The straws of August

With the general acknowledgment that the Surge is working, the anti-war crowd is looking hard for the next line of attack. With the Haditha bloody shirt also going away, you can almost taste the desperation of a group of people that are in dire need to find a defeat and even better to totally discredit the President and Administration they quite literally hate.

Two different straws that have come up this week are curious contrasts. You have Kaplan's rather long Yingling inspired attack on the GOFO gaggle that Bookie has asked folks to weigh in on - and then you have something that seems to come from someone who needs to check his meds.

Via Capt. Ed, we have Hollywierd-addled "British-born, Hollywood-based humorist, commentator, producer and radio host" Martin Lewis at the Huffpo calling for, well, you read it.

General Pace - you have the power to fulfill your responsibility to protect the troops under your command. Indeed you have an obligation to do so.

You can relieve the President of his command.

Not of his Presidency. But of his military role as Commander-In-Chief.

You simply invoke the Uniform Code Of Military Justice.

The United States Code: Title 10, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 47, Subchapter X, Section 934.
...
you have the legal responsibility - under Article 134 of the Uniform Code Of Military Justice - to protect the troops under your command by relieving the President of his MILITARY command.

If you have reason to believe that the President is responsible for "disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces" and for "conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital" then you have the obligation to act.

In addition to relieving him of his command as Commander-In-Chief, you also have authority to place the President under MILITARY arrest.

...and the madness goes on from there. I posted about it along with Lex over at MilBlogs and I know almost all of you have already read about it - but I wanted to mention it again as it is part of the whole weekend mash.

The only thing worth spending any time on though is Kaplan's article. Though not directly related to Kaplan's bit, Bookie has caught on to something I postulated about earlier in the year; that eventually when the anti-victory group has bled Bush white and/or has run out of other things to do in pursuit of their existential crisis, they will go after the military in full force. Not the pin-pricks we have seen even prior to 911 - but a full court press. Throw in the smear movies lined up to go, other supporting attacks will join up for a ride.

In the whole though, Kaplan's bit is not a smearing hatchet job - though the Left will use it as best it can. Regular readers will know that when it comes to GOFO, I have no problem calling a spade a spade, and I do not hide my disdain for some who have made it to the exalted position where they have warriors assigned to pick up their dry cleaning and mow their yard if needed - so I have some sympathy with Kaplan and Yingling, and in places agree with them.

We have not had the leadership since 911 like General Marshall in WWII who would fire people not ready for prime time - wholesale. We are not promoting all the right warfighters and personalities for this war. That is clear. There are the rare exceptions, but as pointed out in the good for Newsweek article about the hunt for OBL,

(the blame for many of our lost opportunities belongs to).. risk aversion in career officers, whose promotions require spotless (“zero defect”) records—no mistakes, no bad luck, no “flaps.” The cautious mind-set changed for a time after 9/11, but quickly settled back in. High-tech communication serves to clog, rather than speed the process. With worldwide satellite communications, high-level commanders back at the base or in Washington can second-guess even minor decisions.

Boy, oh boy. That is spot on. So spot on.

There is also the fear of the selection board. In Kaplan's article, he discusses the fact that the Col. McMaster (I am a fan) of Dereliction of Duty fame has twice been passed over for Brigadier General - twice. Now, I know enough about boards to know you don't know the whole story if you don't know the whole story - but if anyone needs a star it is Col. McMaster. Then again, we know what can happen if you bump the wrong person the wrong way and they show up on your board...

An item that caught my eye as well in Kaplan’s article, and rings very true. It is also related to the reason I blog as CDR Salamander.

McMaster’s nonpromotion has not been widely reported, yet every officer I spoke with knew about it and had pondered its implications. One colonel, who asked not to be identified because he didn’t want to risk his own ambitions, said: “Everyone studies the brigadier-general promotion list like tarot cards; who makes it, who doesn’t. It communicates what qualities are valued and not valued.”

A retired Army two-star general, who requested anonymity because he didn’t want to anger his friends on the promotion boards, agreed. “When you turn down a guy like McMaster,” he told me, “that sends a potent message to everybody down the chain. I don’t know, maybe there were good reasons not to promote him. But the message everybody gets is: “We’re not interested in rewarding people like him. We’re not interested in rewarding agents of change.”

Members of the board, he said, want to promote officers whose careers look like their own. Today’s generals rose through the officer corps of the peacetime Army. Many of them fought in the last years of Vietnam, and some fought in the gulf war. But to the extent they have combat experience, it has been mainly tactical, not strategic. They know how to secure an objective on a battlefield, how to coordinate firepower and maneuver. But they don’t necessarily know how to deal with an enemy that’s flexible, with a scenario that has not been rehearsed.

“Those rewarded are the can-do, go-to people,” the retired two-star general told me. “Their skill is making the trains run on time. So why are we surprised that, when the enemy becomes adaptive, we get caught off guard? If you raise a group of plumbers, you shouldn’t be upset if they can’t do theoretical physics.”

And if I might add, you never promote someone who gets out of step with a senior officer’s pet acquisition program. Never.

The following is also something that is also very true to the Navy. Exceptionally true.

Capt. Kip Kowalski, an infantry officer in the Captains Career Course at Fort Knox, is a proud soldier in the can-do tradition. He is impatient with critiques of superiors; he prefers to stay focused on his job. “But I am worried,” he said, “that generals these days are forced to be narrow.”

Kowalski would like to spend a few years in a different branch of the Army; say, as a foreign area officer, and then come back to combat operations. He says he thinks the switch would broaden his skills, give him new perspectives and make him a better officer. But the rules don’t allow switching back and forth among specialties.

”I have to decide right now whether I want to do ops or something else,” he said. “If I go F. A. O., I can never come back.”

In October 2006, seven months before his essay on the failure of generalship appeared, Yingling and Lt. Col. John Nagl, another innovative officer, wrote an article for Armed Forces Journal called “New Rules for New Enemies,” in which they wrote: “The best way to change the organizational culture of the Army is to change the pathways for professional advancement within the officer corps. The Army will become more adaptive only when being adaptive offers the surest path to promotion.”

Many an officer has taken a set of orders, or turned one down, knowing that this was the end of his career. Without community top-cover at the job he is heading to, or going to a “non-select” job – he was, “sending a message to the board.” Actually, no – the selection board is just closed minded and parochial.

While we are on the subject of close minded and parochial, there are two other items in the news that tie into this on the edges. First let’s talk a bit about Sen. Warner (R-VA).

About a decade too late, Sen. Warner is going to retire. An interesting man in many respects, I had a chance to see the man up close and personal for a period of time in the late ‘90s. A much smaller and frail man in person (make-up and TV can do magic) than you would think (and that was 10 years ago), he is unquestionable “Senatorial” in the way he carries and thinks about himself.

Backing up his public persona you can get from watching and reading him – he has contempt for almost everyone else but himself. He has never been a great supporter of the war, so his efforts to undercut the Gen. Petraeus now as we start to see success - to me iy seems a bit self-serving and daft. At times it is best to step away.

Whatever you think of Bush and his pals and their conduct of the war for the last 4+ years – if at last he has hired the right staff to make it work – why not step away and let the crop grow to harvest?

In January of this year, Warner declared that the Surge would fail. Knowing what I know about Warner’s opinion of his opinions – it would be almost an impossibility for him to declare that anything he once said could be incorrect. Senator Warner, you see, simply does not make mistakes. I just don’t think he can, at this stage of his life, have the mental flexibility to accept that perhaps something he declared dead in the womb might be walking around getting the job done.

Senator Warner is also making the common professional politicians who are used to bullying their way to getting what they want make; that taking away something from a recalcitrant Senate colleague to make him support your pet project next time is like getting what you want in Iraq by taking away 5,000 of ~160,000 troops on the ground.

That is ~3% of the total – but besides the usual effect of 3,000NM screwdrivers – this sends the wrong message to our Iraqi allies who are already worried that we will, like we have in the past, leave our allies high and dry. He thinks it sends a signal, it does - it sends a signal that what OBL says is true, we are a weak horse and a fool for picking our side. Anyway, funny timing by the Senior Senator from VA going after the Iraqi gov'munt.

Speaking of 3,000NM screwdrivers – all sorts of stuff in the news about the Joint Chiefs recommending to the president that the troop levels be lowered in Iraq by big fat numbers next year. Ahem. Are they fighting in Iraq? No. Let a 4-star that has actually proven progress make the recommendations. You just keep the toilet paper and tampons moving east - ok?

According to administration and military officials, the Joint Chiefs believe it is of crucial strategic importance to reduce the size of the U.S. force in Iraq in order to bolster the military's ability to respond to other threats, a view that is shared by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.

There is also some ego work going on here,

Pace's recommendations reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who initially expressed private skepticism about the strategy ordered by Bush and directed by Petraeus, before publicly backing it.

Don't ever underestimate the ability for some people not to like something just because it wasn't their idea - or for the press to not get the story right. Either way, an interesting bit floating around.

In the end I would like to ask them (or whoever is making the story up); shouldn't you focus on winning the war you are in now before you start worrying about what you may or may not have to fight in the future? Victory now is the best preparation for victory later.

At last – an end to an exceptionally long post (thanks Bookie for giving life to what is most likely the most long-winded, rambling post I have put out in, well, ever).

OK, not the end. One more rabbit hole to go down. Well, maybe the last one....I want you to ponder a word that I think I will give an example of tomorrow. This is a Salamander word – so give credit where credit is due. Antitransformatinalism.

Antitransformationalism is the solidly held belief that in the end there is really little new under the sun. The loud, proud, smart, and ,on average, very ignorant advocates of “Transformation” are really just mal-educated, intelligent men spouting "weekend-seminar, 2-week Outward Bound MBA-speak camp" Bullsh1t Bingo lingo because they lack the historical perspective to understand the core nature of the socio-military-political environment they are in. To justify their response to the world around them - everything must be Transformational - because they don't know any other word. Windex for all ills - Transformational ideas for the trolls under the bridge and the Minator in the maze.

Note that McMaster and Nagl are both historians.

Case in point. As I was reading Kaplan’s bit a third time and finding myself nodding my head, I was reminded that much of this has been around before. Some of my favorite quotes from Nagl’s “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam” came to mind.

Well, we have a variation of, “As Iraqi forces stand up in number, we will stand down.”

“…we could not win the war without the help of the population, and of the Chinese population in particular; we would not get the help of the population without at least beginning to win the war.”
- Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton to Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Field Marshal Montgomery on 23 DEC 51 on Malaya.

You have the “We need a new plan (surge) and the right General to run it.”

Montgomery to Lyttelton:
“Dear Lyttelton,
Malaya.
We must have a plan.
Secondly we must have a man.
When we have a plan and a man, we shall succeed: not otherwise.
Yours Sincerely,
Montgomery (F.M.)

Afterwards he selected General Sir Gerald Templer. Pp.87.

We have an almost verbatim quote you are starting to see from some parts of the MSM and even Democrats in Congress.

31 July 1960. In its Special Edition proclaiming the end of the Emergency, the Straits Times commented, “Perhaps there is no great point in recalling all the tragic and idiotic blunders, all the false optimism, all the unrealism of the first phases of the war, but it is not possible to appreciate fully the heroism of the Security Forces unless the stupidities of some of those in command are remembered.” Pp. 103.

You have the problem of a bunch of great peace time Generals just not ready for war time,

“Twenty years after the debacle at the Kasserine Pass, it was hard to find a General in the U.S. Army who worried that he or his colleagues might squander resources and waste the lives of soldiers. The junior officers of World War II, now the generals of the 1960s, had become so accustomed to winning from the later years of that was that they could no longer imagine they could lose. (The failure in Korea they rationalized away as the fault of a weak civilian leadership which had refused to “turn loose” the full potential of American military power against Chins.) They assumed that they would prevail in Vietnam simply because of who they were.” Pp.133. Neal Sheehan, “A Bright Shining Lie” – pp.287

(BTW, have you notice none of the problem Generals we have had right now have been USMC? Just saying.)

We have the “The first part of the war was not right…”

“I don’t believe the way the Vietnam problem – which is basically not a military problem – was handled in the early days was the right one. I didn’t carry out my tactics in Malaya by raising masses of local troops and putting them all in British uniforms and giving them enormous loads to carry so that they became completely immobile. We did it by equipping them and training them as near as possible to the enemy they had to compete with in a particular terrain. This applied not only to the local forces, but also to all the British units. Their street fighting and jungle techniques were worked out with the very greatest care. I only used bombing in the jungle or mountains in Malaya in order to flush out the Communists.”
- Field Marshal Templer in ’68. Pp204

And this quote kind of stands all on its own.

Rather than squarely face up to the fact that army counterinsurgency doctrine had failed in Vietnam, the army decided that the United States should no longer involve itself in counterinsurgency operations. The “Weinberger doctrine” of 1983 made such involvement less likely by creating a series of tests that in practice precluded American participation in any wars that did not allow full exploitation of American advantages in technology and firepower. The army returned to its organizational roots, creating a force that triumphed in the extremely conventional Gulf War of 1990-91. The day after that victory, President George Bush crowed, “By God, we ‘ve licked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.”

In fact, the Gulf war simply confirmed the army’s Jominian concept of fighting purely military battles with high-technology weaponry and overwhelming firepower. By refusing to acknowledge that most wars, unlike the Gulf, are and will be bought on battlefields populated by people who may support one side or than other (or one of many), the army continued to prepare itself to fight wars as it wanted to fight them. Pp.207.

Oh, and to go really far back – we have Proverbs 23:11,

As a dog returns to its vomit, so a fool repeats his folly.

Man, did that ramble. BTW, if you didn't read all the articles linked above - please don't comment - you probably didn't see the thread that connects all the rambles and rabbit holes. Heck, I barely do. Did this do Bookie? I'm not happy with my post - but for a Monday, it is about all I've got.

From Ganjgal to Befehlstaktik

There are broader issues in the background story of the Battle of Ganjgal where SGT Dakota Meyer earned his Medal of Honor. What went on in the TOC, CPT Swenson and more. The details of that will come out over time, but there are a larger things at play here worth considering.

Mistakes will always take place in war even when you have the right people with the right orders conducting the right mission, and we always have to be careful to not do two things; don't twist the 3,000-mile screwdriver (if you have one), or in hindsight pick every action apart as if you would have unquestionably done something different if you were there.

Well, you weren't. You may have, you may have not. What can seem wrong in hindsight can, at the moment, seem very right. That is a simple fact.

Things bad will happen in war, bad mistakes of commission or omission will take place, but there are things you can do to mitigate it. That is what I find interesting, trying to identify those eternal things in the background, store them away, and hope that you might prosper from that knowlege in the future if you find yourself in a similar situation.

First - let's set the stage. The Battle of Ganjgal too place on 08 SEP 09. General Stan McChrystal just took over command of ISAF/US Forces Afghanistan earlier that summer and had released his report just a few weeks prior. Two weeks before that - he released his Direction & Guidance for Counterinsurgency to the forces in the field.

From the UNCLAS version of his D&G, here are some excerpts just so you know what was floating around in the ether.

Protecting the people is the mission. ... We will not win simply by killing insurgents. … we must change the way that we think, act, and operate … how we interact with people, how we drive or fly, how we patrol, how we use force … Security will not come from overwhelming firepower…A military force, culturally programmed to respond conventionally (and predictably) to insurgent attacks is akin to the bull that continually charges that matador's cape … an insurgency cannot be defeated by attrition; … The intricate familial, clan, and tribal connections of Afghan society turns "attrition math" on its head. From a conventional standpoint, the killing of two insurgents in a group of ten leaves eight remaining: 10-2=8. From the insurgent standpoint, those two killed were likely related to many others who will want vengeance. If civilian casualties occurred, that number will be much higher. Therefore, the death of two creates more willing recruits: 10 minus 2 equals 20 (or more) rather than 8. This is part of the reason why eight years of individually successful kinetic actions have resulted in more violence. The math works against an attrition mind-set. This is not to say that we should avoid a fight, but to win we need to do much more than simply kill or capture militants.

Second, conventional culinary action against insurgents consumes considerable resources with little real return and is likely to alienate the people we are trying to secure. Large scale operations to kill or capture militants carry a significant risk of causing civilian casualties and collateral damage. If civilians die in a firefight, it does not matter who shot them - we still failed to protect them from harm. Destroying a home or property jeopardizes the livelihood of an entire family - and creates more insurgents. We sow the seeds of our own demise.

... and so it goes for seven pages. Official investigations point in other directions than the above or the JUL09 Tactical Directive, but having been there eight months earlier under the previous tactical directive - at least my experience is that it is sewn in to everything you do - especially from the Staff level. I do not discount its impact at all.

As ISAF is/was a NATO operation - there was a constant background noise that American forces were killing too much; too quick to use indirect fire; too disruptive. The surge we started in late 08 was just getting heft and moving forward - and the US still had not fully taken back the keys from NATO.

At the exact time Ganjgal took place, the entire ISAF leadership was soaking in the reaction to the Kunduz airstrike and all the gnashing of teeth and rending of clothes that went with it.

Remember the context of the time.

New Commander. New focus. The new Commander put out his guidance - a slight modification of General McKiernan's "Shape Clear Hold Build" - and the forces in the field were in the process of digesting them. Read the D&G in full as linked to above, then read the various reports of the Battle of Ganjgal - and the disconnect is clear on what the theory was - and what the reality of the facts on the ground were.

The coalition forces were taking increasing fire and could observe women and children shuttling fresh ammunition to Taliban fighting positions.

When broad theories meet narrow facts - that is where cracks develop and gaps are created where lives fall in to.

The path from think-tank to General's Desk to Staff back to General's Desk to the field is one well worn. When it results in D&G/ROE you can rough out a general matrix to tell you what is going to happen at the element and unit level.

Many problems can be minimized in the profession of arms by following the basics of Vince Lombardi Leadership 101 - keep it simple, keep it short. If your D&G sounds like the executive summary to a PhD dissertation, you're doing it wrong. If you are writing for the parlors of Georgetown and the salons of Europe but are delivering to the Strategic Corporal, you're doing it wrong.

With that set, here is the rough cocktail-napkin matrix of the interplay between Operational D&G, Tactical Leadership in the TOC (Tactical Operations Center), and Unit Level Leadership in contact with the enemy.

Solid D&G : Right Tactical Leadership:
--- Unit Level Leaders have room to make decisions based on their judgement and the facts at hand. Short OODA loop as the unanticipated happens (as it always does).
--- Judgement is well demonstrated and reflected in execution.
--- Few questions coming up from down the chain, lots of information coming up from down the chain.
--- Core Principals reinforce decisions. Things happen as reasonably expected.

Solid D&G : Wrong Tactical Leadership:
--- Orders seem to need constant repeating. OODA Loop is just an Oooooooo.
--- Unit Level Leaders seem to want to be told what to do or ask questions that are easily answered with a quick reading of the D&G.
--- More questions coming up from down the chain, less information coming up from down the chain. Initiative discouraged; approval seeking encouraged.
--- Core Principals seem to be missing. Things happen that make so sense related to the orders given.

Difficult D&G : Right Tactical Leadership:
--- Potential problems at the unit level are identified and planned responses are prepared to mitigate impact. OODA Loop extended, but functioning.
--- Unit Level Leaders understand the "white space" gaps and are confident of their support by Tactical Leadership if in extremis.
--- Challenges made and requests for modifications/clarifications come up from down the chain; Tactical Leadership responds based on Core Principals. Communication between levels short, decisive.
--- Conflicting requirements are resolved quickly based on Core Principals, judgement, and character of leadership. Deviations are reported as needed after decisions are made.

Difficult D&G : Wrong Tactical Leadership:
--- Orders are seen from a bureaucratic vice military point of view. OODA loop is too long or non-existent. Making no decision is seen as decision making. "Observe" is replaced by "Comply."
--- Unit Level Leaders do not understand the "white space" gaps as they do not know they exist as Tactical Leadership has never thought out or wargamed the implications of higher D&G.
--- Tactical Leadership is self-focused, judgement is supplanted by reverence to specific words in D&G. A palatable sense of detachment, distance, leavened with complacency felt between different levels of leadership.
--- Core Principals are undefined. Judgement is out-sourced. Trust between Unit and Tactical Leadership is missing.

What are the "Core Principals?" Well, that is the question - isn't it? It can depend on the person and their position - but it really shouldn't. Another way to look at Core Principals is to look at what the default Decision Point should be? When all else is confusing - is there one question you keep in your back pocket for guidance that provides a "yes or no" answer that can guide you out of the fog? There should be. One would hope that in every leader's default Decision Point question there is one one shared by all:

- Do I trust my subordinate leaders in the field? If yes, give him what he needs.

That is not an easy question - but it is one that has to be founded in a mindset and a level of trust between leaders - with both commissioned and non-commissioned officers. Knowledge that we trust their judgement based on the fact we know they understand our mission, our commander's D&G, and the specific needs for those under their charge. They have the training and facilities to make the right call. That is the mindset - the result of selecting, training, promoting, and developing leaders that have earned the trust that enables a mindset build on that trust - it is self-reinforcing.

When that doesn't exist, you develop a bureaucratic, dare I say Soviet, mindset. You have no trust in others - only the orders you have from higher. You don't believe in judgement, only the judgement of those who wrote your orders. If there is "white space" then that needs to be filled from - you guessed it - from higher up the chain. You don't lead - you manage the orders given to you by others. You don't look for gaps, you ignore them. It is a mindset of fear.

Do we want officers or automatons? Our nation's history is full of officers who found themselves in situations where they could not "just follow orders" and had to use their training, education, and judgement ... and if that failed ... then their commanders would rely on their subordinates' .... character.

A commander who has trust and confidence in his leadership and subordinates' leadership intentionally writes D&G that has "white space" to give his leaders in the field running room. He knows that he has officers who, on balance, have the judgement, character, and understanding of the profession of arms to carry out what needs to be done for the mission at hand. Likewise, you must have officers on the receiving end that meet that expectation.

Even in the best of circumstances, that doesn't work out sometimes. When things do not work out the way they should in that chain of events from the Operational Level through the Tactical down to the Unit - you need to ask broader questions once you get past the, "He asked for X and they did not give it to him because of Y, and as a result Z happened." You have to ask if we have a system that promotes and encourages the right officers with the right mindset. A military gets the officers it recruits, trains, and promotes.

What are our criteria? What are our priorities? What do we reward? What do we punish? Remember, it is almost never the superficial characteristics of the individuals in the ranks, but the quality of their leadership that makes the difference.

Along those lines, let's pivot slightly to Tom Rick's post over at FP. In it he brings back someone we haven't visited with since 2007, Col. Paul Yingling, USA. You need to read it all - but here is the parts that are germane to our discussion.

Scipio's centurions didn't have 3.5 years of brigade staff time to learn their trade before fighting Hannibal. Sherman's cavalry troops were not made audacious by rigorous PME. Guderian's race to the English Channel was not preceded by a year of stability in ARFORGEN. Patton's tank companies were not the product of enlightened personnel policies. These officers succeed because they had the intelligence to see the battlefield clearly, and the courage to act on their convictions...

Claims that today's wars are somehow more complex than previous conflicts will draw belly laughs from historians. Is sectarian conflict in Iraq somehow more politically complex than Rome's civil wars? Does the rate of technological change in the last ten years in Afghanistan exceed that of the last two years of World War I? Even if we accept the dubious proposition that today's wars are unparalleled in complexity, successful brigade commanders have demonstrated that mission command works. Colonel Sean McFarland helped turn the tide in Anbar Province thanks in large part to the autonomy he granted to Captain Travis Patriquin. Colonel H.R. McMaster's success in Tall Afar was attributable to a command climate in which thinking was required and PowerPoint was not. Have new and unparalleled complexities transformed warfare since 2006?

... Thick orders and elaborate SOPs haven't eliminated costly, stupid mistakes. Consider two of the most heavily regulated activities on the modern battlefield -- air strikes and detainee operations. Air strikes have killed civilians and ground troops have abused detainees, even when the SOPs regulating these activities ran to several hundred pages. ... Leaders prone to crimes and blunders are not dissuaded by elaborate checklists or sternly worded prose.

Yet the production of highly prescriptive orders and SOPs, what Germans call Befehlstaktik, continues unabated; why? The primary purpose of detailed orders is not battlefield success, but rather the protection of field-grade and flag officer careers. In ten years of war, no Army general has relieved a fellow flag officer for battlefield failure. Why so many failures and so little accountability? When a small unit gets in trouble, senior commanders find cover in SOPs thick enough to stop an OER bullet. (I told the troops not to beat detainees; it's right here on page 11.) Rather than preventing battlefield failure, detailed planning often enables it. Senior officers can survive almost any debacle so long as there's a FRAGO and a captain between them and the problem.

Detailed planning can be useful in understanding problems, anticipating opportunities and risks and synchronizing activities. Prescriptive orders and SOPs have their place in performing routine mechanical tasks. However, these techniques are often counterproductive in the fog and friction of combat. Modern combat requires junior leaders capable of exercising judgment and initiative, and senior officers capable of fostering these qualities. It requires junior leaders capable of acting on commander's intent, and senior officers capable of clearly expressing their intent. It requires junior leaders capable of taking prudent risks, and senior officers willing to underwrite and reward risk-taking.

Sorry Tom and Paul for taking such a long pull-quote - but that is so full of win, I can't help myself.

After a decade of war - the Army still has a lot of work to do in order to refine its culture. That should give Navy a pause - we have not had anything close to the trial by fire experienced by the Marines and Army. We are thick with toxic cultural problems, unpurged by the unfudgeable truth of combat. I don't think we need to go through the list again. We haven't even started to clean house - and I would offer with the latest promotions at the highest levels, we aren't going to begin soon.

No institution, much less a military one, is perfect. With continual critical review though, it can get better - evolve - adapt. When critical review is squashed, diminished, mau-mau'd or aggressively punished, then over time a military will degrade, become ineffective, and then put the nation it serves at Strategic Risk.

The Army in the last decade has brought out some great critical thinkers; Nagl, McMaster, Yingling and others; some on active duty, some retired, some have just gone home. Through their efforts, the Army has improved - all that from an institution still seen by many as hide-bound.

Where is our Navy's Nagl, McMaster, Yingling and others? I can think of a few - some we hear from more than others - some we have featured here and on Midrats. Some of the best I know who are still on active duty only communicate via email or FB where they once had a much higher profile. Why? Simple - our Command Climate is worse than the Army's when it comes to dissent. We have had our exceptions when it comes to leaders willing to listen to criticism - Admirals Stavridis and Harvey come to mind .... but where are those coming behind them? Out front? No. Toiling away behind the scenes? Yes.

Why behind the scenes? Simple as described to me by them; fear. Well founded fear; but fear. Every time they stick their head out, they get professionally mau-mau'd to the point they pull their head back inside their shell. After all, they do have a family to feed and hope for future positions of influence; and honestly that is OK. I haven't been the greatest example of intellectual courage either - for the same reason.

Is it really the best path to improving our Navy, pushing our best thinkers in to the shadows? Classifying our INSURVs to hide only our shame from public view? Rewarding the parrots while punishing the eagles and Capitoline Geese?

While Nagl pulled a Salamander and punched out near the first exit - McMaster and Yingling are still on active duty. McMaster received much deserved top-cover to make BG and it is nice to see Yingling in a great O6 job in Garmisch-Paremkirchen.

They are still out front - giving as well as they can to make the service they love better - and by doing so - providing great service to their nation. Creative friction - the heat and sparks of future victory. BZ to them.

What does all this have to do with Ganjgal? Everything. It has to do with how we select, train, and reward leaders - and how those leaders then carry out their responsibilities. It is a larger story than Ganjgal and needs to be reviewed by leaders in all services, because we can all learn from it.

By study, perhaps in the future we will see more CDR Evans, and less Ganjgal TOC.

Everyone knows their time ...

As many of you know, late last week our nation lost an opportunity; one it probably would have passed on - but an opportunity nonetheless.

I’m a colonel in the U.S. Army, and next summer I will retire to teach high school social studies. My friends think I’m crazy, and they may have a point.

That is Col. Paul Yinling, USA. He is going home.

It is funny, when you retire some people ask either why you stayed in so long, or why you are leaving so soon. Everyone knows their own reasons - and Paul I think has a good one on the top of his list.

Colonel is the last rank before general’s stars, and it comes with significant perks. My pay is triple the national average teacher’s salary. Military budgets have doubled over the past decade, while school districts have slashed funding, increased class sizes, cut programs and laid off teachers. The social status accorded to the military is wonderful, while teachers are routinely pilloried by politicians and pundits for student outcomes that are often driven by events and conditions far beyond the schoolhouse door.
....
Especially in a democracy, we ought to respect most those who foster the character traits that make self-government attainable — parents and teachers, coaches and ministers, poets and protesters. When I hear the Army motto, “This We’ll Defend,” it’s them I have in mind.

I’ve served five combat tours in Desert Storm, the Balkans and Iraq, and I’ve had cause to reflect on what it means to live well. It has little to do with money or social status or proximity to power. Instead, amid the clamor of a youth baseball practice, I’m part of a conversation on character that echoes in eternity. The opportunity to engage in that conversation more often is why I want to teach.

I've blogg'd about Paul before, generally due to his very brave and well focused critique coming after his 2007 article, "A Failure in Generalship."

His diagnosis of the Army's General Officers paralleled the same problem we have in the Navy with our Flag Officers;

“As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war” - arguing that Congress needs to be more bold when holding three- and four-star generals accountable.
...
"It is unreasonable to expect that an officer who spends 25 years conforming to institutional expectations will emerge as an innovator in his late forties." - arguing that the US generalship suffers from conformity, lack of vision, and lack of creativity.

Since 2007, I have looked for the Navy's Yingling to come to the front - but it has yet to happen. I know we have a few, I exchange emails with them on a regular basis - but for reasons of their own, they remain in the background working other issues - and for good reason they best know and I don't question.

In a parallel universe, it would have been good to see people like Yingling and McMaster rise to the top in our Army - but that isn't to be. Perhaps McMaster has a better chance as his critique was made towards a previous generation and not this one; but it took an act of Petraeus to get him to BG .... We'll see.

As for Paul - we should all set aside our own selfish projections on the man and just thank him for his years of service. We should wish him the best going forward, as he will continue to serve his nation - just in a different way.

Everyone knows their time - and their reasons. Thanks Paul, we'll be hearing from you again soon I hope.

Yingling Revisited

Wondering what is going wrong with out General & Flag Officers is not a new thing. Our buddy Lolita Baldor over at AP reminds us of Paul Yingling's article over a half-decade ago in her good article on the 5 GOFO that have had problems as of late.

Nice pull quote at the end of her article parallels some of the core causes I touched on yesterday at USNIBlog.

"You're not describing a general officer corps, you're describing a human condition," said Anthony Cordesman, a national security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Whenever people are in hierarchical structures they develop a sense of entitlement, and they do, on occasion, abuse it."

Some parts of our culture try to make those at the highest ranks of the military to be demigods of some kind, but they aren't. They are just humans - but all the glory and weakness that comes with that.

Yingling babblefest

First of all, I always giggle when I see his name, because I am reminded of one of my favorite cheap beers. Anyway.

I know I am showing up late to the discussion - but to be honest - I didn't see the shocking nature of his article. I saw Bubblehead mention it on MilBlogs, kind of yawned and moved on. There just didn't seem to be much "there" there. But, after bouncing around the MilBlog world - where tough questions and observations are the norm - I missed this one point: this is a Gannett driven attack.

Ah ha - the MSM being too clever by half. Duh, silly me. It is a reminder though that MilBlogs can say the same thing over and over - but it is hard to get your word heard on the A-team unless you have MSM push, or you can be spun in "the correct manner."

Why did I not feel the need this weekend to come in from working on my garden and playing with the family? Well, here we go:

- The opening is a "job of the General 101" review of what a Go/FO's job is. Nice review, and nothing shocking.

After visualizing the conditions of future combat, the general is responsible for explaining to civilian policymakers the demands of future combat and the risks entailed in failing to meet those demands. Civilian policymakers have neither the expertise nor the inclination to think deeply about strategic probabilities in the distant future. Policymakers, especially elected representatives, face powerful incentives to focus on near-term challenges that are of immediate concern to the public. Generating military capability is the labor of decades. If the general waits until the public and its elected representatives are immediately concerned with national security threats before finding his voice, he has waited too long. The general who speaks too loudly of preparing for war while the nation is at peace places at risk his position and status. However, the general who speaks too softly places at risk the security of his country.

Very nice, very true, and very much in line with what has been going on for thousands of years. Good to review though, as very few study history like they should.

- The next bit is almost paraphrased from bits of Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam and Ricks' Fiasco.

Despite the experience of their allies and the urging of their president, America's generals failed to prepare their forces for counterinsurgency. Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Decker assured his young president, "Any good soldier can handle guerrillas." Despite Kennedy's guidance to the contrary, the Army viewed the conflict in Vietnam in conventional terms. As late as 1964, Gen. Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated flatly that "the essence of the problem in Vietnam is military." While the Army made minor organizational adjustments at the urging of the president, the generals clung to what Andrew Krepinevich has called "the Army concept," a vision of warfare focused on the destruction of the enemy's forces.

That's Nagl.

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) estimated in its 1998 war plan that 380,000 troops would be necessary for an invasion of Iraq. Using operations in Bosnia and Kosovo as a model for predicting troop requirements, one Army study estimated a need for 470,000 troops. Alone among America's generals, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki publicly stated that "several hundred thousand soldiers" would be necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. Prior to the war, President Bush promised to give field commanders everything necessary for victory. Privately, many senior general officers both active and retired expressed serious misgivings about the insufficiency of forces for Iraq. These leaders would later express their concerns in tell-all books such as "Fiasco" and "Cobra II." However, when the U.S. went to war in Iraq with less than half the strength required to win, these leaders did not make their objections public.

That's Ricks.

- So, at this point we have a history review and some paraphrasing of two books that everyone should have had a chance to either read or scan a review or two of in the last half decade. And next? Well, he gets to some actual good stuff.He ends up with a tad over the top, but solid ending.

Iraq is America's Valmy. America's generals have been checked by a form of war that they did not prepare for and do not understand. They spent the years following the 1991 Gulf War mastering a system of war without thinking deeply about the ever changing nature of war. They marched into Iraq having assumed without much reflection that the wars of the future would look much like the wars of the past. Those few who saw clearly our vulnerability to insurgent tactics said and did little to prepare for these dangers. As at Valmy, this one debacle, however humiliating, will not in itself signal national disaster. The hour is late, but not too late to prepare for the challenges of the Long War. We still have time to select as our generals those who possess the intelligence to visualize future conflicts and the moral courage to advise civilian policymakers on the preparations needed for our security. The power and the responsibility to identify such generals lie with the U.S. Congress. If Congress does not act, our Jena awaits us.

I say over the top because Valmy brought about the fall of absolute monarchy and the rise of the French Republic - is he trying to say that the terrorists are the French (snicker) and we are Prussians in the army of the Duke of Brunswick? ....... and Jena; are we the Prussians again - and who will be Napoleon who will get lucky - the Chinese? Who? Sloppy use of history: B-.

No; we are not even close. 1864, perhaps.

- Now we get to the interesting part - how do we grow the right Generals?

What we have here is a Lt. Col. who is very frustrated with Generals/Flag Officers and how they are selected and raised. Amen brother! This has always been the case in a peacetime military - and we need to adjust and fix the problem.

What we need to look at is how are we doing now in selecting leaders being that we are in a low-grade war. Let's look at the breakdown of who was selected in FY01 and how is selected in FY07. When it comes down to combat commands, education, etc - are we selecting differently now? If not, how do we change that?

What bothered me was his desire to get Congress more involved in the process. He rightly asks for changes and ways to make the system reward better qualities - Congress is the right way to do that - but instead of going the direction of what is needed - fix the Goldwater-Nichols nightmare THEY created - he totally loses me on this;

Finally, Congress must enhance accountability by exercising its little-used authority to confirm the retired rank of general officers. By law, Congress must confirm an officer who retires at three- or four-star rank. In the past this requirement has been pro forma in all but a few cases. A general who presides over a massive human rights scandal or a substantial deterioration in security ought to be retired at a lower rank than one who serves with distinction. A general who fails to provide Congress with an accurate and candid assessment of strategic probabilities ought to suffer the same penalty. As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war. By exercising its powers to confirm the retired ranks of general officers, Congress can restore accountability among senior military leaders.

YIKES!!! We have enough of a problem with some of our Flag Officers who spend more time in DC than in the Fleet - if you encourage that behavior you will have a more political senior military leadership - and that would be much worse than what we have now. A more political GO/FO corps? You do that and you will have a disgrace like we had when all through the 1990s the Joint Chiefs made Happy-talk until 1999 when they all of a sudden cried that they were starved to death. Only General Krulak kept his integrity in that time. More Generals and Admirals afraid of telling the truth to Congress? No thank you. More Krulak, that would be nice.

Yingling gets close to the target - but that is it. I would have posted right away if he asked for something real radical - like getting rid of Goldwater-Nichols.

I ask you this; doesn't this 20+ year old document scream "replace me!"

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, sponsored by Sen. Barry Goldwater and Rep. Bill Nichols, caused a major defense reorganization, the most significant since the National Security Act of 1947. Operational authority was centralized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as opposed to the service chiefs. The chairman was designated as the principal military advisor to the president, National Security Council and secretary of defense. The act established the position of vice-chairman and streamlined the operational chain of command from the president to the secretary of defense to the unified commanders.

Since 1986, Goldwater-Nichols has made tremendous changes in the way DOD operates-joint operations are the norm-Arabian Gulf, Zaire, Haiti, and Bosnia. Implementation of the act is an on-going project with Joint Vision 2010 (1996) and Joint Vision 2020 (2000). Both documents emphasize that to be the most effective force we must be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically. The joint force, because of its flexibility and responsiveness, will remain the key to operational success in the future.

Yingling outlines some of the problems we have that need to be corrected....just that to get to the meat of this article you have to go through a maze to get there. Was all this backward looking repeat the sugar to get you to take a bite of the strawberry? Was this done, edited, encouraged by Gannett as a way to ride a favorite hobby-horse? It almost seems that way.

Promotion boards in general are an area ripe for reform. Let's stop bitching about the past - but learn from it and take action.

That is why I didn't cover it to start with. I didn't want to bore my readers with stuff they already read about here - and none of his idea seems worth it. If you are going to be subjected to the same thing repeated over and over - you are going to get it from me.

Why spend all this time now? The Gannett connection and all the time this is getting. Just strange for something that has so much fluff and not all that viable meat. It reads nice once - but sleep on it and then read it twice again and tell my how many, "Wow, I could have had a V-8!" moments you had.

If you think my post is all FOD - scroll down MilBlogs to read what Greyhawk, Lex, Chap (1, 2, 3), Grim, DadManly, Bubblehead, SoldierDad, and BLACKFIVE, Skippy, and John of Argghhh!!! all have to say.

Ponderable of the Day

I hope everyone is enjoying their end of summer in a proper way. As you may have noticed, I've been in and out of twitter and FB a bit, but have been light here on the homeblog as I bounce between kids, beach, beef, beer, dogs and watermelon - with only the iPhone to keep me company.

I don't like to go too long without visiting the front porch unless I put out the "Cold Iron" sign and set the troll watch. I found just the right thing though, thanks to Paul Yingling.

John Quincy Adams's

Warning Against the Search for "Monsters to Destroy," 1821

And now, friends and countrymen, if the wise and learned philosophers of the elder world, the first observers of nutation and aberration, the discoverers of maddening ether and invisible planets, the inventors of Congreve rockets and Shrapnel shells, should find their hearts disposed to enquire what has America done for the benefit of mankind? Let our answer be this: America, with the same voice which spoke herself into existence as a nation, proclaimed to mankind the inextinguishable rights of human nature, and the only lawful foundations of government. America, in the assembly of nations, since her admission among them, has invariably, though often fruitlessly, held forth to them the hand of honest friendship, of equal freedom, of generous reciprocity. She has uniformly spoken among them, though often to heedless and often to disdainful ears, the language of equal liberty, of equal justice, and of equal rights. She has, in the lapse of nearly half a century, without a single exception, respected the independence of other nations while asserting and maintaining her own. She has abstained from interference in the concerns of others, even when conflict has been for principles to which she clings, as to the last vital drop that visits the heart. She has seen that probably for centuries to come, all the contests of that Aceldama the European world, will be contests of inveterate power, and emerging right. Wherever the standard of freedom and Independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She will commend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her example. She well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force.... She might become the dictatress of the world. She would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit....

[America's] glory is not dominion, but liberty. Her march is the march of the mind. She has a spear and a shield: but the motto upon her shield is,Freedom, Independence, Peace. This has been her Declaration: this has been, as far as her necessary intercourse with the rest of mankind would permit, her practice.

The NATSEC Marketplace of Ideas Ain't Beanbag

So, you think you want to engage in the push and pull in the NATSEC marketplace of ideas?

As a reader here, I think you do.

Now and then I get emails from people who want to help change the way we do things. They want to write, debate ideas, and generally move the ball forward for reform. As we've discussed here often, that is a difficult place to go for a whole host of reasons.

There isn't enough discussion out there on the topic, and as such it was great to see two of the premier members of the GenX Esoteric and Exalted Order of the Retired O5's, John Nagl and Paul Yingling, put out an exceptional primer on the subject, Considering Defense Reform? Read This First, over at AUSA.

You should read it all, but here's what stood out for me as just plain good advice.

...we’d like to offer some advice to young leaders who are considering fighting the battle for defense reform.

1. Don’t do it.

... you will fail and you will suffer. ... Your career, your family and your friendships will suffer to no good end. If you want to advance, go along and get along: Attend the unit barbecue, laugh at the boss’s jokes and for God’s sake never write for publication.

They are serious. Also consider that even if you try to be anon, ahem, all it takes is one or two people to connect the dots and you'll be discovered. If you are lucky, they will direct their "issues" to your face. If you are not so lucky, you'll only notice the effects later.

As "insurgents" themselves, John and Paul know not all will take #1 to heart, so for those they offer some more advice;

2. Aspire to do, not to be.

You’re still here, so it’s likely you’ve decided, in the words of John Boyd, to do something rather than be something. Boyd did something: transformed our understanding of aerial combat and decision-making. He retired as a colonel. Billy Mitchell did something: demonstrated the critical role air power would play in 20th-century warfare. He was court-martialed for insubordination and reduced in rank from brigadier general to colonel. Defense reformers too often pin their hopes on the example of George C. Marshall, who spoke truth to power as a colonel and yet rose to five stars. We mean no offense, but chances are you’re not George C. Marshall

People forget that track record. There are others.

4. Be kind.

Master the art of disagreeing without becoming disagreeable. Your new idea will offend and anger people whose identity and livelihood are wrapped up in the status quo. ... Defuse angry reactions to your ideas with courtesy, patience and perhaps most importantly of all, self-effacing humor.

I can't emphasize this enough (yes, it is hard to do sometimes. Guilty). I just watched, again, a smart and passionate person blow up their career because they could not help being nasty. I mean, twitter troll nasty. Friends come and go, but enemies accumulate. Also remember that when you try to stab someone in the back, even if you miss, a lot of people will see that you tried and take note. This vibe on tone and attitude is along the same lines as Claude Berube's FEB 2009 Proceedings article, The Navy Can Handle the Truth: Creative Friction without Conflict.

That goes along nicely with;

5. Seek allies. 

... You will find allies for your ideas among those who disagree with you, but only if you look for areas of agreement. ... Disagreement is necessary for dialogue. Every opponent is a potential ally.

Exactly. I've never understood the demand for perfection and full alignment of some by others. Like I try to promote here; I don't have the perfect answer, but neither do you. Only through our discussions can we both work our way towards the truth somewhere between the two of us.

You need to build a network not just on the personal level in detail, but that is broad in scale;

7. Build an outside game and an inside game.

... To change a large bureaucracy, you’ll need to generate energy from the outside. In other words, you’ll have to help journalists, scholars, policy analysts and other independent voices explain how and why the bureaucracy is failing. However, that outside energy will merely disturb the bureaucracy. To change it, you’ll need to work inside the bureaucracy to channel that energy into productive reform.

There is a final note that hits home. Time moves way too fast.

10. Your time too shall pass.

One day, your name will be stricken from the active roles. You may get killed, you may get wounded, you may retire, you may resign. If you are fortunate enough to walk off the parade field, make sure you have someone and something waiting for you. Maybe that someone is your spouse, children or longtime friends. Maybe that something is a second vocation or an avocation. No matter how honorable your service, you are more than your service record.

Take joy in having served, and find a way to keep serving.