Showing posts with label Corvette. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Corvette. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 27, 2021

Is Sweden Going to Lap us Again?


Plucky Sweden, a nation 32 times smaller than the USA, produces some exceptional weapons - mostly on her own.

Looks like they are going to leverage Visby ... and I'm a bit jealous.

I'm seething over at USNIBlog.

Come on by, pull up an Ikea chair, and push some meatballs and herring around the plate with me.

Monday, August 24, 2020

Russian Shipbuilding "Suitcases Without Handles" - Sounds Familiar

For reference, Project 20280 is the Steregushchiy Class Corvettes. From a distance and looking at her lines and weapons capability, she seems at sexy, teethy beast ... and she is. 

As we have been our own worst enemy in surface ships this century, it is easy to despair as we see what other people are building ... but we should take some comfort in this; they are having troubles too. 

Take some time to dig through the google translation of an article from a topwar.ru on the challenge the Russians have had with where they were and want to be with their near shore surface fleet. 

Old Cold Warriors like myself still twitch at the thought of Russian/Soviet submarines prowling the northern latitudes ... but that threat is but a shadow of itself. What we can forget is that from the Russian point of view ... the threat from Western submarines never left. 

Walk a bit in the Russians' moccasins;
2016 was a landmark year in the Navy's approach to anti-submarine defense. This year, the last diesel corvettes 20380 and the lead corvettes 20386 were laid down. Since then, no other BMZ ANTI-WATER SHIP has been laid down in Russia. Four years later, in Russia, three (!) Corvette vital for the fleet remained in the construction, except for 20386, namely "Strict" project 20380, "Agile" project 20385 at the "Severnaya Verf" and "Sharp" project 20380 at the ASZ. And that's it! And this is in a country whose potential adversary's power is based on nuclear submarines of outstanding combat qualities. It's just unthinkable. 6 units of 20380 were delivered to the fleet, two more corvettes of project 20380 are being prepared for mooring (“Zealous” at “Severnaya Verf” and “Aldar Tsydenzhapov” in the Pacific Ocean). At the same time, the money for shipbuilding was quite allocated. "Monument of project 20386" has already spent huge amounts of money on itself, and, perhaps, "will ask for more." At the same time, the time of the ship's readiness is unknown and cannot be predicted, but the budgets for it have been mastered. A series of "suitcases without handles" is under construction - patrol ships of Project 22160. They are under construction with very limited combat capabilities of MRK. In general, these three undertakings were very expensive for the country: they could completely upgrade the surface fleet at BMZ with multipurpose ships. These expenses cannot be called rational. But the fleet developed without any intelligible strategy, and what happened was happening. The anti-submarine defense was weak before our eyes, but there was a feeling that this did not bother anyone.
"Suitcases without handles." I couldn't help but laugh at this problem we share with our Russians in trying to successfully run shipbuilding programs in the 21st Century ... and I can feel their frustration. We built Little Crappy Ships that seem to go few places and when they get there can do so little ... about as helpful as "suitcases without handles." Yes, I shall use that nice Russian phrase. 

I also can feel this sense of relief that - like our upcoming FREMM-based FFG(X), there may be relief on the way;
Corvette project 20380 in any of its options is not at all ideal. He has a lot of shortcomings. But today we have a choice between "nothing" and 20380. In such conditions, the renewal of the 20380 series is absolutely correct and uncontested. However, the question of what the corvette should actually be for the forces of the near sea zone, what weapons and capabilities it should have, has not lost its importance. And in the near future, an analysis of the possibilities of building such ships in the form in which they are needed will be done. In the meantime, let us congratulate the Navy on returning to the right path. Let's hope that this victory of common sense will be far from the only one.
Anyway, give the whole thing a read and give a nod to our Russian friends. At least we don't have their problems.

H/t SJS.

Friday, October 25, 2019

Fullbore Friday

War wages all around you, and yet, you have your modest ship.
The motor vessel Ondina was a modern Dutch tanker of the Petroleum Company La Corona and had been delivered by the Dutch Dry Dock Company in Amsterdam [Amsterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij ADM]. The tanker had an overall length of 130 meters and a standard displacement of 6,341 ton and was equipped with a 6 cylinder Werkspoor diesel engine with a modest power supply of 2,800 shp. The maximum speed of the Ondina therefor was only 12 knots.
Each day brings harder news, yet you have a mission. 

The enemy is all around, and escorts are few. Who will protect you from the enemy?
...the new Bathurst-class corvette HMIS Bengal, which was destined for the British Indian Navy. During the Second World War 60 of these ships were constructed after an Australian design. Four of these corvettes, often called minesweepers as they were equipped with minesweeping equipment, had been built in the framework of the ’Commonwealth’s Shipbuilding Programme’ for the Indian Navy. British India at that time was still a British colony and therefore automatically a member of the Commonwealth. The four ships built for India were HMIS Madras, HMIS Punjab, HMIS Bombay and HMIS Bengal. This last ship was taken into service on 8 August, 1942, by Lieutenant Commander W.J. Wilson of the Royal Navy Reserve (RNR).

The corvettes of the Bathurst-class originally had a standard displacement of 650 ton but during the war the vessels were loaded with masses of extra equipment, ammunition and depth charges; so fully equipped they had a displacement of over 1,000 ton. The ships were provided with a triple expansion steam engine which supplied 2,000 shp. The max speed of the corvettes was designed to be 15 knots, but because of the larger displacement most of them did not go faster than 13 knots. On HMIS Bengal a 7.6cm gun (twelve pounder) had been installed as the foreseen 10.2cm guns were no longer in stock. The secondary armament of the ship consisted of a 40mm Bofors and two 20mm Oerlikon machine guns as anti-aircraft weapons. For the anti-submarine warfare the multi-purpose vessel was equipped with a type 38 Asdic (fore runner of the sonar) and 40 depth charges.

As the Bengal had only a capacity of 186 tons of heavy liquid fuel oil she could not reach India in one go from the Australian mainland. But sailing together, the ships would serve each other: the Ondina received an escort for part of the trip and HMIS Bengal could obtain fuel from the Dutch tank ship. It was scheduled that the Ondina and the Bengal would split up at Diego Garcia on the Chagos Archipellago south of the Maldives. On 5 November, 1942, the two allied ships departed from Fremantle. With an average speed of 10 knots it promised to be a long and dull crossing.
Dull? No. That was not to be.
In the morning of 11 November, 1942, HMIS Bengal and the Ondina sailed in line ahead, heading west-north-west. It was a nice and sunny day with a flat sea and excellent visibility. Around 11:30 a lookout of the Ondina saw two ships appear over the horizon at 90 degrees over port at a distance of approximately 12,000 meters. A little bit later the ships were also sighted from the Bengal. Because of the high deckhouses the strange ships for a moment were taken to be aircraft carriers. Because there had been no mentioning at all about allied ships being in the neighborhood, both Ondina and Bengal sounded the alarm and both ships turned 90 degrees to starboard, away from the suspected enemy ships. Around 11:50 Bengal signaled to Ondina to maintain her heading. The Bengal herself turned into the opposite direction in order to catch up head on with the enemy ships and to create time for Ondina to escape.


The enemy ships were recognized to be Japanese auxiliary cruisers and the Bengal steamed straight forward towards the one in front. First they thought that they were facing Hokoku Maru and the smaller Kunikawa Maru. Captain Horsman understood that he would never be able to pick up sufficient speed with his slow tanker to escape from the faster Japanese vessels and decided to face the battle and to support the Bengal with his 10.2cm gun. Just before 12:00 Hokoku Maru opened fire at HMIS Bengal and at 11:58 the corvette send an SOS signal to Fremantle with the message that they and the Ondina were under fire of two Japanese raiders in the position of 19.38 degrees southern latitude and 93.5 degrees eastern longitude, about half way Fremantle and the Chagos Archipellago. HMIS Bengal answered the fire of the Hokoku Maru with her twelve pounder. Second mate Bakker of the Ondina, who was the artillery commander of the tanker and was standing on the poop deck next to the gun, asked permission from captain Horsman to open fire. Steaming away from the approaching Japanese auxiliary cruisers, the captain of the Ondina granted permission. The artillery crew consisted of merchant seaman Visser, Able Seaman B.A. Hammond of the Royal Australian Navy and the Acting Able Bodied Seamen R.H. Bayliss, H.C. Boyce and H.A. Brooklyn of the Royal Navy. The Ondina opened fire when the Hokoku Maru had approached till about 8.000 meters, around 12:05. While the Dutch tanker received her first 14cm hit, which splintered the mast, the first 10.2cm shell of the Ondina went wide and the second hit just in front of the bow of the Japanese auxiliary cruiser. Therewith Second Mate Bakker could adjust his fire and the third grenade hit the deckhouse of the enemy ship. This was an extra ordinary achievement as the Ondina was not equipped with distance measuring equipment nor with fire-guidance. Bakker now diverted his fire to the stern of the Hokoku Maru. Whilst both HMIS Bengal as the Hokoku Maru continued to shoot at each other the fifth or sixth shot of the Ondina caused an enormous explosion on the Japanese auxiliary cruiser. A giant yellowish flame erupted and soon thereafter part of the stern broke off while the wrecked float planes shattered into the sea. The broken part of the rear of the ship sank and wild fires broke out in various places onboard the ship. Thereafter the ship listed heavily to starboard which caused ammunition to roll over and even more explosions erupted.

Aboard the Ondina they could not believe their ears and eyes The artillery crew danced for joy in spite of the fact that some enemy shells hit which damaged the radio antenna and one of the starboard life boats. The Chinese crew members who were not on duty, had sought a safe refuge below deck and AB Seaman Henry did his utmost to keep them composed. The Aikoku Maru now took aim on both ships and placed several hits on both ships that caused little damage though. When the Bengal ran out of ammunition the corvette put up a smoke screen and turned away from the battle around 12:40. One minute later the Bengal was hit again; this time in the rear which caused a fire to start. The crew of the corvette however succeeded to control the fire. The last they saw of the Ondina aboard the Bengal was that the tanker received a hit on the bridge at 13:08 and desperately tried to prevent further hits by changing course all the time a little bit. The corvette after having seen this, sent a coded message with the information that one of the auxiliary cruisers as well as the tanker had been sunk.

Aboard the Hokoku Maru the crew could not control the heavy fires and Commander Hiroshi could do nothing else but to issue the order to abandon ship. In the meantime on board all electrical power had failed and the engine rooms were ablaze. Because the Hokoku Maru was a converted merchant ship she did not have many watertight compartments; consequently the vessel made quickly a lot of water and after another heavy explosion the auxiliary cruiser foundered at 13:12. Of the 354 crew 76 lost their lives amongst whom Captain Hiroshi. 
 
In the meantime Ondina had fired her last 10.2cm shells whilst the Aikoku Maru had closed in on the tanker up to approximately 3.500 meters. Captain Horsman ordered white flags to be hoisted and ordered to abandon ship. The engines had stopped and the crew disembarked the ship in three life boats and two life rafts. The hit that struck the Ondina at 13:08 on her bridge, the last to be seen by the Bengal, killed captain Horsman. The remaining Japanese raider approached the Ondina up till 400 yards and launched two torpedoes towards the abandoned ship that both hit. Large holes were blasted in the starboard side of tanks number 1 and 2. This caused the Ondina to list to about thirty degrees, but remained floating on the other tanks. Thereafter the auxiliary cruiser maneuvered along the bow of the tanker, of which the Japanese thought that its fate had been sealed and started to machine gun the life boats and rafts. This war crime was probably committed out of frustration about the sinking of the Hokoku Maru and the escape of the Bengal. By this machine gunning three Chinese stokers were killed and the chief engineer J.J. Niekerk and ABS Henry were severely wounded. Chief engineer Niekerk died an hour afterwards from his wounds.

At 15:00 the Aikoku Maru had picked up the survivors of her sister ship and returned to the Dutch tanker. The Japanese fired another torpedo but missed. Convinced that the tanker had been lost, the Japanese auxiliary cruiser left the battle scene and sailed away in northerly direction without any further concern about the drowning crew of the Ondina.

Salvage of the Ondina
After the first mate Rehwinkel had provided a seaman’s grave to the chief engineer, he wanted to return to the Ondina. Of the crewmembers that were with him in the life boat only sailor Visser was prepared to accompany him. The others, Chinese crew members refused to come along as they feared that the Ondina would sink as yet. Second mate Bakker in the meantime, with the motor launch in which he was commander, had returned to the tanker. Together with third engineer Leys, the Australian gunner Hammond and the British artillerist Ryan he boarded the ship which was still on fire in several places. Bakker and the gunners started to pump water into several of the port tanks which slowly righted the Ondina. Leys inspected the engine room and established that the diesel engine was still in working condition. The motor launch was sent to collect the other life boats and rafts and Leys and Bakker went to the bridge where a fire was still burning. The fire was extinguished by both men after which they carried the body of the captain to his cabin. The tanker had in the meantime been righted and the outboard valves could be closed. Around 19:00 all life boats were alongside the tanker and the crews from the rafts had been taken aboard the life boats. The life boats were hoisted on board as good and as bad as this was possible and secured. The stokers and engineers went to work and a few hours later first officer Rehwinkel could give the order ”slow ahead”. And somewhat later even “full ahead”. The heavily damaged tanker set her heading for Fremantle while the crew extinguished the last fires in the forecastle.

The next day captain Horsman received a dignified seaman’s burial. The wounded were cause for serious worry. Especially ABS Henry was in serious condition. He had a crushed leg and had lost a lot of blood and was in urgent need of professional care. After two days the crew of the Ondina was of the opinion to be safe enough to send a radio message and to ask for medical assistance. This message was sent in clear language as, after the order to abandon ship, all secret documents and also the code book had been thrown overboard. The surprising and unexpected message was being received by the allied authorities in Colombo on Ceylon and in Fremantle with disbelieve and mistrust. As the Bengal had indeed reported the Ondina to be sunk and a trap, created by the Japanese in order to lure a ship towards them, was suspected. From Fremantle a signal was sent to inquire about her position. Rehwinkel did not dare to provide this because his clear language message could also be read by the enemy. Therefore medical assistance remained lacking for the time being.

It was not until 17 November before the damaged tanker was reconnoitered by an Australian Catalina flying boat, over 220 nm north-west of Fremantle. Onboard the Ondina shortly before, a ship had been spotted and with signal lamp the Catalina was asked to contact that ship and to ask for the presence of a doctor. The relevant ship turned out to be the Australian hospital ship HMAS Wanganella and it was directed quickly towards the Ondina. By quick handling of the doctors the life of ABS Henry could be saved. The next day the Dutch tanker entered the port of Fremantle after a trip that had not proceeded according to expectations and which had cost the lives of five crew. The day before HMIS Bengal had safely made the harbor of Diego Garcia. The last days the corvette had to sail at slow speed to safe fuel, but there had been no further problems.
Note, both ships ran out of ammo.

You never have enough ammo.

The accountants and supply people are always wrong. Take what they say you need, and add at least 30% more.

Always.

Also, when the next war comes, and it will - what are our plans to give our auxiliaries teeth? They will need it - regardless what the peacetime theorists say.

They always have during every war with a maritime component. From the dawn of time. It won't be different next time either.




Nice video here a year later of the Bengal.


H/t MR.

Sunday, July 15, 2018

How Small Ships Can Make a Big Navy Better, on Midrats


Building off our discussions from last week's Midrats, our guest this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern will be Lieutenant Joshua M. Roaf, USN to discuss part of the solution to improving the professional performance of our Surface Warfare Officers in what should be the core of their skillset; seamanship.

Using many of the issues he raised in a recent article co-authored with LT Adam Biggs, USN, Bring Back the Patrol Craft, we will explore the various advantages of returning balance to the fleet with an expansion of truly small surface combatants.

A native of Bennington, Vermont, LT Roaf graduated from Ithaca College, Ithaca NY in 2010 with a bachelor’s degree in Biochemistry and earned his commission from Officer Candidate School in 2010.

Afloat, Lieutenant Roaf completed his division officer tours aboard USS REUBEN JAMES (FFG57) where he served as the Main Propulsion Officer and Electrical Officer and then aboard USS ANZIO (CG-68) as the Navigator and Executive Department Head. During his sea tours, he participated in numerous Multi-National exercises (RIMPAC 2011/12, CANADIAN TGEX, BOLD ALLIGATOR, JOINT WARRIOR) and completed two Western Pacific deployments.

Ashore, Lieutenant Roaf taught navigation, naval operations and leadership development through the North Carolina Piedmont Region Consortium (NCPR) Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) at the University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill (UNC). Additionally, he earned his Professional Science Master’s (PSM) in Toxicology degree from the UNC. In support of this degree, Lieutenant Roaf completed a joint internship at the Wright Paterson Air Force base in Dayton Ohio working with the Navy Medical Research Unit.

He is currently stationed at Surface Warfare Officer School in Newport RI, training to become a Department Head afloat.

Join us live if you can, but if you miss the show you can always listen to the archive at blogtalkradio or Stitcher

If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here.


Monday, October 09, 2017

Engineering is hard. Even harder in a global marketplace

New ships and their engineering plants have a long history of growing pains of one cause or another. Our LCS and the Royal Navy Type-45 are just two of the most recent examples.

At the end of this small article at StrategyPage.com's Murphy's Law about the next batch of 5 German Navy K130 corvettes, the author brings up a couple of issues that are a bit under-appreciated;
The first five K130s didn’t enter service until 2010 because it was found that there was a serious problem with the first ones delivered. It seems that the gearbox for the diesel engines were defective. Some screws came loose, fell into the gears, causing them fail. The gearbox was manufactured by a Swiss firm, and the Swiss reputation for flawless engineering was believed to have made a problem like this nearly impossible. But it turned out that the Swiss subcontracted much of the work to a Polish firm, which did not have the same Swiss standards of engineering excellence. The Germans demanded that the Swiss clear up this mess and delayed the first K130s entering service until 2010. The first two K130s were commissioned in 2008, but were soon decommissioned until the gearbox problems were addressed. Three more K130s were not commissioned until they had any needed modifications to their gearboxes and five were in service by 2013.
First issue: when you outsource your engineering - don't assume that is the end of the outsourcing chain. If you are "buying" a supplier's reputation, and are you actually getting that which you thing you're buying?

Second issue: while the peacetime economics may be sound, what are the potential issues at war with having significant parts of your warships built in other nations - especially ones that are not even allied with you?

When the next multi-year nation-state on nation-state war comes, which it will, who will be able at war to best get around the outsourcing efficiencies of peace?

Tuesday, January 10, 2017

The Corvettes of Winter

Don't get me wrong, I love the Baltics - it's beautiful, the people are great - but, well, there are the winters...

As such, I don't know about you, but even for a Russian, there has to be a better place for a Black Sea ship to overwinter than that sad, little, abused, and threadbare corner of the former East Prussia;
“Your greetings and the warmth of your hearts to Kaliningrad!!” — On October 26, the DFR Lab revealed that two Russian Buyan-M class corvettes of the Black Sea Fleet, armed with Kalibr-NK long-range cruise missiles, had entered the Baltic Sea. The deployment was a surprise, because only three weeks earlier, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) had announced that the ships were to be attached to its Mediterranean squadron.
Read the whole thing over at medium.com, they've done a great job with OSINT to geo-locate exactly where these two exceptional corvettes are located.
The Russian MoD has not officially confirmed the transfer of the two corvettes to the Baltic Fleet. Its latest official statement is the one from October 5 in which it announced their attachment to the Mediterranean squadron.
However, on October 26, Russian media outlet “Izvestiya” ran a report quoting an anonymous “official source from the Russian Ministry of Defense” which appeared to confirm the deployment.
Baltic or Med? Who knows. I do know Sailors though ... and I think they'd rather winter in Tartus or Sevastopol.

There are other issues with Russian plans for the enclave;
The article reported that the Baltic Fleet would soon be reinforced with a division of Buyan-M class missile corvettes, armed with Kalibr missiles. It went on:
According to Izvestiya’s information, the first two small missile ships — “Zelenyy Dol” and “Serpukhov” — are being transferred from the Black to the Baltic Sea, and will soon join the newly formed division. Three more missile ships will be constructed and sent to the Baltic Fleet by the end of 2020.
“The formation of a small missile ship division and brigade within the Baltic Fleet has already started,” an official source from the Russian Ministry of Defense told Izvestiya. “We are planning to finish the job in two to three years. Currently, the newly-formed divisions have already received their first missile complexes and ships.”
And no, I don't think this is part of any Russian dis-information campaign. Russian PAOs are just not that well organized in the Baltic right now. They do plan to build up the Baltic Fleet, and Kaliber capable surface combatants are no longer needed near Syria.

If you are a geography geek like me, enter 54.637778, 19.945833 in to GoogleEarth and play around the port of Baltiysk (nee Pillau) and the neat old Swedish star-fort ruins. Kind of sad the mis-use of the land you can see from the air over then entire enclave - but such is war and Soviet/Russia misuse of once productive land.

To get a better view of the issues, take some time to follow the Kaliningrad/Polish border. Though not a Bavarian landscape, the Polish side is full of small farms, functional villages, and a people trying to make the most economic good of the land. On the Kaliningrad side? Yikes. The Russian part of East Prussia is to the former East Prussia what the NYC of "I am Legend" is to NYC of today.

Oh, and that island at N54 36' 37.31" E19 56' 53.1" - I'd like to know its history. 

Friday, January 06, 2017

Fullbore Friday

For you fans of, "The Cruel Sea" ... I repost this about once a year as I just love the history and record of this scrappy class of warship.

I was reminded today of her via Claude's retweet about the HMCS SACKVILLE
Even if you've read this FbF in the past - give it another read.


What happens when a Navy finds itself short and has to play catch-up until the yards can design and build a more capable fleet? Sink all its funds into a few big ships and then hold its breath? Perhaps build good enough until you get yourself straightened out? Go smart?
They were a stop-gap measure to take the strain of convoy protection until large numbers of larger vessels — destroyers and frigates — could be produced. Their simple design using parts common to merchant shipping meant they could be constructed in small commercial shipyards all over the United Kingdom and eastern Canada where larger ships like destroyers could not be built. Additionally, the use of commercial machinery meant that the largely reserve and volunteer crews that manned them were familiar with their operation.
Yep, you knew they were going to make it to FbF - The Flower Class Corvette from one of the books on Phibian's professional reading list (hey, there is an idea I never get around to), The Cruel Sea. For a 205', 33' beam 16 kt ship - she seems multi-mission to me.
* 1 x 4 in (102 mm) BL Mk IX gun,
* One QF 2 pounder naval gun (40 mm) "pom-pom"
* Six x 20 mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns
* One Hedgehog A/S Mortar
* Depth charge projectors
Range 3,500 nautical miles at 12 knots, and oh boy did they made a lot of them; 267. Duty is as duty does - the Battle of the Atlantic would have been lost without them.
Service on corvettes was cold, wet, monotonous and uncomfortable. The ships were nicknamed "the pekingese of the ocean". They had a reputation of being very bad at rolling in heavy seas, with 80-degree rolls (that is, 40 degrees each side of the normal upright position) (check out the pics here) being fairly common - according to Nicholas Monsarrat they "would roll on wet grass" - however, they were very seaworthy ships, and no seaman was ever lost overboard from a Flower during WW2.Flower corvettes provided the main escort duties during the critical Battle of the Atlantic, and so were in the thick of the fight. Their primary aim was to ensure that merchantmen survived the crossing rather than sink U-boats, and so if a convoy encountered a U-boat a typical action would involve the corvette forcing the submarine to dive (thus limiting its speed and manoeverability) and keeping it underwater (and pre-occupied with avoiding depth charge attack) long enough for the convey to pass unmolested. This tactic was stretched to the limits when the U-boats made a 'wolf-pack' attack, intended to swamp the convoy's defences, and the Flower's low top speed made effective pursuit of a surfaced U-boat impossible.

Radar, Huff-Duff radio direction finding, depth-charge projectors and ASDIC meant that the Flower was well equipped to detect and defend, but lack of speed meant that they were not so capable of joining the more glamorous fast hunter-killer surface groups which were in place by the end of the war. Success for a Flower, therefore, should be measured in terms of tonnage protected rather than U-Boats sunk. Typical reports of convoy actions by these craft include numerous instances of U-Boat detection near a convoy, short engagement with gun or depth-charge, followed by a rapid return to station as another U-Boat takes advantage of the fight to attack the unguarded convoy. Continuous actions of this kind against a numerically superior U-Boat pack demanded considerable seamanship skills from all concerned, and were very wearing on the crew.

35 were lost at sea, of which 22 were torpedoed by U-boats, and 4 sunk by mines. It is thought that Flowers participated in the sinking of 47 U-boats and 4 Italian submarines.
How is this for you Snipes out there.
2 fire tube boilers, one 4-cycle triple-expansion steam engine
Don't laugh at that plant - after the war they proved their value.
Of particular interest is the story of HMCS Sudbury, built in Ontario in 1941. After WW2 ended she was converted to a towboat and Harold Elworthy, owner of Island Tug & Barge bought her in 1954. The Sudbury and her crew specialized in deep-sea salvage and completed many dramatic operations, but made their reputation in November/December 1955 when they pulled off the daring North Pacific rescue of the Greek freighter Makedonia.

The Sudbury towed the disabled vessel for 40 days through some of the roughest weather imaginable before arriving safely into Vancouver to a hero's welcome. The incident made headlines around the world and for the next decade the Sudbury and her 65-meter sister ship Sudbury II, purchased by Island Tug in 1958 were the most famous tugs on the Pacific coast.
There is actually one as a museum ship, HMCS SACKVILLE (K-181) that is pictured below. What a class of ship.

Friday, January 29, 2016

Fullbore Friday

There is a case that can be made for LCS. It is that, yes, LCS is really that bad - but it is what it is. We need good enough until we can get our act together and get better.

5 years past the tipping point to get better and on the down-slope to the Terrible 20s, they have a point. It is a good and sober opinion, and one that has some historical support.

An encore FbF puts some light on that idea. Ponder it a bit. You can also ponder that a FLOWER Class Corvette is still a more dangerous warship to everything but aircraft than a 2016 LCS ... but let's not spoil the party a bit.

For you fans of, "The Cruel Sea" ....


What happens when a Navy finds itself short and has to play catch-up until the yards can design and build a more capable fleet? Sink all its funds into a few big ships and then hold its breath? Perhaps build good enough until you get yourself straightened out? Go smart?
They were a stop-gap measure to take the strain of convoy protection until large numbers of larger vessels — destroyers and frigates — could be produced. Their simple design using parts common to merchant shipping meant they could be constructed in small commercial shipyards all over the United Kingdom and eastern Canada where larger ships like destroyers could not be built. Additionally, the use of commercial machinery meant that the largely reserve and volunteer crews that manned them were familiar with their operation.
Yep, you knew they were going to make it to FbF - The Flower Class Corvette from one of the books on Phibian's professional reading list (hey, there is an idea I never get around to), The Cruel Sea. For a 205', 33' beam 16 kt ship - she seems multi-mission to me.
* 1 x 4 in (102 mm) BL Mk IX gun,
* One QF 2 pounder naval gun (40 mm) "pom-pom"
* Six x 20 mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns
* One Hedgehog A/S Mortar
* Depth charge projectors
Range 3,500 nautical miles at 12 knots, and oh boy did they made a lot of them; 267. Duty is as duty does - the Battle of the Atlantic would have been lost without them.
Service on corvettes was cold, wet, monotonous and uncomfortable. The ships were nicknamed "the pekingese of the ocean". They had a reputation of being very bad at rolling in heavy seas, with 80-degree rolls (that is, 40 degrees each side of the normal upright position) (check out the pics here) being fairly common - according to Nicholas Monsarrat they "would roll on wet grass" - however, they were very seaworthy ships, and no seaman was ever lost overboard from a Flower during WW2.
Flower corvettes provided the main escort duties during the critical Battle of the Atlantic, and so were in the thick of the fight. Their primary aim was to ensure that merchantmen survived the crossing rather than sink U-boats, and so if a convoy encountered a U-boat a typical action would involve the corvette forcing the submarine to dive (thus limiting its speed and manoeverability) and keeping it underwater (and pre-occupied with avoiding depth charge attack) long enough for the convey to pass unmolested. This tactic was stretched to the limits when the U-boats made a 'wolf-pack' attack, intended to swamp the convoy's defences, and the Flower's low top speed made effective pursuit of a surfaced U-boat impossible.

Radar, Huff-Duff radio direction finding, depth-charge projectors and ASDIC meant that the Flower was well equipped to detect and defend, but lack of speed meant that they were not so capable of joining the more glamorous fast hunter-killer surface groups which were in place by the end of the war. Success for a Flower, therefore, should be measured in terms of tonnage protected rather than U-Boats sunk. Typical reports of convoy actions by these craft include numerous instances of U-Boat detection near a convoy, short engagement with gun or depth-charge, followed by a rapid return to station as another U-Boat takes advantage of the fight to attack the unguarded convoy. Continuous actions of this kind against a numerically superior U-Boat pack demanded considerable seamanship skills from all concerned, and were very wearing on the crew.

35 were lost at sea, of which 22 were torpedoed by U-boats, and 4 sunk by mines. It is thought that Flowers participated in the sinking of 47 U-boats and 4 Italian submarines.
How is this for you Snipes out there.
2 fire tube boilers, one 4-cycle triple-expansion steam engine
Don't laugh at that plant - after the war they proved their value.
Of particular interest is the story of HMCS Sudbury, built in Ontario in 1941. After WW2 ended she was converted to a towboat and Harold Elworthy, owner of Island Tug & Barge bought her in 1954. The Sudbury and her crew specialized in deep-sea salvage and completed many dramatic operations, but made their reputation in November/December 1955 when they pulled off the daring North Pacific rescue of the Greek freighter Makedonia.

The Sudbury towed the disabled vessel for 40 days through some of the roughest weather imaginable before arriving safely into Vancouver to a hero's welcome. The incident made headlines around the world and for the next decade the Sudbury and her 65-meter sister ship Sudbury II, purchased by Island Tug in 1958 were the most famous tugs on the Pacific coast.
There is actually one as a museum ship, HMCS SACKVILLE (K-181) that is pictured below. What a class of ship.

Tuesday, November 26, 2013

Easy solution if you just tilt your head a bit

Syndey said something earlier this year that has kind of stuck in my craw;
For now, until the LCS becomes fully operational, it’s up to the Cyclones to patrol the shallows.
Isn't LCS a little overkill? If you think the PC lacks a bit of punch as well, is there something that might be better for the job?

Well, what are the basics?
Cyclone Class PC
Displacement: 336 metric tons
Length: 55 m
Beam: 7.6 m
Draft: 2.3 m
Installed Power: 4 Paxman diesels;
Propulsion: 4 shafts;
Speed: 35 knots
Range: 2000-2500nm at 12knots, with transit fuel reserve
Crew: 4 officers, 24 enlisted personnel
Armament: 2 × MK 38 25 mm autocannon
5 ×.50 caliber machine guns
2 × MK 19 40 mm automatic grenade launchers
2 × M240B machine guns
6 × FIM-92 Stinger SAMs
Wait ... what do I see?

Ambassador Class Fast Missile Craft
Displacement: 500 t
Length: 60.6 m
Beam: 10 m
Draft: 2 m
Installed power: 4 × MTU diesels
Propulsion: 4 shafts
Speed: 41 knots
Range: 2,000 nmi at 15 knots
Crew: 8 officers, 28 enlisted
Armament: 8 × RGM-84 Boeing Harpoon SSM Block 1G in 2 quad canister launchers
1 × General Dynamics/OTO Melara Mk 75 76 mm/62 Super Rapid DP gun
1 × Mk 31 Mod 3 RIM-116 RAM (21 missiles)
1 × Raytheon Mk 15 Mod 21 Phalanx (Block 1B) 20 mm Phalanx CIWS
2 × deck-mounted 7.62 mm M60 machine guns
The Ambassador four ship run for Egypt ran $1.29 billion. That works out to ~$323 per ship.

We say that we will use LCS to replace what we now use the PC for. OK, let's use LCS-1 as the benchmark.
Displacement: 3,000 t
Length: 115 m
Beam: 17.5 m
Draft: 3.9 m
Installed power: Electrical: 4 Isotta Fraschini V1708 diesel engines, Hitzinger generator units, 800 kW each
Propulsion: 2 Rolls-Royce MT30 36 MW gas turbines, 2 Colt-Pielstick diesel engines, 4 Rolls-Royce waterjets
Speed: 47 knots
Range: 3,500 nmi at 18 knots
Boats & landing craft carried: 11 m (36 ft) RHIB, 40 ft (12 m) high-speed boats
Complement: 15 to 50 core crew, 75 with mission crew (closer to 100 with a mission module)
Armament: 1 AGM-176 Griffin (modified to function on a ship)
1x BAE Systems Mk 110 57 mm gun, 400 rounds in turret and two ready service magazines with 240 rounds each.[9]
4x .50 in (12.7 mm) machine guns
2x 30 mm Mk44 Bushmaster II guns
One Mk 49 launcher with 21x RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile Surface-to-Air Missiles
Other weapons as part of mission modules
Aircraft carried:
2x MH-60R/S Seahawk
MQ-8 Fire Scout
You know, the production line is open. Economy of scale makes building them even less expensive. LCS is really a bit much to do what the PC are designed to do.

Why not? I don't know about you, but I would love to have a couple of dozen of these to give to our top-shelf junior LCDR to command ... heck maybe a senior LT or two ...

Sigh.

Friday, October 12, 2007

Fullbore Friday


What happens when a Navy finds itself short and has to play catch-up until the yards can design and build a more capable fleet? Sink all its funds into a few big ships and then hold its breath? Perhaps build good enough until you get yourself straightened out? Go smart?
They were a stop-gap measure to take the strain of convoy protection until large numbers of larger vessels — destroyers and frigates — could be produced. Their simple design using parts common to merchant shipping meant they could be constructed in small commercial shipyards all over the United Kingdom and eastern Canada where larger ships like destroyers could not be built. Additionally, the use of commercial machinery meant that the largely reserve and volunteer crews that manned them were familiar with their operation.
Yep, you knew they were going to make it to FbF - The Flower Class Corvette from one of the books on Phibian's professional reading list (hey, there is an idea I never get around to), The Cruel Sea. For a 205', 33' beam 16 kt ship - she seems multi-mission to me.
* 1 x 4 in (102 mm) BL Mk IX gun,
* One QF 2 pounder naval gun (40 mm) "pom-pom"
* Six x 20 mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns
* One Hedgehog A/S Mortar
* Depth charge projectors
Range 3,500 nautical miles at 12 knots, and oh boy did they made a lot of them; 267. Duty is as duty does - the Battle of the Atlantic would have been lost without them.
Service on corvettes was cold, wet, monotonous and uncomfortable. The ships were nicknamed "the pekingese of the ocean". They had a reputation of being very bad at rolling in heavy seas, with 80-degree rolls (that is, 40 degrees each side of the normal upright position) (check out the pics here) being fairly common - according to Nicholas Monsarrat they "would roll on wet grass" - however, they were very seaworthy ships, and no seaman was ever lost overboard from a Flower during WW2.

Flower corvettes provided the main escort duties during the critical Battle of the Atlantic, and so were in the thick of the fight. Their primary aim was to ensure that merchantmen survived the crossing rather than sink U-boats, and so if a convoy encountered a U-boat a typical action would involve the corvette forcing the submarine to dive (thus limiting its speed and manoeverability) and keeping it underwater (and pre-occupied with avoiding depth charge attack) long enough for the convey to pass unmolested. This tactic was stretched to the limits when the U-boats made a 'wolf-pack' attack, intended to swamp the convoy's defences, and the Flower's low top speed made effective pursuit of a surfaced U-boat impossible.

Radar, Huff-Duff radio direction finding, depth-charge projectors and ASDIC meant that the Flower was well equipped to detect and defend, but lack of speed meant that they were not so capable of joining the more glamorous fast hunter-killer surface groups which were in place by the end of the war. Success for a Flower, therefore, should be measured in terms of tonnage protected rather than U-Boats sunk. Typical reports of convoy actions by these craft include numerous instances of U-Boat detection near a convoy, short engagement with gun or depth-charge, followed by a rapid return to station as another U-Boat takes advantage of the fight to attack the unguarded convoy. Continuous actions of this kind against a numerically superior U-Boat pack demanded considerable seamanship skills from all concerned, and were very wearing on the crew.

35 were lost at sea, of which 22 were torpedoed by U-boats, and 4 sunk by mines. It is thought that Flowers participated in the sinking of 47 U-boats and 4 Italian submarines.
How is this for you Snipes out there.
2 fire tube boilers, one 4-cycle triple-expansion steam engine
Don't laugh at that plant - after the war they proved their value.
Of particular interest is the story of HMCS Sudbury, built in Ontario in 1941. After WW2 ended she was converted to a towboat and Harold Elworthy, owner of Island Tug & Barge bought her in 1954. The Sudbury and her crew specialized in deep-sea salvage and completed many dramatic operations, but made their reputation in November/December 1955 when they pulled off the daring North Pacific rescue of the Greek freighter Makedonia.

The Sudbury towed the disabled vessel for 40 days through some of the roughest weather imaginable before arriving safely into Vancouver to a hero's welcome. The incident made headlines around the world and for the next decade the Sudbury and her 65-meter sister ship Sudbury II, purchased by Island Tug in 1958 were the most famous tugs on the Pacific coast.
There is actually one as a museum ship, HMCS SACKVILLE (K-181) that is pictured below. What a class of ship.

Saturday, June 16, 2007

New Command slots opening up




Makes you want to laugh, cry, and want to speak German all at the same time. You will learn from the crew on the first ship what "Oh sh1t" is in German (hint, its Scheiße).

I don't know for sure, but I think these are the German and Danish Corvettes that were patrol of the Lebanese coast.

Boredom can be very bad for your career.


Hat tip reader Perry.