It is important reading that will enlighten some, and drive others to distraction. Put me in the second category as it puts out there what many of us have been writing about for over half a decade. None. Of. This. Should. Be. A. Shock. It. Was. Predictable. By. Any. Honest. Objective. Overview. Of. The. Direction. Our. Leadership. Was. Taking. Us.
In 2010, a Navy report found that the material readiness of its surface force had declined over the previous ten years and was well below the levels necessary to support reliable, sustained operations at sea and achieve expected ship service lives. Among other things, the report found that the declines in material readiness were attributable to reductions in the number of assessments and inspections, deferrals of scheduled maintenance, and reductions in the length of major repair periods from 15 to 9 weeks.Good stuff here for review. You know that little buggabear about technology risk we were yammer'n about WRT LCS, DDG-1000 and others? Well, that is just part of a larger problem we have in talking about and mitigating risk. A culture steeped in happy-talk does just that - avoids talking about risk. This is a cultural problem.
... the Navy has not undertaken a comprehensive assessment of risks to the implementation of its strategy, nor has it developed alternatives to mitigate its risks.Yes, and next time will you PLEASE at least have a link to CDRSalamander in the footnotes? One note of caution;
From 2010 to March 2012, INSURV data indicated a slight improvement in the material readiness of the surface combatant and amphibious warfare fleet, but over that period casualty reports from the ships increased, which would indicate a decline in material readiness.This can also be read that improvements are the RESULT of more CASREPS, but it can also be the fact that we are running ships hard and have fewer people in ship's company that can fix things themselves; maybe both?
Read it all.