The LCS Full Court Press is on, I guess ...

This has been a rather humorous couple of weeks in the seemingly endless squabble over the pierside tinkertoy that is LCS and its erector set mission modules.

LCS fussbuckets like your humble blogg'r tend to be a suspicious lot - and it looks a bit "off" to see so much LCS apologia out in such a short time - so let's dig around the good, the bad, the curious, and frankly the ugly that has bubbled up as of late.

Perhaps this from BusinessWeek on 04 June served as a catalyst for the LCS supporters;

Congress will take a close look at the Pentagon’s $34 billion Littoral Combat Ship program and may consider restrictions on the Navy’s $2 billion request to buy four vessels in fiscal 2014, Representative Randy Forbes said.

Forbes, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee’s seapower panel, said today that any decisions would await the final report from an LCS review by the Government Accountability Office. A draft of the GAO study said Congress should consider slowing the program’s funding because the Navy is buying ships faster than it can test their design and performance.

“I’m not going to prejudge” the report, Forbes, a Virginia Republican, told reporters. “I’ll wait until we see it, but we are going to do some intensive oversight on this program, which will include hearings.”

There you go. Loss of money tends to focus the mind. So, what do you say, go back to the last few days of May? Sure.

Kris Osborne at DoD Buzz strikes a very 2005 press release sounding article;

The three packages, engineered with a modular, plug-and-play ability to integrate on both the Independence and the Freedom variants are designed for mine counter-measures, anti-submarine warfare and surface warfare, said Capt. John Ailes, LCS Mission Modules program manager.

They consist of groups of weapons, sensors, UAS, mine-detecting technologies, aircraft, electronics and unmanned watercraft, among other things, designed to work in tandem on specific threats and issues, Ailes explained.

The Navy’s two-variant approach to the LCS development effort, which ultimately aims to build and deploy at least 55 ships, has come under scrutiny and received criticism for the wisdom of its two-variant approach, which critics have said will make sustainment more challenging.

The LCS program has also faced scrutiny for rising costs, and questions inside and outside the Navy about the fleet’s survivability and ability to meet mission requirements.

I guess if I have to repeat the same points over and over with for the better part of a decade - the other side can too. Oh, as one of my readers emailed me a few days ago, I would be remiss if I did not share this;

While recognizing that there is a business case to move toward greater commonality among the variants, particularly when it comes to sustainment and logistics, Ailes emphasized that the much-criticized two-variant approach resulted in several positive developments.

“We got spectacularly low cost and there is strength in diversity. Also, if you have an enemy that is trying to combat you, you give him a harder problem if you bring capabilities that are different. That is more difficult than going up against a single, well-understood capability,” he added.

Yes, I guess diversity has a variety of uses. Curious though - I wonder if Sailors want to go to war with something that is a "harder problem" to fight - or go to war in a ship that has weapons systems that have a "well-understood capability?"

A day later, Chris Cavas weighs in, sounding like something between a weary father or observational uncle - telling the story of the changes the follow on designs are going through;

Like a child entering adolescence, the Navy’s littoral combat ship program has entered an era in which some elements are trying to emulate fully mature combat systems, some are getting ready to try and others have much further to go.

The well-publicized cost growth of the program is nominally under control. “Ship production is stable, costs are going down, the contracts are a fixed price,” Sean Stackley, the Navy’s top acquisition official, told Congress on May 8. “There’s all goodness there.”

I was even feeling a bit more positive until ...

A year ago, the service had planned to test the Griffin, a small missile developed for Special Operations Command, on Freedom. But the missile is considered too lightweight for the LCS, and it was not installed. Instead, data is being gathered from testing aboard the coastal patrol vessel Monsoon.

“We really want to do a competition and award for an SSM that has a little longer range than the Griffin,” Murdoch said. “Ideally, what I’d like to have is autonomy — an autonomous seeker that you don’t have to designate with a laser to guide the missile on target.

“That’s another area that’s budget-dependent,” Murdoch added. “We have money this year and next to do studies and get ready for [industry solicitations] in 2014.”

Barring funding complications, the Navy is hoping to field an SSM on the LCS in 2019.

Hope. 2019. Great ... over a decade of service and then perhaps something with a longer range than a 1-iron.

03 June has RADM Rowden, 
Director of Surface Warfare, joined the fun at MaritimeLink;

Though the acquisition strategy changed, the consistent intent has been that the Navy would take the knowledge gained in the build, test and operation of these first ships to inform program changes. In some cases, the learning curve in these ships has been steep, with many of the issues highlighted in defense industry reporting and in the blogosphere. However, I can state with confidence that we have already aggressively applied lessons learned to improve the ships in production, and we will continue to do so going forward.
...
While criticism of the LCS program remains, I wanted to take opportunity to show how the Navy remains committed to delivering and sustaining warships that are operationally ready, combat effective and cost efficient. As we gain momentum, we will take plenty of fixes and make the course corrections to ensure we are getting LCS forward, in numbers, to support our national maritime objectives. These ships provide much-needed capability, and as I indicated last week, I strongly believe that forward presence and numbers are important values in a naval force unto themselves."

That's great and all - I love aspirational goals too - but faster please. These thing are joining the Fleet and it will be years before any of them will be anywhere close to being more than weak-IOC operationally ready, combat effective against any comparable adversary's ship or submarine - and when the whole program's cost structure is taken in to account vs. utility to Combatant Commanders, well, the cost efficient ship sailed a long time ago.

Keeping the drumbeat going, Robert D. Holzer at BreakingDefense gives it a swing on 07 June;

The chorus of criticism facing the first ships of the Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class calls for a little historical context to be brought to this debate. Almost all new ship classes experienced considerable “birthing pains in their early days.

This is not new. Indeed, the first six frigates acquired by the American Navy in 1797 all came in late and over budget.

Oh, no he didn't! Yes he did. Just one little reply; when they went to sea, they could more than hold their own against any other frigate at sea ... LCS ... well, they speak for themselves. If the first Six Frigates went to sea with nothing but swivel guns, then you may have a point, Shipmate.

Anyway - he reviews the other ship class challenges, argued and debunked with varying degrees of success over the years. Rinse and repeat, again, is fine - I do it all the time.

Making smoke, on the same day - SECNAV makes a nice show of it;

Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced June 6 the next three joint high speed vessels (JHSV) will be named USNS Yuma, USNS Bismarck and USNS Burlington, and two littoral combat ships (LCS) will be named USS Billings and USS Tulsa.

I guess the 7th was "the day" to put stuff out, because over at AviationWeek, Michael Fabey came out to play with one of the most tiresome and patronizing quotes of the entire LCS campaign;

“Do not compare LCS to current platforms. It cannot be manned, trained, equipped, or maintained or tactically employed in the same way. NO OLD THINK.”

- -- 2008 U.S. Navy LCS Cardinal Rules (Emphasis in original)

Snort - I guess he needs to talk to a few of the authors above then.

Just a little more time on the 2008 quote; the last five years have shown that LCS is trending towards traditional manning numbers, training programs, legacy equipment (if they can make it fit), the maintenance plans need adjusting, and of course - we can't decide if it can do the tactical missions that we have been doing for the last century - and shocking - still need to do. Come on Michael - you asked for that.

And ... where did this come from?

The biggest impediment to the potential success of the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) may very well be some of the top-level brass who continue to view the ship through the “old-think” prism used to scrutinize traditional Navy warships.
...
The Navy needs to rid the service of the “old think.” The admirals and surface warfare officers would be a good place to start.

OK, I'm game. List all the "admirals and surface warfare officers" who have used "old think" to make LCS what it is today. Who are these brave souls that write and speak against LCS?

Seriously, show me this gauntlet of brass that has prevented LCS from demonstrating its glory.

Finally, something came out yesterday that simply, in a word, made me sigh. Our friend and hail fellow well met, Jim Holmes at TheDiplomat makes a try to find a new tactical angle on LCS. I'm generally here with him at the start,

Over at The National Interest last month, the Naval Diplomat reviewed the debate over the U.S. Navy's new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). My goal was less to rehash the ship's design than to puzzle out why the LCS debate — a debate, after all, over a mere hunk of machinery — is not just fiercely contested on the merits but often venomous.
...
With no common lexicon for shaping tactics, doctrine, and operations, the LCS debate quickly degenerates into claims and counter-claims about whether newfangled bits of hardware will perform as advertised. It takes on the "uh-uh!" and "uh-huh!" quality familiar to all ex-schoolboys.

Yet such craft are joining the fleet. Fitting them into U.S. maritime strategy is imperative. ... There's little new under the sun.

Remember when I threw in the towel about three years ago on LCS - that the anti-LCS cadre lost the intellectual battle, so we might as well try to make the best of it?

Well - Jim is searching.

In passing I portrayed the LCS as a "skirmisher" for U.S. Navy fleets operating off enemy coastlines. It acts as an advance guard for the main force, venturing into coastal waters to clear mines, detect and target submarines, and pummel speedboats and other small craft fielded by the likes of Iran and China. Once the littoral combatants do their work, the battle fleet can approach enemy shores to project power ashore, evacuate noncombatants, or what have you.

He fleshes out his concept - give it a good read, but I'm not convinced. It cannot do ASW with any kind of air threat, even if the ASW module works as designed. It can't defend itself. ASW is slow, so is MIW. Maritime skirmishers need to be small and agile - in the ASUW role or support of special operations. LCS isn't really that small, though it is agile. A skirmisher also needs to be able to inflict damage in the surface role - LCS just doesn't have any "there" there. It is fast with a shallow draft - but it has the profile of a WWII destroyer and more. It isn't going to sneak up on anyone, even at night.

Nice try Jim, and you have some good points - but I don't think we've bridged the gap.

So, there you go - a little review of a strange and, ahem, diverse little cluster of the LCS Joy Luck Club - covering the spectrum from "The Best Thing Since Bacon" to "Let's Try to Make it not Suck Quite as Hard" side of that aisle.

What reason for all this now? Is LCS moving towards PLAN SALAMANDER of 36 that I abandoned years ago out of despair? If the substance of the lastest pro-LCS argument is any indication, LCS is in significnt danger. Here is why.

None, and I mean zip-zero-nada, of the latest articles have anything new. Even Jim's skirmisher idea is just a reworking of the streetfighter concept. If there is nothing new to say but that there are additional delays, we need to wait another half decade for a corvette to have an ASCM, and that once we have a half dozen ships displacing water, then we'll be close to a design we can use - then I'm sorry; you're doing it wrong.

Speaking from my seat in from the LCS Eeyore Caucus - I say; "Meh; let's just do the best we can and start design work on two new classes - one between PC and LCS - and one between LCS and DDG-51 Flt-IIA."

One final note; this by far is the most interesting pro-LCS comment I have read in awhile. It's from Jim's article. In its own way - I think it fits as a way to close this up.

MAJOR LOWEN GIL MARQUEZ, PHILIPPINE ARMY
June 10, 2013 at 3:46 pm

The US LCS are one of the potent weapons in offense and defense posture that can e use to infuse to AirSea attle doctrine in order to address the small speed boat, liferaft that wil be used by China or Iran against any United Nation free World Forces, it is very minimal and cheap when it comes to the resources with strong, big possitive output when it is properly used in Blue Water Warfare, it will bring isastrous effect over the enemy bee hive doctrine, counter the hive with a fire and it will dissapear in the map of the earth…

ELEVENTY!

LCS: How Did We Get Here?

Time to put a little bit of the snark behind and address LCS from a forensic point of view.

As step one, I would like everyone to go over to the NWC site and download what is to this point, the summary of the LCS journey from Undersecretary of the Navy, Robert O. Work titled; The Littoral Combat Ship: How We Got Here, and Why.(NB: NWC has taken it off line as of 1/30. Reason here.)

My first thought on reading this was to go section by section in detail, but I don't think I will. I will get to a couple of pull quotes, but mostly I want to keep this very general.

Most of you know my long standing and fundamental disagreement with the direction we have gone with LCS - indeed the whole concept - and repeating it again will not change the fact we are where we are.

As a side note with regard to my loyal opposition to LCS, in some ways, I would seem to have been part of the natural constituency for LCS. My dislike of LCS has nothing to do with the view of many of the pro-large-ship detractors, as a matter of fact I've been a proponent of smaller ship since well before I went online banging the Riverine Drum in 2004. I am someone who agrees with the requirement for a balanced Fleet leavened with a healthy mix of sub-9,000 ton ships from Riverine to the larger EuroFrigates, but I remain in the position that LCS is not the answer to that requirement.  It is an answer, and one we will have to do the best with what we have, but not the answer we needed, at least not at that percentage of the Fleet. 

I reserve the right to be wrong, but part of my disappointment with LCS is not unlike that of a dancer who showed up for a Tango dance party but instead found himself listening to Beach Music.  Don't mistake my lack of enthusiasm as someone who wished he were bowling instead. I still want to dance, just this isn't, in my opinion, the right music.

Most important at this time is to try to make the best of it as we can, while being brutally honest with ourselves about its limitation so we don't risk national reputation and Sailors lives on a tide of happy talk.

Undersecretary Work has done everyone from all sides of the debate a great service with this report, as it is without question the most thorough, honest, and detailed forensic outline of how LCS came pierside. It is very much one-stop-shopping for anyone who would like to know the significant decision points in the process.

You need to make the effort to read the whole thing. If you only read pull quotes, or stop before page 35, then you are going to miss the larger meaning and greatest value.

Go to the link above, or read it here.

Littoral Combat Ship - How we Got Here and Why by Robert O. Work.

To see if I can draw you in to reading the whole thing;

Third, Admiral Clark believed LCS answered the loud calls for defense “transformation” then being made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In a speech given in January 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld said,

“Preparing for the future will require us to think differently and develop the kind of forces that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances.”

Moreover, in his view, thinking differently included a willingness to skirt or bend long-established rules when pursuing “transformational” systems. As he explained:

…we must transform not only our armed forces, but also the department that serves them by encouraging a culture of creativity and intelligent risk taking. We must promote a more entrepreneurial approach to developing military capabilities, one that encourages people, all people, to be proactive and not reactive, to behave somewhat less like bureaucrats and more like venture capitalists; one that does not wait for threats to emerge and be "validated," but rather anticipates them before they emerge and develops new capabilities that can dissuade and deter those nascent threats.

Based on these three considerations, CNO Clark confidently declared LCS his number one transformational program and budget priority, and requested authority for a new program start in the Navy’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 President’s Budget submission. Secretary Rumsfeld approved, including the request in the Defense Department’s FY 2003 President’s Budget submission, delivered to Congress in February 2002. By so doing, and consistent with his announced approach to defense transformation, the Secretary signaled he was not disturbed by the LCS’s lack of analytical pedigree.

I don't think one can hang this on Rumsfeld if that is part of this angle; I don't think it is, but it can be read as such. So, in a word; no. 

LCS was and is a product of senior leadership from Admirals Clark, Mullen, and especially Roughead. Without their full-throated advocacy and willing smoke screens, LCS would not have survived - for good or bad.

I enjoy this next bit as, for those who missed it, it catches perfectly the "we are smarter than everyone who came before ... all is new, and don't question by beautiful vision..." vibe that resonated throughout the Chain of Command at the time,

In response, the Navy admitted the LCS program represented “a departure from traditional analysis processes by conducting targeted analysis to support concurrent development of the capability documents, mission module definitions and integration requirements.” This targeted approach included a three-phase “tailored analysis of alternatives” that would “fill in analysis gaps that previous studies had not covered”—a clear reference to the conceptual work and studies conducted in the 1990s. Regardless of whether Congress fully agreed with this approach, by allowing a concept and development process that would follow rather than precede program start to continue, it implicitly endorsed Admiral Clark’s decision to pursue a small Littoral Combat Ship in a way distinctly different from normal programs.

So the PPT will say it, so it will be done. Sigh. That is the most important lessons of LCS. Next program we have to build a new warship - look at what they did with LCS and do the opposite.

Few things demonstrate this programmatic over-reach and Staff malpractice better than the manning concept for LCS. It is as if in someones head we had sea-going Rosies, Roombas, Woombas, and Replicators to go with AI watchstanders ... just because we said we wanted it;

Admiral Clark endorsed an initial “core crew” manning target (those who operated the LCS seaframe) of thirty to fifty crew members, based on his expectation that LCS would set new standards in automation.

Members of his staff pushed even harder, recommending a core crew in the range of fifteen to thirty officers and Sailors. In the end, Admiral Clark and his staff split the difference, agreeing to objective and threshold manning core crew targets of fifteen and fifty crew members, respectively. Importantly, however, they agreed that ship accommodations for the entire crew (core crew plus “mission package” crew) should not exceed seventy-five racks (i.e., installed bunks).105 They felt this aggressive target would be a forcing function both to push industry design teams towards the greatest use of automation and increase chances the Navy would minimize crew size and manpower overhead—and overall LCS lifecycle costs.

The emphasis placed on limiting the total number of racks—and therefore total crew size—was also partly influenced by the Navy’s desire to pursue a “multi-crewing, forward stationed” deployment model for LCS. By adopting a rotational crewing model along lines long practiced by the ballistic missile submarine force, Navy leaders hoped to achieve employment efficiencies of 75 percent (e.g., ships deployed for thirty-six months followed by a twelve months interdeployment maintenance and training cycle). While such high efficiencies would minimize LCS’s peacetime turn-around ratio, maximize the number of ships forward deployed and ready, and lead to “fewer transoceanic transits,” rotating very large core crews would create a substantial manpower overhead bill.106  Therefore, the leaders sought to keep the total crew size from exceeding seventy-five personnel.

Of course, with such a small crew, the supporting off-board logistics, maintenance, and training construct would be absolutely critical to LCS’s ultimate success. However, in 2003 there was no substantive discussion about how this construct might work. The officers were content to let LCS Flight 0 ships “investigate alternative …support concepts that…satisfy these requirements.”

Amazing. Shockingly gobsmackingly amazing. Those who said all those nasty thing to those of us who asked at the time if they were just pulling numbers out of their ..... hats - beers on you.

To keep the already longish post brief ... I will let you find your own nuggets and bring them in to comments.

When you get through reading it, see if it changes in one way or another how you think in 2013 of the program. Do we need all 55? Just 24, 36?

Work's report does a good job pointing out that, in a fashion, LCS is close to what was asked for in the beginning.  However, even if the ship can come out within half a standard deviation of how it was envisioned, it begs the question - was the vision flawed? Was the question itself flawed, and thus begot a flawed answer? Does it answer the initial question in a satisfactory manner while remaining mute to the follow-on question? When compared to similar answers to the "what next" question produced by other nations - most who have exceptionally different maritime requirements - does it come out on top, or is it lacking? Are the planning assumptions still valid? If not, do we have a sufficient branch plan? Ah, there is the rub - though to the end I think you outline some very workable branch plans.

Of course, that is all very academic; we are where we are. That is why I like a lot of the last 3rd of the report, as it informs thought to where I shifted to three years ago; a grudging acceptance of LCS and a hope that we make the best of it.

In that respect, I remain convinced that good people in hard jobs are trying to do their best to make it worth all the time an effort. I think that part of the challenge ahead will be to rebuild so much of the goodwill that was lost inside the beltway and out due to the shifting narrative over the years due to best-case story lines sold early.

The changing narrative, which the article outlines very well, only added to general suspicions that the program was not well thought out and was not well grounded. That may not be fair, but especially on the manning side, it sure looks that way.  Good people working hard and the inventiveness of Sailor can fix many an initial error, so we will have to let that process work itself out.

Like a billiard ball bouncing around the table after missing a too hard hit shot at the left corner pocket, LCS may indeed find its way in to a pocket - heck even the one it originally aimed at - but it will get there in a round about inefficient way totally different than originally envisioned, and it won't be pretty to watch.

A lot is still based on hope, and that remains my major concern. Is the major part of technology risk behind us? I think so - but the critical linkages to tactical utility and optimization have yet to be made. The reason that is true is also covered in the article, I like that.

We'll find out in the next half decade how successful we are. The final answer will probably be somewhere between the Eeyore Opposition and Undersecretary Work's informed optimism.  Heck, I hold hope that I am wrong on LCS and I'll be buying rounds of beers and steak dinners for a few people at the next Salamandepalooza in DC while I dine on crow. That would be the best outcome for all.

To end things up, here is some common ground I have with The Under;

The only thing standing in the way of success for LCS would be a lack of imagination and hard work. After fleet operators get their hands on the ships and refine old operational and logistical support concepts and develop new ones, there is little reason to think the ship will not be an important contributor to twenty-first century Total Force Battle Network operations.

Oh no. I can't let another of my hobby horses pass without comment.

I may quibble over the threshold definition of "important" - but that isn't another of the HUGE background problems with LCS.  Nothing is more fun than red-hatting "networks."

They are great and wonderful thing in peace, exercises, and wargaming - but we do not own space and the EW spectrum. You cannot classify math, and you cannot assume that you own what belongs to all.

FORCEnet, Celestial Networks, whatever you want to call it - it is a mirage. Like our buddy Galrahn pointed out in twitter yesterday as we pop'd ideas back and forth - next RIMPAC, let's turn off GPS and remove all access to satellite communication and IT connectivity. Do it for a few days and see how things go.

Do we want tomorrow's Admiral Beatty to say,

There seems to be something wrong with our bloody networks today!

... as everything goes to crap.

As a final note, Undersecretary Work has been pondering LCS for quite awhile. I recommend as a historical document his 2004 work, Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship, and in closing would like to thank him for a foundation reference as we continue to try to figure out the pitfalls and promise that these two classes of ships present us.

---

UPDATE: Yamgumphabalalalala. Visual commentary.

Hat tip JOPA.

If This is Defending LCS, You're Doing it Wrong

The events of the last year have, in a way, been a Pyrrhic victory for long standing LCS critics. It would have been the best thing for our Navy and its nation if we had been wrong - and as I mentioned years ago, I wished I were proven wrong - but the facts are clear; this sub-optimal platform will saddle our Navy for the next three decades with lost opportunity, China doll deathtraps that will remind everyone of the cost of the Transformationalists' Tiffany Navy.

In the global marketplace of ideas, the verdict is in. No one is trying to replicate the LCS concept. While we have been making excuses during the long, slow rollout of both LCS variants, the Dutch, Danes, Germans, French, Russians and others have commissioned and deployed superior sub-7,000 ton warships that, unlike LCS, are ready to go to war tomorrow. They are very real, self-deployable warships with provable performance metrics that LCS can't seem to get off the PPT.

Other nations' mocking performance in their rollouts do not stop our blinkered LCS advocates who just won't let go. They cannot accept that their beautiful little theory has been destroyed by a rampaging gang of facts and experience.

They yell louder, they call people names, but the facts continue to be what they are.

If you are new here and to the argument against LCS, just click the LCS tag. There is over a decade of commentary here on it - with links that go back even further. A little more than half decade ago when I realized we had moved past the tipping point to execute Plan Salamander and mitigate much of the negative 2nd and 3rd order effects from this snakebit program, I settled on just hoping that with enough time and money, we could salvage something of use from this program.

SECNAV Mabus & SECDEF Carter have helped in the last year. In not letting the perfect be the enemy of the good, most of us had welcomed the stage whisper admission of the failure that led to the redesign of the LCS in to a kind of FF inline with the previous decades LCS-(I) concept, and finally the premature ending of the run. A half-decade late, but a welcome end to the bleeding.

Now, as we have repeated often the last few years, the great effort is to see what can be done to make these ships of some use. You have the Navy you are given, not the one you want.

Does that mean we should stop beating up on LCS/FF? No, not at all. The horrible shortcomings of this program need to be brought out and gibbeted on a regular basis as a warning to future program managers and leaders as to what no to do. It is also needed as now and then, some members of the rapidly decreasing member of the Cult of LCS step out of the shadows and once again try to convince the unwashed masses that LCS is really all that and a box of chocolates. Everyone, you see, are just too stupid, ignorant, or compromised to see its perfection. Have they not seen the PPT? Have they not read the CONOPS? Do they not tasted its awesomesauce?

Well, over at WOTR, our old buddy Steven has dusted off the LCS Tent Revival Handbook to enlighten the heathens. It has kind of a old-timey feel to it, but as the ball is tee'd up, let's grab an old Big Bertha and give a whack at it.

He is a true believer and means well ... but he's wrong, and here's why.

Let's start with the title;

WHY CHOOSE THE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP? BECAUSE IT IS THE BEST OPTION

What? Is it still 2007? Shipmate, we are way past the "choose" point. The choice was made, measured, found wanting, regretted, and then retracted. By design, at this point it is our only option - and we've already rejected it with seven servings of buyer's regret.

How is that working out for us?

USS Fort Worth, successfully deployed to Singapore in a variety of missions suffered an engineering casualty that appears similar to that of Milwaukee.

Outline all those PMA it performed, ifyoudontmind. "Successful." I'm sorry - is this successful?

The USS Fort Worth, a Navy littoral combat ship, has suffered extensive gear damage while docked at a port in Singapore. The Navy is blaming the incident on a crew error.

According to reports, the crew failed to use sufficient lube oil, leading to excessively high temperatures on the gears. Debris also found its way into the lubrication system, which also contributed to failure, Defense News reports. The crew did not follow standard operating procedures.

I have yet to see a deployment debrief where gross maintenance neglect is in the "successful" slide. Makes for a rough end of tour award write-up.

Silly. Let's see what else is being thrown up against the wall.

The relatively small size of America’s fleet means that a much higher percentage of ships must be forward-based in order to meet demands for both presence and war fighting missions articulated in the 2015 Cooperative Maritime Strategy.

Relative to who? "What" is forward based and "where" is more important than a number, especially in transition to war. For the foreseeable future, LCS will not be able to conduct any more meaningful war fighting missions than the USN gunboats of COMYANGPAT could after Dec. 7th 1941.

The LCS remains the best program to pursue a modular small combatant.

How long do we pursue until we actually achieve? LCS-1 was commissioned ~8 years ago, 1/3 of its service life. I think we have the answer. With the transition to FF, bolt-on ASCM, and truncated production ... I think the pursuit has turned in to acceptance of failure.

The LCS program has been plagued with legitimate problems to be sure, but defense media sources would rather garner headlines for reporting problems such as the Milwaukee and recent Fort Worth engineering problems rather than analyze why the Defense Department and the Navy chose and have retained the LCS concept.

Blaming the messenger is not a way to progress. I'm sorry, but as per the below, this is simply false. If LCS concept was good, there would be no FF, you would get full production, and other navies would be producing their own versions.

LCS is a peacetime concept that has not even met its minimum theoretical wartime utility requirements for ASUW, MIW, or ASW. As long as we don't have to go to war, LCS will do fine. As long as we continue to shovel money and excuses at it, LCS will do fine. As long as we continue to set lower standards for it to meet, LCS will do fine.

The 2015 Cooperative Maritime Strategy states that 300 ships will be required to provide both presence and war fighting capability in forward operating areas.

Well, no, we don't live in that universe. With the huge debt bomb ticking away, land powers of Russian and China stretching, domestic budget requirements expanding, and the need to recapitalize our SSBN fleet ... well, no. We are not going to get as many ships as we want, or for that matter we need. We also should not just go for numbers for numbers sake. That is a false economy.

Given the success of the Fort Worth deployment and the potential capability of its anti-ship missile armament, the LCS supports both presence and warfighting as required by the Cooperative Maritime Strategy.

Everything is "potential" with this class of ships. A bolt-on, non-integrated, high RCS box launcher on deck is better than nothing (a moment of quiet reflection for the wasted space where NLOS was supposed to be), but again ... long range ASCM was not in the LCS CONOPS. That is simply trying to get something out of it - a move I approve of for what is is worth. You can bolt those on anything, so why not LCS?

A Reasonable Price

For what? A self-propelled 57mm gun and some bolt on 1-off weapons? Give me three accountants and they will give me four different cost estimations for each Unicorn Class FMC LCS (including contractor shore support etc), but this is just silly at this stage of the game. If you want to go there, then here is a question. Is it better to have 10 ships that have limited capability or 6 ships that are fully mission capable through their primary mission areas?

Which is better; to buy 10 $1 items that give you $.85 utility, or to buy 5 $2 items that give you $2.2 utility in return?

Intelligence and/or future strategic requirements may suggest a larger frigate than the modified LCS with greater range, but unlike the late 1970s there is no need for an escort with a destroyer’s armament to plug a gap in overall U.S. surface force capabilities.

Actually, intelligence and future strategic requirements already suggest a larger frigate than the modified LCS, and as for convoy escort ... a secondary mission, sure. Who is asking for a primarily designed convoy escort? PEO Strawman would like their job back.

The LCS, through its system of modular capabilities resident on a common hull offers an affordable solution to the problem of how to field multiple low-end capabilities and rapidly and affordably update them over time. Each LCS mission package is an assembly of sensors, weapons, associated equipment, and the sailors needed to operate them. The mission module list currently features surface warfare, antisubmarine warfare and mine warfare packages. An LCS can only support one module at a time. LCS represents a compromise in a common hull for all three missions that it is larger than the MCM and PC units, but smaller than the Perry class frigates it replaces.

Oh just stop. Mission modules remain only PPT deep. None are even close to being ready to deploy, much less prove their worth under operational conditions. Also, LCS-1 is ~85% the displacement of a Perry class frigate, and only 30' shorter.

One wonders how the FFG-7 or DD 963 classes, both labeled as under-armed and unsurvivable, or the excessively expensive AEGIS system would have fared in an Internet age of instant criticism and anonymous condemnation.

ISWYDT. I love when it becomes about me, but back to the game. 

First of all, we need to stop even trying to parallel LCS with OHP, but if you so wish, we can. Eight years in to the Perry class, we had commissioned 50 of them and they were conducting global fleet operations in all mission areas.

For the SPRUCANS, eight years in to the program and all 31 had been commissioned, and ditto performance at sea as the OHP.

TICO? 20 ships and the AEGIS bugs well worked out with refinements ongoing. 

The LCS program represents a reasonable attempt to field a common small combatant that meets present U.S. requirements and fits within the force structure of the 2nd decade of the 21st century. Its cost remains significantly lower than other proposed solutions from the analysis community. It has suffered unremitting criticism from an analysis community unhappy with the Navy’s choice of small combatant, from a defense press eager to publish bad news stories, from a retired community unfamiliar with its concept, and from legions of “hobbyists” who heretofore never had access to the age-old, messy process of compromise involved in producing a warship. In spite of criticisms, the LCS still represents the best way forward to produce a small combatant that meets multiple mission requirements in the 21st century.

Actually, no. LCS is a failed attempt. By reinforcing failure until recently, we have only damaged our navy and unnecessarily hazarded its Sailors when future conflict at sea comes. 

The best compromise with LCS has been the attempt to make a marginally better warship with the FF modification and the decision to stop throwing good money at a failed program by ending the buy early.

If you are looking for good news in the sad story that is LCS, that is it.

It would be great for our Navy and the nation it serves if one day I can go over to Steven and the other LCS advocates and say, "Folks, the next three rounds are on me. I was wrong about LCS. You were right. I should have seen this for what it is."

We are not there, and not heading there. As a matter of fact, I feel quite comfortable that day will never come.

The beatings, however, will continue.

The CNO and the dangers of living in a PPT world

This is just sad to read. Really - sad to read.

Critics say ... the ship will be limited to doing only one thing at a time.

That’s not the way Roughead looks at it. He sees more of a quick-change operation. The Navy can stock spare modules at strategic ports, or airlift them in via large C-17 cargo planes.

“Within 24 hours, I can shift from a very good mine countermeasures ship to a very good anti-submarine ship,” he said. “I submit I can change the capabilities in a region faster than if I have to sail in other capabilities.”

No sir, actually you can't. That is all theory and unfunded promises.

I submit that our ships will be put in harms way without the ability to produce effects needed by the combatant commander due to their inability to sail with the kit that is needed, and unable to effectively and efficiently "transform" in to a different mission set without abandoning another. Sailors will have to do with a sub-optimal platform with static mission systems that cannot respond to the one constant at sea - change. They enemy won't wait while you depart to change clothes - you will fight as are are dressed.

The 24-hrs just doesn't stand the follow-on question test. Maybe in VACAPES, but ...

1. How many places will you have all these "spare" mission modules and fully qualified crews on a "ready 1" status? Do you have enough that a LCS in the South China Sea or Horn of Africa can realize - "Shoot, there are submarines here. Bad guys, stay right there I'll be right back." - then transit to a location having those mission modules and fully qualified crews (NB: more than one you know, LCS will not be going solo) - take the old mission modules off, put the new ones on, gas-go and return onstation to pick up where they were? Oh, and now that they are looking for submarines now - what about the mines they were looking for before?

2. Where is the funding coming from to enable this 24-hr turn around time from South America, to Africa, to Southern Asia, to Europe, to the Yellow Sea? Stationing agreements, BA/NMP, spare airlift, storage and maintenance facilities, all funded - right?

3. Has the USAF signed an agreement for priority lift WRT the number of C-17 sorties that will be needed? Do we have the equipment and personnel in place to move and support these personnel and equipment from the airhead to port?

The CNO repeats the most easily debunked spin of LCS - I guess he has never read the debunking over the years, or Naval history for that matter. Wait, scratch that - perhaps he doesn't think anyone else has? I don't know - but this stale spin is some weak cheese. This never stands up to the light of day.

“The LCS will afford us opportunities to operate in places we haven’t been able to go because of its draft and speed,” he said. “With the numbers we are able to buy, at the cost we are buying them, we couldn’t do it with any other ship class.”

Even a 5-minute review of surface ship actions in Vietnam, The Falklands, to the invasion of Iraq shows the inaccuracy of this statement. It insults the intelligence of all who reads it.

Almost as insulting as this excuse.

Roughead said that the littorals have fewer growing pains than some of the Navy’s past ships.

“I have introduced several classes of ships in my career, and we had far bigger problems than that,” said the admiral, who retires next month.

“If you look at how long we spent in development of previous ships classes -- the (destroyer) DDG-51, and say the Ticonderoga-class cruisers, they were in development for 12 to 14 years,” he said. “So that means you are paying money into developing that ship for that period of time. We did LCS in about five.”

I am confused. With the "I" and "me" is he talking about his tenure as CNO - or is he using the Royal "I" and "me?" If he is talking about his tenure as CNO - then he may have a point. LPD-17 and DDG-1000 have quite the record, I guess.

Hmmm .... let's see. If he is using the Royal "I" and "we" then let's look closer at that statement.

Let's start with the largest crime of the Lost Decade - the decommissioning of all the SPRUANCE Class. I will even be generous with the timeline.

SPRU
- The study that outlined the need; 1967 (or 1965).
- Ordered; 1970.
- Laid down; 1972.
- Commissioned; 1975.
- First Operational Deployment; 1979.
- Timeline in years: 5, 7, 10, 14.

OHP
- The study that outlined the need: ~1971 (hard to tie down).
- Ordered; 1973.
- Laid Down; 1975.
- Commissioned; 1977.
- First Operational Deployment; 1981 (Great Lakes in 1979 doesn't count).
- Timeline in years: 2, 4, 6, 10.

TICO
- The study that outlined the need; 1973-75 depending on your call.
- Ordered; 1978.
- Laid down; 1980.
- Commissioned; 1983.
- First Operational Deployment; 1984.
- Timeline in years: 5, 7, 10, 11.

BURKE
- The study that outlined the need: ~1982.
- Ordered; 1985.
- Laid down; 1988.
- Commissioned; 1991.
- First Operational Deployment; 1993.
- Timeline in years: 3, 6, 9, 11.

LCS
- The study that outlined the need: ~2001.
- Ordered; 2004.
- Laid down; 2005.
- Commissioned; 2008.
- First Operational Deployment; TBD.
- Timeline in years: 3, 4, 7, TBD.

It is the first operational deployment that is the key. Until then, all you are is an funding sponge. The Caribbean cruise on the way to San Diego doesn't count.

When will they be ready? Even if LCS made an operational deployment today - that would be 10 years, in line with OHP. When will LCS be able to deploy for ASW, MIW, ASUW? 2013 at earliest maybe? That makes first deployment at .... wait for it ... 12 years. More than TICO, OHP, and BURKE. Only two years better than the SPRU. Grab you bag of pixie dust and make it next year? Congrats, you are worse than OHP and tied with BURKE and TICO.

I can hear some people now - "Your timeline is wrong!" OK - we can all pick a start date of our choosing which will impact the timeline. I think I have been more than fair and consistent. If you have ligit corrections or other dates - post them in comments and we can adjust if needed. I could have been rougher. As a matter of fact - and I think VADM Cebrowski would agree - that the concept for LCS pre-dates 2000. In that case - LCS is plodding along worse than even SPRU.

Let's look at the CNO's comment again.

“If you look at how long we spent in development of previous ships classes -- the (destroyer) DDG-51, and say the Ticonderoga-class cruisers, they were in development for 12 to 14 years,” he said. “So that means you are paying money into developing that ship for that period of time. We did LCS in about five.”

Someone help me out here - I just don't see it. Where is he getting his numbers? I don't see an appreciable delta even with the most pro-LCS spin to justify the hype. There are better reasons to show support for LCS - but timeline from concept to being of use to the Fleet? No. Fail.

As we have mentioned before, many people have too much invested emotionally and career wise in LCS. As a result, they see nothing but rainbows and unicorns - or their command climate is such that their Staff only produces reports of rainbows or unicorns. Either way, its embarrassing.

Hey, I have always said that if you are willing to throw enough money at LCS and move your timeline to the right - in the end you will have something the Fleet can use. Sub-optimal, but useful in some narrow, defined ways. We need to have fact based discussions if we are going to make it work. We have more work to go there.

One reason I have little patience with the Church of the LCS is the fact that few are willing to even discuss actual facts on the ground. If you even get close to that point, they go in to wish-land, or speak as if just because something is on a PPT - that means that it will be.

I don't live in that land. I live in the land of "is." In my world, you see, Unicorns don't actually ride on rainbows and shi'ite Skittles. No, they ride on the backs of Sailors and consume funding lines.

The fleet is waiting and the coal bunker is getting low. Call for more coal when there isn't doesn't mean it is there.

Everyone Goes Salamander on LCS

Almost everyone except VADM Rowden this month it seems, but he'll come around, again.

I believe most visitors to the Front Porch have already caught a snippet or two of the LCS slam-dance from earlier this month, but I think if you only know the pull quotes - that I'll start with here - you are missing the best parts.

Let's start with everyone's most popular Salamanderesque remark from the Senate hearing from our friend Sean - at the 1:51 point;

"The experience of LCS, it broke the Navy," said Sean Stackley, assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition.

Though repeated in many articles, that pull quote really needs full context of the complete 01 DEC 16 United States Senate Armed Services Committee's hearing on Oversight, Acquisition, Testing, and Employment of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and LCS Mission Module Programs. You can watch this in full here.

Another solid pull quote from the hearing that got some play - and is still funny every time I read it, is from Paul Francis, managing director of acquisition and sourcing management at the Government Accountability Office;

"The miracle of LCS didn't happen,"

With that set of the most quoted bits, let's back up a bit and look at a little, well plowed ground.

We've beat up on LCS a lot for the last decade, and right now we are deep in that stage we started talking about when we reached the point of no return, the place somewhere in this 12-step LCS program where; "Good people in hard jobs are doing the best to make of a flawed program for our fleet and its Sailors."

I know the hearing at the link is 2.5 hrs long, but not only are Stackley and Francis worth your time, Michael Gilmore and VADM Rowden also have some good moments to inform your opinion of this still developing program.

Senators McCain, Reed, Ayotte, and Inhofe make a good show, as do others.

BTW, separate LCS, Gilmore's gutting of F-35 at the 1:30-38 exchange with McCain is just brutal.

At about the 1:39 point Stackley hit center mass with Sen. King on our hobby horse - a blindness to technology risk, as does Francis with his culture comment at 1:44.

If anyone really goes Salamander, it would be Gilmore at 1:46, but let's get to a sore point that goes back to when we first tilted against LCS a decade ago. 

Damn it - we were right from the start. Go to Stackley at the 1:52 point,

Mr. Chairman, in reference to the $220 million ship; the witnesses who informed the Congress, I don't think they knew or understand how much this ship would cost. ... they believed, or they desired it strongly enough to believe that it would cost $220 million, but the underpinning below that was broken. 

I. Rest. My. Frick'n. Case.

I should never have to buy a beer in the Beltway ever again.

As I pivoted circa 2010, we now have what we have and we will to make the best of it - but we need to make sure that everyone only now paying attention and in the future knows how we got here so the same mistakes are not made again with the same program.

This story needs to be told over and over again and again and again. Good enough for the Senate and House, it is good enough for the Front Porch. 

OK, I'm going to stop now with the minute by minute reporting. I can't do a blow-by-blow, but I did my favorite part.

Watch it all.

A week later over a The House Armed Services Committee;

“The ship works,” Sean Stackley, the assistant secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, said in closing testimony Dec. 8 before the House Armed Services Committee. “We have reliability issues but we’ll get through those.”
...
“It’s an exciting time in our Navy bringing this capability into the fleet, the capabilities that it [the LCS] is going to deliver” he (VADM Rowden) said. “We have a team focused on the issues, we’re learning about the issues, we’re learning about how to maintain it, and going forward I am 100 percent that we will tackle those issues and we will defeat them.”

“We need to acknowledge that many problems that exist and fix them,” said Gilmore, who has been highly critical of the development of the LCS, particularly the schedule, lack of testing, lack of reliability and lack of redundancy of systems, which impacts survivability. “I’m glad the Navy is now acknowledging these problems, but in the past that hasn’t always been true.”

OK VADM Rowden, calm down a bit. We're drifting in to FITREP verbiage over-reach;

Rowden, whose surface force has deployed three LCSs to the Western Pacific to date, said the fleet commanders keep asking him, ‘How many LCS can I get and how fast can you get them to me?’”

Oh, in the name of all that is holy, no they are not - not as presently configured and deployed. No one would trade one DDG for two 2016 LCS. If anyone would, they should be relieved for cause. 

If LCS were all that in need, the coast of Yemen would be crawling with LCS, but it isn't because LCS can't. 

The fruit is not ripe. It is on the tree, and it is the only tree we have to eat from - but the ripening is not complete. Eat too much of what is there 1QFY17, and you'll get sick.

So, almost everyone is going Salamander now except VADM Rowden. He'll come around eventually - he's been there before, drifted away, and come back. It is known.

Time Again to Turn the LCS Compost Pile

Alternative Headline - LCS: You Get What You Pay For

It has been awhile since we’ve batted LCS/FF about the ears, and this month’s latest from the GAO gives us an opportunity to do just that.

I would offer to you Syndey Freedberg’s latest over at BreakingDefense, as well as Robert Beckhusen over at WOTR and their thoughts on the GAO’s latest. Read them and take some time to review the GAO report for yourself too, but until then, here are some of my thoughts.

There continues to be a lot of competing arguments swirling around LCS. Some would like everyone to be quiet and let the Navy get on with the Plan of the Day, but I think that is the worst thing we can do. The problems with LCS need to be addressed on a regular basis for two reasons; 1) as a testimony so future programs won’t repeat the mistakes and hubris of LCS; 2) so those who are going to sea on them or giving orders to the ships have a clear idea what they are capable of.

In any event, from one end to the other, in 2016 there is no one who is screaming, with any credibility, “LCS is awesomesauce!” Some of the fringes on both sides can edge close to self-delusion, but there is a center-mass grouping of opinions that – correctly – are closer to, “This is the best we can hope for, so let’s get on with it.”

Since I resigned myself to our LCS future ~2010, I have put my hope that good people in hard jobs will try to make the best of our snake-bit inheritance. With the LCS to FF moment, we had one more chance to execute a modified PLAN SALAMANDER that was first proposed a decade ago (license build a EuroFrigate design until we could get a domestic design ready), but it was clear early that the morphing of LCS in to a FF was baked in to the cake.

Results, as expected;

And, here we are;

In late 2014, the Navy recommended (and the Secretary of Defense approved) procuring both variants of a minor modified LCS, designating it a “frigate.” The Navy prioritized this option because of its relatively lower cost and quicker ability to field, as well as the ability to upgrade remaining LCS, over making more significant capability improvements. GAO’s analysis found the planned frigate will not provide much greater capability in some areas than LCS and that some cost assumptions may have overstated this option’s affordability.

As we predicted here.

With consideration for the range of desired enhanced performance and capabilities for the SSC as identified by the fleet representatives, the task force subsequently identified additional minor modified LCS options, though these options would also require accepting reduced weight and other design margins to accommodate the changes. These alternate LCS options offered reduced capabilities as compared to some capability concepts the task force had initially identified, as capabilities had to be downgraded to accommodate the design constraints of the minor modified LCS.

In making its recommendation, the Navy prioritized cost and schedule considerations over the fact that a minor modified LCS was the least capable option considered. However, certain cost assumptions made by the task force may have overstated the minor modified LCS’ relative affordability as compared to other options. The Navy’s decision was also based on a desire to start production of the first frigate in 2019, and without a break in production at the LCS shipyards. The Navy noted in its recommendation that the minor modified LCS will provide improvements in combat capability over the current LCS fleet—specifically due to its multi-mission capability. However, the frigate will have similar capability in most areas as the current LCS; many of the performance requirements for the frigate are the same as LCS requirements. As noted, some of the improvements led to lowering some capabilities for the frigate, such as range. Moreover, a minor modified LCS will not fully address all lethality and survivability concerns raised by the former Secretary of Defense. DOT&E identified some of these concerns in its reporting on the planned frigate program. Namely, the planned frigate will not have significant improvements to AAW capability or to reducing the vulnerability of the ship to sustaining damage as compared to the current LCS.

There are people I respect that, for mostly peace-time priorities and economic reasons, are willing to hedge towards a low-low mid (which is what LCS/FF is) to get numbers, but I remain with the belief that one must keep an eye towards wartime requirements. If you are a Maritime Component Commander at war, do you want 5 sub-optimal ships with a glass jaw and a weak fist for your medium sized warship, or 3 ships that can hit and take a hit? I’d bet on the brawler, but my argument lost out.

In some ways, we continue to plow the same field, but the weeds keep cropping up and make it a necessity. This is unchanged; our nation will have LCS/FF as a significant part of our battle fleet for decades, and we need to be clear-eyed about its capabilities and limitations. Knowing such, as always, pray for peace.

Flash of the Obvious on SSC nee LCS-(I)-minus

Everyone I sure noticed that I did not blog at all about the pre-selection announcement about the work being done on the Small Surface Combatant.

The outcome was pre-determined. You have a lame-duck SECDEF who is not known for his maritime expertise whose #2 is Bob Work - the strongest advocate of LCS there is.

For reasons both defendable or not; well meaning or otherwise - if anyone seriously thought we would get anything but a glittered and plastered up LCS, they were fooling themselves.

Of course the result was going to be some modification of LCS. I'll give everyone credit - they managed to finish what they started;

Today’s announcement simply means 32 of those will be the original LCS design and 20 will be the upgraded version. (At least some of the original 32 will eventually receive at least some of the upgrades, but the current design can’t accommodate all the changes).

Yep, 32+20=52. Close enough, I guess.

This is just a Gruberesque attempt to get industry the LCS hulls they wanted. This is also a demonstration of the complete lack of imagination and vision we have when it comes to our surface fleet. Heck, they still can't downselect.

The Navy remains committed to buying both the speedboat-like Freedom hull, built by Lockheed Martin and Marinette Marine in Wisconsin, and the space-age-catamaran Independence, built by General Dynamics and Austal in Alabama.

I love this nugget - again proving the decade long Salamander critique of LCS right. I should never have to buy another beer again;

The one real sacrifice in the new LCS design is the ability to clear mines. That mission will be left to the 32 original-model Littoral Combat Ships — which, Greenert insisted, was enough to handle “the most stressing” possible scenarios.

Yep. And like Chap and others said even before me - when it was all said and done, those missions modules will simply be bolted in place on designated ships and that will be that.

I have to check myself though. Five years ago when industry was out pimping their LCS-International version - I said this;

This has inherent multi-mission capability. Can defend itself adequately and though a lot will have to be shoe-horned in - it is a tough 'lil uber-Corvette. Still a china doll with a glass jaw - but one that might get in a hit or two in a fight.

If you are going to force the LCS hull on me - then give it to me in this package. Sure, it will cost $1 billion+; but it is what it is and gets you more than a LCS + two mission-modules and logistics tail it needs ever could.

At least with this ship - if you send the CO and his Sailors in harm's way they will at least have the tools to be able to put up a fight against whatever comes their way.

As this looks like not the full LCS-(I) version, but a bit more modest, they'll keep it under $1-billion. We'll just have to deal with it until a different set of leaders decide to build a real small surface combatant.

I don't have more to say than that. What a complete baby shambles.

Via Sam over at USNINews, here's the factsheet;

Modified LCS Fact Sheet-2