Proactively “From the Sea”; an agent of change leveraging the littoral best practices for a paradigm breaking six-sigma best business case to synergize a consistent design in the global commons, rightsizing the core values supporting our mission statement via the 5-vector model through cultural diversity.
That is a phrase that no one wants associated with our Sailors .... but if you are wearing NWU's and think that it is in a different world than the old CNTs ... well ... you need to read the following P4.
R 120737Z DEC 12 FM COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA TO COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI ALFLTFORCOM ALPACFLT INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA CHINFO WASHINGTON DC BT UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR COMMANDERS, COMMANDING OFFICERS, OFFICERS IN CHARGE AND COMMAND MASTER CHIEFS SECINFO/-/-// MSGID/GENADMIN,USMTF,2012/COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA// SUBJ/NAVY WORKING UNIFORM// REF/A/MSGID:MEMO/VCNO/10MAY1996// GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. IN 1996, NAVY LEADERSHIP REMOVED FLAME RESISTANT REQUIREMENTS FROM NAVY WORKING UNIFORMS (NWU).
CONSISTENT WITH THIS DECISION, COMMANDS HAVE SINCE THAT TIME BEEN REQUIRED TO PURCHASE FLAME RESISTANT ORGANIZATIONAL CLOTHING FOR SAILOR USE. THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THIS REQUIREMENT. THEREFORE, THE NWU TYPE I WAS APPROPRIATELY DESIGNED WITHOUT FLAME RESISTANT QUALITIES. 2. ON 15 OCTOBER 2012, AN IMPROMPTU TEST CONDUCTED BY THE NAVY CLOTHING TEXTILE RESEARCH FACILITY IN NATICK, MA REINFORCED THE FACT THAT THE NWU TYPE I IS NOT FLAME RESISTANT AND FURTHER FOUND THAT WHEN SUBJECTED TO FLAME IT WILL BURN ROBUSTLY UNTIL COMPLETELY CONSUMED. 3. AS THE CNO'S EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR DAMAGE CONTROL MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT, I NEED YOU TO ENSURE THE FOLLOWING: A. SAILORS ARE AWARE THAT TYPE I NWU'S LACK THIS FLAME RESISTANT QUALITY. B. SAILORS HAVE BEEN PROPERLY ISSUED FLAME RESISTANT ORGANIZATIONAL CLOTHING IN KEEPING WITH DUTIES ASSIGNED: E.G., ENGINE ROOM PERSONNEL, PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN FLIGHT RELATED DUTIES, DAMAGE CONTROL PERSONNEL, FIRE FIGHTERS, WELDING, COMBAT MISSIONS SUBJECT TO IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVISES (IED) ATTACKS, ETC.). 4. INFORMED BY THIS IMPROMPTU TEST AND IN COORDINATION WITH THE UNIFORM BOARD, ADM HANEY AND I WILL CONTINUE TO REVIEW THE REQUIREMENTS FOR -- AND FLAME RESISTANT QUALITIES OF -- WORKING UNIFORMS, INCLUDING THE TYPE I NWUS. WE WILL EXPLORE LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS THAT AFFORD OUR SAILORS THE RIGHT PROTECTIVE CLOTHING, ALIGNED WITH THE TASKS THEY ARE REQUIRED TO PERFORM IN VARIOUS OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS. 5. ADM BILL GORTNEY SENDS.// BT #0008 NNNN
This is a good and responsible message, but I do not think this goes far enough.
A warship can, at any time, become a place of explosions, flame, steam, and heat. Just ask the crew of the USS COLE - Sailors don't have time to say, "one second, let me change uniforms" when by either mechanical error, human error, or enemy attack they find themselves in a position where they are covered head to foot with something that, ahem,
... WHEN SUBJECTED TO FLAME IT WILL BURN ROBUSTLY UNTIL COMPLETELY CONSUMED.
Make sure that everyone gets this message, and incorporates good follow-on questions up their Chain of Command.
IMAO this is just another reason NWU needs to go on the ash heap of uniform history.
Hat tip oneofthegoodones. UPDATE: OK, here is the video.
I'm sorry, I really appreciate the effort - but maybe I'm missing something. It took us 16 years to realize that something we are ordering our Sailors to wear on warships burns and melts in to flesh, which is unacceptable .... yet we are telling everyone to carry-on and wear it anyway when there are much better options available right now? Does anyone appreciate DC101 WRT flash and fire? This can only be an answer that makes sense if you are not battleminded and trying hard not so say, "We made a mistake that is deadly. We were wrong." OK, I guess if the Flag Officers will not make the right call, then it is up to the Commanding Officers to make the call - and if they don't, the CMDCM's to ask the hard questions. If I may be so bold as to suggest an opener from behind the closed door;
"Sir, the Navy discovered a month ago that this uniform burns on its own and will melt in to our flesh. Why are your Sailors beign ordered to wear this fire hazard on your ship while underway?"
If you worry what kind of impact the money trouble in DC may have on the condition of the ships we are riding hard and leaving up wet, I invite you to spend some time with RDML Joe Carnevale, USN (Ret), Senior Defense Advisor for the Shipbuilders Council of America, presentation from 5 December 2012. I recommend slide 31 if you are in a hurry.
First of all, LCDR Armstrong, pay attention - I found you another drinking partner.
The idea that it is possible to study warfare systematically, from a historical perspective, has already appeared in ancient times, but it received pronounced theoretical and practical endorsement at the beginning of the modern era. The aim of military theories, which had begun to develop since the Renaissance period, was to examine what the most efficient form of organization would be to build up, train and deploy an army in order to achieve the ultimate goal of operating a military force – victory. Many military thinkers have claimed that military theory should be created through a study of military history. The argument between the various schools of thought was (and still is) whether military theory can be universally applied. But at the same time there is a general consensus that military history should be studied in order to define the relevant military theory, and that historical research is the basis for military theory since throughout history it was war that provided clear lessons.
One of the most outstanding instances of historical research which created a theory is the book by Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890). It may be said quite simply that Mahan created a naval theory after a profound study of the military history of naval warfare in the modern period, with a definition of a number of essential principles which in his opinion constituted the basis for the creation of sea power.
Like counter piracy now, there was no reason to be short of ideas for Counter Insurgency a decade ago. Heck, forget our hard learned lessons from Vietnam - the West has been at it for thousands of years.
The great shame is that even now, repeating stupid mistakes of the recent and ancient past, there are those who want to forget everything about COIN. Like the saying goes, those who forget history ...
In a must read extended article at Small Wars Journal, Dr. Tal Tovy, assistant professor of History Department at Bar-Ilan University Israel, outlines the very open history of COIN - if you just make the effort to read it.
He gives a great primer on what "going Roman" really means, and though in living memory we have incinerated hundreds of thousands of civilians in an afternoon - perhaps some of the Roman methods are beyond our use today, but there is no excuse not to see the clear pattern and I pray that we do not let our hubris allow us to forget again for COIN and all the warfare disciplines whose larger answers are all written and waiting to be read. Just an example of what you will find in Tovy's work.
A study of the sources dealing with the response of the Romans to the revolts of Tacfarinas, Boudica and Bar Kochba indicates that similar methods were used.
At the beginning of the revolt we see that the Roman army does not initiate offensive measures for the very reason that it did not have sufficient military forces. Another reason was the guerrilla methods used by the rebels, against which Roman tactics based on the regular forms of battle was ineffective. The lack of military preparedness and the use of inappropriate methods of warfare for the military situation were the cause for catastrophe and the defeat of the legions. The situation for the rebels changed for the worse in both instances on the arrival of officers who changed the warfare tactics of the Roman army and adapted them to those of the enemy as well as to the field conditions.
For example, the arrival in Judaea of Julius Severus, the governor of Britain, who had gained practical experience in mountain warfare acquired in Britain itself, mainly in Wales. This enabled him to deploy a military system against the guerrilla forces of Bar Kochba which was suited to the field and warfare conditions in Judaea. Severus brought with him the forces that had accumulated experience in mountain warfare, relied more upon archers and cavalry, as well as troops of German origin (numeri) which had operated as light and mobile units. Similar trends can be found in the suppression of revolts in North Africa. The Roman army ceased operating in large units and began using smaller and more mobile ones. The army took control over vital passageways and created a blockade by constructing fortresses. This restricted the movements of the rebels within the enclosed areas in which the mobile units operated, thus restoring the offense initiative and gradually crushing the revolt.
It can all be brought forward.
A framework for political and economic activities provides a broader operational basis. Modern COIN theories clearly determine that carrying out such activities can lead to calming a certain region through separation between the guerrilla forces and the civilian population. These methods of activity include building infrastructure, improving health and educational systems, increasing the efficiency of the economic system, etc. These processes can be regarded as parallel to the measures carried out by Rome in the areas it conquered and after the suppression of a revolt.
As an analogy, it may be said that the desire of the United States to establish democracy and liberalism, according to the American model, in the countries where it is active, resembles the process of Romanization. Also, the dependence of the United States on rulers who display pro-American tendencies, even if they are dictatorships, is parallel to the model of client states that Rome created. In many places around the world the United States has supported and even aided the accession of rules who presented an agenda that corresponded to American interests. During the Cold War period these were leaders who displayed a firm and aggressive stance against Communism, and today these are the moderate Islamic leaders who are opposed to the trends of Islamic fundamentalism. Thus, without going into philosophical speculations about the importance of studying history, we may also learn from the distant experience of Rome about warfare against guerrilla forces and against revolts that are occurred today as well in various parts of the world.
More could and should be spent on the lessons of Rome and others, but not now. Just remember to put up your guard, become exceptionally skeptical, and do not let others bully-boy their way to shutting you up when they cry, "All is new! War is different! This is unprecedented! This is revolutionary! Transformation! Everything has changed! Eleventy! Game changer! War winning technology!" No, that is the bleating of the ignorant and the agenda-born. Only tools change - the fundamentals are the same. To take a town, you need your men on the corner - forcing their will on the town with sword, pike, musket, or assault rifle. To embargo them you need a longboat, a sloop, a battleship, a submarine. Just ask a Roman, or Dr. Tovy.
Is this where we are heading? Cloward-Piven catches the car, and the reaction is ... what?
As in war, then enemy gets a vote ... so is the far Left finds Gloward-Piven as close to taking place than they ever thought ... what is the losing side to do?
If decades of symmetrical politics against the Statists has failed, then what is the asymmetric option?
Our friend and dude I need to buy a pitcher or two with, DrewM, rounds it out. Not to say I am in alignment with him as such a reaction is fully supporting Cloward-Piven - but his position is defensible. The second and third order effects are nation changing with global effects no one can predict - with national unity in peril. But enough of fevered pondering - DrewM, over to you. Define it for us.
“Let It Burn” is about inaction. There’s no point in trying do anything that avoids going over the fiscal cliff/sequestration. Remember, the deal that got us to this point was agreed to by House Republicans, Senate Democrats and signed by Obama. That’s as bi-partisan as it gets. I’ve heard from squishy low information voters, Obama and the media that “bi-partisan problem solving” is the Holy Grail of politics. Well, here it is.
Will it lead to massive disruptions? Yes. That’s the point. The current system is rigged against conservative. We should play no part in its perpetuation. If you can’t win the game, concede and start new one. That’s the heart of Let It Burn.
This isn't some petty "I lost so I'm taking my ball and going home" tirade. This is what people want. It's simply not sustainable. If we can't stop them, we don't have to continue to enable them either.
Bill Kristol has a column attacking the Wall Street Journal for opposing any tax hikes. John Podhoretz challenges any conservative to argue with it. Well, I just did.
What Podhoretz should have done is challenge any Republican to argue against Kritol’s analysis. That can’t be done in a serious way.
We need to start disassociating conservatism from the GOP. We’ve tried it for 30 years. It hasn’t worked.
We’ve tried to save the country from the folly of expanding liberalism and the country said, “we don’t want to be saved”. Let It Burn just means letting them have what they want and rebuilding later.
After 2010 I had some hope that we might be able to turn this massive welfare state around. The full implementation of ObamaCare means that isn’t going to happen. At least not absent a total collapse of our fiscal house of cards.
Let It Burn isn’t an option, it’s an eventuality. The questions are will we be complicit in it any longer and do we want to delay it? I say no. Let the liberals own it. Very few things are made better by delaying the day of inevitable reckoning.
The sooner it burns, the sooner we can try and rebuild.
Back in the day, I had a few questionable out of the box thoughts; "Skipper, why can't we configure the MK-46 LWT for surface attack? If you think about it, there are a few ... " - but the Syrian government is coming up with some weaponeering ideas even ENS Salamander wouldn't think of. Via Brown Moses, the Syrian air force seems to be expanding the concept of ground attack helo ordnance utilization;
I believe what we are seeing here is a naval mine, and it seems to have certain similarities with the SADAF-02 mine, ...
Either you are running out of ground attack weapons, some Quatermaster Boomdfield is insisting you use everything in one bunker before you break open the seal on the next one, or someone is having fun with what they find in the magazine. Finally, will someone feed the bloody kitten?!?
From the conflicts that came following the break-up of Yugoslavia, a decade in Afghanistan, land and sea-based ballistic missile defense, Libya, and now Patriot missiles deployed to the Turkish-Syrian border, NATO continues to test what kind of alliance it is after the fall of the Soviet Union roughly a quarter-century ago.
Where does the alliance stand, and what direction is it going? Are the roles of the member states changing? Where is the alliance strongest, and where does it need the most improvement?
Our returning guest for the full hour this Sunday from 5-6pm EST to discuss this and more will be Dr. Daniel Goure, is Vice President with the Lexington Institute.
Dr Goure has held senior positions in both the private sector and the U.S. Government, as a member of the 2001 Department of Defense Transition Team, two years as the director of the Office of Strategic Competitiveness in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as a senior analyst on national security and defense issues with the Center for Naval Analyses, SAIC, SRS Technologies, R&D Associates, and System Planning Corporation.
Prior to joining the Lexington Institute, Dr. Goure was the Deputy Director, International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
He has consulted for the Departments of State, Defense and Energy. He has taught or lectured at the Johns Hopkins University, the Foreign Service Institute, the National War College, the Naval War College, the Air War College, and the Inter-American Defense College. Since 2001, Dr. Goure has been an adjunct professor in graduate programs at Georgetown University, and the National Defense University since 2002.
Dr. Goure holds Masters and Ph.D. degrees in international relations and Russian Studies from Johns Hopkins University and a B.A. in Government and History from Pomona College.
Join us live if you can, but if you miss the show you can always listen to the archive at blogtalkradio - the best way to get the show and download the archive to your audio player is to get a free account and subscribe to the podcast on iTunes.
, The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890). It may be said quite simply that Mahan created a naval theory after a profound study of the military history of naval warfare in the modern period, with a definition of a number of essential principles which in his opinion constituted the basis for the creation of sea power.
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