Lockheed: LCS concept is a dumb idea

They don't say it in those words, but that is what I hear LMT saying.

"In fact, LCS-I appears much more suitable for international customers than the US Navy's [version of] LCS.

"The USN's LCS is designed to be part of a large naval array, while the Israelis are seeking a stand-alone, self-sufficient surface vessel," said the source. "In this respect, the USN is unique in its size and missions, while most of the world's navies are closer to the Israeli concept."

IN requirements will dictate two major differences in the LCS-I hull, compared with the US LCS: Israel intends to mount a four-face phased-array multifunction radar on the LCS, which will require a new topside structure; and unlike the USN, Israel requires the installation of the Mk 41 vertical launcher system.

Let me translate that for you:

LCS is based on a PowerPoint concept that won't work and at $300 million a pop for a hull with no mission system (add another $150-200 million) based on yet to be fielded systems - we can't sell that to anyone. The hull is solid enough to make into a nice Corvette with a phased-array radar and MK-41 - kind of a mini-Arleigh Burke. Now that can break things and kill people. The other thing is just requirement hoops from the Pentagon. Hey, we just work here. Don't blame us.

Sunday Funnies

Three tons of love

They are "natural born" Canadians.

Sources close to last night's investigation are calling the suspects arrested yesterday a "homegrown" group, meaning they are Canadian citizens or long-time residents, raised and allegedly radicalized without leaving the country. It's a phenomenon Canadian officials have been warning about for the past few years.

Nice Irish boys.

1. Fahim Ahmad, 21, Toronto;
2. Zakaria Amara, 20, Mississauga, Ont.;
3. Asad Ansari, 21, Mississauga;
4. Shareef Abdelhaleen, 30, Mississauga;
5. Qayyum Abdul Jamal, 43, Mississauga;
6. Mohammed Dirie, 22, Kingston, Ont.;
7. Yasim Abdi Mohamed, 24, Kingston;
8. Jahmaal James, 23, Toronto;
9. Amin Mohamed Durrani, 19, Toronto;
10. Steven Vikash Chand alias Abdul Shakur, 25, Toronto;
11. Ahmad Mustafa Ghany, 21, Mississauga;
12. Saad Khalid, 19, of Eclipse Avenue, Mississauga.

Now ponder our Northern border. Feel secure?

This is our world as it is; not as you wish it to be.

More from The Commissar, LGF, PajamasMedia, and ThreatsWatch. Also here, here, here, here, and here. Coming to at town near you.

Peas be upon you.

Haditha: Acknowledge. Accept. Analyze. Act.

To this point, I have not written about Haditha on purpose, and in emails with some fellow travelers I have encouraged restraint and waiting for the indictment prior to saying anything. Well, after a good night’s sleep and the assault on my theory by a brutal gang of facts on the ground as a result of a quick review of what looks like the weekend news cycle – I have changed my mind. The fog has not cleared enough to fully see what we are facing, and many of the rumors around are unsubstantiated – but one thing is clear from my little vantage point – fed with this latest fuel, the anti-victory army is on the march and regardless of what the ultimate truth is, right now they are trying to take the high ground and outflank us. Though the time is not of my choosing, at least for me, the wait is over – the battle is joined – it is time to engage. What changed my mind? Three things. First, this article on Lieutenant Colonel Chessani in The Denver Post. Secondly, Daniel Henninger’s bit in the WSJ, and finally an interview with Lt. Gen. Chiarelli this AM on NPR. Let us turn into the enemy,

When I am without orders and unexpected occurrences arrive I shall always act as I think the honor and glory of my King and Country demand. But in case signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy.

We now know, in broad terms, what is accused to have occurred WRT the Haditha incident. Regular readers know that I have been uncharacteristically quite about this. My reasons are simple – in initial reports are almost always wrong, and following reports only have a percentage of the truth. Something of this seriousness, and lets face it – in this environment it is – I wanted to wait until the charges were made and enough reports were out that I could start to get an outline of what we are looking at. Facts on the ground are such that to delay longer is just being pig-headed on my part. Mostly, I am going to avoid a day-by-day sniper war with the usual suspects on the Left. I will comment on major turning points, but all-in-all, I will let the Military Justice system take its course. If you are frustrated, angry, sad, and generally pissed off about it – yet strangely accepting of the reality – I recommend the below to you if you are looking for some advice. Hey, it could be garbage, but it works for me.

Acknowledge:
- Everyone involved in this from the judge, journalist, jury member, and accused is, as you are, a flawed human being.
- In war, there is a constant battle between instinct and training. The Upper-Paleolithic Hunter-Gatherer and the 21st Century Sophisticate. Emotion and mission. The line is thin and easily, imperceptibly crossed. Quantum Theory applies: you can be in both spaces at the same time. There is such a thing as time compression. There is such a thing as acting without thought. There are such things as memory gaps. A civilian who has been in a major traffic accident, fire, or victim of a violent crime may be able to comprehend a bit. Someone who has watched their wife almost die in childbirth may have a glimmer of understanding. A policeman who has been a significant gun battle with a well-armed criminal is close to understanding.
- Something bad may have happened. Something that is not part of US practice, policy, and procedures.

Accept:
- Not everyone in the military knows what they are talking about. Off the top of my head, I think you can roughly break military experience into nine categories; each step an additional one to the next.
-- 9: Never deployed.
-- 8: Deployed, never in combat.
-- 7: Deployed in a safe location, executing/supporting combat operations in theater.
-- 6: Deployed in a combat environment, never directly engaged by the enemy.
-- 5: Engaged the enemy with BVR (Beyond Visual Range) weapons, or an onstation enabler of CAT 1.
-- 4: Engaged by hostile forces for a short or isolated time period with no physical impact.
-- 3: Engaged by hostile forces and injured.
-- 2: Engaged in direct action with hostile forces.
-- 1: Engaged in prolonged hostile action with the enemy, on the ground, face-to-face.
----- As always, it is the very few how are CAT 1. I think that each CAT has its own view of what the military and combat is. If you are a CAT 4, you can theorize and discuss what happens at CAT 1 – but it is important to understand your limitations. The further away you are from the CAT you are talking about, the more pixilated your thoughts, opinions, or concepts are going to be.
- The Civilian world has no idea what the military is like. Some will try to understand and many will be succeed. Most do not/will not/don’t give a damn.
- This will be a press feeding frenzy. Some journalist will try to make their name off this. Some will try to be fair. Most will do what their bosses want; try to sell advertising by boosting ratings/sales.
- Good people in tough situations can do bad things.
- Good people in tough situations can make bad decisions.
- Some politicians would flay their children on live TV for political gain if they could get away with it.

Analyze:
- Where does leadership fail? At what point in the Chain of Command did someone step forward? Why didn’t others? Should they? If not, why? If so, why? What makes people in such situations turn the other way; fear, cowardice, immorality, or love?
- Being that such situations as alleged happen in every war where the enemy dresses and blends with the civilian population they swim in; have we done enough to train leaders to respond to this situation when it happens?
- As always, honestly ask the question, “What would I do?”

Act:
So, where from here? I will leave you with a quote from Daniel Henninger.

In El Paso, Texas, the father of Marine Lance Cpl. Miguel Terrazas, whose death from a roadside bomb is the event said to have precipitated the Marine shootings at Haditha, said simply: "I don't even listen to the news." This may be the widespread reaction as the Haditha story overwhelms all else--enough, I don't want to hear about it.

And there begins the Iraq Syndrome.

Some elements of the newly ascendant Democratic left may welcome it, but no serious person in American politics should.

The Vietnam Syndrome, a loss of confidence in the efficacy of American military engagement, was mainly a failure of U.S. elites. But it's different this time. This presidency has been steadfast in war. No matter. In a piece this week on the White House's efforts to rally the nation to the idea of defeating terrorism abroad to thwart another attack on the U.S., the AP's Nedra Pickler wrote: "But that hasn't kept the violence and unrest out of the headlines every day." This time the despondency looks to be penetrating the general population. And the issue isn't just body counts; it's more than that.

The missions in Iraq and Afghanistan grew from the moral outrage of September 11. U.S. troops, the best this country has yet produced, went overseas to defend us against repeating that day. Now it isn't just that the war on terror has proven hard; the men and women fighting for us, the magnificent 99%, are being soiled in a repetitive, public way that is unbearable.
The greatest danger at this moment is that the American public will decide it wants to pull back because it has concluded that when the U.S. goes in, it always gets hung out to dry.

Two major military reports will come out soon on the Haditha incident, and no one will gainsay justice if that is required. But the atmosphere around this event is going to get uncontrollably manic, and that will feed the dark, inward-turning sentiments already poisoning the country's mood over issues like the immigration debate.
Good for Democrats? Don't count on it. After this, the public appetite for a Democratic president's "humanitarian" military intervention in a Darfur or East Timor will be close to zero.

One suspects that U.S. troops were party to some awful events in the Pacific and European theaters of World War II, all gone in the mists of history and the enemy's defeat. Not now. Gen. Chiarelli's magnificent "99.9%" notwithstanding, it's the phenomenon of the so-very-public 0.01%--at Abu Ghraib, on an Afghan street, at Haditha--that is breaking America's will this time.

Fight.

---

UPDATE: For a very exceptional overview of the larger press issue, see Greyhawk's post over at The Mudville Gazette; Provocation. More solid reading by Wretchard at The Belmont Club.

Fullbore Friday

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EDITORIAL NOTE: What do I think of Haditha? I will post extended remarks by tomorrow on the subject.

---

I was having a "discussion" (shock there) with a co-worker about future ship manning levels and some of the "interesting" plans some people have for feeding Sailors on long deployments (think microwave food for 180 days).

Never underestimate the importance of good chow on a ship. Forget scurvy, weevils, and the days where EVERYTHING is served via an ice cream scoop - I say, "remember the Battleship Potemkin!"

The uprising was sparked by the second in command of the battleship (ahhhh, an Old Navy XO), who allegedly threatened reprisals against a number of the crew for their refusal to eat rotten meat. Reportedly he mustered the crew on the quarterdeck near where a tarpaulin was laid out and armed marines were drawn up. The sailors assumed that a group execution was pending and rushed the marines (themselves sailors) calling on them not to shoot. The actual events sparking off the mutiny remain uncertain and have been overshadowed by the version presented in the famous Sergei Eisenstein film "The Battleship Potemkin". Certainly discipline in the Tsarist navy was harsh and morale low following defeats in the Russo-Japanese War.

The mutineers killed a number of the officers, including Captain Evgeny Golikov, his second in command Ippolit Giliarovsky and the medical officer who had certified the meat as fit to eat. The surviving officers were placed under arrest.

Tactical ignorance - Strategic stupidity

Finally getting around to an April Navy Times article about the Navy returning to its vomit: it is going to starve and neglect Mine Warfare .... again. Anyone here remember what happened to the USS Princeton and USS Tripoli?

While sweeping further toward shore, the task group was targeted by Iraqi fire control radars associated with Silkworm missile sites inside Kuwait. Task force ships moved out of Silkworm range and worked to locate the radar site. During those maneuvers on 18 February, Iraqi mines found their mark. Within three hours of each other, Tripoli and USS Princeton (CG 59) were rocked by exploding mines. As damage control teams successfully overcame flres and flooding aboard Tripoli and Princeton, Impervious, Leader and Avenger searched for additional mines in the area. Adroit led the salvage tug USS Beaufort (ATS 2) toward Princeton to tow her to safety.

I guess not. Well, I am not going to go through the moving from TX to CA - what I want to focus on is this little tidbit:

Yet of 19 Navy ships damaged or sunk by adversaries since 1945, 15 were victims of mines.

... and every ignorant SOB of a country out there has them. Don't think you can rely on your "allies" to bring theirs either. Here is the stupid part.

All 12 of the Navy’s small MHC coastal minehunters would be decommissioned by 2008.

All of these ships of the Osprey class were commissioned from 1993 to 1999. Great LCDR commands that build great leaders. Gone again. Just stupid. And they are going to combine ASW and MIW "Centers of Excellence." Sure....why not put AAW and EW together? Here are two men smarter then me on the subject.

“When you say ‘center of excellence,’ you’re focusing in on a specific mission. When you start to blend two missions under one mission under a center of excellence, you can very easily dilute the effort,” said Al Konetzni, a retired vice admiral, who at the time was deputy commander of Fleet Forces Command.

Konetzni, a submariner, noted mine and anti-submarine warfare shared “some similarity in the water column,” but otherwise, “they’re completely different. ASW is very dynamic. Mine warfare is very static.”

Many said the command would be better placed under surface forces, where expeditionary and littoral warfare concerns are greatest.

“We don’t do minesweeping in areas where submarines operate,” said naval analyst Norman Polmar. “It would have made a lot more sense to combine the mine forces with the surface forces. They work with the surface forces and not with the submarine forces.”

There is a "White Paper" out on this that I don't have (email it if you have it, please). It is unsigned (they really should have started a blog) and moving in circles that I am not part of. The Naval Enquirer got a copy though:

“We believe the Navy’s plan to reorganize and merge Mine Warfare and Anti-Submarine Warfare is not well conceived and is focused on cost-savings and organizational/enterprise efficiencies rather than any enhanced [mine warfare] capabilities that might result,” the paper said.

“Cost-savings at the expense of required warfighting competencies is not a desirable outcome. Efficiency is not the same as effectiveness.”

That is just about perfect. More ignorance from "Big Navy" here.

The proposal to split up the community’s ships and helicopters also is drawing concern.

Sigh. My thoughts? Well, right in line with 'ole Norman.

The mine community also fears the merger will strip it of its only flag officer, further diluting its influence in a Navy where few officers have much mine experience.

“There are very few mine warfare specialists,” the retired senior officer said. “They understand ships, aircraft. They don’t understand the integrated mine warfare picture using ships, helicopters, vehicles and explosive ordnance teams.”

He said no commander of a mine squadron has ever been promoted to admiral.

Polmar is equally pessimistic.

“They will keep [the flag officer] initially and then it will disappear as we further downgrade mine warfare,” he said. “And that will continue until the next time a U.S. ship runs into a mine.”

The cost of peacetime leadership in wartime will be the bodies of Sailors consumed by Hagfish. 'Nuff said.

Video from N00's office call the other day

Seriously: there I am, sitting with the N3, when The Boss gets a call from the DESRON Commodore....

It is shocking how much it was like the following (except in real life I don't have horns - or kiss a55 that bad: well, I don't think so):