No reason to ignore it. It is right in front of you, waiting. All you need to do is look at it, smell it, touch it.
I'm pondering the Zeitgeist over at USNIBlog ... come visit and tell me what you think.
4 hours ago
Proactively “From the Sea”; an agent of change leveraging the littoral best practices for a paradigm breaking six-sigma best business case to synergize a consistent design in the global commons, rightsizing the core values supporting our mission statement via the 5-vector model through cultural diversity.
124Total URL Eligibles (SG 91/92)
39 URL Selects (not including AVN/Seq Commands)
21 of 39 selects on first look (54%)
- 35 had a masters (90%)It is like a decade of war never happened. You could have seen almost the same results in 2000. This is simply the result of a system running on autopilot. Led by people who have lost whatever operational mindset they once had, that they don't even understand what their core job is - to fight wars.
- 37 had completed JPME 1 (95%)
- 26 had completed JPME 2 (67%)
- 35 had joint duty assignments (90%)
- 24 were JQO (62%)
- 21 had completed an overseas tour (54%)
- 1 had completed IA/GSA (3%)
By Vice Admiral Tom CopemanI'll afford you the same benefit of the doubt as I do all VADM, I really don't think you penned it all, someone on your staff got it started and you got a chop on it. Well, I don't know, maybe you did. If you did, I don't think your Staff served you well if you let them chop on it.
Twenty-five years ago, then CNO Admiral Trost looked into the future and began our shift from a Cold War focus to dealing with regional and littoral conflicts in the years to come. So we started down the path to where we are now—working through various iterations, starts and stops, and plenty of ideas on ship types and classes to deal with unknown future threats.25 years ago was JAN 1988. I'm sorry, no one in 1988 was seeing the end of the Cold War, much less shifting away from it. We were both JOs then ... come on, you remember. Heck, Hunt for Red October wasn't even in movie theaters yet.
Despite rampant revisionism in Washington on the changing scope and nature of the Soviet threat, he continues to base his analysis of the Navy's needs on a belief that the Soviet Union is just as dangerous as ever.I'm sure I am missing something. Can anyone here give me something with a '87-89 date stamp where Admiral Trost sees the decay of the Soviet Union and the need in 2012 to have a corvette that can't even get its 57mm and 30mm guns to work right?
Now we have assets in place to operate in the littorals and we have new ways of delivering troops and equipment to the beach.OK, soooooo ..... the gun line off Vietnam was not in littorals? 5-inch Friday off Al-Faw in 2003 was not the littorals? LCS is actually and asset we can, in 2013, fight in the littorals?
How many of us saw the expansion of C5ISR? Or, who knew in the late 1980’s that there would even be UAVs, much less see the ubiquity of their use? Which is the sticking point about the future—it is wholly unknown. And for those who say past is prelude. That may be, but the past isn’t a plot.Well, only the cynic would have said, "Oh, come on. We went from C2, to C4I, to another NCM for C4ISR. What more can they do - make it C5ISR? Please, everyone will think it is an old air-force cargo plane doing ISR ... no one will make that acronym .... we'll be stuck with C4I or C4ISR ... you can bank on it." Oops. That is what you get for not being cynical enough. By 2020, what more can we add to it?
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is an important addition to the Battle Force and is exactly the ship we envisioned 11 years ago to fill a capability gap in the Littorals in Surface Warfare, Mine Warfare and Anti-submarine Warfare. It is here now and we fully expect it to be an important an integral and substantial part of our future force.Exactly? Define soon? Not that important right now ... or in the next few years. I'll take that bet. Well, that mention of a year is fun. 11 years ago was what .... 2002. What was being said in 2002?
The Defense Planning Guidance in May 2002 directed the Navy to pursue a new class of small, stealthy "Littoral Combatant Ships" to support troops ashore and to conduct anti-mine, intelligence and reconnaissance operations. The Navy planned to build two "Flight Zero" LCS vessels to refine the new class' concept of operations. More detailed mission modules are to be developed for the Flight One LCS that was hoped would appear soon after 2007. The Navy wanted to buy eight of these ships through 2009, with the first in 2005.No, go back to RADM Don Loren's 2002 article; nothing has changed. It is still think'n, hope'n and plann'n. In twice the time it took to fight WWII, LCS isn't PMC in any of its primary mission areas. One could argue ASUW. One could, but I wouldn't. Back to VADM Copeman;
It’s a high speed, shallow draft, multi-mission workhorse full of technology that is our future. As we decommission different ships of various classes, LCS will step up and fill multiple roles. It is far more automated than previous class ships, and with lower manning, requires us to adapt our training and operations to meet that reality.A ship that cannot deploy for more than 4-months due to crew burnout and habitability issues is not a work horse. Show pony, perhaps .... but not a workhorse.
So, let me get to my priorities:No, we won't do much warfighting with LCS. Its best utility will be presence operations in peacetime. Warfighting will be with DDG and up. LCS will be kept far away from significant warfighting, if it can avoid it. It simply is not ready, and won't be for awhile.
1. Warfighting. It’s what we do – A large part of that will be with LCS. LCS must get into the Fleet and fully integrated where we will use both variants and the mission modules to their best effect.
2. Readiness. The world is a dynamic place and the Navy has to have the best trained Sailors who will operate the best equipment possible. In many ways what we operate will determine the number, type and training of Sailors needed. That support trail begins now for what we will require in the decades to come.
3. Building the future fleet. What will the world look like in another decade. That’s a question which forces us to make assumptions about future resources, alliances, bases and strategies. The concepts, design outlines, support requirements—training, simulators, supply chain and dollars—required to operate in 2025 have to get underway soon.
No matter what news you see or hear about our budget, as of today, we get to steam around the world as part of the most powerful Navy in history. We have the best people, representing the best nation, with the best ships ever known. Let’s keep it that way… tell the Surface Navy story wherever you go. The oceans aren’t getting smaller and the world isn’t getting safer. A maritime nation needs a worthy maritime capability.NOOOOOO! Tease! I feel robbed. Ending the article with output from the Random Flag Officer Speech Generator? I feel like for most of the article I was reading a press release from industry and then the start of an actual article of interest starts .... only to be cut off at the knees by a paragraph by the RFOSG.
Ultimately, (Copeman) warned, "if you don't want to get hollow, you have to give up force structure."
"Resources are going to drop. They're going to drop significantly," the admiral said.VADM Copeman just went Salamander circa 2008. Therefor, he is correct. It took a half decade, but welcome. One day soon, they will all go Salamander in their own way. It has been written.
"If it were my choice," Copeman said, "I'd give up force structure to get whole. But it's not always my choice."Admiral Greenert; call your office.
DTG 112146Z Jan 13Hat tip FrontPorch.
UNCLASSIFIED/
FM SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
TO ALNAV
INFO SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
BT
UNCLAS
ALNAV 006/13
MSGID/GENADMIN/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC/-/JAN//
SUBJ/RISK MITIGATION FISCAL PLANNING//
RMKS/1. THIS IS AN UPDATE ON THE CURRENT FISCAL SITUATION FACING THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AS CONGRESS CONTINUES TO WORK TOWARD A DEFICIT REDUCTION PLAN TO AVOID THE DAMAGING EFFECTS OF SEQUESTRATION AND TO PASS A BUDGET TO END THE EQUALLY DELETERIOUS EFFECTS OF THE CONTINUING RESOLUTION (CR) UNDER WHICH WE HAVE OPERATED SINCE THE FISCAL YEAR BEGAN OCTOBER 1, 2012.
2. SEQUESTRATION WAS DELAYED FOR TWO MONTHS IN THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT (ATRA) PASSED BY CONGRESS ON 1 JANUARY, CREATING MORE TIME TO AGREE ON DEFICIT REDUCTION, BUT GIVING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LESS TIME TO MITIGATE SPENDING CUTS IF NO AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED.
3. BUT DON (AND ALL OF DOD) FACE AN EQUAL BUT MORE IMMEDIATE FISCAL CHALLENGE BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF AN FY-13 APPROPRIATIONS BILL, WHICH HAS LEFT US OPERATING UNDER THE CR, WHICH LOCKS OUR BUDGET INTO LOWER FY-12 LEVELS FOR OUR OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE ACCOUNTS DESPITE INCREASING RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH DEMAND INCREASED RESOURCES.
4. BECAUSE SEQUESTRATION WAS DELAYED, OUR FOCUS MUST NOW SHIFT TO THE IMPACTS OF THE CR, WHICH CREATES SIGNIFICANT SHORTFALLS IN OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, NAVY (OMN) AND MARINE CORPS (OMMC) ACCOUNTS AND THE RESULTANT STEPS WE MUST TAKE TO MAINTAIN A MINIMUM LEVEL OF PRESENCE. UNLESS A SPENDING BILL IS PASSED QUICKLY BY THE NEW CONGRESS, WE MAY BE FORCED TO OPERATE UNDER THE SAME CR THAT HAS BEEN SUSTAINING US SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS FISCAL YEAR. THIS CR IS SET TO EXPIRE AT THE END OF MARCH. SHOULD CONGRESS DECIDE TO EXTEND THE CR THROUGH THE END OF FY-13, THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS WOULD NOT HAVE ENOUGH MONEY TO MEET FY-13 REQUIREMENTS IN THESE ACCOUNTS.
5. WE EXPECT TO RECEIVE FY-13 OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (OCO) FUNDING; HOWEVER, THOSE FUNDS ARE EARMARKED FOR SUPPORT OF CRITICAL WARFIGHTING REQUIREMENTS AND WOULD NOT PROVIDE ANY SIGNIFICANT RELIEF TO OUR BASELINE OPERATING ACCOUNTS. WE PROJECT A SHORTFALL OF OVER $4 BILLION IN OUR BASE O&M ACCOUNTS WHICH FUNDS NAVY AND MARINE CORPS READINESS.
6. GIVEN THE GREAT UNCERTAINTY WE FACE, WE MUST ENACT PRUDENT, BUT STRINGENT BELT-TIGHTENING MEASURES NOW THAT WILL PERMIT US TO OPERATE THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS THROUGH THE REST OF THIS FISCAL YEAR IF THE CR IS EXTENDED. EACH OF THESE STEPS ARE DESIGNED TO BE REVERSIBLE, AT LEAST TO SOME EXTENT, SHOULD CONGRESS PASS AN FY-13 BUDGET. ACCORDINGLY, NAVY AND MARINE CORPS LEADERSHIP HAS ADVISED THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THAT THEY ARE CONSIDERING A SERIES OF ACTIONS, EACH SUBJECT TO EXCEPTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL ACTIVITIES. ACTIONS INCLUDE BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO:
- CURTAIL ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING SUPPORT SERVICES
- REDUCE TRAVEL
- DELAY ALL DECOMMISSIONINGS AND ANY DISPOSALS OR LAY-UPS
- REDUCE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGETS
- CURTAIL REMAINING FACILITY SUSTAINMENT RESTORATION AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
- CUT FACILITIES SUSTAINMENT, EXCEPT FOR SAFETY OF LIFE
- REDUCE SPENDING ON BASE OPERATING SUPPORT
- CANCEL ANY PLANNED FACILITIES DEMOLITION
- TERMINATE TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES, EXCEPT THOSE SUPPORTING MISSION-CRITICAL ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING THE WARFIGHTER
- IMPLEMENT A CIVILIAN HIRING FREEZE
7. THESE STEPS WILL NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM COMPLETELY. WE WILL ONLY BE ABLE TO SUSTAIN CURRENT FLEET OPERATIONS. WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SUFFICIENTLY MAINTAIN AND RESET OUR FORCES FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.
8. WITH A YEARLONG CR, THE POTENTIAL FOR CIVILIAN FURLOUGHS EXISTS, BUT ALL DECISIONS IN THAT REGARD WILL BE MADE AT THE DOD LEVEL. WE WILL FOLLOW WHATEVER GUIDANCE WE RECEIVE.
9. THIS GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. SHORTLY, YOU WILL BE HEARING SPECIFICS FROM SERVICE LEADERSHIP ABOUT THEIR PLANS FOR THE AMOUNT OF THESE ADJUSTMENTS AND WHAT ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN TO LIMIT THE IMPACT ON OUR MILITARY PERSONNEL, CIVILIANS, AND FAMILIES.
10. RELEASED BY RAY MABUS, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.//
BT
SAPR-L training provided command leadership triads (Commanding Officer / Officer in Charge, Executive Officer / Assistant Officer in Charge and Command Master Chief / Chief of the Boat / Senior Enlisted) the skills to promote a culture of change through interactive video and facilitated face-to-face (F2F) discussion. Deployed command leadership triads that were not able to participate in F2F SAPR-L Preparation or Defense Connect Online (DCO) / Teleconference training can still complete the training by attending a SAPR-L training session conducted by their parent command or viewing a DVD recorded Master Mobile Training Team led training session. Contact the SAPR Task Force (via link below) to obtain a DVD copy in the mail.So, here is the first clown out of the car. A little detail here, this is written by an O6 selected for Command. He knows a few things about leadership. He has been in this rodeo before.
...
Based on the success of the SAPR-L delivery model and positive feedback received, the SAPR-F delivery plan has changed. Master Mobile Training Teams (MMTT), certified by the Center for Personal and Professional Development, will now deploy to fleet concentration areas in December 2012 to begin SAPR-F Preparation Training. Commands cannot begin SAPR-F training until their training team has attended SAPR-F Preparation Training. In order to allow ample time for this change to be executed, the deadline for active and reserve E-6 and below completion of SAPR-F has been extended from 31 December 2012 to 31 March 2013. Additional information and execution guidance is included in NAVADMIN 336/12.
-----Original Message-----Oh, wait. We are not even close to being done.
From: [redacted] Commanding Officer [redacted]
Sent: Saturday, January 12, 2013 8:58 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc:[redacted]
Subject: Last Chance SAPR-L Training
I wanted to reach out one last time before beginning Administrative
action as a result of your non-compliance with the CNO's order to
complete SAPR-L Training. I will provide one last opportunity for
training on January 13 and 27 from 0900-1100 in the CO's conference
room. Keep in mind that your failure to complete the required training
will be considered a violation of the UCMJ and will be treated as such.
If I am contacting you in error, please let me know.
COs,
Please let me know if there is a specific reason your member in the To
line has not been able to complete the training.
Vr
CAPT [redacted]
Commanding Officer
[redacted]
O [redacted]
C [redacted]
[redacted]@navy.mil
[redacted]@navy.smil.mil
-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted] Commanding Officer [redacted]
Sent: Monday, December 17, 2012 12:55
To: [redacted]
Subject: Non-compliance Warning
Importance: High
Presently, [redacted] has no record of SAPR-L completion for those of
you in the "To: line". It is your responsibility to complete SAPR-L
training by the end of January. If you have already attended the
training, I will need documentation to enter it into FLTMPS.
[redacted] will provide training on both weekends in January and you
are welcome to complete training there or with your Unit. Your COs are
copied and they have all completed the training required to ensure you
are able to comply with this simple requirement mandated by the CNO.
Failure to complete will result in administrative processing for failure
to obey a direct order.
COs,
As with the others in your unit, this training needs to be recorded on a
3500 and entered into FLTMPS. If you conduct the training, please let me
know when and how it was completed. As always, if you need any support,
please ask.
Vr
CAPT [redacted]
Commanding Officer
[redacted]
O [redacted]
C [redacted]
[redacted]@navy.mil
[redacted]@navy.smil.mil
Today we had SAPR-F training. During the training (which overall I thought was better and more realistic than previous years training), the following statistic was brought up:So, there you go.
90% of sexual assaults go unreported
I raised my hand and asked where that statistic comes from, because it seemed very high and I wanted to know where it was calculated. The Staff Judge Advocate giving the training responded with:
"It's a Congressional figure. If you can't support the CNO's message, we can take you off of the CTT. I realize that nukes and cryppies want numbers, but the point is you need to recognize that sexual assault is a problem."