It is time again - and as usual the CBO helps best.
“As a team last year we were horrible at the fundamentals of the game of football. Nobody here knows how to block and nobody knows how to tackle. All I saw last year was grab, grab, grab! “What we’re going to do now is go back to basics and we’re going to learn, drill and practice the fundamentals until we become better at them than anyone else in the game. If you do this with me, I will make you champions.”
That alternative plan is not a recommendation by CBO but simply an illustration of the possible consequences of continuing funding for shipbuilding at its historical average amount rather than increasing it, as would be required under the Navy’s 2014 plan.243. That is real close to what number front porch? Yes ... 240. That is a number that we have been using here since well before 2010.
Purchases under that alternative plan would number 193 ships (versus 266 in the Navy’s plan), including 157 combat ships and 36 support ships.
Under that alternative plan, the battle force fleet in 2023 would be about the same size as in the Navy’s plan but by 2043 would number 243 ships, as opposed to the 306 ships in the Navy’s plan.
So again - let's use that number; 240. What do we do, and how do we do it? What are the Assumptions? What are the Risks? What must be done, what can be done, what can be done with great risk, and what is simply outside a reasonable expectation?
To not have a "minority report" using a baseline fleet +/- 240 just makes it harder for the next generation to "make it happen."