After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a new Fleet Response Plan (FRP) put fighting forces at an ever-increasing operations tempo. Six-month deployments have turned into seven or even eight, and ships and units head quickly back to sea, sometimes just weeks after returning. It is not unusual for more than half the fleet's 289 ships to be underway on any given day.This has been known at the deckplate level for a years. It is a simple understanding of the facts of maintaining a Fleet of ships. Fundamentals; something that we thought we were smarter than during the Lost Decade.
But answering those bells is taking a toll on ships, budget and people. Navy leaders have concluded that something's got to change.
"We may have to dial down here," said Adm. John Harvey, commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command. "We can't do everything all the time and still sustain the fleet. There's a balance you have to reach. And I think it's up to us to articulate what that balance is and what it takes to sustain that balance over time."
The Navy's leaders are looking at nearly all aspects of how the fleet is being used: Preparation and training, cost and maintenance, operating cycles and capabilities. There is serious talk about returning to pre-FRP six-month deployments, putting the fleet on a more predictable cycle that is friendlier to shipyard periods, maintenance budgets and the personal lives of sailors.
...
The Navy and its Congressional overseers are increasingly worried that the fleet is working its ships so hard that they'll wear out years before they're supposed to. This summer, Harvey, along with a number of lawmakers, expressed such concerns when he testified in Washington before the House Armed Services Committee about the readiness of the fleet's ships.
Keeping ships in shape to make their 25-, or 30- or even 40-year planned operational life spans is fundamental to the Navy's three-decade fleet plan. And that plan is already aggressive: it will push many ships, including cruisers, destroyers and amphibious ships, as much as 10 or 15 years beyond their original design life.
Happy talk only lasts so long - then the facts of chemistry and engineering finally trump, as they always do, PPT.
"For the Navy to talk about cutting back its commitment is really an organizational change of major proportions," said one former officer familiar with the discussions. "The big picture is that there is a general retrenchment."It is called reality. It is called honest leadership. It is called doing the right thing. BZ Admiral Harvey; again.
The topic doesn't even have a particular name, sources said, and the discussion is only beginning. But it's of fundamental importance to how the entire Navy will operate.
"Controlling that demand signal is not so much saying it's invalid, it's saying here's what we can give you over the long haul," Harvey declared. "Let's make priorities. Let's make choices about what we do."
Wait ... I want to see that again.
"Let's make priorities. Let's make choices about what we do."Someone translate that into Latin and put it on a patch.
According to Google translate: <span>Faciamus priorities. </span><span>Choices faciamus nos quid :-P Maybe I'll generate up an image later.....</span>
ReplyDeleteForgive my ignorance...brought on by my lengthy self-imposed excile from this site in response to a posted purely political rant (I am one of those who prefers this blog remain professional) but....what decade would be "the Lost Decade"?
ReplyDelete2000-2010. Lost opportunities. Nansen/Visby/Absalon vs. LCS/DDG-1000/LPD-17.
ReplyDelete.... and welcome back ... and your definition of "professional" may be different than mine. I won't claim to be perfect as long as you don't JM.
... and remember - the best thing for those ideas you don't like is to respond with your own.
Looks like someone finally figured out that giving career shore duty mucky-mucks telecommuting options in the name of Life/Work, while sticking Petty Officer Timmy on back to back ten month deployments is a lot like asking about the damn strawberries.
ReplyDeleteI would use optiones for choices in the plural (or you could use electiones, but I prefer the former usage). Priorities is more sticky (my Latin is extremely rusty)...I suppose you could quaestio as it has some of the same conotation, although not the same explicit meaning.
ReplyDeleteSorry...what's the HTML tag fur turning off history and linguistics nerd-status? ;)
I realize that you want to recognize someone speaking the truth, now matter who they are. But Harvey is one of the leading crusaders in all of the diversity nonsense as well.
ReplyDelete<span><span>How about this one? </span></span><span><span>"Gravitas primoris. Faciamus quid bene agimus."</span></span>
ReplyDelete<span><span></span></span>
<span><span>Somehow I like this one better: </span></span><span>"Hayaan amin gumawa ng prayoridad. Nating gumawa ng mga pagpili tungkol sa kung ano ang ginagawa namin."</span>
<span></span>
<span>Mostly cuz of the "ano", which made me smile in remembrance. Everything ano, ultimately leading to "Hindi maliki bagay".</span>
<span></span>
<span></span>
Yes, we had posted the e-mail from him when he was a "lowly" VADM as N1. I seem to remember 16% goal of Hispanics in the Fleet. I may be remembering that incorrectly, maybe not. Maybe, now he's seeing how bad the Fleet is doing, he will prioritize his goals differently than the current CNO. My opinion, for what it is worth, is that if we give our Sailors pride in work, pride in owndership of their ship and command, treat them with respect and instill patriotism, love of country, and love of service while also ACTUALLY following the EO policy, your Sailors will do most of the recruiting for you (Big Navy).
ReplyDeleteConsistently kicking them in their reproductive organs, training them in crap (diversity, etc), not training them and equiping them for victory at sea and getting lost in the menutia (TFU) damages morale, retention, and ship force readiness.
Yes - he is a squish on that topic ... I know that well, and he is mentioned, by name, as a procuring cause - through recommendation of one of the Diversity Bullies - in the USNA IG report.
ReplyDeleteThat being said - he works for the CNO and his marching orders are clear .... as they were when he was CNP.
True believer in the Diversity diktat or good Sailor - I don't know one, the other, or both. The end effect is the same.
That being said - I don't ask for perfection in all issues as I can not produce perfection myself. I will take good over perfect any day, and ADM Harvey is better than good on balance. That is fine for me.
The hardest thing I've ever had to deal with being enlisted, is being told everything was a priority.
ReplyDeleteHow long have I been preaching this now? How much has it cost the taxpayers to NOT keep up with corrosion?
ReplyDeleteAnd what of our sailors? You know, the ones that don't know how to splice three strand nylon rope for lifelines? Huh? The ones that own systems, but don't know where the power disconnects are? Where are the sailors who used to go to SIMA to hone their repair skills?
Having got on a plane with the PC problems still hot off the press, I was frankly embarassed at what I've seen over the past few days of the International OPV conference in Cadiz, Spain. I mean come on..how is that so many other countries have such superb 1400-2800 ton offshore patrol assets while we not only have none similar..we have nobody on the 'inside' of the NAvy that would have the first clue how to design anything like what I've seen paraded across the screen for the last few days.
ReplyDeleteFair and defendable position on your part.
ReplyDeleteAs for me, I'm confident given the vantage point I had that he "was" and "is" a "true believer" and given my belief that such nonsense is the most toxic issue we are dealing with, I simply can't let it pass.
I will add that on the plus side for VADM Harvey that he is certainly devoted to his wife given some other things I saw. And I certainly respect him highly for that.
How about:
ReplyDeleteGratuitus prandium non est.
There's no free lunch.
:P
Other than that,
Cetereum censeo, LCS delendam esse!
Above all, I am sure LCS should be destroyed!
the last one around the Ghostbusters-style sign with LCS silhouette instead of a ghost
:P
It wasn't a lost decade. I can point out some very pretty slides with snazzy titles and impressive graphics.
ReplyDeleteSigned,
Powerpoint
Game, set, match to ShawnP
ReplyDeleteThe entire diversity argument will be rendered superfluous if the Navy sticks to its "enterprise business model" because there won't be any ships for the sailors to be diverse on.
ReplyDeleteI've never been a sailor and I knew the first time I heard of the FRP that it was doomed. Why? Because it basically said that maintenance would take a back seat to deployment in the event of an priority need. But it was clear that every deployment would soon be a priority need. There was no structure in place to put a damper on the demand signal. Big Navy had no way to tell the CoComs "no, you can't have those ships; we need them in the yard."
As to the Cyclone class problems, I'd actually like to see a repeat production run, with Mk38Mod2s.
ReplyDeleteI'd also like to see the Navy look at using the Javelin ATGM on them. Good range, little or no backblast from launch, day/night sensor, easy to train up on, and relatively cheap.
Not a perfect system, but I'm willing to bet it work pretty well. And pretty well now, is better than perfect sometime in the distant future.<span> </span>
I would submit that the diversity fetish not only is a distraction that takes away thought and rigor towards operational questions but it also plants the seed in the junior ranks of substandard performers who will be expected to perform in the piss-poor operational playground that is being concocted now. It's an insidious double-punch combination.
ReplyDeleteI have read that article and a few of the folks in my class on how to fix the plastic Boeing electric Hornet all talked about it over a break before class. The question that wasn't asked nor shown by either Adm Harvey or the reporter, was how with the longer deployment cycles, the Navy has basically said you don't need a social/personal life. The only thing to know is how to pack up and unpack a sea bag, a triwall with gear, and accept the only way to live ones life with thier family is via Skype,email, snail mail. Throw in a divorce lawyer here and there for some folks cause their hasn't been an off for a large number of folks. We haven't been like this in over thirty years since the Post-Vietnam, shriking of American superiority, bad economy 1970's. Yet, when grumbling in the workcenter's about the deployment cycles I have listened to leadership say they had done worst, which I have thrown the BS flag at that statement.
ReplyDeleteSweden has created coastal defence version of Hellfire... worth a try?
ReplyDeleteMaybe Coast Guard can do some designs for USN? they have been making patrol craft for, like, decades?
ReplyDeleteBut who designed the FRC? Damen...one of several companies 'over there' that are seriously capable designers/builders of well-proven large coastal patrol vessels and even larger OPVs.
ReplyDeleteThere is no shame IMO in admitting that range and mission is a vessel type we do not do very well compared to "everywhere else that designs ships for small navy's that manage small budgets" . I mean come on..the PC is an ancient hull from the Voser portfolio..as is/was the USCG Island Class..as is the FMC parent hull for the Egyptian Navy (said hull design since heavily modified..but you get my drift)
YNSN, one of these days you and Southern Air Pirate (who I know personally) will have to get together over a few beers. You two are peas in a pod...
ReplyDeleteThe higher cost: Historically low number of ships compounded by inability to sail them is that Joint planners tend to write off maritime options due to either inability to have them, get them or operationally plan for them given their long lead times and the speed of need. Should COCOM demand signal for ships dwindle and they remain silent on the hill each year, budgeteers will certainly think about divesting in Naval capability in lieu of faster/cheaper/dependable/available options despite the inability of other COAs to SUSTAIN their presence--the hallmark of the Naval force.
ReplyDeleteUS Navy leadership? WTF, I thought prioritization was saying "everything is most important" and the only right answer to any demand signal was "we'll do it, and we'll do it cheaper and with fewer people."
ReplyDeleteI'm pleasantly astonished to see someone willing to choose between competing priorities instead of just saying yes; telling the truth, and using something akin to common sense.
Is there actually hope for this organization?
Priorities and Choices.
ReplyDeleteUnfortunately, in the long decades of peace, those who are now in senior military leadership became extremely "corporate". That term is not meant in any complimentary way regarding business efficiency or demand-driven activity. No, they have become "corporate" in the pejorative way that word is used. They watched and learned that by never making a decision, one could never be criticized for making an unpopular or bad decision. By straddling the fence, they could possibly appease both parties. We have created, and then fostered, and then rewarded, a culture of willful indecisiveness.
We will not get any priorities out of people. We will be told what our priorities are, and then be expected to do precisely what was excluded from that list, and criticized because we made a decision about where to allocate training and readiness resources. Which brings us, as YNSN points out below, to where EVERYthing has priority. Which, after a very short while, means that nothing has priority. What is the Navy expected to do? Be a "Global Force for Good". So, how much time and focus and publicity is spent on building, training, and maintaining a Navy for the things listed as Navy missions in the QDR? Not bloody much.
The biggest problem with the military culture of willful indecisiveness is, of course, that in it are the seeds of our destruction. For one can be many things and be a successful military leader. Tall, short, bald, hairy, even a little fat or stupid. But one thing a leader cannot be is indecisive. Because warfare is not corporate, in spite of Madison Avenue's comparisons. On the field of battle, the enemy will gladly seize the initiative instead of waiting for your decision. And there will be hell to pay getting it back, if you can. And that cost is paid for in lives.
Yet, these are the leaders we have cultivated in senior positions in our Armed Services. The two wars in which we are engaged has only been partially successful in washing away those barnacles. The rest continue to drive us toward a position to where the enemy (or allies) will happily make the decisions for us. See "1956 Suez Crisis" and "American Loans".
Men like Mattis, and Conway, and Petraeus, and Harvey, and Dunford, stand in stark contrast to this dead weight of "corporate" leaders. We can only hope the contrast is stark enough where the culture at those levels is changed for good.
<span>Priorities and Choices.
ReplyDeleteUnfortunately, in the long decades of peace, those who are now in senior military leadership became extremely "corporate". That term is not meant in any complimentary way regarding business efficiency or demand-driven activity. No, they have become "corporate" in the pejorative way that word is used. They watched and learned that by never making a decision, one could never be criticized for making an unpopular or bad decision. By straddling the fence, they could possibly appease both parties. We have created, and then fostered, and then rewarded, a culture of willful indecisiveness.
I have grave doubts as to whether we will get any priorities out of these people. We will be told what our priorities are, and then be expected to do precisely what was excluded from that list, and criticized because we made a decision about where to allocate training and readiness resources. Which brings us, as YNSN points out below, to where EVERYthing has priority. Which, after a very short while, means that nothing has priority. What is the Navy expected to do? Be a "Global Force for Good". So, how much time and focus and publicity is spent on building, training, and maintaining a Navy for the things listed as Navy missions in the QDR? Not bloody much.
The biggest problem with the military culture of willful indecisiveness is, of course, that in it are the seeds of our destruction. For one can be many things and be a successful military leader. Tall, short, bald, hairy, even a little fat or stupid. But one thing a leader cannot be is indecisive. Because warfare is not corporate, in spite of Madison Avenue's comparisons. On the field of battle, the enemy will gladly seize the initiative instead of waiting for your decision. And there will be hell to pay getting it back, if you can. And that cost is paid for in lives.
Yet, these are the leaders we have cultivated in senior positions in our Armed Services. The two wars in which we are engaged has only been partially successful in washing away those barnacles. The rest continue to drive us toward a position to where the enemy (or allies) will happily make the decisions for us. See "1956 Suez Crisis" and "American Loans".
Men like Mattis, and Conway, and Petraeus, and Harvey, and Dunford, stand in stark contrast to this dead weight of "corporate" leaders. We can only hope the contrast is stark enough where the culture at those levels is changed for good.</span>
<span><span>Priorities and Choices.
ReplyDeleteUnfortunately, in the long decades of peace, those who are now in senior military leadership became extremely "corporate". That term is not meant in any complimentary way regarding business efficiency or demand-driven activity. No, they have become "corporate" in the pejorative way that word is used. They watched and learned that by never making a decision, one could never be criticized for making an unpopular or bad decision. By straddling the fence, they could possibly appease both parties. We have created, and then fostered, and then rewarded, a culture of willful indecisiveness.
I have grave doubts as to whether we will get any priorities out of these people. We will be told what our priorities are, and then be expected to do precisely what was excluded from that list, and criticized because we made a decision about where to allocate training and readiness resources, and we will have been wrong for following guidance. Which brings us, as YNSN points out below, to where EVERYthing has priority. Which, after a very short while, means that nothing has priority. What is the Navy expected to do? Be a "Global Force for Good". So, how much time and focus and publicity is spent on building, training, and maintaining a Navy for the things listed as Navy missions in the QDR? Not bloody much.
The biggest problem with the military culture of willful indecisiveness is, of course, that in it are the seeds of our destruction. For one can be many things and be a successful military leader. Tall, short, bald, hairy, even a little fat or stupid. But one thing a leader cannot be is indecisive. Because warfare is not corporate, in spite of Madison Avenue's comparisons. On the field of battle, the enemy will gladly seize the initiative instead of waiting for your decision. And there will be hell to pay getting it back, if you can. And that cost is paid for in lives.
Yet, these are the leaders we have cultivated in senior positions in our Armed Services. The two wars in which we are engaged has only been partially successful in washing away those barnacles. The rest continue to drive us toward a position to where the enemy (or allies) will happily make the decisions for us. See "1956 Suez Crisis" and "American Loans".
Men like Mattis, and Conway, and Petraeus, and Harvey, and Dunford, stand in stark contrast to this dead weight of "corporate" leaders. We can only hope the contrast is stark enough where the culture at those levels is changed for good.</span></span>
Well, what I really like about the Javelin for application on a Cyclone class is that it has virtually no backblast at launch.
ReplyDeleteReally, no mods at all are needed for the ship. And training a crewmember is a matter of hours, not weeks.
Vern Clark the gift that keeps on giving.
ReplyDeleteFor a long time now I have been refering to him as the "Second worst CNO-ever". I may have to revise that estimate to "the worst CNO ever".
Having cruised in the 1980's when deployment extensions had to be approved by SECDEF-it was truly sad to watch Uncle Vern create FRP as a way to keep the Navy "relevant". And as a result five carriers were dedicated to OIF when only three were really required. Maybe they needed five airwings-but Al Udeid was around and open for business.
As a result USS Abraham Lincoln got an 11 month cruise-just to make sure the F-18 E and F got to play. Air threat in Iraq? Zero point zero. Their reward for a job well done? Three cruises in three years. 2004 found them right back out in Westpac.
Uncle Vern's reward for a job not well done? "Welcome the boardroom Mr. Clark!"
Thanks Vern. Thanks for nothing.
Gimp asks... "is there is hope for the organization"?
ReplyDeleteNot sure about hope for the organization, as Skippy pointed out, CNO Vern keeps on giving, over a long cycle which is the challenge with selecting leaders that leave legacies, like little ticking time bombs when priorities are not set. And bills to be paid. Off topic, but today, I see CJCS Mike Mullen has declared suicides the latest "emergency" for DOD, and maybe it is. To be clear, this is not to lessen the impact an increased servicemember suicide rate has. Families, communities, friends, and more all suffer, and obviously there must be suffering by the person prior to the act. It pains me to read of 5 deceased young troopers at Ft. Hood. It's downright tragic when a young service member takes their own life, much less someone more mature, or a civilian, or as a result of service. But you know what Mike, people, particularly in the ground forces are stressed with the deployment cycles and combat plus crappy leadership. For all the supposed help available, it's not enough, and you can't tell me that it's not frowned upon still to seek help for those in uniform, wherever they are. The show goes on, and everything remains important, all doing more with less....Platforms, and people are stressed, and NOW the 'leadership' is reacting as an emergency? Uh, Mike, we're 9 years into combat dude; where were you other than pandering to the diversity crowd and being "corporate" over the last decade or more?
Skippy,
ReplyDeleteI was at the USNI warfare expo in Va Beach in '02 and listen to Adm. Clark put out his "Seapower 21" plan (which is still being taught as viable via NKO courses on the NSS). I challenged him at the post presentation Q&A and I didn't grab a mic to be recorded, but I basically told him that technology and forward sea basing isn't going to work if we don't have the supply train to support it. We had proved that over forty plus years before in the 60's durinv Vietnam and then the immediate post Vietnam 70's. He gave me a retort that was basically the W.C. Fields line of "go away kid your bothering me" cause I didn't understand the three levels of war and his plan was going to work. The next day when I was went to the morning briefing on reduced manning presented by some other admiral. Just after that broke up members of the OpNav CPO mafia cornered me and told me that I was wrong for disrespecting the CNO like that in a public forum. I looked at one of these CPO's and told him that it is our duty to say if the emperor has no clothes then we need to speak up. Otherwise stifling debate and only generating "yes,sirs" is going to cut our own throats. That thought hit that khaki wall and just dropped dead right there like a rat bit by a Habu. I realized that within the five-sided wind tunnel the only way to succeed to climb on the handles of knifes on your way to the top, while smiling and nodding your head yes to your boss.
Your point about the supply chain is most correct. I was involved in aviation supply planning for OIF. In the fall of 2002 we pointed out to CNAP ( later to become CNAF)-that there was not enough capacity in the airlift system to support five CV's and that the Navy needed to begin buying more space on AMC channels now if it hoped to have enough room in the pipeline. The idea was dismissed.
ReplyDeleteSure enough in February, less than a month before OIF kicked off the back log in parts waiting to get to the CV's was huge. Somehow they did not like it when we said "we told you this was going to happen."
I'm sure it was cheaper to ship via DHL or FEDEX with the same result and greater visability. God knows that was our experience.
ReplyDeleteBill, I was impressed by the ROK PCs. Tough looking ships. Taken down by a single torpedo because that was not their forte. We've got to move beyond the idea that we can have 6 different ships of the line and frigates too. The idea 300 years ago that frigates could decline battle with any ship of the line. That's old think. That stupid old SWO graphic of up, down all around is the lowest limit in a modern warship. It must be able to conduct effective air and missile defense and it needs to be able to destroy surface targets OTH and it must be able to detect submarines and engage them. Anything less is a waste of money and lives.
ReplyDeleteOne of my least favorite CO's told me that he only had 5 #1 priorities. He was one of the few losers that never made it beyond LCDR CO.
ReplyDeleteActually XBradTC there is a significant "go thee to hell" route that big navy can and does take or little navy can and does take with regard to COCOM demand signals. Little navy just points to the Red Lines and says "no". Big navy asks the COCOM to weigh in heavily, very heavily with the next POM and demand an increase in base force to meet the deployed commitments. Look at the increases in SPECWAR deployable force or some of the SPECOPS deployable force. The war in Af requires a zero.zero ship of any psize. Why are they deploying? The war in Iraq, ditto. Why are we deploying ships? The whole Partnership for Peace and other nonsense deployments are make work and not worth a single pipe wrench. Look at our laughingly described "anti-piracy" make work in the Red Sea! It's as hollow as our warship support to the various anti-drug task forces. All of it makework except perhaps the ABM mission which, on the face of it is purely stupid to start with. Oh it may work but don't we think it would be more cost effective to just put them ashore?
ReplyDeleteactually, shore-based SM-3 is in the works for deployment in Poland, AFAIK... unless this was just Obama's sweet talk (I hope not...)
ReplyDeleteBut mobile ABM defence comes in handy as carriers might need it soon against PLA/AF/AN - btw do we really know who is managing them? - ASBMs
新年を寂しく過ごしている方に必見。まだ間に合う出逢いのサイトです。冬休み後半の思い出作りに異性と過ごしませんか？今から始まる異性との新たな関係を築き、一年の初めを良い思い出に変えましょう
ReplyDelete