AFG: The Disaster to Come

We once had a pretty good plan for AFG, one that began development in late '07 and brought us the uplift in '08/09 and on. It sidelined for a large part the ineffective NATO forces and build a conditions based Shape-Clear-Hold-Build process, slightly modified as time progressed.

In spite of the original sin of Bonn, too much hope, and the unfortunate trusting of NATO to do what it promised - there was a path that gave AFG the best chance to bring security to their nation and as a result, increase our own security.

For years you have read here and over at BigPeace my posts about the importance of Conditions Based planning - the route to victory for thousands of years - vs. Calendar Based planning which has another history to it, one of retreat and defeat.

That is where we are heading. Fred & Kimberly Kagan get close to it.

Everything Secretary Panetta said about the transition approach envisioned at Lisbon is true—that process, excessively binding and bureaucratic in our opinion, does foresee the gradual and conditions-based transition of the task of securing all of Afghanistan to the Afghan security forces. At some point—not specified at Lisbon or in any public statement or document before this one—the mission of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), would change from defeating the insurgency alongside the Afghans to assisting the Afghans in securing their own state. Could that point come in late 2013? Perhaps. But there is no way to be sure now. Announcing it as a fixed timeline now, therefore, would be not only foolish but irresponsible. Secretary Panetta said one thing about Afghanistan that is certainly not true: “Consolidating those gains is going to be what we have to do in 2012, ensuring that we continue the transitions, ensuring that we continue to improve the Afghan army during this year.” If those goals are the limits of our campaign in Afghanistan for 2012, then our mission there will fail. The reason is simple: You cannot consolidate gains that have not yet been made.

What Panetta is talking about is Calendar Based wrapped up in Conditions Based dressing.

If that is the case, then we are not in this to win. The present administration has neither the will, the plan, or the patience to get us to a condition we reached in mid-08 in IRQ - the opportunity to declare victory and go home.

Since the President's West Point speech he has been clear - he just wants out. First it was 2011, then 2014, and now 2013 it seems. Since he telegraphed that desire, the enemy has been given a lifeline - a reason to be patient. They know victory is theirs if they wait.

Sure, there is a small chance that AFG will reach some benign limbo - but that is just hope. Hope has a low probability of success. Conditions Based decisions increase the odds of success in the out years - Calendar Based is only focused on the short term check in the block.

We've been here before. Vietnamization worked, and with USA support following the North's invasion in '72, South Vietnam in effect has won its own peace.

Then we had Watergate and the '74 election.

The Left could not let a victory in Vietnam stand, and when they had the chance they cut off the South while their Communist fellow travelers doubled down support to the North so when they had a do-over in '75, the South was lost and so was the war.

So again, we find ourselves with people from the same cloth.

If we are not in this to "win" this, then what exactly are we doing? If you are not in it to win - then what is the morality of asking one more family to sacrifice their son or daughter?

We're taking the 2nd ausfahrt prior to the Friendship Bridge, it seems

President Obama outlined his policy towards Afghanistan in his disastrous December 2009 West Point speech that I covered here at the time. 

For the better part of eight years since I’ve outlined the absolutely wrong-headed nature of this approach to AFG; you can read some of that archive here. In four months less time than his predecessor, yesterday President Trump outlined his plan. A little of the pre-Obama concepts, but adjusted given the realities of today.

If, like me, you have style, substance, or personal reasons not to enjoy listening to President Trump speak, then ignore the video embedded below. Instead, read the transcript in full. Ignore the selective pull quotes, inaccurate opinionating, or bitter political posturing by his perma-opponents who would say Trump was wrong if he said puppy noses were cute – read it yourself.

I’ll bring out some pull quotes of interest in a moment, but here’s the Executive Summary: two of the best military minds of their generation, National Security Adviser McMaster and Secretary of Defense Mattis, helped develop a plan that they believe gives us a chance to salvage something in Afghanistan after seven years of dithering. Not a perfect plan, but a doable one. I am willing to give them the benefit of the doubt and fully support it. The major reason is that it returns to something I have written about for well over a decade, Conditions Based Planning, and throws away what remains of the Obama Administration's bollocked-up Calendar Based Planning.

Read it all, but here are the significant points.

…nearly 16 years after the Sept. 11 attacks, after the extraordinary sacrifice of blood and treasure, the American people are weary of war without victory. Nowhere is this more evident than with the war in Afghanistan, the longest war in American history, 17 years.

I share the American people’s frustration. I also share their frustration over a foreign policy that has spent too much time, energy, money — and most importantly, lives — trying to rebuild countries in our own image instead of pursuing our security interests above all other considerations.

That is why shortly after my inauguration, I directed Secretary of Defense Mattis and my national security team to undertake a comprehensive review of all strategic options in Afghanistan and South Asia. My original instinct was to pull out. And historically, I like following my instincts.

But all my life I’ve heard that decisions are much different when you sit behind the desk in the Oval Office,

Once you get behind the door, the perspective changes. Once you have some of the best minds in the country define the 2nd and 3rd order effects of a decision, you can quickly come to a different conclusion. That is one reason Obama never fully did what he wanted to do in his DEC 09 West Point speech, and this is why Trump is changing his mind too.

I arrived at three fundamental conclusion about America’s core interests in Afghanistan. First, our nation must seek an honorable and enduring outcome worthy of the tremendous sacrifices that have been made, especially the sacrifices of lives.
…
Second, the consequences of a rapid exit are both predictable and unacceptable. 9/11, the worst terrorist attack in our history, was planned and directed from Afghanistan because that country was ruled by a government that gave comfort and shelter to terrorists.

A hasty withdrawal would create a vacuum for terrorists, including ISIS and Al Qaeda, would instantly fill just as happened before Sept. 11. And as we know, in 2011, America hastily and mistakenly withdrew from Iraq. As a result, our hard-won gains slipped back into the hands of terrorist enemies. …
…
Third, and finally, I concluded that the security threats we face in Afghanistan and the broader region are immense.

In some ways, we are roughly right where Osama wanted us – involved in a long term war on the ground in Afghanistan – but the circumstances are different than what he and we thought in 2001. 

It is also 2017 now. We are where we are. The key is how to make the best of it.

This is the most important part of the speech;

But to prosecute this war, we will learn from history. As a result of our comprehensive review, American strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia will change dramatically in the following ways.

A core pillar of our new strategy is a shift from a time-based approach to one based on conditions. I’ve said it many times how counterproductive it is for the United States to announce in advance the dates we intend to begin or end military options.

We will not talk about numbers of troops or our plans for further military activities. Conditions on the ground, not arbitrary timetables, will guide our strategy from now on.

That is where Trump went Salamander. We are back to Conditions Based Planning – what military best practices tells us is the best path to success.

Another fundamental pillar of our new strategy is the integration of all instruments of American power — diplomatic, economic, and military — toward a successful outcome. Someday, after an effective military effort, perhaps it will be possible to have a political settlement that includes elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan. But nobody knows if or when that will ever happen.

Did you get that? All the traditional levers of national power. This is not just a military way forward. We are also willing to come to accommodation with SOME of the Taliban elements. Good to open that door.

Ultimately, it is up to the people of Afghanistan to take ownership of their future, to govern their society and to achieve an everlasting peace. We are a partner and a friend, but we will not dictate to the Afghan people how to live or how to govern their own complex society. We are not nation-building again. We are killing terrorists.

That is “no” to nation building as the conceit of the Bonn Agreement begat, and accepts that Afghanistan will have to order its affairs on Afghan terms. Not nice from our perspective, but what works for them.

Now for what I see as the largest risk in this new direction; the India card vs. Pakistan.

The next pillar of our new strategy is to change the approach in how to deal with Pakistan. We can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond.
…
It is time for Pakistan to demonstrate its commitment to civilization, order and to peace.

Another critical part of the South Asia strategy for America is to further develop its strategic partnership with India, the world’s largest democracy and a key security and economic partner of the United States. We appreciate India’s important contributions to stability in Afghanistan, but India makes billions of dollars in trade with the United States, and we want them to help us more with Afghanistan, especially in the area of economic assistance and development.

You can never have a more than 5-min conversation with a Pakistani officer without India coming up. Pakistan has always played both sides in AFG, so they've used up too much capital to stop us from pulling that card. India is a more natural ally for the USA anyway. This is a risky play, but probably the right one in the overall game. I wouldn't have recommended going that hard in the open, but not my job.

So, we have our next phase in Afghanistan. This is a good plan, and given everything, probably the best to be expected.

I’ve called during the time of calendar based dithering that we would probably be best to just go home and hope for the best. That was because with a calendar based plan, defeat is inevitable; it is only the timing and method that is in question. This plan gives of a chance to salvage something.

For those looking for End States, Objectives, Decisive Points, Criteria for Success, etc – this isn’t the venue for that. This speech gives us approximately the Commander’s Intent and Initiating Directive. The Operational Planners can build a plan off that, and are.

Ahhhh ... the logistics of retreat

Judging by traffic, comments and links, I know that the national security consumer has long moved on from Afghanistan.

Well, I haven't and I will continue to post on it just so no one here is "shocked" about where this is all heading.

I'm quite proud of the front porch; you are a rough and tumble but well read group. We manage to keep each other honest and even a history geek like myself learns something new every day from the good folks who comment, email, tweet and play on FB. As a result, I know I don't need to go in to all that much detail with the regulars. You've been reading my stuff on AFG for almost a decade - and you know my line well since President Obama's DEC 09 West Point speech.

Call it what you will, but when we announced to the world that we were leaving Conditions-Based planning for Calendar-Based planning, we signaled retreat. If you're new, click the Afghanistan tag at the bottom of the post an read up. It's all there.

The Taliban are following exactly the Red Most Likely COA; they are husbanding their forces. Attack enough to ensure that you can claim that you kicked the Infidels out - but don't attack so much you lose the forces you will need for the civil war to follow. Take ground when it is surrendered, but only do so kinetically when absolutely necessary. It is better to simply explain to tribal leaders the ground truth, "They are leaving, we are staying. Who do you think you should be working with?"

The signal of retreat is having 2nd and 3rd order effects all over the place. One of the major ones is simply the lack of respect one gets in that part of the world by losing face. A few cases in point:

Via Craig Whitlock in WaPo:

Military logisticians would like to send home 60 percent of their equipment and vehicles by trucking them into Pakistan and then loading them onto ships — the least expensive method by far. But cargo is flowing out on that route at only one-third the planned rate, the officials said.
...
Officials declined to elaborate on the reasons for their heavy reliance on the more expensive methods of transport. They said, however, that Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter and other Pentagon officials are scheduled to arrive Friday in Kabul to meet with senior Afghan officials on the issue.

Carter will also meet with U.S. troops before touring other countries in the region.

The government of Afghanistan closed the border this summer after a dispute over whether the Pentagon and its contractors should have to pay $70 million in customs “fines” for taking the military gear out of the country. The Pentagon has refused to pay, calling the penalties a thinly veiled attempt at a shakedown.
...
The United States has 60,000 troops in Afghanistan, but that number will dwindle to 34,000 by February. The U.S. and NATO combat mission is scheduled to end by December 2014. The Obama administration and Afghan leaders are still negotiating whether any U.S. troops will stay after that to help train Afghan security forces.

They've seen this movie before, they know what comes next.

I remember a dark moment in Destille Garden outside HQ ISAF in a late Thursday chatfest with the gaggle in early '09. Playing "what if" where I offered for the first time - repeated since a few times here - that if we were not in it to win it, that we should just withdrawal to the airheads. Fly everyone that we can out of there. Kill anyone who approaches too close to the base perimeter. What we can't fly out, destroy - as it would be immoral to ask one more American family to ask one of their children to die for something we have no intention of seeing through.

Of course, that was an extreme and ill-advised COA spoken in the false bravado a few days with little sleep will give you, but something we all kind of nodded our head at. We are doing a slower version of that right now in any event. Following the CINC's D&G of late '09, we have to give credit to those who got him to delay the full retreat signal from '11 to '14. That gave us a few more years to help create the effects we wanted on the ground to hopefully give the Afghan people a better chance, but we know what history is telling us.

Jacob Siegel is about on the right sheet of music over at TheDailyBeast,

For 12 years the United States has waged war in Afghanistan, pursuing a shifting set of objectives as public interest came and went. Now, facing the full withdrawal of military forces by the end of 2014, time is running out to make what we can of the country we’ve occupied for more than a decade.
...
It’s hard to achieve a recognizable victory in a war whose aims keep being redefined, but perhaps this, too, is Afghan good enough. We have achieved considerable success at prosecuting central al Qaeda and denying it sanctuary in Afghanistan, an effort that culminated in the public view with the raid on Osama bin Laden.

But the Taliban, once in decline, has been resurgent in recent years and now effectively controls large parts of the Pashtun south.

The Afghan military forces, which have been the focus of American training and funding, have displayed a mixed record at best. Desertion and corruption are both rampant. The logistical system is incapable of providing necessary supplies on time, and in many cases the willingness of units to fight is questionable.

The Afghan forces, unsurprisingly, take the long view. They know we are leaving soon, and where they see themselves outnumbered many seek accommodation with the Taliban as a means of self-preservation. The upshot has been that some areas once rid of Taliban forces have been ceded back to them after the Afghan Army took over responsibility.

It didn't have to end this way, but it is. We lost our patience. We are serving a half-cooked loaf of bread simply because we couldn't be patient enough to follow the recipe.

Has much changed in the year since Carmen Gentil's report?

A former resistance fighter during the Soviet occupation of his country, Afghan Col. Turab Adil knows that Afghans can put up a good fight.

He recalls how in the 1980s the mujahedin, as they were known, slipped through the hills and valleys to drive out the Communist superpower and its attack helicopters, tanks and fully armed troops.

Today's Afghan army will fight just as ferociously against Taliban fighters, but Adil and others say it can't defeat them under the current U.S. military strategy that calls for the withdrawal of all combat forces by the end of 2014.
...
"Over the last few years there has been tremendous progress in the Afghan National Security Forces," he says. "But when it comes to logistics (supplies and support for Afghan troops), intelligence gathering and decision-making, they still need help."

On the margins, perhaps - from the INFOPS and PSYOPS of the Taliban are way ahead of our efforts.

It is almost moot at this point. The last fighting season is done. Our poor planners don't even have the D&G to know what they are to do and with how many forces next year. Hard to do troops-to-task when you don't even have your tasks yet.

Well, that is what you have Branch Plans for ... or we can go the Wesley Clark method and make it up as we go along.

This might turn out OK, that that isn't where the smart money is.  
I wish the Tajik, Uzbek, and especially Hazara the best of luck from here on out. As for the Pashtun - well - never cared much from them from Karzai on down.

Unlike that dark talk in Destille Gardens, I think we will get home fairly intact. We'll be allowed to leave not unlike the Soviets over the Friendship Bridge.

Could be worse.

Hope that Mattis-Petraeus win the argument

As we have documented here since the CINC's West Point Speech last year - there is a significant disconnect between what President Obama, Vice President Biden and others have been saying and what SECDEF-COMCENTCOM-COMISAF have been saying.

Strange public discussion. Though the CINC and his spokesmen continue to speak Time-Based planning WRT JUL 2011 - the uniformed leadership and SECDEF continue to focus on Conditions Based.

Thing about Conditions Based Planning, you can't reverse engineer it to a calendar. You cannot predict to a month if Decisive Conditions have been met. Additionally - it takes months from the point you make a decision to where forces can start to decrease if measured by total force levels. The only way to do that is if you tell Unit X that they are not deploying to relieve Unit Y. If you plan on forces to decrease by JUL 2011 in an organized manner - the decision needs to be made by Christmas to do it right. That would require you to predict Conditions, something you cannot do.

Now, if in JUL 2011 a Operational Review was completed that stated that, "Decisive Conditions have been achieved at A, B, and C. As a result, we will redeploy units X and Y and when their deployment is over, they will not be replaced." That would be fine ... and force levels would start to drop a few months later - just like we saw in Iraq when Decisive Conditions were met.

Here is my concern. As we get closer and closer to JUL 2011, the CINC and the DOD story lines do not get any closer. I don't see the likes of Mattis and Petraeus fudging conditions - so I wouldn't worry about that. We cannot afford in a Strategic context to have either our uniformed leadership tell happy-talk half-truths for domestic political reasons - again - nor can we have a situation where the civilian leadership and uniformed leadership are in open conflict. Watching this get patched together will be interesting - and in a few years will spawn quite a few Doctoral works.

11 months is not a long time in the Planning world when you are talking about bringing forces home in an orderly manner.

Listening to Petraeus here - the gap is still un-bridgeable. Watch.

Visit msnbc.com for breaking news, world news, and news about the economy

MSNBC video can be clunky - so via Allah, here is some of the transcript - though you can get more from the MSNBC site.

MR. GREGORY: Let me talk about U.S. troops. I asked you before, when we talked about this July deadline of next year, how stifling is the, the concept of this deadline and this Washington debate to what you’re trying to do here?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I don’t find it that stifling. I’m not bowed over by, you know, the knowledge that July 2011 is out there. In fact, the president has been very clear, Vice President Biden’s been very clear as well, more recently, that this is a date when a process begins that is conditions based. And as the conditions permit, we transition tasks to our Afghan counterparts and to security forces and, and in various governmental institutions, and that enables a “responsible drawdown of our forces”…

Let me point out one other item about July 2011 if I could. Because what I have often noted was that in the speech that the president made at West Point, there were two messages. One was a message of substantial additional commitment, additional 30,000 troops, again more civilians, more funding for Afghan forces, authorization of 100,000 more of them and so forth; but also a message of increased urgency. And that’s what July 2011 really connotes. It is to all the participants, those in Kabul, some of us in uniform, again our civilian counterparts, that we’ve got to get on with this, that this has been going on for some nine years or so, that there is understandable concern, in some cases frustration, and that, therefore, we’ve got to really put our shoulder to the wheel and show during the course of this year that progress can be achieved. And, and, again, one manifestation of that is out there that you have this date.

He is trying hard to give the CINC running room - I hope he takes it.

Executive Summary on the CINC's AFG Speech

If you come here on the regular basis, then you read my stuff here over at Big Peace as well on our switch from Conditions to Calendar based planning for AFG.

What was the meaning of the President's speech on AFG? Here is the executive summary - nothing new really. At the height of fighting season we have announced the first step in our slow retreat under fire from AFG.

The Taliban know it and they are doing exactly what they should be doing when their enemy has announced a calendar based retreat; fight enough to claim you kicked them out, but husband most of your resolve and forces for when they leave, set the conditions for surrender and acceptance of your power by those either on the fence or on the other side - then take power.

We are no longer in this to win, as the President announced at West Point 18-months ago. All we are doing is closing our eyes and hoping that the AFG forces we are training will be able to ... do something ok; maybe.

Recoverable, perhaps. The trendlines though are not in our favor.

Desperately Seeking Phase 4: AFG Quandary Again

I guess it is time, again, as I have done every few years for the last decade+, to review how we got to where we are in AFG.

To understand why we are here, you have to know how we got here. 

It isn’t an easy story, but it should not be a surprise. Click the AFG tab if you want to see what I’ve written in the past on the topic, but I’ll summarize a bit here.

It can be best described in seven acts.

Act 1: Original Sin – Take the institutional arrogance of United Nations bureaucrats, business-class flying NGO leadership, Davos world view, and imbue it with a slight whiff of residual colonial parochialism, and you have the immediate post-911 Bonn Agreement. 

It was finalized when many of our Special Forces still had not washed the horse sweat from their DCUs. It set up a structure for the future Afghanistan before the power centers there could weigh in. Afghan solutions to Afghan problems and all that was simply not transformational enough. 

There were good people there who meant well, but it was asking too much, too soon, with too little appreciation for the realities of Afghanistan. This isn’t 20/20 hindsight either. We argued it at the time along the lines of, “Are they really committed to this for the long haul?”

This ran for roughly the first 2-3 years. Two recommendations for the later portions of this period that don’t get the attention they deserve: First, Sarah Chayes’s book, The Punishment of Virtue, and the documentary by Sedika Mojadidi, Motherland Afghanistan.

Act 2: Allied Hope – NATO decided to prove that it was more than just an exercise club and more than Euro-centric. As with a rather small footprint the USA seemed to have AFG under control, NATO believed it could take charge. From 2005-2006 it was decided while the USA remained in control of Regional Command East (RC-E), the Brits, Canadians, and Dutch would take RC-S, the Spanish and Italians would take RC-W, the Germans RC-N, and the Turks would take RC-C in Kabul.

It looked OK for a while, but the security situation started to spiral out of control. The exercise club also took some of its bad habits with it to war, and it stumbled. 

First, the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements out of Mons just never got filled. Some of the contributing nations who did throw their hat in the ring only did so with so many national caveats and ROE restrictions that they could never leave base, or if they did, couldn’t do much. They didn’t bring the right kit, or for some newer NATO nations, had no idea how to deploy. The assumption was Uncle Sam would, as always, pick up the slack.

Act 3: Buyer’s Remorse – By late 2006, the NATO-sceptics critique started to break above the happy-talk. AFG was more serious than NATO and the USA were saying, and most of the alliance member were not up to the challenge, and if they were – their staying power was brittle at best. 

If you had to draw the line somewhere, it would have been the summer of 2007 when NATO failed to fill the rotary-wing aviation bridging force. At the last minute, a combination of US military and civilian contractors filled the gap. After that goat rope, it was clear that NATO culminated. It was clear to the Americans in NATO and at the USA Joint Staff. 

Planning began to, in unkind terms, take back the keys … as long as the surge in Iraq worked. Some of the larger minimal-caveat maneuver forces, the Dutch and the Canadians, had already signaled they had enough and were going home. We needed to not only replace them over time, but increase the national presence overall.

Bit by bit, RC by RC, we took the keys back.

Act 4: Classic COIN’s Stillbirth – There is a little overlap between Act 3 and 4, as they transitioned slowly in parallel. A new Scots-Irish General came to lead the US forces in AFG and ISAF, General McKiernan, USA. He brought with him “Shape, Clear, Hold, Build” – a plan to combine civilian, governmental, and military efforts district by district to enable government of Afghanistan control. 

Shape and Clear required additional forces. Through late 2007 and 2008 the planning for the uplift of forces (surge) was made. The Iraqi surge’s success happened just in time, and forces were able to begin coming in by the summer of 2008.

Then we had an election. The new administration came in to Kabul to look over the surge plans, and with minimal changes, allowed it to continue. It was clear that there were new ideas with Holbrook and his fellow travelers, but that it would take a year for them to get those ideas ready for President Obama to issue derived D&G.

With SCHB and the uplift, we thought at the time this was a decade long effort if we stuck with it. In Destile Gardens we would darky speak that if we ditched this conditioned based plan and went to a calendar based plan, we might as well just retreat to the nearest airhead and go home.

It took less than a year.

Act 5: Retreat – President Obama’s December 2009 West Point speech where he announced a calendar based plan that signaled retreat, it seemed everything else was just commentary on the inevitable drive to The Friendship Bridge … if we were lucky.

In a story yet to be told well by anyone … over the course of the next year, someone competent and knowledgeable about military matters got the ear of President Obama and we never fully left in the summer of 2011 as he outlined. We hedged, and we got lucky.

Act 6: The Great Dithering – Obama moved the decision point to the right, to the next President. We treaded water in quiet, drone filled dreams of hoping that Afghanistan would just go away. From the end of his first administration through his second, we dithered. We mowed the grass and relied on hope. He hoped a disaster didn’t happen on his watch, we hoped for something we could call a win.

Act 7: Acceptance and Salvage – Here we are in Act 7. As with the change from Bush to Obama, the first year of Trump will mostly be the conditions created by the prior administration. As with McMaster and Mattis having better first hand knowledge of the area, it appears that we may see changes faster.

This week, we have heard that President Trump has a plan to look at;

The Washington Post this week reported that senior administration officials are pushing President Donald Trump to effectively return to the combat mission against the Taliban, adding thousands of troops to the fight.

Sources told the paper the new plan would also authorize the Pentagon to set its own troop numbers for Afghanistan, instead of following White House recommendations. Pentagon officials would also review the rules of engagement for troops operating there, following a Trump campaign trail promise to give military leaders more autonomy.
...
White House spokesman Sean Spicer said no decisions on troop levels in Afghanistan have been finalized yet, but he reiterated Trump’s promises to keep America safe and root out terrorist threats across the globe.

“One of the things he has asked our national security team to think through is to think through the strategy,” he said. “How do we win? How do we eliminate the threat?”

We should wait and see – and serious national security people need to give Mattis and his team the benefit of the doubt and a chance.

We can’t rewind back to 2009. The window long ago closed for SCHB and helping district by district drag Afghanistan to where we would like them to be.

Perhaps in Act 7 we can salvage something from Act 6. We keep enough forces in place to help build capacity of the ANSF (#evergreen) and to have the ability to kill AQ and ISIS where they pop their head up, as it pleases us. We accept that Afghanistan will have to come to peace on Afghan terms as best it can with its always restive Pashtun plurality. As long as trans-national terrorists can’t use it as a base, then that should be OK.

That should be good enough, and perhaps where we should have kept it before Act 1 set everyone off this long, sordid task almost a generation ago.

Good Lord Man, Bring Everyone Home Then

This is it? Commander in Chief of the world's top power?

"So, you know, I think that, have we achieved everything that some might have imagined us achieving in the best of scenarios? Probably not. You know, there's a human enterprise, and you know, you fall short of the ideal, ... Did we achieve our central goal? And have we been able, I think, to shape a strong relationship with a responsible Afghan government that is willing to cooperate with us to make sure that it is not a launching pad for future attacks against the United States? We have achieved that goal. We are in the process of achieving that goal. And for that, I think we have to thank our extraordinary military, intelligence and diplomatic teams, as well as the cooperation of the Afghan government and the Afghan people.

Has he ever been briefed on the actual OPLAN for AFG? Objectives/Goals, End States, Mission?

Good googly moogly, from this horror show, it looks like he has not - or worse - he has and simply cared so little for it that he didn't let any of it soak in.

Anyway, let's read that again;

We have achieved that goal. We are in the process of achieving that goal.

Either this or that ... cannot do both.

I've known since DEC of 2009 that he had no idea what conditions based vs. calendar based planning was all about - and the history of both, but he could at least try to instill some confidence in his military in the field and show some spine as we continue our scheduled retreat.

This level of disinterest and depression just endangers all who are in the field right now. Heck, the center is broken ... now I know what the Elector of Bavaria was thinking at Blenheim.

If this is the level of commitment that the Commander in Chief has in AFG ... then we are way past any measure of morality in keeping people in harm's way.

2013's fighting season will be simply setting the conditions for 2014's retreat - a retreat right in the middle of fighting season. Might as well do it now ... but we won't/can't/probably shouldn't.

The responsible thing is to execute the CINC's orders as best as you can, but by no means take exceptional measures that put your people in harm's way. The CINC has given up on victory, no reason to do more than is strictly described. Get as many people home as possible, and to h311 AFG.

This is ALL on President Obama's head. He came in to office with a OPLAN that at least had a chance through Shape-Clear-Hold-Build and a conditions based path to some type of acceptable resolution. Now? Nothing. This eventual defeat is all of his making.

Watch the video above, you can hear it in his voice. He knows it, and perhaps even wants it.

I don't know. I can't see in to a man's heart, but I can judge him by his actions. Those speak for themselves.

As for senior leadership in uniform since DEC 09, know this. Somewhere in the near future there will be a young man or woman who will get their PhD and will write a book about your silence - about your inaction - about your willingness to stand in silence while this went on. 

It will make Bright Shining Lie and Dereliction of Duty look like love letters. Be prepared for it. Be ready to defend your silence. There are some schools of thought that will make sense to explain your silence ... but don't be shocked when you are held to account by history.

You have stars for a reason.

On Iraq - everyone take a breath

As with most things in the MSM about the war and the CINC and what is said - it is best to read the whole thing.

The title.

Obama: US combat in Iraq to end by Aug. 31, 2010

The pull quote.

"I have come to speak to you about how the war in Iraq will end," President Barack Obama on Friday moved to fulfill the defining promise of his campaign, saying all U.S. combat troops will be withdrawn by the end of August 2010.

But in the same speech before Marines and military leadership here, he announced that the vast majority of those involved in the pullout will not leave this year.

...and the rest of the story.

And even after the drawdown, a sizable U.S. force of 35,000 to 50,000 U.S. troops will stay in Iraq under a new mission of training, civilian protection and counterterrorism.

I guess it depends on the definitions of "war" and "combat," but there will be a lot going on after 10AUG10 if we need to - and there will be combat unless everyone is ordered to be a FOBit - CT will require combat - full stop.

As a side note: calendar based planning is a recipe for disaster - I am more of a conditions based guy; but there is no reason to panic - let's see how it goes.

The vanity of declared peace

Funny thing happened yesterday - the Voice of America put out an article, "US, NATO Mark End of War in Afghanistan" and after SWJ and I had some sighs and slow head shakes - they changed the title of the article to, "US, NATO Mark End of Afghanistan Mission."

Snort ... but the html still reads, "http://www.voanews.com/content/us-nato-mark-end-of-war-in-afghanistan/2576316.html"

Fine, I'll let VOA fix their apparent fail, but it is quite illustrative. You see, I know, SWJ knows, and the title editors at VOA know that you simply cannot declare a war over by walking away (that is called surrendering the field, or like the Elector of Bavaria at Blenheim, running away to leave the fighting for others). If you are reporting the news, and not trying to make it digestible, then you should have stuck with the original title.

You see, title #1 was more in line with the words of the United States Commander in Chief,

“Today’s ceremony in Kabul marks a milestone for our country. For more than 13 years, ever since nearly 3,000 innocent lives were taken from us on 9/11, our nation has been at war in Afghanistan,” Obama said. “Now, thanks to the extraordinary sacrifices of our men and women in uniform, our combat mission in Afghanistan is ending, and the longest war in American history is coming to a responsible conclusion.”

Just so we're clear, let me pull that out for you to scratch-n-sniff a bit,

“Now, ... longest war in American history is coming to a responsible conclusion.”

OK, he called it a war, but it would be nice for President Obama to exactly define "responsible conclusion." The Taliban are not done. AQ is not done, the ANSF are not done. The over 10,000 Americans that will stay in AFG are not done.

But hey, we are just talking semantics right? We are all happy to lie and die for semantics, natch.

If it has concluded, then who has won? Have we reached our criteria for success? All our decisive points achieved? Reached all our decision points to complete the transition phase? How about our objectives? Do we have our end state? Mission of a "Safe and Stable Afghanistan?"

Of course not, those are things one has in an actual operational plan. We left that construct in December of 2009, as we have discussed in exhaustive detail. 

Buy hey, let's look at the revision we did to the OPLAN before the DEC 09 West point speech. Slide 79 is a good snapshot if you don't have time for the full brief.

You know what, if I don't show you, who will? 

As best I can in an open forum, let me give you the last full measure of a doable plan for some type of success in AFG. The above pic is one slide produced from Revision 4 to OPLAN 30302 - the Operational Level OPLAN for AFG produced in April of 2009. This brief was from 2010 before the first post-DEC 09 revision was put out.

Dig through it yourself, here is the whole brief by BG Berger, French Army. Nice guy.

NATO OPLAN Overview from 09-10 by CDR Salamander

Conditions based planning is long gone, what we have been working the last half decade is all calendar based political BS in line with the kind of thinking that got us the Islamic State.

Since December of 2009 we have created the conditions for a long term problem much worse than if we had simply slogged along with what was working and doable, district by district shape-clear-hold-build. But no.

Again, almost weekly I find myself quoting Trotsky,

"You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you."

We cannot walk away for the problem of expansionist, fundamentalist Islam. We couldn't in IRQ and we won't be able to in AFG.

The NATO-led military alliance in Afghanistan formally ended its 13-year-long combat mission, leaving a relatively under-trained Afghan national security force to fight the deadly Taliban insurgency largely on its own.
...
"Our new resolute mission means we will continue to invest in Afghanistan's future, our commitment to Afghanistan endures," Campbell said.

NATO’s Resolute Support mission will consist of about 13,000 mostly American personnel that will continue advising, assisting and training Afghan national security forces in their fight against the Taliban.
...
At its peak, there were about 140,000 troops from 50 countries taking part in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan.

It was launched under U.S. leadership to invade Afghanistan 13 years ago to remove the Taliban from power for sheltering the al-Qaida network that plotted the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

Washington has since spent more than $100 billion on Afghan reconstruction in addition to its estimated $1 trillion war effort.

We are doing to AFG what Clinton's DoN did to the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY in the 1990s. Here is that quote again;

... leaving a relatively under-trained Afghan national security force to fight the deadly Taliban insurgency largely on its own.

That is the opening error that will compound from here.

Just as you cannot expect any good from pulling a carrier out of the yards incomplete, you cannot leave a conflict with a plan incomplete and expect your desired effects to appear out of the south end of a north flying unicorn.

Back a bit more than a half a decade ago in Destile Garden, we outlined best case and worst case scenarios about the post-Bush 43 AFG conflict. What we have now isn't the worst - the original Obama summer '11 withdraw was close to the worst - but this is near to one of the bad scenarios we pontificated about that I have to say that we more or less had it wired.

There is hope that this will flop in the good area - if Pakistan wakes up and the new AFG government gets lucky, then so will we. Experience tells us, however, that to trust in luck is not the best strategy - but it is what we have.

People forgetting the recent past and the hard lessons learned in blood and treasure? Yea, it's a thing.

“Experience shows that the first casualty of peace is such wisdom, if any, as has been learned in war.”

Richard Henry Tawney (1880-1962)

British economic historian

In his book Why Britain Fights (1941)

In this case, a declared peace. Do the math. 

We also need to be honest about what the President is doing. He is simply doing something to mark a line on his Presidency bucket list. He was elected twice by the American people. In his mind, they knew what he wanted to do - and he is doing it. The aftermath will have to be fixed by those who will hold the office after he leaves.

He has a lot more to do in the next 25 months, so stand by.

So, Who Has the Branch Plan?

Since DEC of 09, you've read my stuff about this - no need to repeat it again.

After President Obama's West Point speech of 2009, many of us told you this was a distinct possibility. Operational Planning 101, a couple thousand years of written military history, and the cultural norms of the Pashtun told anyone who was listening where the smart money was.

They will not let us retreat in peace.

After all, that is not how it is done. The weak horse must be treated as such, natch.

Via the LongWarJournal;

The US military today suspended most of its combat patrols with Afghan forces as the green-on-blue, or insider attacks by Afghan security personnel on Coalition troops, continue to spike. The training of Afghan forces and their partnering with US troops has been the cornerstone of the Obama administration's strategy to hand over security to the Afghans as the US completes its withdrawal by 2014.

"The order effectively suspends 'until further notice' most of the operations which US and Afghan troops conduct side by side," CBS News reported today. "At higher headquarters, Afghans and Americans will still work together, but in the field small unit operations putting Afghan soldiers alongside Americans ... will be suspended unless an exception is granted by a commanding general."

Behold the fruits of a calendar-based Plan, AKA orderly retreat.

According to The Long War Journal's Special Report, Green-on-Blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data, insider attacks account for 15% of Coalition casualties so far this year. There have been a total of 60 such attacks on Coalition forces since 2008, and they have occurred in 18 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, with the vast majority of the attacks taking place in Helmand province (17 attacks) followed by Kandahar province (9 attacks). Since 2008, insider attacks have killed 119 Coalition troops and affiliates and have wounded 98. The number of attacks has spiked since 2008, starting with 2 attacks reported in 2008; to 5 in 2009; to 6 in 2010; to 15 in 2011; to 32 in 2012. The steep rise in attacks parallels the increased pairing of Coalition troops with Afghan forces in training and mentoring situations, and occurs as the overall number of Coalition troops is sharply declining due to the planned transfer of Afghan security to Afghan forces by 2014.

It did not have to end this way, we had a solid conditions-based plan - but we elected people with no knowledge of military history, mal-advised, and were enabled by uniformed leaders who forgot their Sheehan and McMaster; too comfortable in their positions of power and influence.

We invited this.

Building off the previous post from last night, does anyone really believe this statement?

... US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta dismissed the green-on-blue attacks as the "last gasp" of the Taliban.

No it's not. It is to ensure that we leave under fire - that we are defeated; and that they get credit for it.

The enemy has some good operational planners too. We have thrown this away.

The Realities of a Calendar Based Plan

MarineCorpsTimes has a nice snap-shot of what we will see more and more in the march to 2014 and beyond. Ground gained will be lost as we leave before the ANSF are fully seasoned and ready. Literally the definition of half-baked. 

It didn't have to end this way - but district by district it will where ever the Pashtun have the critical mass to be able to force the issue, and we made the conscious decision to let it happen.

Rather than concentrating on the border, the border police are based here and in other villages along the Helmand River in Khanashin district, focusing security operations about 60 miles north of Bahram Chah. To push south, the border police would need more manpower and larger weapons, said Lt. Col. Rasoul, who oversees the ABP police kandak, or battalion, with headquarters in Taghaz, a village with a few thousand inhabitants but no paved roads or electricity.

The situation hints at certain complexities as the U.S. military shifts to a security force assistance mission in Afghanistan. The strategy was widely implemented this summer, as thousands of Marines and soldiers across the country returned to the U.S. as part of a force drawdown.

The Marine Corps’ footprint in southwestern Afghanistan has shrunk from about 17,000 in the spring to 7,000 now, with many of the remaining forces redistributed to assist Afghan units, rather than run independent counterinsurgency operations.

Since the shift, Afghan National Security Forces have been tested in numerous bloody battles, particularly in Sangin, Kajaki and other districts in northern Helmand where resistance has been stiff for years. Even in southern Helmand, Afghan units have struggled with logistics, planning and internal power struggles that threaten to undermine security.

“It goes back to the question that everyone asks: When we pull out, can the Afghan forces do what needs to be done to secure Helmand province?” said Lt. Col. David Bradney, who commanded 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, in northern Helmand until the unit rotated home to Twentynine Palms, Calif., in October. “I would tell you that, yes, the Afghan National Security Forces are absolutely capable enough to beat the Taliban. It’s all a question of gumption and will. Do they have the leadership to force the discipline of action, and the commitment to get their forces into the field and risk, perhaps at times, being unsuccessful, to achieve success?”

No one should be shocked. We made the decision to support a policy that thousands of years of military experience tells us would fail ... and we did it without a whimper ... but everyone kept their chance at another star or good post-retirement gig. Everyone kept their good parking space.

There is another article out of Australia that is very much worth your time to get a non-USA perspective.  In part;

But as any honest futurist will admit, there is no way of knowing exactly how events will unfold once we leave: good, bad or indifferent. It is not inconceivable, however, that a de-facto division of the country may emerge between the Pashtun south and the northern groups.

The stronger we can make the ANSF before we leave the less likely is the scenario of being fulfilled. Besides, once we leave the Pashtun groups likely will splinter and dissipate their strength with infighting.

The AFG war in a graph

I've put a lot out there about what has happened in my war, AFG - the place all told I spend half a decade directly working in and on via one capacity or another. If you need to review, just click the "Afghanistan" tab - it is mostly there.

There continues to be three fundamental issues I keep pounding away on because way too many people just don't understand them.

1. For much of the first half of the war, it was not a USA-dominated operation on the ground. As a matter of fact, until they proved they couldn't unburden themselves of caveats and make an honest attempt to fill the CJSOR, there were as many NATO/coalition forces as USA forces.
2. There was no "Obama surge." The planning for that began in earnest at CENTCOM and the Joint Staff in late '07, was firmly set by early '08, and began deployment in late '09, with a full head of steam going in to Obama's inauguration. Anyone who tried to get a flight out of Qatar and in to AFG in late '08 and early '09 can tell you that story. Again, click the tab for the details. All President Obama is was not stop it, put his scent on it, and let it happen - until ...
3. The West Point speech of December 2009 was when Obama signaled that we were going to quit, to start the long goodbye - and so with conditions based plans in the dustbin, we slid in to the intellectually corrupt calendar based retreat - forcing good people to try to make the best of a mess they were given. When the good people got Obama to move off his summer of 2011 withdraw to summer/fall of 2014, we may have just given the ANSF a chance. It may have been too early like it was in IRQ to go home, but we'll see.  Oh, yes, we'll see.

Like I put in a comment SEPCOR, I will keep beating this drum. I will not let the false narrative pushed by the present administration's apologists stand unopposed. I will not go quietly in to that sweet night. No, I will rage, rage, rage against the fading light. I was there. I was part of that process. It is my duty to tell this story and to make sure the facts are out there, regardless if people want to believe it or not.

A picture is worth a thousand words, and after yesterday's post - I think I'll just let the picture tell the rest.

Hat tip DefenseOne.

Diversity Thursday

Stick with me - this is actually, I think, a move in the right direction - the Diversity Bullies are trying to hide their racialist agenda. As we usually do on DivThu ... let's use their own words against them.

So, this line is interesting.

THIS SETS FORTH THE 2012 CALENDAR FOR AMERICA (CFA12), DETAILING THE NAVY'S LARGE-SCALE OUTREACH EVENTS FOR THE COMING YEAR.
...
THE PRIMARY GOAL OF NAVY OUTREACH IS TO GAIN AMERICANS' UNDERSTANDING THAT THE NAVY IS A WARFIGHTING FORCE, OPERATING FORWARD, READY TO FIGHT AND WIN TODAY AND EVERY DAY. ACHIEVING THIS GOAL IS A PARTICULAR AND UNIQUE CHALLENGE. THE NAVY'S MEN AND WOMEN MAKE UP ONLY A FRACTION OF ONE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL U.S. POPULATION. INDIVIDUAL CONNECTIONS, WHICH CAN BE THE MOST POWERFUL AND INFLUENTIAL ONES, ARE NOT AS PERVASIVE TODAY AS IN THE PAST. BECAUSE NAVAL FORCES AND PERSONNEL ARE BASED PRIMARILY ON BOTH COASTS, THE NAVY IS CHALLENGED TO COMMUNICATE ITS MISSION AWAY FROM FLEET CONCENTRATION AREAS. IN 2012, THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE WAR OF 1812 PROVIDES A POWERFUL PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO LAUNCH AN INFORMATIVE OUTREACH CAMPAIGN.

Sounds real good, reasonable and the right attitude to take to reach out to all Americans throughout our nation. Wide geographic reach, both urban and rural, etc. Right?

Well .... mostly. There is something not quite right in the mix ...

When I look at the full message, my initial reaction is thus: our Navy thinks ....
1) You enjoy being patronized like a serf.
2) You are fine being lied to.
3) You are happy to be in a Navy who sees you first by your race and/or ethnicity. You know - just like the racist idiots in the KKK.

It is a good rule of thumb in life that when people cannot accurately describe what they are doing, or wrap it in words that are not reflected in the action being taken, either something wrong is being done and/or the people doing it are too ashamed or embarrassed at what they are doing to accurately tell you.

In the case of this message, we have both.

What we have is something, in a way, that is kind of funny. The racialists in their pursuit of their Cultural Marxist goal of division and sectarianism are trying, Popular Front like, to fold in their fetid mess inside legitimate exercises. In the below - note the bold. Those are actually legitimate inclusive events.

The non-bold? Those are sectarian and racialist organizations and activities that we continue to support. Amazing - we continue to send money and good will to organizations that look at people at the most superficial way possible - retrograde in the extreme.

Full message is here.

R 191906Z Jan 12
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC//DNS//
TO NAVADMIN
BT

NAVADMIN 023/12

MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC//DNS/JAN//

SUBJ/CALENDAR FOR AMERICA 2012//

REF/A/DOC/OPNAV/28MAY09//
REF/B/MTG/CHINFO/08NOV11//
NARR/REF A IS OPNAVINST 5726.8 OUTREACH: AMERICA'S NAVY. REF B
IS THE 2012 CALENDAR FOR AMERICA PLANNING CONFERENCE.
POC/KIM [redacted]/CDR/DIRECTOR NAVCO/LOC: MILLINGTON, TN/TEL:
(901) 874-[redacted]/EMAIL:KIM.[redacted](AT)NAVY.MIL//

RMKS/1. THIS SETS FORTH THE 2012 CALENDAR FOR AMERICA (CFA12), DETAILING THE NAVY'S LARGE-SCALE OUTREACH EVENTS FOR THE COMING YEAR. EVENTS INCLUDE NAVY WEEKS, FLEET WEEKS, DIVERSITY EVENTS, WAR OF 1812 BICENTENNIAL COMMEMORATIVE EVENTS, BLUE ANGEL AIR SHOWS, SHIP COMMISSIONING CEREMONIES AND KEY RECRUITING EVOLUTIONS AMONG OTHERS.

2. PER REF A AND AS DISCUSSED REF B, RESEARCH AND ASSESSMENT CONDUCTED OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS HAS SHOWN THAT WHILE AMERICANS LIKE AND APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR NAVY, THEY DO NOT TRULY UNDERSTAND THE NAVY'S MISSION AND ITS IMPORTANCE. NAVY OUTREACH EFFORTS MUST BE STRUCTURED AND EXECUTED TO EDUCATE THE AMERICAN PUBLIC ON THE NAVY'S CAPABILITIES AND RELEVANCE TO NATIONAL SECURITY. THE PRIMARY GOAL OF NAVY OUTREACH IS TO GAIN AMERICANS' UNDERSTANDING THAT THE NAVY IS A WARFIGHTING FORCE, OPERATING FORWARD, READY TO FIGHT AND WIN TODAY AND EVERY DAY. ACHIEVING THIS GOAL IS A PARTICULAR AND UNIQUE CHALLENGE. THE NAVY'S MEN AND WOMEN MAKE UP ONLY A FRACTION OF ONE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL U.S. POPULATION. INDIVIDUAL CONNECTIONS, WHICH CAN BE THE MOST POWERFUL AND INFLUENTIAL ONES, ARE NOT AS PERVASIVE TODAY AS IN THE PAST. BECAUSE NAVAL FORCES AND PERSONNEL ARE BASED PRIMARILY ON BOTH COASTS, THE NAVY IS CHALLENGED TO COMMUNICATE ITS MISSION AWAY FROM FLEET CONCENTRATION AREAS. IN 2012, THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE WAR OF 1812 PROVIDES A POWERFUL PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO LAUNCH AN INFORMATIVE OUTREACH CAMPAIGN.

3. TO FURTHER HELP GAIN AMERICANS' UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR NAVY, PARTICULARLY INTO AREAS OF THE COUNTRY THAT HAVE NO SIGNIFICANT NAVY PRESENCE, THE NAVY WILL IMPLEMENT A NEW PROGRAM IN 2012 THAT WILL MATCH 50 SENIOR OFFICER, CIVILIAN AND ENLISTED LEADERS WITH 50 CITIES ACROSS AMERICA. THE "NAVY 50-50" PROGRAM WILL SEND NAVY
LEADERS TO THEIR ASSIGNED CITY FOR 2-3 DAYS OF HIGH-LEVEL ENGAGEMENTS WITH CORPORATE EXECUTIVES, CIVIC LEADERS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS, NON-PROFIT EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND SENIOR EDITORS AND JOURNALISTS FROM THE MEDIA. MORE INFORMATION ON THIS NEW INITIATIVE WILL BE FORTHCOMING SEPCOR.

4. SIMPLE AND CONSISTENT MESSAGING IS ESSENTIAL TO HELP THE AMERICAN PUBLIC UNDERSTAND THEIR NAVY. KEY NAVY MESSAGES WILL BE PROVIDED SEPCOR.

5. SCHEDULED CFA12 OUTREACH EVENTS (READ IN FOUR COLUMNS):

DATE: CITY: EVENT: LEAD:

JAN 28 LOS ANGELES CHINESE NEW YEAR FESTIVAL & PARADE (7)
JAN 30-31 CHARLOTTE, NC US WOMEN IN NUCLEAR-REGION II CONF (7)
FEB TBD HATTIESBURG, MS KW60 OUTREACH AT AFRICAN AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY (14)
FEB 15-16 WASHINGTON, D.C. LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE CONF (7)
FEB 15-18 HOUSTON, TX SOCIETY OF MEXICAN AMERICAN ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (7)
FEB 16-18 PHILADELPHIA, PA BLACK ENGINEER OF THE YEAR STEM AWARDS (7)
FEB 19-25 WASHINGTON, D.C. NATIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS (7)
MAR TBD NORFOLK, VA KW60 EVENT AT MACARTHUR MUSEUM (14) MAR TBD WASHINGTON, D.C. 1812 KICKOFF EVENT (14)
MAR 2-3 ALBUQUERQUE, NM ASIAN AMERICAN ENGINEER OF THE YEAR AND CONFERENCE (7)
MAR 5-6 NATIONAL HARBOR, MD SEA SERVICE LEADERSHIP ASSOC WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP SYMPOSIUM (7)
MAR 8-10 DALLAS, TX WOMEN IN AVIATION INTERNATIONAL CONF (7)
MAR 10 EL CENTRO, CA NAF EL CENTRO ANNUAL AIR SHOW (8) MAR 17-18 ST. GEORGE, UT THUNDER OVER UTAH AIR SHOW (8)
MAR 26-31 PHOENIX, AZ PHOENIX NAVY WEEK (1)
MAR 21-24 ALBUQUERQUE, NM 23RD ANNUAL NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN SCIENCE & ENGINEERING FAIR (7)
MAR 24 GULFPORT, MS SEABEE DAY (OPEN BASE) (2) MAR 24-25 PUNTA GORDA, FL FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL AIR SHOW (8)
MAR 26-27 WASHINGTON, D.C. HISPANIC ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES CAPITOL FORUM ON HISPANIC HIGHER EDUCATION
MAR 26-28 WASHINGTON, D.C. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUCATION (7)
MAR28-APR1 PITTSBURGH, PA NATIONAL SOCIETY OF BLACK ENGINEERS CONVENTION (7)
MAR31-APR1 TUSCALOOSA, AL TUSCALOOSA AIR SHOW (8)
APR TBD AVONDALE, LA PCU SOMERSET (LPD 25) CHRISTENING (11)
APR TBD LOS ANGELES, CA NATIONAL IMAGE INC. TRAINING CONFERENCE (7)
APR 12 WASHINGTON, D.C. NUESTRO FUTURO 2012 LATINO EDUCATION CONFERENCE (7)
APR 14-15 KINGSVILLE, TX WINGS OVER SOUTH TEXAS AIR SHOW (8) APR 16-23 NEW ORLEANS, LA NEW ORLEANS NAVY WEEK - WAR OF 1812 (1,9) APR 18-25 TBD DAYS OF REMEMBRANCE (HOLOCAUST) (7)
APR 21-22 NEW ORLEANS, LA NAS JRB NEW ORLEANS AIR SHOW (8)
APR 25 LOS ANGELES, CA ASIAN AMERICAN AND PACIFIC ISLANDER SUMMIT (7) APR 25-30 FORT LAUDERDALE, FL FLEET WEEK - PORT EVERGLADES (2,9) APR 28-29 WARNER ROBINS, GA WARNER ROBINS AFB AIR SHOW (8)
APR30-MAY4 ATLANTA, GA ASIAN AMERICAN AND PACIFIC ISLANDER SUMMIT (7)
APR30-MAY4 ATLANTA, GA FEDERAL ASIAN/PACIFIC AMERICAN COUNCIL (7)
MAY 5 BOWIE STATE UNI, MD PATRIOTS TECHNOLOGY TRAINING CENTER YOUTH SUMMIT ON TECHNOLOGY (7)
MAY 5-6 CHERRY POINT, NC MCAS CHERRY POINT AIR SHOW (8) MAY 7-13 NASHVILLE, TN NASHVILLE NAVY WEEK (1) MAY 12-13 SMYRNA, TN THE GREAT TENNESSEE AIR SHOW (8) MAY 14-20 SPOKANE, WA SPOKANE NAVY WEEK (1) MAY 19 SAN DIEGO, CA USS SAN DIEGO (LPD 22)COMMISSIONING (11) MAY 19 TORRANCE, CA TORRANCE ARMED FORCES DAY CELEBRATION (5) MAY 19-20 ANDREWS AFB, MD ANDREWS AFB AIR SHOW (8) MAY 23 NEW YORK, NY HUDSON RIVER AERIAL DISPLAY (8) MAY 23-30 NEW YORK, NY NYC FLEET WEEK-1812 CELEBRATION (3,9) MAY 26-27 JONES BEACH, NY JONES BEACH AIR SHOW (8)
MAY28-JUN1 KALMAR, SWEDEN WOMEN IN NUCLEAR (WIN)CONFERENCE (7)
MAY 29 ANNAPOLIS, MD USNA GRADUATION FLY-OVER (8)
MAY29-JUN2 NEW YORK, NY NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (7)
JUN TBD TBD ASIAN & PACIFIC ISLANDER AMERICAN SCHOLARSHIP FUND HIGHER EDUCATION SUMMIT SERIES (7)
JUN TBD BALTIMORE, MD BLUE COAST SMALL BUSINESS SYMPOSIUM (13) JUN 2 GULFPORT, MS USS MISSISSIPPI (SSN 782)COMMISSIONING (11) JUN 2-3 VIRGINIA BEACH, VA VIRGINIA BEACH AIR SHOW (8) JUN 4-7 WASHINGTON, D.C. BATTLE OF MIDWAY COMMEMORATION AND WREATH LAYING CEREMONY AT NAVY MEMORIAL (14)
JUN 4-8 DENVER, CO SOCIETY OF AMERICAN INDIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES NATIONAL TRAINING CONFERENCE (7)
JUN 6 WASHINGTON, D.C. DOD DIVERSITY SUMMIT (7) JUN 6-10 PORTLAND, OR PORTLAND ROSE FESTIVAL (4,10) JUN 6-12 NORFOLK, VA NORFOLK HARBORFEST - WAR OF 1812 (9)
JUN 7 WASHINGTON, D.C. ASIAN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE NETWORK CAREER PLANNING CONFERENCE (7)
JUN 9-10 MANKATO, MN MANKATO AIR SHOW (8) JUN 13-19 BALTIMORE, MD BALTIMORE NAVY WEEK - WAR OF 1812 (1,9) JUN 16-17 BALTIMORE, MD BALTIMORE AIR SHOW (8) JUN 23-24 LATROBE, PA LATROBE AIR SHOW (8) JUN29-JUL6 BOSTON, MA BOSTON NAVY WEEK - WAR OF 1812 (1,9) JUN30-JUL1 PORTSMOUTH, NH BOSTON PORTSMOUTH AIR SHOW (8) JUL 2-4 BOSTON HARBOR, MA BOSTON HARBOR AERIAL DISPLAY (8)
JUL 4-12 HOUSTON, TX ACADEMIC, CULTURAL, TECHNOLOGICAL SCIENTIFIC
OLYMPICS AND NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE CONVENTION (7)
JUL 5-8 BELLEVUE, WA JAPANESE AMERICAN CITIZENS LEAGUE NATIONAL CONVENTION (7)
JUL 6-9 NEW LONDON, CT OPSAIL EVENT (3,9) JUL 7-8 DAYTON, OH DAYTON AIR SHOW (8) JUL 14 PENSACOLA BEACH, FL PENSACOLA BEACH AIR SHOW (8)
JUL 16-20 DETROIT, MI FEDERALLY EMPLOYED WOMEN NATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM (7)
JUL 16-22 SACRAMENTO, CA SACRAMENTO NAVY WEEK (1) JUL 19-28 SIOUX FALLS, SD SIOUX FALLS NAVY WEEK (1) JUL 21-22 SIOUX FALLS, SD SIOUX FALLS AIR SHOW (8) JUL 28-29 TWIN FALLS, ID TWIN FALLS AIR SHOW (8) JUL31-AUG5 SEATTLE, WA SEATTLE SEAFAIR (4,10)
JUL31-AUG4 LAS VEGAS, NV TUSKEGEE AIRMEN INC NATIONAL CONFERENCE (7)
AUG TBD TBD MANA HERMANITAS SUMMER LEADERSHIP INSTITUTE (7)
AUG TBD TBD NAVAL OFFICER MENTORSHIP ASSOCIATION NATIONAL
CONFERENCE (7)
AUG TBD TBD ASIAN HERITAGE AWARDS (7)
AUG TBD BUFFALO, NY KW60 WREATH LAYING CEREMONY AT BUFFALO'S KOREAN WAR MEMORIAL (14)
AUG 1-4 BALTIMORE, MD BLACK DATA PROCESSING ASSOCIATES (7)
AUG 1-5 SAN DIEGO, CA NATIONAL NAVAL OFFICER ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE (7)
AUG 4-5 SEATTLE, WA SEAFAIR AIR SHOW (8)
AUG 6-9 SAN DIEGO, CA GOLD COAST SMALL BUSINESS SYMPOSIUM (13)
AUG 6-13 MILWAUKEE, WI MILWAUKEE NAVY WEEK - WAR OF 1812 (1,9)
AUG 11 CHICAGO, IL BUD BILLIKEN PARADE (7)
AUG 13-16 DETROIT, MI BLACKS IN GOVERNMENT NATIONAL CONFERENCE (7)
AUG 13-20 CHICAGO, IL CHICAGO NAVY WEEK - WAR OF1812 (1,9) AUG 18-19 CHICAGO, IL CHICAGO AIR AND WATER SHOW (8) AUG 20-27 TOLEDO, OH TOLEDO NAVY WEEK - WAR OF 1812 (1,9)
AUG 20-24 SAN DIEGO, CA ASSOCIATION OF NAVAL SERVICES OFFICER NATIONAL CONFERENCE (7)
AUG 23-25 NEW YORK, NY NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ASIAN AMERICAN PROFESSIONALS NATIONAL CONVENTION (7)
AUG 26 TBD WOMENS EQUALITY DAY (7) AUG27-SEP4 CLEVELAND, OH CLEVELAND NAVY WEEK - WAR OF 1812 (1,9)
AUG 28-31 TBD NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MEXICAN AMERICAN RIGHTS TRAINING CONFERENCE AND BUSINESS MEETING (7) SEP TBD TBD USS ANCHORAGE (LPD 23)COMMISSIONING (11) SEP TBD PASCAGOULA, MS PCU AMERICA (LHA 6) CHRISTENING (11)
SEP TBD WASHINGTON D.C. HISTORICALLY BLACK COLL & UNIVERSITY - WHITE HOUSE INITIATIVE (7)
SEP TBD EDINBURG, TX HISPANIC ENGINEERING, SCIENCE AND TECH WEEK (7)
SEP TBD WASHINGTON, D.C. JAPANESE AMERICAN CITIZENS LEAGUE NATIONAL CONVENTION (7)
SEP TBD NORTH ISLAND, CA CORONADO SPEED FESTIVAL (OPEN HOUSE) (5) SEP 1-3 CLEVELAND, OH CLEVELAND NATIONAL AIR SHOW (8) SEP 3-10 DETROIT, MI DETROIT NAVY WEEK - WAR OF 1812 (1,9) SEP 8-9 LITTLE ROCK, AR THUNDER OVER THE ROCK AIR SHOW (8) SEP 10-17 BUFFALO, NY BUFFALO NAVY WEEK - WAR OF 1812 (1,9) SEP14-OCT1 SAN DIEGO, CA SAN DIEGO FLEET WEEK AND AIR SHOW (5,10) SEP 15-16 OCEANA, VA NAS OCEANA AIR SHOW (8) SEP 22 GALVESTON, TX USS FORT WORTH (LCS 3)COMMISSIONING (11) SEP 22-23 GRAND JUNCTION, CO GRAND JUNCTION AIR SHOW (8) SEP 29 MANHATTAN, NY USS MICHAEL MURPHY (DDG 112)COMMISSIONING (11)
SEP 29-30 KANE'OHE BAY, HI MCAS KANEOHE BAY AIR SHOW (8)
OCT TBD OAKLAND, CA SOCIETY OF MEXICAN AMERICAN ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS SYMPOSIUM (7)
OCT 4-9 SAN FRANCISCO, CA SAN FRANCISCO FLEET WEEK (5,10) OCT 6-7 SAN FRANCISCO, CA SAN FRANCISCO AIR SHOW (8) OCT 12-14 MIRAMAR, CA MCAS MIRAMAR AIR SHOW (8)
OCT 13 WASHINGTON, D.C. 237TH NAVY BIRTHDAY (14)
OCT 20-22 WASHINGTON, D.C. HISPANIC ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (7)
OCT 20-21 JACKSONVILLE, FL JACKSONVILLE SEA AND SKY SPECTACULAR (8)
OCT 21 ATLANTA, GA WHO'S WHO IN ASIAN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES (7) OCT 22-28 HOUSTON, TX HOUSTON NAVY WEEK (1)
OCT 26-30 LAKE BUENA VISTA,FL HISPANIC ENGINEER NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS AWARDS CORP (7)
OCT 26-30 NEW YORK, NY THURGOOD MARSHALL LEADERSHIP TRAINING CONFERENCE (7) OCT 27-28 HOUSTON, TX WINGS OVER HOUSTON AIR SHOW (8)
NOV VARIOUS NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN HERITAGE MONTH (7)
NOV TBD TBD AMERICAN INDIAN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING SOCIETY CONFERENCE (7)
NOV TBD TBD WOMEN IN DEFENSE (7)
NOV TBD TBD NATIONAL WOMEN OF COLOR IN TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE (7)
NOV TBD TBD GRACE HOPPER CELEBRATION OF WOMEN IN COMPUTING (7) NOV TBD TBD WOUNDED WARRIOR HIRING AND SUPPORT CONFERENCE (7) NOV 2-3 PENSACOLA, FL NAS PENSACOLA AIR SHOW (8)
NOV 8-10 HOUSTON, TX SOCIETY OF WOMEN ENGINEERS CONFERENCE (7)
NOV 12 CARRIER CLASSIC - TBD
NOV 14-18 FT WORTH, TX SOCIETY OF HISPANIC PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS (7) DEC TBD SAN DIEGO, CA HOLIDAY BOWL (5,10)

6. LEAD ACTION OFFICES FOR THE EVENTS IN PARAGRAPH 5 ARE AS FOLLOWS:
(1) NAVY OFFICE OF COMMUNITY OUTREACH, (901) 874-[redacted].
(2) COMMANDER, NAVY REGION SOUTHEAST, (904) 542-[redacted].
(3) COMMANDER, NAVY REGION MID-ATLANTIC, (757) 322-[redacted].
(4) COMMANDER, NAVY REGION NORTHWEST, (360) 396-[redacted].
(5) COMMANDER, NAVY REGION SOUTHWEST, (619) 532-[redacted].
(6) COMMANDER, NAVY REGION MIDWEST, (847) 688-[redacted]
(7) CNP, OFFICE OF DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION (N134), (703) 695-[redacted].
(8) BLUE ANGELS, (850) 452-[redacted].
(9) U.S. FLEET FORCES COMMAND, (757) 836-[redacted]
(10) COMMANDER, U.S. THIRD FLEET, (619) 524-[redacted]
(11) OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, (703) 697-[redacted]
(12) U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, (808) 471-[redacted]
(13) SECNAV, OFFICE OF SMALL BUSINESS PROGRAMS (202) 685-[redacted]
(14) NAVY OFFICE OF COMMEMORATIONS (202) 433-[redacted]

7. CFA12 WILL BE MAINTAINED AT WWW.NAVY.MIL/NAVCO, WITH CHANGES AND UPDATES THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. ADDITIONAL STAKEHOLDER LARGE-SCALE EVENTS NOT YET SCHEDULED OR CONFIRMED (SUCH AS NAVAL AVIATION TACTICAL DEMONSTRATIONS AND NAVY PARACHUTE TEAM PERFORMANCES) WILL BE PUBLISHED BY SPONSORING STAKEHOLDERS SEPCOR. SCHEDULES FOR SHIP COMMISSIONING AND CHRISTENING CEREMONIES ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE. CONTACT COGNIZANT STAKEHOLDERS FOR SMALLER-SCALE EVENTS AND DETAILS.

8. RELEASED BY VICE ADMIRAL J. M. BIRD, DIRECTOR, NAVY STAFF.//

BT
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Good news? Yes. I will take this as another victory on the way to a just, non-discriminatory, and color blind Navy. The Diversity Bullies are hiding. You only hide if you have something that needs to be hid. Well, either that or we are institutionalizing sectarianism. If the latter, well congrats; "Through Division there is Unity!"

VADM Bird; does this really meet the standard of clarity, transparency, and honesty that you want associated with your name?