Fullbore Friday

Sacrifice.

In 1940, Bedford, VA had a population of 3,973.

When the National Guard’s 116th Infantry Regiment was activated on February 3, 1941, Bedford bestowed its soldiers in Company A to their ranks. By D-Day in 1944, there were still 37 Bedford soldiers in that company which became part of the 1st Infantry Division.

They were slated for the D-day invasion.

“When Company A landed on target and on time at Dog Green beach – one of only a handful of units to do so – they received the fire intended for a much larger force. For Bedford, the result was especially devastating. Of 37 assigned to Company A, 31 loaded into a landing craft and headed for Omaha Beach in the first wave; the remainder belonged to supply details and would arrive later.

“En route, a landing craft struck an obstacle and sank, stranding dozens far from shore, including five of Bedford’s boys. The remaining 26 successfully reached Omaha Beach, where 16 were killed and 4 wounded within a matter of minutes. Three others were unaccounted for and later presumed killed in action.

“Another Bedford boy was killed in action elsewhere on Omaha Beach with Company F, bringing Bedford’s D-Day fatalities to a total of 20.”

20 out of 38. A 52.6% casualty rate, in one day.

Now upscale that. 20 is .5% of the city's 1940 population.

In 1940, Baltimore, MD had a population of 859,100. That same loss rate, in one day, for Baltimore would be 4,298.

No consider this, for those who grew up in a small town.

In Bedford, most went to high school together. Grew up together. Their families all knew each other.

They died for ... what? For whom?

That is war. That is why it is so horrible. That is why it must be avoided until there are no other options.

And it will always be with us.

FITZ & MCCAIN - what will we learn?

Will there actually be change for the better after a cold, hard look at ourselves after the horrible year for the surface navy that was 2017?

There might be reason to be optimistic. I'm discussing over at USNIBlog. Come on over.

Japan Steps Out from History's Shadow

As I said almost a half-decade ago, say hello to the return of the Japanese flattop;

The ruling party endorsed Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's call to remove a 1 percent psychological cap on defense spending against gross domestic product that has been in place since the 1970s.

In line with the more ambitious spending policy, Abe's Liberal Democratic Party on May 25 also gave its blessing to refit the helicopter carrier Izumo into a full-fledged aircraft carrier.

All smart-thinking navalists should welcome this move by Japan. Though their own distinct culture, the Japanese are firmly in the Western camp and are a good and just people. WWII notwithstanding, they have never been a natural enemy of the United States.

As China rises, a strong Japan will with each year be an important part of keeping her in check - or at least looking over her shoulder. At a time when working with China requires certain "expectations" from smaller nations, a strong Japan will give other smaller Asian nations someone else to look towards as a partner that won't have the same strings attached.

The Japanese are an insular and proud people, and that is fine and good. They are our friends, and man for man are an exceptionally good military.

As we finish up our Midway remembrances, it is good to remind ourselves it is 2018 and Japan needs to be a full partner.

Now, spend some of that money on some F-35B and get to work on a larger follow-on class of CV.

Decisions and Outcomes

Guest post by Michael Junge, CAPT, USN

Commander Alfredo Sanchez’ career ended at 0524 on August 21, 2017. A graduate of the University of Puerto Rico, Sanchez’ career included graduate studies at the US Naval War College, two chief engineer tours, and service as executive and commanding officer of USS John S McCain (DDG 56). He was, as all commanders in command of ships are, destined for promotion to Captain. 

Last week he pleaded guilty to dereliction of duty as part of a plea deal that retained his retirement. He is one of only three commanding officers to face courts-martial in the last two decades. He is the only one to be tried for actions that were not related to personal misconduct. Sanchez commissioned in 1998 and as part of the plea agreement requested to retire this year at the minimum 20 years of commissioned service. 

Removal followed by retirement has been the Navy’s practice for the last few decades. When commanding officers and executive officers are removed from command they progress through an administrative process that may include non-judicial punishment, an administrative recommendation for detachment for cause, a board of inquiry to show cause for retention or all, or none, of these. Given the modern approach to command removal these officer’s are digitally and irrevocably linked to whatever incident occasioned their removal and also linked to those who were removed for other reasons. Collisions, groundings, fires, misuse of alcohol, sexual harassment, assault, and rape are all linked in a melange of end of year firing lists.

It wasn’t always like this. In 1945, submarine commander Lieutenant Charles Eliot Loughlin was removed from command at Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz’s order and court-martialed. Found guilty of intentionally sinking a Japanese aid ship, Loughlin was barred from submarines but commanded in surface ships, rising to the rank of Rear Admiral and retiring in 1968 – twenty-three years after his court-martial conviction. His was not an isolated case. 

In 1969, Captain Kent Liston Lee commanded USS Enterprise (CVAN 65) when explosions and a fire during an Operational Readiness Inspection killed 28 and injured 343. Damage included 15 aircraft destroyed and 17 damaged as well as extensive damage to the flight deck. After a series of flag assignments, he served as the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command rising to the rank of vice admiral before retiring in 1976.

In 1975, Commander Jeremy Michael Boorda ran USS Farragut (DDG 37) aground while departing Den Helder, Netherlands, for Brest, France, damaging both sonar domes. Boorda later commanded Destroyer Squadron 22, Cruiser-Destroyer Group Eight, and Commander, Battle Force Sixth Fleet before becoming Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Boorda took his life on May 16, 1996.

In 1975, Lieutenant Michael Mullen commanded USS Noxubee (AOG 56) when she collided with a buoy and damaged the ship enough that she was soon decommissioned. He recovered and returned to command of USS Goldsboro (DDG 20), USS Yorktown (CG 48), Cruiser-Destroyer Group TWO, US Second Fleet and NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic and was the Pacific Fleet’s 1987 Vice Admiral Stockdale Leadership Award. He retired as an admiral in 2011 after serving as the Navy’s Vice Chief and Chief of Naval Operations and as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In 1985, Commander Robert Joseph Natter, while in command of USS Chandler (DD 996), passed a tug towing a barge down the Columbia River. Chandler sped by the tug and barge at a high rate of speed, swamping the barge. In 1987, the US District Court of Oregon found that USS Chandler was solely at fault for the collision by violating the safe speed rule. Natter later held commands worldwide, including Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, Commander of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Commander U.S. Northern Command, and Commander-in-Chief of the NATO Western Atlantic Command. He retired in 2003 as an admiral.

In 1990, Captain Joseph Scott Mobley commanded USS Saratoga (CV 60) when a liberty launch overturned and 21 sailors drowned. He went on to command Carrier Group TWO, was Director of the Navy Staff in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Director for Operations of U.S. Pacific Command and Commander of the Naval Air Force of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet until his retirement from the Navy, as a Vice Admiral, on June 1, 2001. 

In 1996, Captain John M. Kelly commanded USS Gettysburg (CG 64) when she collided with the Iranian corvette Bayandor in the northern Arabian Gulf. Kelly promoted to flag rank and commanded the Abraham Lincoln Battle Group in July 2001, completing an historic ten-month deployment including three combat operations: Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Southern Watch, and as CTF 50 in command of strike forces for four carrier battle groups, for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The airwings and Tomahawk equipped cruisers, destroyers, and submarines of CTF 50 compromised the largest strike group assembled since the Korean War.

In 2002, a torpedo shield door gasket failed aboard USS Dolphin (AGSS 555) while she operated off San Diego, California. Despite the abandonment, the submarine was stable and towed back to port where she underwent three years of repairs before decommissioning. Kelety promoted to captain and retired in 2008.

In 2005, Captain Jeffery S. Jones commanded USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) when she collided with the 34-foot Canadian sailboat MAREEKA II. There were no casualties or injuries reported as a result of the collision. Captain Jones promoted to Rear Admiral and served as the senior naval advisor to the head of the Iraqi Navy and commanded Expeditionary Strike Group SEVEN before retiring in 2013. He was a 2001 recipient of the Stockdale Leadership Award.

Between 1945 and 2015, 318 commanding officers dealt with and recovered from some accident or problem that today would mean career death. Some instances involved significant loss of life.  Some meant the loss of a ship or submarine.

In a time when the surface navy is undermanned, has been undermanned, and is likely to be undermanned for the foreseeable future can we really afford to discard officers whose only error was being in command when something bad happened? Have we raised the “reasonable person” standard so high that no one knows what it really is? Is every commanding officer really only one eighteen-year old’s mistake away from being removed from command?

Our Chief of Naval Operations speaks of advocacy mentorship - and he has a point. People like Bryce Benson, Alfredo Sanchez, Sean Babbitt, Jessie Sanchez, Jana Vavasseur, and David Nartker need someone in their corner. Someone who remembers that these officers are the best of our best and that the qualities that placed them in command were not erased by a decision later judged to be in error. Their decisions were not wrong - the outcome was. Likewise, the decisions the Navy has made in these cases are not yet wrong, but the outcomes are likely to be.

---

Capt. Michael Junge is a U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer currently serving at the U.S. Naval War College. He commanded USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) and served in amphibious assault ships, destroyers, and frigates and is the author of the forthcoming “From Pillar to Pillory: U.S. Navy Crimes of Command 1945-2015.”.  The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Naval War College, the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. His cat remains unhappy, but is now hopeful as he corresponds with his new friends in Washington, DC.

American Strategic Myths Through the Lens of Star Wars - on Midrats

There is a long and successful record of fiction, especially science fiction, being instructive about history, human nature, and the eternal course of events.

Fiction, of course, gets its inspiration from reality - a two way road.

What do the Star Wars movies have to tell us about some of the comfortable myths we may see in American military and strategic thought?

Using his latest article at the Modern War Institute, Star Wars and American Strategic Myths as a starting point, our guest today Sunday at 5pm Eastern will be returning guest Major Matt Cavanaugh, USA an active duty Army Strategist and nonresident fellow with the Modern War Institute at West Point. He’s been the youngest recipient of the Army Strategist Association’s highest professional award (in 2015), and was named the US Army’s Athlete of the Year (in 2009). He’s currently finishing a PhD on supreme command under Professor Colin Gray at the University of Reading (UK), and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal, among other publications. His book, co-edited and co-written with Max Brooks (of World War Z) is Strategy Strikes Back: How Star Wars Explains Modern Military Conflict, from Potomac Books has been available since May 1st from Potomac Books.

Join us live if you can, but if you miss the show you can always listen to the archive at blogtalkradio or Stitcher. 

If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here.

Another uniform failure

OK fine, I'll say it.

Everyone, man and woman, looks 5-months pregnant.

Ditch these horrible uniform options, visit every ship in SNMG1 and SNMG2, steal the best ideas, and then try again.

Fullbore Friday

If you think that the Good Idea Fairy should have a French last name, you are probably right;

RAF Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferté, who was born in India and was of partial French descent, devised this propaganda idea to boost the morale of the French when he was provided with intelligence report by Major Benjamin Cowburn of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) that the Nazi Forces paraded down the Champs-Élysées boulevard everyday between 12:15 and 12:45.

Oh, yeah ... you know where this is going,

... Philip called in Wing Commander Gatward to see if he would volunteer for the risky mission. With numerous low-level day light attacks under his belt, Gatward, along with his navigator, Sergeant Gilbert Fern, agreed. Beside flying low level down the Champs-Élysées and attacking the German soldiers, the plan also included a backup target of attacking the Nazi Navy (Kriegsmarine) headquarters in the former home of the French Ministry of Navy, Ministère de la Marine.

Of course you would. 

What a great story;

The duo took off again at 11:29 am on June 12, 1942 from Thorney Island in West Sussex in heavy rain. By the time they were flying over Rouen, the city in the North of France, there was bright sunshine and excellent visibility. The aircraft encountered the first anti-aircraft fires while passing over the suburbs of Paris at a very low altitude of just 30ft. They had circled around the Eiffel Tower at 12:27 and the radiator of the starboard engine of the aircraft suffered a bird strike. But they somehow managed to maintain their course.

The intelligence report about the schedule of the parade was found to be incorrect and no German soldiers were there to be strafed. However, Gatward flew down the Champs-Élysées at second floor window height and Fern released the first flag over the Arc de Triomphe. Gatward then attacked the Naval Ministry in the Place de la Concorde public square and strafed the ministry building with 20mm cannon shells, scattering the German soldiers, much to the delight of the Parisians. Then Fern dropped the second Tricolour. After completing the attack, Gatward turned the Beaufighter for home at 12:30 pm. They landed at RAF Northholt in South Ruislip in Western London at 01:53 pm.

That just started his war - one he had a superior record of excellence.

Upon returning to London, Gatward removed the dead bird from the engine radiator. It was found to be a French crow and was laid to rest at the RAF Northolt. Later, intelligence mentioned that the Nazi parade had been cancelled due to confusion following the Operation Squabble. The attack hugely boosted the morale among the British and French.

Gatward was immediately awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross and Fern received a Distinguished Flying Medal. Gatward was also awarded a second Distinguished Flying Cross in September 1944 for his heroics during the aerial attack on a German convoy off the Norwegian coast. He further received a Distinguished Service Order in October, 1944 ...

...and a life well lived,

retired in 1964 as Group Captain after spending 30 years in the RAF. The RAF hero lived with his wife Pamela in Essex and died in 1998 aged 84.

It is a shame the Beaufighter isn't better known. Here's a nice overview of a solid bit of kit.


Hat tip Tom.