The Hard Science of Harder Truths

There are two parallel universes of people who think about what the next few decades hold in the national security arena. 

The people in one universe are as smart and as well educated as those in the other. They have solid, reasoned expectations about the national security challenges we face in the near to medium term. They can discuss probable and possible technology "game changers" that will impact how we can project national will on a global scale, and other of the "sexier" topics that are fun to talk about nonetheless.

They have an admirable understanding of how nations work together with their friends and competitors. Internally, they have a good diversity of ideas on how to create the right mix of manpower, training and equipment now to set the stage for preparing our nation to be able to address the future's challenges as they come up.

In that first universe, as there is in the second, there is much conflict between national security confessions; they have their own think tanks, preferred authors, opinion leaders, and theorists. They can have dramatically different approaches to things as diverse as diplomatic priorities, strategic communications, and military force structure.

In that first universe they do have one thing in common - a common variable that separates them from the second universe. 

They base their ideas on the recent past (except for the futurists who in both universes are the over-caffeinated 11-yr old boy at the dinner party, but that is a topic addressed in other posts) and the metrics that dominated it; demographics, growth models, business cycles, but their time-relative bias is off; the metrics of 30 years ago are given the same weight as those of 10 years ago. 

They are doing the right thing - benchmarking the past to help understand the future - but as if in some strange state of denial, they seem blind to what will actually shape this century the most - the facts on demographics, economics, budgets, and plain hard math - that show in the near-mist shapes that are unfamiliar and intimidating. With each passing year the shapes get clearer and clearer, yet in the first universe they try to look other the other direction, and ignore the gathering clarity in the hope it will drift away or simply not be that bad once it comes in to full view. It is on that point that our universe splits and becomes parallel.

In the second universe, at the inflection point where they look in to the future, the people in the second universe do not look away. When that shadow appears in the mist, they focus on it. They stare unblinking at the emerging shape and, as opposed to wishing away any nasty bits coming forward, they instead outline exactly what possible dangers exist, regardless of the discomfort it causes. They want to make sure that they are fully prepared to do what needs to be done to deal with what is coming - because coming it is. 

If you were to pull up a chair next to one of the people in that second universe cleaning his glasses so he could see the edge of the mist as clearly as possible, you would be sitting next to our friend Jerry Hendrix.

You need to read it all, as I'm only going to pull a small bit - but here is the scene he sets in the opening to his latest work from CNAS, Avoiding Trivia: A Strategy for Sustainment and Fiscal Security.

Gird your loins and lean in with him; he sees it clearer than most.

If the goal were a strategy to undermine the power and influence of the United States and bring its era of global leadership to an end, a Bismarckian grand strategist could not have designed a series of events as debilitating as those of the past fourteen years. For the United States to reverse current trends and sustain its position in the world, it will need to move from reactive policies to a posture of proactivity. It will also have to examine the extent of its interests and reconnect with the basic, cultural fundamentals of grand strategy.

Grand Strategy has never resided purely within the military realm; it is rather an expression of national goals in totality. To express strategy purely in military terms would neglect the logistics line that stretches from the front to the factories that produce armaments and to the economy that supports the overall effort. The military function cannot be separated from the economic: Clausewitz and Mahan cannot be considered with out Keynes and Friedman. Deficit spending and growing debt, along with a weakening economy and crumbling national infrastructure, present a growing threat to the United States that may far exceed traditional security threats, especially when we consider that the national security complex is dependent upon these components of national life: the economy and national infrastructure form the foundation for U.S. actions in the world.

Americans, sadly, too often do not see anything that does not have a USA stamp on it. As a result, there is the assumption that the challenges they see in the USA are in isolation and don't exist elsewhere - a thought that "we" are having trouble, but as "we" don't make the effort to study the rest of the world, we assume that everyone else is doing well. That warps our thinking and planning.

Yes, we have problems - and the one represented in the graph above is at the top of my list both directly and in the secondary effects it will have for me in my dotage, and my children's entire life. But what about the condition of other power centers?

One of the more valuable aspects of Hendrix's article is that he gives the reader a thumbnail view of the three other power centers of the world and the challenges they face. We don't come off all that bad in comparison.

Europe;

...When industrialization, urbanization, cultural maturation, and the decline of religion in daily life led to a reduction in the size of the family, and hence of the working population, policy makers attempted to reverse the shortfall by expanding immigration to bring in additional workers ... exacerbated Europe’s overarching handicap: its fractured sense of self. Despite efforts to form a collective whole within the European Union and bind themselves together economically with the Euro as a common currency, the states of Europe still consider themselves sovereign entities. ... Without an amalgamation of effort and resources, it is difficult to envision how Europe could emerge as a serious global competitor in the near future.

Russia;

Ultimately Putin’s Russia faces the same challenges as his strongman predecessors: how to control a small population scattered across a vast territory, vulnerable to the threat of outside invaders, with scarce resources. With all of its historic, economic, and demographic challenges, as well as the results of the current sanctions regimes and, no doubt, lingering distrust of Russia in Europe following its aggressive actions, Russia will not reemerge as a significant world power for a number of decades.

China;

Given its centrally planned, mercantilist approach to economics, China is not and cannot be considered a “responsible actor” within the current global economic system. It cannot regain its historic central position in Asia, the “Middle Kingdom” within the current system. Thus, it must be understood that China is actively working to time its rise to coincide with the United States’ decline so as to create both a soft landing and an alternative for the current global system.

However, it cannot accomplish these goals on its own. It is not strong enough economically or militarily to take over the system, and its culture and diplomacy are not similar enough to entice others outside of Asia to voluntarily join their destinies with China. For China to accomplish a peaceful transfer of power, it would need a willing partner in the United States. This is not outside the realm of possibility at the moment, given that America has its own historic and cultural issues to deal with.

Some may make the charge that Hendrix is simply dismissing and assuming away challengers, yet those are mostly the same people who ignore challengers' problems and instead like to point to our challenges alone. That simply is no way to get a clear view of the future; to disregard your strengths and amplify your weakness, while at the same time disregarding your competitors' weaknesses and emphasizing their strengths. That way of thinking is to make a dedicated effort to avoid looking clearly at the problem.

We are not alone in having challenges, but we have a great gift. Our greatest challenges are internal. They are our problems to solve - and in comparison to others, arguable simpler problems. All it takes is will, maturity, and leadership.

The largest single threat to the U.S. position in the world arises within the United States itself. Seeking to focus on the competition of ideas, it has lost sight of the state of its own economy and the very real sources of friction – on land and predominantly at sea – that characterize the global arena.

Its natural tendency to confuse “American exceptionalism” with its real economic and military interests has resulted in a confused and disjointed national strategy. If it is to maintain its position of global leadership, the United States needs to refocus on its economic health and on its maritime roots.
...
Still, there are those who will point out America’s advantages, despite its debt. The United States still has the world’s largest economy, for a time, and it still has the world’s largest military, for a time.

In addition, the global economic system remains tilted in America’s favor: the laws remain Western and are premised on free trade and self-determination, for now. Lastly, the global exchange and reserve currency remains the dollar, which has been strengthening following the Federal Reserve’s 2014 decision to cease quantitative easing. The United States still has time on the clock; the question is how to use it?

This is not a problem of the military side of the national budget alone - though some will act as if it is. That is just not in line with the facts. There is also the danger of what we have seen in the past - the military takes the hit, and everyone else demurs. That won't work anymore - we have used that trick one time too many.

Hendrix has made an honest proposal from the military side of the argument. There should be parallel efforts to address these hard truths by others in the Beltway whose specialties are welfare, federal employee management, health care, regulation, and taxes. They cannot have as their answer, "more money; more taxes" as that simply is not a solution by serious people with a focus beyond the next election cycle. 

To keep this momentum going, those in other policy areas must join with equally bold ideas that are willing to take their "bite of the sandwich." For the Hendrix's specifics, difficult to summarize here, I point you to his article. Invest the time and read it all.

We are long overdue for serious, adult conversations about the position we have put ourselves in to. We should do it as the Germans did two decades ago. By doing so, we can avoid becoming what Greece is now.

In a work both broad in scope, but surprisingly narrowly focused in areas, Hendrix's work is a great entering point of discussion for what needs to be an iterative debate to get a view on the challenge, accept it as it is, and put this nation back on a track that will leave our children and grandchildren a nation at least as strong, united, and wealthy than the one we inherited.

Naval Presence and National Strategy, with Jerry Hendrix - on Midrats

From the same school as "If you want peace, prepare for war," a global maritime power must maintain a presence at sea. It must design a national strategy in line with its economic capability and political will, and make sure it mans, trains, and equips its navy in line with the design.

If presence is a critical function of a navy, how is it best accomplished, what are the tradeoffs, and how does it impact friends, competitors, and those sitting on the fence?

Our guest for the full hour to discuss this and more this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern will be Dr. Henry J. Hendrix, Jr, CAPT USN (Ret).

Jerry is a Senior Fellow and the Director of the Defense Strategies and Assessments Program at the Center for a New American Security.

When on active duty, his staff assignments include tours with the Chief of Naval Operation’s Executive Panel (N00K), and the OSD Office of Net Assessment From 2011-2012 he served as the Director and Designated Federal Officer of the Secretary of the Navy’s Advisory Panel. He also contributed to the 2012 Department Posture Statement to the Congress. Following the fall, 2011 Navy Inspector General’s Report on the state of the Naval History and Heritage Command, he was verbally ordered by the Secretary to assume the position of Director of Naval History.

Hendrix previously served as the Navy Fellow to the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. He has been awarded a Bachelor Degree in Political Science from Purdue University, Masters Degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School (National Security Affairs) and Harvard University (History) and received his doctorate from King’s College, London (War Studies).

Join us live if you can with the usual suspects in the chat room and offer up your questions for our guest, but if you miss the show you can always listen to the archive at blogtalkradio. 

If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here.

The Fleet we Have, Want, and Need with Jerry Hendrix - on Midrats

What is the proper fleet structure for the USN as we design our Navy that will serve its nation in mid-Century?

Join us this Sunday from 5-6pm for a broad ranging discussion on this topic and more with returning guest, Henry J. Hendrix, Jr, CAPT USN (Ret.), PhD.

Fresh off his recent retirement from active duty, Jerry is a Senior Fellow and the Director of the Defense Strategies and Assessments Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).

A Naval Flight Officer by training, his staff assignments include tours with the Chief of Naval Operation’s Executive Panel (N00K), the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (Force Development) and the OSD Office of Net Assessment.

His final position in uniform was the Director of Naval History.

Hendrix also served as the Navy Fellow to the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. He has a Bachelor Degree in Political Science from Purdue University, Masters Degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School (National Security Affairs) and Harvard University (History) and received his doctorate from King’s College, London (War Studies).

He has twice been named the Samuel Eliot Morison Scholar by the Navy Historical Center in Washington, DC, and was also the Center’s 2005 Rear Admiral John D. Hays Fellow. He also held the Marine Corps’ General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. Fellowship. He authored the book Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy and received a number of awards, including the United States Naval Institute’s Author of the Year and the Navy League’s Alfred T. Mahan Award for Literary Achievement.

Join us live if you can with the usual suspects in the chat room and offer up your questions for our guest, but if you miss the show you can always listen to the archive at blogtalkradio. 

If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here.

Listen to internet radio with Midrats on Blog Talk Radio

CAPT Henry J. Hendrix Jr., USN - Nay

Regular guest on Midrats, a great officer, serious writer, and a man not given to rash thoughts - Captain Henry J. Hendrix Jr., USN has sent an open letter to USNI Board of Directors.

How the BoD can sit mutely is beyond me.

---

Members of the US Naval Institute Board of Directors:

There is much hyperbole circulating regarding the proposed change to the Naval Institute’s mission statement and the departure of Major General Tom Wilkerson, USMC (Ret) as CEO. Although I had an initial negative reaction to the proposal, I have thus far avoided public comment in any major way. As I care deeply about the United States Naval Institute, I wanted to take the opportunity to think carefully and objectively, and consult with people whose opinion I value before reaching a conclusion and/or stating my opinion. I have done that.

First let me state that I love the Naval Institute. As a midshipman, I read the NROTC battalion’s copy of Proceedings every month. It became my wish to publish within that journal’s pages; to do so signified to me recognition among an elite group of individuals who comprised the intellectual core of my chosen vocation. I made several attempts at creating something worth reading before appearing in December, 2001 issue of Proceedings, 13 years into my career. It was a major professional milestone for me, and when I published my book, it was important that it come out of Naval Institute Press. This is where the Naval Institute lies in my own thoughts. It does not hold a similar place, in my opinion, in the lives of the current generation of Junior Officers.

Over the past fifteen years or so we have seen a drop off in our membership among junior and now mid-grade officers of the maritime services. I am sure you are aware that our demographic trends towards senior officers and the retired community. This is, literally, a death spiral for a professional organization. Under these circumstances the effort must be directed at outreach to the younger core of the profession, towards gaining legitimacy as an honest broker in the debates and discussions that lie at the center of their professional lives. Maintaining an “independent forum” is critical to this, but unfortunately the growing perception, according to conversations that I routinely have among junior officers, is that the Naval Institute has become a wardroom for active duty flags carrying water for their leadership and retired flags pushing platforms for the defense corporations that employ them. Incorporating “advocacy” into our mission statement is a mistake and would be disastrous to our membership rolls, thus I strongly oppose the proposed change to the USNI Mission Statement.

With regard to the departure of MGen Wilkerson as the CEO and Publisher of the Institute, the circumstances are troubling. From what I have gathered from online sources, General Wilkerson had proposed the creation of a stand-alone think tank that would focus on maritime security issues. This entity was to be “fire-walled”, as one of my contemporaries characterized to me, from the normal day to day activities of the Institute, preserving the independence of the open forum while also creating opportunity for creative and concentrated thought. After due consideration, I applaud and enthusiastically support this concept. Based upon my own conjecture, I surmise that the Board of Directors chose to reject this initiative in favor of integrating such activities in the form of advocacy on maritime issues into the US Naval Institute proper and that there was an agreement for a professional parting of ways with the General. As I stated earlier, I believe incorporating advocacy into USNI proper will undermine the legitimacy of the Institute as an open forum in the eyes of junior and mid-grade officers. Under these circumstances, I regret that the Board chose to disagree with General Wilkerson over this issue.

Some have told me that the key to the Naval Institute’s future lies in who is selected to lead it following General Wilkerson’s departure. I agree completely. Leadership is critical at this strategic inflexion point in the Institute’s life. This crisis over the mission of the organization has created a threat to the enviable reputation that the Institute has built one critical idea at a time since its founding in 1873. Some have suggested that what is needed at this time is a leader who can gain access and influence with the maritime service’s leadership. While I disagree with the legal reasoning that brought about the decision that CNO’s can no longer serve in an honorary capacity as a leader of the Institute, I do not believe that strengthening the relationship between USNI and the maritime service’s front offices is the answer to our prayers. I have heard that the Board’s search committee is looking for a retired three or four star officer who has left active service in the past five years. I strongly oppose such narrow search criteria. Your crisis is not with the Navy’s leadership, it is with the junior and mid-grade officers who, in their growing cynicism, refuse to participate in what they perceive to be a rapidly closing “open forum.”

I respectfully suggest that you open your search criteria to pursue a person with the characteristics of the Army’s John Nagl, who was a major creative force behind the COIN strategy and now serves as the head of the Center for New American Security. We need a young professional with an O-5/O-6 resume, possessing a strong reputation amongst the naval strategic community, who has the energy and legitimacy to promote the open forum of the Naval Institute to a generation of officers who no longer believe in this core center of our profession. In my mind names like Brian McGrath, Vic Addison and Frank Hoffman fit this description.



I feel compelled to respectfully request that you, regardless of your reaction

to my suggestion, not to select a member from the current Board’s membership to take over as CEO. While I am sure that anyone considered would be well qualified, the appointment of an individual to lead the Institute who was an active participant in the departure of MGen Wilkerson and the decision to change the mission statement will heighten the cynicism amongst the junior and mid-grade officers as well as the current membership of the Naval Institute. Such a move will have a significant negative impact upon the legitimacy of the United States Naval Institute.



Very Respectfully

Henry J. (Jerry) Hendrix II
Captain, USN (PhD)

Searching for the military Laffer Curve

I love think pieces, the ones you read that make you stop, read again, and then parse.

Find the chaff, define the wheat, and then shuffle again - breaking in to bits.

Fresh off his civilian clothes shopping spree now that the uniform is in the back of the closet, our friend Jerry Hendrix, CAPT USN (Ret.) is stretching out his PhD on his new desk at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) in a bit at The National Interest that is well worth you stopping by to read in full; A Conservative Defense Policy for 2014: Look to Eisenhower.

In my first run at Jerry's bit, I was a bit drawn off what I think are some unnecessary distractions. I think they are there because this probably should have been broken in to a few articles. Valid topics worthy of discussion, but perhaps best in a separate article. 

The first distraction was the opening partisanship vibe it gave off - right away it puts up walls to half your readers if they imply what follows is another (R)-bad (D)-not bad bit;

Recent discussions amongst Republicans regarding U.S. Defense force structure have revealed an ongoing disagreement between two camps within the party. Military Hawks, citing the recent disturbances in Ukraine and Iraq, have begun to beat the drum for more resources to be allocated for the Department of Defense to address threats that never really subsided. Fiscal Hawks, focused on budget deficits that stretch as far as the eye can see, continue to argue for DoD to continue to be part of a basket of cuts in entitlements and discretionary programs.

That is a good argument to have, but why limit a two-sided debate to one party? No reason to make this seem partisan to some readers, you have to draw in the inside argument for the other party - there is one if you look for it. In any event, Republicans only have one-half of Congress - they aren't even a majority decision maker. The Democrats hold most of the power levers, especially holding the Commander in Chief billet, that are the key in making any significant decisions in defense.

Maybe it is just me and my ongoing theme of the need to find and nurture a bi-partisan defense consensus. There is one, but we keep missing opportunities to feed it - I'm a little sensitive to the topic. 

Sure, there are extremes on defense in both parties that will never learn good sandbox skills for the benefit of all - but there is a large group from both sides of the aisle whose interests well overlap and are the key to finding the right answer to a very real challenge.

In his article, Jerry only brings up the Democrats directly in this context;

The Democrats need to come to the table to address the looming crises in Social Security and healthcare.

Yes, they do - but so do Republicans. By not at least addressing the internal debate in both parties on defense and entitlement spending, an opportunity is missed by putting Republican interest in defense and Democrat interest in domestic issues - the actual situation is much more nuanced. Lost opportunity and a distraction, but let's move on.

I would offer that this one aspect of the article should be set to the side whether you enjoy it or not, because Jerry is bringing up some reference points that are spot on and should be the part of all efforts to find the right solution;

It has not been so long since the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pronounced that our debt posed a grave threat to our national security at home and around the world.
...
we should not give way to election-year desires to spend more, ignoring the long-term implications of our debt.
...
In the end, a major inflationary pressure remains our addiction to exquisite platforms.

There he hits it. Regulars here and at Midrats know this is a topic that is absolutely critical. "Exquisite," "Tiffany," "Perfect vs. Good," "Transformational!," - the Biblical plagues we have suffered over the last couple of decades. Regardless of how we got here or who is at fault, it needs to be fixed now.

This is where my review of Jerry's article turns. He sets out an argument that is incomplete but central, and a valid starting point;

... the United States needs to maintain a military strong enough to deter the rise of competitors and preserve its ability to respond to crises around the world, the question that remains is: how large and how capable does our military have to be to accomplish these twin goals?

I don't think a strong military will deter the rise of competitors, just as Rome did not deter the Germanic tribes or the British Empire deterred Imperial Germany - but a military does need to be strong enough to decisively meet any challenge at war while being effective and affordable in peace, or at least a warm peace. (NB the word "strong" does not necessarily mean "big" - more on that in a bit).

Objective analysis suggests that a path exists that would allow cuts to the DoD budget and marginal growth in the force. Such a path is predicated on recognizing that our national fascination with high-tech weapons systems has led to a defense culture where the exquisite has become the enemy of the “good enough.”

There it is. That is the core; that is the question - that is the sexy bit.

Is that a path, or a destination - or both? How do you visualize the quandary that less can give you more, and that to meet a nation's national security requirements - more might actually be less?

Is it as simple as quality vs quantity? Platforms vs. payloads? Size vs nimbleness? Yes and no.

How do we boil that down? For me, I go back to my other calling; economics.

Economics is the perfect meeting place between the hard and soft sciences - the STEM and the philosopher. Yes, self-serving observation, but it is my blog, so roll with me a bit.

I will make an assumption - you all know what the Laffer Curve it. If not, read up and come back.

If you are looking for my takeaway visual for most of what Jerry is looking for and trying to explain - here you go. Let's call it the Salamander Curve. Ahem ... OK, the Salamander-Hendrix Curve ... ehhhh, alright then; Hendrix-Salamander Curve, whatever ...

Executive Summary: for every national security military requirement (X), there is a place where the maximum benefit is gained between cost, complexity, and utility. The challenge is to find that maximum benefit. On either side of that point, you are operating at a suboptimal level; either you are spending too much on too much complexity and producing a diminishing level of capability to the nation, or you are spending too little on obsolete or sub-optimal platforms to achieve what is required. Depending on where you are, you can spend more on more complex systems and personnel and gain additional national security benefit, or you can spend more and get less.

Jerry put it, perhaps, a bit more eloquently.

It is unwise to accept the false premise that we can only arrive at a larger force by spending more on the same types of platforms that we are already building. A conservative approach to the future must find the right balance between high-priced silver bullets that can only be purchased in small numbers and low technology assets that can be purchased in large quantities at low costs. ... The turning point on defense will occur when we recognize that spending less money does not have to equate to a smaller force. Wise leaders have a credible alternative in defense-force structure and should pursue it.

Maritime Strategy Monday: Influence?

As I am entering a period of limited time to blog (about a week and a half at first guess - one of those short notice things - I'll blog some, but not more than one or two short posts a day max) - this will wind up being a bit shorter than I wanted, but here we go.

---

When an organization finds itself at a pivot point in crisis, it naturally looks to its leadership for direction and a viable plan forward. The Navy is at such a point, and has been for the last two years.

A problem we have, however, is that we are on the tail end of a lost decade of false hope and forgotten promises where those in the Navy now have little faith in their leadership's ability to honestly build a Fleet, discuss its challenges, and direct a course towards a successful future. Much of that has to do with the fact to a large measure, our senior leaders have taken the Soviet model of a unified message. Essential in wartime, but in peace a sure recipe for stilted group think.

If you look at the complete cock-up that is DDG-1000, the rest of the Tiffany Navy as represented by the schizophrenic LCS Corvette, the Titanium-gilt LPD-17, the too-heavy-to-go-anywhere ACS, the "no slack because all we have is light attack" FASKE-18A-G, rolled around "1/3 good, 2/3 babble by committee" updated Maritime Strategy - looking to our senior leadership for clear direction and guidance, with a few exceptions, is about as helpful as dropping to your knees in the Temple of Jupiter and praying for the king of the gods to deliver you from the harpies that haunt your life.

An organization in need of ideas will not accept a vacuum. Into the gap will come more more junior officers, Sailors, industry, and concerned citizens with ideas to try to find a way out of the hole we find ourselves in. CDR Henry J. Hendrix Jr is one of those officers. You don't have to agree with all his ideas, I don't, but you owe it to yourself and the Navy you love to read them and think about them.

It is the ideas and proposals of smart, thinking, and thoughtful officers like CDR Hendrix that the Navy should be welcoming and examining - regardless of what discomfort they cause. Jerry comes from a line that traces its lineage to Admiral Sims. It is never an easy thing to put your ideas out there with your name attached to it - to accept the slings and arrows that come with it.

With that dose of love thrown Jerry's way and to take up the assignment from last WED - on with the show.

As a reminder, in this month's Proceeding, CDR Henry J. Hendrix Jr, has an article titled Buy Ford not Ferrari - that is what we are going to discuss today.

Let's take that thing apart and spread the bits on the table and talk about what we have here. Not a full fisking, I don't have the time (feel free to hit areas I don't in comments) - but let me comment on those areas that jumped out to me.

Like I said earlier - I don't agree with all the author puts out there, but I could be all wrong and he could be all right. Not the point - the point is that he has some solid ideas worth looking at. With our maritime future challenged going forward with very real fiscal terrain issues, his ideas need to be taken in and chewed on.

In many ways, that is the great underlying strength the article - it offers options that are realistic given the limited amount of money we have to put hulls in the water and get ships underway. The time of the PPT program has past. That wiggle room is gone. It is time to put up or shut up.

The problems that will have the most impact on the Navy's future force structure are large and can be categorized in two groups. The first is the growing expense of building new ships. The costs involved in research, development, and production of destroyers, cruisers, and carriers, each of which fields new, leading-edge technologies, have placed the price of the future force out of reach, even with four percent of the gross domestic product funding the Department of Defense.

Second is the growing mismatch between the Navy's strategic vision and its acquisition plan.

Correct. A Fleet should meet the Strategy. As we have outlined here - hope, wish, and desire have prevented that up to now.

At a conservative estimated price tag of $30 billion to construct and a daily operating cost in excess of a million dollars, carrier strike groups are quickly becoming prohibitively expensive to both build and deploy. When these characteristics are considered alongside rising threats and increasingly challenging operational environments, even more questions arise.

If this idea holds for 10-11, it holds for 9 - but I think I know what he means. This is one of the weaker parts of the article. It does not match with the later CVN numbers he proposes, but from a cost-mitigation perspective it holds. CVN, for all their issues, are still the only global sustained strike capability we have. I don't think his CVN critique is fleshed out well and may be worth a dedicated article - but let's move on.

Talking about SS,

Torpedoes launched from these boats, and shore- and ship-based missiles can sink outright most of the world's surface combatants and would, at least, significantly degrade the mission effectiveness of American super-carriers.

Spot on with the threat. For ASCM, it isn't the Exocet, Silkworm, Harpoon and the other subsonic threats that bother me - it is the supersonic ASCM and ASBM that keep me up at night. They are not insurmountable, but need more attention than they are getting.

The venerable deep-strike A-6 Intruder and the long-range F-14 interceptor have vanished into the boneyard with their spots on the flight deck taken by the F/A-18 Hornet variants, which were intended to be replacements for the A-4 and A-7 short- and medium-range light attack aircraft. ... we find ourselves in a circular argument reminiscent of the late Admiral Hyman Rickover, that "I must defend my force, Sir, so that I can defend my force." The CSG is, remarkably, a construct that can operate effectively only in a permissive environment, or be committed to an anti-access environment only under the most extreme conditions when national interests compel leadership to risk what amounts to a significant percentage of the Navy's annual budget in a single engagement.

The loss of a dedicated carrier based tanking asset remains a critical failure by Navy Air. Just short sighted in the extreme. Buddy tanking is a joke - doesn't count. What follows is the pull quote.

What is needed is a Navy cheap enough to be built in large numbers while remaining sufficiently effective to defend American interests on the high seas. We need Fords, not Ferraris.

Hi-Lo; the only way to go. Can't argue with him in any way on that point, however ....

Step one is to abandon the idea of a Navy built around 11 or 12 carrier strike groups.

Only for the money reasons in my book - for the reasons stated before. A larger DoD question is how do you replace the national need for global strike as the B-3 now is pushed to the right? Give it up? Tough problem.

Next, in a word, ungh.

A key tenet of post-9/11 strategic thought is that extremist religious terrorism is avoidable. Societies with infrastructural resources such as electricity, clean water, public education, and some modicum of medical care do not generally incubate extremist groups in their midst. Naval forces that have basic abilities to police the sea lines of communication while also seizing port call opportunities to build the basic communal building blocks of productive life ought to be an important component of the future Navy.

I am sorry my friend - this is just plain wrong and debunked. Read here, here, and here to start - but I cannot let that comment stand. The 911 hijackers, OBL and almost all of Al Qaeda's mid-level and higher leaders and operators are well educated sons of the middle to upper classes. Lack of opportunity, frustration, and envy resulting from living in a culture that denies basic human desires compared to the best of western culture is more of the cause. The Navy cannot do anything to counter that.

All the things that the author offers that the Navy can do helps in a broader extent our national image - on the margins - but will do nothing to negate the source that breeds Islamist terrorism. A port visit by every USN ship to Karachi doing nothing but charity work will do nothing to change what is going on with the larger cultural and religious trends in Pakistan driving terrorism.

The next step on the Navy's path to a new future should be the creation of "Influence Squadrons" composed of an amphibious mother ship (an LPD-17 or a cheaper commercial ship with similar capabilities), a destroyer to provide air, surface, and subsurface defensive capabilties, a Littoral Combat Ship to extend a squadron's reach into the green-water environment and provide some mine warfare capabilities, a Joint High Speed Vessel to increase lift, a Coastal Patrol ship to operate close in, and an M80 Stiletto to provide speed and versatility.

Sounds like a tailored Task Force, but the use of the phrase "Influence Squadron" (INFRON) is very problematic as its very name creates a significant STRATCOM problems.

Most of the leaders of the nations we would like to influence will have nothing to do with any USA force that publicly advertises that it is there to influence them. Influence is a loaded word that opens you up to charges of paternalistic imperialism. If that is what you are after, fine, just don't advertise it.

On balance though, the substance and mission of the "INFRON" as presented and constructed,

The hypothetical Influence Squadron would, in part, be composed of (clockwise from top left): an amphibious mother ship like the USS San Antonio (LPD-17); a guided-missile destroyer like the USS The Sullivans; a Littoral Combat ship like the USS Freedom (LCS-1); an M80 Stiletto; and a joint high-speed vessel like the USS Swift (HSV-2).

... is interesting and deserves to be looked at from a budgetary and sustainability standpoint - but it needs a new name out of the box.

These forces, operating every day around the world, would represent the preponderance of visible U.S. naval power. Their understated capabilities would epitomize America's peaceful, non-aggressive intent, and would carry out the new maritime strategy's stated purpose of providing positive influence forward. However, the Influence Squadron, carrying credible firepower across a broad area of operations, could also serve to either dissuade or destroy pirate networks that might seek to prey upon increasingly vulnerable commercial sea lines of communication.

Creating 16 of these squadrons, ten in the Pacific, six in the Atlantic, would allow the Navy to forward deploy six to eight squadrons at any given time, expanding American influence around the world. Pacific-based squadrons would routinely deploy to the east coast of Africa, the Persian Gulf, the waters off Malaysia to include the Strait of Malacca, the archipelagic waters of Indonesia, the waters in and around the Philippines, and the regional waters near Japan and Korea.

Atlantic-based squadrons would visit the Caribbean, South America, the north and western coasts of Africa as well as pushing up into the Black Sea to visit Georgia, the Ukraine and other partners in the region. Sometimes, however, Influence Squadrons, no matter how well they are placed, will not have the necessary concentration of capabilities to meet the emergent challenges. It would be at this point that the next force along the scale of naval response would be dispatched.

Well, that looks a lot like a modern day version of colonial fleets - which have a long and successful history of doing just what is proposed for the INFRON. All that being said though, I go back to the author's critique of the vulnerability of the CVN - and INFRON's are exceptionally vulnerable. Vulnerability isn't a deal killer for me, everything is vulnerable if you have a smart guy under the Red Hat, it is what you do to mitigate it that is important.

After sending spit-balls teacher's way for a while, here is where I warm up to some of the other parts of the article.

If it is accepted that the aircraft carrier, with its aviation strike packages, represents the sledgehammer of America's arsenal, then the ESG, with its Tomahawk-firing cruisers and destroyers, as well as its scalable squad-to-battalion Marine force, represent the wrenches, screwdrivers, and pliers within the nation's war on terrorism toolbox. When the introduction of the MV-22 Osprey and the short take-off/vertical landing (STOVL) Joint Strike Fighter is factored into the strategic equation, the ESG represents a force that is ideally structured to counter terrorist actions anywhere from oceanic blue water to ground operations 150-200 miles inland. The flexibility of this unit makes it the ideal candidate to serve as a critical response force, capable of dealing with threats short of those large enough to justify a surge force deployment.

Merge some of the INFRON concepts with an expanded and scalable ESG concept, and there you have something I can very easily embrace.

Instead, the aircraft carriers (nine or ten for the sake of this discussion) and their support ships and airwings will remain in home waters, exercising as required to maintain six CSGs in a high state of combat readiness. The assumption underlying this force is that one carrier will be involved in reactor upkeep, one will be coming home from either a regional deployment or a major international exercise, and another will be on her way out. This leaves roughly six carriers in standby, ready to surge at a moment's notice. Where they surge from is a critical question. A smaller carrier force needs to be redistributed to get the most out of a decreased number of ships.

Most of America's strategic interests in the decades to come will be in the Asian Pacific region, and that is where the majority of the nation's aircraft carriers should be as well. Of the force of nine or ten carrier strike groups, six should be home ported in the Pacific; two in Bremerton, two in San Diego, one in Japan, and one in another forward base to be determined. The remaining east coast carriers should be strategically dispersed between Norfolk and Mayport. This distribution scheme will both help ensure the survivability of the force against surprise attacks, and cut the transit time to crises around the globe. The bottom line is that the United States should always have six carrier strike groups ready to surge to a point of conflict within 15 to 30 days.

Here we go. Solid, solid - and you know he had me at "...carriers should be strategically dispersed...," but wait - it gets even better from a Salamander perspective.

Another critical component of the surge force will be the Expeditionary Strike Groups and their light amphibious carriers. Long considered to be the central core of the amphibious force, these highly capable aircraft carriers can serve in new roles within surge operations. Assuming one is in dry-dock for maintenance, a force of ten LHAs can provide nine small flattops for surge operations. Five of them will go to sea with their embarked Marine Expeditionary Units serving as their primary strike assets (again, the assumption would be that two of the MEUs would either be deploying or returning from deployment at any given time) while the remaining available LHAs deploy with each of their decks and hangars populated by two squadrons of STOVL Joint Strike Fighters.

Return of the CVS/CVL? Yes, yes .... solutions, yes.

Now, you 1120's get your inhalers ready,

Another area of focus for the future force should be in undersea warfare. Perhaps no place poses a greater threat to the current U.S. force structure or suggests the greatest potential for improvement in a future Navy than the underwater environment and the vessels that populate it. The first major proposed shift is the inclusion of diesel-powered submarines that incorporate air-independent propulsion (AIP) technologies. These submarines can be purchased for a fraction of the cost of a nuclear-powered fast-attack submarine such as those of the Virginia class.

Diesel/AIP boats are very quiet, and can be equipped with effective torpedoes, antisurface missiles, and even antiair missiles. These relatively inexpensive yet highly capable subs should replace the Virginia-class boats in the shallow-water environment alongside the new Influence Squadron surface force, allowing the Virginias to concentrate on their antisubmarine warfare mission in the blue-water environment. The one significant drawback of the non-nuclear design is shorter patrol intervals because of limited fuel supply. But this can be offset by forward-basing them near their patrol areas. A number of nations may welcome permanent basing of diesel/AIP submarines but have rejected nuclear-powered submarines in their ports for political reasons.

Ick. -1 point for Jerry. It is ASW not USW. Anti-X isn't bad, it is clear ... but I'll give you a pass. Let us not speak of it again. Besides that, major golf-clap - you know my 6/6 LANT/PAC split of SS/SSK dream.

Another proposed area of change is the permanent inclusion of guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) in the U.S. inventory. The advantages inherent in the deployment of these concentrated strike packages either in conjunction with a strike group, or by operating alone are only now being recognized. However, the U.S. Navy has made a mistake along the path to an SSGN force by tying the capability to a back-fit program for Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines. Future guided-missile submarines should be built new as adaptations of the Virginia class, perhaps offsetting the decreased buy of Virginias as the diesel/AIP boats come online.

More yummy stuff. This will be essential to bridge the initial deep strike gap that you will have with fewer CVN and tankers to bring the Light-Attack-Little-Legs carrier aircraft deeper .... though as all TLAM guys know - all the VLS cells in Christendom cannot match the sustained combat power of a gaggle of CVN off an enemy's shore ... SSGNs are good - even if they are not perfect. I'll never see a flight deck of new production F-14D and A-6G - so I will take what I can get.

More goodness follows,

Rampant "next-war-itis" needs to stop, and the Navy needs to commit itself to fighting the very real, and very relevant conflict of today. To be sure, the Navy will need to retain its current, high-end capabilities in such numbers and at such readiness as to dissuade future competitors from entering into conflict with the United States. The data suggest that if the Navy were to pursue a future fleet as described here, with both high- and low-end capabilities in an appropriate ratio, it could have 320 hulls in the water within 12 years for three quarters of the acquisition budget it intends to spend. This represents a net savings of almost five billion dollars a year. Again, I say the Navy needs to buy Fords, not Ferraris.

Bring back Hi-Lo? Yes, Great Caesar's Ghost, Yes!

So, there we go. That reflects some of my thoughts, how 'bout yours? Remember, you don't have to like all or agree with all. CDR Hendrix has a thick skin and the confidence in his informed decisions. Remember, creative friction without conflict.

As a side-bar, let me approach again a topic I brought up at the top of this post. We need more idea and solution pieces like the author's out there to discuss. Closed door processes and blind obedience to personal, not professional, loyalty is what got the Navy to the point it is at now. Aggressive discouragement of thought and publication needs to stop.

CDR Hendrix is the exception - he puts himself out there, not the rule. I tip my hat to him and the chain of command that supports him.

I get email all the time from Active Duty and civilian personnel who state, "I would like to bring this up, but .... " and what follows the "but" is a common story of fear of retribution, or a command/community policy that anything published must be in full alignment with official policy or community diktat.

That is sad, and in spite of Admiral Stavridis' plea, it is a reality in our Navy more often than not. I wish more of our leadership shared Admiral Stavridis' understanding of the critical importance of debate,

The process of reading and writing is important, he said, because the nation faces an “innovative” enemy like the Sept. 11, 2001, attackers and South American smugglers who transport drugs at sea in semisubmersible vessels.

“The most important reason is that the people who want to do harm to this country are doing so,” he said. “They are thinkers.”

Either through published works or through weblogs, the goal is an exchange of ideas, knowledge and information — such as on the participator-driven Wikipedia, he said.

“No one of us is as smart as all of us together,” he said. “

- but they do not - and they let their subordinates know they do not.

We should exchange ideas, and we should take those ideas apart into their constituent parts; feel them, smell them, hold them up to the light. Embrace those that we think fit and are workable, discard the perfect pipe dream, and argue publicly about what may or may not be a good idea. Whatever we do though, we need to publicly talk. More creative frictions without conflict - less Borg-like group think.

Well outside the demands of "Shut Up" we need to talk. We don't do it enough.

I mean absolutely no disrespect with the following, but it tells a story: everyone has their reasons and I do not walk in his Corframs. However, in a time when we are going to violate law on CVN numbers, we have a limited-duty non-multimission Corvette called LCS, a Fleet rotting pierside due to years of bad maintenance and oversight - we have a non-traditional enemy growing at sea and new conventional powers on the rise (just to mention a few challenges) - what do we have the Chief of Naval Operations focused on and discussing with the Fleet?

While visiting the Annapolis High School Navy Junior ROTC program yesterday, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead said his top long-term priority is increasing diversity in the officer corps.

In what is believed to be the first-ever visit by a CNO to a high school JROTC program, Roughead told the roughly 90 cadets that the ethnic diversity of the officer corps must parallel the makeup of the fleet.

"If you looked at the Navy, you would say it kind of looked like America - it has the right mix of whites and African Americans and Asians," Roughead said.

But take a closer look at the officer corps, he said, and "you would see the complexion ... change to largely white male."

He isn't just saying that to the kids - I have stood 10 feet from the CNO as he told a room full of Sailors and Marines the same thing. Take that and do with it what you will. I have to work today, I have a very long two-week thingy coming up, and it is too early to drink.

Last note - CDR Hendrix has a book out - give it a look-see - if you noticed, his article is Bu11sh1tBingo free (more or less ;) ) - I would bet you a round at Trader Johns pre-Tailhook his book is even better.

Hendrix's View from an Island Nation

Regular readers know the importance of the United States being the world’s premier sea power, but that is inside the lifelines of our corner of the national conversation. 

For a whole host of reasons we have discussed here over the years and on Midrats – in spite of our nation surrounded by the fruits of the open seas – the larger American public does not see it. We suffer, in essence, from our success.

The time when the free flow of goods across the globe was not a given has slipped well out of living memory. Except for older cohort GenX and older, no one even remembers the regional threat the Soviet Red Banner Fleet aspired to be right before the empire she served collapsed and disaggregated.

Not just the United States, but the developed and developing nations throughout the globe who benefit from the post-WWII maritime environment suffer from seablindness. There are other powers - resentful, bitter, and grasping – who even though they benefit from the global agreement – wish to break it down and create something new. Not so much that they want something better – they just don’t like a system they had no role in creating – one defined by the assumed ever-presence of the United States Navy and her friends.

As fish are not aware of the water they swim in, so the global economy does not fully understand the world it exists in … and the fact that it is under threat of disappearing. 

Our friend Jerry Hendrix has been an integral and valuable part of the public conversation for well over two decades – longer inside the lifelines of the US military. 

This month he has an exceptional article over at The Atlantic titled, “America’s Future is at Sea” or in the more flashy online version, "The Age of American Naval Dominance is Over" that you need to take time to read. He weaves together not just the history, but the economic, diplomatic, and civilizational threads that all connect to American seapower. 

What adds additional importance to his article is the venue. 

As I mentioned in the opener to this post, “we” know this story – or at least most of it. The problem is too many others do not. 

The Atlantic has a certain readership segment which includes many people of influence and proximity to the levers of power, or a degree or two separated from someone who does. The vast majority of its readers who are not soaked in the details involving the maritime domain.

These people need to understand the issues as much as readers here do. You really need to read it in full, but here are a few pull quotes I’d like to share. He starts out strong;

Very few Americans—or, for that matter, very few people on the planet—can remember a time when freedom of the seas was in question. But for most of human history, there was no such guarantee. Pirates, predatory states, and the fleets of great powers did as they pleased. The current reality, which dates only to the end of World War II, makes possible the commercial shipping that handles more than 80 percent of all global trade by volume—oil and natural gas, grain and raw ores, manufactured goods of every kind. Because freedom of the seas, in our lifetime, has seemed like a default condition, it is easy to think of it—if we think of it at all—as akin to Earth’s rotation or the force of gravity: as just the way things are, rather than as a man-made construct that needs to be maintained and enforced.

But what if the safe transit of ships could no longer be assumed? What if the oceans were no longer free?

Nothing is guaranteed ... or as Papa Salamander would often tell me, "No one owes you a living."

Imagine, though, a more permanent breakdown. A humiliated Russia could declare a large portion of the Arctic Ocean to be its own territorial waters, twisting the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to support its claim. Russia would then allow its allies access to this route while denying it to those who dared to oppose its wishes. Neither the U.S. Navy, which has not built an Arctic-rated surface warship since the 1950s, nor any other NATO nation is currently equipped to resist such a gambit.

Or maybe the first to move would be Xi Jinping, shoring up his domestic standing by attempting to seize Taiwan and using China’s anti-ship ballistic missiles and other weapons to keep Western navies at bay. An emboldened China might then seek to cement its claim over large portions of the East China Sea and the entirety of the South China Sea as territorial waters. It could impose large tariffs and transfer fees on the bulk carriers that transit the region. Local officials might demand bribes to speed their passage.

"Gentlemen's agreements" only work if both parties act as gentlemen and keep their word. What happens when one party decides not to be? What is the enforcement mechanism ... or is there one at all?

If oceanic trade declines, markets would turn inward, perhaps setting off a second Great Depression. Nations would be reduced to living off their own natural resources, or those they could buy—or take—from their immediate neighbors. The world’s oceans, for 70 years assumed to be a global commons, would become a no-man’s-land. This is the state of affairs that, without a moment’s thought, we have invited.

This is not alarmism. A discordant and ill-timed blending of demography, debt, economics, and politics are driving the global system of crisis - what we warned of starting 13-yrs ago as "The Terrible 20s."

—a “free sea”—first enunciated by the Dutch philosopher Hugo Grotius in 1609. The United States and Great Britain, the two traditional proponents of a free sea, had emerged not only triumphant but also in a position of overwhelming naval dominance. Their navies were together larger than all of the other navies of the world combined. A free sea was no longer an idea. It was now a reality.

In this secure environment, trade flourished. The globalizing economy, which allowed easier and cheaper access to food, energy, labor, and commodities of every kind, grew from nearly $8 trillion in 1940 to more than $100 trillion 75 years later, adjusted for inflation. With prosperity, other improvements followed. During roughly this same period, from the war to the present, the share of the world’s population in extreme poverty, getting by on less than $1.90 a day, dropped from more than 60 percent to about 10 percent. Global literacy doubled, to more than 85 percent. Global life expectancy in 1950 was 46 years. By 2019, it had risen to 73 years. 

What happens if global trade retrogrades to a prior, less safe, less predictable (hurting insurance carriers ability to properly set rates) and vibrant time? Well, you look at the positive effects of growth in the past to see an inverse of what a return to the multipolar ocean might bring the future. That is what Jerry just did. Re-read the above and ponder even a fraction of that headwind;

It is important as we look at today's challenge to accept that we are not a passive victim of a changing world. No. We are here mostly as a result of our own actions. Decline is a choice.

As a side note, if you are not already thinking of another article in The Atlantic from 16 year's ago, Robert D. Kaplan's "America's Elegant Decline," go ahead and read it now.

It is never to a nation’s advantage to depend on others for crucial links in its supply chain. But that is where we are. In 1977, American shipbuilders produced more than 1 million gross tons of merchant ships. By 2005, that number had fallen to 300,000.

Today, most commercial ships built in the United States are constructed for government customers such as the Maritime Administration or for private entities that are required to ship their goods between U.S. ports in U.S.-flagged vessels, under the provisions of the 1920 Jones Act.

The U.S. Navy, too, has been shrinking. After the Second World War, the Navy scrapped many of its ships and sent many more into a ready-reserve “mothball” fleet. For the next two decades, the active naval fleet hovered at about 1,000 ships. But beginning in 1969, the total began to fall. By 1971, the fleet had been reduced to 750 ships. Ten years later, it was down to 521. Reagan, who had campaigned in 1980 on a promise to rebuild the Navy to 600 ships, nearly did so under the able leadership of his secretary of the Navy, John Lehman. During Reagan’s eight years in office, the size of the Navy’s fleet climbed to just over 590 ships.

Then the Cold War ended. The administrations of Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton slashed troops, ships, aircraft, and shore-based infrastructure. During the Obama administration, the Navy’s battle force bottomed out at 271 ships. Meanwhile, both China and Russia, in different ways, began to develop systems that would challenge the U.S.-led regime of global free trade on the high seas. 

Read it all.

If this isn’t enough Hendrix, and there is never enough, Jerry will join us this upcoming Sunday for Midrats. Don’t miss it!

Mini Hospital Ships and Influence Squadrons

The end of July brought us this little nugget that I have not pulled out of draft yet;

Republican senators want to include $2.2 billion for Navy shipbuilding in the latest round of relief funds meant to combat the coronavirus pandemic.

According to the text of the bill, lawmakers would allot $1.45 billion of that money so the service could buy four “expeditionary medical ships.”

The proposed funds for medical vessels come after the Navy dispatched its two hospital ships, USNS Mercy (T-AH-19) and USNS Comfort (T-AH-20), earlier this year to aid in pandemic relief efforts. Austal USA, which builds the Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) vessels in Mobile, Ala., has evaluated the potential to use the EPF hull for missions like hospital ships.

Here and over on Midrats we've asked for more hospital ship and for more "unsexy but important."

From both a manning and utility point of view - there is a whole lot of potential for presence, public relations, and info ops with these vessels inline with Jerry Hendrix's "Influence Squadrons" concept from the previous decade.

It is as correct now as it was then. Many of the naysayers when it comes to hospital ships touch on the fact our existing hospital ships are hard to man, have obsolete engineering plants, etc, etc.

These are smaller, more flexible, easier to ... well ... as VADM Merz said more professionally;

“The problem with those [hospital] ships is, there’s only two of them, and they’re big, and we’re moving to a more distributed maritime operations construct,” Merz explained at the April 2018 hearing. “There’s no lack of commitment [to this medical capability]; matter of fact, we’re taking a broader look at the capabilities on whether or not they are aligned with the way we plan to fight our future battles. So you’re going to see that requirement surface probably this year, and then we’ll start the process on how we’re going to fill that requirement.”

I think we should at least experiment with a variation of Jerry Hendrix's influence squadrons with these at the core.

Episode 650: Keeping America's Dominance at Sea with Jerry Hendrix

Except for those over a 85, no one alive has ever existed at a time when the US Navy was not the premier naval power - and no one alive at all has known a world where the US Navy was not the premier naval power in the Pacific.

Though on paper it could be challenged in the first third of the 20th Century by the Royal Navy, and was challenged in a very real way by the Imperial Japanese Navy in the Pacific in the early mid-century, after the 1930s no industrial power could hope to compete with the United States in production and warships ready to fight at sea in a major conflict.

During the Cold War, there were a couple of decades where the Soviet Union could put a fleet to sea to give the US Navy regional concern, but never really on an ocean wide scale.

As we approach the end of the first quarter of the 21st Century, a rising power is presenting a challenge in the Pacific the US Navy, and its political leaders, seem to have trouble accepting.

The People's Republic of China is clear that it wants the global power the USA presently has - including on the high seas. 

Returning to Midrats Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern to discuss his recent article in The Atlantic, "The Age of American Naval Dominance is Over" is Jerry Hendrix, PhD.

Jerry is a retired USN Captain, author, and a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, in Indianapolis. His most recent book is To Provide and Maintain a Navy (2020).

Join us live if you can, but it not, you can get the show later by subscribing to the podcast. If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here. You can find us on almost all your most popular podcast aggregators as well.

Jerry, in all your spare time ....

We have a little follow -up to my post at USNIBlog earlier this month.

The director of the Navy’s historical command resigned Monday, in the wake of an inspector general report that found his command struggling with decaying records and fraying ties to historians, the Navy’s top spokesman said. Jay DeLoach, a retired rear admiral, had led the Naval History and Heritage Command, which is based at Washington Navy Yard, since 2008. In that job, he had overseen 112 employees who preserve and archive the Navy’s historical collections, a voluminous collection of records, artifacts, art and photographs, as well as 12 Navy museums. DeLoach arrived as an iconoclast — challenging what he saw as a hidebound, “introverted” center to better serve the needs of the fleet. He called for “forward-looking historians.” ... Capt. Jerry Hendrix, the director of the Navy Secretary’s historical advisory panel, has been named the command’s interim director,

.... yes, that would be "our" Captain Hendrix - frequent guest on Midrats.

Hat tip Lee.

"Five Ocean Navy Strategy" with Rep. Jim Banks (R-IN) & Dr. Jerry Hendrix - on Midrats

During the 2016 election, then candidate Donald Trump ran on building a 350 ship Navy. That number soon moved up to 355.

Two years after his inauguration, the path to get there is hard to see.

There is a movement of navalists who are not just looking for the path to 355, but looking to the challenge of China at the end of the next decade, want our Navy to move north of 400 ships.

To that end, in February a resolution was introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Jim Banks (R-IN) titled, “Five Ocean Navy Strategy.”

Congressman Banks will join us Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern along with Dr. Jerry Hendrix, CAPT, USN, (Ret) to discuss the Resolution and the need behind it.

Join us live if you can, but if you miss the show you can always listen to the archive at Spreaker. 

If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here.