It kind of speaks for itself. I'll bold items I find, well, interesting.
R 081811Z JUL 05 PSN 162650I20Anyone fired yet?
FM PRESINSURV NORFOLK VA
TO RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHMFIUU/ASSTSECNAV RDA WASHINGTON DC//SP// RUENAAA/ASSTSECNAV RDA WASHINGTON DC//SP// RUCBCLF/COMFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA//NOO/N1/N43/N6// RUCBCLF/COMLANTFLT NORFOLK VA//NOO/N01/N43/N6// RUWDEAB/COMNAVSURFOR SAN DIEGO CA//N00/N1/N4/N6/N42/N43/N434A13//RHMFIUU/CMC WASHINGTON DC//MCPOR11//RHMFIUU/COMMARFORLANT//00//RHMFIUU/COMNAVNETWARCOM NORFOLK VA//N3/N6// RUENAAA/NAVINSGEN WASHINGTON DC//OO// RHMFIUU/COMNAVSEASYSCOM WASHINGTON DC //00/SEA03/03D/03D5/04/04M/04R/04X/04L/05/05D/05J/05N/05P/05Z/06//RULSSEA/COMNAVSEASYSCOM WASHINGTON DC//00/SEA03/03D/03D5/04/04M/04R/04X/04L/05/05D/05J/05N/05P/05Z/06//RULSDMA/PEO SHIPS WASHINGTON DC//SHIPS-F/PMS317/PMS470// RHMFIUU/PEO C4I AND SPACE SAN DIEGO CA//00/C4I// RULSSBL/PEO IWS WASHINGTON DC//00// RHMFIUU/BUMED WASHINGTON DC//M3F/M3FA// RHMFIUU/NAVICP MECHANICSBURG PA//NAVICP-04// RHMFIUU/COMNAVSUPSYSCOM MECHANICSBURG PA//4C3/51// RHMFIUU/NAVPERSDEVCOM NORFOLK VA//N5// RHMFIUU/NAVSURFWARCEN PANAMA CITY FL RHMFIUU/NAVSURFWARCENDIV CORONA CA//QA33// RHMFIUU/COMSPAWARSYSCOM SAN DIEGO CA//00/04/04F/05// RHMFIUU/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PATUXENT RIVER MD //NAIR00/PMA213/PMA251/PMA260// RHMFIUU/NAVSURFWARCEN SHIPSYSENGSTA PHILADELPHIA PA//9126// RHMFIUU/NAVSURFWARCENDIV PORT HUENEME CA//00// RHMFIUU/NAVSURFWARCENDIV CRANE IN//FLO// RHMFIUU/NAVUNSEAWARCENDIV NEWPORT RI//8332// RHMFIUU/SPAWARSYSCEN CHARLESTON SC//00/09/OF/30/50/60/70// RHMFIUU/SPAWARSYSCEN NORFOLK VA//00/01// RHMFIUU/SPAWARSYSCEN CHARLESTON DET NORFOLK VA//01// RHMFIUU/SPAWARSYSCEN SAN DIEGO CA//200/260// RHMFIUU/COMNAVSAFECEN NORFOLK VA//00/30// RHMFIUU/NAVY JAG WASHINGTON DC//31// RHMFIUU/COMNAVSAFECEN NORFOLK VA//00/30// RUCOBRO/COMAFLOATRAGRU ATLANTIC NORFOLK VA//00// RHMFIUU/SWOSCOLCOM NEWPORT RI//60// RUCOFAJ/COMREGSUPPGRU NORFOLK VA//00/01/N43// RHMFIUU/SUPSHIP GULF COAST MS//00/117/200/300// RUCOFAJ/MIDLANT RMC NORFOLK VA//213/4100// RHMFIUU/COMOPTEVFOR NORFOLK VA//70/75// RHBOZMB/COMPHIBGRU TWO RHQHSAN/PRECOMUNIT SAN ANTONIO RHMFIUU/PRESINSURV NORFOLK VA
BT ### THIS IS A 4 SECTIONED MESSAGE COLLATED BY LMDS ### UNCLAS PART I OF III. PART II DTG 081812ZJUL05, PART III DTG 081813ZJUL05 MSGID/GENADMIN/PRESINSURV NORFOLK VA/-/JUL/
SUBJ/INSURV REPORT FOR PCU SAN ANTONIO (LPD 17) ACCEPTANCE TRIAL (AT) / RMKS/
1. THE BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY CONDUCTED AN AT IN PCU SAN ANTONIO (LPD 17) AT PASCAGOULA, MS DURING THE PERIOD 27 JUN-1 JUL 05 (INPORT ONLY). THE UNDERWAY PORTION OF THIS AT WAS LINKED FROM THE BUILDERS TRIAL CONDUCTED 26 APR-3 MAY 05. A FOLLOW-ON PRE-SAILAWAY UNDERWAY TRIAL WILL BE CONDUCTED DATE TBD TO VERIFY THE COMPLETION OF THE VESSEL AND OBSERVE THOSE EVENTS THAT COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED BECAUSE OF EITHER INOPERATIVE EQUIPMENT OR INCOMPLETE INSTALLATION. THE BOARD RECOMMENDS THE CNO AUTHORIZE COMNAVSEASYSCOM TO ACCEPT DELIVERY PROVIDED ALL STARRED DEFICIENCIES HAVE BEEN CORRECTED OR WAIVED BY CNO PRIOR TO ACCEPTANCE.
2. SENIOR MEMBER COMMENTS:
A. PCU SAN ANTONIO IS AN INCOMPLETE SHIP. HOWEVER, AS OBSERVED DURING BUILDERS SEA TRIAL (WITH ALL UNDERWAY DEMOS ACHIEVING SATISFACTORY EOC GRADES), PCU SAN ANTONIO IS A HIGHLY CAPABLE PLATFORM WITH GREAT POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE USEFUL SERVICE TO THE FLEET. (not a nice sentence in Navy FITREP talk) AS IS OBSERVED IN ALL FIRST SHIPS OF A NEW CLASS, SPACE COMPLETION REPRESENTS A CHALLENGE TO THE SHIPBUILDER. OF THE 943 SPACES IN SAN ANTONIO (NOT INCLUDING TANKS, VOIDS, ETC.), 25 SPACES ARE GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED, 199 SPACES ARE GOVERNMENT-INSPECTED COMPLETE, AND 433 SPACES COMPLETED THE BUILDERS PRELIMINARY INSPECTION PROCESS. THE REMAINING 286 SPACES ARE EITHER NOT INSPECTED OR INCOMPLETE. THIS SHIP IS NOT READY FOR SHIPS FORCE MOVE ABOARD. SAFETY DEFICIENCIES EXIST THROUGHOUT THE SHIP AS SIGNIFICANT INDUSTRIAL WORK CONTINUES. SECURITY OF SHIPS FORCE SPACES WILL BE CHALLENGED BY THE AMOUNT OF INDUSTRIAL WORK REMAINING. SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CONTROL AND FIREFIGHTING SYSTEMS REMAIN EITHER UNFINISHED OR INOPERATIVE. IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT IDENTIFIED SAFETY AND SECURITY ISSUES BE RESOLVED PRIOR TO CREW MOVE ABOARD.(Ummm, yep)
B. POOR CONSTRUCTION AND CRAFTSMANSHIP STANDARDS ARE EVIDENT THROUGHOUT THE SHIP AND ARE MANIFESTED IN NUMEROUS WAYS. DESPITE GREAT EFFORTS TO CORRECT MANY ISSUES, SOME REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES. SAN ANTONIO WILL BE PLAGUED BY ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONIC CABLE PLANT INSTALLATION DEFICIENCIES THROUGHOUT ITS ENTIRE SERVICE LIFE IF CURRENTLY-PLANNED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE NOT COMPLETED. POOR INSTALLATION PRACTICES HAVE RESULTED IN UNSAT WIREWAY CONDITIONS. POOR INITIAL CABLE-PULLING PRACTICE LED TO WHAT IS NOW A SNARLED, OVER-PACKED, POORLY-ASSEMBLED, AND VIRTUALLY UNCORRECTABLE ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONIC CABLE PLANT. WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY IS COMPROMISED THROUGHOUT THE SHIP BY NUMEROUS MULTI-CABLE TRANSITS THAT MAY NEVER ACHIEVE WATERTIGHTNESS WITHOUT EITHER THE USE OF RISE IN LOCATIONS INSIDE AND BELOW THE V-LINES, OR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SPECIAL SEALING TECHNIQUE.
C. SHIP-WIDE ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION ENCLOSURES TO INCLUDE POWER PANELS, CONTROLLERS, FUSE BOXES, AND JUNCTION BOXES HAD SIGNIFICANT ELECTRICAL DISCREPANCIES. WIRING, HARDWARE, CIRCUIT LABEL PLATE IDENTIFICATION, AND ENCLOSURE CLEANING WERE NOT COMPLETED SHIP-WIDE.
D. FINAL PRESERVATION WAS NOT COMPLETE SHIP-WIDE. CORROSION IS PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE SHIP. ALTHOUGH SIGNIFICANT CORROSION CONTROL DESIGN INITIATIVES HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO SAN ANTONIO (CRES MATERIALS TOPSIDE, HIGH SOLID PAINTS IN THE WELL DECK, ETC), AFFECTED AREAS CAN BE OBSERVED NEARLY EVERYWHERE, BUT ARE WORSE IN THE WELLDECK (PROBABLY SURFACE RUST ONLY), VEHICLE STOWAGE AREAS, PASSAGEWAYS, ACCOMMODATION LADDERS AND ASSOCIATED STOWAGE SPACES, SIDEPORT DOORS AND ASSOCIATED SPACES, WEATHER DECKS INCLUDING THE RESCUE BOAT DECK AND MISSION BOAT VALLEY, THE SUPERSTRUCTURE, AND BOTH MAIN AND AUXILIARY MACHINERY SPACE BILGES. PRESENT CONDITIONS SUGGEST THAT INSUFFICIENT BASE METAL PREPARATION IS THE ROOT CAUSE. ADDITIONALLY, LACK OF SUFFICIENT WEATHER DECK DRAINS PROMOTES STANDING WATER AND WILL EXACERBATE THIS ALREADY SIGNIFICANT CORROSION CONTROL PROBLEM. THE SHIPBUILDER IS AWARE OF THESE CORROSION CHALLENGES AND HAS PLANNED CORRECTIVE ACTION. NONE OF THE AREAS IDENTIFIED ABOVE HAVE, AS YET, BEEN PRESENTED TO GOVERNMENT QUALITY ASSURANCE.
E. FOLLOWING DEFICIENCIES WILL PREVENT WELLDECK CERTIFICATION: JP-5 FUELING STATION INSTALLATION IS INCOMPLETE, DISTILLED WATER SYSTEM INSTALLATION WAS INCOMPLETE, LCAC ALIGNMENT MARKERS WERE MISSING, AND LCAC LINE-UP STRIPES WERE MISSING.
F. ALTHOUGH NOT AN OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT (ORD) REQUIREMENT, BUILDERS SPECS INCLUDED THE INCORPORATION OF SIGNIFICANT RADAR CROSS-SECTION (RCS) REDUCTION TECHNOLOGY. AS SHIP CONSTRUCTION PROGRESSED, DESIGN REDUCTION DECISIONS WERE MADE BECAUSE OF CONSTRAINED FUNDING. RCS EFFECTIVENESS IS NOW REDUCED. FINAL IMPACT WILL REMAIN UNKNOWN UNTIL FOLLOW-ON TESTING IS PERFORMED. ADDITIONAL MODIFICATIONS MAY BE REQUIRED TO REDUCE THE EFFECT OF RCS HOT SPOTS. SUSPECTED HOT SPOTS INCLUDE: RESCUE BOAT POCKET LACKED A ROLLER CURTAIN AND THE BULKHEADS IN THE POCKET WERE UNTREATED, LIFERAFT RCS COVERS WERE NOT FUNDED, VENTILATION FAN ROOM SUCTION VENT LOUVERS WERE NOT FUNDED, 01-LEVEL SHORE POWER CABLE PANEL HAD ROUND VERSUS SQUARE TUBING, NUMEROUS TOPSIDE POCKETS (LOUD SPEAKERS, LP AIR SERVICE CONNECTIONS, FLIGHT DECK WHEEL STOPS, FIRE STATIONS, ETC.) LACKED COVERS AND MAY REPRESENT HOT SPOTS, MOORING CHOCKS, UNDERSIDES OF BRIDGEWINGS, CATWALKS, SLQ-32 PLATFORMS, ETC., ALL LACKED EITHER RCS SHROUDS OR COVERS.
G. FLEX HOSES ON OEM UNITS THROUGHOUT THE SHIP LACKED FLEX HOSE DATA TAGS (MPACS, LPACS, BAL/DEBAL HPUS, RESCUE BOAT DAVIT, BOAT AND CARGO CRANE, SIDE PORT DOORS, CPP OD BOXES, EMERGENCY CRP HAND PUMPS, ETC).
H. OVER 50 PERCENT OF MECHANICAL GAGES AND SWITCHES THROUGHOUT THE SHIP WILL BE OVERDUE FOR CALIBRATION EITHER AT OR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING SHIP CUSTODY TRANSFER. AVONDALE FACILITY OF NGSS IS NOT A CERTIFIED NAVY CALIBRATION ACTIVITY.
I. WATER MIST EXCESS FLOW VALVES WERE FOUND TO BE UNSUITABLE AND MODIFIED. EXCESS FLOW VALVES ARE DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN SYSTEM PRESSURE AND PREVENT FLOODING DURING ACTIVATION IF A HIGH PRESSURE NOZZLE IS REMOVED OR DAMAGED. MMR 1 HAS 11 GPM SPRING-LOADED VALVES INSTALLED, WHICH HAVE PROVEN THROUGH TESTING TO BE UNSATISFACTORY. EXCESS FLOW VALVES IN THE OTHER FOUR MAIN ENGINEERING SPACES HAVE BEEN MODIFIED. A TESTED AND PROVEN ORIFICE-BASED SYSTEM WILL BE INSTALLED AND TESTED DURING THE POST-SHAKEDOWN AVAILABILITY.
J. SEVERAL ECS CASUALTIES WERE OBSERVED DURING TRIALS. SPECIFICALLY, A LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSOCIATED INSTABILITY WERE OBSERVED TWICE WHILE UNDERWAY DURING THE BUILDERS TRIAL. THIS INSTABILITY WAS CAUSED BY VRTU (DAUS) BUFFER MEMORY OVERLOAD. DURING PART I OF III. PART II DTG 081812ZJUL05, PART III DTG 081813ZJUL05 MSGID/GENADMIN/PRESINSURV NORFOLK VA/-/JUL/ SUBJ/INSURV REPORT FOR PCU SAN ANTONIO (LPD 17) ACCEPTANCE TRIAL (AT) OF UNKNOWN STATUSES DISPLAYED ON OPERATING CONSOLES AND LOCK UP OF VARIOUS VRTUS (DAUS). LOCAL CONTROL WAS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF PLANT EQUIPMENT. DURING THE AT, ECS EXHIBITED A SIMILAR INSTABILITY. THIS INSTABILITY WAS CAUSED BY THE FAILURE OF A CORE SWITCH ON THE SWAN. IN EACH CASE, ECS AND SCS HAD TO BE RESET IN ORDER TO REGAIN CONTROL. THERE ARE NO INTERNAL DIAGNOSTICS TO MONITOR ECS HEALTH TO DETERMINE ANY FAULTS IN ECS HARDWARE. ECS EVENT VIEWER IS CONSTANTLY SCROLLING ALARM CHANGES MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO TRACK CURRENT ALARMS AND TO LOOK AT THE ALARM HISTORY.
K. LOAD CENTERS 21 AND 22 LOCAL/REMOTE SELECTOR SWITCHES DID NOT DISABLE THE SHORE POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER MASTER SYNCHRONIZER AND LOAD CONTROLLERS WHEN IN THE LOCAL POSITION. THIS PREVENTS ACCOMPLISHMENT OF EOSS PROCEDURE SPRU. WHEN THE SHORE POWER BREAKER IS CLOSED THE ONLINE SSDG WILL UNLOAD.
L. THERE WERE 389 GFE AND 150 CFE OUTSTANDING SHOCK QUALIFICATIONS, COVERING THOUSANDS OF INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS. THE PROGRAM MANAGER HAS A ROBUST SHOCK DEFICIENCY CORRECTION PLAN AND IS COMMITTED TO ACCOMPLISH QUALIFICATION OF THE REMAINING UNQUALIFIED ITEMS.
M. THE AFT AEMS INTERNAL ACCESS LADDER WAS NOT SAFE TO ERECT OR USE. THE LADDER APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO A COMBINATION OF SAFETY STANDARDS AND DID NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE FALL ARREST SYSTEM OR WEIGHT BEARING ABILITY. ADDITIONALLY, THE EFFORT REQUIRED TO ERECT THE LADDER WAS TIME CONSUMING AND REQUIRED SIX PERSONNEL VERSUS THE TWO REQUIRED BY SPEC. INSTALLATION WAS INCOMPLETE DURING THE TIME OF TESTING. CONSIDERABLE ENGINEERING EFFORT HAS GONE INTO THE DESIGN OF THIS LADDER, BUT SIGNIFICANT SAFETY AND MAINTAINABILITY ISSUES REMAIN.
N. THE CLEARANCE FOR MILITARY VEHICLES WAS DEGRADED IN THE MAIN, LOWER (AFT), UPPER VEHICLE STOWAGE AREAS AND FLIGHT DECK RAMP BECAUSE OF OBSTACLES OR PROTRUSIONS, VERTICAL CLEARANCES NOT MEETING MINIMUM REQUIREMENT, AND MISSING GUARDRAILS OR CURBS. ADDITIONALLY, WELL DECK, UPPER VEHICLE, FORWARD, AFT, AND BRIDGE HINGED RAMPS WERE MISSING GUARDRAILS OR CURBS.
O. DUE TO SWAN COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS WITH SCS AND ECS END USER SYSTEMS, SWAN CASUALTY MODE TESTING WAS SUSPENDED. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY COMMUNICATION PATHS RUN THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL NODE ROOMS AND CREATE A SINGLE POINT OF FAILURE FOR ECS SYSTEM.
P. THROUGHOUT THE SHIP THERE WERE LADDERS MISSING PINS, HANDRAILS MISSING PINS, SAFETY CHAINS MISSING AT HATCHES AND ON LADDERS, HATCHES MISSING SUPPORT STANCHIONS OR THEY ONLY HAD ONE STANCHION HOLDING THE HATCH OPEN. LADDERS WERE MISSING CLIMBER SAFETY RAILS, HAND GRABS, AND/OR DID NOT EXTEND HIGH ENOUGH TO SAFETY ACCESS THE NEXT LEVEL. LIFERAILS WERE MISSING ON MANY TOPSIDE SPACES CREATING A FALL HAZARD.
Q. NUMEROUS EYEWASH STATION INSTALLATIONS THROUGHOUT THE SHIP WERE INCOMPLETE, AND ALARMS WERE NOT CONNECTED OR TESTED. ADDITIONALLY, PLUMBED EYEWASH STATION OPERATING VALVES OPERATED BACKWARDS.
R. BASELINE NOISE AND HEAT STRESS SURVEYS COULD NOT BE ADEQUATELY COMPLETED BECAUSE VENTILATION SYSTEMS WERE INCOMPLETE AND UNBALANCED. VENTILATION MEASUREMENTS COULD NOT BE TAKEN TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE SPEC BECAUSE CPS WAS NOT ABLE TO BE SET BECAUSE OF THE INCOMPLETE AND UNBALANCED VENTILATION SYSTEMS.
S. VENTILATION SYSTEMS WERE INCOMPLETE SHIP-WIDE. OF GREATEST CONCERN WAS THE LACK OF PERMANENT VENTILATION IN HAZARDOUS SPACES (JP-5 PUMP ROOMS, VCHT PUMPROOMS, HAZMAT STORAGE SPACES, PAINT LOCKER, ETC.). TEMPORARY AND DISCONNECTED VENT DUCTING WAS PREVALENT ON THE 2ND DECK AND THE PLATFORMS BELOW IT.
T. FAS STATION 1 JP-5 RISER FLANGE WAS INCORRECTLY LOCATED AND MISSING A CHECK VALVE. THE DFM RISER FLANGE WAS ALSO INCORRECTLY LOCATED. NUMEROUS EQUIPMENT AND FITTINGS WERE NOT INSTALLED INCLUDING MESSENGER FAIRLEAD PADEYES, GYPSY WINCH CLEAT, GYPSY WINCH MASTER OPERATOR, PROBE RECEIVERS, STATION-TO-STATION PHONE LINE CLEAT, AND CHAFFING BAR.
U. FAS STATION 5 JP-5 RISER FLANGE WAS INCORRECTLY LOCATED AND MISSING A CHECK VALVE. ADDITIONALLY, THE JP-5 RISER DECK PENETRATION POSITIONED THE RISER DIRECTLY IN THE WAY OF THE STATIONS FORWARD DOOR. IN AN EMERGENCY, THIS DOOR IS THE EGRESS POINT FOR A MAJORITY OF STATION PERSONNEL. THE DFM RISER FLANGE WAS ALSO INCORRECTLY LOCATED. NUMEROUS EQUIPMENT AND FITTINGS WERE NOT INSTALLED INCLUDING MESSENGER FAIRLEAD PADEYES, GYPSY WINCH CLEAT, GYPSY WINCH MASTER OPERATOR, PROBE RECEIVERS, STATION-TO-STATION PHONE LINE CLEAT, AND CHAFING BAR.
V. A PRE-SAILAWAY TRIAL FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THE SHIP (TBD) WILL REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING DEMOS/REDEMOS: FULL POWER REDEMO, STERN GATE REDEMO, RO UNITS REDEMO, STEERING REDEMO, POTABLE WATER REDEMO, ELECTRIC PLANT POWER MANAGEMENT, CATHODIC PROTECTION, DARKEN SHIP, VARIOUS IC SYSTEMS, PILOT DEBARK STATION, PORT ACCOM LADDER, PORT SIDE PORT DOOR AND CARGO CRANE, PORTABLE SIDEPORT RAMP, VEHICLE CLEARANCE, HINGED RAMPS, LIFE RAFT MANUAL RELEASE DEVICE, FAS STATIONS, MISSION BOATS, WATERTIGHT DOORS, CPS, WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY, BALLAST/DEBALLAST REDEMO, DTE REDEMO, CMWWDS, IPDS, DECON, SMOKE EJECTION SYSTEM, HFP SYSTEMS OUTSIDE THE MACHINERY PLANT, SALT WATER SPRINKLING SYSTEMS OUTSIDE THE MACHINERY PLANT, TEMP AND SMOKE ALARM, SCBA CHARGING AND BREATHING AIR MAIN, VARIOUS NON-MACHINERY SPACE AFFF SPRINKLING SYSTEMS, AIRBORNE NOISE SURVEY, HEAT STRESS SURVEY, DSVL REDEMO, FLUX GATE COMPASS REDEMO, NIXIE, VARIOUS COMMS, TACAN REDEMO, IFF REDEMO, SLQ-32 REDEMO, 23TV, BFTT, ENGINEERING CONTROL SYSTEM RELIABILITY, AT/FP LOAD-OUT, DEGAUSSING, AMMO HANDLING ROUTES, FATHOMETER PERFORMANCE, MAGAZINE SPRINKLER CHECKS, AMMO READY SERVICE LOCKER INSPECTIONS, ARMORY AND MAGAZINE INSPECTIONS, RAM MOD 3 INSPECTION, CREW-SERVED WEAPONS STATIONS INSPECTIONS, MK 46 30MM GUN SYSTEM INSPECTION/DEMO, SSES AT-SEA DEMO, KSQ-1 DEMO, DWBTS, GCCS-M, LINK 11/16, MEDICAL FACILITIES, DENTAL FACILITIES, EYEWASH STATIONS, OWS, PLASTIC AND SOLID WASTE SYSTEMS, WORK SHOP SAFETY, SAFETY NETS, JP-5 SYSTEM DEMONSTRATION, AND AVIATION SUPPORT FACILITIES DEMONSTRATION).
W. SHIPBUILDER-PROVIDED CREW TRAINING IN THIS SHIPBUILDING YARD FALLS SHORT OF OTHER NEW CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS. IN THE TICONDEROGA-CLASS SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM OVER 25 CREW TRAINING COURSES WERE PROVIDED. IN THE ARLEIGH BURKE-CLASS SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM OVER 25 CREW TRAINING COURSES WERE PROVIDED. THE SAN ANTONIO-CLASS SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM IS CURRENTLY COMPRISED OF ONLY SIX GENERAL FAMILIARIZATION COURSES. THIS IMPACT IS MITIGATED IN SAN ANTONIO BY CONSTRUCTION DELAYS WHICH HAVE PROVIDED FOR MORE TRAINING TIME, BUT PART I OF III. PART II DTG 081812ZJUL05, PART III DTG 081813ZJUL05 MSGID/GENADMIN/PRESINSURV NORFOLK VA/-/JUL/ SUBJ/INSURV REPORT FOR PCU SAN ANTONIO (LPD 17) ACCEPTANCE TRIAL (AT) WILL BECOME A FACTOR IN FUTURE CREWS OF FOLLOW-ON PRECOMM UNITS. THERE ARE NO SAN ANTONIO-CLASS SPECIFIC NEC TRAINING COURSES. UNIQUE SYSTEMS (SWAN, ECS, ETC.) WILL REQUIRE THE PROGRAM MANAGER TO FUND FACTORY TRAINING FOR THIS AND FUTURE PRECOMM CREWS. HOWEVER, AFTER THE SHIPS IN THIS PROGRAM HAVE FINISHED CONSTRUCTION, TRAINING FOR MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF THESE CRITICAL SYSTEMS WILL BE RESIDENT ONLY WITHIN THE SHIPS LIFELINES THROUGH OJT. THERE ARE NO EMBEDDED TRAINERS FOR THESE UNIQUE SYSTEMS.
X. THE VCHT SYSTEM HAD 25 DEFICIENCIES THAT PREVENTED CERTIFICATION OF THE SYSTEM.
Y. MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE EQUIPMENT FOR UNDERWAY OPERATIONS WAS ACHIEVED AT 1143 ON DAY FOUR OF THE INSPECTION.
Z. 36 OF 100 WATERTIGHT CLOSURES INSPECTED WERE NOT WATERTIGHT.
AA. 0 OF 2 IPDS WERE OPERATIONAL.
BB. 18 OF 18 VENTILATION AIRFLOW ALARMS WERE EITHER INOP OR MISADJUSTED.
CC. 11 CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES PRECLUDED OILY WATER SEPARATORS CERTIFICATION.
3. STARRED DEFICIENCIES:
A. PROPULSION:
* THE STABILITY OF THE ENGINEERING CONTROL SYSTEM (ECS) WAS SUSPECT. FAULTS OBSERVED INCLUDED SEVERAL SYSTEM CRASHES, LOSS OF VARIOUS DAUS VRTUS, AND LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH VARIOUS CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPULSION AND ELECTRICAL PLANTS (MPDES, SSDGS, ETC.) THE ECS HAD AN EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF ACTIVE ALARMS THROUGHOUT THE BUILDERS TRIAL.
* NUMEROUS ECS INPUTS WERE NOT CONNECTED.
* AMOT LUBE OIL TEMPERATURE REGULATING VALVES IN THE MAIN PROPULSION DIESEL ENGINE (MPDE) LUBE OIL SYSTEMS WERE IMPROPERLY SET. INCORRECTLY REGULATED MPDE ENGINE LUBE OIL TEMPERATURE PREVENTED THE SHIP FROM MAKING FULL POWER FOR A SUSTAINED PERIOD. ENGINE LUBE OIL TEMPERATURES WHILE AT FULL POWER, DROVE LUBE OIL TEMPS OUT OF LIMITS HIGH (IN EXCESS OF 140 DEGREES F).
B. AUXILIARIES
* NRS 1, 2, AND 3 CARGO AND WEAPONS ELEVATORS INSTALLATION WAS INCOMPLETE AND UNTESTED.
* CHILLED WATER PLANT TITANIUM HEAT EXCHANGERS WERE NOT PROVIDED WITH CHLORINATORS/DECHLORINATORS.
* IN THE FORWARD WATERHEATER/DUMBWAITER ROOM, THE DUMBWAITER HOIST CABLE DRUM LACKED A SAFETY GUARD TO PREVENT A PERSON FROM BECOMING ACCIDENTALLY CAUGHT UP IN THE MACHINE.
* ANCHOR WINDLASS HYDRAULIC SYSTEM, INLET AND OUTLET SIDES OF THE COOLERS, LACKED SEVERAL REQUIRED THERMOMETERS.
* STEERING SYSTEM PORT RUDDER EXCEEDED THE MAXIMUM ALLOWED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACTUAL VERSUS ORDERED RUDDER POSITION (DID NOT MEET THE NEW CONSTRUCTION 1/4 DEGREE SPECIFICATION).
* WHILE THE INFLATABLE BOOT ON THE PORT RUDDER POST WAS INFLATED THE SHIPYARD CYCLED THE PORT RUDDER. THE INTEGRITY OF THIS INFLATABLE BOOT WAS QUESTIONABLE. TO VERIFY BOOT INTEGRITY, THE SHIPBUILDER REINFLATED THE BOOT TO 80 PSI AND IT HELD PRESSURE FOR 10 MINUTES. RECOMMEND VISUAL INSPECTION OF THIS BOOT DURING THE PLANNED PSA DRYDOCKING.
* REEFER MACHINERY AND CHILLED WATER PLANT MACHINERY ROOM SPACE HALOCARBON MONITORING AND ALARM SYSTEMS WERE INOP.
C. ELECTRICAL
* SSDGS SUFFER FROM OIL FOAMING. NRS 1 AND 2 SSDGS OIL WAS CHANGED WITHIN TWO DAYS OF THE SHIP GETTING UNDERWAY ON BUILDERS TRIAL. 3 OF 5 SSDGS HAD FILTERS REPLACED WITH NEW MESH AND MICRON FILTERS. THE PROBLEM WAS NOT OBSERVED DURING THE A.T., BUT THESE ENGINES WERE RUN INSUFFICIENTLY TO FULLY EVALUATE THE REPAIR.
* 5 OF 5 SSDG ENCLOSURES HAD ELECTRICAL JUNCTION BOXES AND CONTROLLERS LOCATED BENEATH THE DECK PLATES. ADDITIONALLY, SEVERAL OF THE CONTROLLERS COULD NOT BE OPENED BECAUSE THEY WERE FOULED BY PERMANENTLY INSTALLED DECK PLATE SUPPORT STRUCTURES.
* 60 HZ LCAC POWER SYSTEM WAS INCOMPLETE.
* ADVANCED AUTOMATIC DEGAUSSING SYSTEM/MAGNETIC SIGNATURE CONTROL SYSTEM INSTALLATION WAS INCOMPLETE AND UNTESTED.
* THE 12 (EW/SSES WARNING) AND 75 (DECON ANNOUNCING) MC ANNOUNCING SYSTEMS WERE INCOMPLETE AND UNTESTED.
* DARKEN SHIP SYSTEM INSTALLATION WAS INCOMPLETE AND UNTESTED. LACK OF LOUVERS INSTALLED OVER THE VENTILATION FAN ROOM INLET PLENUMS AND NUMEROUS MOTOR CONTROLLERS THROUGHOUT THE SHIP CONSTITUTED LIGHT LEAKS.
* NOT ALL ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONIC SPACES WERE EQUIPPED WITH ELECTRIC GRADE DECK MATTING AS REQUIRED.
D. DAMAGE CONTROL:
* SMOKE EJECTION SYSTEM INSTALLATION WAS INCOMPLETE AND UNTESTED.
* NUMEROUS MCTS CANNOT BE MADE WATERTIGHT IN THEIR PRESENT CONFIGURATION DUE TO EXCESSIVE CABLE PENETRATIONS, POOR CRAFTSMANSHIP AND QUALITY INSTALLATION, AND OVERSTUFFING OF MCTS.
* REMOTE OPERATORS THROUGHOUT THE MACHINERY SPACES WERE CONNECTED TO THE VALVE STEMS VIA ALUMINUM HANDWHEELS.
* BREATHING AIR SYSTEM WAS NOT COMPLETE. THE SHIP WAS NOT EQUIPPED WITH EBACS. THERE WAS NO WAY TO RECHARGE SELF-CONTAINED BREATHER APPARATUS (SCBA) AIR BOTTLES. AIR MAIN FLASKS WERE NOT INSTALLED. THE PIPING SYSTEM WAS INCOMPLETE. COMPRESSORS WERE NEITHER CONNECTED NOR TESTED.
* ALL SSDG RESERVE HFP FIRE EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM DOES NOT MEET REQUIREMENTS OF MIL SPEC MIL-E-24572B FOR A TYPE III SYSTEM. THE RESERVE SYSTEM VENTILATION PRESSURE SWITCH DOES NOT SECURE THE VENTILATION FANS IN THE SSDG ENCLOSURE UPON HFP ACTUATION.
* FLIGHT DECK AFFF SPRINKLING AT THE CENTERLINE OF THE DECK WAS INADEQUATE.
* COLLECTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEM (CPS) INSTALLATION WAS INCOMPLETE AND UNTESTED.
* COUNTERMEASURE WATER WASHDOWN SYSTEM (CMWWS) ZONES 1 THROUGH 5 WERE INCOMPLETE AND UNTESTED.
* DECONTAMINATION STATIONS WERE INCOMPLETE.
* 476 OF 576 WATERTIGHT CLOSURES WERE NOT TESTED BECAUSE OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF TEMPORARY SERVICES RUN THROUGHOUT THE SHIP. WATERTIGHT CLOSURE INSPECTIONS FOR FIT-UP, WARPAGE, DOGGING MECHANISM ADJUSTMENT, AND CHALK TEST COULD NOT BE COMPLETED.
* REMOTELY-OPERATED FIREMAIN VALVES COULD NOT BE OPERATED ELECTRICALLY AT THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENT IN VIOLATION OF SHIP SPEC 521D WHICH STATES THAT LOCAL HARD-WIRED CONTROL FOR EACH FIREMAIN PUMP AND MOTOR-OPERATED VALVE SHALL BE AVAILABLE AT THE COMPONENT.
* MAIN AND AUXILIARY MACHINERY SPACE BILGE SPRINKLING NOZZLES SPRAYED UP AND SOAKED VARIOUS ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS.
* PORTABLE CO2, PKP, AND AFFF FIRE EXTINGUISHERS WERE MISSING THROUGHOUT THE SHIP OR NOT INSTALLED PER SPEC. NO CO2 BOTTLES WERE LOCATED WITHIN REQUIRED DISTANCE OF GENERATORS, SWITCHBOARDS, AND LOAD CENTERS.
* 19 OF 137 REQUIRED FIRE STATIONS WERE NOT INSTALLED. ALL FIRE STATIONS HAD NUMEROUS DISCREPANCIES TO INCLUDE MISSING INVENTORY PLACARD (NONE INSTALLED), BULLSEYES (NONE INSTALLED), HOSE STRAPS (NONE INSTALLED), HOSES, SPANNER WRENCHES AND SECURING BRACKETS, NOZZLE SECURED BRACKETS, INCORRECT NOZZLES, ETC.
* HEAT AND SMOKE DETECTION SYSTEM INSTALLATION WAS INCOMPLETE. TWO ZONES WERE INCOMPLETE. 400 OF 1179 DETECTORS WERE INCOMPLETE AND UNTESTED. THERE WERE 83 DETECTORS WITH ACTIVE FAULTS.
* AFFF SPRINKLING GROUPS 5, 6, 8, AND 9 WERE INCOMPLETE (VEHICLE STOWAGE AREAS).
* BERTHING COMPARTMENT SPRINKLER SYSTEMS FOR 02-0 AND 02-2 SYSTEMS WERE INCOMPLETE.
* WPCS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM INSTALLATION WAS INCOMPLETE AND UNTESTED.
* 8 OF 11 DEBALLAST AIR MAIN ISOLATION VALVES WERE INACCESSIBLE AND REQUIRED REMOTE OPERATORS. BECAUSE OF THE LIFT AND RIGGING GEAR REQUIRED TO ACCESS THESE VALVES, THEIR PLACEMENT WOULD HINDER RAPID CASUALTY RESPONSE IN THE EVENT SECTIONS OF THE DEBALLAST AIR MAIN NEEDED TO BE ISOLATED TO SUPPORT CONTINUED DEBALLAST OPERATIONS.
* IPDS INSTALLATION WAS INCOMPLETE AND UNTESTED.
* NON-ENGINEERING SPACE HFP INSTALLATIONS WERE INCOMPLETE AND UNTESTED.
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