get the prisoners out to another helicopter just outside where a stronger force was holding the only road in and out of the compound. Then near the end of the rescue USAF A-1's would come in and bomb the compound back destroying everything left behind. Read this mission and then look at one of the missions they were talking about for the Iranian Hostage Crisis in 1979, it is the same thing. In the end the mission succeed in proving two things. First that the North Vietnamese country side could be invaded and that we could get our prisoners out if we wanted to, second of all it showed the North Vietnamese that we cared about our people and willing to do what was required to try and get them back. The North Vietnamese response to this was consolidate all the POW's to the infamous Hanoi prison in downtown Hanoi for the rest of the war. The only downside was that the POW's were moved just hours before the mission took off, so the team missed out on the rescue, but the proved the concept. These teams were also the genesis of the Delta Force and 160th Special Operation Air Regiment. Using the lessons learned from this raid would lead to better training, better equipment (even if it was Commercial off the shelf), and better intelligence. The other thing you see is that the over compartmentlization of the intelligence agencies lead to one side knowing about one of their secret projects affecting the area around the camp and choosing not to tell anyone else for fear of leaks. So for me I could start to see the roads for other major intelligence failures being laid due to people wanting to protect their jobs or work environment

6. Away All Boats by Kenneth M. Dodson.

One of a series written just after World War 2 by folks who were there and novelized their own experiences. Originally published in 1953, this book is what I would consider a fine study on leadership and how to influence men into proper leadership positions. Forget the great movie with Jeff Chandler and George Nader, as nearly always the book is better. This is the story of a former Merchant Mariner Captain named McDougal, who joins the Navy after Pearl Harbor and is assigned to a newly built attack transport ship named the Belinda. However, he isn't the captain of this ship, rather he is replaced a man named Hawks who was expecting to take command of a cruiser and instead is assigned to this APA. Starting with the landings at Makin and finally ending at Okinawa you see Captain Hawks who hated being on this ship change to understand that no one doesn't have a part in this war, but you also see 90 wonders from OCS and the V officer programs understand there is more to leadership then just what is granted to them by Navy Regulations. The ending is what makes the leadership lesson come together. I won't spoil it completely, but it is a little different then what the movie plays out with regards to the details.

7. Inferno: The Epic Life and Death Struggle of the USS Franklin in World War II by Joseph A Springer.

A intermix of both the official story and the stories from a number of different enlisted sailors and officers onboard the ship from the time she was commissioned in 31Jan44 till she was almost destroyed in March of 1944. The true meat of the story is during raids off the Japanese Homeland in preparation to the Okinawa campaign. She is loaded down with an deck load of planes fully armed and prepared to attack Japanese air fields. All of the sudden out of some cloud cover a Japanese plane comes in and plants a bomb or pair of bombs (even today it is unknown) and they detonate amongst the strike planes. The ensuing destruction lasted about ten hours and there was a strong belief in 3rd Fleet that she was going to be the first fleet attack carrier lost to combat since the battle of Midway only two years before. In the detonation of F6F's, F4U's, SB2C's and TBM's some of the F4U's were loaded down with the 11.27in Tiny Tim rockets, the damage caused destruction of communications in and off the ship and she even started to take on a 13 degree list due to water being used to put the fire out. Over half her crew were killed in the initial series of plane and bomb blasts. At the end of the day the crew of less then 150 men were able to save the ship, get her power back online and actually steam back under her own power all the way to Ulithi fleet atoll for initial sea worthiness repairs and then all the way home to Brooklyn Naval Yard. Where the war was over as she passed by the Statue of Liberty, she was decommissioned. Her Catholic Chaplin was awarded the Medal of Honor for knowingly putting himself in danger to give last rites to men all over the flight deck. If you pick this book up for the modern sailor you will read about why certain damage control decisions were made in the production of ships, such as scuppers around hatches; because there were situations during this ship's fight against the fire where gasoline and fire waterfalls were pouring through open or warped hatches to lower decks and spreading the fire. Think about this as well, the USS Franklin would be the last heavily damage carrier until twenty three later when the USS Forrestal would suffer in 1967. There are some errors in this for purists, but push those out of your mind as you read this exciting story. This is a book should be on the Navy Reading List.

An economist looks at POTUS passion polls

After all things Navy - most of you know my passion and training is in economics .... so here we go again as I play with charts from a political POV.

First of all, I want you to look at the latest Rasmussen. Just soak in it a bit - and I will give you the "Chartist 101" overview of what it is telling you.

There is a simple concept that is essential to understanding trends in charts; "Higher-Highs and Higher-Lows." Equally important, is the ability to understand "Lower-Highs and Lower-Lows."

Nothing runs in a straight line, and moving averages are usually late in showing you where the direction is going - this is especially true in emotion based polls. It can be "fear and greed" as in stocks, or "love and hate" in politics.

This is what this chart is trying to tell you where we are at the end of 2009 when it comes to those who are very passionate "Pro" or "Anti" Obama.

There are about 50% more people who are passionately "Anti-Obama" than passionately "Pro-Obama." The Anti group is still making slightly Higher-Highs and Higher-Lows - but it seems ready to level out as the swing narrows. Unless there is a bolt from the blue one way or the other - you should expect the Anti level to settle out at 38-42 for the beginning of CY10.

The passionately Pro crowd is having remarkably rougher sledding right now. The only good news for them is that the Lower-Highs have settled. Not going lower, but not trending up either. It is the continued Lower-Lows that is troublesome, especially the latest spike down. That is a sign of growing frustration and disillusionment - my guess would be with the right-end and left-end of his base. The ongoing Lower-Lows tells us there is more to go on the downside - but perhaps settling soon - the steady Highs signal that. Given the same bolt out of the blue - you should expect a settling in the neighborhood of 24-28%; 60% less than the Anti.

So, above is the "What," here is the "So What."

In a 50-50 electorate, especially in mid-terms, it is all about passion. Passion gets you turnout. I don't know if the Republican Party deserves it - but they are set up well for 2010 looking 11 months out - which is close to infinity in politics. However - it is better to fight from this position than the other. This is critically true in the Senate, where the bad-luck of the calendar has them fighting for many more seats than the Democrats.

If anyone wants to know about 2012, you will have to go to someone else. This is so far out, things could be a repeat of Reagan-Mondale in '84, or Carter-Reagan in '80. Do not underestimate POTUS or his Party when it comes to power.

Focus on 2010. The Hope-Change Army is demoralized and doesn't look like they want to come out of their cantonment. The Republicans have a chance. Are they smart enough to win? Harumph - hope ain't a plan.

Beers with Don

The immediate past CO of LCS-1, CDR Don Gabrielson, has put up a defense of LCS over at Phil Ewing's blog. Let's chew on what he has to say for a bit.

Now, I think it is fair to say that Don is a friend of the blog - or at least a professional acquaintance. He has commented here before, and I have had the opportunity to exchange a few emails with him as well; solid folk. He gives as well as he takes - and that is good enough for me.

I just wanted to say that for the same reason I titled this post the way I did - this is a friendly, "Having a beer on Phib's front porch" post - an atmosphere that the blogosphere has trouble recreating unless you specifically point it out - so no taking this post as any more that that.

Give Phil's post a read, but there are a few things Don said that I want to cover here.

We have been pinging on LCS pretty much since I started this blog. We have come at it from a few angles (there are so many to choose from), and I would expect a spirited defense of LCS to address the thorny parts of it.

Well, Don didn't do that really - and that is OK, we all have our favorites - here were his observations aimed at some LCS critics.

Size. People talk about LCS as a ‘small ship.’ Last December, we tied up in Norfolk across the pier from an FFG. My first reaction was, “Who shrank the frigates?” From our bridge wing, we looked across the top of the superstructure of the FFG — and we had two more decks above our heads. Small is a relative term — LCS isn’t small to anyone but us.

Modularity. This means we’re never stuck with an outdated capability longer than it takes to develop a new one — as soon as it’s ready, we can bring systems to the ships, wherever they are, and install them overnight. No other ship can do this. Period. We are barely coming to grips with what this will do for us.
Warfighting capability. When you compare what LCS brings with its mission packages along with core systems that are always onboard, it’s hard to see these ships as anything but incredible war machines. These are three thousand ton ships that are packed with warfighting teeth. They aren’t DDGs because they don’t need to be DDGs.

Maneuverability and access. Shallow draft opens more than five thousand ports to LCS that other US Navy ships can’t enter. We commissioned FREEDOM in Milwaukee — in 17 feet of water. We tied up in a river that was 150 feet wide in Buffalo. We backed into a 75-foot wide dock in a river in Norfolk — without help. The hullforms allow maximum speed in shallow water — FREEDOM exceeded 45 knots in 26 feet of water; waterjet propulsion brings incredible maneuverability — FREEDOM can do a zero-radius turn and reverse course from 15 knots in about 90 seconds, and is incredibly smooth riding at full speed. This will bring huge advantages in warfighting and humanitarian missions, as many small ports lack tugs and other infrastructure associated with larger ports, which means that LCS’ inherent maneuverability will be a distinct advantage. We were able to undock in a river, in 7 knots of current, at night, rather than waiting 24 hours for a tug. In forty sea details, we used tugs far less than half the time, and mostly because they were there. That is unique in my experience on five ships.

Speed. When was the last time you saw a football field go 60 miles per hour and turn on a dime? Every single time we demonstrated what speed combined with phenomenal agility bring, the conversation changed. Skeptics became believers. No other vessel on the water can overtake or outrun LCS in waves above 5 feet. There is no equation that says how much speed is enough – that’s like asking a fighter pilot how fast is too fast, or an army tanker, or an amphibious ops boat driver. If speed didn’t matter, we’d still be flying biplanes and driving tractors with guns, bringing Marines ashore in landing craft instead of LCACs and V-22s. Speed alters the tactical situation and the strategic impact is huge. No one can outrun a bullet. But speed, with agility, can surprise and outrun its aim. Speed will save lives and improve our ability to outmaneuver adversaries.

Crew Size. We could have cut a few bodies here and there from a legacy manning model, or we could force ourselves to rethink how we operate by manning the ship around new technological capabilities. Crew size, more than any physical feature, is a capability driver. I’ve taken to describing the crew size as 40+35, the core crew plus mission package, plus the shore support. It will work, because everyone has the freedom (pardon the pun) to approach their work from an entirely new perspective, and the ship was designed to be operated by a small crew – an important point. We will continue to learn how to do this better – nothing we could conceive of will teach more than the upcoming deployment. But it is working very well. And the crews love it.

Comments:

Size: I wouldn't call that a good thing. That actually reinforces part of the critique of conceptual concept vs. reality of LCS. It is a big Corvette. It is a big target. I don't care how fast you go - if you go zooming close to a place like Kismaayo with that thing, a gaggle of goobers with RPG's or twin-23mm on the back of a Honda will eat your lunch. Heck - just remember the INS Hanit - and she has less than half the displacement of LCS. If you are going to get close - and the "L" stands for "Littoral" then big is bad. MK1 MOD 0 eyeball works great up close and personal. Sure, we call her "Little Crappy Ship" - but that is just a pet name.

Modularity: What you started discussing is open architecture. Of course it has open architecture. Standard industry practice going on two decades - I hope so. My wife's new Volvo has a two to three little computers in it making it run - that does not make it transformational.

The rest of the quote is all PPT. We do not have that capability. We do not even have the mission modules developed and validated in an operational environment. We would like to - but we are not there yet. You may call her what you want - but even if the modules come online in enough numbers to allow quick swap out of modules and crew when you find that in C5F AOR you need MIW vice ASUW - you still have a uni-mission ship. The LCS version we are building is not a multi-mission platform.

Maneuverability and access: About those 5,000 ports - I think most are concerned about the liberty policy at those 5,000 .... But, to be serious; it is a nice speed boat that can do cool turns - but in a large Corvette sized ship - that is all just sexy fun stuff. Most of its work will be done from steerage way to 20 kts. The Navy needs warships, not Willy's Water Circus stunt boats. Speed did not make the Battle Cruiser a superior warship in WWI. Speed did not make the RA-5C a superior reconnaissance aircraft in Vietnam. Which brings us to ...

Speed: Actually, a football field going 60 MPH looks rather slow - you know, like one of those AN-225s we hire out to supply our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan taking off and landing. High speeds eats up fuel. High speed has tradeoffs. To an aircraft with a bone in his teeth - just like to the guys with the twin 23mm behind the beach condo - you are just another target that you lead just a little more.

Crew Size: The realization in official circles has already set in that LCS is undermanned - and changes are being made to increase manning capacity. The original concept for crew size barely outlasted the PPT slide - and in reality didn't even survive the first deployment. The studies are being made - and the extra bunks are being readied for the first deployment. The real issue with crew size has to do with the more important issues with LCS. Let's do a quick review.

The real problem with LCS started with the crew size. With the primary driver being saving manpower costs, we have given up the ability for sustained and effective watch keeping in a combat environment - not to mention habitability.

That leads to another huge issue with LCS - cost per hull and its mission modules. We have decided that a $700 million to $1 billion ship does not need an effective combat damage control capability by design or manning.

Despite all experience - and what we know about the benefits of full ownership - we have outsourced much of what used to be done from ship's company. That is going to be ugly down the road - and will make the material conditions of the SPRUANCE class at 20 look like Japanese ships.

From the penny wise and pound foolish school, we have also managed to design and entire class of ships who per-hull cost is such that we cannot build a Fleet of adequate size. Those ships, to make matters worse, are not multi-mission units - but will be asked to perform missions that would usually go to multi-mission ships such as Frigates - because we won't have any.

As LCS are not multi-mission (swapping out Mission Modules does not make you multi-mission), the enemy will not wait for your ASUW suite to show up when it goes after you while in ASW mode. As a result, much of our fleet will suffer from tactical rigidity. Budgets as they are, the likely inadequate number of Mission Modules and extensive support infrastructure LCS will require, will result in many LCS having one, or no, mission modules in place for the majority of a crew member's PCS cycle.

Excusing program duplicity. Many like to point fingers at GD or LMT for LCS's problems. Me? Notsomuch. This is an all Navy problem. We pushed a program based on bad theory on companies, and then kept changing requirements etc to the point it became what it is; a very expensive large Corvette of limited tactical utility. Never before has so much money bought so little capability from so few ships. Speed does not make up for it.

We are getting the LCS - so we will just have to accept the foolish sunk-cost and lost opportunity costs from what could have been. We decided on certain tradeoffs - it is what it is.

What can we learn from this whole episode? Well - click the LCS tab below for some of the ideas - but let's look at what intellectual school is largely responsible for this debacle of a program - and why LCS is the ship that keeps throwing off sparks between those who think it is the bees knees, and those who think it is a naval Shakespearian tragedy.

Part of it comes to how Phib and Don think about LCS. I like Don - and from the communications I have had with him - I don't think he spits on the ground at the mention of 'ole Phib either.

In the best spirit of the blogosphere, let's have a little creative friction without conflict.

Again, this is the blogosphere and CDRSalamander - so this is a sharp-elbowed conversation on the front porch, but a friendly one.

So off we go.

I think part of the problem between these two well meaning people known as Phib and Don is their very different "world views." The main fault line comes down between two intellectual filters; the futurist vs. the historian. Now and then I have a little fun and call it transformatinalists vs. antitransformationalists - same thing really.

You can get a little better understanding of Don's view of things here,

A noted MIT futurist named Ray Kurzweil wrote a book called “The Singularity Is Near” that discusses the rate of change of knowledge over time. He theorizes that the sum total of knowledge created in the last hundred years exceeded the thousand years before it — which means that in order to stay ahead, you have to work faster.

That is when I giggle a bit and Don looks at me with squinted brow.

Futurists are fun and all, but they do not have perfect vision, and have a very sketchy track record.

When they pontificate, they are a squirmy group to pin down. Usually, futurists will give you an upturned-chin, whaff of the hand dismissal of your concerns with a, "You must be forward looking, not backward looking" comment. Then they try to impart the importance of their new found philosophy by making exaggerated statements like, "...the last hundred years exceeded the thousand years before it ..." or "War is new!" or other such silly phrases.

Intentionally or not, such comments are based on an assumption of ignorance on the part of the vast majority of those who the comments are directed at. Anyone with a wide reading of history will understand that it is intellectual malpractice to state that - let's take an actual city that saw it - living, working and conducting business in Köln/Cologne, Germany from 1909 to 2009 is more radically different than living, working, and conducting business from 909-1909. That is just insulting. Do I even need to explain why?

Akin to teen-agers thinking they have discovered sex, they will then throw Captain Obvious phrases like, "..in order to stay ahead, you have to work faster." Harumph. That has been in effects since Homo Erectus first tried to keep his antelope away from Panthera Pardus. Silly phrase, Don - though I know what you mean.

Let's get back to the futurists track record a bit though. It would be easy to just point to Tomorrowland and the 1939 World's Fair to get a giggle at the Futurists track record of getting some things right (usually the evolutionary estimates) - but critically missing or mitigating the second and third order effects - and totally missing the obvious shortcomings of their "transformational" or "revolutionary" projections.

On the military side of the equation we can even giggle at the NB-36H and other nuclear powered bombers - just to start.

Closer to the nerve, we could also talk about the futurists in the Canadian Defense Forces who were within a FY or two of getting rid of all their tracked armor - including all tanks - as they saw "a future of an all wheeled force" and poo-poo'd the tracked tank as an anachronism. Well - the kick in the teeth of actual conflict in AFG showed them that they not only needed their Leopard I's in theater - but that the needed to upgrade to Leopard II's. Another cautionary tale of many for those who ignore the lessons of combat.

No, let's look at the very cautionary lessons of an uncritical embrace of futurism on the civilian side of the house; just a couple.

The Bauhaus influenced post-WWII urban renewal programs that gutted and destroyed so much of once was functional multi-use urban communities. Something to this day we are expending billions to repair. As we see around us - the best icons of "modernist" architecture are morphing into monuments of their myopia - as was warned about.

To boldly adopt the transformational wheeled bus; the destruction of once fully mature, efficient, clean, and popular urban mass transit trolly/light rail systems from DC to LA - again mistakes needing correction today at the cost of billions. Cities like Amsterdam never destroyed their systems, and are better cities because of it.

Futurism is a fine thought project and is helpful if fleshing out ideas, but is not a sound foundation for building a Fleet or designing a strategy.

Back to the present; finally, there is this note from Battine Chavanne in AviationLeak:

The Navy’s bid to right the LCS program is evident in efforts being undertaken at PEO-Ships, which is attempting to formalize the procurement, acquisition and program management process. PEO-Ships manages 20 major surface ships in seven yards, and projects 25-30 ships by the end of the 2009 Future Years Defense Plan (not to mention hundreds of smaller boats and yards).

Landay’s (read: the Navy’s) focus is, “Can you deliver an affordable ship on time and . . . of sufficient quality?” Sometimes the answer is ‘yes,’ “sometimes ‘no.’ So we’re identifying where we can do better.”

The list of potential improvements reads more like lessons learned from LCS: get the program right up front, understand risk and lock in cost estimates, focus beyond the next budget to account for growth and make sure “we’re not starting construction until we have mature designs,” Landay says.

That sums up nicely what 'ole Phib, Sid, Byron, and the rest of the crew have been pounding about on the program side for years. Glad to know Big Navy is coming around.

As for the warfighting limitations - we will just have to play to her strengths and try to mitigate her larger weaknesses.

We all know we will have LCS in the Fleet - but we should not sell her for something she is not. She will have a use and a place. You go to sea with the ship you have .....

For now though, we need to be looking for a better frigate sized ship, now - something we have also posted a lot on.

Don; I'm shifting from beer to scotch - you game? I'm going to have an glass of Tobermory - let me guess, you are more of a Dalwhinnie type?

Another Salamander Rule validated

Again; once the shooting starts - you realize that your design does not have enough general purpose guns. From WWII to Vietnam to The Falkland Islands War - it has always been true.

On the ground, in the sea and in the air.

(For the MV-22 in AFG)...the Remote Guardian gun system .... is being retrofitted at Leatherneck as we write. And the Corps has changed the rear-​​mounted M240 7.62 machine gun to a .50cal.

The penny pinching half-truth loving people always ignore sound military practice so that better men will fix the problem - at higher cost - later.

They never fail to fail.

Hat tip Lee.

Sunday Funnies

They had to have been OS's at some point.

I want my $2!

Oh my. Kristin - plug your sweet 'lil ears.



Cusack - back in the right decade.