Proactively “From the Sea”; an agent of change leveraging the littoral best practices for a paradigm breaking six-sigma best business case to synergize a consistent design in the global commons, rightsizing the core values supporting our mission statement via the 5-vector model through cultural diversity.
... you beat your enemy by isolating him, denying him allies, keeping him in the dark and - bit by bit - wearing down his energy:
Let's see: 1. America Alone becomes less of a book and more of a way of life when action is needed. 2. Led by CAN and NLD and encouraged by President Obama's West Point speech over a year ago and the JUL 11-14 timeline, more and more of our allies are leaving the field in AFG and elsewhere - content to let us to the heavy lifting. 3. It took us almost a decade to find OBL - just down the street from Pakistan's West Point in one of its city's largest compounds. 4. The American public is tired of "overseas contingency operations."
Well - in the afterglow of OBL assuming room temperature and becoming food for hagfish - Thomas was talking about OBL and his ilk - but he could have been talking about the USA as well.
This war is/will be a long one. Though our enemy may be getting tired - so are we. We need strategic patience and leadership to push us through.
Let's not get cocky because one guy is dead. Much more work remains to be done. Stay serious, stay focused, and stay on mission.
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) continues to be one of my go-to spots for good data, specifically on Afghanistan. A little over a decade ago when I was finishing up my last tour supporting operations in AFG, in our talks in HQ ISAF and around the country, we didn't expect this is where we would be half-way through 2019 - but we knew we could be here. I have to give the Taliban credit where credit is due. As I have outlined here for the last ~9.5 years, since we sent a clear signal at Obama's West Point speech in DEC 2009 that we did not have the will for what needed to be done, the Taliban knew they could do this on AFG time with AFG methods; husband your forces to get ready for the post USA/ISAF presence civil war to come. Keep the attacks going, and just enough to make sure you can say you kicked them out the door. Time is on our side, Allah is on our side, the West is weak and corrupt. Like the infidel Soviets before them, they will leave frustrated and defeated. We will take back what was always ours. Just look at the graph and the notes to the side. The story is all there for you to see. It didn't have to be this way, but perhaps it was destined to be. Read it all.
Over the July 4th weekend, we slipped out of the American fortress in Bagram. The way we left tells you all you need to know about Afghanistan – the conflict we lost in December 2009 when the Taliban were given the last indication they needed that we were not going to press the issue on our time and change Afghanistan our way, but we would let them win on their time and return Afghanistan their way.
It is all as clear now as it was when I wrote about our culmination at Obama’s West Point speech linked above. Regulars here know the story; the rest can follow the link above.
Good ideas are timeless, so I want to return to a topic that predates CDRSalamander and this is a decision point where we can decide to return our nation to its natural state.
My view of our place in the world started to gel in the mid-90s and by the late 90s had solidified into what in the 2020s has cured into a firm mass of resolve; we will destroy our republic by playing empire.
Generations of civilian and military leaders – and generations of citizens – had their view of America’s place in the world warped by WWII and the Cold War. In both cases, the world was faced with expansionist totalitarian secular confessions that required America to be the world power that it was.
That world, thankfully, is gone. There are major threats in this world – Islamic fundamentalism is one, a renewed China is another – but neither of them have the combination of desire and ability that fascism and communism had. Neither are trying to expand their power by military means.
Islamism has a bleeding edge, but its center of gravity is religious, and it has natural boundaries (unless stupid migrant policies succeed in letting it expand).
China’s military growth is based on primarily ensuring access to resources to keep its population’s standard of living improving and as such, protect the domestic power of the Chinese Communist Party.
We do not have a land border with either.
How do we mitigate risk against these two primary and lesser constellations of threats? Generally speaking, it doesn’t take a large standing army … which in a time of limited resources, that is a good thing. Specifically:
- Islamic fundamentalism: simple; contain and modernize. Contain Islamic fundamentalism to where is it now, and on the bleeding edge of the territory where it has reached critical mass, support local forces and governments to modernize along moderate lines. We cannot want a modern existence more than the people of those nations. We cannot force it on them. In nations where there is not a critical mass, aggressively eliminate small cells as you find them. The Cold War campaigns against the Red Army Faction, Weather Underground etc are a good template here. A deadly nuisance, but in time will fade through impotence and attrition.
- China: not so simple. China is primarily an economic and diplomatic challenge. She wants to use her economic power to back her diplomatic efforts to ensure that nations do not get in the way of her economic growth and future prosperity. From those two items, she will take was she sees as her natural place for a nation of 1.3 billion souls: the global leader by mid-century.
China is not advancing primarily through military means. No, she is advancing by a clear national vision, economics, diplomacy, and an evolutionary, iterative advancement of her priorities for her people supporting her national greatness. Her military strength is to underline to others her larger national will; it is supporting, not supported.
While there are some nations such as India, Taiwan, Japan, and the nations around the South China Sea that have some territorial issues, unless you are a very paranoid Russian or Mongolian, China is not otherwise a military threat around her present borders. Where she is – specifically India – they have the land forces they need to counter China if so needed. Though accidents happen, China has no need for a land war on the Asian landmass. Her other conflicts are either at sea or are connected to her access and ability to secure her sea lines of communication to resources.
That is the key; we do not need a large standing army to mitigate the most likely Chinese threats to us or our friends. We can best address the Chinese challenge through our economic strength and smart diplomacy. We have the advantage there if we choose to use it. Militarily, we also have the comparative advantage at sea, in the air, and space … if we choose to accept that.
How does this tie into what I started the post with? Easy.
We were enabled to think we could change Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, etc etc because we thought we could do it on the cheap. Sure, a few National Guard forces would have to be activated, but mostly we had a large standing army to pull the effort from. Like former SECSTATE Albright said, “what is the use of a large army if you aren’t going to use it.”
That was the theory. In practice, especially in 2005-7, it turned out different especially in the reliance on National Guard forces, but we just managed to get through it only because we were one standard deviation away in 2003 from General Shinseki’s center point.
No big national discussion was needed. No large sacrifice. No great national mobilization. We went in half-ass, and our results were half-ass. In Iraq, it was a near run thing it was not a worse disaster than it turned out.
Wars of choice need to demand an understanding that wars are a dark room. You don’t know what is in it when you step in, but you will have to deal with it.
If wars are hard to get in to, you do not fall easily in to tar pits of whimsy.
Take that temptation away. Make it hard. Make it a national effort.
We are a large nation with large responsibilities, but we are also a republic, not an empire.
Give our friends more warning than we did the Afghans last weekend but let them know we have a new strategy. They need to up their land game. We will be there to help, especially in the air and from the sea, but we will not do their work for them.
We plan to move 2/3 of our active ground forces to our National Guard. Except for a few combined logistics, maintenance, and training facilities, all our forward deployed land forces, and most of our air and sea forward deployed forces, need to come home.
WWII and the Cold War are over. Again, we are a republic, not an empire.
We will mitigate risk by ensuring that while we reset our ground forces, we maintain and improve our posture as the world’s premier maritime and aerospace power – including space.
We will maintain a large and robust ground combat capability, but any large conflict will require mobilization of our National Guard and reserve forces. We will have a standing army, but our friends will need to plan to defend their territory with their ground forces primarily – at least at the start.
That is external … but the real benefit here is internal. Remember, the military did not get us in these long running small land wars in Asia this century nor initiate them.
Politicians and the civilians they appointed did. They provided the Direction and Guidance that drove Initial Planning Guidance. They pointed the military in a certain direction.
A large standing army makes things too easy for people who have a short-term focus, especially politicians. Wars should never be easy for those who don’t have to fight them.
Politicians do understand hard work as well as risk/reward. When silky smooth, feel good ideas ooze out of think tanks and faculty lounges into politician’s ears, when those politicians bring those ideas to their military staff, there needs to be a higher bar for yes-men … and more opportunities to deliver the hard truth that the politicians will need to ask more from the American people. No so much money, but the blood of their constituents living in their towns, working in their businesses, friends with their patrons and supporters.
The American people have a good, if imperfect, track record of supporting the expenditure of significant amounts of blood and treasure when needed. American politicians have a rather imperfect, rarely good, track record of convincing themselves they can fight wars of choice on the cheap.
The greatest threat to our nation’s future security and place in the world is not an unrestrained China, it is a US political elite’s inclination to empire.
Since DEC of 09, you've read my stuff about this - no need to repeat it again.
After President Obama's West Point speech of 2009, many of us told you this was a distinct possibility. Operational Planning 101, a couple thousand years of written military history, and the cultural norms of the Pashtun told anyone who was listening where the smart money was.
They will not let us retreat in peace.
After all, that is not how it is done. The weak horse must be treated as such, natch.
The US military today suspended most of its combat patrols with Afghan forces as the green-on-blue, or insider attacks by Afghan security personnel on Coalition troops, continue to spike. The training of Afghan forces and their partnering with US troops has been the cornerstone of the Obama administration's strategy to hand over security to the Afghans as the US completes its withdrawal by 2014.
"The order effectively suspends 'until further notice' most of the operations which US and Afghan troops conduct side by side," CBS News reported today. "At higher headquarters, Afghans and Americans will still work together, but in the field small unit operations putting Afghan soldiers alongside Americans ... will be suspended unless an exception is granted by a commanding general."
Behold the fruits of a calendar-based Plan, AKA orderly retreat.
According to The Long War Journal's Special Report, Green-on-Blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data, insider attacks account for 15% of Coalition casualties so far this year. There have been a total of 60 such attacks on Coalition forces since 2008, and they have occurred in 18 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, with the vast majority of the attacks taking place in Helmand province (17 attacks) followed by Kandahar province (9 attacks). Since 2008, insider attacks have killed 119 Coalition troops and affiliates and have wounded 98. The number of attacks has spiked since 2008, starting with 2 attacks reported in 2008; to 5 in 2009; to 6 in 2010; to 15 in 2011; to 32 in 2012. The steep rise in attacks parallels the increased pairing of Coalition troops with Afghan forces in training and mentoring situations, and occurs as the overall number of Coalition troops is sharply declining due to the planned transfer of Afghan security to Afghan forces by 2014.
It did not have to end this way, we had a solid conditions-based plan - but we elected people with no knowledge of military history, mal-advised, and were enabled by uniformed leaders who forgot their Sheehan and McMaster; too comfortable in their positions of power and influence.
We invited this.
Building off the previous post from last night, does anyone really believe this statement?
... US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta dismissed the green-on-blue attacks as the "last gasp" of the Taliban.
No it's not. It is to ensure that we leave under fire - that we are defeated; and that they get credit for it.
The enemy has some good operational planners too. We have thrown this away.
Rosa Brooks's article at Politico got a lot of play over the weekend, but most commentary focused on the title and the gossipy nature of the "who loves who, and how is saying naughty things about who" discussion of the civilian military divide that has been around since well before the Punic Wars. No, that is not what concerns me, what concerns me are the nuggets of insight into the colossal ignorance we have from people with their hands on the levers of power. Not stupidity. No these are smart, patriotic Americans who are doing the best they can in a job their President has asked them to do. Ignorance; people put in jobs they are ill-trained for and never have the time to learn the fundamentals, or have the people around them which will properly brief things.
There was the White House staffer who called me up and asked me to have CENTCOM move a U.S. drone to Kyrgyzstan, for instance, in an effort to track an alarming outbreak of ethnic violence. When I told him why I couldn’t—the chain of command just doesn’t work that way, and in any case no formal planning or risk assessments had taken place—he quickly grew exasperated.
“You guys”—the Pentagon—“are always stonewalling us on everything. I’m calling you from the White House. The president wants to prevent genocide in Kyrgyzstan. Whatever happened to civilian control of the military?
“You,” I had to tell him, “are the wrong civilian.”
As if to emphasize the culture clash, after episodes like this one, the response from some of my Obama administration colleagues in the White House was bitter: Had I “gone over to the other side?” one asked.
Interesting confrontation in the faculty lounge, but really? That is the conversation of some of the President's most powerful policy and decisions makers have. Let that soak in while I grab my lance and look askance at that windmill again. Some things must be confronted. Some things need to be repeated over and over, simply because they are the truth. The next part of this post will be nothing new to longtime residents of the Front Porch, I walked you through this over and over in the last half-decade. Stick with me though, as we need to review it. We need to speak it. It needs to be brought up every time the false premise is brought up. The truth must always be represented, otherwise the past is lost. Here we go.
Was there a single moment when Obama’s relationship with the military began to sour? Most observers point to the bruising 2009 debates about troop numbers in Afghanistan.
Immediately after his 2009 Inauguration, Obama set out to make good on his promise to “finish the job” in Afghanistan. He commissioned a sweeping review of U.S. policy and announced that he had authorized the interim deployment of an additional 17,000 U.S. troops in response to theater commander Gen. David McKiernan’s request.
By the end of February 2009, the president had adopted the new strategic objectives recommended by his interagency review team: From now on, the United States would emphasize the fight against al Qaeda—and build up the Afghan military’s security forces. But by mid-May, McKiernan, the first of several Afghanistan theater commanders under Obama to discover just how elusive “finishing the job” would be, had been fired. “War is a tough auditor,” retired Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis told me. Not every commander passes muster.
McKiernan was succeeded by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who was in turn assigned to undertake his own 60-day assessment. But when word spread that McChrystal intended to propose a substantial new increase in forces, which Pentagon gossip initially put as high as 80,000 additional troops, waves of dismay spread through the White House. In late September 2009, a copy of McChrystal’s assessment was leaked to the Washington Post. Its bottom line was clear: If the United States did not pour significant additional resources into Afghanistan, and fast, the likely result would be “mission failure.”
I don’t think Obama really realized we were losing the war in Afghanistan until late in 2009,” a retired Army general with substantial Afghanistan experience told me. Furious at the leak—which they blamed on the Pentagon—and reluctant to accept McChrystal’s grim conclusions, senior White House aides engaged in strategic counter-leaks. In their version, McChrystal and the Pentagon were trying to box in the president by pushing to deploy tens of thousands more troops and refusing to consider other approaches.
After months of increasingly tense meetings, Obama came to a decision: Another 30,000 U.S. troops would be sent to Afghanistan, but after 18 months those troops would begin to withdraw.
No. That is not how it happened. Here is the rough outline. The USA handed over the operation in AFG to NATO in late '05 and early '06 as ISAF moved out from Regional Command Capital. After that, NATO had Tactical and the bastardized "In Theater Operational" control of AFG through COMISAF (post '05 always an American), technical Operational Control through a German 4-Star in the NATO Joint Forces Command in The Netherlands, and the Strategic Control through SACEUR in Mons, BEL - always an American 4-Star. The USA had a parallel Command and Control Structure which was to a large measure limited to scattered USA forces and Regional Command East. COMISAF had both a NATO and a USA hat. Big difference, we would do Counter Terrorism (CT) while few others would. The Germans and Scandinavians were mostly in Regional Command North in Masar-e-Sharif, the Italians and Spaniards in Regional Command West in Herat, and the British, Canadians, Dutch, Australians, with very effective Danes and Estonians in Regional Command South. Other NATO and non-NATO nations contributed as well, scattered here and there. There was also the humorous fact on the civilian side that the AFG judicial system was to be mentored by the Italians (!), the police by the Germans (then EUPOL), disbandment of illegally armed groups by Japan (!), and so on. As we tired to figure out the AFG tribal situation, we soon fell in to our own tribal problems. NATO's version of USA Embedded Training Teams (ETT), Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) never were sourced to the level promised, so training of AFG forces never got up on step in line with the OPLAN. Those OMLT who were working would not follow their Kandak from one RC to another making continuity impossible. With few exceptions (Anglosphere nations plus Dutch, Estonians, Danes, and some other nation's SOF), NATO and non-NATO forces were so laden with restrictive Rules of Engagement and caveats that they were worse than useless for any type of direct action. Each Regional Command became a national fiefdom, and drift began. NATO would not deliver the forces they promised to even inside their humble, risk adverse, low-balled Statement of Requirements. By mid-2007, inside the USA lifelines of CENTCOM and the Joint Staff - especially after NATO's failure mid-year to even send enough cargo helicopters or logistics forcing the USA to jump through hoops to make it work - it became obvious the the USA had to take the keys back; NATO could not drive the car. We had to be careful; NATO liked its new job. Other nations got their General Officers forward deployed time, and made sure they were there just long enough to get the check in the block and then move on. The Flags-to-Posts exercise was very nice for our allies. We also were in the middle of the successful surge in IRQ - we had to balance what forces we could quickly move to AFG without side-tracking the good we were doing in IRQ - and not hurting our friends' feelings by jerking back too much from NATO too fast, and then doing significant long term damage to our alliance. By 2007, the Canadians and Dutch had already signaled that their maneuver forces were leaving. Careful balancing was needed ... but we needed to stabilize AFG beyond Kabul, the north, the west, and our FOBs. When General McKiernan came in and brought to the front Shape, Clear, Hold, Build - the structure to make the change took place. Throughout late 2007 and 2008, the USA Joint Staff, CENTCOM and others looked at what was needed to execute Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and more importantly - to take back the most difficult parts of AFG (mostly Pashtun areas) that our NATO allies either couldn't or wouldn't do what needed to be done. First forces of this "surge" started moving in by late '08 - before Obama was elected. As all plans are, it was multi-phase; nothing happens at once. After the 2008 election, Obama had his team do their little dog and pony show in theater (different story for a different day). As we chronicled here, he did a few things to put his stink on it - but nothing of any significance. The great Obama AFG surge was all, and I mean all, planned and put in to motion well before he even got the Democrat nomination. He didn't create it - he just approved it with slight to no modifications; initially. There was a point that AFG did become all his; everything changed in DEC 09 with President Obama's West Point speech where he signaled retreat via a shift from a Conditions Based Plan to a Calendar Based Plan. That was the moment that AFG was thrown to its fate. Everything since has been window dressing, vanity, and commentary. Full stop. Back to Rosa Brooks's article;
... most of the military leaders I interviewed said they believed that military recommendations often go unheeded by senior White House staff, who now assume that a risk-averse Pentagon exaggerates every difficulty and inflates every request for troops or money.
This assumption turns discussions into antagonistic negotiating sessions. As one retired general puts it, “If you said, ‘We need 40,000 troops,’ they’d immediately say, ‘20,000.’ Not because they thought that was the right number, but they just took it for granted that any number coming from the military was inflated.”
“Sometimes you want to tell them, ‘This isn’t a political bargaining process,’” another retired senior military official says ruefully. “Where the military comes in high, they counter low, and we settle on an option that splits the difference. Needless to say, the right answer is not always in the middle.”
A former White House official with Pentagon experience says White House staff often remain willfully uninformed about the logic behind military recommendations: They “don’t want to take the time to go through the slide deck or get the full briefing. Basically, they don’t want to know.”
Over time, of course, a White House tendency to split the difference is bound to create perverse incentives for military planners, making mutual mistrust self-reinforcing. “If you believe the mission truly requires 50,000 troops and $50 billion, but you know that the White House is going to automatically cut every number in half, you’ll come in asking for 100,000 troops and $100 billion,” says the aforementioned former White House official. “The military eventually starts playing the very game the White House has always suspected them of playing.”
Amazing. Simply amazing. Ask General Shinseki over at the VA if he was inflating his numbers. I really want to know who she was talking to. Names would be nice. I can't speak for them, but I can speak for others as one of the guys in the cheap seats who stayed quite but saw it all play out. What she speaks of may have happened somewhere she is aware of - but not where I sat actual and via VTC in AFG, Europe, Qatar, Kuwait, and in CONUS from DC to Tamps. Let me tell you about the teams and commands I worked for/with on AFG; we never inflated numbers. As a matter of fact, we were bounded by Restraints and Constraints that kept our numbers low, but as accurate as possible. We were never ordered to inflate for the sake of inflation. We may argue of one number or another - but it was all about Troops-to-Task and forces needed to create Desired Effects - not negotiating. Not once General Officer, USA or NATO, ever directed numbers to be bumped up for political negotiating purposed. Just the opposite, more often it was about the ceiling on numbers coming from political D&G - as it should be. Deliberately lie on an OPLAN or be ordered to do so for political negotiation purposes? No; the Bull Colonels and Captains would have had head on pikes or resigned first. I never saw that at the Operational, COCOM or Joint Staff levels. If it did happen, let's see some names. Our beefy Union Thugs from Operational Planners and Targeteers Local 302 would like to pay them a visit. Even today, it looks like the national security intellectual capital in the Obama Administration has not changed. The intellectual shallowness and malunderstanding of military history is the only logical reason the President's spokesman would say something like this;
Carney: "Let’s be clear: the war in Afghanistan will end next year as the president has promised."
— Jake Tapper (@jaketapper) November 19, 2013
Alternative explanation: they are knowingly misleading the American people. That is a different topic for a different day. A war does not end just because one side leaves the field and is being pursued by the other. That is a fighting retreat or a route. End of a war? No, the end of one phase. So, there you go. Intelligence such as Rosa's and her colleagues do not translate in to the best in military or foreign policy affairs. "The Best and Brightest" who are out of their area of expertise rarely do. No, the Gossip Girl story of the civilian military divide should not concern you - the fact that in the very serious business of fighting a war, political talking points and spin has in the minds of important people been made flesh - that is the story. You can only learn from history if that history is based on fact. Without honest history, you only set up the future for failure.
Sometimes I get hate mail to the effect "What makes you think you are qualified to voice an opinion of this area? You are not a journalist, ..." and so on and so on.
Well, not like I a need an excuse to exercise my right to free therapy, James Taranto in the WSJgives a perfect example why I am just as qualified to spout off as the next schmuck.
President-elect Obama wants to give an "Islam speech" - the questions is which venue to do it in. After Abe Greenwald and other of my betters talk about Dearborn vs. Cairo and all that - James gives a "in my fantasy world" comment on the real reason such a speech should be given.
Seems to us, though, that there is another alternative: clarity. Obama could speak frankly about the repression, misrule and fanaticism that are sadly common in the Muslim world, while at the same time repudiating anti-Muslim extremism in the West.
Ummmmm, errrrrr; here is where James steps in it.
But there is a city that, although not a national capital, is for all intents and purposes the capital of all Islam--a place where Obama could credibly speak to all Muslims, Sunni and Shiite, from Morocco to Malaysia to Michigan.
Not only that, but Obama's very presence--along with that of his secretary of state, chief of staff, the rest of his entourage and the traveling press from all over the world--would demonstrate that Islam is a more tolerant faith than many Westerners, including this columnist, have thought.
Is it really that simple? Can we be serious? Yes, we can.
All the new president has to do is give a speech in Mecca.
Maybe this is James' point - but a review of Saudi law WRT Mecca might be helpful. For goodness sake - French Special Forces that helped the Saudi's during The Siege of Mecca had to convert to Islam before they could enter the city.
A lot of the reason there is a global religious war was the presence post-Gulf War I of Western forces in the Saudi Kingdom. Having and apostate from Islam give a speech in Mecca itself? Great way to start a real war .... that's for sure.
James, please tell me you were being too clever by half? If not, drop me a line and let me help out with some fact checking - me or Chap; we would be more than happy to help out with the finer details of the Islamic world.
Is this a petty swipe for a small error? Sure, I make spelling and other typos all the time - but I don't have an editor etc; this is a critical substance. One of the problems we have in this war is the press is woefully under-informed of the Muslim world in general and Islamic terrorism specifically. They need to do much more research if they want to made suggestions on what the CINC must do. An ignorant public in war is prepped for defeat. An ignorant press is professional incompetence.UPDATE: Geezzzzz ..... let me quote myself,
Maybe this is James' point .... James, please tell me you were being too clever by half?
Well, it turns out that James is being too clever by half. In comments, follow Chap's links to the podcast and you will see that Mecca was his point. I feel much better, as James is usually right on the target and clear. Perhaps he is just having a bad day (or I am) or the clear portions were edited out. His extended remarks are much clearer than the original post....and that is good news.
Did I jump the gun? Maybe, but no one can tell me it was clear - or that press understanding of Islam has been of fine quality the last decade. James continues to meet the fine standards, and I should read tea leaves more often....or I should write my qualifiers more clearly and break out my individual vs. general criticisms better ...
Chap, less Sadlacks, more fiber....even if you make a good point. ;)
So, SECDEF Mattis (no, I don't get tired of saying this) put it right out there;
"We are not winning in Afghanistan right now. And we will correct this as soon as possible," Mattis said in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Mattis acknowledged that he believed the Taliban were "surging" at the moment, something he said he intended to address.
First, it is a tactical necessity. Over the past two years, the Taliban have been steadily encroaching on Afghan government control of territory, and by some estimates they are now in a position to influence the population in 40% of the country. While Afghan Security forces number over 300,000 and have shown real mettle in many places, they are taking significant casualties and still require effective mentoring down to at least the Battalion level. That means an increase in our overall troop strength is necessary.
Second, the emergence of an Islamic State element in Afghanistan is very concerning. While they have largely been unable to galvanize either the population or create cooperation with the Taliban, they have conducted a series of disruptive terror attacks and add further chaos to an unstable system. A larger NATO force can blunt their impact.
A third key reason is to create political capital that can be very helpful when some portion of the Taliban (who are not a holistic organization to say the least) eventually come to the negotiating table. We will never “win” militarily in Afghanistan, nor can we kill our way to success. Sooner or later we will need to bargain, and a stronger NATO force on the ground will give us better leverage.
Fourth, the additional forces send a signal to the Pakistanis, who are still somewhat playing a “double game” of overtly cooperating with NATO, but in reality supporting some elements of the insurgency. This commitment will tell Pakistan we intend to continue to work for a successful outcome in Afghanistan, and will hopefully encourage them to force the Taliban into negotiations.
Which brings us to another key point: what does success look like? Afghanistan is not going to resemble Singapore anytime soon; but it can have a functioning democratic government, general control over much of its borders, the ability to minimize impact from the insurgency, armed forces with high public approval, and a reduction in both corruption and narcotics — the latter two issues posing a longer term threat to the nation than even the Taliban. Getting to that point of success will require security and thus the additional forces.
I've been writing about AFG from the start of the blog, click the AFG tag below if you're new here and want to catch up. Both Mattis and Stavridis are spot on. Since Obama's DEC09 West Point speech, we turned over all momentum to the enemies of modernity. We had a good, long range plan by 2008, but that was all thrown away. There is a lot to do. Though we are as a nation tired, and on some days I think we should just all just look for the airhead version of the Friendship Bridge and cover what we leave behind in thermite ... but that isn't how this works. Mattis was the first General Officer to set foot in AFG as a 1-Star, and Stavridis had to do what he could with the Political Level D&G he received from Obama as SACEUR. A smart person would defer to their recommendations, or at least give them a fair hearing. If those two gentlemen are standing up and pointing in a certain direction, I'm lacing up my boots and forming up behind them. $.02.
Let's be clear about something, can we? Everybody is fully aware that it is game over in AFG, right? Hopefully since I outlined where we were going since DEC '09 everyone has been bop'd in the nogg'n by the cluebat ... right?
Reason I ask is that I am getting a little itchy over those who are seeming shocked, SHOCKED, that things seem to be getting wobbly.
Along those lines, I guess this post is for me more than you. What is one of the cornerstones of this blog? When I started this blog 108-months ago, I threw out this bit at the end of SALAMANDER SERIAL 001;
Hey, if nothing else, it is cheap therapy.
OK then, this is one of those posts. If you're not interested in my rambling on about AFG - then you may want to go somewhere else for awhile. I need to pound the keys a bit. Thanks for your indulgence. Why is it time to come back to AFG? Well, Mark Mazzetti and Matthew Rosenberg's bit over at NYT set off the cascade;
Increasingly frustrated by his dealings with President Hamid Karzai, President Obama is giving serious consideration to speeding up the withdrawal of United States forces from Afghanistan and to a “zero option” that would leave no American troops there after next year, according to American and European officials.
Mr. Obama is committed to ending America’s military involvement in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, and Obama administration officials have been negotiating with Afghan officials about leaving a small “residual force” behind. But his relationship with Mr. Karzai has been slowly unraveling, and reached a new low after an effort last month by the United States to begin peace talks with the Taliban in Qatar.
The president's plan will pull out most of the 142,000 troops in Iraq by August 2010, or 19 months after his inauguration and 3 months longer than he promised on the campaign trail. Between 35,000 and 50,000 troops will remain until December 2011. While the Bush team once envisioned a long-term peacetime presence along the lines of Germany and South Korea, Obama's aides rejected that.
"The path we're on here, the path is not toward any sort of Korea model," said a senior administration official, briefing reporters under ground rules requiring that he not be identified. "The path is toward reducing, in a fairly substantial way, U.S. forces in 2010 and then down to what's currently anticipated, down to zero, by the end of 2011."
I understand, elections have consequences - our nation voted twice for this Commander in Chief, and it was clear that this was the direction he wanted to go not just in Iraq, so no one should be shocked this trial balloon is going up about AFG as well. The CINC and his fellow travelers are all big fans of "zero." The concept of zero is always attractive to utopians and absolutest who have complete confidence in their unfiltered vision of the truth and future. There is no risk mitigation, there is no hedging. No, for some things there can only be all or nothing; no center. They also lack institutional patience. They will - and do - regularly throw away decades of work today, as opposed to work one more year to finish the job. From the budget to foreign policy - they do not focus on the long term, that is something for others to fix - they focus on what needs to be done now to either win elections, score philosophical points, or justify agendas. After we achieved our End States and Missing in Iraq, the argument could be made that the "zero option" was the right one. Heck, I could argue that point, but one could also argue the original plan of keeping a small force there - but given the fact that we are still in Germany and Japan, leaving at first opportunity was very well defendable. President Obama had that option only because we had already gained a victory. As we were all told, AFG was the "good" war. Thanks to the correct vision at brought to the table by General McKiernan and his Staff after the mistaken outsourcing of AFG to NATO's promises and the fevered dreams of the Bonn Agreement; Shape-Clear-Hold-Build was a way, district by district to do it right - to give a conditions based process of giving AFG back to its people with full coordination by civilian, military, international, and non-governmental organizations via a conditions-base, incremental program. Worked out in ernest in 2007 and early 2008, and enabled by the success of IRQ freeing up forces; the last two years of the Bush administration delivered a surge of forces (Shape and Clear) to create and hold security, to correct the failings of the training of the AFG forces so they could maintain those gains (Hold), and create the conditions for AFG having a chance - not a guarentee - of a civil society (Build). Then, district by district, province by province - we could go home. While he got his team together, the plan was largely adopted with minor tweaking - but that all came crashing down in DEC 2009 with the President's West Point speech. It was all lost then. There will be plenty of scholarly and literary works in the decades that come about how obvious the outcome should have been - and it is. As I said years ago - there is somewhere a young man or woman who will do their doctoral thesis that will become a book that will become a movie that will be somewhere between A Bright Shining Lie and Dereliction of Duty. It didn't have to happen this way, and this isn't political. President Obama could have stayed the course - the right but difficult track. All it took was strategic patience but it all went off the track that day in late 2009 when in one speech the entire dynamic of the war changed and the momentum shifted - both on the ground and more importantly in the minds of the people in AFG - against us.
The press and the public - heck even some of our military leaders, may have thought that the summer of 2011 (later moved to 2014) we could have walked away in anything but ultimate dishonor. I have yet to see one of them give a historical reference to the success of such a Plan ... but people are free to be wrong. In this serious business though, a simple "my bad" won't do. So, here we find ourselves. Let me re-quote something;
... new low after an effort last month by the United States to begin peace talks with the Taliban ...
One does not begin peace talks in the middle of a retreat unless you are doing it simply to humiliate the force doing the retreating. The Taliban are doing exactly what a rational, motivated, and educated force in their position would do; husband your forces, preserve your power, expand your base through soft persuasion based on inevidibility ... yet ... kick the departing force just enough to let everyone know that you were the one that forced their departure. It is called the Red Most Likely COA. Look it up. Discussion of anything but a sub-optimal outcome is just wasted breath at this time. We are half-way through the last fighting season and ...
A deadly blast in the west of Kabul that left at least three people dead has marked the formal handover of nationwide security from the US-led NATO coalition to Afghan forces.
The handover of responsibility on Tuesday is a significant milestone in the nearly 12-year war against Taliban and other armed groups and marks a turning point for American and NATO military forces, which will now move entirely into a supporting role.
It also opens the way for their full withdrawal in 18 months.
The ceremonial handover was, however, marred by an explosion that targeted the convoy of Mohammed Mohaqiq, a prominent ethnic Hazara lawmaker. Mohaqiq is said to have survived the blast.
General Mohammad Zahir, chief of the Kabul Criminal Investigation Division, said three people were killed by the bombing and another 30 were wounded - including six bodyguards.
"The roadside bomb targeted the Mohaqiq convoy, but he safely passed. One of his vehicles was damaged," Zahir said.
What a complete waste this has all become. All that is left to do is what we have discussed often over the last few years; carry out your order and no more. Do all you can to protect your people and bring as many back in one piece as possible. The last fighting season is over and next year we will most likely be at zero ... but at best as good as zero - which is worse than actual zero. When you get home, and at the right time and in the right context - bear witness to what you saw, what you did, and what brought this nation to where it is. We were not forced off the field, our leaders quit. Even the much maligned Elector of Bavaria put on a better show than we have since that day in late 2009. So short sighted. This war will not end with out departure from AFG - no, in some ways it has only begun. We will not have saved the AFG people, we have condemned them. We have not defeated the Taliban, we have given them strength to rebuild. What do we do from here? Simple - ignore the politics of the moment and instead think about the lessons to take away from this all. If you have - and are willing to accept that the next day you will perhaps disagree with them - in a moment where you are sober and in a dark spot, put down your top-5. Though my mood has improved since the 16-yr old Salamander came in making snarky jokes bout The Walking Dead, here we go. 1. We do not nation-build unless we actually have a no-kidding declaration of war and we march in to their nation towards unconditional surrender where we are the unquestionable authority. Then we help them re-build on what ever good foundation they may have. 2. If anyone tells you "war is new" and it can be done on the cheap - go at them and go at them hard. In that light, many of us owe General Shinseki an apology. 3. When we do not have a declaration of war with the goal of unconditional surrender, then we need to be clear what our real options are; punitive expedition, targeted assassination (drones seem to do this well), consequence management, etc. Our operations should be nasty, brutish, and short. "No better friend, no worse enemy"; that works for me. If the locals can't take advantage of a chance to improve their lot; no our problem. Leave a calling card that if they irritate us again, the next time we hit harder. 4. Do not apologize for the nature of war. 5. Do not talk yourself - or let other talk you in - to believe that other nations will do for you what you cannot do for yourself. Accept other nations and international institutions for what they are; not what you wish they were.
For they sow the wind And they reap the whirlwind. The standing grain has no heads; It yields no grain. Should it yield, strangers would swallow it up. ------ Hosea 8:7
The U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan withdrew all international military personnel from Afghan government ministries in Kabul yesterday after two more Americans were killed on the fifth day of violent protests over the burning of the Koran at a coalition military base.
The two, a lieutenant colonel and a major, were both shot in the back of the head in the heavily guarded Interior Ministry, according to Western officials who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to disclose the information. The Taliban claimed responsibility, saying it was retaliation for the burning of the Muslim holy book.
Why? Simple: weakness.
The events of the last week are just another reminder that we find ourselves on a well worn path to defeat. We knew the path was there, but we took it anyway. The reason was simple - we picked the wrong point man.
Our leaders and their people live in a parallel universe. It is past amateur hour - this is professional malpractice writ large.
U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker and Robert Gibbs, Obama's former press secretary, said they believe Afghan President Hamid Karzai's fragile government could collapse and the Taliban would regain power if the U.S. were to walk away.
"This is not the time to decide that we're done here," said Crocker. "We have got to redouble our efforts. We've got to create a situation in which al-Qaida is not coming back."
Added Gibbs, "What the president's trying to do now is get us to a point where we can hand off the security of Afghanistan to the Afghans and that we can bring our troops home."
Do they actually listen to themselves? To the AFG ear - we have already announced that we are walking away. The President has stated he wants to walk away. We are not redoubling our efforts - we are shortening our withdraw timeline; AKA retreating faster.
The Obama Administration was given a path to success - the uplift of forces in '08-09 that would help create the conditions to have a better chance of victory - but they threw it away. The AFG people live in a world of actions, not words. Crocker and Gibbs should both be ashamed of themselves.
As we are not acting like we are in it to win it - is it too early to ask the question: When is the point where we question the morality of asking one more family to give their son or daughter's life in AFG?
From the President to the uniformed Commander in Kabul - I see nothing but weakness. We show nothing but weakness to those who value nothing more than strength. In a way - I don't blame the AFG people from turning on us. They have to live there - and if they know we are leaving and in our wake we put the Karzai government to sort things out - they would be a fool not to start to accrue some street-cred with those who seem to be the power in waiting.
Weakness and defeat. We signal it in AFG - and we signal it at home.
This afternoon, Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) President Imam Mohamed Magid hosted an event featuring senior Pentagon officials and U.S. Military Chaplains. The event served as an opportunity for the Department of Defense (DoD) to deliver an official apology for the actions of American soldiers in Afghanistan who unknowingly burned Qurans at Bagram Airfield on Monday.
Speakers included Dr. Peter Lavoy, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs, ISNA President Imam Mohamed Magid, and U.S. Military Chaplain Lt. Col. Abdul Rasheed Muhammad.
Assistant Secretary Lavoy apologized on behalf of the DoD to the American Muslim community and assured attendees that the Quran burnings were an unfortunate mistake. He highlighted the many diverse faiths represented in the U.S. military and the strong commitment by the DoD to respect each and every one of those religious beliefs equally. He also assured attendees that the military is investigating the incident and all troops are being retrained in the handling of religious materials.
Bask in the Dhimmitude. Video is here for your pleasure.
That is an unforced error in the extreme. Diplomacy isn't about an unending apology tour. When we act in this way; all we do is advertise a passive-receptive attitude that has never commanded respect. The Romans had a term for it, Cinaedus - look it up.
... and yes, about that pic on the right; it begs the question:
Of course - they are no women of any type to be seen because ISNA is a home of radical Islamists; misogynistic, backward looking, supremacists who have no desire to join the Western ideal of openness, freedom, and equality.
Oh, but to say that is judgmental ...
That visit to ISNA is sad and a disservice not only to our nation as a whole - but to the good, modern American Muslims we live, work, and go to school with.
We deserve this whirlwind that is only now starting - we voted for it.
How many years did I spend on AFG ... only to find myself here?
I shouldn't blog this early ... maybe I'll feel better by lunch.UPDATE: Well, I've had lunch and feel about the same. Oh, and did someone say "weakness?" Yepper's. Uncle Jimbo at BLACKFIVE smells it too.
It is like watching a yard you once cared for slowly fade to weeds, dead spots, and brambles. As we have discussed for over 5 1/2 years, this was all foreseen. When you retreat under fire, this is what happens. Sudarsan Raghavan at WaPo has a heartbreaking story about the fruit of this administration's shift in December 2009, now that it is starting to ripen.
Across Afghanistan, tens of thousands of people are once again on the move. It’s a grim deja vu of the years of civil war and Taliban rule, when masses of Afghans flocked to refugee camps. What’s different now is that much of this desperate migration from rural areas to cities is unfolding in Afghanistan’s northeast, reflecting the conflict’s shift from conventional fighting zones in the south and east.
The new refugees are also a bleak symbol of how the shape of the fight has changed since the U.S.-led NATO mission formally ended combat operations last year. Afghan security forces, now backed by less American air support, are engaged in more fierce ground battles with insurgents, trapping civilians in the paths of mortars, rockets and bullets. With the Taliban fragmented and new militant groups surfacing, including the Islamic State, the number of front lines has surged around the country. Civilian casualties are at record levels.
...
The exodus has now reached levels unprecedented since the Taliban regime’s demise in late 2001. Nearly a million Afghans — about 3 percent of the population — have been driven by conflict to other parts of the nation.
...
And after nearly 14 years of conflict — and with crises in Syria, Iraq and South Sudan competing for the world’s attention and dollars — “donor fatigue” has set in, aid workers say. Halfway into the year, the United Nations has received less than one-third of the $405 million it has requested from the international community to respond to Afghanistan’s various humanitarian problems.
...
In the first five months of this year, doctors treated three times as many patients for conflict-related injuries as in the same period last year. On this day, every bed was full. Last month, over a four-day period, doctors treated 77 patients injured by clashes, one-third of whom were women and children.
This is the future our leaders chose. This is what we warned would happen if we did not have the strategic patience to play the long game. This next pull quote is a nice vignette of what Shape-Clear-Hold-Build, district by district, was designed to avoid - and what became inevitable following President Obama's speech at West Point in December 2009.
“I am worried about getting shot again,” said Ghafoor, his eyes downcast as he lay on a bed in the hospital ward. “I don’t care if the Taliban or the government rules. All I want is security.”
...
“My whole life was a few hens and a cow,” said Jamillah. “I have lost all of them, as well as my son and my home. How can I go back?”
This too is Obama's legacy. If you thought the Islamic State found fertile ground in Syria and Sunni Iraq - wait until they build partnerships with the Taliban. Wait until the Iranians move in to Herat and the Shi-ite Hazara heartland of the country to fight against the Islamic State aligned Sunni tribes. Yes, a legacy of a feckless, shortsighted, and self-referential foreign and defense policy.
Is it possible that Afghanistan may turn out some shade of OK where we don't have a mark of shame, again, on our conduct of a campaign? Sure. That might happen. If it does, will it have got there because of sound military planning, and the political support needed to create the conditions for success? No, not really. That all fell apart a bit over four years ago. As we march towards our summer'14 retrograde, we need to watch with a clear eye. Be ready to grasp hold of a firm straw if it drifts past, build something quickly if we can - but not to have false hope on partial observations of selected viewing. I hate to be Miss Mary Darkcloud (well, not really - it is kind of a hobby), but everyone needs to keep their wits about them as we move towards the scheduled withdraw from Afghanistan this year. Depending upon the Operational Planning confession you adhere to, there are in roughly decreasing hierarchy; Mission, End State, Objective, and Decisive Points & Decision Points scattered along the progressing Phases along your Lines of Operation that outline your Tasks and - if you blend in some EBO concepts in to your confession as I do - Desired Effects. You can have wonderful success on individual Objectives, Decisive Points, and Tasks. You can even achieve wonderfully positive results in your Desired Effects - you may even meet one or more of your Objectives, but ... that does not mean that you will get even close to your End State or Mission. In general, if you tap-out before you reach your End State, you will never have achieved your Mission. If you never achieve your Mission, you have not achieved victory as originally planned. You can of course, revise your Plan to change anything and everything - but when you reverse engineer your Plan to lowered expectations, you are just covering your exit - that is all. Now that a few weeks of class is complete in a few sentences (all you Operational Planning trolls, get back in your hole - no nit-pick'n the Cliff's Notes; URR I'm talking to you), let's look at this little bright pebble in the pan;
Donald Sampler, who directs the Afghanistan office for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), told a House subcommittee Thursday that 900,000 Afghan children were enrolled in school in 2001, virtually none of them girls. Today, the number is approaching 8 million, and about one-third are girls.
During the same period, life expectancy has risen from 42 years to 62. The child mortality rate has fallen from 172 to 97 per 1,000 live births.
Electricity now reaches 18 percent of Afghans. Land line and cell towers provide phone service to 90 percent of the population. The telecom industry provides about 100,000 local jobs.
This is all very true and wonderful ... but, well let's review the ISAF Mission Statement;
In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.
There are three parts here. Part 1: "...to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency" Part 2: "...support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)" Part 3: "...facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development" 1.a. Capability?
After more than a decade of war, the Taliban are a long way from being defeated and have been growing in strength. Many of Nato's territorial gains are by no means irreversible.
1.b. Will? I don't even need to quote or link to anything. No one ... and I mean no one of any seriousness is arguing that we have impacted the will of the Taliban one bit. As a matter of fact, after President Obama's DEC09 West Point Speech, it has only grown.
If the troop surge of 2010 was successful in stopping the Taliban's momentum in the south, it did not succeed in defeating the militants, especially in the north and centre where the alliance is thinner on the ground.
2. ANSF? Let's stick with the linked BBC article.
Afghan forces remain inconsistent, but those who train them say the best are as good as any army in a developing country.
But many people still question how the army would fare against the insurgents without help from Nato. Only time will tell.
I agree. Time will tell, but they need more seasoning and continued support to have a chance - hopefully more than we gave to South Vietnam and the Royal Cambodian Army. 3. Governance and development: that takes two. The government of Afghanistan has to ask for it, and there has to be someone there to offer to help. I hope so, but hope isn't all that helpful. Let's go back to the opening quote. Everything that USAID has to say is wonderful and nice - and all of us who served in AFG are glad to see and read it, but ... but ... that is only 1/2 of 1/3. It is just a desired effect, and depending on your Operational Planning confession, perhaps just a Measure of Effectiveness. That is all. Not an End State, not a Mission. No, the concrete is not set. The cake is not baked, and unless we have significantly revised the OPLAN, good odds that along most of the Lines of Operations, we have plenty of Decisive Points that will not be met prior to this summer. Risk increases, and we will have to rely on, yes - hope.
I've put a lot out there about what has happened in my war, AFG - the place all told I spend half a decade directly working in and on via one capacity or another. If you need to review, just click the "Afghanistan" tab - it is mostly there. There continues to be three fundamental issues I keep pounding away on because way too many people just don't understand them. 1. For much of the first half of the war, it was not a USA-dominated operation on the ground. As a matter of fact, until they proved they couldn't unburden themselves of caveats and make an honest attempt to fill the CJSOR, there were as many NATO/coalition forces as USA forces. 2. There was no "Obama surge." The planning for that began in earnest at CENTCOM and the Joint Staff in late '07, was firmly set by early '08, and began deployment in late '09, with a full head of steam going in to Obama's inauguration. Anyone who tried to get a flight out of Qatar and in to AFG in late '08 and early '09 can tell you that story. Again, click the tab for the details. All President Obama is was not stop it, put his scent on it, and let it happen - until ... 3. The West Point speech of December 2009 was when Obama signaled that we were going to quit, to start the long goodbye - and so with conditions based plans in the dustbin, we slid in to the intellectually corrupt calendar based retreat - forcing good people to try to make the best of a mess they were given. When the good people got Obama to move off his summer of 2011 withdraw to summer/fall of 2014, we may have just given the ANSF a chance. It may have been too early like it was in IRQ to go home, but we'll see. Oh, yes, we'll see.
Like I put in a comment SEPCOR, I will keep beating this drum. I will not let the false narrative pushed by the present administration's apologists stand unopposed. I will not go quietly in to that sweet night. No, I will rage, rage, rage against the fading light. I was there. I was part of that process. It is my duty to tell this story and to make sure the facts are out there, regardless if people want to believe it or not. A picture is worth a thousand words, and after yesterday's post - I think I'll just let the picture tell the rest.
I guess it is time, again, as I have done every few years for the last decade+, to review how we got to where we are in AFG. To understand why we are here, you have to know how we got here. It isn’t an easy story, but it should not be a surprise. Click the AFG tab if you want to see what I’ve written in the past on the topic, but I’ll summarize a bit here. It can be best described in seven acts. Act 1: Original Sin – Take the institutional arrogance of United Nations bureaucrats, business-class flying NGO leadership, Davos world view, and imbue it with a slight whiff of residual colonial parochialism, and you have the immediate post-911 Bonn Agreement. It was finalized when many of our Special Forces still had not washed the horse sweat from their DCUs. It set up a structure for the future Afghanistan before the power centers there could weigh in. Afghan solutions to Afghan problems and all that was simply not transformational enough. There were good people there who meant well, but it was asking too much, too soon, with too little appreciation for the realities of Afghanistan. This isn’t 20/20 hindsight either. We argued it at the time along the lines of, “Are they really committed to this for the long haul?” This ran for roughly the first 2-3 years. Two recommendations for the later portions of this period that don’t get the attention they deserve: First, Sarah Chayes’s book, The Punishment of Virtue, and the documentary by Sedika Mojadidi, Motherland Afghanistan. Act 2:Allied Hope – NATO decided to prove that it was more than just an exercise club and more than Euro-centric. As with a rather small footprint the USA seemed to have AFG under control, NATO believed it could take charge. From 2005-2006 it was decided while the USA remained in control of Regional Command East (RC-E), the Brits, Canadians, and Dutch would take RC-S, the Spanish and Italians would take RC-W, the Germans RC-N, and the Turks would take RC-C in Kabul. It looked OK for a while, but the security situation started to spiral out of control. The exercise club also took some of its bad habits with it to war, and it stumbled. First, the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements out of Mons just never got filled. Some of the contributing nations who did throw their hat in the ring only did so with so many national caveats and ROE restrictions that they could never leave base, or if they did, couldn’t do much. They didn’t bring the right kit, or for some newer NATO nations, had no idea how to deploy. The assumption was Uncle Sam would, as always, pick up the slack. Act 3: Buyer’s Remorse – By late 2006, the NATO-sceptics critique started to break above the happy-talk. AFG was more serious than NATO and the USA were saying, and most of the alliance member were not up to the challenge, and if they were – their staying power was brittle at best. If you had to draw the line somewhere, it would have been the summer of 2007 when NATO failed to fill the rotary-wing aviation bridging force. At the last minute, a combination of US military and civilian contractors filled the gap. After that goat rope, it was clear that NATO culminated. It was clear to the Americans in NATO and at the USA Joint Staff. Planning began to, in unkind terms, take back the keys … as long as the surge in Iraq worked. Some of the larger minimal-caveat maneuver forces, the Dutch and the Canadians, had already signaled they had enough and were going home. We needed to not only replace them over time, but increase the national presence overall. Bit by bit, RC by RC, we took the keys back. Act 4: Classic COIN’s Stillbirth – There is a little overlap between Act 3 and 4, as they transitioned slowly in parallel. A new Scots-Irish General came to lead the US forces in AFG and ISAF, General McKiernan, USA. He brought with him “Shape, Clear, Hold, Build” – a plan to combine civilian, governmental, and military efforts district by district to enable government of Afghanistan control. Shape and Clear required additional forces. Through late 2007 and 2008 the planning for the uplift of forces (surge) was made. The Iraqi surge’s success happened just in time, and forces were able to begin coming in by the summer of 2008. Then we had an election. The new administration came in to Kabul to look over the surge plans, and with minimal changes, allowed it to continue. It was clear that there were new ideas with Holbrook and his fellow travelers, but that it would take a year for them to get those ideas ready for President Obama to issue derived D&G. With SCHB and the uplift, we thought at the time this was a decade long effort if we stuck with it. In Destile Gardens we would darky speak that if we ditched this conditioned based plan and went to a calendar based plan, we might as well just retreat to the nearest airhead and go home. It took less than a year. Act 5: Retreat – President Obama’s December 2009 West Point speech where he announced a calendar based plan that signaled retreat, it seemed everything else was just commentary on the inevitable drive to The Friendship Bridge … if we were lucky. In a story yet to be told well by anyone … over the course of the next year, someone competent and knowledgeable about military matters got the ear of President Obama and we never fully left in the summer of 2011 as he outlined. We hedged, and we got lucky. Act 6: The Great Dithering – Obama moved the decision point to the right, to the next President. We treaded water in quiet, drone filled dreams of hoping that Afghanistan would just go away. From the end of his first administration through his second, we dithered. We mowed the grass and relied on hope. He hoped a disaster didn’t happen on his watch, we hoped for something we could call a win. Act 7: Acceptance and Salvage – Here we are in Act 7. As with the change from Bush to Obama, the first year of Trump will mostly be the conditions created by the prior administration. As with McMaster and Mattis having better first hand knowledge of the area, it appears that we may see changes faster. This week, we have heard that President Trump has a plan to look at;
The Washington Post this week reported that senior administration officials are pushing President Donald Trump to effectively return to the combat mission against the Taliban, adding thousands of troops to the fight.
Sources told the paper the new plan would also authorize the Pentagon to set its own troop numbers for Afghanistan, instead of following White House recommendations. Pentagon officials would also review the rules of engagement for troops operating there, following a Trump campaign trail promise to give military leaders more autonomy.
...
White House spokesman Sean Spicer said no decisions on troop levels in Afghanistan have been finalized yet, but he reiterated Trump’s promises to keep America safe and root out terrorist threats across the globe.
“One of the things he has asked our national security team to think through is to think through the strategy,” he said. “How do we win? How do we eliminate the threat?”
We should wait and see – and serious national security people need to give Mattis and his team the benefit of the doubt and a chance. We can’t rewind back to 2009. The window long ago closed for SCHB and helping district by district drag Afghanistan to where we would like them to be. Perhaps in Act 7 we can salvage something from Act 6. We keep enough forces in place to help build capacity of the ANSF (#evergreen) and to have the ability to kill AQ and ISIS where they pop their head up, as it pleases us. We accept that Afghanistan will have to come to peace on Afghan terms as best it can with its always restive Pashtun plurality. As long as trans-national terrorists can’t use it as a base, then that should be OK. That should be good enough, and perhaps where we should have kept it before Act 1 set everyone off this long, sordid task almost a generation ago.
becomes less of a book and more of a way of life when action is needed.
and 
; too comfortable in their positions of power and influence.
and 
.
