My default position when looking at the tactical is that one needs to be careful when you do after-action forensics. You need a detailed and exact timeline and must do your best not to use 20/20 hindsight to pound leaders on the ground who made decision based on adequate training (the best training in only adequate at best), marginal supplies (you never have all or enough supplies at the pointy end), and incomplete information (one never has perfect information) - and most of all - the leader on the ground only has a 24 hour day.
I pound Beltway types without mercy, but that is because they are not engaged in combat - they are just administrators. The combat leader though - you need to give him a wide lane to run in. To make "mistakes." To make the imperfect choice when all others are equally imperfect. Non-optimal decisions can be made, but only those of gross incompetence made with intent, malice or laziness should be used subject to punishment. Only having 3 of X instead of 4 of X is fine - not having X because you decided to go home early - that is different.
There is a lot of gnashing of teeth over the report by Wanat. There are family members of those killed, so you need to be conscious of that. The Army also has a recent history of fudging the truth and, unlike the Navy, has some trouble firing unit level commanders for poor performance.
In that environment - give this a read at WaPo and then come back.
If you have time, read the Army Combat Studies Institute report here or download the PDF.
In this case - I would give the Army the benefit of the doubt. War is messy. War in AFG exceptionally so, especially in 2008 where we had just started to understand that having NATO run the show was a mistake, war was not new, allies were not USA quality outside just a few nations, would never be there in quantity, and that we needed to change course in AFG if we wanted to create the right effects.
The battle took place in Regional Command East - the only place run by the USA at that time - though still under NATO and still in the under-resourced environment we were at that time, in the middle of a pivot taking the keys back from NATO and the theories that didn't play out.
We are still trying to get things right. On that note, I think the Army got this right - as right as a human institution can. The leaders on the ground did the right thing defending their name as well. After all - they were there.
This is war, not football. Lex and Jimbo have some good thoughts as well.
Hat tip LT B.
1 hour ago
