21st Century Patton, With J. Furman Daniel III - on Midrats

Put the popular, and mostly accurate, image of the flamboyant General Patton, USA given to us by popular culture to the side for a moment.

Consider the other side of the man; the strategic thinker, student of military history, and innovator for decades. This week's episode will focus on that side of the man.

For the full hour this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern, we will have as our guest J. Furman Daniel, III, the editor of the next book in the 21st Century Foundations series; 21st Century Patton.

Furman is an assistant professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Prescott, Arizona. He holds a BA (with honors) from the University of Chicago and a PhD from Georgetown University.

Join us live if you can, but if you miss the show you can always listen to the archive at blogtalkradio or Stitcher. 

If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here.

Firing Line with William F. Buckley Jr. "Is Modern Architecture Disastrous?"

Yes, as a teenager I watched Firing Line. You can still bite me - and watch this and you'll see why.

Still true today what Tom Wolfe says about modern architecture.



Hat tip Josh Greenman.

Fullbore Friday

The last year a lot of articles are out about the 5.5 million Finns getting closer to NATO.

A small nation - what could they add? Well, you have to understand the character of the people of Finland. Here's a datapoint.

During the Winter War (1939–1940) between Finland and the Soviet Union, Häyhä served as a sniper for the Finnish Army against the Red Army in the 6th Company of JR 34 during the Battle of Kollaa in temperatures between −40 °C (−40 °F) and −20 °C (−4 °F), dressed completely in white camouflage. Stalin’s purges of military experts caused chaos, and Soviet troops were not issued with white camouflage suits for most of the war, making them easily visible to snipers. Häyhä has been credited with 505 sniper kills.[2][5] A daily account of the kills at Kollaa was made for the Finnish snipers. All of Häyhä's kills were accomplished in fewer than 100 days – an average of just over five kills per day – at a time of year with very few daylight hours.

Häyhä used an M/28-30, with serial number 60974, because it suited his small frame (1.6 m (5 ft 3 in)). The rifle is a shorter, Finnish White Guard militia variant of the Mosin–Nagant rifle, known as "Pystykorva" (literally "Spitz", due to the front sight's resemblance to the head of a spitz-type dog) chambered in the Finnish Mosin–Nagant cartridge 7.62×53R. He preferred iron sights over telescopic sights as to present a smaller target for the enemy (a sniper must raise his head higher when using a telescopic sight), to increase accuracy (a telescopic sight's glass can fog up easily in cold weather), and to aid in concealment (sunlight glare in telescopic sight lenses can reveal a sniper's position). As well as these tactics, he frequently packed dense mounds of snow in front of his position to conceal himself, provide padding for his rifle and reduce the characteristic puff of snow stirred up by the muzzle blast. He was also known to keep snow in his mouth whilst sniping, to prevent steamy breaths giving away his position in the cold air.

The Soviets' efforts to kill Häyhä included counter-snipers and artillery strikes,[citation needed] and on March 6, 1940, Häyhä was hit by an explosive bullet[citation needed] in his lower left jaw by a Red Army soldier, blowing off his lower left cheek. He was picked up by fellow soldiers who said "half his face was missing", but he did not die, regaining consciousness on March 13, the day peace was declared. Shortly after the war, Häyhä was promoted from alikersantti (Corporal) to vänrikki (Second lieutenant) by Field Marshal Mannerheim.

It took several years for Häyhä to recuperate from his wound. The bullet had crushed his jaw and blown off his left cheek. Nonetheless, he made a full recovery and became a successful moose hunter and dog breeder after World War II, and hunted with the Finnish President Urho Kekkonen.

When asked in 1998 how he had become such a good shooter, Häyhä answered, "Practice." When asked if he regretted killing so many people, he said, "I only did my duty, and what I was told to do, as well as I could." Simo Häyhä spent his last years in Ruokolahti, a small municipality located in southeastern Finland, near the Russian border. Simo Häyhä died in a war veterans' nursing home in Hamina in 2002 at the age of 96, and was buried in Ruokolahti.

Hat tip Claude.

The Worm Turns on the IG ... at least for a bit

Who investigates the investigators?

Looks like a few people now that a SEAL Flag Officer is having his Kafka moment.

I'm reviewing over at USNIBlog. Come by and give it a read.

The most important defense news you're not watching

Forget buying new ships and aircraft, the most critical part of modernizing our military is to update the framework it is built around, the Goldwater–Nichols act of 1986.

A product of a different age with a few significant flaws, we are well beyond the need to update it. Slowly, there is progress - at least in keeping the topic alive.

Via John Gould's interview with Michael Herson at DefenseNews;

Q. Spending aside, there are some fairly aggressive provisions in the policy bill, overhauling Goldwater-Nichols, aimed at acquisitions reform. What’s the industry view of provisions that promote outside-the-Capital-Beltway firms versus traditional firms?

A. With the first Goldwater-Nichols, the services were very resistant to Congress coming in and making any changes. But that was a time when Sens. Sam Nunn and Barry Goldwater and others spent years studying the problem and survived changes of control of Congress and they came up with a bipartisan solution, studying the problem so they knew what kind of solutions to offer. And it worked and it saved lives.

Q. But that is not the process this time around. Could you argue the most aggressive reforms are a Hail Mary from Sen. John McCain as the sun potentially sets on his tenure in Congress, if not as the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee? What does industry think?

A. I wouldn’t say that’s necessarily John McCain. It has been Congress’ approach ever since Goldwater-Nichols that everything has got to be quick. We see a problem, we put a commission together. The commission looks at it for six months at best. If we can put a commission together and they got legislation passed, problem solved and we walk away. And the problem’s not solved. What McCain’s done is float a lot of ideas. I don’t think John McCain’s going anywhere. I think John McCain is going to win reelection. Regardless of whether we have the majority in the Senate or not, he is going to be a very powerful influential force on the Senate Armed Services Committee going forward. Thornberry is taking a very measured and thoughtful approach to acquisition reform. He’s got six years as chairman so every year he is going to be doing something else. It’s smart because change in Washington tends to be slow and incremental. But at the same time while he is chairman, he can see what the effects are of what they’ve done in the early years and they can have time to modify it and change it and fix it if necessary prior to the end of his chairmanship.

Of the many reasons to support Captain McCain ... errr... Senator McCain's re-election is this; no one else that I see could help push reform of Goldwater-Nichols on the Senate side.

There are some, like Justin Johnson over at WOTR who are much more cautious;

It’s time to pump the brakes on Goldwater-Nichols reform. Both House and Senate versions of the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) have sections aimed at improving the effectiveness of the Defense Department. And, yes, the intent is laudable. But neither Congress nor the Pentagon has a clear sense of what problem the proposed reforms would solve. Without a clear understanding of the problem, major reforms can end up doing more harm than good.
...
The current debate about the Goldwater–Nichols reform has invoked a wide range of topics —from the Pentagon’s strategy development process to the department’s organizational structure to the roles and responsibilities of the National Security Council. But, it has yet to clearly define distinct problems.

Certainly, the debate has not produced clear examples of systemic failure. Though there has been no shortage of American defense and foreign policy failures over the last decade, it is by no means clear that they have arisen due to organizational or systemic dysfunction. National security failures in the last decade and a half have largely been the result of bad decisions and bad leadership — individual problems unlikely to be fixed by systemic change or overhaul. Bad decision-makers produce bad results, no matter how good the system may be.

While Congress can adjust many of the national security systems and organizations, with the Senate playing a crucial role in ensuring that qualified people are placed in important positions, Congress cannot guarantee better national security outcomes simply by mandating processes or organizational designs.
...
Congressional Action on Goldwater–Nichols

Unfortunately, lack of a clear problem statement isn’t slowing down Congress. Rep. Mac Thornberry (R–Texas) suggests that, since threats “have become more trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional, …[it] compels Congress to build” Goldwater-Nichols reforms into the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Sen. John McCain (R–Ariz.) says his reforms are aimed at what he perceives as a lack of “strategic integration.”

While their analysis of global threats may be correct, the lack of specific examples of U.S. national security failures makes it hard to determine whether the lack of “strategic integration” is an organizational problem or the result of bad decisions by senior leaders.

VADM Rowden Calls an End to the LCS Charades

The news on LCS just won't stop, and based on the comment count from last week's LCS posts - the Front Porch is still digesting it all.

A bombshell was dropped - wait, we're talking Surface stuff, so ... a broadside was fired on Friday as the previous day's letter from VADM Rowden, Commander Naval Surface Forces made the rounds.

The letter rakes the stern of the LCS establishment, and any lingering advocates need to strike their flag. While it is temping to gloat along with the rest of those who predicted much of this for over a decade - let's not do that (OK, maybe a little).

Rowden is doing is exactly what we need done and appears to be heading in the best direction; a smart person with a hard job trying to find a way to make the best of what the mistakes of others has foisted on to his Fleet. It is all I've asked for since throwing the towel in on LCS in 2010, and at last I think this is being done.

Then entire letter is below, but I want to comment on each paragraph, combining when needed - a friendly Fisking if you will.

OK, let's go.

A joint memo from the Chief of Naval Operations and Assistance Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition directed the establishment of a Littoral Combat Ship Review Team on Feb. 29, 2016. Our task was to review crewing, operations, training and maintenance of the ship class.

Our core focus was to maximize forward operational availability, while looking for ways to increase simplicity, stability and ownership. It became clear the LCS crewing construct is the variable that most impacts the other factors such as manning, training, maintenance, and – most importantly – operations forward. As such, one of the main changes to the program will be establishing a “Blue/Gold Plus” crewing concept. This change maximizes forward presence and improves stability, simplicity, and crew ownership. With this change, the crew will now focus on a single mission (Anti-Submarine, Anti-Surface, Mine Countermeasures) for the entirety of their tour.

"Simplicity" - the bane of transformationalists; excellent. Vince Lombardi leadership; superb."Stability and ownership." Lessons of centuries of manning ships and a slap across the face of the green-eye shade Navy; smart. Blue/Gold is a compromise and easy if fix if a failure. The big part of this paragraph - single mission. The fever dream of mission module swapping is dead. We told you that wouldn't work over a decade ago, but we welcome the party. Better now than later.

With Blue/Gold Plus crewing we will create three Divisions of four ships operating on each coast. The divisions will have a single mission (ASW, ASUW, MCM) and be commanded by a major commander identical in stature to officers commanding guided missile cruisers, amphibious transportation docks ships, destroyer squadrons, or amphibious assault ships. The 12 Freedom- variant ships will be homeported in Mayport, Florida. The 12 Independence-variant ships will be homeported in San Diego, California. One ship in each division will be designated as the “training ship,” manned by a single crew comprised of seasoned, experienced LCS Sailors. These training ships will be charged with knowing their mission, training to their mission and training/certifying the remaining six crews in their Division. The remaining ships of the squadron will be the ships that deploy and will be crewed with a “Blue-Gold” construct (similar to the crewing concept of our SSBN’s).

Single mission, focused Divisions run by a CAPT. Each Division will have one LCS in port to make sure all crews are kept trained and ready while their ship is deployed with the other crew. This absolutely works for me. A lot of non-deployable overhead, but you have to work with what you have. I shall not quibble.

The deploying crews will consist of 70 Sailors plus the Sailors manning the aviation detachment. These 70 Sailors are a combination of what was previously known as the “core” crew and the “mission module” crew – ONE CREW focused on ONE MISSION.

In case you missed it, he repeats it. Nod of the head to Rowden.

The Division Commander and staff will oversee all aspects of manning, training and equipping their assigned ships and crews, building expertise, ownership and stability within the crews.

To simplify and stabilize the ongoing testing and evaluation program, the first four ships in the in class will be shifted to dedicated, single-crewed testing ships whose main mission will be test and evaluation of the modular systems being installed on our LCS. Like the training crews, these ships will be manned with seasoned, experienced LCS Sailors. These ships will be available on an as needed basis for training and deployment; however, their main focus will be on system testing.

Back to what works for the Division, and notice Rowden repeats again - "simplify" "stabilize" - this is simply outstanding. Big takeaway here; LCS 1, 2, 3, and 4 are going to be training and evaluation units. This is a subtle admission that we still do not have any idea how to best use these ships with the weapons and systems they may or may not have. There is also a typo in the original, so I am not sure if it is the first four LCS, or first four of each class. If it is 1-8 as opposed to 1-4 ... then, yikes. Things are even worse in 2016 than I thought. Yes, worse than what I thought.

For all of our new ships, a single pre-commissioning crew will remain with the ship through the completion of post-shakedown availability and preparations for the first deployment.

To foster increased ownership by our sailors, we will establish Maintenance Execution Teams within the Division structure. These teams comprised of LCS Sailors will augment the ship crews within the Division in the execution of both preventative and corrective maintenance.

A kick to the groin for another sin of the concept - civilian contractor support. These are Sailors helping - and looks like good shore duty opportunities. Again, this is good stuff.

Finally, as we grow the number of forward operating stations to support our operations forward we will establish Forward Liaison Elements to ensure the support for our LCS where they are operating.

As we implement these changes, we will continue to make iterative adjustments and improvements based on evolving fleet requirements and technological developments. Implementing the approved recommendations from this review and continuing to examine other areas for improvement will better position the LCS program for success – both now and in the future.

This admits that we simply do not know what the future may require, so we'll adjust as needed going forward.

I don't know about you, but this works for me. Given the realities of what can realistically be done at the end of 4QFY16, I can only applaud VADM Rowden and his team on this first iteration of doing what can be done with this star-crossed program. May they squeeze every bit of utility out of it.

Statement from Vice Adm. Tom Rowden, Commander, Naval Surface Forces

Results from the Chief of Naval Operations Directed 60-Day Review of the

Littoral Combat Ship Program

Sept. 08, 2016

A joint memo from the Chief of Naval Operations and Assistance Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition directed the establishment of a Littoral Combat Ship Review Team on Feb. 29, 2016. Our task was to review crewing, operations, training and maintenance of the ship class.

Our core focus was to maximize forward operational availability, while looking for ways to increase simplicity, stability and ownership. It became clear the LCS crewing construct is the variable that most impacts the other factors such as manning, training, maintenance, and – most importantly – operations forward. As such, one of the main changes to the program will be establishing a “Blue/Gold Plus” crewing concept. This change maximizes forward presence and improves stability, simplicity, and crew ownership. With this change, the crew will now focus on a single mission (Anti-Submarine, Anti-Surface, Mine Countermeasures) for the entirety of their tour.

With Blue/Gold Plus crewing we will create three Divisions of four ships operating on each coast. The divisions will have a single mission (ASW, ASUW, MCM) and be commanded by a major commander identical in stature to officers commanding guided missile cruisers, amphibious transportation docks ships, destroyer squadrons, or amphibious assault ships. The 12 Freedom- variant ships will be homeported in Mayport, Florida. The 12 Independence-variant ships will be homeported in San Diego, California. One ship in each division will be designated as the “training ship,” manned by a single crew comprised of seasoned, experienced LCS Sailors. These training ships will be charged with knowing their mission, training to their mission and training/certifying the remaining six crews in their Division. The remaining ships of the squadron will be the ships that deploy and will be crewed with a “Blue-Gold” construct (similar to the crewing concept of our SSBN’s).

The deploying crews will consist of 70 Sailors plus the Sailors manning the aviation detachment. These 70 Sailors are a combination of what was previously known as the “core” crew and the “mission module” crew – ONE CREW focused on ONE MISSION.

The Division Commander and staff will oversee all aspects of manning, training and equipping their assigned ships and crews, building expertise, ownership and stability within the crews.

To simplify and stabilize the ongoing testing and evaluation program, the first four ships in the in class will be shifted to dedicated, single-crewed testing ships whose main mission will be test and evaluation of the modular systems being installed on our LCS. Like the training crews, these ships will be manned with seasoned, experienced LCS Sailors. These ships will be available on an as needed basis for training and deployment; however, their main focus will be on system testing.

For all of our new ships, a single pre-commissioning crew will remain with the ship through the completion of post-shakedown availability and preparations for the first deployment.

To foster increased ownership by our sailors, we will establish Maintenance Execution Teams within the Division structure. These teams comprised of LCS Sailors will augment the ship crews within the Division in the execution of both preventative and corrective maintenance.

Finally, as we grow the number of forward operating stations to support our operations forward we will establish Forward Liaison Elements to ensure the support for our LCS where they are operating.

As we implement these changes, we will continue to make iterative adjustments and improvements based on evolving fleet requirements and technological developments. Implementing the approved recommendations from this review and continuing to examine other areas for improvement will better position the LCS program for success – both now and in the future.

A bright, clear morning

What did I do this AM? Same thing I did yesterday morning and last evening; I sat alone in the middle of my woods with a crossbow waiting for deer that rarely come.

It is always a good time to think, ponder, and generally clear the mind. The kids are scattered with their own things, the wife had stuff to take care of at the home base, so it is just me and the dogs in my country retreat away from it all.

I usually post a video on 911 of the news as it happened - I've told the story many times before about being ONSTA in Bahrain when it all went down, so this year I may give it a pass.

What crossed my mind this AM as I watched the woods wake up was something I mentioned to my buddy Herb over on Twitter; my children - one who is an adult now - have known nothing but the Global War on Terror, or whatever we are calling it this week. I prefer The Long War, but history will figure it out.

As such, the meaning of Orwell's;

"We've always been at war with Eastasia"

...just doesn't have the same meaning to them. For them, "We've always been at war with Islamic terrorists." is reality.

How does this impact their world view? Hard to tell. My entire life up to their age was bounded by the Cold War - but that is a very different game than what we are playing now, a decade and a half after the attack of 911.

What have we accomplished? Both parties have had the Executive Branch for about the same amount of time during this war, and from an objective point of view - I don't think we are winning all that much. The threat of Islamic Terrorism is as great if not greater than it was on 911, they continue to grow.

Due to mindless feelgoodism related to immigration, The West expanded the pond of non-assimilation for the terrorists to swim in, and as a result they have been and will continue to attack us in our homes, businesses, and social gatherings - not to mention the various skirmishes inside Dar al-Islam as it works against modern Islam and what they consider heretics, and on the bleeding edge of where it meets Dar al-Harb.

At home, we've become accustomed to what would have been thought previously as un-Constitutional and un-American intrusions in to our personal freedoms, all for "security." Was it worth the trade? Do you feel safer?

That is what a few hours 15' up a tree with nothing but Cardinals, rabbits, crows, various songbirds and the slow hiss of a Thermocell will bring to mind.

At the decade and a half remembrance of the attack, what is clear to me is that there is much more work that needs to be done. In The West and in our nation specifically, we need to rededicate ourselves to this Long War. We have an enemy more dedicated than we are. Their motivating philosophy is stronger than ours. Their demographics are stronger than ours. We have made progress in some areas, but so have they.

Much more work needs to be done.