CNO has lost confidence in his officers & SNCOs

I'm not gobsmacked about this - I am set back.

The Chief of Naval Operations has stated the following;

I am convinced that our unit commanders and senior enlisted leaders do not understand the significance of this issue, and do not place this high on their agenda.

You can get the full context below - but let's pull this apart.

I only retired a little more than two years ago - and I know one thing - sexual assault is not a training issue. "... do not understand ... " Please. They can chant it in their sleep.

As a father, husband, and brother - who served with fathers, husbands, and brothers along with mothers, wives, and sisters - I take it as an exceptional insult that:
1) The CNO thinks that as men and women, his leaders do not understand the importance of sexual assault: a crime that impacts a woman her entire life and impacts their relationship with every man in their life from there on out.
2) He thinks that only Flag Officers and SES can solve this. Really?

Read the below for context and I'll see you on the other end.

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted]greenert@navy.mil [[redacted]greenert@navy.mil]
Sent: Friday, March 30, 2012 3:06 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: FlagSESWeb Mail - SEXUAL ASSAULT AWARENESS MONTH

Admirals and Senior Executives:

A note here about Sexual Assault Awareness Month.

My staff proposed a more detailed email. I decided you all don't need more detail and events on this subject. But, we do need a mindset change. This past week VCNO released a NAVADMIN that describes our plan for April's Sexual Assault Awareness Month (SAAM). Please read it.

I am really concerned about our lack of progress in preventing sexual assault. We have been after this in earnest since Sep 2009. There has been no discernable [sic] change in the number of sexual assaults. There is quite a bit of "activity" at headquarters - all levels of headquarters. Victim care is much better, JAG and NCIS training has and will continue to improve litigation. But, this is after the assaults occur. That approach (focus on injured people) would be ridiculous if this were a safety problem. But, it is a safety problem. Our people are unsafe due to sexual assaults.

There is a growing feeling in the Congress that we are unable to deal with the problem and they need to take this from the DOD. Legislation has been proposed. Think about that - we cannot prevent our people from assaulting each other - so Congress might have to tell us how to reconcile it.

I need your help - both Flag and SES. This problem reminds me of the drug abuse problem we had in the 70s and 80s. But, there is no elegant deterrent like the urinalysis program to help us. I am convinced that our unit commanders and senior enlisted leaders do not understand the significance of this issue, and do not place this high on their agenda. For example: when I tour work spaces, I see sex-related (some is deviant) cartoons, posters, published jokes and the like in spaces all around our Navy - afloat and ashore. We don't even know to "take that down" when the CNO is walking the space. That is a corrosive atmosphere. Alcohol fuels most all assaults and is the "weapon of choice." Note, it is rarely two drunk kids that allowed things to get out of hand. It is, by far, mostly premeditated. This is a challenge for our time. It is undermining our readiness.

I think you get my point. Take this month to reflect and commit to resolve. We'll talk more at the NFOSES.


All the best,
Jon

We are swamped with sexual assault training and awareness. That hasn't worked; doing more of it won't work either. .

First of all; you probably need to ditch the data you are working with. What the data you are working with developed and reported by a team of criminologists and statisticians? This is a criminal issue that needs good data to understand and attack. If your surveys are being run by anyone else, then they are garbage and you need to start over.

If you have a good survey, then publish the data, both analyzed and raw, so everyone can see what you are being shown, what the variables are. The Executive Summary or PPT will not do. Heck - even liberal arts goofs like me have two semesters of graduate school statistics; we can understand it; and if you are serious about the actual problem more than agendas in Congress, then you will.

We can look at the regression analysis that show what combination of factors, both personnel and situational, produce the most potential for assault. No data sets, parameters, or questions should be "too uncomfortable" "too controversial" or put behind some politically correct cordon sanitaire. We are adults and this is serious.

Then lets look at sexual assault data from the British, Dutch and other European naval services who have had women longer, actually drink alcohol on ships, and have "mature" items in spaces that I am sure will give your women's issues advisers in OPNAV the vapors.

Posters are not the problem. Alcohol is not the problem. Training is not the problem.

Flag Officers and SES prattling on in front of a captive audience is not the solution.

---

UPDATE: Here is the 2010 report, thanks to my ever talented and diligent front porch underground. You need to go to ~pg 380 of the PDF to start seeing USN data. Here is a brief pull quote:

There were a total of 352 subjects in 325 sexual assault investigations initiated and completed in FY10 for the USN. Of the 352 subjects 267 (76%) were members of the USN, six percent (6%) were from other Services, five percent (5%) were civilian, and 13% were unknown.

One percent (1%) of the suspects were female, the same percentage reported in FY09. Ninety-four percent (94%) of the suspects were male, with the remainder being unknown.

Of interest are the age categories, which indicate the suspects in sexual assault investigations tend to be slightly older than victims. The largest age group was 20-24 (26%) followed by subjects between 25-34 years of age at 18%. Approximately 43%, of subjects’ ages were not reported.

The largest rank for suspects in sexual assault investigations is E-1 to E-4 at 35%, followed by E-5 to E-9 at 21%.
...
Could not be prosecuted - In FY10, there were 450 final dispositions for subjects accused of sexual assault. Sixty-one percent (274) of these cases could NOT be prosecuted for the following reasons: lack of jurisdiction (13), the offender was unknown (16), the allegation was unfounded meaning it was false or the allegation did not meet the elements of a sexual assault offense (44), probable cause existed only for a non-sexual assault offense (18), the subject died (0), evidence was insufficient (70) or the victim declined to cooperate with investigation and / or prosecution (113).

Initial civilian jurisdiction - In 21 of the remaining cases, civilian authorities initially assumed jurisdiction. Of these cases, 8 were either pending or the disposition was unknown at the time this report was written. NCIS files indicate that the victim declined to cooperate in 1 case. Of the remaining 12 cases in which dispositions were known, charges were filed in 8 cases or 67% of cases. Further analysis is not possible due to lack of information regarding these cases.

Presented for disposition - As a result of the foregoing, 155 of the remaining subjects were presented to commands for a disposition decision. Commanders declined action in 30 cases pursuant to RCM 306(c)(1). Of the remaining 125 subject cases, courts martial charges were preferred (initiated) against 70 subjects, non-judicial punishment was imposed on 36 subjects, 5 subjects were administratively discharged and other administrative actions were taken against 14 subjects. In other words, courts-martial charges were preferred in 46% of the cases in which any type of action was possible.

There is a lot more here to point the CNO in the right direction. Saying that your Commanding Officers and Command Master Chiefs can't find their a55 with both hands is not it.

LCS Established a Reputation for Success

.... at least when it comes to Walleye fishing.

"That's not something you see every time you go fishing," I said to Brian Harding last Sunday as I dropped a 3/8-ounce jig into the river while he lowered his electric trolling motor from the bow.

We were about 30 yards port of the ship's stern, so it would be easy to remember the spot if we caught fish. Of course, once this new ship leaves to join the fleet this year, we'll have to find other landmarks.
...
They weren't jumping into anyone's boat, but Harding said a few friends reported action in the river "near the LCS." In other words, the USS Fort Worth, LCS-3, one of the Navy's "littoral combat ships" under construction at Marinette Marine.

Shipbuilding, Tiffany, & 2nd-3rd Order Effects

Sigh. Here we go again.

The answer has been there for this question for at least half a decade - but at least more and more people are now starting to ask the question many have been for years.

The Navy's new five-year shipbuilding plan provides adequate support for U.S. defense industry firms, even if it calls for a smaller number of vessels, according to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta.

The new plan, sent to Congress last Wednesday, is based on the goal of building a 300-ship fleet for the Navy.
...

"There'll be some ups and downs and there are some ships that obviously we'll draw down that are outdated. But overall, we are going to . . . not only maintain, but increase our ships in the Navy," Panetta told reporters Sunday after a speech aboard the USS Peleliu.

The ship strategy, he added, will generate enough work to keep U.S. shipbuilders afloat, according to Panetta.

Will someone please brief SECDEF better? Those Planning Assumptions in the 30-yr plan cannot survive even one pass of follow-on questions. He is being poorly briefed, unless he is delaying the truth for awhile longer ....

Aside from those deals, the Navy is still facing some tough decisions in balancing its new plan with industry and lawmaker concerns, acknowledged Vice Adm. Terry Blake, deputy chief of naval operations for integration of capabilities and resources.

Navy brass seriously considered "the second- and third-order ramifications to the industrial base" when cobbling together the new shipbuilding strategy, Blake explained at the same hearing.

The service's calculation was if any decision in the plan nixes a part of the fleet, but allows the Navy to bring that capability back at a later date, then the U.S. firms would be safe.

However, if a part of the fleet is cut permanently, "then we have to present to our leadership the fact that this may be an irreversible decision," Blake explained.

But while the Navy, along with the rest of the Pentagon, is under tremendous pressure to cut costs, sometimes that formula can't be applied as much as industry would like.

"The fact [is] that we may not be able to reconstitute that [capability] at some future date," Blake said. "Then the question takes on an even more serious tone."

"... cobbled together ..." - indeed.

VADM Blake - earlier more than later, you need to put out a revision to the 30-yr plan that addresses its most glaring happy-talk so Congress has a more accurate picture of where we are going.

We did this to ourselves.

It is simple. Look at LPD-17, DDG-1000, DDG-51 Flt-III, and LCS.

LPD-17 is simply too costly, too big, and as a result high per-unit cost; too few. DDG-1000 is actually a CL that is a 3-ship run that is but test-bed of floating technology risk with the expected price tag expected. Because we balked at DDG-1000 and aborted DDG(X) - all we have left is DDG 51 Flt-III with it "make it work" engineering costs to restart the line and meet the requirements - a good answer in a balance considering the poor options the Navy had due to distracted/poor leadership the first decade of the 21st Century. LCS is a speed-fetish's logical result of tradeoffs that resulted in a large Corvette with limited armament and a yet to be validated (or even developed) mission module CONOPS.

So, roll in a new CVN class and the need for a new SSBN class with an existing pipeline of Tiffany designs in an era of unprecedented peace-time budgetary challenges ... there you go.

Oh, and who has been accountable at the 4-star level for this dog's breakfast? That's right - they were promoted or retired in to the food trough. Of course.

Our solution? Simple - call the 30-yr plan just put out for what it is - the best-case scenario. We need two follow-on plans - the most likely and the worst case - and start discussing them in public now, not later - now. We need to under-promise and over-perform. We have a history of over-promising and under-performing. Classic path to no-credibility.

We have the ships we have now, nothing can be done about that. However - we can set things up so that we have a more affordable and functional option to start moving at the tail end of the Terrible 20s. LCS needs to be replaced with a multi-mission patrol frigate on the model of ABSALON/NANSEN classes. We need to re-open DDG-(X) as we cannot live forever in the hull of the BURKE - and hopefully some of the technology discovered to actually work in DDG-1000 can be re-purposed in to DDG-(X). Do LSD-(X) right.

Start to rebuild our credibility and confidence. We still are acting like the dog kennel from The Thing when it comes to explaining our shipbuilding plans. We are better than this.

The truth will set you free.

Character & Integrity: View from the Fleet

I would like to start the week out with a guest post related to my 05MAR post, Do You Need Character and Integrity.

The author is former Commanding Officer of VAQ-135, and prior Midrats Guest CDR James H. Ware III, USN.

Tupper, over to you.

---

I have not seen the proposed training program, and so cannot speak to it from a position of credibility.

However, I have concerns regarding its motives and efficacy from a leader's standpoint. My concerns/observations to any proposed training program:
- why are we doing this? Is this because my leadership has been ineffective?
Has my conduct been unbecoming? Or is it because top-level leaders feel the need to show some kind of initiative in reducing Commanding Officer firings, reducing front-page news?
- why does Navy leadership think that character and integrity can be taught by powerpoint, when as any parent knows, it is formed through years of engaged parenting and by example?
- why are we modeling this training after the Don't-Ask-Don't-Tell Repeal training curriculum? DADT Repeal training was an instructional and highly organized (and effective!) brief clearly and appropriately explaining Navy policy on DADT Repeal last year. This C&I training seems to be completely different, and yet we're addressing it as if it were a Navy policy change.

There are consultants out there who see a paycheck in this and have something to sell. They hope that naval aviation will expand discussion of sensitive issues such as socializing together, poor personal behaviors, alcohol use, personal relationships/friendships, sexual tensions in the workspace so that officers and enlisted sailors will feel more comfortable to talk about these issues and get them out into the open.

The problem with this is officers are ALREADY comfortable talking about these issues, and we have been talking about them with our Chiefs, First Classes, and deckplate Sailors for decades. Before every portcall, I hold an All Hands call where I directly address every Sailor in person and explain my, and the Navy's, expectations for conduct.

Officers and Chiefs already discuss Sexual Assault, Drinking and Driving, Equal Opportunity, Sexual Harassment, Fraternization, and a dozen other "sensitive" issues with clarity and force. Breaking up into small groups to discuss case-studies simply will place another training requirement upon an already-strained, undermanned, over-tasked, overly deployed, high-OPTEMPO workforce.

If the USN is concerned about the high-level firings and misconduct of its Commanding Officers, then it should revamp its evaluation and selection process. I propose:
- evaluation (FITREP) inputs including the perspective of the Sailors who work for the Officer.
- does the Officer demonstrate integrity, on and off duty?
- does the Officer demonstrate honesty and character? Courage?
- anyone under consideration for selection as Commanding Officer should be interviewed, if not in person, then via VTC, by a panel of evaluators. The current system simply considers the opinions of a few senior personnel, and how the Officer looks on paper, in a closed-door, opaque, parochial process that smacks of cronyism. In high school, I had to interview for a job as a dishwasher. As an Officer, I was not interviewed once by the people who supposedly selected me based on a few pieces of paper in my record.

The Navy does not practice what it preaches. I have personally witnessed a peer Officer (not a Commanding Officer) commit misconduct, and was detached for cause. In his Board of Inquiry, the votes were:
3-0 in favor of Misconduct
3-0 in favor of Substandard Performance
2-1 in favor of retention on active duty

He was removed from his critical sea duty billet, deemed not good enough for that, but the Bureau of Personnel was required to retain him. In so doing, they assigned him to a posh set of shore duty orders, including flying orders (getting back in the cockpit) training junior Officers. Mind-boggling.

Any organization values what it rewards. When it rewards misconduct and substandard performance to the degree that this Officer committed, there are no negative consequences to an Officer's actions (short of him committing a capital crime). In the case I related to you, the Officer was a terminal O5 Commander anyway, and was not on track for O6. And yet he retains his job, his pay, and all his benefits. And he will be eligible to retire this summer.

Until the United States Navy synchronizes its actions with its glitzy, overpriced Power Point presentations and holds people accountable, why would we expect things to change? Until the Bureau of Personnel operates transparently and its Detailers and Placement Officers are required to support Navy policy with detailing/placement appropriate for the misconduct, why does anyone think that Character and Integrity training will make a difference?

To the junior Officer, Navy actions speak volumes -- the message is "do as I say, not as I do."

In my opinion, character, rather than taught in a classroom, comes from honorable perseverance through hardship -- not from a case-study. A quick look at the sea-counters or ITEMPO histories of any of our 3- or 4-star flags (with few exceptions) will quickly show that there aren't many leaders in DC or Millington these days that can relate to the deckplate Sailor in the fleet.

An Ungentlemanly Act

30-years ago.

The Bards of War; on Midrats

Film making and Afghanistan. We're going to dive in to it this Sunday from 5-6pm EST.

Our guest is film-maker Scott Kesterson; an award-winning combat videographer / war documentary filmmaker currently working as a Subject Matter Expert (SME) and Senior Influence and Outreach operations consultant in the areas of cultural narrative, visual education and social medial program development and training.

Join us live if you can, but if you miss the show you can always listen to the archive at blogtalkradio - the best way to get the show and download the archive to your audio player is to get a free account and subscribe to the podcast on iTunes.

Listen to Midrats

Sunday Funnies

Real? You decide.



Maybe I need to start "salamanderdate.com" or sump'n.

Hat tip RS.