Proactively “From the Sea”; an agent of change leveraging the littoral best practices for a paradigm breaking six-sigma best business case to synergize a consistent design in the global commons, rightsizing the core values supporting our mission statement via the 5-vector model through cultural diversity.
Once again, I am falling off the grid for awhile. I will be back on or about 05 MAY.
Until then, all orders remain in effect, and I will leave you with one of my favorite scenes from one of my favorite movies, Scene 58 - Hopeless, from Das Boot.
An assignment to kick off the Open Post; feel free to pick your favorite scene from the "Movies for Leaders" on the right side of the page and discuss at will.
For those who may have an interest, the poem at the end of the clip is partially quoted is "Schlacht - Das Maß" ("Battle - The Measure"), by German author Rudolf Georg Binding. In full, with an English translation for you non-FAO intellectual cripples out there....
SCHLACHT - DAS MASS
Die Erde drängt sich zitternd an uns heran. Das Feld steht auf wie ein Mensch vom Lager. Saaten bewaffneter Männer sprießen aus unsichtbaren Samen in den Furchen zutag. Schauerlich groß blühn grünschwarze Kelche Erdstaub und giftige Gase allenthalben empor. Aufgeschreckt rasend springen Fontänen aus trockenem Grund. Auf Feuer gekreuzigt fahren Menschenleiber zum Himmel, zerstieben mit einer Grimasse, schwarze verkohlte Sterne: Erde und Gebein.
Rauchterrassen wälzen sich über uns hin. In schweren Wettern rauscht Eisen nieder. Blitze tasten heran. Donner erwürgt uns. Heulender Abgrund bäumt sich herauf allüberall, und die Sonne schleift Dunkel verpestete Mähnen in unseren Atem. Unentrinnbar hält uns der Himmel unter sich hingebannt: unheimliches Basiliskenauge Über kleinem Getier.
Einsam liegen wir da in der Not der Schlacht; wir wußten, daß jeder einsam war. Aber wir wußten auch dies: Einmal vor Unerbittlichem stehn, wo Gebete entrechtet, Gewinsel zu Gott lächerlich ist, wo keines Mutter sich nach uns umsieht, kein Weib unsern Weg kreuzt, wo alles o h n e Liebe ist, wo nur die Wirklichkeit herrscht, grausig und groß, solches macht sicher und stolz. Unvergeßlich und tiefer rührt es ans Herz des Menschen als alle Liebe der Welt.
Und wir fühlen: dies war das Maß.
--
BATTLE - THE MEASURE
The soil trembling presses to us. The field stands up like a man from the bed. Crops of armed men grow From invisible seeds In the furrows. Eerily big green-black goblets let Soil dust and poisonous gases Bloom everywhere. Alarmdly raving Fountains arise from dry grounds. Crucified on fire Human bodies go to heaven, Burst with an antic, Black charred stars: Soil and bones.
Terraces of smoke roll over us. In thunderstorms, iron rains down. Levins feel their ways. Thunder strangles us. Wailing abyss rears up Everywhere, and the Sun grinds Dark mephitic manes in our breath. Inescapably heaven holds us Bound below: Sinister basilisk's eye Over small animals.
Sesolate we lie there in the misery of battle; We knew that everyone was desolate. But we also knew this: Standing before the remorseless once, Where prayer is futile, where canting to God Is ridiculous, Wher no mother looks for us, Where no woman crosses our path, Where everything is w i t h o u t love, Where only reality reigns, Gruesome and grand, That makes firm and proud. Unforgettable and much deeper It touches the heart of man Than all the love in the world.
Anyway, interesting bit on A15 of the Washington Post yesterday that reminds us how we got here.
The shrinking pool of U.S. manufacturers was the inevitable result of defense spending reductions after the Cold War. Shortly after Bill Clinton took office, then-Defense Secretary Les Aspin and Deputy Secretary William Perry called together the heads of the major defense contractors and told them that the Pentagon would soon need only half of their companies, perhaps even fewer, and could not afford to pay for unneeded factories and workers. Later dubbed the "Last Supper," the dinner meeting triggered unprecedented consolidation as defense companies such as Lockheed, Northrop, General Dynamics, Raytheon and Boeing gobbled up competitors.
Although the consolidations helped contractors survive the spending cuts, they now threaten to undermine the industry. That's because many in Congress and at the Pentagon want to impose stricter oversight and controls on weapons manufacturing and development while simultaneously demanding more competition -- driving the system to an immature and evolving "globalized" marketplace. ... Unless we act soon, we may find that the only solutions available will be to nationalize the military industrial base or to "outsource" production of our weapons systems, with excessive portions of that work going overseas.
We are, carelessly and unwittingly, meandering down both paths.
They talk about how to de-consolidate and broaden the base. Well, for shipbuilding the best way to do that is to stop the "high-cost, low production" model we have right now. With $700 million (ship + mission module) Corvettes, $3 billion "Destroyers" and $1 billion LPD - your Tiffany Fleet will not keep the yards busy. Stomping your feet and demanding 313 ships will not make cash magically appear our of the backside of Congress. Waving The Maritime Strategy about while mantra-like changing Transformational Technology, will not make hulls appear pier side.
Want yard work and a good, balanced fleet? Kill DDG-1000 at two hulls and then reclassify them for what they are, CG-74 and CG-75. A ship the size of the Graf Spee ain't a Destroyer. Roll the technology into CG(X).
Kill the LCS/Mission Module concept. License build the VISBY or LCS-I, which ever is best following a "sail off" - and call it a Corvette. Look at one of the successful Euro-Frigate/Destroyers or the F-310 and/or AFCON Corvette. Then we can figure out with a new perspective on the design for a Destroyer to replace the DDG-51 class. If you can't make up your mind - keep the DDG-51 line going for a few more ships until we get our rectal-cranial inversion corrected.
Build a dedicated MIW ship. Oh, and I want at least a dozen conventional submarines.
Have a better plan? I'd love to hear it. If you think marching forward with LCS and DDG-1000 will get you to 313 ... then you are a funny guy (or girl ...I mean lady ...I mean woman ...whatever - at least I tried to be inclusive).
I think VADM Curtis reads CDR Salamander ..... nawww ... he' just gets it.
ROUTINE R 182356Z APR 08 FM COMNAVSURFOR SAN DIEGO CA//N00// TO ALNAVSURFOR INFO COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI COMNAVSURFOR SAN DIEGO CA//N00// COMNAVSURFOR SAN DIEGO CA//N00// COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK VA COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK VA BT UNCLAS MSGID/GENADMIN/CNSF/7975// SUBJ/SELF ASSESSMENT// RMKS/1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO EXPRESS MY CONCERN ABOUT OUR ABILITY TO SELF ASSESS, AND DIRECT SPECIFIC CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. 2. OUR SHIPS ARE THE MOST COMPLEX AND CAPABLE MACHINES ANY COUNTRY HAS EVER BUILT. WE HAVE BEEN ENTRUSTED BY OUR NATION TO BE GOOD STEWARDS OF OUR SAILORS AND THESE MAGNIFICENT WARSHIPS. A KEY TENANT IN ACHIEVING AND SUSTAINING COMBAT READINESS IS OUR ABILITY TO CRITICALLY SELF-ASSESS OUR SHIPS, SHIP SYSTEMS, AND EQUIPAGE, WITH TECHNICAL RIGOR. 3. RECENT FORMAL AND INFORMAL ASSESSMENTS AND INSPECTIONS INDICATE THAT OUR SELF-ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY HAS DECLINED, RESULTING IN REDUCED READINESS. WE MADE A LOT OF CHANGES IN THE SURFACE FORCE IN THE PAST FEW YEARS. IT IS APPROPRIATE TO TAKE A STRATEGIC PAUSE TO GET BACK TO BASICS ON HOW WE MAINTAIN AND OPERATE OUR SHIPS. WE MUST CONDUCT A RIGOROUS ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT ON READINESS OF THESES (sic) CHANGES SO WE CAN MAKE APPROPRIATE COURSE CORRECTIONS. I WILL HIGHLIGHT FIVE SPECIFIC AREAS WHERE I EXPECT IMPROVEMENT: A. ADHERENCE TO HIGH STANDARDS. COMMANDING OFFICERS ARE RESPONSIBLE TO THEIR ISICS FOR ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING HIGH STANDARDS OF OPERATIONAL, MATERIAL, AND TRAINING READINESS. THERE IS PLENTY OF HELP AVAILABLE TO YOU FROM TYCOM, CLASSRONS, ATG, AND RMC, BUT YOU HAVE TO DRIVE THIS. B. PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE. OUR TECHNICALLY ADVANCED SHIP SYSTEMS MUST BE OPERATED IN STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH AUTHORIZED PROCEDURES. COMMANDING OFFICERS MUST ESTABLISH A COMMAND CLIMATE THAT TOLERATES NOTHING LESS. WHETHER CONDUCTING A ROUTINE ENGINEERING EVOLUTION, PERFORMING A MAINTENANCE ITEM, OR OPERATING THE GEAR, SAILORS MUST UNDERSTAND AND FOLLOW THE PROCEDURES. C. EFFECTIVE TRAINING. TRAINING HAS CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS. SCHOOLHOUSE TRAINING DECREASED AS FISCAL REALITIES DROVE US TO PLACE MORE RELIANCE ON COMPUTER-BASED TRAINING. WE ARE LOOKING AT THIS FROM AN ENTERPRISE PERSPECTIVE TO SEE IF WE HAVE REDUCED ENROUTE TRAINING TOO MUCH. MEANWHILE, COMMANDING OFFICERS MUST ESTABLISH A CULTURE OF TRAINING EXCELLENCE WITH THEIR EXPERIENCED LEADERS ALREADY ONBOARD. WE WILL WORK TOGETHER TO ACCOMPLISH THE NECESSARY TRAINING FOR OUR TECHNICIANS AND OPERATORS. D. ADHERENCE TO ESTABLISHED PROCESSES. OUR SENIOR LEADERS GREW UP USING SEVERAL TOOLS THAT HAVE PROVEN SUCCESSFUL IN MAKING WARSHIPS READY FOR TASKING. THESE INCLUDE A ROBUST 3M PROGRAM, PROPER PMS, MEANINGFUL PMS SPOTCHECKS, REGULAR ZONE INSPECTIONS, PROPER DOCUMENTATION OF MATERIAL CONDITION THROUGH QUALITY CSMP ENTRIES, AND PROPER REPORTING OF MISSION DEGRADATIONS THROUGH THE CASREP PROCESS. EVEN THOROUGH SWEEPERS ARE NECESSARY TO KEEPING WARSHIPS MISSION CAPABLE AND HABITABLE. COMMANDING OFFICERS MUST ENSURE THESE PROCESSES ARE HABITS IN THE SHIP ROUTINE. E. SHIP OWNERSHIP BY WARDROOM, CPO MESS AND CREW. WHILE THE CHALLENGES OF OPERATING A WARSHIP IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF CONSTRAINED RESOURCES AND HIGH OP-TEMPO MAY BE GREAT, THE OFFICERS AND CREW CAN OVERCOME THESE CHALLENGES WITH THE RIGHT ATTITUDE AND COMMITMENT TO EXCELLENCE. COMPLETE OWNERSHIP BY EVERYONE FROM THE COMMANDING OFFICER ON DOWN MANIFESTS ITSELF IN A CAN-DO ATTITUDE, AND LEADS TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT. COMMANDING OFFICERS MUST DISCUSS THIS CONCEPT WITH THEIR WARDROOMS AND CPO MESSES. THE CPO MESS MUST HAVE AN ATTITUDE THAT NO CHALLENGE IS TOO GREAT AND NO SAILOR WILL SUFFER FROM INADEQUATE CARE, ATTENTION OR TRAINING. 4. YOUR SURFACE LEADERSHIP IS COMMITTED TO REVIEWING MANY OF THE FLEET-WIDE PROBLEMS THAT CHALLENGE OUR SHIPS, INCLUDING MANNING AND TRAINING, LOGISTIC SUPPORT, MAINTENANCE FUNDING, AND OTHER WATERFRONT SUPPORT. THAT SAID, SOLUTIONS ARE DIFFICULT, AND MAY BE SLOW IN COMING. THE GOOD NEWS IS YOU HAVE PROVEN PROCEDURES AND PROCESSES THAT ARE WITHIN YOUR CONTROL INSIDE YOUR LIFELINES. I AM COUNTING ON YOU TO ACT NOW. 5. KEEPING YOUR SHIPS READY FOR TASKING IS NOT A PART TIME OR EVENT DRIVEN JOB. YOU WORK YOUR READINESS ISSUES THROUGH AN AGGRESSIVE DAY TO DAY OPS REGIMEN. EVENTS THAT COME ALONG SUCH AS INSURV, DEPLOYMENT, OR ULTRA C/E/S ARE NOT THE DRIVERS FOR YOUR SHIPS - THEY ARE EVENTS THAT SERVE TO PROVIDE YOU DATA POINTS ON THE SUCCESS OF YOUR DAILY EFFORTS. SUCCESS IS MEASURED NOT BY EVENTS BUT BY YOUR EFFORTS AND LEADERSHIP TO INSTILL IN YOUR CREWS TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE, STRONG COMMUNICATIONS, AND OPEN, HARD HITTING ASSESSMENTS. YOU AND YOUR LEADERSHIP TEAMS MUST BE ON THE DECK PLATES ASKING QUESTIONS AND ELEVATING THE STANDARD TO MEET YOUR EXPECTATIONS. 6. KEEP CHARGING AND BE PROFESSIONAL. 7. VADM CURTIS SENDS.// BT
I think you could boil much of the message down to para 3.d., but VADM Curtis brings up a very good point about the Computer Based Training that I think we all are nodding our heads about.
In the end, I think we all owe VADM Curtis a "thank you" for putting this out, because he correctly recognizes that we have to step back and focus on the Vince Lombardi like aspects of being Navy leaders. I know we don't emphasize that - based on what the Fleet hears from the Potomac Flotilla - but at the micro level, there are things we can do as leaders within the lifelines we control.
You can make a difference from Duty Section Leader to Commanding Officer. Even if those around you fail - you can look at yourself in the mirror in the AM. More importantly, we need more Flag Officers to take pause to consider what they are spending their intellectual and leadership capital doing. Fewer messages about "Left-handed Latvian Appreciation Month," and more on the subject of getting ships and Sailors ready to go in harm's way. This is a good start.BTW, someone beat VADM Curtis's N1 with a fat stick. What is "theses" doing in a 3-Star's message? Why did something that has such a great core message get cluttered with wordy happy-talk introductions and flecked with "Enterprise" like lingo that is in a large part responsible for the fundamental seamanship challenges we are facing?
Simple direct language. Blunt, fair, and humble appraisals. My idea; yours may differ.
It doesn't have to be a long stay - heck he doesn't have to go; just have the possibility of going would be fine.
What am I talking about? Well as you know, from Clark to Cohen, the gorging at the military-industrial food trough is an ongoing sub-theme here. The lack of accountability at the highest levels is dumbfounding.
GOFO have a huge amount of influence and power, two very dangerous things for any mortal. These powers must be checked by a rigorous and tightly enforced set of standards and protocols that remind one and all that in the end they are simply public servants. They should be kept as respectfully humble as possible. They should be driven more towards the Grant/Sherman model and less the McArthur/Patton model. When it comes to the non-operational jobs that involve money, even more so. A perfect example why follows.
Sitting at the head of the table, Air Force Maj. Gen. Stephen Goldfein, the highest-ranking officer in the room, leaned forward and told the officers and others assembled before him that they should steer a multimillion-dollar Air Force contract to a company named Strategic Message Solutions.
"I don't pick the winner, but if I did, I'd pick SMS," Goldfein said to the seven-person group that was selecting a contractor to jazz up the Air Force's Thunderbirds air show with giant video boards, according to a lengthy report by Defense Department's inspector general. The head of the selection team almost immediately "caved," giving in to what he believed was a fixed process, while another member of the team called it "the dirtiest thing" he had ever experienced.
Yes, and many of us have seen that kind of not-so-subtle threatening pressure before. More common than most would expect; but such is life in this dark-arts area.
It was during that meeting in November 2005, according to the 251-page report, obtained by The Washington Post, that a controversial $50 million contract was awarded to a company that barely existed in an effort to reward a recently retired four-star general and a millionaire civilian pilot who had grown close to senior Air Force officials and the Thunderbirds.
Remember how I have been calling for a 5-year cooling-off period for retiring GOFO? This is why. If you don't like it, then decline BG or RDML. Simple. If that is asking too much - then perhaps you shouldn't be one. Simple.
In a probe that lasted more than two years, investigators concluded that Goldfein and others worked inside the Air Force contracting system to favor SMS and its owners, despite an offer by the company that was more than twice as expensive as a competing bid.
Goldfein, who is now vice director of the Pentagon's Joint Staff, was found to have gone to great lengths to see the contract awarded to SMS, while senior Air Force leaders socialized with the company's partners. According to the report, Goldfein even arranged for President Bush to record a video testimonial in the White House Map Room that was included in the SMS contract proposal, demonstrating the company's credibility and access.
This is how a good officer's integrity is slowly boiled: he doesn't even realize what he is becoming.
"The investigation found that the December 2005 award to SMS was tainted with improper influence, irregular procurement practices, and preferential treatment," according to a redacted copy of the report. "Lower priced offers from qualified vendors and capabilities in-house were bypassed in an apparent effort to obtain services from [redacted], president of SMS, who had a longstanding relationship with senior Air Force officers and members of the Thunderbirds."
Goldfein and four unidentified officers have received administrative punishments, and investigators are scrutinizing the 99th Contracting Squadron at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada in light of "irregularities" and "systemic weaknesses" that appear to plague the unit. ... Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates is aware of the findings. "He is satisfied the matter has been thoroughly investigated and the Air Force is taking appropriate disciplinary action and corrective measures," Morrell said.
If an E-6 did something like this at his level, do you think ART-15 is all he would get - or should get?
"I am deeply disappointed that our high standards were not adhered to," Air Force Secretary Michael W. Wynne said yesterday.
Is that the best you can do? I bet he is harder on his children when they don't clean up their room. He is not THAT disappointed it seems. There is a pathetic side to all this; the project was chump-change, unneeded, and from the sound of it, cheesy.
The idea behind the Thunderbirds contract emerged in 2005, when Ed Shipley, a close friend of the Thunderbirds who regularly flies aircraft in Air Force shows, suggested ways to keep audiences entertained while the aircraft circle around to do stunts. Shipley, who made millions in direct television marketing videos, came up with an idea for "Thundervision," and his new company, SMS, pitched a $50 million, five-year plan.
Ummm...isn't the "circle around and do stunts" the entertainment? Besides Mrs. Salamander, I don't know anyone who got bored at an airshow.
Gen. John Jumper, then the Air Force chief of staff, asked his vice chief at the time, Gen. T. Michael "Buzz" Moseley, to see if he could make it happen. Moseley met with Goldfein and Shipley in April 2005 and made money available for the project, ordering subordinates and contracting teams to look into it.
Contracting officials dismissed the idea of giving the contract outright to SMS and set up a team to investigate bids. But a majority of people on the selection team were members of the Thunderbirds -- officers who knew Shipley as a friend and Goldfein as the commanding general of the Air Warfare Center. The Thunderbirds commander at one point said, according to the report: "If it's not SMS, we don't want it."
Because we all know that all it takes to spike a career is one guy who owns paper on you who doesn't like you. #1 of 7 probably gets Command. #3 of 7, notsomuch.
Investigators also found Gen. Hal Hornburg, who retired in December 2004, was a "silent partner" of Shipley's who joined SMS in early 2005. Moseley is a friend of Hornburg's and knew Shipley. Neither Shipley nor Hornburg returned calls.
Investigators detail how Moseley -- now the Air Force's chief of staff -- socialized with Shipley and Hornburg in the months after the contract process started. Moseley and his wife, along with Hornburg and his wife, gathered at Shipley's home in Pennsylvania in July 2005, and they shared informal e-mails.
Moseley was not accused of wrongdoing but said in an interview this week that he probably should have backed away from Shipley and Hornburg as the contract progressed. But he emphasized the need for personal relationships to cultivate ideas and said that he knew there were strict boundaries regarding such contracts and that he never crossed them. He said he instructed subordinates to "do the right thing."
What "ideas?" You have to get ideas form two people doing shady business? The USAF is NOT short of smart Staff Officers. Ahem. That quote is just dorky.
His account is supported by e-mail records in the report. "In perfect hindsight, there are some things that the U.S. Air Force could have done differently," he said. "There are some things that people along the way, me included, could have done differently."
General, this was an easy call - any USN Supply Officer (not in Leavenworth) could have made it. You failed. If I were you, I know what I would do right now. The Summer is a great time to retire and move.
Moseley said he wishes that officers who noticed problems in the process had simply said "stop." The contract was canceled in early 2006 after an Arizona company lodged complaints. The U.S. attorney's office in Nevada declined to prosecute the case in May 2007.
He needs to think harder about what he just said. The USAF Chief of Staff tells the Vice Chief to "make it happen." The Vice Chief then talked to an Active Duty 2-Star and the president of the firm in question that the 2-star will push hard for selection. Throw into the mix Moseley's friend Gen. Hal Hornburg who shortly after retirement joined the firm.All that, and Moseley says, "...he wishes that officers who noticed problems in the process had simply said 'stop.' " Fish rots from the head, sir. What is the command climate like?
Sir, heal thyself. Don't blame others. Demand and accept accountability - don't make excuses. Isn't that what you want out of your Junior Officers? Isn't that what you should do as an example?
Heck, 'lil 'ole Salamander is just a cricket in the cowfield, I know. Thing is - it looks like some of the larger beings in the field are making some noise now as well.
The Senate Armed Services Committee has asked the Defense Department's inspector general to review the role of senior Air Force officials in a $50 million contract, seeking further investigation into possible criminal conduct, ethical violations and failures of leadership.
Sens. Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.) asked the inspector general on Monday to review the conduct of all current and former Air Force officials who were named in a 251-page investigative report released last week, noting that it "raises serious questions about the role played" by senior officials.
In case you are one of the last 5 people who don't yet understand that Hollyweird cares about nothing but money and ego - behold another example of what, I believe, Patrick Swayze once said something to the effect, "This town will turn anyone into a whore if you let them."
Pop star and 15-year-old Disney sensation MILEY CYRUS tells ET she's "embarrassed" about an upcoming photograph of her appearing semi-topless in the new Vanity Fair issue.
"I took part in a photo shoot that was supposed to be 'artistic' and now, seeing the photographs and reading the story, I feel so embarrassed," she tells ET. "I never intended for any of this to happen and I apologize to my fans who I care so deeply about."
The photo, on stands next week, accompanies an interview with Miley and her dad, BILLY RAY, and were shot by famed photographer ANNIE LEIBOVITZ. As seen on our show promo last week, they show Miley sitting in profile with just a blanket wrapped around her chest.
Vanity Fair editors respond: "Miley's parents and/or minders were on the set all day. Since the photo was taken digitally, they saw it on the shoot and everyone thought it was a beautiful and natural portrait of Miley. In fact, when BRUCE HANDY interviewed Miley, he asked her about the photo and she was very cheerful about it and thought it was perfectly fine."
However, a Disney Channel spokesperson says: "Unfortunately, as the article suggests, a situation was created to deliberately manipulate a 15-year-old in order to sell magazines."
It is all how you crop and adjust. As a photobug myself, if you take enough pictures and know what you are doing, you can make a Nun look like something else.
Annie Leibovitz. The woman who managed to make Obama's ears small could make Miley ... well ....
The sad thing is - she is 15. Come on Vanity Fair et al - 15. This does not reflect Miley - perhaps it just reflects the sick soul of those who took the pictures and published them. Just like kiddy-porn does not reflect the poor victim - just those on the other end of the camera.
All involved should take a deep breath and think about what they do for a living. Do any of them have young girls? Do any of them care? What are they NOT willing to do to sell: the magazine or their soul?
The Cyrus family should take this as a warning shot. They will turn her into a whore - if you let them.
For reasons best left at the foot of my chosen career, I was not able to see "The Lives of Others" when it came out - though from what I read about it made it look like something I would want to see. This review and discussion by Jay Nordlinger in National Review seals it - I will buy it for my library if for no other reason than for the man almost solely responsible for it, the writer and directory Florian Maria Georg Christian Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck.
What about Donnersmarck’s politics? He is clear and direct: “I want the government to stay as far out of my life as humanly possible.” . . .
He has a frustration shared by many: the success of socialists in portraying the Nazis as diametrically opposite them. He says that people ought to be reminded that socialism was part of the Nazis’ very name. He is against any system that forbids the individual to live his life to the full. And he is determined that Communism, in Europe and elsewhere, will not be perfumed.
“We must make sure to remember that it was a nightmare, because, as we know, ideologies do make cyclical reappearances. It’s incredibly important that we don’t allow people to romanticize Communism, and that we call it what it is: an anti-man religion, completely contrary to freedom.” . . .
He is brimming with opinions, and I ask him about the United States. Donnersmarck says, in the course of his remarks, “I really, really hope that America will not make the mistake that has so weakened Europe: looking toward the government for answers to all problems. I hope that America will continue to respect the principle of subsidiarity, which is to say: The state should do only what the individual truly cannot do on his own” — and even then, the government that acts should be the most local government possible.
His story on how he he made the move is almost important as the movie itself. Everyone said, no - and he did it anyway. A great tragedy for the acting profession - and us all - is the early death of the lead actor, Ulrich Mühe, a man who knew the evil of East Germany well.
Better late than never, but hey; welcome to the party NYT - on page 1 nonetheless!
Moments before the launching on Sept. 23, 2006, Adm. Mike Mullen, the chief of naval operations, told the festive crowd of shipbuilders, politicians and Navy brass assembled at the Marinette Marine shipyard, “Just a little more than three years ago, she was just an idea; now Freedom stands before us.”
Not quite. The ship — the first of a new class of versatile, high-speed combat vessels designed to operate in coastal waters — was indeed bobbing in the river, just four months after the promised launching date. But it was far from finished. In fact, the ship floats there still, work continuing day and night. ... The bill for the ship, being built by Lockheed Martin, has soared to $531 million, more than double the original, and by some calculations could be $100 million more.
Regular readers know the rest of the story, but let's pull out the juicy bits.
In a narrow sense, the troubled birth of the coastal ships was rooted in the Navy’s misbegotten faith in a feat of maritime alchemy: building a hardened warship by adapting the design of a high-speed commercial ferry.
Actually, if you accept compromise - it can be done. The WWII Flower Class of Corvettes are a case in point.
Behind the numbers in the Accountability Office study, experts say, is a dynamic of mutually re-enforcing deficiencies: ever-changing Pentagon design requirements; unrealistic cost estimates and production schedules abetted by companies eager to win contracts, and a fondness for commercial technologies that often, as with the ferry concept, prove unsuitable for specialized military projects.
At the same time, a policy of letting contractors take the lead in managing weapons programs has coincided with an acute shortage of government engineers trained to oversee these increasingly complex enterprises. ... In their haste to get the ships into the water, the Navy and contractors redesigned and built them at the same time — akin to building an office tower while reworking the blueprints. To meet its deadline, Lockheed abandoned the normal sequence of shipbuilding steps: instead of largely finishing sections and then assembling the ship, much of the work was left to be done after the ship was welded together. That slowed construction and vastly drove up costs.
“It’s not good to be building as you’re designing,” said Vice Adm. Paul E. Sullivan, commander of the Navy branch that supervises shipbuilding.
That isn't a new knowledge. Arrogance and ignorance of history and design best practices is what is going on here. At the beginning, those who asked the hard questions were told to sit down and shut up by those who now point the finger at others.
Despite the problems, the Navy secretary, Donald C. Winter, and other top Navy officials say they remain committed to building 55 of the ships, once a steady, fixed-price production run can be assured. Even at about $500 million apiece, Navy officials add, the coastal ships would be a bargain compared with most Navy combat vessels.
With what mission modules?
“The littoral combat ship is an imaginative answer to emerging military requirements, but it has the most fouled-up acquisition strategy I have ever seen in a major military program,” said Loren Thompson, a military analyst at the Lexington Institute, a policy research center.
What emerging military requirements? SHOCK! A ship looking for a mission?!?
“We needed to figure out how to asymmetric the asymmetric guys,” recalled Adm. Vern Clark, who championed the ships as chief of naval operations from 2000 to 2005.
So, there we have it. That is what is so laughable to almost be - no, is - a farce. You cannot be "asymmetrical" with the uber-symmetrical concept of,
To Navy planners, a ship designed for coastal combat could neutralize hostile submarines, surface warships, mines and terrorist speedboats, clearing the way for other combat ships to operate in offshore waters and support combat ashore.
That is a set of missions the USN has been working on for well over a century - take out speedboats (nee Motor Torpedo Boats) and submarines and you can go back centuries. Pathetic.
The Navy also wanted ships that could travel fast, better than 40 knots. And they needed to be easily outfitted with different weapons and surveillance systems. A removable package of mine-sweeping equipment, for instance, could be replaced with a package of special-operations gear used by a Seal (sic) team.
Changing out Mission Modules and "hybrid sailors" is and will never be "easy." Also, the enemy will not wait for your non multi-mission platform to change out its mission modules. Taffy-3 can tell you that you only have minutes to go from ASW to ASUW - as can the British force off the Falklands can tell you that a ship in the Littorals needs to go from NSFS, to ASW, to AAW in a few minutes as well - if not at the same time....but we have covered that insanity in the whole LCS concept before - let's keep plowing through the NYT piece.
Each ship would carry an uncommonly small crew, about 40 sailors.
But as Lockheed and the Navy were completing contract negotiations in 2004, the rules changed drastically. Commercial ferry standards, the Navy determined, would not do.
The underlying principle behind the decision, Admiral Sullivan said, was that the new ships had to be able to “hang tough in a storm and take some battle damage and still survive long enough” for the crew to be rescued.
Again, this is news? Who is the "we" and have "they" been fired?
Adm. Gary Roughead, the current chief of naval operations, said: “We had thought that the commercial variant would not be that far away from what we needed. I’ll tell you, that was underestimated.”
Here is a nice place to ask, "Where is the SWO VADM Tom Connolly when you need him?"
Rear Adm. Charles S. Hamilton II, one of the Navy officers with lead responsibility for the project, said he had given Navy officials several opportunities to slow down the project.
“The clear signal from all quarters was, ‘Hamilton, I want that ship in the water, and I want it out there now,’ ” he recalled in an interview.
Admiral Hamilton left the Navy last year. He now works at Booz Allen Hamilton, the consulting firm.
Who were they RADM Hamilton? Names please. Oh, right - that might impact your new gig. Cue my 5-year moratorium for retiring Flag Officers please ....
Yet if the project was troubled, the Navy’s oversight at Marinette was less than robust. Because of staffing reductions, the Navy office responsible for supervising shipbuilding initially dispatched no one full time to Wisconsin. Even after a team arrived, it failed to appreciate the severity of problems.
“We had very junior people on site,” Admiral Sullivan said.
And who decided to send such a junior team to such a major problem? I would love to bounce the seniority of this team off the senior paygrades in the Diversity Directorate and the CNOs gender and diversity advisors. Priorities and all ...
There is some slack to cut - but maybe not as this wasn't mentioned in all the Happy Talk that started this fiasco.
“It will be great, the next time around,” said Mr. North, the program manager. “Lead ships are truly hard.”
True, but this is also true.
Mr. Winter, the Navy secretary, complained that the Navy bureaucracy had failed to alert him to rising costs. The Pentagon, he said, was bedazzled by the idea of saving money and time with commercial technologies.
“It got oversold,” he said. “The concept was just abused.”
He lamented the Pentagon’s eroding expertise in systems engineering — managing complex new projects to ensure that goals are achievable and affordable — and faulted the notion that industry could best manage ambitious development projects.
“Quite frankly, industry is not good at doing this,” he said.
Names. Again, if you want accountability - you need names. We can't tar & feather - but we can name names.
“If we do not figure out how to establish credibility in our shipbuilding programs and plans, and restore confidence in our ability to deliver on our commitments, we cannot expect Congress or the nation to provide us with the resources we so urgently need.”
Yep, but we knew that going in. No one had the moral courage though to get out in front of this problem. Good people who brought up the fact that if you get in close, any Gomer with a 12.7mm and symmetrically take care of your paradigm were told to sit down and shut up.
Some people, yet to be held to account, decided that it was best inside their short PCS cycle to let their relief take care of it - someone else will clean it up, right? We have jobs as consultants to get quickly, right? Well, that time is now.
LCS - the gift that keeps on giving. We haven't even gotten to the mission module issues. LCS-I or Visby and then lets move on....shall we?
In both structure (no net gain in Staff Weenies) and the assigned COM - this looks like a good start.
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Gary Roughead announced today the reestablishment of U.S. 4th Fleet and assigned Rear Adm. Joseph D. Kernan, currently serving as Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command, as its first commander.
U.S. 4th Fleet will be responsible for U.S. Navy ships, aircraft and submarines operating in the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of focus, which encompasses the Caribbean, and Central and South America and the surrounding waters.
Located in Mayport, Fla., and dual-hatted with Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO), U.S. 4th Fleet reestablishment addresses the increased role of maritime forces in the SOUTHCOM area of focus, and demonstrates U.S. commitment to regional partners.
Did you catch that? Snake eater in charge of keeping an eyeball on Hugo. Colombia should smile, I am.
For those who have been following orders and watching Rescue Me, you are familiar with Charles Durning - and hopefully are familiar with his larger filmography. Sure, we can ping on Hollywierd, but like Mickey Rooney, we should recognize those who deserve it. Bet-cha-didn't know this.
Durning served as a soldier in World War II, during which he was awarded a Silver Star, three Purple Heart medals, and a Good Conduct Medal. He was drafted into the U.S. Army at the age of 21, and landed on D-Day in the Normandy Invasion on June 6, 1944. Some sources state he was in the 1st Infantry Division at the time, but it is unclear if he was a rifleman or in an artillery unit by 1944.
On Omaha Beach itself, Pvt. Charles Durning was among the first troops to land. Drafted early in the war, he was first assigned as a rifleman with the 398th Infantry Regiment, but later served overseas with the 3rd Army Support troops and the 386th Anti-aircraft Artillery (AAA) Battalion.
Durning was wounded by an “S” Mine on June 15, 1944, at Les Mare des Mares. He was transported by the 499th Medical Collection Company to the 24th Evacuation Hospital. By June 17, he was back in England at the 217th General Hospital. Although severely wounded by shrapnel in the left and right thigh, right hand, the frontal region of the head and the interior left chest wall, Durning recovered quickly and was determined to be “fit for duty” on December 6, 1944. Durning was present for the Battle of the Bulge, the German counter-offensive in December 1944.[1]
He was taken prisoner during the Battle of the Bulge, and was one of the few survivors of the infamous Malmedy massacre of American POWs, perpetrated by a battlegroup under Joachim Peiper of the 1st SS Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. "He escaped with two others, and returned to find the remainder murdered."[1]
After being wounded in the chest, Durning was repatriated to the United States where he remained in army hospitals, receiving treatment for both physical and psychological wounds, until discharged with the rank of Private First Class on January 30, 1946.
If he is good enough for France - he is good enough for FbF.
Actor Charles Durning landed on Normandy's Omaha Beach as a 17(sic)-year-old Army Ranger in June 1944. Before leaving Europe, he was wounded three times and awarded three Purple Hearts and a Silver Star. He will receive France's highest honor, the National Order of the Legion of Honor, in a ceremony tonight at the French government's residence in Beverly Hills. From the official release:
You won't be able to do ASW with it (I don't care what that old PPT from '05 says), but it is a smart solution for long-dwell surface search and other Maritime Awareness missions. Smart move - or at least a smart experiment going forward.
The Navy yesterday awarded a $1.16 billion contract to Northrop Grumman Corp. to design and build an unmanned surveillance aircraft for the Navy, a decision the company said would bring 1,700 new jobs to San Diego.
Northrop Grumman bested two rivals, including a San Diego company, in the competition to create a spy plane that will detect and transmit threats and provide other intelligence to Navy fleets around the globe.
Northrop Grumman's bid for the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance program uses a maritime derivative of its RQ-4 Global Hawk.
Length: 47.6 feet
Wingspan: 130.9 feet
Height: 15.3 feet
Maximum altitude: Above 60,000 feet
Maximum flight endurance: 36 hours, with capability to fly more than 2,300 statute miles and “loiter” for 24 hours.
The Los Angeles-based contractor will use a modified version of its Global Hawk, an unmanned aircraft employed by the Air Force in Iraq and Afghanistan, for what the Navy calls the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance project. ... The project is focused on the design and construction of two unmanned aircraft, as well as supporting equipment for transmitting information. Over time, the Navy plans to build a total of 68 aircraft, at a cost of $55 million per aircraft, officials said.
Good partner with the P-8A. Big question - can you make a BAMS Reaper-like, pant, pant? Had to ask ....
Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Wednesday picked Gen. David Petraeus, widely praised as the top commander in Iraq, to lead all Middle East operations, including the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
Can we now move Gen. Mattis to MNF-I? He is WAAAYYY underemployed at NATO's ACT.
Gates also chose Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, who recently served as Petraeus' No. 2, to take over as the top commander in Iraq.
Oops. Guess not, solid though. Go with what works.
R 170149Z APR 08 FM CNO WASHINGTON DC//N1// TO NAVADMIN INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC//N1// BT UNCLAS //N05354// NAVADMIN 106/08 MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/N1/APR// SUBJ/NATIONAL NAVAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION (NNOA) CONFERENCE 2008// RMKS/1. THIS NAVADMIN ANNOUNCES THE NNOA 36TH ANNUAL NATIONAL PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING CONFERENCE, HELD 23-25 JUL 08 AT THE RENAISSANCE PORTSMOUTH HOTEL AND WATERFRONT CONFERENCE CENTER, PORTSMOUTH, VA. THIS YEAR'S THEME IS "DEVELOPING AMERICA'S FUTURE LEADERS TO ENHANCE MISSION READINESS AND CULTURAL AWARENESS." 2. THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE NNOA IS TO ASSIST THE NAVY, COAST GUARD, AND MARINE CORPS IN RECRUITMENT, RETENTION, AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF MINORITY OFFICERS. ("...will not discriminate on the basis of race, creed, religion, color, national origin...."???) THE ASSOCIATION ACCOMPLISHES THIS MISSION THROUGH POSITIVE IMAGE ENHANCEMENT IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, AND BY DEVELOPING THE CAREERS OF OFFICERS THROUGH TRAINING, MENTORING, AND NETWORKING. THE CONFERENCE INCLUDES EDUCATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL SESSIONS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE THE PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF ATTENDEES. 3. THIS YEAR'S THEME IS CONSISTENT WITH CNO'S DIVERSITY POLICY WHICH DIRECTS LEADERS TO ANTICIPATE AND EMBRACE THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES OF TOMORROW AND BUILD A NAVY THAT WILL REFLECT THE MAKE UP OF OUR COUNTRY. AS LEADERS, WE MUST PROMOTE DIVERSITY AND UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS A NECESSITY FOR OUR NAVY TO REMAIN COMPETITIVE, RELEVANT, AND A STRONG GLOBAL FORCE FOR PEACE.
"We must.." or "We shall..."? TAD funds look short already here for 3QFY08.....so sad.
This intellectual cowardice is a mark of shame on all of us.
From my Yankee Spy. As seen after the Harvard-Yale game in the New Haven train station; Senator Kennedy (D-MA) showing some unique fashion sense while traveling and talking with all his friends.
Byron, C-14; get a cup of coffee and get comfortable.The INSURV from the STOUT is making its rounds. Give it a read and then ponder the thoughts below it from a pro whose name I will keep to myself.
UNCLASSIFIED// MSGID/GENADMIN,USMTF,2007/PRESINSURV NORFOLK VA// SUBJ/INSURV REPORT FOR USS STOUT (DDG 55) MATERIAL INSPECTION (MI)// GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. THE BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY CONDUCTED AN MI OF USS STOUT (DDG 55) AT NORFOLK, VA DURING THE PERIOD 10-14 MAR 08 AT NORFOLK, VA. 2. SENIOR MEMBER COMMENTS: A. USS STOUT WAS FOUND UNFIT FOR SUSTAINED COMBAT OPERATIONS. B. ALTHOUGH THE SHIP CERTIFIED ITS READINESS FOR SEA, THE BOARD NOTED DISCREPANCIES THAT WOULD HAVE RESTRICTED UNDERWAY OPERATIONS OR DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS DURING THE POST-UNDERWAY PORTION OF THE MI: 2B GTM/1B GTM, 1 GTG, STEERING, RESCUE BOAT/MAN OVERBOARD, ANCHOR, SPY-1D, FCS ILLUMINATORS, AFT VLS, CIWS MT 21, MK 32 SVTTS AND MK 45 LWG, HALON, AND UHF LOS COMMS. C. AAW, USW, AND SUW MISSION AREAS WERE SIGNIFICANTLY LIMITED BECAUSE: AN/SPY-1D POWER OUT WAS REDUCED BY APPROX 75 PERCENT AND THE PROCESSING ABILITY WAS REDUCED BY APPROX 13 PERCENT, 2 OF 3 MK 99 ILLUMINATORS WERE INOP (LOSS OF 360 DEG COVERAGE AND NUMBER OF MISSILES INFLIGHT), AFT VLS MAGAZINE WAS UNAVAILABLE BECAUSE OF THE FUEL TANK LEAKAGE IN THE EDUCTOR SUMP (LOSS OF 68 PERCENT OF THE MISSILE INVENTORY), CIWS MT 21 WAS INOP, PORT AND STBD MK 32 SVTT TRAIN MECHANISMS WERE BINDING AND MOUNTS COULD NOT BE QUICKLY TRAINED TO FIRING POSITION, AND MK 45 5 INCH GUN COULD NOT SUPPORT GUNNERY DEMO BECAUSE OF CORROSION IN THE GUN CRADLE. SEE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE, OPERATIONS, AND WEAPONS SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS. D. THE ANCHORING DEMO WAS NOT COMPLETED BECAUSE THE ANCHOR WINDLASS WILDCAT/CAPSTAN SHAFT COUPLING UPPER AND LOWER SLEEVES HAD EXCESSIVE CONCENTRIC MOVEMENT (UP TO 1/4 INCH) AND THE MECHANICAL BRAKE WAS MISADJUSTED. E. MOB RECOVERY METHOD WAS DEGRADED. CORROSION ON THE DAVIT FOUNDATION, PEDESTAL, FALLS TENSIONING DEVICE, DAVIT SHEAVE, AND THE HOOK SECURING PIN WAS SEVERE ENOUGH TO WARRANT A SAFETY INSPECTION (COULD NOT DEPLOY RHIBS). THE AS-FOUND SAR SWIMMER GEAR WOULD NOT PERMIT OPS IN WATER TEMP BELOW 60 DEG F. F. THE SHIP INITIATED SELF-SUSPENSION OF FLIGHT OPS FOR DAMAGED FLIGHT DECK NETS AND HARDWARE. AVIATION FACILITIES INSPECTION RESULTED IN 7 ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SELF-SUSPENSION OF FLIGHT OR AVIATION RELATED OPS. SEE AVIATION SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS. G. ENGINEERING CONTROL SYSTEMS WERE DEGRADED. 8 OF 8 CONSOLES FOUND WITH RESISTANCE READINGS BETWEEN RETURN AND GROUND TO BE BELOW THE MINIMUM OF 250K OHMS IAW PMS 2521/051 A-18. 5 OF 62 DDG'S HAVE EXPERIENCED UNCOMMANDED MAIN PROPULSION/ELECTRICAL GENERATION EVENTS DUE TO GROUNDS. H. 11 GTM RBOS AND 7 GTG RBOS WERE IDENTIFED DURING THE INPORT INSPECTION. I. RUDDER INSPECTION OVER THE PAST 11 MONTHS INDICATED BARE METAL SURFACE AREA HAD INCREASED BY APPROX 700 PERCENT AND 270 PERCENT FOR STBD AND PORT RUDDERS RESPECTIVELY. ADDITIONALLY, PITTING OF UP TO 2 INCHES IN DIAMETER BY 0.25 INCHES DEEP HAD DEVELOPED ON THE RUDDER SURFACE AREA. THE SHIP'S IMPRESSED CURRENT CATHODIC PROTECTION (ICCP) SYSTEM WAS NOT OPERATING PROPERLY. ICCP IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT BARE METAL DAMAGE. J. GROUNDS IN 60 HZ DISTRIBUTION AND IC SYSTEMS WERE A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE. 3 ICSM PANELS, 5 60 HZ POWER PANELS, 4 SOUND POWERED PHONE CIRCUITS, AND 1 SHORE POWER RECEPTACLE WERE FOUND GROUNDED DURING THE INSPECTION. 2 GROUNDS DISCOVERED BY SHIP'S FORCE IN JAN 08 HAD NOT BEEN CORRECTED. INVESTIGATION AND CORRECTION OF THE GROUNDS IAW NSTM 300 PARA 300-3.2.6 WAS REQUIRED. K. KEEL REST AND BOAT CHOCKS DID NOT HAVE 90 PERCENT MINIMUM CONTACT WITH THE BOAT IN THE STOWED POSITION. L. ACCOM LADDER WAS NOT OBSERVED. LADDER WAS OFF THE SHIP FOR REPAIR (CASREP 07094). M. ANCHOR CHAIN'S 1ST AND 2ND SHOT DID NOT RIDE IN THE WELP OF THE WILDCAT IAW NSTM 581-5.1.4.1. N. MK 39 GYRO DATA CONVERTER (GDC) DATA TO SPY-1D COMPUTER INTERMITTENTLY CHANGED STATUS FROM GOOD TO FAILED, CAUSING AFT GYRO INFORMATION TO BE UNRELIABLE BECAUSE OF FAULTY ADAPTATION DATA CIRCUIT CARDS. SYMPTOM WAS ORIGINALLY IDENTIFIED IN MAR OF 06 (CASREP 06049, USS STOUT MSG 311830Z MAR 06) WHICH ALSO IDENTIFIED UNRELIABLE DATA TO WCS, GUN FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM, AND N PLUS 1 COMPUTER. O. AFT MK41 VLS HAD 10 DELUGE VALVES LEAKING AND FWD VLS HAD 3 VALVES LEAKING. SALINITY CHECK AFT HAD TWICE THE ALLOWABLE LIMIT (4 VICE 2 MICROMHO). SEDIMENT WAS ALSO PRESENT IN THE AFT DELUGE HOSES WHICH WILL LEAD TO VALVE FAILURES. P. MT 51 CRADLE ROUND/POWDER POSITION SWITCHES WERE CORRODED, PREVENTING THE GUN FROM FIRING DURING THE GUNNERY DEMO. CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUIRED 4 HOURS (CORRECTED). ADDITIONALLY, SALT WATER CORROSION WAS ON THE CRADLE VALVE BLOCKS, LOADER DRUM PIPING/VALVE BLOCKS, FUZE SETTER ELECTRICAL SWITCH CONNECTORS, MAIN CABLE CONNECTOR TIE-POINT, LOWER HOIST ASSEMBLY, SHIELD ACCESS DOOR LINKAGES, AND UPPER HOIST CHAIN TRACK. Q. SHIP'S UHF LOS COMMUNICATIONS WERE DEGRADED AND COULD NOT FULLY SUPPORT 80 PERCENT OF 5TH FLEET COMMUNICATIONS PLAN WITH AVAILABLE ASSETS. OVERALL COMMUNICATION ANTENNA MAINTENANCE AND CORROSION PREVENTIVE MEASURES, IF UNIMPROVED, WILL LEAD TO FURTHER COMMUNICATION SYSTEM DEGRADATIONS. SEE COMMUNICATIONS SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS. R. AN/USQ-153 ISNS SIPRNET AND NIPRNET WERE DEGRADED WITH THE FOLLOWING DEFICIENCIES: SERVERS HAD UNAUTHORIZED USB 500GB HARD DRIVES CONNECTED, IAVA PATCHES WERE NOT CURRENT, SERVERS REQUIRED DEFRAGMENTATION, TAPE BACK-UP DEVICES WERE INOP OR MALFUNCTIONING, AND INTEGRATED NETWORK MANAGER (INM) WOULD NOT START. S. AN/USQ-144 ADNS SYSTEM HAS BEEN INSTALLED FOR OVER 1 YEAR WITHOUT A COMPLETED SOVT. T. FOOD SERVICE DIVISION'S ABILITY TO SAFELY OPERATE WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE OF THE GREASE INTERCEPTOR HOOD MATERIAL CONDITION. SEE SUPPLY SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS. U. SHIP'S ABILITY TO STORE, PREPARE, AND SERVE FOOD WAS DEGRADED. SPECIFICALLY: WALK-IN FREEZER DID NOT MAINTAIN 0 DEG F OR BELOW (CORRECTED), 5 OF 13 REACH-IN REEFERS WERE INOP, 4 OF 13 REACH-IN REEFERS WERE DEGRADED, REACH-IN REEFER CONDENSER COIL FILTER CLEANING MAINTENANCE WAS NOT BEING COMPLETED (CORRECTED), 2 OF 2 SINGLE TANK DISHWASHERS WERE INOP, 3 OF 3 WASTE DISPOSAL UNITS WERE INOP, 3 OF 4 STEAM KETTLES WERE INOP, 1 OF 3 CONVECTION OVENS WAS INOP, AND 1 OF 2 SANITIZING SINKS WAS INOP. V. SEALANT IN THE SHOWERS HAD FAILED, ENABLING 7 OF 12 SANITARY SPACE SHOWER DECKS TO BECOME SEPARATED FROM THE SURFACE AND ROT. W. BERTHING 2 HAD NUMEROUS MATERIAL AND PRESERVATION ISSUES WITH THE BERTHING TIER FOUNDATIONS CORRODED TO THE POINT OF LOST METAL DUE TO A WATER FOUNTAIN THAT HAD BEEN LEAKING FOR A YEAR (SHIP REPORTED). BERTHING IS SCHEDULED FOR REHABILITATION IN 2011. FOUNDATIONS REQUIRE TESTING FOR QUALIFICATION TO SAFELY SUPPORT PERSONNEL FOR COMBAT STRESS/DESIGN STRESSES. X. MAIN DRAINAGE WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE THE AUX 1 EDUCTOR OVBD DISCHARGE VALVE (MD-V 2-169-2) DID NOT SHUT REMOTELY, MER 1 EDUCTOR LOCAL AND REMOTE SUCTION GAUGES WERE INOP, THEREFORE PREVENTING SHIP'S FORCE FROM FOLLOWING EOP. AUX 1 BHD STOP VALVE (MD-V-31 4-173-6) MOV LOCAL OPEN INDICATOR LIGHT WAS OUT. Y. HALON WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE THE PAINT LOCKER EXHAUST AND THE MER 2 SUPPLY VENTILATION DAMPENERS FAILED TO CLOSE. Z. 22 OF 24 PORTABLE DAVIT SOCKETS HAD EXCESSIVE CORROSION AND REQUIRE LUBRICATION/CLEANING OF THE SOCKET COLLARS, DAVIT BEARINGS, DAVIT FEET, AND FOOT SOCKETS. AA. 1 OF 2 CONREP STATIONS WAS INOP (SEE DECK SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS). AB. SHIP'S SELF-ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY WAS EVALUATED AS MARGINAL. AC. 26 OF 77 WATERTIGHT CLOSURES INSPECTED WERE NOT WATERTIGHT. AD. 2 OF 2 IPDS WERE OPERATIONAL. AE. 14 OF 20 VENTILATION AIRFLOW ALARMS WERE EITHER INOP OR MISADJUSTED. AF. 9 CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES PRECLUDED OILY WATER SEPARATORS CERTIFICATION. AG. DOSSERT CONNECTORS WERE FOUND IN THE NR 1 AND NR 3 SWBDS. THERMAL INDICATIONS REVEALED NO SIGNS OF LOOSENING OR LOCAL HEATING. CONNECTORS NEED TO BE DOCUMENTED FOR FUTURE INSPECTION. AH. 2 SYSTEMS DID NOT HAVE PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM (PMS) INSTALLED. SEE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SECTION OF THIS REPORT FOR DETAILS. 3. THE FOLLOWING CASREPS WERE ACTIVE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MI: NUMBER NOMENCLATURE CATEGORY 06026 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 2 06027 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 2 06028 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 2 07049 AFT MK41 VLS MODULE 3 2 07051 AFT MK41 VLS MODULE 2 2 07076 ACTS 2 07092 MSS CONSOLE 2 07094 ACCOMMODATION LADDER 2 07098 CONDITIONING SYSTEMS, AIR 2 08001 FLIGHT DECK NETS 2 08002 AIR SYSTEMS, HIGH PRESSURE 2 08005 SHF 2 08007 HULL STRUCTURE 2 08009 FCS NR 1 2 08011 STEERING GEAR W/CONTROL 2 08012 BFTT 2 08013 SPY HVPS 2 08016 STEERING GEAR W/CONTROL 2 08017 NR 1 HPAC WATER PUMP 2 08018 MT22 CIWS MAGAZINE 2 08019 PURIFIER NR 2 LUBE OIL 2 4. 23 DEPARTURES FROM SPECS (DFS) EXISTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MI. A. THE FOLLOWING DFS WERE IN EXCESS OF 180 DAYS: NUMBER NOMENCLATURE DATE ISSUED DDG55-003-01 MILLING MACHINE 11/13/2003 DDG55-001-02 NR 1 CRP PUMP SEAL 1/23/2006 DDG55-002-02 NR 2 CRP PUMP SEAL 1/23/2006 DDG55-004-02 NR 1 CPP SHEAR PINS 9/26/2003 DDG55-005-02 NR 2 CPP SHEAR PINS 9/26/2003 DDG55-012-01 MRG MOST REMOTE BEAR 11/26/2002 DDG55-005-03 STBD BLKHD SEAL 220 3/13/2003 DDG55-006-03 STBD BLKHD SEAL 254 3/13/2003 DDG55-007-03 STBD BLKHD SEAL 300 3/13/2003 DDG55-008-03 PORT BLKHD SEAL 300 4/25/2003 DDG55-018-03 NR 1 MRG UNLOADER VLV 1/28/2006 DDG55-019-03 NR 2 MRG UNLOADER VLV 1/28/2006 DDG55-001-04 NR 1A GTM SHOCK MOUNT 4/9/2007 DDG55-002-04 NR 1B GTM SHOCK MOUNT 4/9/2007 DDG55-003-04 NR 2A GTM SHOCK MOUNT 4/9/2007 DDG55-004-04 NR 2B GTM SHOCK MOUNT 4/9/2007 DDG55-021-04 NR 2 MRG L/O COOLER 6/3/2005 B. NO DFS WERE ISSUED TO SUPPORT COMPLETION OF THE MI. 5. 15 ACTIVE TEMPORARY STANDING ORDERS (TSO) EXISTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MI. A. NO TSO WERE IN EXCESS OF 45 DAYS. B. NO TSO WERE ISSUED TO SUPPORT COMPLETION OF THE MI. 6. DEMO RESULTS: SAT (0.80-1.00)/DEGRADED (0.60-0.79)/UNSAT (0.00-0.59): -AAW DTE DEMO WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.51) BECAUSE OF REDUCED AN/SPY-1 DETECTION RANGE AND FAILURE OF 2 OF 3 FCS ILLUMINATORS. -SD DTE DEMO WAS DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.73) BECAUSE THE CIWS MT 21 WAS INOP AND DID NOT SUPPORT THE ENGAGEMENT. -GUNNERY LIVE FIRE DEMO WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.30) BECAUSE MT 51 DID NOT FIRE UNTIL THE CORRODED BREECH SAFETY DEVICE WAS REPAIRED. -USW DTE DEMO WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.91). -FULL POWER DEMO COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED (SCORE: 0.00) BECAUSE REQUIRED EQUIPMENT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED. SHIP WAS ABLE TO ACHIEVE 80 PERCENT FULL POWER ON A 3 GTM CONFIGURATION AND A 1 HOUR HIGH POWER DEMO WAS CONDUCTED AT THAT SPEED. -QUICK REVERSAL ASTERN WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.95). QUICK REVERSAL WAS CONDUCTED FROM 80 PERCENT FULL POWER AHEAD TO 100 PERCENT FULL POWER ASTERN. -QUICK REVERSAL AHEAD WAS SAT (SCORE: 1.00). QUICK REVERSAL WAS CONDUCTED FROM 100 PERCENT FULL POWER ASTERN TO 80 PERCENT FULL POWER AHEAD. -STEERING DEMO WAS SAT (SCORE: 0.95). STEERING DEMO WAS CONDUCTED AT 80 PERCENT FULL POWER. -ANCHORING DEMO WAS UNSAT (SCORE: 0.00) BECAUSE OF ANCHORING DEFICIENCIES. 7. SHIPBOARD PRESERVATION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.79): -CCIPT IN-SERVICE CORROSION CONTROL SURVEYS WERE CONDUCTED IN JUN 06 AND SEP 05. INSURV CORROSION INSPECTION VALIDATED THAT 80 PERCENT OF THE DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED DURING THE SURVEYS WERE STILL OUTSTANDING. SURFACE PREPARATION AND COATING APPLICATION HAS NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED PROPERLY OVER THE LIFE OF THE SHIP AND HAS ADDED TO THE OVERALL INCREASED WEIGHT OF 3.5 TONS IAW CCIPT SURVEY REPORT FOR USS STOUT (DDG 55), WHICH HAS DECREASED FUEL SAVINGS, SPEED, AND STABILITY. -FLIGHT DECK STATUS LIGHTING SYSTEM WAS INOP BECAUSE OF CORROSION. -CORROSION CONTROLS FOR BULKHEAD TO DECK INTERFACE IN BERTHING 5 AND 7 SANITARY SPACES WERE INADEQUATE (GRADE 1G). -APPROX 210 SQ FT OF THE 05 LEVEL DECK WAS CORRODED. 65 PERCENT OF THE NON-SKID HAD RUST BLEEDING THRU, ALL DECK DRAINS WERE CORRODED WITH FLAKING METAL AND WASTAGE, THE KNIFE EDGE HAD MULTIPLE SPOTS OF FLAKING METAL, AND THE JUNCTION OF THE DOG HOUSE BULKHEAD AND DECK WAS CORRODED OVER THE ENTIRE LENGTH. ADDITIONALLY, THE FWD STBD CORNER WAS CRACKED. -AFT ICCP MAGNETIC CONTROLLER WAS INCORRECTLY SET. HULL POTENTIAL READING WAS .900 VDC, REFERENCE AND AUX CELL CHECK READINGS WERE AT .900 VDC AND CONTROLLER OUTPUT READING WAS .150 VDC (CONTROLLER OUTPUT SHOULD BE 0 VDC WHEN HULL POTENTIAL IS ABOVE .850 VDC ). -1 OF 2 BRUSHES ON THE STBD SHAFT GROUNDING ASSY HAD LESS THAN 50 PERCENT CONTACT WITH THE SHAFT SLIP RINGS. -PORT AND STBD SHAFT GROUNDING WIRE INSULATION WAS DETERIORATED. -PORT AND STBD RUDDER GROUNDING STRAPS WERE THE WRONG MATERIAL AND INCORRECTLY BOLTED ON BOTH ENDS. -VAPOR CONDENSATION INHIBITORS (VCIS) WERE NOT INSTALLED IN APPROX 75 PERCENT OF THE ELECTRICAL ENCLOSURES IAW MRC 3001/002-18M-4. -ALL FCS DIRECTORS HAD EXTENSIVE CORROSION ON THE FASTENERS AND HARDWARE BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT WEATHER-PROOFED. ADDITIONALLY, THE FCS 1 TRAIN SEAL FAILED AND ALLOWED WATER INTRUSION INTO THE TRAINING GEAR FLUID WHICH WAS MILKY WHITE IN COLOR. THIS IS A CLASSWIDE ISSUE. -HARPOON LAUNCHERS AND FOUNDATIONS WERE CORRODED. CABLE STUFFING TUBES TO THE LAUNCHERS HAD ASTM 1G CORROSION AND SHOWED 90 PERCENT METAL WASTAGE. -TV-DTS ANTENNA 10-1 (STBD/FWD) HAD RUST GRADE 1-G (OVER 50 PERCENT RUSTED) ON THE CONDUIT SECURING PLATE. -OE-567/WSC-6 SHF ANTENNA 3-17 (STBD/FWD) HAD RUST GRADE 1-G (OVER 50 PERCENT RUSTED) ALONG ANTENNA BASE. -AN/SRQ-4 HAWKLINK ANTENNA WAS SHOWING SIGNS OF WAVEGUIDE CORROSION. 8. SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES AND EQUIPMENT OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (EOC) INCLUDE: A. PROPULSION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.69): -1 OF 4 GTMS WAS INOP. -4 OF 4 GTMS HAD LUBE OIL LEAKS. -2 OF 4 GTM MODULE HALON ALARM BELLS WERE INOP. -NR 1B GTM HAD FOD ON THE INTAKE PLENUM SCREEN. -NR 1 MRG WAS MISSING PHYSICAL SECURITY DEVICES ON VARIOUS FLANGES. -2 OF 2 MAIN THRUST BEARING REAR SEALS LEAKED LUBE OIL. -3 OF 4 LUBE OIL SERVICE PUMPS LEAKED LUBE OIL. -NR 2 MRG LUBE OIL STRAINER DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALARM WAS MISADJUSTED (CORRECTED). -2 OF 2 MER 1 FUEL OIL SERVICE TANK QUICK TRIP VALVES WERE INOP (CORRECTED). -2 OF 2 MER 1 FUEL OIL PRE-FILTER DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALARMS WERE MISADJUSTED (CORRECTED). -2 OF 4 GTM BLEED AIR CHECK VALVES WERE INOP. -8 BLEED/MASKER/PRAIRIE AIR SYSTEM LOW POINT DRAINS HAD NO FLOW. -14 FLEXIBLE HOSE ASSEMBLIES THROUGHOUT THE BLEED/MASKER AND PRAIRIE AIR SYSTEMS HAD LAGGING PADS INSTALLED THAT APPEARED NOT TO HAVE BEEN REMOVED IOT CONDUCT THE ANNUAL PMS INSPECTION REQUIRED BY MIP 5000/009. -3 OF 3 GTGS HAD LUBE OIL LEAKS. -2 OF 3 GTG PMA LUBE OIL PUMPS LEAKED INTO THE GENERATOR. -NR 1 GTG THERMOCOUPLE BLOCK WAS BROKEN. -NR 1 GTG BLOW-IN DOOR CONTROLLER WAS IN MANUAL DURING OPERATION. -NR 2 GTG HALON TIME DELAY WAS MISADJUSTED (CORRECTED). -NR 3 GTG HAD A FUEL LEAK ON THE FUEL FILTER HOSE. B. AUXILIARIES: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.56): -RUDDER ACCURACY CHECKS FAILED FOR BOTH ALPHA AND BRAVO STEERING UNITS. -ALL STEERING HYDRAULIC POWER UNITS WERE LEAKING HYDRAULIC OIL IN SEVERAL PLACES, REQUIRING CONSTANT WIPERS. -VERTICAL PACKAGE CONVEYOR WAS INOP BECAUSE OF IN-SERVICE LIMITS. THE TORQUE COUPLING PERSONNEL SAFETY GUARD WAS NOT INSTALLED, MAIN, 2ND AND 3RD DECK LOADER/UNLOADER GRAVITY CONVEYOR CONNECTION POINTS WERE NOT INSTALLED (ECP 572-02A-C021), CONVEYOR DID NOT STOP WHEN THE JAM LIMIT SWITCHES WERE ACTUATED UP TO 1.5 INCHES IAW SAFETY ADVISORY 033-00, 01 LEVEL SECONDARY DRIVE CHAINS WERE LOOSE, AND ALL LEVEL PERSONNEL SAFETY SHIELDS WERE IMPROPERLY MADE WITH SHARP EDGES. -NR 1 A/C WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A LEAKING MECHANICAL SEAL ON THE COMPRESSOR (CASREP 07098). -NR 1 REFRIGERATION UNIT WAS OOC BECAUSE OF AN INOP CAPACITY CONTROL. -NR 4 A/C CHILLER WAS LEAKING CHILLED WATER INTO THE BILGE. -NR 1 FREEZE BOX COIL TEMP CONTROL SWITCH WAS INOP, MAINTAINING THE TEMP AT PLUS 3 DEG F. -NR 1 AND NR 2 COILS FOR THE FREEZE BOX AND THE COILS FOR THE CHILL BOX LOUVERS WERE INOP. -2 OF 2 REVERSE OSMOSIS UNIT DUMP VALVES FAILED TO TRIP ON HIGH SALINITY (CORRECTED). -2 OF 2 HPAC AND 1 OF 3 LPAC TYPE 1 DEHYDRATORS FAILED THE DEWPOINT TEST. -NR 1 HPAC HAD A LEAKING WATER PUMP (CASREP 08017). -NR 4 FIREPUMP SUCTION VALVE WAS INOP REMOTELY FROM THE MAIN DECK CONTROL STATION. -3 OF 6 FIREPUMP SUCTION VALVE LOCAL POSITION INDICATORS WERE MISSING. -NR 1 SWS PUMP HAD A SIGNIFICANT LEAK IN PUMP CASING VENT LINE. LEAK WAS VENTING 1 FT BELOW A POWER PANEL. -4 OF 5 SWS SUCTION VALVE LOCAL POSITION INDICATOR DIALS WERE MISSING. -NR 2 AND NR 5 SWS PUMPS HAD LEAKING MECHANICAL SEALS. -2 OF 3 WATER HEATER HIGH TEMP SAFETY SWITCHES WERE MISADJUSTED ON HIGH TEMP. -3 OF 3 WATER HEATER HIGH TEMP SAFETY SWITCHES DID NOT HAVE MANUAL RESET. -2 OF 3 WATER HEATER OPERATING SWITCHES WERE MISADJUSTED. C. ELECTRICAL: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.77): -MAIN 60 HZ SWBD AND LOAD CENTER AQB-L AND AQB-LL SERIES CIRCUIT BREAKER ADJUSTABLE SHORT TIME PICK-UP AND SHORT TIME DELAY SETTINGS WERE NOT SET IAW TECHMAN (CORRECTED). -CL Z VENT ZONE 3 PANEL NR 3 CIRCUIT BREAKER DID NOT TRIP DURING STAGE 1 LOAD SHED TESTING. -ABTS 01-116-1 AND 02-305-2 DID NOT SHIFT IN AUTO WHEN TESTED. -ABT 2-239-1 INTERMITTENTLY SHIFTED FROM NORMAL TO ALTERNATE POWER SOURCES WHEN IN THE AUTOMATIC MODE. -ABT 1-127-1 EXTERIOR CABINET WAS SEVERELY CORRODED AND COULD NOT BE OPENED. -POWER PANELS 2-50-2, 2-162-2 AND 03-173-1 HAD OVER-RATED CIRCUIT BREAKERS INSTALLED. D. DAMAGE CONTROL: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.69): -MER 1 BILGE SPRINKLER SOPV DID NOT OPEN FULLY WHEN ACTIVATED (CORRECTED). -3 GEN RE-ENTRY HOSE NOZZLE WAS INOP (CORRECTED). -2 OF 3 EBACS DID NOT FILL BOTTLES IAW THE PMS TIME FRAME (15-18 MINUTES). BOTH WERE IN EXCESS OF 20 MIN. -3 OF 3 HPFAS DID NOT FILL BOTTLES IAW THE PMS TIME FRAME (45 SEC). -23 OF 63 SCBAS WERE UNSAT. -3 BERTHING SALTWATER SPRINKLERS DID NOT ALARM DURING TESTING. -1 OF 2 AN/KAS WAS INOP (PORTSIDE). -1 OF 3 PP-4276C/PD WAS INOP. -AUX 1, MER 1, AND 3 GEN HALON PRIMARY ACTIVATION CO2 BOTTLES LEAKED. -FIREMAIN PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE WAS INOP. E. DECK: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.50): -3 OF 3 MEDICAL MK 1 LIFE VESTS WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW MIP 5832/R-1. -4 OF 7 RESCUE BOAT MK 1 LIFE VESTS FAILED TO PROPERLY INFLATE. -1 OF 2 SAR LPU-28 LIFE VESTS FAILED TO PROPERLY INFLATE (CORRECTED). -1 OF 2 SAR STROBE LIGHTS WITH THE BLUE LENS FAILED TO OPERATE IAW MIP 5832/U-1 (CORRECTED). -1 OF 2 SETS OF SAR GLOVES WAS HOLED AND REQUIRED REPLACEMENT (CORRECTED). -2 OF 2 SETS OF CPU-72P DRY SUIT LINERS WERE MISSING, PREVENTING SAR FROM ENTERING WATER IN TEMPS LOWER THAN 60 DEG F IAW NWP 3-50.1 FIGURE 5-59 WATER TEMPERATURE GUIDELINES. -BOAT DECK SAR MEDIVAC LITTER WAS MISSING WEIGHT TEST DATA, 2 OF 2 ADJUSTABLE CARRYING HARNESSES AND A LUMBAR SUPPORT PAD (CORRECTED). -4 OF 4 RETRACTABLE BITTS/CHOCKS REQUIRED MAINTENANCE IAW MIP 5821/Q-4. BITT BUSHINGS, UPPER AND LOWER GUIDES REQUIRED INSPECTION, CLEANING, AND LUBRICATION. -3 OF 6 MOORING LINES HAD EXCESSIVE ABRASIONS, TWISTED STRANDS, IMPROPER SPLICES, SEVERE COCKLING, AND WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW MIP 5821/Q-11R. -2 OF 4 FANTAIL BITTS HAD EXCESSIVE ABRASIVE CUT CONDITIONS AND SIGNIFICANT CORROSION. -RAS NR 5 MANUAL OPERATION CUT-OUT WAS BENT AND MISSING SECURING LANYARD. -RAS NR 5 WAS MISSING THE ELECTRIC DISK BRAKE RELEASE LEVER. THE PADEYE COULD NOT BE DEMONSTRATED IN THE MANUAL MODE. -1 OF 2 LOWER LIMIT SWITCHES WAS INOP ON RAS STA NR 5. -SLIDING PADEYE EMERGENCY PNEUMATIC DRIVE WAS MISSING. -1 OF 2 TILT STOWED BACKSTAY YOKES WAS SEIZED ON STA NR 5. -RAS NR 5 AND NR 6 WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW 5713/Q-3R-S-1. BOTH STAS HAS SEVERELY CORRODED CARRIAGES, WORM SCREWS, FOUNDATION MEMBERS, LOWER CONNECTION BOXES, AND ELECTRIC MOTORS. -RAS NR 6 WAS ASSEMBLED INCORRECTLY AFTER OVERHAUL. THE KING POST REQUIRED RE-WORK TO PROPERLY INSTALL THE SLIDING BLOCK SO LUBRICATION MAINTENANCE OF THE BALL DRIVE CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED (SHIP REPORTED). -4 OF 4 KINGPOST UNREP LIGHTS WERE DAMAGED AND INOP ON RAS STAS NR 5 AND NR 6. -SEWING MACHINE WAS INOP BECAUSE OF MISSING POWER, SAFETY PLACARD, AND OPERATING ACCESSORIES. -28 OF 28 TOPSIDE LIFEJACKET LOCKERS WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW PMS MIP 6111/S-1. -AFT LOOKOUT LIFE RING WAS DETERIORATED AND PUNCTURED. DISTRESS MARKER LIFE RING SECURING BRACKETS WERE MISSING AND STENCIL WITH SHIP'S NAME AND HULL NUMBER WAS UN-READABLE. -SHIP'S BROW WAS MISSING 5 OF 10 LIFELINE STAPLES. -6 OF 6 FENDER SECURING STRAPS WERE MISSING. -PILOT'S LADDER WAS NOT RIGGED IAW NAVSHIP DWG 804-5000900. -PILOT'S LADDER WAS NOT PROPERLY ADJUSTED TO TERMINATE AT WATERS EDGE. -72 OF 187 (31 PERCENT) OF MAIN DECK KEVLAR LIFELINES WERE NOT MAINTAINED IAW MIP 6121/S-5. -60 PERCENT OF THE BAXTER BOLTS INSPECTED WERE NOT IAW PMS 6111/A-2R. F. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE: SAT (SCORE: 0.90): -S/F COULD NOT POWER ON THE ALTERNATE MK 116 UYH-3 BECAUSE OF FAULTY WIRING TO THE BACK SHELL. -1 OF 6 TORPEDO BREECH CONTROL VALVES WAS STUCK OPEN BECAUSE OF CORROSION. -TORPEDO BANDING TOOLS WERE MISSING. G. OPERATIONS: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.62): -AN/SPY-1D D/PD T20, FPA T26 MOD 3 (LOSS OF 4 OF 16 CHANNELS), AND FPA T27 MOD 3 (LOSS OF 4 OF 16 CHANNELS) WERE INOP BECAUSE OF FAULTY HVPS T138 (CASREP 08013). -12 OF 16 CHANNELS IN FPA T26 WERE INOP (4 CORRECTED). -12 OF 16 CHANNELS IN FPA T27 WERE INOP (3 CORRECTED). -AN/SPY-1D SIGNAL PROCESSOR SIDE A DROPPED OFF-LINE BECAUSE OF DIGITAL FAULTY ISOLATION FAILURES AND THE INTERMITTENT FAULT WITH RADAR TARGET DATA PROCESSOR NR 2. -AN/SPY-1D ARRAY T01 POWER SUPPLY WAS INOP (LOSS OF REDUNDANCY). -AN/SPS-67 SHORT PULSE MODE WAS INOP. -AN/SPS-67 MODULATOR CURRENT EXCEEDED 22 AMPS (CORRECTED). -APX-118 IFF TRANSPONDER MODE 4 WAS INOP. -ROTATING IFF ANTENNA (SPS-67) SUM AND DIFFERENCE VSWR WAS OUT-OF-SPEC. -AN/URN-25 TACAN REFLECTED POWER WAS HIGH AND IPA TUBE CURRENT WAS OUT-OF-SPEC LOW. -MK 137 MOD 4 SRBOC LAUNCHERS NR 1A AND NR 3A SAFE LAMPS WERE FAULTY (LAUNCHER NR 1A SHIP REPORTED). S/F COULD NOT DETERMINE SAFE/ARM STATUS AT AFFECTED LAUNCHERS. -MK 137 LAUNCHER NIGHT LOADING LIGHTS WERE INOP (SHIP REPORTED). -PCMS WAS DEGRADED (INSPECTION SCORE: 211). -HD1140 SPY COOLING SYSTEM WAS NOT OPERATED IAW PMS 456/R08 W-1. COPPER NICKEL HEAT EXCHANGER WAS ON-LINE VICE TITANIUM HEAT EXCHANGER BECAUSE TITANIUM HEAT EXCHANGER WAS CLOGGED. -BFTT DEMO WAS DEGRADED BECAUSE OF MULTIPLE FAULT INDICATIONS (CIU SETUP OR DMS FAULTY, 1553B STATUS ERROR-DUAL COMM FAILURE). FAULTS OCCURRED APPROX 3 TIMES PER MINUTE AND CAUSED OWN SHIP INFORMATION TO BE ERRATIC. H. WEAPONS: SAT (SCORE: 0.88): -MT 21 AMMO HANDLING SKIP BOX JUMPED DURING OPERATION AND WAS UNSAFE TO OPERATE. -MT 21 WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A FAULTED ANTENNA VRU. PROBLEM COULD NOT BE REPLICATED WHEN RUNNING SOTS IN PORT. -HARPOON LAUNCHERS AND FOUNDATIONS WERE EXTREMELY CORRODED. CABLE STUFFING TUBES TO THE LAUNCHERS HAD ASTM 1G CORROSION AND SHOWED 90 PERCENT METAL WASTAGE. PCMS HAD MULTIPLE LAYERS OF PAINT FLAKING OFF. -26 OF 90 VLS LAUNCHER DELUGE GROUNDING STRAPS WERE CORRODED. -AFT VLS LAUNCHER, MODULE 2, CELL 6 HATCH WAS BINDING AND REQUIRED REPLACEMENT. -AFT VLS LAUNCHER, MODULE 3 FAILED SYSTEM BITE. -AFT VLS LAUNCHER, MODULE 7 FAILED SYSTEM, LSEQ AND MCP BITE. CELLS 1-4 HAD MULTIPLE FAULT CODES. -MT 51 AMMO ELEVATOR HOIST WAS NOT TESTED BECAUSE THE HATCH TRIPOD HOSES WERE DAMAGED AND FASTENERS WERE MISSING. -FCS 1 TRAIN SEAL FAILED AND ALLOWED WATER INTRUSION INTO THE TRAIN FLUID WHICH WAS MILKY WHITE IN COLOR. -FCS 1 MAN ALOFT SWITCH WAS INCORRECTLY LABELED. SAFE WAS UNSAFE AND VICE VERSA (CORRECTED). -FCS 3 TWT PARAMETERS WERE OUT OF ALIGNMENT, PREVENTING RADIATION. I. NAVIGATION: SAT (SCORE: 0.90): -GYRO REPEATER IN IC GYRO ROOM NR 2 WAS FAULTY. -EM LOG NR 2 R1 POTENTIOMETER WAS FAULTY. J. COMMUNICATIONS: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.77): -12 OF 14 AN/WSC-3 UHF LOS TRANSCEIVERS WERE INOP OR DEGRADED: NR 1, NR 3, AND NR 12 HAD NO RF POWER OUT, AND NR 4, NR 5, NR 6, NR 7, NR 8, NR 9, NR 10, NR 11, AND NR 14 WERE NOT IAW PMS AND WERE OUT OF ALIGNMENT. -2 OF 2 AN/WSC-3 UHF HAVE-QUICK LOS TRANSCEIVERS WERE DEGRADED. -AN/SSQ-88 QUALITY MONITORING TEST SET WAS INOP BECAUSE TEST EQUIPMENT WAS AT CAL. -AS-3771, AS-3772, AS-3773 HF RECEIVE ANTENNAS REQUIRED PRESERVATION AND HAD LOW INSULATION RESISTANCE. -2 OF 2 AS-3226 VRC-46 VHF ANTENNAS HAD MISSING HARDWARE AND NR 2 FAILED VSWR TEST. -AS-390 UHF ANTENNA NR 3-15 HAD HIGH VSWR AND THE AS-390 QMCS UHF ANTENNA PAINT WAS DETERIORATED. -4 OF 4 AS-2815 SSR-1 UHF SATCOM ANTENNA HARDWARE PRESERVATION WAS DETERIORATED AND 1 OF 4 HAD A LOOSE BOND STRAP. -1 OF 2 AN/VRC-46 VHF TRANSCEIVERS WAS INOP BECAUSE OF FAULTY AS-3226 ANTENNA. -OA-9243 (HF ANTENNA TILTING GROUP) ANTENNA HANDCRANK TURNED VIOLENTLY WHEN USING THE ELECTRIC SWITCH TO RAISE OR LOWER THE ANTENNA, CREATING A SAFETY HAZARD. -HF IMI FAILED. -S/F COULD NOT DEMONSTRATE AN/USC-38 NECC BECAUSE OF NO CKT AVAILABILITY. -AN/WSC-6 SHF WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A POOR SIGNAL TO NOISE RATIO (CASREP 08005). -OE-567/WSC-6 SHF ANTENNA 3-18 (PORT/AFT) BASE GASKET WAS WORN AND SPLITTING. -21 OF 27 TA-970/980/990 RED PHONES WERE DEGRADED OR INOP. -LINK 4A WAS INOP BECAUSE OF AN INABILITY TO PASS TRACK DATA. -3 OF 3 NAVY ORDER WIRE TERMINALS WERE INOP OR DEGRADED. K. INFORMATION SYSTEMS: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.78): -AN/USQ-185 CENTRIXS DOMAINS COULD NOT BE ACCESSED OR EVALUATED BECAUSE PASSWORDS WERE NOT AVAILABLE. -AN/USQ-185 CENTRIXS FOUR EYES ENCLAVE COULD NOT BE TESTED BECAUSE PASSWORDS WERE NOT AVAILABLE. -AN/UYK-163 NIAPS SERVER HAD SKED DATA TEMP FILES 500 GIG IN SIZE (CORRECTED). -AN/UYK-163 NIAPS SERVER DID NOT BACK-UP SKED DATA NOR LIVE STATE IMAGES ONTO TAPES. -NOMEX DECKING IN RADIO WAS SEVERELY DEGRADED BECAUSE NUMEROUS DECK PLATES HAD NO SECURING HARDWARE. THIS CREATED A TRIP AND MISSILE HAZARD. OF NOTE WAS THE FACT THAT THE DECKPLATES IN LOW OR NO TRAFFIC AREAS ALSO HAD NO SECURING HARDWARE BUT NO SIGNS OF DAMAGE. L. SUPPLY: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.67): -GIH WASHDOWN SYSTEM NOZZLE CLEANING AND ALIGNMENT MAINTENANCE WAS NOT BEING COMPLETED (CORRECTED). -GIH 5 OF 6 FAIL-SAFE (DETROIT) SWITCHES WERE NOT WITHIN ANNUAL CALIBRATION PERIODICITY AND THE ONE THAT WAS WITHIN PERIODICITY DID NOT FUNCTION AS DESIGNED. -GIH MAIN GALLEY DIVERTER DAMPER WAS INOP. -MEAT SLICER WAS INOP. -1 OF 3 SELF-SERVICE ICE MACHINES WAS INOP. -ICE CREAM MACHINE WAS INOP. -1 OF 3 COFFEE MACHINES WAS INOP. -BUFFALO MACHINE WAS INOP. -1 OF 2 60 LB WASHERS WAS INOP BECAUSE OF A SAFETY INTERLOCK SWITCH ON THE DOOR. -CORROSION CONTROLS FOR CPO SEABAG LOCKER DECK WERE INADEQUATE (GRADE 4G). -CORROSION CONTROLS FOR STOREROOM NR 4 BILGES WERE INADEQUATE (GRADE 3 G). M. HABITABILITY: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.75): -3 OF 7 CREW BERTHING WATER COOLERS WERE INOP AND 2 OF THE REMAINING 4 WERE DEGRADED (S/F REPORTED REPAIRING 4 PRIOR TO OUR INSPECTION). N. NAVOSH: SAT (SCORE: 0.85): -3 OF 3 4-GAS ANALYZERS WERE INOP (1 CORRECTED). -36 BOTTLES OF CALCIUM HYPOCHLORITE WERE STORED IN THE FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS STOREROOM (CORRECTED). -5 OF 16 EYEWASH STAS HAD MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES. -SAFETY NET BETWEEN GTMS 2A AND 2B WAS NOT INSTALLED. -SAFETY GUARD CHAINS WERE MISSING ON 4 OF 6 ACCESS TRUNKS (1 CORRECTED). -12 OF 17 TRUNK SAFETY NETS WERE NOT IAW NAVSEA GUIDANCE (NAVSEA DRAWING 804-5184163 REV A). -BIOLOGICAL REFRIGERATOR ALARM (HIGH/LOW TEMP AND LOSS OF POWER) WAS INOP. -STERILIZER WAS INOP. -EMERGENCY POTABLE WATER WAS NOT AVAILABLE IN MAIN MEDICAL. O. VENTILATION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.77): -5 OF 13 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH SPACES HAD EXHAUST AIRFLOW BELOW DESIGN SPEC. -4 OF 20 SANITARY SPACES HAD EXHAUST AIRFLOW BELOW DESIGN SPEC. P. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: DEGRADED (SCORE: 0.66): -OIL CONTENT MONITOR LEAKED BY WHEN NOT ENERGIZED PREVENTING ACCURATE READINGS AND THE INLET PIPING DID NOT HAVE A RELIEF VALVE INSTALLED. -WASTE OIL HOLDING TANK 5-220-1-F OIL/WATER TLI WAS INOP. -1 OF 2 COMPRESS MELT UNITS WAS INOP (CORRECTED). -LARGE PULPER WAS MISSING THE JUNK BOX CAUSING PULPED MATERIAL TO FLOW INTO THE PIPING SYSTEM AND CLOG THE DRAIN LINES. -PMS WAS NOT INSTALLED FOR THE LARGE PULPER OR THE TOP-LOADING PARTS WASHER. -FWD VCHT PUMP ROOM VENTILATION AND SUMP FLOODING ALARMS WERE INOP. -S/F COULD NOT OPERATE NR 1 VCHT EJECTOR PUMP BECAUSE OF VACUUM LEAKS IN THE NON RETURN VALVE. Q. AVIATION: UNSAT (SCORE: 0.59): -RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF FLIGHT OPS UNTIL THE FLIGHT DECK NETS AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE ARE REPAIRED, DAMAGED PROXIMITY SUITS ARE REPLACED, AND THE DECK STATUS LIGHT IS REPAIRED. -RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF NIGHT FLIGHT OPS UNTIL THE DROP-LINE LIGHTS ARE REPAIRED. -RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF INSTRUMENT METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS (IMC) FLIGHT OPS UNTIL THE TACAN IS REPAIRED. -RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF VERTREP OPS UNTIL THE STATIC WANDS ARE REPAIRED. -RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF AIRCRAFT FUELING OPS UNTIL THE JP5 HOSES ARE HYDROSTATICALLY TESTED AND THE AIRCRAFT FUELING STA PRESSURE GAGE IS REPAIRED. -RECOMMEND SELF-SUSPENSION OF HIFR OPS UNTIL THE HIFR REFUELING NOZZLE IS REPAIRED. -2 OF 3 PROXIMITY SUITS WERE DAMAGED AND UNSERVICEABLE. -DECK STATUS LIGHT WAS INOP. -2 OF 2 STATIC WANDS FAILED CONTINUITY CHECK. -LINE UP LIGHTS WERE INOP (CORRECTED). -DROP LINE LIGHTS WERE INOP. -JP5 STORAGE TANK 4-402-0-J HAD SEDIMENT IN TANK. -JP5 SERVICE TANK 4-390-0-J HAD SEDIMENT IN TANK. -HIFR NOZZLE GROUNDING CLAMP WAS BROKEN. -ALL JP5 HOSES WERE OUT OF HYDROSTATIC PERIODICITY. -AIRCRAFT FUELING STATION PRESSURE GAGE READING WAS INACCURATE. -HIFR REFUELING NOZZLE AND 2 OF 2 D1R REFUELING NOZZLES FAILED CONTINUITY CHECK (1 OF 2 DIRS CORRECTED). -1 OF 2 WIND SPEED TRANSMITTERS WAS INOP. -1 OF 2 ELECTRICAL GLOVE SETS WAS DAMAGED (CORRECTED). 9. COMMODORE R. TINDAL III, COMDESRON 2, WAS PRESENT FOR THE INSPECTION AND OUT-BRIEF. CAPT R. BONNER WAS THE SENIOR INSPECTOR. 10. PRESIDENT, BOARD OF INSPECTION AND SURVEY, CONCURS WITH THE FINDINGS.//
Do we set up our leaders and Sailors for failure sometimes? Is it always the CO and the Chief's Mess - or is there only so much a crew can do with the time, money, and ship they are given? How much deferred maintenance can you hold to those who were not responsible for it?
Looking past the amost-unique aspects of Sea Swap, as we look to extend some of our ships to a 40+ service life - what do we need to do for the long-term? Are there harder questions out there? Below is one pro's opinion, what are yours?
STOUT has had a rough go of it lately. This was sort of anticipated.
Obviously with a poor INSURV, many of the items identified will be loaded into the SRA package or, more likely than not, scheduled for CMAVs after the SRA (the beauty of MSMO contracts). One big discussion point here that people seem to forget...STOUT was one of three East Coast participants in the SeaSwap experiment (along with LABOON and GONZALEZ). She was not the ship on station but she was literally "de-crewed" for extensive lengths of time during crew swaps. The ISIC (RSO) was left as a care-taker but that can't be the same. Add in the "lack of ownership" issues that get discussed when you talk SeaSwap, I'm sure that contributed to the less than stellar material condition of the ship but to what degree, I couldn't say. But we are seriously short-changing these ships of needed maintenance for budgetary reasons... We defer lots of work. Just my two-cents...
BTW, for a variety of reasons, I have a soft spot for STOUT, so be gentle.
Hat tip NAVSEA Spy.UPDATE: Wait, there's more! Galrahn is all over the CHOSIN. Christopher Cavas is on the hunt as well in Defense News. He includes a bit on the equally ugly CHOSIN INSURV.
First, we have an interesting quote; considering that it comes from Buzz Lightyear,
"I don't think I have ever seen anything so bad," said retired Capt. Rick Hoffman, who commanded the cruiser Hue City, a sister ship of the Chosin.
Here is the Chang of Command Block-41 verbiage from h311,
"InSurv is by its nature an inspection that will always reveal a fairly large number of deficiencies, hopefully most of them minor," said retired Capt. Jan van Tol, who commanded a destroyer and an amphibious assault ship. "However, the scale and scope of the deficiencies, spread across all of the ship's departments and including the [executive officer] and command master chief, suggests that there is a severe and long-standing problem with low standards; low initiative in finding/fixing/managing problems and following up on documented problems; poorly managed programs; and an apparent inability to train junior people in material management."
I think we see where the red-dot is pointing,
High-ranking officers now are searching for what led to the problems revealed by the two inspections.
"There's a discussion active inside the community about self-assessment issues and processes," said Capt. David Lewis, the assistant chief of staff for maintenance and engineering with Naval Surface Forces in San Diego.
Lewis pointed out that a great number of the problems on the two ships were known even before the inspections. But the InSurvs turned up more problems than were expected.
"The thing that popped at me was the volume of the discrepancies. Normally, we don't get that much on a given ship," he said.
Byron, talk to me Brother!
"DDGs have a corrosion trend, we are seeing that more and more," Lewis said. "We are starting to address that in our work batches for depot-level repair. It's in areas that are generally hard for ship's force to get into, places they don't go routinely. Uptakes and that kind of stuff."
The ships' material condition was not due to lack of funds, Lewis said.
Ohhhh, boy. CDR FITREP fodder on the way....under the bus he goes...
"We are 100 percent funded to our requirement for maintenance," he said.
Remember what I said pre-update?
Based on calculations in the most recent 30-year fleet plan, Chosin is meant to remain in service for 35 years, or until about 2026. The Stout and its sister ships are to last for 40 years - until 2034, in the Stout's case.
The best questions,
"Where was the chain of command? Why did the parent squadron not know of the terrible material condition?" van Tol asked. The ship's command, he said, "has a lot to answer for, either in terms of not finding and fixing the problems, or at least advising his seniors of the problems."
The ship's enlisted leaders also are partly responsible, van Tol said.
"One could also ask where the chief's mess was in all this, since they are the technical experts as well as the senior enlisted leaders onboard." ... "Many of the problems noted should have been picked up in previous inspections of various kinds," he said. "What were the results of those inspections? Who should have followed up on deficiencies? Why did the chain of command - both within the ship and above the ship level - not monitor progress in fixing said deficiencies?"
Bring out a very uncomfortable truth,
Each of the ships has a crew of about 350 sailors. The Navy has been working for some years to reduce maintenance requirements on sailors in order to shrink crew sizes, and the smaller crews planned for future ships such as littoral combat ships and the Zumwalt-class DDG 1000 advanced destroyers mean maintenance issues could become more acute. Navy planners have said a key to maintaining readiness is to transfer more responsibility to land-based organizations.
Tough statements,
"... there doesn't appear to be a lot of attention to detail going on." ... "I see in both of these ships a basic contempt for good Navy practices," the retired flag officer said. "Too much rust. Too many [preventive maintenance systems] checks that weren't done properly. Too much equipment InSurv had to tell them wasn't working." ... "There's a serious lack of command involvement in what's going on on the ship," the flag officer said. "That's basic."
That being said, we should be carfull looking to burn witches and say that is the end of the story and we can move back to "optimal manning" and "hybrid sailors."
There are plenty of people out there who should be thinking hard about their decisions and how it may have had a play in this goat rope.
However .... MCPON gets in his shot as well. Ouch.
"The success or failure of any commandwide inspection can be placed directly at the entrance to the CPO mess," Campa said. "There are all kinds of challenges, and reasons for failure. But it's been proven that the experience that resides in the mess can tilt the results of any inspection toward success if the chiefs are engaged on the deck plates."
.
