Proactively “From the Sea”; an agent of change leveraging the littoral best practices for a paradigm breaking six-sigma best business case to synergize a consistent design in the global commons, rightsizing the core values supporting our mission statement via the 5-vector model through cultural diversity.
We once had a pretty good plan for AFG, one that began development in late '07 and brought us the uplift in '08/09 and on. It sidelined for a large part the ineffective NATO forces and build a conditions based Shape-Clear-Hold-Build process, slightly modified as time progressed.
In spite of the original sin of Bonn, too much hope, and the unfortunate trusting of NATO to do what it promised - there was a path that gave AFG the best chance to bring security to their nation and as a result, increase our own security.
For years you have read here and over at BigPeace my posts about the importance of Conditions Based planning - the route to victory for thousands of years - vs. Calendar Based planning which has another history to it, one of retreat and defeat.
That is where we are heading. Fred & Kimberly Kagan get close to it.
Everything Secretary Panetta said about the transition approach envisioned at Lisbon is true—that process, excessively binding and bureaucratic in our opinion, does foresee the gradual and conditions-based transition of the task of securing all of Afghanistan to the Afghan security forces. At some point—not specified at Lisbon or in any public statement or document before this one—the mission of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), would change from defeating the insurgency alongside the Afghans to assisting the Afghans in securing their own state. Could that point come in late 2013? Perhaps. But there is no way to be sure now. Announcing it as a fixed timeline now, therefore, would be not only foolish but irresponsible.
Secretary Panetta said one thing about Afghanistan that is certainly not true: “Consolidating those gains is going to be what we have to do in 2012, ensuring that we continue the transitions, ensuring that we continue to improve the Afghan army during this year.” If those goals are the limits of our campaign in Afghanistan for 2012, then our mission there will fail. The reason is simple: You cannot consolidate gains that have not yet been made.
What Panetta is talking about is Calendar Based wrapped up in Conditions Based dressing.
If that is the case, then we are not in this to win. The present administration has neither the will, the plan, or the patience to get us to a condition we reached in mid-08 in IRQ - the opportunity to declare victory and go home.
Since the President's West Point speech he has been clear - he just wants out. First it was 2011, then 2014, and now 2013 it seems. Since he telegraphed that desire, the enemy has been given a lifeline - a reason to be patient. They know victory is theirs if they wait.
Sure, there is a small chance that AFG will reach some benign limbo - but that is just hope. Hope has a low probability of success. Conditions Based decisions increase the odds of success in the out years - Calendar Based is only focused on the short term check in the block.
We've been here before. Vietnamization worked, and with USA support following the North's invasion in '72, South Vietnam in effect has won its own peace.
Then we had Watergate and the '74 election.
The Left could not let a victory in Vietnam stand, and when they had the chance they cut off the South while their Communist fellow travelers doubled down support to the North so when they had a do-over in '75, the South was lost and so was the war.
So again, we find ourselves with people from the same cloth.
If we are not in this to "win" this, then what exactly are we doing? If you are not in it to win - then what is the morality of asking one more family to sacrifice their son or daughter?
As we have documented here since the CINC's West Point Speech last year - there is a significant disconnect between what President Obama, Vice President Biden and others have been saying and what SECDEF-COMCENTCOM-COMISAF have been saying.
Strange public discussion. Though the CINC and his spokesmen continue to speak Time-Based planning WRT JUL 2011 - the uniformed leadership and SECDEF continue to focus on Conditions Based.
Thing about Conditions Based Planning, you can't reverse engineer it to a calendar. You cannot predict to a month if Decisive Conditions have been met. Additionally - it takes months from the point you make a decision to where forces can start to decrease if measured by total force levels. The only way to do that is if you tell Unit X that they are not deploying to relieve Unit Y. If you plan on forces to decrease by JUL 2011 in an organized manner - the decision needs to be made by Christmas to do it right. That would require you to predict Conditions, something you cannot do.
Now, if in JUL 2011 a Operational Review was completed that stated that, "Decisive Conditions have been achieved at A, B, and C. As a result, we will redeploy units X and Y and when their deployment is over, they will not be replaced." That would be fine ... and force levels would start to drop a few months later - just like we saw in Iraq when Decisive Conditions were met.
Here is my concern. As we get closer and closer to JUL 2011, the CINC and the DOD story lines do not get any closer. I don't see the likes of Mattis and Petraeus fudging conditions - so I wouldn't worry about that. We cannot afford in a Strategic context to have either our uniformed leadership tell happy-talk half-truths for domestic political reasons - again - nor can we have a situation where the civilian leadership and uniformed leadership are in open conflict. Watching this get patched together will be interesting - and in a few years will spawn quite a few Doctoral works.
11 months is not a long time in the Planning world when you are talking about bringing forces home in an orderly manner.
Listening to Petraeus here - the gap is still un-bridgeable. Watch.
MSNBC video can be clunky - so via Allah, here is some of the transcript - though you can get more from the MSNBC site.
MR. GREGORY: Let me talk about U.S. troops. I asked you before, when we talked about this July deadline of next year, how stifling is the, the concept of this deadline and this Washington debate to what you’re trying to do here?
GEN. PETRAEUS: I don’t find it that stifling. I’m not bowed over by, you know, the knowledge that July 2011 is out there. In fact, the president has been very clear, Vice President Biden’s been very clear as well, more recently, that this is a date when a process begins that is conditions based. And as the conditions permit, we transition tasks to our Afghan counterparts and to security forces and, and in various governmental institutions, and that enables a “responsible drawdown of our forces”…
Let me point out one other item about July 2011 if I could. Because what I have often noted was that in the speech that the president made at West Point, there were two messages. One was a message of substantial additional commitment, additional 30,000 troops, again more civilians, more funding for Afghan forces, authorization of 100,000 more of them and so forth; but also a message of increased urgency. And that’s what July 2011 really connotes. It is to all the participants, those in Kabul, some of us in uniform, again our civilian counterparts, that we’ve got to get on with this, that this has been going on for some nine years or so, that there is understandable concern, in some cases frustration, and that, therefore, we’ve got to really put our shoulder to the wheel and show during the course of this year that progress can be achieved. And, and, again, one manifestation of that is out there that you have this date.
He is trying hard to give the CINC running room - I hope he takes it.
President Obama outlined his policy towards Afghanistan in his disastrous December 2009 West Point speech that I covered here at the time. For the better part of eight years since I’ve outlined the absolutely wrong-headed nature of this approach to AFG; you can read some of that archive here. In four months less time than his predecessor, yesterday President Trump outlined his plan. A little of the pre-Obama concepts, but adjusted given the realities of today. If, like me, you have style, substance, or personal reasons not to enjoy listening to President Trump speak, then ignore the video embedded below. Instead, read the transcript in full. Ignore the selective pull quotes, inaccurate opinionating, or bitter political posturing by his perma-opponents who would say Trump was wrong if he said puppy noses were cute – read it yourself. I’ll bring out some pull quotes of interest in a moment, but here’s the Executive Summary: two of the best military minds of their generation, National Security Adviser McMaster and Secretary of Defense Mattis, helped develop a plan that they believe gives us a chance to salvage something in Afghanistan after seven years of dithering. Not a perfect plan, but a doable one. I am willing to give them the benefit of the doubt and fully support it. The major reason is that it returns to something I have written about for well over a decade, Conditions Based Planning, and throws away what remains of the Obama Administration's bollocked-up Calendar Based Planning. Read it all, but here are the significant points.
…nearly 16 years after the Sept. 11 attacks, after the extraordinary sacrifice of blood and treasure, the American people are weary of war without victory. Nowhere is this more evident than with the war in Afghanistan, the longest war in American history, 17 years.
I share the American people’s frustration. I also share their frustration over a foreign policy that has spent too much time, energy, money — and most importantly, lives — trying to rebuild countries in our own image instead of pursuing our security interests above all other considerations.
That is why shortly after my inauguration, I directed Secretary of Defense Mattis and my national security team to undertake a comprehensive review of all strategic options in Afghanistan and South Asia. My original instinct was to pull out. And historically, I like following my instincts.
But all my life I’ve heard that decisions are much different when you sit behind the desk in the Oval Office,
Once you get behind the door, the perspective changes. Once you have some of the best minds in the country define the 2nd and 3rd order effects of a decision, you can quickly come to a different conclusion. That is one reason Obama never fully did what he wanted to do in his DEC 09 West Point speech, and this is why Trump is changing his mind too.
I arrived at three fundamental conclusion about America’s core interests in Afghanistan. First, our nation must seek an honorable and enduring outcome worthy of the tremendous sacrifices that have been made, especially the sacrifices of lives.
…
Second, the consequences of a rapid exit are both predictable and unacceptable. 9/11, the worst terrorist attack in our history, was planned and directed from Afghanistan because that country was ruled by a government that gave comfort and shelter to terrorists.
A hasty withdrawal would create a vacuum for terrorists, including ISIS and Al Qaeda, would instantly fill just as happened before Sept. 11. And as we know, in 2011, America hastily and mistakenly withdrew from Iraq. As a result, our hard-won gains slipped back into the hands of terrorist enemies. …
…
Third, and finally, I concluded that the security threats we face in Afghanistan and the broader region are immense.
In some ways, we are roughly right where Osama wanted us – involved in a long term war on the ground in Afghanistan – but the circumstances are different than what he and we thought in 2001. It is also 2017 now. We are where we are. The key is how to make the best of it. This is the most important part of the speech;
But to prosecute this war, we will learn from history. As a result of our comprehensive review, American strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia will change dramatically in the following ways.
A core pillar of our new strategy is a shift from a time-based approach to one based on conditions. I’ve said it many times how counterproductive it is for the United States to announce in advance the dates we intend to begin or end military options.
We will not talk about numbers of troops or our plans for further military activities. Conditions on the ground, not arbitrary timetables, will guide our strategy from now on.
That is where Trump went Salamander. We are back to Conditions Based Planning – what military best practices tells us is the best path to success.
Another fundamental pillar of our new strategy is the integration of all instruments of American power — diplomatic, economic, and military — toward a successful outcome. Someday, after an effective military effort, perhaps it will be possible to have a political settlement that includes elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan. But nobody knows if or when that will ever happen.
Did you get that? All the traditional levers of national power. This is not just a military way forward. We are also willing to come to accommodation with SOME of the Taliban elements. Good to open that door.
Ultimately, it is up to the people of Afghanistan to take ownership of their future, to govern their society and to achieve an everlasting peace. We are a partner and a friend, but we will not dictate to the Afghan people how to live or how to govern their own complex society. We are not nation-building again. We are killing terrorists.
That is “no” to nation building as the conceit of the Bonn Agreement begat, and accepts that Afghanistan will have to order its affairs on Afghan terms. Not nice from our perspective, but what works for them. Now for what I see as the largest risk in this new direction; the India card vs. Pakistan.
The next pillar of our new strategy is to change the approach in how to deal with Pakistan. We can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond.
…
It is time for Pakistan to demonstrate its commitment to civilization, order and to peace.
Another critical part of the South Asia strategy for America is to further develop its strategic partnership with India, the world’s largest democracy and a key security and economic partner of the United States. We appreciate India’s important contributions to stability in Afghanistan, but India makes billions of dollars in trade with the United States, and we want them to help us more with Afghanistan, especially in the area of economic assistance and development.
You can never have a more than 5-min conversation with a Pakistani officer without India coming up. Pakistan has always played both sides in AFG, so they've used up too much capital to stop us from pulling that card. India is a more natural ally for the USA anyway. This is a risky play, but probably the right one in the overall game. I wouldn't have recommended going that hard in the open, but not my job. So, we have our next phase in Afghanistan. This is a good plan, and given everything, probably the best to be expected. I’ve called during the time of calendar based dithering that we would probably be best to just go home and hope for the best. That was because with a calendar based plan, defeat is inevitable; it is only the timing and method that is in question. This plan gives of a chance to salvage something. For those looking for End States, Objectives, Decisive Points, Criteria for Success, etc – this isn’t the venue for that. This speech gives us approximately the Commander’s Intent and Initiating Directive. The Operational Planners can build a plan off that, and are.
As I thought about the CINC's speech at West Point today, in hindsight I have to admit I was being an optimist. In my head, I decided that I had a rough idea what was coming, and as a result was going to title this post, "Give the CINC some room to work." I wanted to support my President. Take 3/4 of the package and push on.
I have a buy-in in AFG - I want us to succeed, victory if you will. As you have read here, I have been confident that with with the USA taking back the keys from NATO, strategic patience, and going with what we know works - this is doable - doable with the right military and political leadership.
Our military leadership at the in-theater operational and strategic level is good and sound. Our COIN built around Shape-Clear-Hold-Build is sound. As in all war though, you need the political to be at the same level. That is the CINC. That is why this speech was so important. We are at an inflection point - we needed a home run.
He lost me at 20:18. I'll explain.
There are three parts to his strategy (it is unquestionably his now); a military surge - a civilian surge - and a "Pakistan" surge. The civilian surge cannot produce desired effects in AFG without the safe and secure environment created by military forces. A stable Pakistan, in terms and in line with our security needs, cannot exist without a safe and secure AFG. For the civilian and Pakistan part of his plan - the military must be given the resources and time to make it happen.
Here is how the President put it.
We will meet these objectives in three ways. First, we will pursue a military strategy that will break the Taliban's momentum and increase Afghanistan's capacity over the next 18 months.
That is when I looked over to Mrs. Salamander and said, "I hope I just didn't hear a timeline."
The 30,000 additional troops that I'm announcing tonight will deploy in the first part of 2010, the fastest possible pace, so that they can target the insurgency and secure key population centers. They'll increase our ability to train competent Afghan security forces and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight. And they will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans.
What you have here is the continuation of the plan that has been in the works since mid-08 and extended by a few more brigades - the McChrystal expansion of the McKiernan uplift. Good - but that previous paragraph was still echoing in my head.
Start sucking your teeth now.
Because this is an international effort, I've asked that our commitment be joined by contributions from our allies. Some have already provided additional troops, and we're confident that there will be further contributions in the days and weeks ahead.
Where are they coming from? Jones-Craddock tried and failed. McNeill-McKiernan tried and failed. Will Stavridis-McChrystal succeed now that we are telling everyone that we intend to leave come h311 or high water?
Here is what we do know. In a year from now, the Canadians and the Dutch (together ~3,500 relatively caveat-free forces) are leaving AFG. This has been known for awhile. The French stated earlier that they will send no more. The Brits can throw a few hundred in the south - but they are already looking at the door. You could double the Spanish, Italian, or German numbers if you want - but due to their ROE/Caveats, they will have little effect.
Former Warsaw Pact NATO economies are under so much stress and their militaries so small - they aren't going to give you thousands. Turks? Please.
I hope that the CINC has some surprises in his back pocket - really he as to. If we do not see allied contributions in the high four to low five-figures in the next, "days and weeks" - then do I really need to tell you what that means tactically, operationally, or strategically?
From an INFO OPS & STRATCOM POV, I just cannot see the CINC saying the above without firm commitments that will be made public in that timeframe. If not; trainwreck. This is varsity football, you can't say things like that unless they happen. This is not domestic politics. This is significant national strategic risk.
Our friends have fought and bled and died alongside us in Afghanistan. And now we must come together to end this war successfully. For what's at stake is not simply a test of NATO's credibility; what's at stake is the security of our allies and the common security of the world.
Now, taken together, these additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011. Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground.
This was at approx 20:18 according to the clock in my car. I am glad Mrs. Salamander was driving. My head fell into my hands, literally. I didn't yell or pound the dashboard. I just said, "Oh, sh1t."
Now, everyone put on your red hat ... or red turban, if you will.
18 months is a fortnight at best for the Taliban, a weekend really. They will wait us out. The AFG government, just like the AFG government after the Soviet withdrawal, will hold on for awhile after we leave - but it is all baked in the cake.
Right now every smart AFG that can is transferring money and making plans to get out. Calls and emails are going to family in the USA, Canada, Germany, The Netherlands, The UK - wherever they have a connection - making a Plan B if they haven't already because they were foolish enough to believe in the USA.
By moving from a conditions based (or effects based depending on planning school you come from) plan to a time based plan, we just solved the Taliban's and Al Qaeda's problem.
We just validated all that has been said about the West. The weak horse is at a canter for all to see.
We'll continue to advise and assist Afghanistan's security forces to ensure that they can succeed over the long haul. But it will be clear to the Afghan government -- and, more importantly, to the Afghan people -- that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country.
They can't do it in 18 months if they know we are leaving them. They know their history better than we do. They know what happened when the Soviets left. They know.
Everyone on the military side of the house knows the AFG will not be ready in 18 months. If anyone does - they sure have been keeping it to themselves. I would like to hear them say it to. Not, "I will carry out the orders .... " mantra - but a not kidding, "Yes, this is outstanding!" true believer stuff.
If the Afghans knew we were there for the long haul, would they be on the readiness curve to be ready once conditions were set? Sure. We just threw that away. You can't force this and expect it to work. This isn't politics - this is the building of a military and civil infrastructure that did not exist before.
By putting an 18-month stamp on things, we just stated that we don't care about the conditions on the ground or if we have desirable or undesirable effects - we are just looking at the countdown.
Success, victory - whatever you want to call it - is never achieved on a chronological basis. You retreat on a timetable - you succeed by reaching decisive conditions, objectives, effects, and end states as defined by your mission. Military 101. This can't be the best military advice he is getting.
Second, we will work with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy so that the government can take advantage of improved security. This effort must be based on performance. The days of providing a blank check are over.
President Karzai's inauguration speech sent the right message about moving in a new direction. And going forward, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our assistance.
We'll support Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people. We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable. And we will also focus our assistance in areas such as agriculture that can make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people.
None of that can be done in a nation larger than Germany in 18-months. Just talk to our Agricultural Development Teams in the east of AFG. They just started two years ago, and are only now impacting a few districts. It takes time to do this right.
Now, the people of Afghanistan have endured violence for decades. They've been confronted with occupation by the Soviet Union, and then by foreign al-Qaeda fighters who used Afghan land for their own purposes.
So tonight, I want the Afghan people to understand: America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country. We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens. And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect, to isolate those who destroy, to strengthen those who build, to hasten the day when our troops will leave, and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner and never your patron.
The AFG didn't hear a word of that. All they heard was,
"...transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011."
Everything else is background noise.
Third, we will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan. We're in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. And that's why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border.
That is/was what we have been doing as a nation. It will all be for nothing if we abandon AFG.
I am not going to fisk the entire speech, read it yourself if you missed it, but there is one more thing I want to cover before I hit the rack.
He had three explanations in his speech. The first two were aimed at the political Left who either wants to retreat now - or do nothing. The third was aimed at, I believe, those who are seeped in a few thousand years of military best practices. Here it is.
Finally, there are those who oppose identifying a timeframe for our transition to Afghan responsibility. Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort, one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade. I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost and what we need to achieve to secure our interests.
Furthermore, the absence of a timeframe for transition would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan.
No one in a uniform has counseled an "open-ended escalation." No one. No, there are just those who are trying to achieve the mission in AFG. The only way to do that is through the proven methods of defining your mission, your end state, your objectives, your decisive points (or conditions or effects - depending on your flavor), your tasks and then the troops you need to achieve them.
There is no "time." If you are given a time limit - then you plan for that and work backwards. Usually though, the planning goes like this - "When the following conditions are met, we can transition to the next phase .... " With time-based plans, all that matters is the time. You know that - the enemy knows that.
If your enemy does not have a chronological restraint, then to achieve their decisive points, objectives, end states and mission - then all they need to do is hit the mattresses and wait you out.
If your enemy sees your Strategic Center of Gravity as the political will to continue - then when you set a conditions-free chronological end to your campaign; then you just advertised that your Center of Gravity has been compromised and is falling apart.
The President in the end wanders into a discussion of costs. OK, we can do that. There is another thing that has stood true for thousands of years - war is always less expensive than defeat. Ask the Khwarezm Shahs, the Confederates, the Soviets, the Baathists, well ... you get the idea.
Here is a question I have for our 4-Stars:
Where in the history of warfare has a time-based strategy worked? When has it ever been determined to be a superior plan for success/victory/mission than a conditions based or effects based plan? Conventional warfare or COIN, when? So, for the pro-victory coalition - what is there in this speech?
Well, hope isn't a plan - but there is hope.
This was a political speech, not a military speech. In politics there is nuance and the truth can change. We must hope for the truth to change. We can hope that "transition" if fudged enough to allow the Commander on the ground to have enough troops for a long enough time to build and expand the Afghan security forces.
Maybe the decision will be made to not start the withdraw in 18-months until conditions are better. Hope, maybe - but it is what it is.
As leaders, there is nothing illegal in the CINC's orders, so you pursue them as best as you can. You can push hard for 18-months with the hope that the largely Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and the other parts of the Afghan National Security Forces can significantly up their game to the point that when the American resources start to draw down - that the Afghans can keep it going. Hope that the drawdown will be manageable and that the financial and material support continues so the Afghan government isn't abandoned like we abandoned the South Vietnamese in '75.
That is, of course, if you think that the hope has a chance to succeed. What do you do if you are faced with the situation that you can no longer plan to win - instead you have to plan an orderly withdraw?
From a moral position - if your mission is strictly chronologically based - what is the risk level you take with the lives of your men and women? For what purpose are you expending lives? What are you "buying" with them?
Ahhh, that pesky thing called the operational art. A Decision Point. How do you define the conditions where further expenditure of resources will not bring about a sustainable desired effect inside an artificial timeline - and as a result when do you decide to pull back to the cantonment?
Tough nut. It would be great to be able to talk to John C. Pemberton about it.
History. How will she read this speech? How will history judge the uniformed leadership?
It doesn't have to end this way - but if you surrender to a time-based plan - history says it does.
If it does - it will be the fault of the elected leaders we have - though they will, like they did in Vietnam, falsely blame the military - but we know that.
This is it? Commander in Chief of the world's top power?
"So, you know, I think that, have we achieved everything that some might have imagined us achieving in the best of scenarios? Probably not. You know, there's a human enterprise, and you know, you fall short of the ideal, ... Did we achieve our central goal? And have we been able, I think, to shape a strong relationship with a responsible Afghan government that is willing to cooperate with us to make sure that it is not a launching pad for future attacks against the United States? We have achieved that goal. We are in the process of achieving that goal. And for that, I think we have to thank our extraordinary military, intelligence and diplomatic teams, as well as the cooperation of the Afghan government and the Afghan people.
Has he ever been briefed on the actual OPLAN for AFG? Objectives/Goals, End States, Mission? Good googly moogly, from this horror show, it looks like he has not - or worse - he has and simply cared so little for it that he didn't let any of it soak in.
Anyway, let's read that again;
We have achieved that goal. We are in the process of achieving that goal.
Either this or that ... cannot do both. I've known since DEC of 2009 that he had no idea what conditions based vs. calendar based planning was all about - and the history of both, but he could at least try to instill some confidence in his military in the field and show some spine as we continue our scheduled retreat.
This level of disinterest and depression just endangers all who are in the field right now. Heck, the center is broken ... now I know what the Elector of Bavaria was thinking at Blenheim. If this is the level of commitment that the Commander in Chief has in AFG ... then we are way past any measure of morality in keeping people in harm's way. 2013's fighting season will be simply setting the conditions for 2014's retreat - a retreat right in the middle of fighting season. Might as well do it now ... but we won't/can't/probably shouldn't.
The responsible thing is to execute the CINC's orders as best as you can, but by no means take exceptional measures that put your people in harm's way. The CINC has given up on victory, no reason to do more than is strictly described. Get as many people home as possible, and to h311 AFG. This is ALL on President Obama's head. He came in to office with a OPLAN that at least had a chance through Shape-Clear-Hold-Build and a conditions based path to some type of acceptable resolution. Now? Nothing. This eventual defeat is all of his making. Watch the video above, you can hear it in his voice. He knows it, and perhaps even wants it. I don't know. I can't see in to a man's heart, but I can judge him by his actions. Those speak for themselves.
As for senior leadership in uniform since DEC 09, know this. Somewhere in the near future there will be a young man or woman who will get their PhD and will write a book about your silence - about your inaction - about your willingness to stand in silence while this went on.
It will make Bright Shining Lie and Dereliction of Duty look like love letters. Be prepared for it. Be ready to defend your silence. There are some schools of thought that will make sense to explain your silence ... but don't be shocked when you are held to account by history.
Judging by traffic, comments and links, I know that the national security consumer has long moved on from Afghanistan. Well, I haven't and I will continue to post on it just so no one here is "shocked" about where this is all heading. I'm quite proud of the front porch; you are a rough and tumble but well read group. We manage to keep each other honest and even a history geek like myself learns something new every day from the good folks who comment, email, tweet and play on FB. As a result, I know I don't need to go in to all that much detail with the regulars. You've been reading my stuff on AFG for almost a decade - and you know my line well since President Obama's DEC 09 West Point speech. Call it what you will, but when we announced to the world that we were leaving Conditions-Based planning for Calendar-Based planning, we signaled retreat. If you're new, click the Afghanistan tag at the bottom of the post an read up. It's all there. The Taliban are following exactly the Red Most Likely COA; they are husbanding their forces. Attack enough to ensure that you can claim that you kicked the Infidels out - but don't attack so much you lose the forces you will need for the civil war to follow. Take ground when it is surrendered, but only do so kinetically when absolutely necessary. It is better to simply explain to tribal leaders the ground truth, "They are leaving, we are staying. Who do you think you should be working with?" The signal of retreat is having 2nd and 3rd order effects all over the place. One of the major ones is simply the lack of respect one gets in that part of the world by losing face. A few cases in point: Via Craig Whitlock in WaPo:
Military logisticians would like to send home 60 percent of their equipment and vehicles by trucking them into Pakistan and then loading them onto ships — the least expensive method by far. But cargo is flowing out on that route at only one-third the planned rate, the officials said.
...
Officials declined to elaborate on the reasons for their heavy reliance on the more expensive methods of transport. They said, however, that Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter and other Pentagon officials are scheduled to arrive Friday in Kabul to meet with senior Afghan officials on the issue.
Carter will also meet with U.S. troops before touring other countries in the region.
The government of Afghanistan closed the border this summer after a dispute over whether the Pentagon and its contractors should have to pay $70 million in customs “fines” for taking the military gear out of the country. The Pentagon has refused to pay, calling the penalties a thinly veiled attempt at a shakedown.
...
The United States has 60,000 troops in Afghanistan, but that number will dwindle to 34,000 by February. The U.S. and NATO combat mission is scheduled to end by December 2014. The Obama administration and Afghan leaders are still negotiating whether any U.S. troops will stay after that to help train Afghan security forces.
They've seen this movie before, they know what comes next. I remember a dark moment in Destille Garden outside HQ ISAF in a late Thursday chatfest with the gaggle in early '09. Playing "what if" where I offered for the first time - repeated since a few times here - that if we were not in it to win it, that we should just withdrawal to the airheads. Fly everyone that we can out of there. Kill anyone who approaches too close to the base perimeter. What we can't fly out, destroy - as it would be immoral to ask one more American family to ask one of their children to die for something we have no intention of seeing through.
Of course, that was an extreme and ill-advised COA spoken in the false bravado a few days with little sleep will give you, but something we all kind of nodded our head at. We are doing a slower version of that right now in any event. Following the CINC's D&G of late '09, we have to give credit to those who got him to delay the full retreat signal from '11 to '14. That gave us a few more years to help create the effects we wanted on the ground to hopefully give the Afghan people a better chance, but we know what history is telling us. Jacob Siegel is about on the right sheet of music over at TheDailyBeast,
For 12 years the United States has waged war in Afghanistan, pursuing a shifting set of objectives as public interest came and went. Now, facing the full withdrawal of military forces by the end of 2014, time is running out to make what we can of the country we’ve occupied for more than a decade.
...
It’s hard to achieve a recognizable victory in a war whose aims keep being redefined, but perhaps this, too, is Afghan good enough. We have achieved considerable success at prosecuting central al Qaeda and denying it sanctuary in Afghanistan, an effort that culminated in the public view with the raid on Osama bin Laden.
But the Taliban, once in decline, has been resurgent in recent years and now effectively controls large parts of the Pashtun south.
The Afghan military forces, which have been the focus of American training and funding, have displayed a mixed record at best. Desertion and corruption are both rampant. The logistical system is incapable of providing necessary supplies on time, and in many cases the willingness of units to fight is questionable.
The Afghan forces, unsurprisingly, take the long view. They know we are leaving soon, and where they see themselves outnumbered many seek accommodation with the Taliban as a means of self-preservation. The upshot has been that some areas once rid of Taliban forces have been ceded back to them after the Afghan Army took over responsibility.
It didn't have to end this way, but it is. We lost our patience. We are serving a half-cooked loaf of bread simply because we couldn't be patient enough to follow the recipe. Has much changed in the year since Carmen Gentil's report?
A former resistance fighter during the Soviet occupation of his country, Afghan Col. Turab Adil knows that Afghans can put up a good fight.
He recalls how in the 1980s the mujahedin, as they were known, slipped through the hills and valleys to drive out the Communist superpower and its attack helicopters, tanks and fully armed troops.
Today's Afghan army will fight just as ferociously against Taliban fighters, but Adil and others say it can't defeat them under the current U.S. military strategy that calls for the withdrawal of all combat forces by the end of 2014.
...
"Over the last few years there has been tremendous progress in the Afghan National Security Forces," he says. "But when it comes to logistics (supplies and support for Afghan troops), intelligence gathering and decision-making, they still need help."
On the margins, perhaps - from the INFOPS and PSYOPS of the Taliban are way ahead of our efforts. It is almost moot at this point. The last fighting season is done. Our poor planners don't even have the D&G to know what they are to do and with how many forces next year. Hard to do troops-to-task when you don't even have your tasks yet. Well, that is what you have Branch Plans for ... or we can go the Wesley Clark method and make it up as we go along. This might turn out OK, that that isn't where the smart money is. I wish the Tajik, Uzbek, and especially Hazara the best of luck from here on out. As for the Pashtun - well - never cared much from them from Karzai on down. Unlike that dark talk in Destille Gardens, I think we will get home fairly intact. We'll be allowed to leave not unlike the Soviets over the Friendship Bridge. Could be worse.
Funny thing happened yesterday - the Voice of America put out an article, "US, NATO Mark End of War in Afghanistan" and after SWJ and I had some sighs and slow head shakes - they changed the title of the article to, "US, NATO Mark End of Afghanistan Mission." Snort ... but the html still reads, "http://www.voanews.com/content/us-nato-mark-end-of-war-in-afghanistan/2576316.html" Fine, I'll let VOA fix their apparent fail, but it is quite illustrative. You see, I know, SWJ knows, and the title editors at VOA know that you simply cannot declare a war over by walking away (that is called surrendering the field, or like the Elector of Bavaria at Blenheim, running away to leave the fighting for others). If you are reporting the news, and not trying to make it digestible, then you should have stuck with the original title. You see, title #1 was more in line with the words of the United States Commander in Chief,
“Today’s ceremony in Kabul marks a milestone for our country. For more than 13 years, ever since nearly 3,000 innocent lives were taken from us on 9/11, our nation has been at war in Afghanistan,” Obama said. “Now, thanks to the extraordinary sacrifices of our men and women in uniform, our combat mission in Afghanistan is ending, and the longest war in American history is coming to a responsible conclusion.”
Just so we're clear, let me pull that out for you to scratch-n-sniff a bit,
“Now, ... longest war in American history is coming to a responsible conclusion.”
OK, he called it a war, but it would be nice for President Obama to exactly define "responsible conclusion." The Taliban are not done. AQ is not done, the ANSF are not done. The over 10,000 Americans that will stay in AFG are not done. But hey, we are just talking semantics right? We are all happy to lie and die for semantics, natch. If it has concluded, then who has won? Have we reached our criteria for success? All our decisive points achieved? Reached all our decision points to complete the transition phase? How about our objectives? Do we have our end state? Mission of a "Safe and Stable Afghanistan?" Of course not, those are things one has in an actual operational plan. We left that construct in December of 2009, as we have discussed in exhaustive detail. Buy hey, let's look at the revision we did to the OPLAN before the DEC 09 West point speech. Slide 79 is a good snapshot if you don't have time for the full brief.
You know what, if I don't show you, who will? As best I can in an open forum, let me give you the last full measure of a doable plan for some type of success in AFG. The above pic is one slide produced from Revision 4 to OPLAN 30302 - the Operational Level OPLAN for AFG produced in April of 2009. This brief was from 2010 before the first post-DEC 09 revision was put out. Dig through it yourself, here is the whole brief by BG Berger, French Army. Nice guy.
Conditions based planning is long gone, what we have been working the last half decade is all calendar based political BS in line with the kind of thinking that got us the Islamic State. Since December of 2009 we have created the conditions for a long term problem much worse than if we had simply slogged along with what was working and doable, district by district shape-clear-hold-build. But no. Again, almost weekly I find myself quoting Trotsky,
"You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you."
We cannot walk away for the problem of expansionist, fundamentalist Islam. We couldn't in IRQ and we won't be able to in AFG.
The NATO-led military alliance in Afghanistan formally ended its 13-year-long combat mission, leaving a relatively under-trained Afghan national security force to fight the deadly Taliban insurgency largely on its own.
...
"Our new resolute mission means we will continue to invest in Afghanistan's future, our commitment to Afghanistan endures," Campbell said.
NATO’s Resolute Support mission will consist of about 13,000 mostly American personnel that will continue advising, assisting and training Afghan national security forces in their fight against the Taliban.
...
At its peak, there were about 140,000 troops from 50 countries taking part in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan.
It was launched under U.S. leadership to invade Afghanistan 13 years ago to remove the Taliban from power for sheltering the al-Qaida network that plotted the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.
Washington has since spent more than $100 billion on Afghan reconstruction in addition to its estimated $1 trillion war effort.
We are doing to AFG what Clinton's DoN did to the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY in the 1990s. Here is that quote again;
... leaving a relatively under-trained Afghan national security force to fight the deadly Taliban insurgency largely on its own.
That is the opening error that will compound from here. Just as you cannot expect any good from pulling a carrier out of the yards incomplete, you cannot leave a conflict with a plan incomplete and expect your desired effects to appear out of the south end of a north flying unicorn. Back a bit more than a half a decade ago in Destile Garden, we outlined best case and worst case scenarios about the post-Bush 43 AFG conflict. What we have now isn't the worst - the original Obama summer '11 withdraw was close to the worst - but this is near to one of the bad scenarios we pontificated about that I have to say that we more or less had it wired. There is hope that this will flop in the good area - if Pakistan wakes up and the new AFG government gets lucky, then so will we. Experience tells us, however, that to trust in luck is not the best strategy - but it is what we have. People forgetting the recent past and the hard lessons learned in blood and treasure? Yea, it's a thing.
“Experience shows that the first casualty of peace is such wisdom, if any, as has been learned in war.”
In this case, a declared peace. Do the math. We also need to be honest about what the President is doing. He is simply doing something to mark a line on his Presidency bucket list. He was elected twice by the American people. In his mind, they knew what he wanted to do - and he is doing it. The aftermath will have to be fixed by those who will hold the office after he leaves. He has a lot more to do in the next 25 months, so stand by.
If you haven't already, click here and give it a read. It is 66 pages total and has some things redacted - but there is plenty here to absorb.
Like I mentioned yesterday, what I want to do here isn't to fully parse and discuss the whole thing, but instead pull out a "Top-5" takeaways.
As time is short, here are mine;
1 --- Repeat and plea: This document is long because much of it is a repeat of concepts and ideas that have been around since both McNeill and McKiernan. This is good though, as we have a new administration and press that are new to the conflict. McChrystal states such on page 1-3 with,
"These concepts are not new. However, implemented aggressively, they will be revolutionary to our effectiveness."
Ungh, the "R"word. I'll let the hyperbole pass - as the importance of this is that it lets you know that the new strategy isn't. McChrystal is banging the same drum as McNeill and McKiernan - except this time louder.
2 --- OEF gone: If I am reading this right, then this is a big deal. Annex B "COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS," page B-2 states,
Transfer OEF units OPCON to COMISAF and place them on the ISAF Combined Joint Statement of Requirements.
Why big? OEF were strictly under USA C2 and not ISAF. As such, they could do more "things" that under ISAF/NATO ROE they could not. In the end though, it is fine. What is significant though is what is under the surface here. ISAF CJSOR has been under-resourced as we have tried very hard to get NATO to do what it promised. It has not. By taking OEF units to fill the hole, we effectively say, "To h3ll with you. We give up. We'll do it."
Yes, Uncle Sam is not only taking back the keys - he is p155ed.
If there is anything very different now than a year ago -- the USA has become more unilateral vice multilateral in AFG. Ironic thing to do in a Democrat administration I guess - but that is OK as it is the right answer.
3 --- Planning 101. Go to Annex A, "Military Plans." This is a classic schooling. This is the result of McChrystal and his crew just having their fill of the Rube Goldberg construction of the Operational Plan for ISAF. A plan hobbled together from Effects and non-Effects based plans with USA, Brit and other planning concepts that just do not fit together well.
It is a good thing to happen, a mandate to clean up the plans. Not quite deck-chairs on the Titanic either, as if you cannot plan well - you will execute worse. It would be interesting to see the product that comes out from this --- probably by Christmas. War College geeks should read this section twice. Very good read.
4 --- Time Based vs. Condition Based: Look at page 2-18. Something I like is brought up, defining the new strategy as having three stages; Gain the Initiative, Strategic Consolidation, Sustained Security. A key point is made in Stage 1,
A failure to reverse the momentum of the insurgency will not only preclude success in Afghanistan, it will result in a loss of public and political support outside Afghanistan.
Very good point, one that needs repeating.
I do though have a concern with a statement in Stage 2,
As ISAF and ANSF capabilities grow over the next 12-24 months and the insurgency diminishes in critical areas, ISAF will begin a second stage....
This was a mistake. We have a Conditions Based comment .... but with a Time Based definer. The politicians will focus on the 12-24 months. What if the Condition (or Effect, if you will) of the additional forces does not cause a significant change until 36 months? What if the politicians want, as you know they will, for a status update closer to the 12 vice the 24? This raises the Political Risk way too high in exchange for a hope for any gain made by putting this in the document.
5 --- NATO is put on report: Throughout this document are very undiplomatic zingers thrown at the NATO HQs involved in Brunssum, Mons, and Brussels. One of them, repeated more than once, is on page 2-20,
Proper resourcing will be critical. The campaign in Afghanistan as been historically under-resourced and remains so today - ISAF is operating in a culture of poverty.
The natural by byproduct of NATO culmination in DEC 07. Many of the nations simply wanted to contribute enough to get their flag out front and join the parade if victory happens -- but small enough that they could not take the blame for failure.
Throughout the document you will see comments about troops not leaving bases, not getting involved with the local population, laden with caveats, not understanding COIN ..... those comments are all in the face of our NATO allies; Germany, Italy, Spain more than most.
Those are my Top-5 Take-Aways.
The Executive Summary: We know what it takes to win, we always have. We are no longer going to be quiet about it ... the stakes are too high. Lead, follow, or get the h311 out of the way.UPDATE: In today's WaPo, two good reads here and here.
McChrystal needs as much support as he can get .... as the mini-McNamaras out there are overthinking this,
But before any decision is made, some of President Obama's civilian advisers have proposed looking at other, less costly options to address his primary goal of preventing al-Qaeda from reestablishing itself in Afghanistan. Those options include a redirection of U.S. efforts -- away from protecting the Afghan population and building the Afghan state and toward persuading the Taliban to stop fighting -- as well as an escalation of targeted attacks against al-Qaeda itself in Pakistan and elsewhere. ... The commander's report, administration officials said, is only one of many "inputs" the president is considering. Others include assessments from the State Department, the intelligence community and his White House advisers.
Obama's decision is complicated by a deepening domestic political divide and no guarantee of success whichever option he chooses. One observer, characterizing the president's dilemma at its most extreme, said: "He can send more troops and it will be a disaster and he will destroy the Democratic Party. Or he can send no more troops and it will be a disaster and the Republicans will say he lost the war."
Why be worried - harumph.
But Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a Navy veteran of Vietnam who once led opposition to that war, praised Obama's deliberative pace.
"All the president is saying is that he wants to take the time to make sure this decision is not done like the Gulf of Tonkin" resolution, where "underlying assumptions aren't questioned," Kerry said. The 1964 joint congressional resolution, based on false information about North Vietnamese actions and adopted amid an anti-communist frenzy, authorized President Lyndon B. Johnson to use military force in Southeast Asia.
Some people have never left Vietnam.
There is one thing from Vietnam that does translate - that is the Strategic Center of Gravity ..... and it is right inside the DC Beltway.UPDATE II - Electric Boogaloo: Things get more and more interesting. Over at Politico, they are talking about the DC whodunit WRT the leak.
Bob Woodward’s Monday-morning exclusive on a 66-page report from Gen. Stanley McChrystal to President Barack Obama about Afghanistan policy was a rite of passage for the new administration: the first major national security leak and a sure sign that the celebrated Washington Post reporter has penetrated yet another administration.
White House officials greeted the leak with a grimace, but none suggested they’d begin a witch hunt for the leaker. Woodward is famous for his access to the principals themselves — he recently traveled to Afghanistan with National Security Adviser James Jones — and leak hunters couldn’t expect with confidence that they’d find themselves disciplining just an undisciplined junior staffer.
Within 24 hours of the leak of the Afghanistan assessment to The Washington Post, General Stanley McChrystal's team fired its second shot across the bow of the Obama administration. According to McClatchy, military officers close to General McChrystal said he is prepared to resign if he isn't given sufficient resources (read "troops") to implement a change of direction in Afghanistan:
"I have come to speak to you about how the war in Iraq will end," President Barack Obama on Friday moved to fulfill the defining promise of his campaign, saying all U.S. combat troops will be withdrawn by the end of August 2010.
But in the same speech before Marines and military leadership here, he announced that the vast majority of those involved in the pullout will not leave this year.
...and the rest of the story.
And even after the drawdown, a sizable U.S. force of 35,000 to 50,000 U.S. troops will stay in Iraq under a new mission of training, civilian protection and counterterrorism.
I guess it depends on the definitions of "war" and "combat," but there will be a lot going on after 10AUG10 if we need to - and there will be combat unless everyone is ordered to be a FOBit - CT will require combat - full stop.
As a side note: calendar based planning is a recipe for disaster - I am more of a conditions based guy; but there is no reason to panic - let's see how it goes.
SUBJ/AFG TIMELINE// REF/A/020118ZDEC/CINC// RMKS/1. REF A SHOULD BE SEEN AS A STATEMENT OF CINC STRONG INTENT. CINC ALWAYS HAS THE FREEDOM TO RE-EVALUATE HIS DECISIONS.// BT #0000 NNNN R 022308ZDEC FM CINC/PAO TO ALLWORLD BT
REF/B/020118ZDEC/CINC// RMKS/1. CANCEL REF A. REF B REMAINS IN EFFECT. 2. CINC EMPHASIZES REF B IS LOCKED IN - THERE IS NO FLEXIBILITY. TROOPS WILL START COMING HOME IN JUL11. IT IS ETCHED IN STONE. PAO HAS CHISEL.// BT #0000 NNNNFollow the links Shipmates. I don't make this stuff up.
SECDEF - you were just punked.UPDATE: The goat roping spaz's along in a great expanding grabastic cluster.
Looks like McChrystal and SECSTATE were punk'd too. Hey - when you follow this link to Allah at HotAir and watch the video, you would almost think that SECSTATE learned Operational Planning from 'ole Phibian Salamander. Strange bedfellows, indeed.
July 2011 is not a withdrawal date, but a specific target date for beginning to transition security responsibility to Afghan forces, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said on several morning talk shows today.
“We’ve been given very clear direction from the president to start the transfer of responsibility for security to the Afghan security force,” Navy Adm. Mike Mullen said on “American Morning” on CNN. “July of 2011 is a time where we can start to transition, … but it’s not a hard deadline to leave.”
That does not match with what the CINC and his spokesman said yesterday.
I know very well what the transition phase of an operation is. I also know that a successful transition date is decided on by conditions. You set yourself up for failure if you don't have a conditions based transition date.
From a military planning perspective, what Admiral Mullen says in the clip below makes absolute sense and if it is the plan - then things are fine and well going forward (though mentioning any conditions free start date is a rookie planner mistake).
Thing is - what Mullen says isn't in alignment with what the CINC said yesterday.
On both the firmness of the date and the withdraw of US troops; we have a condition where the public statements of the CINC and his Spokesman are not in agreement with his SECDEF, SECSTATE, and CJCS are not in alignment.
If this confuses military professionals, Senators, and press - what is this doing to our STRATCOM and an understanding of our purpose to the rest of the world?
My $.02: the CINC needs to make a clear statement - soon.
I fully understand trying to clean up behind your boss - but it is the CINC's word that matters. He needs to clarify what his plan is.
Right now it just looks like our national security leadership is in chaos. No way to run a railroad, much less fight a war.
