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This technology, only a POM away, is the answer to all our problems. If we only invest a bit more and trust this one braintrust, the future will be ours to dominate with fewer units, fewer personnel, less bloodshed, with more power and flexibility. All we need to do in to close our minds and trust our seers of the future who know. They just know, dontchaknow.
What we need to do is to throw away all that oldthink, embrace the Tommorowland of Our Betters, ignore the reality of the conflict and operational reality all around us and focus on the vignette. Focus on the presentation. Focus on our pristine, exquisite, transformational vision of what will be.
We just need to recapitalize, redirect funds, retire oldthink platforms early and hold out hands together is the only way smart, visionary, right thinking, and - ahem - promotable people think. The post-retirement jobs are all going to be here for those who, well, you know. We don't need to get in to specifics about that right now, now do we?
We have seen this movie before. An experienced and slightly world weary matron is once again seduced by the handsome flatterer who tells a story clear to all but the matron that is is little more than the usual over-promise and under-deliver sweet talk that she has fallen for in the past. What follows is a roller coaster of great expectations followed by excuse laden disappointment that in the end leads only to painful recriminations and prenury.
Unmanned systems will continue to provide incremental additional utility if we are smart with our money, humble with our ambitions, and harsh in our evaluations. But no, that is not good enough. Once again we are seeing slick aspirational ideas that we are all supposed to embrace - in spite of the reality of what we see around us tells us what is actually needed, regardless of what the last few conflicts have tried to teach us - indeed, what centuries of solid military experience has taught us.
Like the push for the A-12 prevented us from having a viable and much needed replacement for the capabilities of the A-6, this snake-oil pushing may lead us to miss what unmanned systems have to really offer us by mid-century.
The industry overreach never ends, they never stop. There is always a new group of thinkers who think they have, like those cute teenagers who think they have discovered s3x, discovered something that no one else ever has. They have an insight in to a new way that no one else. They have an idea, a technology, a concept that they are sure - if only everyone trusted them and showed the same enthusiasm they had - will transform, offset, or generation jump their way in to the future where enemies fall away before their dominance while everyone is quickly victorious and makes it home for supper.
Sorry, it never works that way. In spite of a few thousand years of people trying to convince their leaders it really will this time - after all, they are smarter and more insightful than previous generations. It. Never. Works. That. Way.
And so it is for drones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) - or whatever we are calling it this FY.
Drones have been with us for decades and technology holds the promise of their greater utility in the future. They key is "promise." We should continue to build a little, test a little, learn a lot - but that isn't good enough for some. Those "some" need to be challenged at every step or they will put us right were we are now; the A-6 to A-12 debacle; the loss or organic tanking; the myopic victory of the Light Attack Mafia that left our multi-billion dollar CVN with decks full of short ranged strike fighters and little more; the LCS who seems to only be able to combat the effort to build a functional fleet; and the white elephant DDG-1000 who, I am willing to bet, has only begun to build on its record of transformationalist under-performance.
Where there are solid, sane, and defensible developments in the drone world, such as the decision to focus the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program on Carrier-Based Aerial-Refueling System (CBARS) - that doesn't keep the drone good idea fairy from pushing. They will always push as their product is the push.
We're going to unpack something, and it is going to be painful - at least for me. From the 11 July Defense News, retired Air Force Generals John Loh and Ronald Yates ask, "What Next for Drone Warfare?" The executive summary is, "Not this." - but what fun would that be? Let's pull apart the juicy center, a mini-Fisk if you will;
There is no shortage of scenarios well suited to this next generation of combat RPAs. Obviously, their current effectiveness can be improved with all-weather stealth technology, longer endurance, better sensors, larger payloads and connectivity to the global "info-sphere". With these improvements, they can cover targets in other regions where terrorists congregate, such as North Africa, Yemen, Somalia and Southwest Asia. Further, with an optimized vehicle, RPAs can be incorporated into war plans against aggressive nation-state adversaries.
Next-generation RPAs can also be the foundation for enforcing international truces and treaties. They can provide continuous, high-resolution surveillance of important facilities to detect activity that could violate agreements, and immediately strike targets.
Establishing no-fly zones over contested areas is a viable alternative to nation-building. The continuous no-fly zones over Iraq for twelve years after the First Gulf War in 1991 demonstrated their effectiveness as a deterrent to further warfare. No-fly, no-drive zones patrolled with RPAs and manned aircraft can detect and strike any air or ground target, obviate the need for "boots on the ground", and maintain air dominance over the area.
In the same vein, new, optimized RPAs would be the best choice for tracking activity and exerting U.S. influence in hot spots such as the Ukraine, Taiwan Straits, North Korea, Spratley Islands and Central America.
A new fleet does not require new infrastructure. Today's RPAs have capable ground-based flight and mission-control facilities, and robust, jam-resistant data links. Fortunately, programs are already underway to upgrade them such that fielding a new force of RPAs would require little, if any, additional capabilities. And, the global info-sphere of space-borne, networked communications already exists to link RPAs in any region of the world.
Goodness. What a start;
There is no shortage of scenarios well suited to this next generation of combat RPAs.
Of course, if you carefully design your vignette to remove the enemy's vote, assume your dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum and low-Earth orbit, and you can keep the JAG/LEGAD hogtied and ball-gagged in some fan room with two MA's securing the door. No problem.
Obviously, their current effectiveness can be improved with all-weather stealth technology, longer endurance, better sensors, larger payloads and connectivity to the global "info-sphere".
There, in a nutshell, is how we got ACS, A-12, LCS, DDG-1000, FCS etc etc etc - we just assume all challenges away and all good things to happen as a result of just saying so. Additionally, on the back of a cocktail napkin, I think the drone in the above paragraph will need to be something between a G4 and a 737. Good luck hiding that from anyone. It would also help having a vertically challenged contractor in the back room spinning hay in to gold.
With these improvements, they can cover targets in other regions where terrorists congregate, such as North Africa, Yemen, Somalia and Southwest Asia. Further, with an optimized vehicle, RPAs can be incorporated into war plans against aggressive nation-state adversaries.
How many years lost to "making do with what legacy systems we have left after we retire others to capture the cost" will that take? What opportunity cost for those hundreds of millions? What of the conflicts we will be in that - as history tells us - this brave new world capability will be useless in? I assume "optimized" means that whatever you have is covered with fairy dust and will even cure the Heartbreak of Psoriasis?
Next-generation RPAs can also be the foundation for enforcing international truces and treaties. They can provide continuous, high-resolution surveillance of important facilities to detect activity that could violate agreements, and immediately strike targets.
Will someone check the fan room? I am sure I heard the JAG screaming through the ball gag. Also, we are pretty much already doing that, minus the AI implied "immediately." But, yeah.
Establishing no-fly zones over contested areas is a viable alternative to nation-building. The continuous no-fly zones over Iraq for twelve years after the First Gulf War in 1991 demonstrated their effectiveness as a deterrent to further warfare. No-fly, no-drive zones patrolled with RPAs and manned aircraft can detect and strike any air or ground target, obviate the need for "boots on the ground", and maintain air dominance over the area.
Wait, did someone just come out of a coma? I'm sorry, but I don't think the Shia or the Kurds agree all that much and - in the end analysis - that the NFZ in Iraq prevented any conflict. Sure, prevented one unknown possible conflict, but conflict came anyway. Any air or ground target? No need for "boots on the ground?" My Buddha, it is almost as if nothing has happened in the last decade.
In the same vein, new, optimized RPAs would be the best choice for tracking activity and exerting U.S. influence in hot spots such as the Ukraine, Taiwan Straits, North Korea, Spratley Islands and Central America.
"Best choice" under what terms? Define how you exert U.S. influence via something that no one sees, interacts with, or knows what it is doing? That is ISR, not presence of influence operations. Oh, and if they can see or interact with it - then you won't have that asset any more to do your subliminal influencing - or what ever this means.
A new fleet does not require new infrastructure. Today's RPAs have capable ground-based flight and mission-control facilities, and robust, jam-resistant data links. Fortunately, programs are already underway to upgrade them such that fielding a new force of RPAs would require little, if any, additional capabilities.
So, no new hangars? No new facility to support troops and contractors? No new simulators or repair facilities? No new bandwidth requirements?
And, the global info-sphere of space-borne, networked communications already exists to link RPAs in any region of the world.
"Info-sphere" - is that a new term I need to add to BS-Bingo? Will we see that more? Again, I assume that all the bandwidth we are using right now is fully under military control, robust against jamming, can avoid hacking or ASAT, and can operate against a hostile EW environment against peer and near-peer operators? Scaleable and secure? Redundant with ready spares?
Really?
Read it all. It all sounds so clear, easy, and doable - and of course it does. This is the classic problem of choosing the "all assumptions are green" nested best case scenario thinking that has set us back time and time again. This needs to be challenged at every step of the way or we will once again find ourselves passing up "good" evolutionary products that were doable for ethereal "generation jumping" ideas that just never wind up making a shadow, or are produced in such small numbers that they have little use.
We live in a crowded world with limited resources. What happens when this meets modern technology's ability to shorten the time/distance equation and increase the ability to know of what lies below the waves?
What complications do we fine when the above two points meet up with the eternal search by growing nations to reach for the seas to support their homeland's growing needs?
As populations demand more protein in their diets as per capita incomes rise, many nations see the open seas as the best place to fill that demand. With more competing for shrinking resources, can fishing be seen as a security threat? How does it impact coastal states' economic, food, and environmental security? What are the roles of transnational organized crime and state power in this competition. Is international law being strengthened to meet this challenge, or is the challenge undermining the rule of law? More than last century's quaint "Cod Wars," does this have the potential trigger to broader, more serious conflict?
Our guest this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern to discuss this and more will be Scott Cheney-Peters, LT, USNR.
Scott serves as a civil servant on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, and is the founder of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC).
Scott's active duty service at sea included the USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and USS Oak Hill (LSD 41). His shore duty before leaving active service was in Washington, DC, where he served as the editor of Surface Warfare magazine.
Scott graduated from Georgetown University with a B.A. in English and Government and holds an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. Scott researches issues affecting Asian maritime security and national security applications of emerging technology.
Join us live if you can with the usual suspects in the chat room and offer up your questions for our guest, but if you miss the show you can always listen to the archive at blogtalkradio or Stitcher.
If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here.
Sometimes training and instinct make the hero. Sometimes though, the more difficult thing takes place. Against the grain, with great risk and for no material gain - someone makes the conscience decision to do what is often the more difficult choice - do the right thing.
As brave as any Medal of Honor recipient- last month we lost a lion; Irena Sendler.
POLAND suffered more than any other European country during the second world war. And there was an extra twist: the history of that suffering was then systematically distorted by the Soviet-imposed Communist rulers, and widely misunderstood abroad. Auschwitz, for example, is still often referred to as a “Polish death camp”—rather than one run by the country's Nazi occupiers, in which huge numbers of Polish citizens perished. And gentile Poles are typically imagined to have rejoiced, collaborated or simply stood by as their Jewish compatriots were exterminated.
Poles, said the former Israeli leader Yitzhak Shamir, “imbibe anti-Semitism with their mother's milk.”
Certainly prejudice was prevalent in pre-war Poland; but many Poles defied it. One of the bravest was Irena Sendler. As a doctor's daughter, she had been brought up in a house that was open to anyone in pain or need, Jew or gentile. In the segregated lecture halls at Warsaw University, where she studied Polish literature, she and likeminded friends deliberately sat on the “Jewish” benches. When nationalist thugs beat up a Jewish friend, she defaced her grade card, crossing out the stamp that allowed her to sit on the “Aryan” seats. For that, the university suspended her for three years. All this was good preparation for the defiance she was to show after 1939, when the Germans invaded.
She was, a friend said, “born to selflessness, not called to it”. Certainly she had good genes. A rebellious great-grandfather was deported to Siberia. Her father died of typhus in 1917, after treating patients his colleagues shunned. Many were Jewish. Leaders of the Jewish community offered money to her hard-up mother for young Irena's education. Like many social workers in pre-war Poland, Mrs Sendler belonged to the Socialist party: not for its political ideology, she said, but because it combined compassion with dislike of money-worship. No religion motivated her: she acted z potrzeby serca, “from the need of my heart”.
Under Nazi occupation the Jews of Warsaw were herded into the city ghetto: four square kilometres for around 400,000 souls. Even before the deportations to the Treblinka death camp started, death could be arbitrary and instant. Yet a paradox created a sliver of hope. Squalor and near-starvation (the monthly bread ration was two kilos, or 4.5lb) created ideal conditions for typhus, which would have killed Germans too. So the Nazis allowed Mrs Sendler and her colleagues in and out of the tightly guarded ghetto to distribute medicines and vaccinations.
That bureaucratic loophole allowed her to save more Jews than the far better known Oscar Schindler. It was astonishingly risky. Some children could be smuggled out in lorries, or in trams supposedly returning empty to the depot. More often they went by secret passageways from buildings on the outskirts of the ghetto. To save one Jew, she reckoned, required 12 outsiders working in total secrecy: drivers for the vehicles; priests to issue false baptism certificates; bureaucrats to provide ration cards; and most of all, families or religious orders to care for them. The penalty for helping Jews was instant execution.
Names in glass jars
To make matters even riskier, Mrs Sendler insisted on recording the children's details to help them trace their families later. These were written on pieces of tissue paper bundled on her bedside table; the plan was to hurl them out of the window if the Gestapo called. The Nazis did catch her (thinking she was a small cog, not the linchpin of the rescue scheme) but did not find the files, secreted in a friend's armpit. Under torture she revealed nothing. Thanks to a well-placed bribe, she escaped execution; the children's files were buried in glass jars. Mrs Sendler spent the rest of the war under an assumed name.
The idea of a heroine's treatment appalled her. “I feel guilty to this day that I didn't do more,” she said. Besides, she felt she had been a bad daughter, risking her elderly mother's life with her wartime work, a bad wife to both her husbands, and a neglectful mother. Her daughter once asked to be admitted to the children's home where her mother worked after the war, in order to see more of her.
Mrs Sendler need not have worried. Far from being honoured, she narrowly avoided a death sentence from the Communist authorities. Her crime was that her work had been authorised and financed by the Polish government-in-exile in London; later, she helped soldiers of the Home Army, the wartime resistance. Both outfits were now reviled as imperialist stooges. In 1948 repeated interrogations by the secret police in late pregnancy cost the life of her second child, born prematurely. She was not allowed to travel, and her children could not study full-time at university. “What sins have you got on your conscience, Mama?” her daughter asked her.
It was not until 1983 that the Polish authorities allowed her to travel to Jerusalem, where a tree was planted in her honour at Yad Vashem. Many of the children she had saved sought her out: now elderly themselves, all grateful, but some still yearning for details of their forgotten parents. In 2003 she received Poland's highest honour, the order of the White Eagle. It came a little late.
No regrets needed. Thank you Irena - I hope to see you on the other side.
This FbF first published in June 2008.
OK, call me old, but I like my ship's bell in polished brass.
What do you think of the LCS bell? I'm not all that inspired, but that is just me. I know some have a nice polished bell, like FREEDOM's here - but what in Neptune's name is that abomination in the pic below?
I'm more of a USS NORMANDY (CG 60) type.
That doesn't look like a cover, that look painted. Did they use the stunt bell for the photo shoot? Poor form. Let us hope that this is just a builder screw up and we can speak no more of it.
Had a chance to ponder what Israel has been doing in her corner of the Long War the last few years?
I'm discussing some interesting concepts the Israelis are working with over at USNIBlog. Come by and visit and tell me what you think.
Adversity can be a great motivator and agent of change is you have the right leaders in place to take advantage of it. Likewise, if you have an institution with an open and learning mind, you can learn a lot that was previously unseen in reality's unstressed state.
Paul Shinkman's article from last week should have you thinking if we are taking best advantage of the low-boil conflict in Eastern Ukraine by having the right people taking stock of the Ukrainian operational experience against Russia and her proxies.
It starts with a clear reminder that as the future moves forward, to rely on paper and the good will of others for your own nation's security is to invite a predator in to your home;
In the years after the collapse of the Soviet empire, the need diminished in Ukraine and elsewhere for a state-of-the-art army following Western promises it would protect these new allies in exchange for giving up their nuclear weapons, through a set of agreements known as the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances.
The most valuable part of what we are doing to help the Ukrainian military modernize, is that we are getting a few on how the Russians operate;
The pro-Russian forces, believed to be backed by Moscow directly, have perfected other 21st century warfighting techniques that make their infantry movements that much more effective. Troops here say they are harassed with "reverse text messages," prompting them to lay down their arms and quit. Their enemy has also integrated drones into its fighting formations, using them to identify targets like Danilo and his men, and firing artillery much more accurately.
...enemy targeting drones that have become ubiquitous with the fighting. In fairness, troops at the front lines and international observers say that Ukraine, too, employs drones in the war zone, despite explicit international agreements barring either side from using such technology.
...
The 25-year army veteran was also quick to point out how much he and his comrades were able to teach the Americans, who haven't focused on tank warfare following 15 years of counterinsurgency fights in the Middle East. Balkovnic also boasts his army is the only one that has fought the Russians on the ground in decades, and he's offered insights to his American counterparts on the kind of fighting he's experienced – namely drone and electronic warfare.
"It's a very different war than we have grown up training for," says U.S. Army 1st Lt. Edward Timmis, one of the trainers at the base in Yavoriv. "These guys have a very, very real threat with the mechanized [vehicles] and people that have a lot of men to back them up with equipment."
"We came in with an expectation of the caliber of soldier we'd be training and really with the first unit, we were blown away. They were very professional soldiers, obviously very experienced. It's been humbling teaching these guys and training them."
I hope that we are sending out very best officers and NCOs to Ukraine. No offense to the California National Guard, but we need those on the fast track in the regular army soaking in this. We also need our best USAF and USN EW types in country. I assume they are. If so, no reason for anyone to confirm it. If not, get to it.
There is a maritime security component to the conflict in the Sea of Azov off Mariupol and the Black Sea that I hope we have both green-water advisers and smart people watching and learning.
The Russians have had a lot of opportunities to see how we operation, we sure better be taking maximum advantage of this and Syria to get our share.
Profile in courage, I guess.
First glance takeaway; if you want a sex change but cannot afford it, join the military.
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SUBJ/SERVICE OF TRANSGENDER SAILORS AND MARINES INTERIM GUIDANCE//
REF/A/SECDEF MEMORANDUM/30JUN16//
REF/B/DOC/DODI 1300.28/30JUN16//
NARR/REF A is DTM 16-005, Military Service of Transgender Service Members. REF B is Department of Defense Instruction 1300.28, In -Service Transition for Transgender Service Members.//
RMKS/1. On June 30, 2016, the Secretary of Defense announced that the Department of Defense (DoD) had lifted the ban preventing transgender
individuals from serving their Nation in the military. The Department of the Navy (DON) remains committed to ensuring that all who are qualified and wish to serve have the opportunity to do so. Until DON policies and procedures are released, interim guidance for the service of transgender Sailors and Marines is provided in this ALNAV.
2. Consistent with the policies and procedures set forth in references (a) and (b), transgender individuals shall be allowed to serve openly in the DON. These policies and procedures are premised on the conclusion that open service by transgender Sailors and Marines, while being subject to the same standards and procedures as other members with regard to their medical fitness for duty, physical fitness, uniform and grooming, deployability, and retention, is consistent with military readiness.
3. Applicability. This policy applies to all DON military personnel, including those serving in the Reserve Components.
4. Definitions
a. Transgender Service Member. A Service Member who has received a medical diagnosis indicating that gender transition is medically necessary, including any Service Member who intends to begin transition, is undergoing transition, or has completed transition and is stable in the preferred gender.
b. Gender transition process. Gender transition in the military begins when a Service Member receives a diagnosis from a military medical provider indicating that the members gender transition is medically necessary, and concludes when the Service Members gender marker in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) is changed and the member is recognized in the preferred gender.
5. Timeline for Implementation. Policies for the service of transgender Sailors and Marines will be implemented in stages over the next year-starting most immediately with addressing the needs of current Sailors and Marines, followed by training for the entire force, and ultimately accession of transgender applicants.
a. Effective immediately
(1) Transgender Sailors and Marines may serve openly, subject to the procedures set forth in this ALNAV.
(2) Transgender Sailors and Marines will be subject to the same standards as any other member.
(3) Sailors and Marines shall not be involuntarily separated, discharged or denied reenlistment, nor continuation of service, solely on the basis of their gender identity.
(4) A Sailor or Marine whose ability to serve is adversely affected by a medical condition or medical treatment related to their gender identity should be treated in a manner consistent with a member whose ability to serve is similarly affected for reasons unrelated to gender identity or gender transition.
(5) Exceptions to Policy (ETP). DON policies and procedures related to transgender service and gender transition to include completing a gender marker change in DEERS are being developed. In the interim, requests related to transgender service and for gender transition shall be submitted through the first General or Flag Officer in the chain of command, via Chief of Naval Personnel/Deputy Commandant (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and ultimately to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)(ASN(M&RA)) for adjudication. ETPs will be addressed on a case-by-case basis, following the spirit and intent of references (a) and (b).
(6) Sailors and Marines and Commanders and Commanding Officers with questions regarding service of transgender Service Members should contact their Service Central Coordination Cell (SCCC).
b. No later than October 1, 2016.
(1) The DoD will issue a training handbook for Commanders and Commanding Officers, transgender Service Members, and the force; and medical guidance for providing transition related care to transgender members.
(2) The Military Health System will be required to provide transgender Sailors and Marines all medically necessary care related to
gender transition, based on the guidance that is issued.
(3) Reference (b) is effective October 1, 2016. Sailors and Marines will be able to begin the process to officially change their gender in personnel management systems. Once the Sailor or Marines gender marker is changed, the member will be responsible for meeting all applicable military standards in the preferred gender and will use military berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities associated with their preferred gender.
c. Between November 2016 - July 2017. DON will conduct training for every Sailor and Marine, with specialized training provided for Commanders and Commanding Officers and medical personnel.
d. No later than July 1, 2017. The Navy and Marine Corps will begin accessing transgender applicants who meet all standards. The gender identity of an otherwise qualified individual will not bar them from joining the Navy or Marine Corps, from admission to the United States Naval Academy, or from participating in Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps or any other accession program.
6. Harassment. It is DoD policy that discrimination based on gender identity is a form of sex discrimination. DoD and DON issuances are being revised to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity and to incorporate such prohibitions in all aspects of the DON Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) program.
7. Responsibilities
a. ASN(M&RA)
(1) Adjudicate ETP requests received from Sailors and Marines requesting gender transition.
(2) By November 1, 2016, promulgate a Secretary of the Navy instruction to establish policy, assign responsibilities, and prescribe
procedures for the standards of retention, accession, separation, in-service transition, and medical coverage for transgender personnel serving in the military services.
(3) Ensure all DON and Service regulations, policies, and guidance are reviewed and updated, in accordance with references (a) and (b).
b. Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps
(1) Continue to ensure that all Sailors and Marines are able to perform their duties free from unlawful discrimination. It is DON policy that discrimination based on gender identity is a form of sex discrimination.
(2) As in all cases, ensure that all Sailors and Marines are afforded the opportunity to obtain mental health care and allowed reasonable accommodations to receive medical care as recommended by their medical providers. In-service medical care for issues related to transgender service or gender transition do not require exceptions to policy.
(3) Continue support of SCCCs to provide multi-disciplinary (e.g., medical, legal, military personnel management) expert advice and assistance to Commanders with regard to service by transgender Service Members and gender transition in the military and assist Commanders in the execution of DoD, DON, and Service policies and procedures.
(4) Effective immediately, provide a weekly update to ASN(M&RA) summarizing requests for ETPs for adjudication.
(5) Effective immediately, review all Service issuances, the content of which relate to, or may be affected by, the open service of transgender Service Members, and provide a list of affected issuances to ASN(M&RA).
(6) No later than November 1, 2016, create a Service-wide training and education plan, to include specialized training for Commanders and Commanding Officers and medical personnel. The training of Sailors and Marines across the DON shall be completed no later than July 1, 2017.
(7) No later than November 1, 2016, issue implementing guidance, addressing the military service of transgender Service Members, to include establishing a process by which transgender Sailors/Marines may transition gender while serving, consistent with mission, training, operational, and readiness needs, and a procedure whereby a Sailors/Marines gender marker will be changed in DEERS.
(8) No later than November 1, 2016, provide to ASN(M&RA) a list of facility changes that may be required to fully implement references (a) and (b), with associated costs.
(9) No later than July 1, 2017, update all existing Service regulations, policies, and guidance, or promulgate new issuances as
appropriate, in accordance with references (a) and (b).
8. Points of Contact. Questions on transgender service policy should be directed to the Navy and Marine Corps SCCCs:
a. Navy SCCC: Comm: 1-855-628-9311 or email: usn_navy_sccc @navy.mil
b. Marine Corps SCCC: Comm: 703-784-9386, DSN: 278-9386 or
email: USMC.SCCC@usmc.mil
c. DoD SCCC: https://defense.gov/transgender
9. Released by Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy.//
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