DG-26 Guam Killer

Everyone wants to talk about the DF-21D, the "Carrier Killer."

I don't think we are talking enough about the DF-26.

I'm pondering over at USNIBlog ... come by and puzzle your puzzler with me.

What Taiwan can learn

One of the best things a military can do - it actually is a requirement - it to look at the most recent conflicts of other nations at a similar technological stage for hints at what does and does not work at war. 

Theories and exercises at peace can be dangerously misleading. Only by looking at what happens at war can you be prepared for when it is your turn.

The most recent iteration of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is one such example. How could this inform Taiwan? 

Eric Chan over at The Diplomat looked at that angle;

However, the first and most obvious lesson of the Armenia-Azerbaijan war is that through massed unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), it is possible for ground forces to cheaply replicate elements of a robust air force at a localized level.

...

Azerbaijan used a significant number of “unmanned” AN-2 biplanes as decoys to locate Armenian air defense and artillery. These decoys were quite low-tech: the pilots simply aimed at the cheap biplanes at Armenian lines, strapped the controls with belts to maintain course, and bailed out. Paired with strike UAS, this proved to be an extremely cost-effective method of revealing and then targeting an enemy air defense.

Those are just a couple of observations. Good stuff to ponder. Give it a read. 

The 2020s Cruiser Crisis

Over the last few years, I have come to the firm opinion that both structurally and culturally, the US Navy is incapable of fixing itself. We have run out of time and are actually past time. To continue to work inside the same infrastructure, policies, laws, and personalities and expect a different result is insanity. We need relief from Congress. Yes, that Congress.

We need a new law and mindset towards acquisition and program management in line with a Goldwater-Nichols replacement. The latest datapoint is the absolute state of our cruiser fleet.

Like so many of the problems we have with the quality, quantity, and utility of the fleet we have today, this was all unavoidable.

It was also very predictable. We are, in spades, enjoying the fruits of Transformationalism rounded up with a decorative acquisition system which seems to be intentionally designed to prevent the development of an effective fleet. We had a series of leaders who made wrong bet, and then doubled down or allowed themselves to be distracted by the political fashion of the moment instead – as it is always easier to seek the praise of those who sneer at you, than to work hard for those you lead.

The latest chapter of “The Terrible 20s” can be seen in an under-examined part of the latest 30-yr shipbuilding plan … the decommissionings;

 In 2022: 

Six Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers will be placed in reserve: San Jacinto (CG 56), Hue City (CG 66), Anzio (CG 68) Vella Gulf (CG 72) and Port Royal (CG 73).  

...

In 2023:  

Two Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers will be placed in reserve: Bunker Hill (CG 52) and Mobile Bay (CG 53). 

... 

In 2024: 

Two Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers will be placed in reserve: Antietam (CG 54) and Shiloh (CG 67). 

In 2026: 

One Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser will be placed in reserve: Chancellorsville (CG 62).

While the budget will determine how much we will buy and how close we get to the goals of the 30-yr shipbuilding plan, the decommissioning schedule you can roughly count on. Time, wear and tear, and the issues of deferred maintenance will ensure that.

If we can’t build more than we scrap, we are a degrading force.

So, at a time when the Chinese Communists have a modern cruiser in serial production and even the Italians will cut steel on a slightly under-armed but still cruiser sized warship, why is the world’s premier Navy being left hoping the latest flight of DDG’s designed during the Cold War will carry the day?

Simply – we have an ossified, adhesion filled pile of accretions that is our acquisition system. To compound the problem, we do not seem to have the right mindset when it comes to ship design.

Just recall the disaster that was CG(X). If we were a properly functioning organization, we would already have Hull-1 ready for deployment, Hull-2 about to commission, and serial production for the next decade. We would also already have plans for the steel cut on the hull in 2025 of the first Flight II of the class, and already be briefing the follow-on CG class. 

Instead, in a period as long as two World Wars, we wait … while the Chinese Communist Navy moves from strength to strength, and allied navies with but a small fraction of our shipbuilding budget have modern ships with proven weapons in production.

It has been over a decade since I warned of The Terrible 20s. Here we are. 

The cruiser crisis of the 2020s is just a small part of a complex problem we are involved with that has economic, political, and demographic factors that would be here regardless of the decisions at OPNAV. Our self-generated failures just compound the challenges.

If anyone you associate with is a senior uniformed or civilian leader in our Navy or industry is panicked or surprised – note that. That just informs you that this person cannot see past the FY they are in. They are a danger to the people who work for them, the organizations they lead, and the nation and Navy they serve.

This is not a wake call, this is a reckoning. 

Naval Primacy is America's Best Strategy, with Jerry Hendrix - on Midrats

When trying to get a grasp on the best way to secure the nation's security and interests, why should Americans look to the sea?

Do American's assume or take for granted what three-quarters of a century of American dominance of the high seas gifted them?

Is this assumption in danger? 

Where do we stand and what steps need to be taken to secure what every American living assumes is their birthright?

To discuss this and related issues this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern will be one of our favorite guests, Dr. Jerry Hendrix, CAPT USN (Ret.), and author of the upcoming book, To Provide and Maintain a Navy; Why Naval Primacy is America's First, Best Strategy.

Since retirement, Jerry has remain engaged in the full breadth of national security issues while at The Telemus Group and  Center for a New American Security.

When on Active duty, his staff assignments include tours with the CNO’s Executive Panel, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and the OSD Office of Net Assessment. 

His final active duty tour was the Director of Naval History. 

He has a BA in Political Science from Purdue University, Masters Degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School (National Security Affairs) and Harvard University (History) and received his doctorate from King’s College, London (War Studies).

He has twice been named the Samuel Eliot Morison Scholar by the Navy Historical Center in Washington, DC, and was also the Center’s 2005 Rear Admiral John D. Hays Fellow. He also held the Marine Corps’ General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. Fellowship. He authored the book Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy and received a number of awards, including the United States Naval Institute’s Author of the Year and the Navy League’s Alfred T. Mahan Award for Literary Achievement.

Fullbore Friday

One of the most dangerous yet commonly held beliefs about a future conflict with China is that we could somehow hold China back by convincing them we could defeat them in 72-hrs. 

Another is that, for some reason, the US Army should have a role - somehow - in significant numbers. That would imply action on mainland Asia.

Even though WWII has mostly faded out of living memory, the Korean War is still inside that fading line. One would think - especially with all the belated focus of the last few years - we would have a greater understanding of the Chinese military history and tradition that, at least to them, goes back thousands of years.

Many will make comments about the Russian ability to sustain and even thrive on hardship and sacrifice, but they hold nothing against the Chines ability to do the same.

At the very highest levels of our natsec nomenklatura, I fear there are very few that understand the scope of China's ability to take and sustain loss.

Case in point, let's look to just one datapoint from WWII. Americans were involved in relative small numbers in this campaign, heck there was even a movie made, 1960's The Mountain Road with James Stewart and Harry Morgan, but this remains almost unknown to the modern mind.

The best single stop summary of the campaign is over at wikipedia. You should go there to read the whole thing, but let me just pull some numbers for what the Japanese called, Operation Ichi-Go;

Operation Ichi-Go (一号作戦 Ichi-gō Sakusen, lit. "Operation Number One") was a campaign of a series of major battles between the Imperial Japanese Army forces and the National Revolutionary Army of the Republic of China, fought from April to December 1944. It consisted of three separate battles in the Chinese provinces of Henan, Hunan and Guangxi.

These battles were the Japanese Operation Kogo or Battle of Central Henan, Operation Togo 1 or the Battle of Changheng, and Operation Togo 2 and Togo 3, or the Battle of Guilin-Liuzhou, respectively. The two primary goals of Ichi-go were to open a land route to French Indochina, and capture air bases in southeast China from which American bombers were attacking the Japanese homeland and shipping.

...

In the first phase, the Japanese secured the Pinghan Railway between Beijing and Wuhan; in the second, they displaced the US air forces stationed in Hunan province and reached the city of Liuzhou, near the border with Japanese-held Indochina. 17 divisions, including 500,000 men, 15,000 vehicles, 6,000 artillery pieces, 800 tanks and 100,000 horses participated in this operation.

The Japanese included Kwantung Army units and equipment from Manchukuo, mechanized units, units from the North China theater and units from mainland Japan to participate in this campaign. It was the largest land campaign organized by the Japanese during the entire Second Sino-Japanese War. Many of the newest American-trained Chinese units and supplies were forcibly locked in the Burmese theater under Joseph Stilwell set by terms of the Lend-Lease Agreement.

In Operation Kogo, 390,000 Chinese soldiers, led by General Tang Enbo (湯恩伯), were deployed to defend the strategic position of Luoyang. The 3rd Tank Division of the IJA crossed the Yellow River around Zhengzhou in late April and defeated Chinese forces near Xuchang, then swung around clockwise and besieged Luoyang. Luoyang was defended by three Chinese divisions. The 3rd Tank Division began to attack Luoyang on May 13 and took it on May 25.

Japanese occupation (red) of eastern China near the end of the war, and Communist guerrilla bases (striped)

The second phase of Ichigo began in May, following the success of the first phase. Japanese forces advanced southward and occupied Changsha, Hengyang, Guilin and Liuzhou. At the Defense of Hengyang, the Japanese only won a Pyrrhic victory since 17,000 Chinese soldiers held out against over 110,000 Japanese soldiers from June 22–August 8, 1944, inflicting 19,000-60,000 dead on the Japanese. In December 1944, Japanese forces reached French Indochina and achieved the purpose of the operation. Nevertheless, there were few practical gains from this offensive. US air forces moved inland from the threatened bases near the coast. The operation also forced British Commandos working with the Chinese as part of Mission 204 to leave China and return to Burma. The U.S. Fourteenth Air Force often disrupted the Hunan–Guangxi Railway between Hengyang and Liuzhou that had been established in Operation Ichigo. Japan continued to attack airfields where US air forces were stationed up to the spring of 1945.

...

All in all, Japan was not any closer in defeating China after this operation, and the constant defeats the Japanese suffered in the Pacific meant that Japan never got the time and resources needed to achieve final victory over China. The Japanese suffered 11,742 KIAs by mid-November, and the number of soldiers that died of illness was more than twice this.[24][25] The total death toll was about 100,000 by the end of 1944.[5]

The Chinese losses for this series of battles alone? 500,000 to 600,000.

For the entire war, in the Pacific theater USA's killed were 111,606. For the entire war.

I have been warning for the better part of two decades that a war with Communist China is coming - or at least a skirmish. It is only a matter of time and place - both will be of their choosing, unless someone is exceptionally stupid on either side. This will be their coming out party as a military force. Outside chance India might be that nation of choice, but I think less likely than the USA.

We need to be ready. I hope we have smart OPLANS and CONOPS on the shelf and have run some solid war games with modest and limited End States. I worry that, as I have seen before, we don't have the right people with a realistic world view running them, shaping them, reviewing them.

We will see, one day.

Pray for peace. Hope for wise leaders with even wiser counsel.

The Surprising Navalists Leave a Marker

 

It has been a bit more than four years ago that navalists were in their second month of excitement about the prospects for a larger Navy with the incoming Trump Administration. 

As most did not expect him to win in 2016, few of us paid any more than passing attention that he picked up on work already done under Obama’s SECNAV Mabus to mark “350-355” as the number needed given the realities of the evolving global security situation – specifically China’s not so peaceful rise.

Not fully appreciated at the time, partisanship and incomplete information led many to not give credit to the Obama team for their work prior to the election. Likewise, in a few years the larger fleet had a Trump stamp on it and it experienced trouble getting broad support. 

That is a shame.

If everyone could take a deep breath for a moment – and remember national security should be on balance non-partisan – what we really have here is a bi-partisan consensus that we need a larger Navy. Will the Biden team pick up where Trump’s left off? We’ll have to see, but we have a reference point, a Ref. A., a marker.

The expected outgoing National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien and the Russ Vought, the director of the White House Office of Management and Budget, have an article out this week at the Wall Street Journal, The Navy Stops Taking On Water. I'm glad they did, as this is a conversation that has to break out in to the open.

Sadly, it is behind the paywall and as a result will get limited viewing, but let me grab a few pull quotes for discussion.

To start, the most simple concepts are always the most important;

As a maritime nation, the U.S. depends on control of the sea to protect its people as well as the flow of cargo.

In the second paragraph, this fact, and various iterations of it, should be part of any navalist discussion or position paper. Anyone with a map, globe, or paper thin understanding of our history knows this to be true. No other service has an argument so sound in the search for resources. Only the USAF gets close.

This is your marker if you’re a numbers guy. Of course, you have to gain the support in Congress to get the money needed to make it happen;

The plan will provide a battle force of 355 vessels within 10 years and nearly 400 within 20 years. It will end the decadeslong decline in attack submarines by building three a year beginning in 2025, with a goal of 80. It will more than double the number of small multimission ships to nearly 70. The backbone of this ship class will be the new Constellation-class frigates, and the Navy will need a second shipyard to increase the pace of construction. The workhorses of the fleet, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, will be modernized.

There is a bit of wishcasting in the unmanned arena. Yes, I know the PPT is sexy and the manpower savings seductive … but industry only tells you the best case variation of the various best case scenarios. Development, yes … and maybe in 2030 such things can be said, but in 2020, the technology simply is not in reach. Reality is not in line with the PPT;

Finally, the plan calls for significant investments in new unmanned ships, which will enhance the resilient strike capabilities of the fleet at a fraction of the cost of manned ships.

How do we get Congressional and taxpayer support? That is the easiest question;

This road map is accompanied by proposed investments in our country’s shipbuilding industry to increase production capacity and create more American jobs. Stable and consistent shipbuilding investments would employ hundreds of thousands with critical manufacturing skills that are easily applicable to other industries. This new labor demand will inspire young people to obtain the requisite vocational training, helping to sustain U.S. manufacturing strength.

This is something we can give money to with results NOW. We are short of facilities to properly maintain the fleet we have today. If we are to grow our fleet, we will need even more. At a minimum we need two new or re-activated shipyards (spit-BRAC-spit) – most likely three.

This last bit leaves me a bit disappointed; 

The increased costs would be fully paid for by reinvesting savings accrued from drawdowns in the Middle East, managing the size of military personnel, and cutting Pentagon overhead.

Overly optimistic. We don’t have all that much left in the Middle East. There is little, at least on the Navy side of the house, flex in uniformed personnel numbers. As for the always popular “Pentagon overhead,” again, we need Congressional action.

There will be only one way to get more money for the fleet our nation needs; we will have to claw it away from the other services.

Goldwater-Nichols is an albatross around the national security neck. It must be replaced. COCOM reform must be done in parallel. Without that, all else is vanity.  With a conductor’s baton in one hand and a battle axe in the other – walk straight in to the grabasstic acquisition system while we are at it. 

Those three must be done first. I think everyone will be pleased with the results … except for the rent seekers from industry and those who have grown comfortable in their well paid, non-productive billets.

In parallel with this is a 30-yr shipbuilding plan. Yes, I know … I know. However, let’s go to the start of the post; there is a bi-partisan consensus that we need a larger Navy. Have a better way to get there? Well, bring it to the table. Compromise with well meaning people who will also compromise. There is more than one way to get to the fleet we need. The challenge west of Wake Island is getting stronger every month – and for 15-yrs we have moved from weakness to weakness.

Biden's Preliminary NATSEC Direction and Guidance

Did you catch Biden's speech where he introduced him nomination for Secretary of Defense?

In it, if you look at a certain angle, you can see an outline of what you can expect from him - broadly - for national security priorities.

I have quotes and details over at USNIBlog.

Come by and give it a read and tell me what you think.