Details over at USNIBlog.
Come by and look at the bones with me.
4 hours ago
Wednesday, January 08, 2020
So, Who Wants to Cut Staff Numbers
Details over at USNIBlog.
Come by and look at the bones with me.
Tuesday, January 07, 2020
For a Larger Fleet: An Open Letter to the President
A larger fleet will not build itself - especially a reach through the headwinds of the next decade to 355. To do so will not just take words, it will take vision, leadership, and substantial investment.
Nothing will happen without strong consistent Presidential leadership, supporting senior personnel, and emphasis that this is a priority.
How to get there? Regular guest Bryan McGrath has offered us the opportunity to post an open letter to President Trump on that exact topic.
Bryan, over to you.
Dear Mr. President,
To begin, I would like to wish you and your family a Happy New Year and much happiness in 2020.
The central message of this letter is that the Navy will not grow without your personal and sustained interest. Some background follows.
We are not acquainted, but if you asked a few folks in your national security team who I am, you would find that I am not well thought of in that circle. My criticisms of you as a person, a candidate, and as president have been consistent and unremitting. However, our differences are not the subject of this letter. Rather, I hope to connect with you on a subject that unites us, and that is a larger, more powerful Navy.
For the purposes of this discussion, I assume that your campaign promise to grow the Navy to 350 ships was an authentic policy position, and that the Navy’s late 2016 Force Structure Assessment (indicating a requirement for 355 ships) represents that Service’s attempt to reconcile what is being asked of it globally in an era of renewed great power contention.
Counting ships is an unsatisfying way of characterizing a Navy’s strength. Numerous other factors come into play, to include weapons, sensors, networks, carrier air wings and shore-based aviation, deployment patterns, employment posture, and training cycles. But a simple count remains the best method of quickly conveying to general audiences the strength of this Navy relative to past U.S. Navies and relative to other navies (when counted similarly).
As I draft this letter, there are 293 ships in the Navy’s battle fleet, which suggests growth on the order of 21% to reach your desired fleet. The Department of the Navy’s budget for 2020 is about $205.6B, and although this figure buys both a Navy and a Marine Corps, our discussion should assume an annual cost to buy, build, and maintain a 355 ship Navy as at least 21% higher (or $43.2B higher annually, in constant dollars). I qualify this figure because of my belief that current Navy readiness is underfunded, so simply increasing resources proportionally enshrines the readiness gap in a larger fleet.
Putting aside the expense associated with growing the Navy, difficulties in doing so are compounded by the inconvenient fact that the previous naval buildup (in the Reagan Administration) occurred about one ship-life in the past. Which means that as you try and build the Navy, Reagan era ships—built when there was a larger and more competitive shipbuilding industrial base—are reaching the end of their service lives, even after some of them have had significant service life extensions. The Reagan buildup was substantial, and its retirement produces considerable headwinds.
So we find ourselves with a problem. You want a significantly larger Navy. I want a significantly larger Navy. Your National Security Adviser recently made it clear that this remains an administration priority. Your Acting Secretary of the Navy made statements recently indicating that he is taking a more aggressive position in trying to bring about your wishes, seeking from uniformed leadership in the Navy and Marine Corps a plan to get to 355 ships in 10 years. Your Combatant Commanders worldwide want a larger and more powerful Navy. Your Navy Admirals want a larger and more powerful Navy (but not at the cost of its readiness). Many on Capitol Hill are in favor of building a larger Navy. So, what is the problem?
First, the defense budget has increased dramatically in your first three years in office, and I applaud this. But it hasn’t bought a bigger Navy, at least not anywhere near the bigger Navy that you and I want. It hasn’t bought a bigger Air Force, a bigger Marine Corps or a bigger Army. What this additional money did was address festering readiness sores across the Services and purchased needed precision weapons stocks. I am confident that the Joint force is at a higher state of readiness today than it was when you took office. But to repeat—it is no larger, and it must grow to keep up with our worldwide commitments to advance our security and prosperity. The expense associated with growth is massive and must contend with myriad other claimants upon the taxpayer’s dollar, including future taxpayers. Additionally, the costs associated with keeping even the present force level in a high state of readiness never go away.
Next, and related to the first, there are good cases to be made that resources for all three military department budgets are insufficient. The proof of this arises in part from the plain fact that your statements of support for growing the Navy have not translated into additional dollars necessary to not only build that Navy, but to man, train, and equip it. While conspiracy theorists sometimes point to the fact that the Defense Secretary is a West Point graduate, the Secretary of State is a West Point graduate, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is an Army General as reasons the Navy has not grown in spite of your campaign promise, the truth is far more prosaic. Your cabinet secretaries and your Chairman of the Joint Chiefs are executing a National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy that convey no real strategic rationale for a massive shift of resources within the defense budget from one Service to another. Absent a large, across the board increase in defense spending authorized by the Congress (that would grow all the Services), the only method of growing the Navy within foreseeable DoD resources is to privilege the Navy over the other Services within the department’s budgeting processes, and then take that budget to the Hill. To do this, a major strategic shift would have to occur, and this has clearly not happened.
All of this leads me to conclude that absent your leadership, a larger Navy will remain out of your grasp, and even with your leadership, it will be a difficult, but not impossible task. So please accept the following unsolicited advice designed to help achieve our common goal.
Build a Case for a Larger Navy. There is a very strong case for a larger Navy. I make it all the time. But it is a lonely calling, and it requires (again) either a massive across the board increase in defense spending (the way we achieved growth in the 80’s) or a considerable shift in current resources within DoD. The former is unlikely to happen in the current threat/budget/political environment, and the latter is unlikely without a strategic basis for doing so. Build the case. Tell your advisers that you want them to investigate alternative national security strategies that rely more heavily on seapower. Give them six months to come back to you with a few options that do so within existing DoD resources. Pick a path and then proselytize it (recognizing of course, your other duties and priorities). Do not ignore Democrats on the Hill who would likely support you.
You Want it Bad, You Get it Bad. Achieving a 355 ship Navy within 10 years with modest increases in spending is not impossible. It is however, unwise. In order to do so, you could put a freeze on the retirement of ships. You could order ships to be brought out of mothballs. You could cut down on current operations and modernization in order to harvest dollars for acquisition. I would be shocked if any or all of these considerations were not on the table as the Acting Navy Secretary seeks to meet your mandate. The problem with these options is that they will contribute to a larger—but more hollow—force that will be poorly manned, trained, and equipped. Essentially, every ship kept on duty past its planned service life, and every ship brought out of retirement, instantly become new drains on current readiness accounts, at a rate far beyond their worth to the Fleet. Change the terms of the debate in order to get what is important—a larger and more powerful Navy—and not a larger, less powerful Navy. Do this by easing off on any existing timetable, and also by considering my next recommendation.
Consider Scrapping the Current Counting Mechanism. The counting rules we operate under today flow from a Reagan-era Navy Secretary John Lehman memo. Over time they have become “customary” law, and when Obama Navy Secretary Ray Mabus tried to change them, he encountered considerable resistance on the Hill. To some extent, the rigidity of these rules is tying your hands, so I recommend calling an audible. Direct the Acting Secretary of the Navy (through the Defense Secretary) to convene a task force that brings together DoD, Navy, Joint Staff, NSC, and Capitol Hill stakeholders, the purpose of which would be to arrive at a new method of quantifying and qualifying naval power. Baseline the current fleet under new rules that would more comprehensively account for capabilities ignored under the current rules. Then announce your plan for a larger, more powerful Navy under the new rules, and with a new strategy.
Make the Navy and Marine Corps Produce on Integration. The new Commandant of the Marine Corps and the new Chief of Naval Operations are both dedicated to greater levels of integration of their services at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. In this integration are the seeds for a greater reliance on seapower, which could then buy down risk on reducing resources to other elements of military power, allowing you to grow the Navy within a new strategic framework.
Get building. Direct the Secretary of Defense to move at least $10B annually from non-Navy accounts directly into the Navy’s budget, with half of it going to shipbuilding and half to other readiness accounts. This would be a down-payment on moving to a more seapower-oriented strategy. It would go a long way to arresting some of the cuts in shipbuilding that have been reported in the news recently. Keep in mind that this would be a down-payment on a much larger expenditure that will have to be continued over time.
Mr. President, your instincts on the need for a larger and more powerful Navy are right but the bureaucracy that must unlimber to bring it about needs your vocal and consistent leadership. I realize that you have a lot on your plate these days, but it does not take much time to look your team in the eye and tell them to bring you options by a date certain. This is of course, only half the battle, as you would then need to persuade the Congress to join you in this pursuit. Few things you do in your time in office would be as consequential as building the Navy this nation requires, and the cheering you hear from the shore will be me.
Bryan McGrath is the Managing Director of The FerryBridge Group LLC, a national security consultancy. The ideas offered here should be considered his and are not those of any client he represents.
Nothing will happen without strong consistent Presidential leadership, supporting senior personnel, and emphasis that this is a priority.
How to get there? Regular guest Bryan McGrath has offered us the opportunity to post an open letter to President Trump on that exact topic.
Bryan, over to you.
Dear Mr. President,
To begin, I would like to wish you and your family a Happy New Year and much happiness in 2020.
The central message of this letter is that the Navy will not grow without your personal and sustained interest. Some background follows.
We are not acquainted, but if you asked a few folks in your national security team who I am, you would find that I am not well thought of in that circle. My criticisms of you as a person, a candidate, and as president have been consistent and unremitting. However, our differences are not the subject of this letter. Rather, I hope to connect with you on a subject that unites us, and that is a larger, more powerful Navy.
For the purposes of this discussion, I assume that your campaign promise to grow the Navy to 350 ships was an authentic policy position, and that the Navy’s late 2016 Force Structure Assessment (indicating a requirement for 355 ships) represents that Service’s attempt to reconcile what is being asked of it globally in an era of renewed great power contention.
Counting ships is an unsatisfying way of characterizing a Navy’s strength. Numerous other factors come into play, to include weapons, sensors, networks, carrier air wings and shore-based aviation, deployment patterns, employment posture, and training cycles. But a simple count remains the best method of quickly conveying to general audiences the strength of this Navy relative to past U.S. Navies and relative to other navies (when counted similarly).
As I draft this letter, there are 293 ships in the Navy’s battle fleet, which suggests growth on the order of 21% to reach your desired fleet. The Department of the Navy’s budget for 2020 is about $205.6B, and although this figure buys both a Navy and a Marine Corps, our discussion should assume an annual cost to buy, build, and maintain a 355 ship Navy as at least 21% higher (or $43.2B higher annually, in constant dollars). I qualify this figure because of my belief that current Navy readiness is underfunded, so simply increasing resources proportionally enshrines the readiness gap in a larger fleet.
Putting aside the expense associated with growing the Navy, difficulties in doing so are compounded by the inconvenient fact that the previous naval buildup (in the Reagan Administration) occurred about one ship-life in the past. Which means that as you try and build the Navy, Reagan era ships—built when there was a larger and more competitive shipbuilding industrial base—are reaching the end of their service lives, even after some of them have had significant service life extensions. The Reagan buildup was substantial, and its retirement produces considerable headwinds.
So we find ourselves with a problem. You want a significantly larger Navy. I want a significantly larger Navy. Your National Security Adviser recently made it clear that this remains an administration priority. Your Acting Secretary of the Navy made statements recently indicating that he is taking a more aggressive position in trying to bring about your wishes, seeking from uniformed leadership in the Navy and Marine Corps a plan to get to 355 ships in 10 years. Your Combatant Commanders worldwide want a larger and more powerful Navy. Your Navy Admirals want a larger and more powerful Navy (but not at the cost of its readiness). Many on Capitol Hill are in favor of building a larger Navy. So, what is the problem?
First, the defense budget has increased dramatically in your first three years in office, and I applaud this. But it hasn’t bought a bigger Navy, at least not anywhere near the bigger Navy that you and I want. It hasn’t bought a bigger Air Force, a bigger Marine Corps or a bigger Army. What this additional money did was address festering readiness sores across the Services and purchased needed precision weapons stocks. I am confident that the Joint force is at a higher state of readiness today than it was when you took office. But to repeat—it is no larger, and it must grow to keep up with our worldwide commitments to advance our security and prosperity. The expense associated with growth is massive and must contend with myriad other claimants upon the taxpayer’s dollar, including future taxpayers. Additionally, the costs associated with keeping even the present force level in a high state of readiness never go away.
Next, and related to the first, there are good cases to be made that resources for all three military department budgets are insufficient. The proof of this arises in part from the plain fact that your statements of support for growing the Navy have not translated into additional dollars necessary to not only build that Navy, but to man, train, and equip it. While conspiracy theorists sometimes point to the fact that the Defense Secretary is a West Point graduate, the Secretary of State is a West Point graduate, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is an Army General as reasons the Navy has not grown in spite of your campaign promise, the truth is far more prosaic. Your cabinet secretaries and your Chairman of the Joint Chiefs are executing a National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy that convey no real strategic rationale for a massive shift of resources within the defense budget from one Service to another. Absent a large, across the board increase in defense spending authorized by the Congress (that would grow all the Services), the only method of growing the Navy within foreseeable DoD resources is to privilege the Navy over the other Services within the department’s budgeting processes, and then take that budget to the Hill. To do this, a major strategic shift would have to occur, and this has clearly not happened.
All of this leads me to conclude that absent your leadership, a larger Navy will remain out of your grasp, and even with your leadership, it will be a difficult, but not impossible task. So please accept the following unsolicited advice designed to help achieve our common goal.
Build a Case for a Larger Navy. There is a very strong case for a larger Navy. I make it all the time. But it is a lonely calling, and it requires (again) either a massive across the board increase in defense spending (the way we achieved growth in the 80’s) or a considerable shift in current resources within DoD. The former is unlikely to happen in the current threat/budget/political environment, and the latter is unlikely without a strategic basis for doing so. Build the case. Tell your advisers that you want them to investigate alternative national security strategies that rely more heavily on seapower. Give them six months to come back to you with a few options that do so within existing DoD resources. Pick a path and then proselytize it (recognizing of course, your other duties and priorities). Do not ignore Democrats on the Hill who would likely support you.
You Want it Bad, You Get it Bad. Achieving a 355 ship Navy within 10 years with modest increases in spending is not impossible. It is however, unwise. In order to do so, you could put a freeze on the retirement of ships. You could order ships to be brought out of mothballs. You could cut down on current operations and modernization in order to harvest dollars for acquisition. I would be shocked if any or all of these considerations were not on the table as the Acting Navy Secretary seeks to meet your mandate. The problem with these options is that they will contribute to a larger—but more hollow—force that will be poorly manned, trained, and equipped. Essentially, every ship kept on duty past its planned service life, and every ship brought out of retirement, instantly become new drains on current readiness accounts, at a rate far beyond their worth to the Fleet. Change the terms of the debate in order to get what is important—a larger and more powerful Navy—and not a larger, less powerful Navy. Do this by easing off on any existing timetable, and also by considering my next recommendation.
Consider Scrapping the Current Counting Mechanism. The counting rules we operate under today flow from a Reagan-era Navy Secretary John Lehman memo. Over time they have become “customary” law, and when Obama Navy Secretary Ray Mabus tried to change them, he encountered considerable resistance on the Hill. To some extent, the rigidity of these rules is tying your hands, so I recommend calling an audible. Direct the Acting Secretary of the Navy (through the Defense Secretary) to convene a task force that brings together DoD, Navy, Joint Staff, NSC, and Capitol Hill stakeholders, the purpose of which would be to arrive at a new method of quantifying and qualifying naval power. Baseline the current fleet under new rules that would more comprehensively account for capabilities ignored under the current rules. Then announce your plan for a larger, more powerful Navy under the new rules, and with a new strategy.
Make the Navy and Marine Corps Produce on Integration. The new Commandant of the Marine Corps and the new Chief of Naval Operations are both dedicated to greater levels of integration of their services at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. In this integration are the seeds for a greater reliance on seapower, which could then buy down risk on reducing resources to other elements of military power, allowing you to grow the Navy within a new strategic framework.
Get building. Direct the Secretary of Defense to move at least $10B annually from non-Navy accounts directly into the Navy’s budget, with half of it going to shipbuilding and half to other readiness accounts. This would be a down-payment on moving to a more seapower-oriented strategy. It would go a long way to arresting some of the cuts in shipbuilding that have been reported in the news recently. Keep in mind that this would be a down-payment on a much larger expenditure that will have to be continued over time.
Mr. President, your instincts on the need for a larger and more powerful Navy are right but the bureaucracy that must unlimber to bring it about needs your vocal and consistent leadership. I realize that you have a lot on your plate these days, but it does not take much time to look your team in the eye and tell them to bring you options by a date certain. This is of course, only half the battle, as you would then need to persuade the Congress to join you in this pursuit. Few things you do in your time in office would be as consequential as building the Navy this nation requires, and the cheering you hear from the shore will be me.
Bryan McGrath is the Managing Director of The FerryBridge Group LLC, a national security consultancy. The ideas offered here should be considered his and are not those of any client he represents.
Labels:
Budget Wars,
Leadership,
Shipbuilding,
Trump
Monday, January 06, 2020
One Simply Does Not Do "Throw Away COAs"
What prompted the thread was the story started, I believe, by a writer at NYT that the killing of Qasem Soleimani was "a mistake" because some careless staffer put that option in a decision brief as a poison pill to drive decisions towards what they wanted ... yet Trump picked it anyway to everyone's shock.
Though "garbage COAs" or "throwaway options" should be an urban myth, you do see it as a too-clever-by-half bureaucratic tactic by the immature, unprofessional, uneducated, or unethical who by some mistake make it in to a planning team.
Both in the classroom and the staff room, those type of people or mercilessly culled or used as an object of scorn as an example of what not to do. I'm sorry, that simply is not what is done.
Like a religion, operational planning at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels have a myriad of confessions and variations on a theme. They do have some fundamentals in common.
Along those lines, I offered to set the record straight that at the highest levels, these things are not done. Sure, they do happen now and then - but that poorly of a led staff is the great exception, not the rule - and you can tell by the decisions they made.
Good people can disagree on if it was time to eliminate QS; but after the storming of our embassy, it was not a "throwaway."
Enough intro, you can read the unroll here, or just the repeat below. It has not been edited, put down warts and all.
It simply is not done.
Here is how it works. This is for a 4-star, you can scale up to a CINC.
Before the 4-star sees the slide deck, 50/50 chance the COS has looked at it (another 3 or 4 star). Prior to that, the at least two other 2 or 3 stars have approved it. Before that a whole gaggle of O6 types were involved in getting it ready for prime time.
Everyone in that series would have to give a nod to a "throwaway slide" containing something they would not want to, or would not be able to, execute. Best practices, based on preliminary direction & guidance, would allow 2 or at most 3 Courses of Action (COA) for the principal to choose from.
They run a spectrum usually based on increasing levels of effort/risk. All COA are what the staff recommend as valid and executable options. Below the above mentioned O6 (Colonel or navy Captain) is a whole bee hive of O3-O5s working. If anyone of them were a jackass enough to propose something we couldn't sell to OPS or PLANS - much less the O6 gauntlet, they wouldn't be on the planning group anymore. I had people removed from my teams for less.
It would help everyone if those who are so vested in hating Trump that they can't think straight would just check themselves for a bit. Say what you want about Trump, but there are some people of exceptional quality in his national security staff, both civilian & military, who are briefing options for him.
I am willing to have history prove me wrong, but I know enough about those people & have played that game enough to be willing to put down a paycheck or two that the "throwaway slide" is just made up, or is a bitter boy talking out of school because his/her preferred COA was not the one the CINC approved.
You see, that is a thing about COA - each one is there because in the chain of staff officers there are some who are convinced that their COA is the best option. The other COAs are sub-optimal garbage staff officers of lesser vision have proposed. Yes, even in staffs, crap is political and egos are in play. Good GOFO promote that friction though, as they want different and valid options to bring up to the Principal.
Heck, I was briefing my preferred COA to a 4-star once & his 3-star ground component commander (who I later briefly worked for when he got his 4th star - fun story for a different day) interrupted & challenged my/our ground force levels (he wanted more & different). I - just a middling navy O5 - looked over at the Principal, who just said, "Well, Sal explain to LtGen XXX what he doesn't understand about your COA." ... and he let me go back and forth with the GCC. (NB: the J3 told me the COA I was briefing was the one J00 wanted, so I knew I was OK to dance).
Anyway, the other 2 COA briefed that day were also valid & good COA, all depended on the Principal's desired effort/risk calculus. In that crowd, with a constellation of GOFO and senior civilian leaders, it would be career suicide - not to mention gross professional malpractice & unethical - to put anything up there that was "garbage" or "throwaway."
Sure, the Principal may choose COA-C - and that will cause butthurt for those on the staff who really like COA-A & COA-B, but that does not make COA-C a throwaway ... unless of course, the person calling it that is a immature & unprofessional brat who by using that terminology, just advertises that they should not been on that high level of a staff to begin with.
So, at the end of the day, 99% this is either a made up story or was a leak by a disgruntled staffer who is butthurt their preferred COA was not chosen.
There is that 1% chance that history will prove me wrong and at the highest levels of the US government we have staffers who will produce and approve options for the CINC that are "garbage" and "throwaway" to the degree they would fail out of my NATO Operational Planning course.
Labels:
Iran,
Leadership
Sunday, January 05, 2020
Midrats' 10th Anniversary Show
Happy New Year to everyone and you know what 2020 means? It means that Midrats is having its 10th Anniversary.
Come join us this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern as we look back at the previous decade and do our best to see what is coming over the horizon for the next.
Who knows, we might have a surprise guest or two.
You can listen to the show at this link or below, but remember, if you don't already, subscribe to the podcast at Spreaker or any of the other podcast aggregators.
If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here.
Labels:
Midrats
Friday, January 03, 2020
Fullbore Friday
Somewhere there was a 20-yr old ordnanceman that made sure the weapons were loaded and ready.
Somewhere there was a 30-yr old pilot and 40-yr old copilot who were on their game.
Somewhere there was a large group of intelligence professionals who kept an unblinking eye on their target, giving decision makers real-time, actionable details.
Somewhere there was an entire ecosystem of communications, IT, and satellite professionals that maintained a lashed up of legacy and cutting edge technology enabling world-wide, real time observation of the target over an extended period.
Somewhere there were senior uniformed and civilian advisers providing the Principal the pros and cons of action.
Somewhere there was a Principal who gave the order.
After thousands of deaths and untold tens of thousands wounded … one of the most blood soaked enemies of our nation was eliminated.
Fullbore to everyone.
Thursday, January 02, 2020
Diversity Thursday
So, you thought I was done with DivThu? Ha!
Welcome to 2020 people.
Stephen Bainbridge is the William D. Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law in Los Angeles. As in many places where the cancerous identity politics cult has grown to infest every corner, as part of his annual merit pay raise, the commissariat forces him to submit a statement of how he contributes to the University's goals in Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion.
How very Maoist.
This is high art;
Welcome to 2020 people.
Stephen Bainbridge is the William D. Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law in Los Angeles. As in many places where the cancerous identity politics cult has grown to infest every corner, as part of his annual merit pay raise, the commissariat forces him to submit a statement of how he contributes to the University's goals in Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion.
How very Maoist.
This is high art;
Although I am aware and respectful of the many dimensions within which a university properly seeks a diverse faculty and student body, I have long been particularly concerned with the lack of intellectual diversity at the law school. A survey of U.S. law professors in general found that white Democratic professors (both male and female), Jewish professors, and nonreligious professors “account for most (or all) of the overrepresentation among racial, gender, religious, and ideological groups in law teaching.”[1] The groups that “account for most of the underrepresentation among racial, gender, religious, and ideological groups in law teaching” are Republicans (both male and female), Protestants, and Catholics.[2] This disparity persists even though “religious and political diversity are probably more important for viewpoint diversity than gender diversity and roughly as important as racial diversity.”[3]
At UCLA, we know that the campus as a whole leans substantially to the left. “A study of various university faculties showed that at Cornell the ratio of liberal to conservative faculty members was 166 to 6, at Stanford it was 151 to 17, at UCLA it was 141 to 9, and at the University of Colorado it was 116 to 5.”[4] Conservative students at UCLA have been “harassed, stalked, and threatened.”[5] I recently searched the opensecrets.org donor database for political contributions made by persons who claimed UCLA School of Law as their employer. Thirty-eight of those persons contributed solely to Democratic candidates, the Democratic Party and various affiliates, and liberal PACs. One person contributed to both Republicans and Democrats. Three persons contributed exclusively to Republican candidates, the Republican Party, and various NRC affiliates. Of the faculty members who contributed exclusively to Republican candidates, the most recently hired of the two was hired in 1997. As a monetary matter, 92.67% of all contributions went to Democrats and affiliated groups.[6]
Because conservative students and students of faith often feel alienated and estranged in an environment that is so relentlessly liberal and secular, I have made particular efforts to reach out to and support such students. I have served as a mentor for leaders of The Federalist Society and Christian Law Students Association. I have given talks to both organizations. I taught a Perspectives on law and Lawyering seminar devoted to Catholic Social Thought and the Law, which gave students—whether Catholic or not—an opportunity to consider how their faith (or lack thereof) related to the law and an opportunity to learn about a coherent body of Christian scholarship that might inform their lives as lawyers. I have also tried to lead by example, such as by serving as a volunteer with the Good Shepherd Catholic Church’s St. Vincent de Paul chapter, which raises funds for distribution to poor persons who are in danger of losing their home due to inability to make rent or mortgage payments.
Labels:
Diversity
Wednesday, January 01, 2020
In 2020, Look Up
Details over at USNIBlog.
Come by and give it a read.
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